
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
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BILLIE H. HIX

Chief, Technical Systems Branch The Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center



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 P P E R A T I O N A L U N I T S

 AT 2200 HOURS 5TH JAMARY, 1945

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6th Jan; y, 1945.

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Propered by Operations Records, A-3, AIR STAFF. SHAEF.

T H I S P A G Ē I S U Ν С L A S S I F Ι Е D

	INTERNAL DESTRUCTION LIGP	
	Chief of sin Stars	- COTT NO:
	CHART OF BUT PERTY	1
•	Deputy Chief of Air Staff (A-3 Division)	3
	Axecutive Ufficer (A-3 Division)	4 .
	Senior Ops Officer (G/C McComb) (3 Copies) Cos 1	6 - 8
	Cps 2	9 10
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	CATOR	12 13
	C F C O (2 Copies) Chief Navigation Officer	14 + 15
	Assistant Chief of Star 1-2	16 17
	Target Section A-2 Signals Security	· 18
	Chief Air Signals Officer	19 20
	Chief Armanment Officer · War Room (Air) (Major Stackhouse)	21
	A C of S A-4	22
	Admin Plans Air Force Engineer	23 24
	Statistical Section. Secretary Conserval store	24 25 26
	Traffic Master, Air Message Centro U S Mistorical Officer, Air Staff (2 Copies)	27
	STARL NTL WEDB	20 - 29 30
	Stat Control Section (Copt Curran) Air Staff Officer, SHLEF Command Post, (Lt Col Zocokler)	31
	THE DEVIL A V ORALL OPENAND FORT (Cont Dominal	32
	3 A 3 O Bomber Command (Advanced)	33 34
	Ops Records (6 Copien)	
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	A & Prepart Connand (Intelligence)	62 63
	H Q 302 Transport Wing EXTERNAL (CONTINENT)	64
	H Q Ninth Air Porce Advanced H Q " " " Main (Atten 26 Scu)	65
	H Q Second T & F (Main)	65 66
	Dombing Analysis Unit	67 63
	H Q USSTAF (Advanced) H Q USSTAF "Col Schwartz - Armanunt & Ordnance Officer	69
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136	418 (RCAF) 605	Dlackbushe "	Menquito VI	
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138	107 305 (Pol) 613	Epinoy (A75) "	Mosquito VI n	
139	98 180 320 (Dutch)	Melsbrock (B58) "	Mitchell II/III "	
140	21 464 (RAAF) 407 (RNZAF)	Thorney Island """	Monguito VI	
34 (PR)	16 (FR) 69 (NR) 140 (FR)	Melsbreek (1958) "	Spitfire XI (PR) Wellington XIII Mesquito IX/XVI (PR)	
	38 Group (a) A O C	- H G Earls Colno - A/V/M J R Scarlett-	Streathfield OBE	-
Rivenhall	A O C 295 570	- A/V/M J R Scarlett- Rivenhall	Stroothfield OBE Stirling IV	
Earls Colno	A O C 295 570 296 297	- A/V/M J R Scarlett- Rivenhall " Earls Colne "	Stirling IV " Halifax V	
Barls Colne Soathers- field	A O C 295 570 296 297 196 299	- A/V/M J R Scarlett- Rivenhall "Barls Colne "" Weatherafield ""	Stirling IV " Halifax V Stirling IV	
Barls Colno Weathers-	A O C 295 570 296 297 196 299 299 290 644	- A/V/M J R Scarlett- Rivenhall " Earls Colne " Southerafield "" Tarrant Rushton	Stirling IV Palifox V Stirling IV Halifox III	
Barls Colno "Cothers- field Tarrant Rushton	A O C 295 570 296 297 196 299 299	- A/V/M J R Scarlett- Rivenhall "Barls Colne "" Weatherafield ""	Stirling IV " Halifax V Stirling IV	
Barls Colne Cothers- field Tarrant Rushton Treat	л О С 295 570 296 297 196 299 290 644 190 620 46 Grown (b) -	- A/V/M J R Scarlett- Rivenhall " Earls Colne " Southerafield "" Tarrant Rushton	Stirling IV Halifax V Stirling IV Halifax III Stirling IV	
Barls Colne Cothers- field Tarrant Rushton Treat	л О С 295 570 296 297 196 299 290 644 190 620 46 Grown (b) -	 A/V/M J R Scarlett- Rivenhall Barls Colne Wothersfield "Tarrant Rushton Great Dunnow Main H Q Harrow Weal Adv H Q Nethersvon 	Stirling IV Halifax V Stirling IV Halifax III Stirling IV	
Earls Colno Conto Field Tarrant Rishton Breat Cunnow	A O C 295 570 296 297 196 299 298 644 190 620 46 Group (b) - A O C 42 271 512	 A/V/M J R Scarlett- Rivenhall " Barls Colne " "Barls Colne " " Tarrant Rushton Broat Dunnow Broat Dunnow Moin H Q Harrow Weal Adv H Q Netheravon - A/Odr L Darv H1 MC Down Ampney " Broadwell 	Stirling IV Malifur V Stirling IV Halifar III Stirling IV Id Dukotas	
Earls Colhe Cothers- field Tarrant Rushton Preat Jannow	A O C 295 570 296 297 196 299 644 190 620 46 Group (b) - A O C 40 C 42 271	 A/V/M J R Scarlett- Rivenhall " Earls Colne " Voathersfield "" Tarrant Rushton Great Dunnow Moin H Q Harrow Weal Adv H Q Netheravon - A/Odr L Barv 11 MO Down Amphoy " 	Stirling IV Ralifax V Stirling IV Halifax III Stirling IV Halifax III Stirling IV	
Earls Colno Foothers- field Tarrant Rishton Brost Dunmow Brosdwell Blakebill	A O C 295 570 296 297 196 299 290 644 190 - 620 46 Group (b) - A O C 40 271 512 233 437 (RGAF) 575 (a) Under Oper	 A/V/M J R Scarlett- Rivenhall " Earls Colne " Weathersfield "" Tarrant Rushton Great Durnow Moin H Q Harrow Weal Adv H Q Netheravon Adv H Q Netheravon A/Odr L Darv H MO Down Ampney " Broadwell Piskehil Fara " 	Stirling IV Palifux V Stirling IV Halifax III Stirling IV Id Dakotas """ """ """ """ """ """ """ "	

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		H Q Liege/Bier. ral - Drig General	set (A93 1 James) W KoCau	ley	
370th "	420-429-430	Asch (Y29) Florennes (A78) Florennes (A70) Asch (Y29)		P 47 P 38 P 30 P 51		
422nd (Ni	ght Fighter) Soan	Florennos (178)			Gommand A 20	TTT LIGGEDA
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75144 000	Gommanding Gener	H Q Lisle Riggol	Crimer T	Saunas	me.	
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	Commanding Constil	- Major Concral Samuel Reims	E Anderson	
		Beauvais/Tille (A61)	B 26	
lst Pathfindo	r Squaaron			
90th Bomb Win	Convanding Officer	H Q Laon/Athies(A69) r - Colonel Harold I, Mac	e	
323rd Grp	453-454-455- 56	Laon/Athics (A69)	B 26 B 26	
307th " 394th "	556557550559 504505506587	Clastres (171) Cambrai (174)	3 26	
397th "	596-597-590-599	Peronné (A72)		
99th Romb Wir	Commanding Office	H Q Beaumont sur Oise r - Colonal Reginald F C	(A60) Vance	
200md Cam	449-450-451-452	Recovera/21110 (A61)		
322nd Grp - 314th "	194-495-496-497	Commollion-on-Voxin (
386 ah ""	552-555-554-555 572-573-574-575	Henumont sur Oise (A60 Roya/any (A73)	B 26	
97th Romb (Li	(ht) ing Couranding Genera	H Q Melun 1 - Drig General Söwerd	N Lackhouse	
409th Grp	640-611-642-643	Trotigny (140)		
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416th "	660-669-670-671			
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64th Fighter	Corrandin' Gener	I Q Indres 3 - rig Concrel Glonn	0 Harcus	
50th Grp	10-01-313 314-315-316	Ochey (15)	P 47 P 47	
324th " 371at "	404-403-406	TUDIOUNSTIC (IT)	1 41	
350th "	365-366-367	Croix de Mata (A90)	I 47	
415th (Night	Fighter, Squn	Ochey (Afr)	lenarighter	
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GROUP		-6-			
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		- Desangon			
3rd Group FAF		Dole Tavaux		P 47	
1st Group	11/3 11/5 111/3 * 1/3 1/7	Luxeuil Ochey	(Y8) (A96)	P 47 Spitfires	
		Luxouil	(18)	"	
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at out that to	111/33 TR 1/31 - 1/34 -	Cognae Touleuse	(¥30)	Dover Noveno Simous .	
	1/34 1	Bordeaux	(137)	Douglas DB 87 Maryland	
	1/18 9/1 11/18 F	Vannos Toulouse	(1.33)	n 24	
		Touroupo	(¥30)	Dewoitine 520	
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and a show a					
	Under Ower Horse	OOP CARRING O	COMMUND		
	(Under Courations)	1 Control or	lat 1774	ed Airborne Army)	
	IX The (Under Operations Deconding General H Q -	1 Control of 1 - Major Gon	lat 1771	ed Airborne Army) Williams	
IX T C C Pathr	(Under Operations, Communding General H Q - Inder Group (Prov)	1 Control of 1 - Major Gan Ascot	lat 1771	. Williams	
IX T C C Pathf 1-2-3-4 Pathfi	(Under Operations, Communding General H Q - Inder Group (Prov)	1 Control of 1 - Major Gan Ascot	lat 1771	ed Airborne Army) Willians C 47 C 53	
IX T C C Pathr 1-2-3-4 Pathri 52 T_C Wing	(Under Operations, Communding General H Q - Inder Group (Prov)	l Control of 1 - Major Gon Ascot Chalgrova	lst Alli eral P L	. Williams	· ·
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	H O SECO	ND T A F		NUNTH AIR FORCE	
	(i)	<u>83 GROUP</u> 12 Typhoon 5 Tonscat V 6 Spikfiro IX 1 " XI FR 5 " XIV 2 " XVI	(1) Sqđns " " Sqđn Sqđns "	1 F 47 Group 2. F 36 Groups 1 F 61 Sodn 2 F 6 Sodns 1 F 5 Sodn 1 F 51 Group	
		1 " IX MI 1 " XIV PR 4 Juster IV (37 Squedrons)	Sodn " Sodna (ii)	6 P 47 Groups 1 P 61 Sodn	
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P A G E	(111)	CS Sanarons) <u> <u> S5</u> GROUP <u> 3 Monoulto 200</u> 2 " XIII 1 ASR (6 Squisdrons)</u>	Sodins " (iv) Sodin	(13 Squadrons)	
S U N C	(iv)	2 GNOUF 4 Mitchell II/III 2 Rostens III/IV 3 Mosquito VI (14 Squadrons)	Sq āns "	l A 20 Group (45 Squadrons) FIRST LACATOAL AIR FORCE	•
L A S S I	(v)	34 WING 1 Spitfire 1./XI 1 Vallinton XIII 1 Mosquito II/XVI (3 Squadrons)	Sođa "	1 Hoaurightar Soon 2 P 5 Sodna 2 P 5 " 2 2 26 Croups	
F I E D		<u>30 ch0m</u> 6 Stirling IV 2 Malifax V 2 " III (10 Squadrone)	(1) Souna "	5 P 47 Sadne 4 Spitfire Sadne 6 I 26 " 6 Groupe Patris Sadne 2 Nevel Groups	
		<u>16 GROUP</u> 6 Dakota		(22 Squadrons) IX <u>ARCE C RAIER COMMUN</u> 60 C 47 C 53 Squas	
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	No. <u>91</u> <u>SECRET</u> <u>G-3 REFORT</u> <u>SECRET</u> <u>240800</u> October 1945 Hq U.S. Forces European <u>Theater (Main)</u> APO 757
	<pre>1. OCCUPATIONAL ZONE BOUNDARIES: (Soo hep 0-5 Report No. 69 dated 22 October 19:5) 2. LOC.TION OF TROOPS: 0. U.S. b. British) Soo hep G-3 Report No. 69 c. Fronch) deted 22 October 19:5. d. Russian)</pre>
T H I	 OUA OPERATIONS: GROUND. SEVENTH US ARMY/WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT. VI and XXIII CORPS. NTR. THIRD US ARMY/WESTERN MILITARY DISTRICT. XII CORPS. 63 Inf Div relieved of responsibility for occupational zone by 4 armd Div and 2 Cav Gp. 231200A Oct
S P A G E	 45. 2 Cav Up assumed responsibility for LANDAREISE HEADER and GRAFERAD. 4 Area Div assumed responsibility for LANDARJESE DEGENORE, VILSEONER, PRARAIRCH.N, GRISSBACH, PASSAU, WEGSCHEID and WOLFSTEIN. XV, XX and XXII CORPS. NTR. FIFTEENTH US ARGA. NTR. U.S. FORCES AUSTRIA. Advance party 26 Inf Div departed LINE V8588 for Camp Pittsburgh on 23 October 1945. 4. FRITISE OPERATIONS. Nothing to report.
I S U N C	 FRENCH OPEFATIONS. Nothing to report. RUSSIAN OPERATIONS. Nothing to report. STATUS OF REDEFLOYLENT. Nothing to report.
L A S S I F I E	8. <u>HISCELLANEOUS</u> . Nothing to report. John W Huffer Jon A.S. NEV INS, Brigadier concral, 0.3.C., DaC of S, 3-3.
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
ORDER OF BATTLE

U.S. FORCES		U.S. FORCES (Continued)	
SEVENTH US ARMY (Keyes) 29 Inf Div (Gerhardt) R6606	R6989 (Bromon	US FORCES AUSTRIA	
	Sub-Dist)	42 Inf Div (Collins)	Z9827
instat one on (survey)	G9781	26 Inf Div (Macon)	V2773
2 Armd Div (Dovine)	N1582		
3 Inf Div (Schmidt)	G9480	BRITISH FORCES	
76 Inf Div (Barker)	C1423		
1 Armd Div (allon)	1/6542	HE BRITISH ARLY OF THE RHINE (Mont	(vomary)
VI Corps (Burross)	S1517	the president of the many (some	.7201
84 Inf Div (Bolling)	16706	3 Inf Div (whistlor)	J1881
36 Inf Div (Stack)	S5504	7 arnd Div ("yno)	27148
100 Inf Div (Tychson)	SU621	6 Corps (Barker)	N7521
12 Larnd Div (Holbrook)	S7612	15 Inf Div (Barber)	S6568
3 Armd Div (Grow)	S7329	11 Armd Div (Moberts)	C3460
		1 Corps (Thomas)	19509
THIRD US ARMY (Truscott)	Y6614	52 Inf Div (H.kowell-Smith)	B1772
XXII Corps (Harmon)	L0742	Gds Div (Marriott)	F5934
94 Inf Div (Barnott)	5766		.B1617
80 Inf Div (Lauer)	P5665	53 Inf Div (dors)	F4587
XV Corps (nobertson)	02643	30 Corps (Horrocks)	X0059
102 Inf Div (Keating)	07+56	POL arnd Div (Haczok)	V7156
. 79 Inf Div (Kingran)	17529		R1910
1 Inf Div (andrus)	T0562		X9011
XX Corps (McBride)	Y6429	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	W7481
71 Inf Div (white)	¥3550	43 Inf Div (Barker)	X5951
.9 Inf Div (Ladd)	23249	to the bet (bet here)	
XII Corps (Prickett)	V1855	BRITISH FORCES AUSTRIA	
. 83 Inf Div (Mickle).	Q0219		
90 Inf Div (Earnest)	P1929	HQ BRITISH TROOPS AUSTRIA	D2381
4 armd Div (Frickott)	U2503	5 Corps	D1184
	1071.00	46 4nf Div	B8560
PIFTEONTH US ARMY (Patton)	117198	78 Inf Div	D1184
& BERLIN DISTRICT (Barker)		CDH FORCES NETHERLANDS (Simonds)	27704
82 AB Div (Gavin)	28445	2 CDN Inf Div (Matthews)	E3797
		5 CDN Lrnd Div (Johnston)	Q2213
'S FORCES EUROPE IN THEATER		4 CDN armd Div (Drury)	V2718
		1 CDN Inf Div (Foster)	22507
XVI Corps (anderson)	S1880	3 CDN Inf Div (Keefler)	E3897
*66 Inf Div (Rollins) S.a. 1	ARSEILLES	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
*69 Inf Div (Finloy) S.A. LE	HAVRE	FRENCH FORCES	
101.4B Div (Cutlor)	G9312		
		FRENCH FORCES AUSTRIL. (Bothouart)	D7759
TELTER SERVICE FORCES		4 FR ktn Div (do Hosdin)	D7759
	REIMS	FRENCH FORCES GERMANY (Koonig)	R3718
Oise Section		9 Col Inf Div (Valluy)	46652
*75 Inf Div (Doran)	RELAS	I FR Corps (do Linaros)	.10933
		5 FR armd Div (Schlesser)	X1144
* Divisions staffing assembly	-	2 Moroccan Div (de Linaros)	11744
and Staging Camps.		14 FR Inf Div (Salan)	00896
		II FR Corps (Chovillon)	10939
		3 algorian Div (Chevillon)	R3894
		1 FR Inf Div (Caillos)	Q5476
		10 FR Inf Div (Bertrand)	L9594 L2030
		1 FR rmd Div (Sudro)	12000

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70th FIMMER WI	<u>NG</u>	Vorviora	
		oral - Brig General Jam	a WeChuley
36th Grp	22- 3-53	Ge Gulot (209)	
	492-493-494	St Trond (192)	
360 th	386-307-308		
ADLth "	506+507-508	St Smnl (192)	
L7Lth "	42 -1.29-1.30	Florences (175)	
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HID.S. TWY.	VICI -
H.Q. SECCIE T.A.F.	MINTH AIR FORCE
) <u>83 GRCUP</u> 12 Typhicon Sodns 5 Tempest V Sodns 4 Spitfire IX Sodns 1 " XI IR Sodn 4 " XVI Sodns 1 " XIV FR Sodn 1 " XIV FR Sodn 5 " XIV Sodns 4 Austor IV Sodns (37 Souchrons)	 <u>IC 7.4.6.</u> <u>4</u> P 1.7 Groups 1 P 30 Group 1 P 61 Sodn 2 P 6 Sodns 1 F 5 Sodn 1 F 5 Sodn 1 F 3 Sodn 20 Soundrons)
<u>64 GRGUP</u> 9 Typhcon Sgûns 1 "Fî Sgûns 2 Tempest V Sgûns 11 Spitfire IX Sgûns 4 " XVI Sgûns 1 " XV FR Sgûns 1 " XIV FR Sgûns	11) <u>XIX TAO</u> <u>3</u> 2 47 Groups 1 2 61 Sqdn 2 F 6 Sqdns 2 F 5 Sqdns 1 P 30 Group 1 P 51 " (20 Squndrons)
3 Austor IV Solns (32 Squedrons) <u>85 CACUP</u> 3 Hosaito XXX Solns	111) <u>XXIX 1/6</u> <u>4</u> P 47 Groups 1 P 38 Group 2 F 5 Sqdn 2 F 6 Sqdns (18 Squadrons)
3 " XIII Solna 1 M3R Sodn (7 Sourdering) <u>2 GRCUP</u> 4 Mitchell IV/III Solna 2 Doston II/IV Sodn 6 Mesquito VI Sodn (14 Sourdering)	1v) <u>IX P.C.</u> D 25 Groups <u>1</u> D 26 (FFP) Sq <u>3</u> A 26 Groups <u>1</u> 1 (45 Squadrons) <u>FIRAT TACTICA</u> , AIR FM
34 WING 1 Spliffire IX /XI Sigh 1 Sollington X/II Sigh 1 Mesquit: IX/XVI Sigh (3 Signalr na)	1) <u>XIT TAG</u> 5 P 47 Groups 1 Jeaufichter Sodn 2 F 5 Sodas 2 F 5 Sodas 4 D 26 Groups (34 Soundrons)
<u>38 GROUP</u> <u>5 Stirila</u> : IV Sedns 2 Helirax V " 2 " III " (10 Segundrons) <u>A6 GROUP</u> <u>5 Dekota</u> Sedns	 FILLT FARMON ATT CONS. 5 2 17 Square 4 Dpitfire Square 5 Group Patric Square 2 Havel Square (15 Squadrons)
	IX THOOP CAMPLER COM 60 C 47 C 53 Loins
2014L SQUED Second TF. Minth Air Force Mirst The Air Force IX T.C.C. Othera	93 103 50 20

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
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UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Director of Operations

HEADQUARTERS

14 February 1945.

REMORANDUM)

TO

) Colonel Odom.

The Order of Battle for the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) is as follows:

 119		IR FORCE (PROV	é.
V.T.	A & Calo	VOSGES	
 Brig.	Gen	Saville	

KII TACIICAL AIR CORPS SAVERIME (ADV) MIRECOURT (REAR) Brig. Gan. Barous

64TH FIGHTER WING LUDRES

50th Group - OCHEY Lt. Col. Case, Jr. 10th 81st 313th Sqdns _____P-47s

324th Group - DOLE/TAVAUX Col. Lydon (P-47s) 314th 315th & 316th Sodns

358th Group - TOUL/CROIX-DE-

Col. Tipton (F-47s) 404th 405th & 406th Sadas

371st Group - NANCY/TANTONVILLE Col. Kleine (P-478)

415th Nite Fighter Gp - DIJON Captain Augsburger LST TACTICAL AIR COMPS (FR) BESANCON Brig. Gen. Gerardot

1ST FRENCH FIGHTER WING DOLE

Major Julas Morlat

lst Fighter Group - LUXEUIL Major Alexandre Spitfires

Jrd Fighter Group - AMBERIEU Maj. de La Mastiniere(P-39 & P-47)

4th Fighter Group - AMBERGERU

Maj. Guillaume Rivels (P-475)

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(137 TAF Order of Battle Contid)

42nd Bomb Wing - DIJON Brig. Gen. Doyle

17th Bomb Group - DIJON Col. Harrel, Jr. (B-26s) 34th 37th 95th & 432nd Bomb Squadrons

320th Bomb Group - DIJON Lt Col Ashley - (D-20s) 441st 442nd 443rd & 444th Bomb Squadrons 1st French Bomb Wing - LYON Lt. Col. Gelee


<u>31st Bomb Group - LYON</u> Lt Col de Maricourt (B-26s)

34th Bomb Group - LYON Lt Col Bouvard -(B-26s)

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ROUTINE SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: EX-97660, FEE 12. INTERNAL ADDRESS:

FROM: COM Z 121933Z

INFO: USSTAF 130635A

TO : WAR

INFO: SIXTE ARMY GP TWELPTH ARMY GP

Order of battle, ETOUSA, as of 31 January 1945 as follows: Headquarters ETOUSA. Assigned Headquarters ETOUSA are: Twelfth Army Group; Sixth Army Group; Ground Force Reinforcement Convend; U S Strategic Air Forces in Europe; First (attached SHAEF for operational control) Airborne Army; XVIII (attached First U S Army) Corps (Airborne).

Assigned Twelfth Army Group are the following: First U S Army; Third U S Army; Minth U S Army; Fifteenth U S Army; 56 Infantry Division.

Assigned First U S Army are the following: 326 A Brigado; 49 AAA Brigado; 75 (attached Sixth Army Group) Infantry Division; V Corps; 7 (attached V Corps) Armored Division; 2 (attached V Corps) Infantry Division; 9 (attached V Corps) Infantry Division; 90 (attached V Corps) Infantry Division; VII Corps; 2 (attached VII Corps) Armored Division; 3 (attached VII Corps; 2 (attached VII Corps) Armored Division; 3 (attached VII Corps; 2 (attached VII Corps) Armored Division; 3 (attached VII Corps) Armored Division; 83 (attached VII Corps) Infantry Division; 1 (attached XVIII Corps) (Atroorne) Infantry Division; 30 (attached XVIII Corps) (Airborne) Infantry Division; 84 (attached XVIII Corps) (Airborne) Infantry Division; 186 (attached XVIII Corps) (Airborne) Infantry Division; 186 (attached XVIII Corps) (Airborne) Infantry Division.

Assigned Third U S Army are the following: First T D Brigade; 33 (attached Sixth Army Group) F & Brigade; 33 AAA Brigade; 10 (attached Sixth Army Group) Armored Division; III Corps with Sixth Armored Division; VIII Corps with 11 Armored Division, 4, 87, 90 and 95 Infantry Divisions; XII Corps with 4 Armored Division, 5,

USSTAF MAIN IN 17254

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76 and 80 Infantry Divisions; XX Corps with 26 and 94 Infantry Divisions.

Assigned Minth U S Army are the following: 55 AAA Brigade; XIII Corps; 34 (attached XIII Corps) F A Brigade; 29 (attached XIII Corps) Infantry Division; 102 (attached XIII Corps) Infantry Division; XVI Corps; 5 (attached XVI Corps) Armored Division; 35 (attached XVI Corps) Infantry Division; XIX Corps; 8 (attached XIX Corps) Infantry Division; 78 (attached XIX Corps) Infantry Division; 104 (attached XIX Corps) Infantry Division.

Assigned Fifteenth U S Army are the following: 8 (Attached Third U S Army for supply and administration) Armored Division; 8 (attached Third U S Army for supply and administration) Armored Division; 13 Armored Division; 16 Armored Division (Advance Detachment); 20 Armored Division (Advance Detachment); 28 (attached Sixth Army Group) Infantry Division (Advance Detachment); 28 (attached Infantry Division; 71 Infantry Division (Advance Detachment); 86 Corps; XXIII Corps.

Assigned Sixth Army Group are the following: Seventh U S Army; 44 AAA Brigade.

Assigned Seventh U S Army are the following: 12 Armored Division; 13 F A Brigade; 34 AAA Brigade; VI Corps; 14 (attached VI Corps) Armored Division; 36 (attached VI Corps) Infantry Division; 42 (attached VI Corps) Infantry Division; 45 (attached VI Corps) Infantry Division; 79 (attached VI Corps) Infantry Division; 103 (attached VI Corps) Infantry Division; 36 (attached VI Corps) Brigade; XV Corps; 44 (attached XV Corps) Infantry Division; 65 (attached XV Corps) Infantry Division; 70 (attached XV Corps) Infantry Division; 100 (attached XV Corps) Infantry Division; XXI Corps; 3 (attached XXI Corps) Infantry Division; XXI

Accigned XVIII Corps (Airborne) are the following: 13 Airborne Division (Advance Detachment); 17 (attached III Corps) Airborne Division; 82 Airborne Division; 101 (attached VI Corps) Airborne Division.

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Assigned U S Strategio Air Forces in Europe are the following: Fighth Air Force; Ninth Air Force; Eighth Air Force Composite Command; Eastern Command; Air Service Command; IX Troop Carrier Command; 63 Fightor Wing; XII Factical Air Command.

Assigned Eighth Air Force are the following: I Air Division with 1, 40, 41, 94 Combat Bond Wings and 67 Fighter Wing; 2 Air Division with 2, 14, 20, 95, 96 Combat Bond Wings and 65 Fighter Wing; 3 Air Division with 4, 13, 45, 92, 93 Combat Bond Wings and 66 Fighter Wing; VIII Air Porce Service Command; VIII Air Force Fighter Command; 325 Fhoto Wing Recon.

Assigned Winth Air Force are the following: IX Bomb Division (M) with 97, 98, 99 Combat Bomb Wings; IX Tastical Air Command with 70 Fighter Wing; XIX Tastical Air Command with 100 Fighter Wing, 303 Fighter Wing; 84 Fighter Wing; IX Air Porce Service Command; IX Air Defense Command; IX Engineer Command.

Acaigned Air Service Command: Ease Air Depot Area; 502 Transport Wing.

Assigned IX Froop Carrier Command are the following: 50, 52 and 53 Troop Carrier Wings.

Assigned 63 Fighter Wing is the following: 72 Fighter Wing.

Assigned XII Tactical Air Command are the following: 64 Fightor Wing; 42 Bomb Wing.

Assigned Communications Zone are the following: 5 Engineer Special Brignde; 6 Engineer Special Brigade; 51 (attached USSTAF) AA Erigade; 47 (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 50 (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 51 (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 54 (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 74 (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 52 (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 52 (attached USSTAF, further attached First U S Army for operations) AAA Brigade; 56 (attached

USSTAP MAIN IN 17254


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USSTAF, further attached 21 Army Group for operations) AAA Brigado.

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
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EDITED LITERAL TEXT

ROUTINE

In roply dito: EX-18958

From : HQ Comm Z

: WAR

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F E D Info Ha USSTAF 6th Army Group Main SHAEF Fwd

March 10th

Internal Address: Sgd. Lisenhower From ETOUSA Action to AGMAR and info to USSTAF, 6th army Group, 12th He 12th army Group Lain army Group and SHAEF Ford

SECRET

Order of battle, European Theater of Operations, US Army as of 28 Feb 45 as follows: Headquarters, European T of Opns, US Army. Assigned HG, ETOUSA are: 12th Army Group; 6th Army Group; Ground Force Roin-forcement Command; US Strategic Air Force in Europe; First (attached to SHAE" for Operational Control) Airborne Army; XVIII (attached First US Army) Corps (Airborne).

Assigned 12th army Group are the following: First US Army; Third US Army; Minth US Army; 15th US Army; 66 Infantry Division.

Assigned First US army are the following: 32 FA Brigade; 49 AAA Brigado; III Corps: Kinth (attached III Corps) Amaored Division; First (attached III Corps) Infantry Division; Minth (attached III Corps) Infantry Division; 78 (attached III Corps) Infantry Division; V Corps; Seventh (attached V Corps) Armored Division; Second (attached V Corps) Infantry Division; 28 (attached V Corps) Infantry Division; 69 (attached V Corps) Infantry Division; 106 (attached V Corps) Infantry Division; VII Corps; Enfantry Division; 106 (attached V Corps) Infantry Division; VII Corps; Enfantry Division; 99 (attached VII Corps) Infantry Division; 104 (attached VII Corps)Infantry Division; 104

Assigned Third US army are the following: First TD Brigade; 33 FA Brigade; 38 AAA Brigade; VIII Corps with Sixth and Eleventh Armored Divisions and Fourth, 87 and 90 Infantry Divisions; XII Corps with Fourth Armored Division and Fifth, 76 and 80 Infantry Division; XX Corps with Tenth Armored Division and 26 and 94 Infantry Divisions.

Assigned Ninth US army are the following: 34 FA Brigade; 55 AAA Brigade; 75 Infantry Division; 95 Infantry Division; XIII Corps; Fifth (attached XIII Corps) armored Division; 84 (attached XIII Corps) Infantry Division; USSTAF Main in 22421 (cont'd over)

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HE US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPPE INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

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102 (attached XIII Corps) Infantry Division; XVI Corps; Sth (attached XVI Corps) Armored Division; 35 (attached XVI Corps) Infantry Division; XIX Corps; Second (attached XIX Corps) Armored Division; 29 (attached XIX Corps) Infantry Division; 30 (attached XIX Corps) Infantry Division; 83 (attached XIX Corps) Infantry Division.

Ansigned 15th US Army are the following: 61 FA Brigade; 13th Armored Division; 16th Armored Division; 20th Armored Division; 65 Infantry Division; 71 Infantry Division; 86 (Advance Det) Infantry Division; 89 Infantry Division; 97 (advance Det) Infantry Division; XXII Corps; XXIII Corps.

Assigned 6th army Group are the following: Seventh US Army; 44 AAA Brigade.

Assigned Seventh US Army are the following: 34 AAA Brigade; 45 Infantry Division; Third Infantry Division; 79 (attached XVI Corps) Infantry Divialon; 13th FA Brigade; VI Corps; 14th (attached VI Corps) Armored Division; 36 (attached VI Corps) Infantry Division; 42 (attached VI Corps) Infantry Division; 103 (attached VI Corps) Infantry Division; 35 (attached VI Corps) AAA Brigade; XV Corps; 12th (attached XV Corps) Armored Division; 44 (attached XV Corps) Infantry Division; 100 (attached XV Corps) Infantry Division; 63 (attached XXI Corps) Infantry Division; XXI Corps; 70 (attached XXI Corps) Infantry Division;

Assigned XVIII Corps (Airborne) are the following: 13th Airborne Division; 17th Airborne Division; 82 Airborne Division; 101 Airborne Division.

Assigned US Strategic Air Forces in Europe are the following: 8th Air Force; 9th Air Force; Air Technical Service Command; IX Engineer Command; IX Throop Carrier Command; 63 Fighter Wing.

Assigned 8th Air Force are the following: First Air Division with First, 40, 41 and 94 Combat Bomb wings and 67 Fighter Wing; Second Air Division with Second, 14th, 20, 95 and 96 Combat Bomb wings and 65 Fighter Wing; USSTAF Main in 22421 (cont'd over)

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HE US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE INCOMING MESSAGE

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Page 3, cont'd. RC

ROUTINE SECRET

Third Air Division with 4th, 13th, 45, 92 and 93 Combat Bomb wings and 66 Fighter Wing; VIII Air Force Service Command; VIII Air Force Fighter Command; 325 Photo Wing Recon.

Assigned 9th Air Force are the following: IX Bomb Division (M) with 97, 98 and 99 Combat Bomb Wings; IX Tactical Air Command with 70 Fighter Wing; XIX Tactical Air Command with 100 Fighter Wing; IX Fighter Command with 84 and 303 Fighter Wing; IX Air Force Service Command; IX Air Defense Command.

Assigned Air Technical Service Command are the following: Base Air Depot Area; 302 Transport Wing.

Assigned IX Troop Carrier Command are the following: 50, 52 and 53 Troop Carries wings.

Assigned 63 Fighter Wing are the following: 71 Fighter Wing; XIX Tactical Air Command with 64 Fighter Wing and 42 Medium Bomb Wing.

Assigned Communications Zone are the following: Fifth Engineer Special Brigade: Sixth Engineer Special Brigade; 31 (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade: 47 (attached USSTAF) AAA Erigade; 50 (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade: 51 (attached USSTAF) AAA Erigade; 52 (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade: 54 (attached USSTAF) AAA Erigade; 74 (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade: 56 (attached USSTAF) AAA Erigade; 74 (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade: 56 (attached USSTAF, further attached 21 Army Group for Operations (AAA brigade.

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
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In Reply Ci	La: W 8133 12 Mar. 45 8% 19835	
Pros	: Mgs. Com Zona 121932Z	INTERNAL ADDRESS:
36	: WAR	To: AGAAN Info: USSTAF, Sixth area
	: Hqs. Twelve Army Supreme Hq. Adr. PMD Hqs. USSTAF 130350A	Group, Twolyth Army Group SHASF FAD book Massago Sgd: Elsenhower Hq ET.UGA
18571	EX 1895822421	

Asend our EX-18958 of 10 March as indicated below: Add Eastorn Command to Units assigned to US TAF and Eighth Air Force Composite Command to Units assigned to Minth Air Force,

Attachment Eighteenth Gorps (Airborne) to First Airborne Army should read: Attached First Airborne Army for operations Assignment of the 94th Inf Div should be corrected to read: Assigned to the Brd United States Army and attached to XX Corps.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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ROUTINE SECRET

In reply cito: EX-31100

From : He Comm Z

To : WAR

nan Info HQ USSTAF Main Sixth Army Grp Main HQ 12th Army Grp Main Suprame HQ ARF Fwd April 10th

Internal Address: From : ETOUSA Action to AGMAR Info to US Strategic Air Force: Sixth Army Crp; 12th Army Grp; and SHAEF Forward Sgd. Eisenhower

Order of battle, ETOUSA, as of 31st March 45, as follows:

EQS, ETOUSA.

Assigned HQS, STOUSA are the following: 12th Army Group: 6th Army Group; Ground Reinforcement Command; United States Strategic Air Forces in Surope: First Airborne Army (attached SHARF for Operational Control); XVIII Corps (Airborne) (attached First Airborne Army for operations); 31st (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 47th (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 50th (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 51st (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 52th (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 56th (attached USSTAF), further attached (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade; 56th (attached USSTAF), further attached 21st Army Group for operations (AAA Brigade; 74th (attached USSTAF) AAA Brigade.

Assigned 12th Army Group are the following: First United States Army; Third United States Army; Ninth United States Army; Fifteenth United States Army; 71st (sttached XII Corps) Infantry Div.

Assigned First United States Army are the following: 32nd FA Brigade; L9th AAA Brigade; 36th (attached XXII Corps for operations) Inf Div; III Corps; 7th (attached III Corps) Armored Div; 38th (attached III Corps) Inf Div; 99th (attached III Corps) Inf Div; V Corps; 9th (attached V Corps) Armored Div; 2nd (attached V Corps) Inf Div; 69th (attached V Corps) Inf Div; VII Corps; 3rd (attached VIII Corps) Armored Div; First (attached VII Corps) Inf Div; 8th (attached VII Corps) Inf Div; 9th (attached VII Corps) Inf Div; 78th (attached VII Corps) Inf Div; 104

USBEAF Mein in 29344 (cont'd over)

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Assigned Third United States army are the following: First TD Brigade; 33rd (attached XII Corps) FA Brigade; 38th AAA Brigade; 4th (attached XXI Corps) Inf Div; 10th (attached VI Corps) Armored Div; 13th (attached 6th Army Group) Armored Div; VIII Corps with 76th, 87th and 89th Inf Divs; XII Corps with 4th and 11th Armored Divs and 26th and 90 Inf Divs; XX Corps with 6th armored Div and 5th, 65th and 80 Inf Divs.

Assigned Ninth United States Army are the following: 34th (attached XVI Corps for operations) FA Brigade; 55th AAA Brigade; 102 (attached 15th United States Army for operations) Inf Div; XIII Corps; 5th (attached XII Corps) Armored Div; 84th (attached XIII Corps) Inf Div; 95 (attached XII Corps and further ettached HKNI Corps for operations) Inf Div; XVI Corps; 8th (attached XVI Corps for operations) Armored Div; 29th (attached XVI Corps) Inf Div; 35th (attached XVI Corps) Inf Div; 75th (attached XVI Corps) Inf Div; 6 Corps; 2nd (attached XIX Corps) Armored Div; 30 (attached XIX Corps) Inf Div; 83rd (attached XIX Corps) Inf Div.

Assigned Fifteenth United States army are the following: 54th AAA Brigede; 61st PA Brigade; 16th armored Div; 20 armored Div; 66th Inf Div; 10 Armored Div; XXII Corps; 94th (attached XXII Corps) Inf Div; 97th (attached XXII Corps) Inf Div; XXIII Corps.

Assigned Sixth Army Group are the following: Seventh United States Army; 44th AAA Brigads; 79th (attached XVI Corps) Inf Div.

Assigned Seventh United States Army are the following: 13th FA Brigade: 34th AAA Brigade; 36th Inf Div; 70 Inf Div; 103 Inf Div; VI Corps; 100 (attached VI Corps) Inf Div; 35th (attached VI Corps) AAA Brigade; XV Corps; 3rd (attached XV Corps) Inf Div; 414th (attached XV Corps) Armored Div; 44th (attached XV Corps) Inf Div; 45th (attached XV Corps) Div XXI Corps; 12th (attached XXI Corps) Armored Div; 42nd (attached XXI Corps) Inf Div; 63rd (attached XXI Corps) Inf Div.

Assigned XVIII Corps (Airborne) are the following: 13th Airborne Div; 82nd Airborne Div; 101 Airborne Div; 17th (attached XIX Corps) Airborne Div.

USBTAF Main in 29344 (cont'd over)


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ROUTINE

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Assigned United States Forategic Air Forces in Europe are the following: 8th Air Force; 9th Air Force; Eastern Command; Air Technical Service Command; IX Eugineer Command; IX Troop Carrier Command; 63rd Fighter Wing.

Assigned Sth Air Force are the following: First Air Div with First, Forty, Forty-first and Minety-fourth Combat Bonb Wings and 67th Fighter Wing; Second Air Div with Second, M4, 20, 95, 96th Combat Bomb Wings and 65th Fighter Wing; Third Air Div with 4th, 13th, 45th, 92nd and 93rd Combat Bomb Wings and 66th Fighter Wing; VIII Air Force Service Command; VIII Air Force Fighter Command; 325 Photo Wing Reconnelissance.

Assigned 9th Air Force are the following: 9th Bomb Div (M) with 97th. 98th and 99th Combat Bomb Wings; IX Tectical Air Command with 70 Fighter Wing; XIX Tectical Air Command with 100 Fighter Wing; IX Fighter Command with 84th and 303 Fighter Wings; IX Air Force Service Command with 8th Air Force Composite Command; IX Air Defense Command.

Assigned Air Technical Service Command are the following: Base Air Depot Area; 9th Base Air Depot Area with 302 Transport Wing.

Assigned IX Troop Carrier Command are the following: 50, 52nd, and 53rd Troop Carrier Wing,

Assigned 63rd Fighter Wing are the following: 71st Fighter Wing; XII Tastical Air Command with 64th Fighter Wing and 42nd Mediwa Bomb Wing.

Assigned Communications Zone are the following: 5th Engineer Special Brigade; 6th Engineer Special Brigade.

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

Action : (WAR)

USSTAF Main in 29344

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

ROUTINE SECRET

In reply cite: EX-43959

12 May 1945 Internal address:

From: Hy COM ZONE 1218232

To : VAR

Info: He USSEAF MAIN 1311168 Sixth Amay Gp Main SHAEF MAD Eq 12TR ARMY GP MAIN

Order of battle, BTOUSA, as of 30 April 45, as follows: Has European Theater of Operations, Assigned Has European Theater of Operations are the following: 12th Army Gp; Sixth Army Gp; Ground Force Reinforcement Cond; US Strategic Air Forces in Europe; First Airborne Army (Attached SHARF for operational control); XVIII (sttuched Minth US Army) Corps (Airborne); 13th (attached Com Zone) Airborne Div.

Assigned 12TH Army Gp are the following: First US Army; 3rd US Army; Ninth US Army; 15TH US Army.

Assigned Firstlls Army are the following: 32 FA Brigade; for 9 AAA Brig; 78 Infantry Div; V Corps; First (attached V Corps) Infantry Div; 97 (attached V rpt O Corps) Infantry Div; VII Corps; 3rd (attached VII Corps) armd Div; 2nd (attached VII Corps) Infantry Div; Ninth (attached VII Corps) Infantry Div; 69 (attached VII Corps) Infantry Div; 104 (attached VII Corps) Infantry Div; 7DII Corps; Sirth (attached VIII Corps) armed Div; Minth (attached VIII Corps; Sirth (attached VIII Corps) armed Div; Minth (attached VIII Corps; for adm and sup)armd Div; 76 (attached VIII Corps) Infantry Div; 87 (attached VIII Corps) Infantry Div; 89 (attached VIII Corps) Infantry Div.

Assigned 3rd US Army are the following: 1st TD Brigade; 36 AAA Biigade; 4th Armd Div; 16th armd Div; 70 Infantry Div; III Corps with 14th Armd Div and 86 and 99 Infantry Divisions; XII Corps with 11th Armd Div and 5th, 26, 90 Infantry Divisions

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HQ. US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

and 33 FOQA Brigade; XX Corps with 13th Aread Div and 65, 71 and 80 Infantry Divisions.

Assigned 9th US Army Gre the following: XIII Gorps; 5th (attached XIII Corps) armd Div; 29th (attached XIII Corps) Infentry Div; 35 (attached XIII Corps) Infentry Div; 84 (attached XIII Corps) Infentry Div; 102 (attached XIII Corps) Infentry Div; 34 (attached XIII Corps for operations) FA Brig; XVI Corps; 75 (attached XVI Corps) Infentry Div; 79 (attached XVI Corps) Infentry Div; 95 (attached XVI Corps) Infentry Div; 55 (ettached XVI Corps) AAA Brig; XIX Corps; 2nd (attached XIX Corps) attached XVI Corps) Infentry Div; 55 (attached XVI Corps) AAA Brig; XIX Corps; 2nd (attached XIX Corps) attached XVI Corps) Infentry Div; 30 (attached XIX Corps) Infentry Div; 33 (attached XIX Corps) Infentry Div; 7th (attached XVIII Corps) Armd Div; 30 (attached XIX Corps) Infentry Div; 33 (attached XIX Corps) Infentry Div; 7th (attached XVIII Corps) Alron med Div; 8th (attached XVIII Corps) (Airborne) Infentry Div;

Assigned 15th US Army are the following: 66th Infantry Div; 106 (attached Com Zone) Infantry Div; 54 And Birg; GXII Corps; 94 (attached XXII Corps) Infantry Div; MIII Corps; 28 (attached XXIII Corps) Infantry Div; 61 (attached XIII Corps) FA Brig.

assigned 5th Army Group are the following: 7th US Army.

Assigned 7th US Areay are the following: 13th FA Brig; 35 AAA Birg; 44 AAA Brig; 63 Infantry Div; 100 Infantry Div; VI Corps; 10th (attached VI Corps) Ared Div; 44 (attached VIE Corps) Infantry Div; 103 (attached VI Corps) Infantry Div; XV Corps; 20 (attached XV Corps) Ared Div; 42 (attached XV Corps) Infantry Div; 45 (attached XV Corps) Infantry Div; EXI Corps; 3rd (attached XXI Corps) Infantry Div; 4th (attached XXI Corps) Infantry Div; 12th (attached XXI Corps) Ared Div; 36 (attached XXI Corps) Infantry Div; 34 (attached XXI Corps) AAA Brig.

Assigned XVIII Corps (cirborne) are the following: 17th (attached XXII Corps) (Airborne) Div: 82 (attached 9th US Army) Airborne Div: 101 (attached VI Corps) Airborne Div.

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

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Assigned US Strategic Air Forces in Europe are the following: 8th Air Force; 9th Air Force; Eastern Command; Air Technical Service Command; IX Engineer Command; IX Troop Carrier Command; 63 Fighter Wing.

Assigned 8th Air Force are the following: lat Air Division with first, 40, 41 and 94 Combat Bomb Wings and 67 Fighter Wing; 2nd Air Division with 2nd, 14, 3rd Air Division with 4th, 13th, 45, 92 and 93 combat bomb Wings and 66 Fighter Wing; VXII Air Force Fighter Compand; VIII Air Force Service Command; 325 Photo Wing Recon.

Assigned 9th Air Force are the following: 9th Bomb Div (M) with 97, 93 and 99 Comb Bomb Wings; DX Tactical Air Command with 70 fighter wing; XIX Factical Air Command with 100 fighter wing; IX Fighter command with 84 and 303 fighter wings; IX Air Force Service Command with 8th Air Force Composite Command; IX Air Defense Command; 31 (attached IX Air Defense Command) AAA Brig; 47 (attached IX Air Defense Command) AAA Brig; 50th (attached IX Air Defense Command) AAA Brig; 51 (attached IX Air Defense Command) AAA Brig; 52 (attached IX Air Defense Command) AAA Brig; 56 (attached IX Air Defense Command)

Assigned Air Technical Service Command are the following: Base Air Depot Area; 9th Base Air Depot area with 302 Transport Wing.

Assigned IX Troop Carrier Command are the following: 50, 52 and 53 Troop Carrier Wings.

Assigned 63 Fighter Wing are the following: 71 Fighter Wing; XII Tactical air Command with 42 medium bomb wing and 64 fighter wing.

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

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Assigned Communications Zone are the following: 5th Engineer Special Brig; 6th Engineer Special Brig

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

14 JUNE

PRICRITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: MAR 16365

FRCM: AGLAR 132244B TO : ETOUSA 1407058 INFO: USSTAF ejn

INTERNAL ADERESS: FROM: NARCOS REF : W 12686 USSTAP IN 41406

Awaiting your immediate reply to W 12686 for answer to British people.

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ACTION: ETO INFO : A-5 1-3 A-1

A-L /G RECORDS

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In reply cite: FLD 24955 June 13

FROM: SHAEP FORWARD

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TC : HQ USSTAF HAIN HQ COLM Z W/R INTERNAL ADDRESS:

TO FOR ACTION ADWAR, MARCOS TO FOR INFO AMSSO, TROOPERS, USSTAF, ETCUSA (MAIN) TO: COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR ACTION AND BRIFISH CHIEFS OF STAFF FOR INFO

mha

FROM: SHAEF FORMARD SGD: EISENHOUTER

REF: W 12686 (41408)

THIS IS SCIF NULBER 4.54

There was no intention in SCAF 422 that US Army Air Force units in Norway should cause under British control.

Moreover, recent experience has indicated increasing need for close coordination between British Air Porces in Germany and those in Norway.

It is therefore requested that you disregard paragraph 4 of SGAF 422 and substitute the following:---

It is recommended that, on termination of combined command, British Navel Forces in Norway be passed to command of the Admiralty and that command of the British Air Forces in Norway be passed to the British Air Commander-In-Chief of Germany, as a group under 2nd TAF. Command of the Allied Land forces in Norway should be passed to the War Office with the British Chiefs of Staff seting as the agent of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Norwegian Navel and Air Forces is handed over finally to the Norwegian government,"

The difference in system of command between ground and air forces recommended above should lead to no difficulties.

For WARCOS this answers your W-12686 of 6th June

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: (WAR) INFO: A-5 A-3 A-1 C/S USSTAF ADV

AG RECORDS USSTAF IN 42468

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Juil

HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

SECRET

IN HEPLY CITE: FAD 24608

FROM: SHAEF FWD LLLTOOB

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INFO: HQ USSTAF 121125B CASERTA, HA COMZ, HQ AAF NAPLES, USMILMIS, HQ 6TH ARMY GP, HQ 12TH ARMY GP

10 : WAR VARIOUS OTHERS 11 June 45

INTERNAL ADDRESS:

TO FOR ACTION: AGRIAR FOR COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF, TO FOR IMPO : AMASO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF. AGHAR FOR JOINT CHIEP'S OF STAFF, NAVY DEPT, TROOPERS, A IR MINISTRY, ADMINALTY, OFFICES OF THE WAR CABINET, SHAEP MAIN. SHALF REAR, AIRSTAFF, 12TH ARMY GP, 6TH ARMY GP, US GP CC, CONTROL COMMISSION FOR GREMANY BRITISH ELEMENT, ETCUSA COM Z, AFHQ, MTOUSA, MAAF, MILITARY MISSION MOSCOW, ANCXF MAIN, ANCXP PH. SCO FOR MAIN, SHARF MISSION FRANCE, SHAEP LISSION BELGIUM, SHARF MISSION NETHERLANDS, SHAEF MISSION DENMARK, BERLIN DIST TWO, USSTAF, COMMAVED, COMMAVFORCER, SFHQ, SOUTCO, SHARP HAIN, 9TH AF, 2ND TAF, US ATC, RAF BOMBER CHD, RAF FICHTER CMD, RAF COASTAL CHD, RAF TRANS CMD, CHIEF; COMBINED OPNS, 88 GP HAF, 8TH MP. AFHQ PASS TO MTUDSA NOIC BHUSSELS PASS TO COMNAVEOR GER, AGWAR PASS TO US ATC, ALP OSLO PASS TO 88 GP BAF C/O AIR HQ NORMAY. THIS IS SCAP NUMBER 451 FROM SHAEF FRO SGD: ET SENHOWER

SCAF 382 (not to all) refers.


1. In order to complete the necessary arguangements for the termination of combined Command at some future date to be determined by you it will be convenient to fix upon a date by which this Headquarters and all outside agencies will be prepared This might be feasible as early as 30 June 1945 but not earlier.

USSTAF MAIN IN 42136

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(cont d)

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Page 2 (cont.d).	
	SECRET
hours 30 June. If the situat bired command would be a few	a requested to issue the necessary preliminary orders for disposal of subordinate agencies and units so that the shed if directed by you on short notice on or after 2400 ion permits, a suitable time for the termination of com- days after my return from the United States.
war and foot to ell!	102410
USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:	and service course
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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

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FROM: / IF S.M. T SHATE FLD 0915008

TO . H USSTAF 091731B

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UNTERNAL CORFSS:

FRCM: AIR STAFF CHARP FOR SGD : SCHLATTER TO : USS TAF MAIN FOR : CANERDA

Confirming details arranged in conference Dupreme Commander and Chief of Staff Supress Readquarters this morning for reference in AGLAN got arnold and Opasta. Sphere to now USSEAF or its successor to Prankfurt and house in this building as soon of practicable. All air matters to continue to be the responsibility of the Sonior in Germanian. Joint ETO Staff to be set up with his Representation tentatively as follower lajor General Bibsel if available; G-3 Deputy for Constitutions Brigadier Ceneral Ministry (later date); G-4 Deputy Brigadier General Lynne Matter with view to assuming G-4 position at a later date; with appropriate Aux Representation in the grade of Gol or below Desired is release of Major General Bavans without delay to assume dates of General Bibsell to textilable, desire recommendation of Buyury G-4. If Major General Bibsell to textilable, desire recommendation of suitable for Officer for theater General Bibsell to textilable, desire recommendation of suitable for Officer for theater General Bibsell to textilable, desire recommendation of suitable for Officer for theater General Bibsell to textilable, desire recommendation of suitable for Officer for theater G-2, tlanning on balance of ETO Staff set up proceeding on assumption that ein matters will be handled by ESENF or its successor and that only joint policy matters primaril, administrative on the air side will be proceeded by theater Headquarters.

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INFO : USSTAF ADV C/S D/CO AO REDORDS A=3 COMP O

USSTAF IN 41652

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE .

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

PRIORITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: W-12686, JUNE 7.

FROM: TAR 0621032

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TO : ETOUSA MAIN 071500B

INFO: HO USSTAF 080845B

INFO USSTAF TO: COLIFERETC

PARAPHRASE RELAY BY JEAR ACTION SHAFF FUD

FROM: WARCOS

INTERNAL ADDRESS:

REF: W-10936 - IS USSTAF IN 40528. UA-70452. SCAP-422.

Look at Arnolds WAR-10936 and Spaatz answer thereto to Unit A 70452 and advise how this affects SCAF 422 which the British are pow prepared to improve.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: (SHAEF)


INFO : A-5

A-1 A-3 AG RECORDS

USSTAF MAIN IN 41408

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

PRIORITY SACRAT

	Li Kaf	LT 0175: \$93446
	FROM	HATE JAIN VERSAILLES 271300B
	TO :	NQ 12TH ARMY GROUP SAIN 15TH US ARMY
5.	20.	HQ USSTAF HAIN 280055B SHARF MISSION TO PARIS SIXIN ARMY OF AIN HQ 21ST ARLY OF IMIN HQ NINTELIR FORCE MAIN HQ AND NAPLES SAL MIS MISSOR

2-140

27 June 45

INTERNAL A DORESS:

(1) CG LETH ARLY GP
(2) CG LETH ARLY GP
(3) SACLAD
(4) CINC SAPOR
(5) CG STATH ARLY GP
(6) CG NINTH ATH RONCE
(7) ADCING SECOND TAP
(8) CG USSTAF
(9) SHARP AISSION (FRANCE)
(10) STLTTARY AISSION ADSGORE

"SOHE ATTO RADIA"

Rof: W 21929 - Not Iden FWH 23520- Not Iden

The following coordinating instructions are insued in view of orgent need to conjugate assangements prior to termination of combined command of ADF and (less para 3 which will be acted upon immediately) are subject to agreement by SACATED and app roval by combined Chiefs of Staff of AGMAR # 21929 of 25 June (not to all).

As soon as possible at a time to be agreed between counseling General, 12th are Chomp and Commanding General, 15th army Group (Commanding General designate US Forces in Austria), command of all US Forces in Austria will pass to Commanding General US Forces in Austria. At the same time the boundaries of TTO will be extended to include sustria Commanding Ceneral US Forces in Austria will, however, be responsible direct to the US joint Chiefs of Staff for Hilitary Covernment and all political matters in US compiled Austria

Prior to that date Covmanding General 12th army Group will complete such oreliningly covements as will ensure that units which scove no useful purpose in fust is, and for whom suitable accomposition exists elsewhere are moved out also that units astride the sustrian frontier are moved entirely into or out of austria as resulred. Commending General 12th army Group will as soon as possible furnish this Beadquerters and Commanding Ceneral designate US Forces in ustria with a detailed troop list of US units initially to remain in sustria.

US JAF VAIN IN 49313

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PRICEITY SECRAT

This Headquarters and, after termination of combined command, Commanding General USFIT will remain responsible for the operational command, training, logistical support and administration of US Forces in Austria as detailed in FUL03520 (SGLF 433) and Commanding General US Forces in Austria will report to SGATE/Comman in General USFET on these matters.

iwe

Commanding General US Forces in Austria will handover to Prench Forces the French occupational zone in Austria as soon as it is procalgated, dealing direct with Commanding Beneral, 6th Army Group or the French Ministry of War as appropriate US units relieved by French Forces will be withdrawn into Gensany and revert to conmanni of Commanding General 12th Army Group/Enstern military district. US of litary Group ermaent personnel will be withdrawn form French zone in Austria coincident with the value? of US Forces. German prisoners of War and disarmed energy personnel will be handed over in bITU. No indigenous civilians will be allowed to move. Providem of movement will be afforded to United Nations displaced persons and assimilies.

Commanding General US Forces in Austria, will commencing as soon as agreed acres in Austria are promilgated, arrange the necessary reliens between US ad Soviet Forces in direct consulatation with appropriate Soviet Commanders

Commanding General, US Forces in Austria will be responsible for saving arrangements direct with appropriate soviet Commanders for the movement of the and French arriants into their respective zone in Vienna including the southerest of running rights to that city 0, land and air. As soon as metional zones in Fienna will arrange the movement of US and French gerrisons into their agreed zones coordinating also with Com Kone, 6th Army Group, 12th army Group and the French Biolatry of War where appropriate.

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

PRIORITY

In reply cite: S 93452

To

From : SHAEF Main 271315B

Hy Com Z

: HQ USSTAF 272155B

HQ 6th Army Gp

Hy AAF Naples

HQ USUILLIIS

Hy 12th Army Gp

27th June

SECRET

Internal address: Action 1. EXFOR 2. 12th Army Group 3. 6th Army Group 4. SHAEF Mission (France) 5. Com Zone 6. US Hy Berlin District 7. British Hy Berlin District Info 8. AFIN 9. USSTAF 10. 2nd TAF 11. Ninth AF 12. CG, 15th Army Group 13. Military Mission Moscow From SHAEF Main Sgd. Tedder Cite SHGCT

ARC .

Ref: S 92156 is USSTAF Main in 44013 -S 93203 is USSTAF Main in 44991

1. The following draft instructions are to be used as a basis for discussion with the French Chief of Staff for national defense with a view to their subsequent issue to all concerned when agreed by the French and when executive orders are received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. They are furnished to addressees at this time for planning purposes only. All necessary preliminary discussions with the local Soviet and French authorities will, however, be initiated at once so that executive action may be taken promptly when ordered on.

2. Commencing on 1st July 1945, or as soon thereafter as mational zones in Germany, Austria, Berlin and Vienna still under discussion have been agreed and promulgated, the following action will be taken.

3. 21st Army Group by direct arrangement with appropriate Soviet Commenders will hand over those parts of the Russian zone in Germany presently occupied by British forces.

4. 12th army Group by direct arrangement with appropriate Soviet Commanders will hand over that part of the Russian zone in Germeny USSTAF Main in 42565 (cont'd over)

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

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presently occupied by United States forces.

PRIORITY

5. Above reliefs will be subject of the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5 of S 92156 of 21 June, as modified by S 93203 of 26 June, 1945 (neither to all).

6. 12th army Group by direct arrangement with 6th Army Group will take over, occupy and govern that part of the agreed United States zone in Germany presently occupied by French forces.

7. 6th Army Group by direct arrangement with 12th Army Group and Commanding General, United States forces in Austria respectively, will take over with French forces these parts of the agreed French zones in Germany and Austria presently occupied by United States forces.

8. United States Military Government personnel will be withdrawn from the French zones in Germany and Austria coincident with the relief of United States forces.

9. French Military Government personnel will be withdrawn from the United States zone in Germany coincident with the relief of French forees.

10. German prisoners of war and disarmed enemy personnel in areas which change hands between United States and French forces will be handed over in Situ. No indigenous civilians will be allowed to move. Freedom of movement will be afforded united mations displaced persons and assimilies.

11. On completion of the above reliefs between United States and French forces command of the First French Army and the Alpine Front Command will revert to the French Ministry of War.

12. United States Headquarters Berlin District and British Headquarters Berlin District will nove their respective garrisons into their agreed zones in Berlin as already planned. French Ministry of War will designate troops for the French garrison, novement of which to Berlin will be arranged by 12th Army Group in coordination with Com Zone, 6th Army Group, and SHARF Mission (France) as appropriate. National USSTAF Main in 42565 (cont'd over)

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

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garrison commanders will be responsible for local coordination with the Russians in Berlin. In the event the national zones are not finalized by the date of execution of this order the French Ministry of War is invited to despatch a French Control Council with minimum additional personnel to the United States and British zones in Berlin, to remain as guests of the United States and British until such time as the French zone is finalized and French troops are available to enter it, taking all errangements for accommodations and supply with US HQ Berlin District who will coordinate with British HQ Berlin District.

13. Commanding General, United States Forces in Austria and the French Ministry of War will designate their respective garrisons for their agreed zones in Vienna. Movement of United States and French garrisons will be coordinated by Commanding General United States Forces in Austria in conjunction with Com Zone, 6th Army Group, 12th Army Group and SHAEF Mission (France) as appropriate. Commanding General United States Forces in Austria will also effect all necessary coordination with the Mussions.

14. Completion of movement of national garrisons into Berlin and Vienna will be reported to this Headquarters at which time they will revert to national command and cease to be responsible to this Headquarters.

15. In the event that movements and reliefs as ordered in this directive are not completed at the time Combined Command of the Allied Expeditionary Force is terminated, the appropriate national commanders will be responsible for their completion.

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

Action : see address

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
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ADSCE C/S USSTAF Adv

USSTAF Main in 42565 45265

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT ARC

PRIORITY SECRET

In reply cite: S 93451 27th

From : SHAEF Main 2713158

: NV 12th army Group Naples Info Info USSTAF 2719308 SHANF Mission to Paris oth Army Group Yth Air Force Eq HQ Allied Armies in Italy Main

Internal Address: Action 1. AFEA 2. 12th Army Group Info 3. 6th Army Group 4. 15th Army Group 5. UHMSF Lission (France) 6. 9th Air Force 7. USSTAF

Ref: W 21929 - not identified S 93446 - not identified

For BACMED.

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1. Following ACMAR WX 21929 of 24 June (not to all) and in anticipation of Combined Chiefs of Staff approvel request your agreement to coordinating cable to Commanding General designato, United States forces in Austria issued this day direct to Commanding General, 15th Army Group in wise of urgency.

2. As essential preliminary recommend 2 Corps pass to commend 12th Army Group on closing Salzburg erea. Request your concurrence sconest.

For 12th Army Group.

3. In receipt of AFHQ confirmation assume command of 2 Corps as above and place it in command of all US forces remaining initially in Austria in relief of 15 Corps and take action as detailed in cable 593446 this date.

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USSTAF Main in 45248

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

PRICEUTI SECRET

In roply cite: Y 126 E 5th July

From : HQ Minth Air Force Main 051703B

: HQ USSTAF Main 0520018 HQ Minth Air Force Service Command Internal Address: To 1. CG, Ninth Air Force Service Command 2. Info to CG, USSIAF From HQ Minth Air Force Sgd. Weyland

ARC

Ref: A215 July 3 is USSTAF Main in 46609

Reforence Air Staff SHARP Main message A215, 3 July. USSTAF has indicated thas units will be under operational control of Munth Air Force and Minth Air Force Service Command effective midnight 7/8 July.

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Action : see address

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USSTAP Main in 46748

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

PRICRITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: S-95206, JULY 4.

FROM: SHAEF MAIN 0415208

TO : HE USSTAF 050137B G-2 USFET HC ALLIED ARNIES IN ITALY

INFO: HQ NINEH AF NAPLES INTERNAL ADDRESS: TO: 1. CG USSTAF 2. CG TLELFTH ARLY GP 3. CG FIFTERNTH ARLY GP INFO: 4. SACMED 5. C IN C EXFOR 6. CG SIXTH ARLY GROUP 7. CG MINTH AIR FORCE 8. AOC IN C SECOND TAF 9. SHAEF LISSION TO PE NOE 10. MILITARY MISSION MOSCO: FROM: SHAEF LAIN SCD: TEDDER CITE: SHGCT

REF: S-93446 JUNE 27 - IS USS PAF IN 45313. UA-72078 JUNE 30.

Para 1. Amplify S-93446 of 27 June by addition of new paragraph 8 as follows:-Para "8. All U S Army Air Force Units now in Austria or to be based there will remain under Command of Commanding General, USPET through USAAFIE".

Para 2. For USSTAF this confirms policy in UA-72078 of 30 June.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: 1-5

INFO : A-3 A-1 A-2 ATSCE C/S USSTAF ADV AG RECORDS



USSTAF MAIN IN 46656

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
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From : SHANF Main 041630B TO : Hy USSIAF Main 042037B 14 Comm Z 14 Dimth Air Porce Main

Maples G-2 Div USENT NQ Allied Armics in Italy Main

Nof: 593456 June 27 is USBAF Main in 45313 S96562 July 1 is USSIF Main in 66058 Internal Address: For action 12th AG, 5tH AG, EMARF Mission France, AFM for into AGMAR for Combined Chiefs of Staff, Air Ministry pass to AMSSO for British Chiefs of Staff, US (Ministry Military Mission Messon, Con Zone, 15th AG, Minth Air Force From SHARF Main Spd. Teddor Cite SHGCT Emis in SCAF number 473

1. Command of all US Ground Forces in Austria will pass to the Commanding Conormal, US Forces in Austria affective 052400B July, 1945.

2. For the inneals to future and until announced by UNFEF, adviatetration of UN Forces in Austria will remain the responsibility of 12th Army Group

Supply of US Serves in Austria will continue to be the responsisility of 3rd Augy/Sustern Willbary District under USFEP.

. Simultaneously with the passage of Command at 0524003 July 1945, The boundaries of the Suropean Theater will be extended to include

USSING DIS PRIMEIOUS

US LAF MALA 14 10588

(see addreas)

Into A-1 A-2 A-3 A-5 A25CE C/S UBSCAF Adv

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INCOMING MESSAGE ARC EDITED LITERAL TEXT

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In reply cite: A 215

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SECHET 3rd July

from	:	Air Staff SHARM Main 031600H	Internal Address: From Air Staff SHAEF Main
ľo		USSTAF Main 0321185 Air Linistry Whitehall Ninth Troop Carrier Group 314th Troop Carrier Group 442nd Troop Carrier Group Transport Command Second TAF Lain Second TAF Rear Air Staff SHAEF Acer 12th Army Group Seventh Army Third Army Winth Army Com Zone Ninth Air Force Service Cond ETOUSA UK Base Section Delta Base Section Har Office Admiralty ANCXF 21st Army Group SCOFOR	Fighter Command Sath Group Acth Group Sath Group Bith Group Hilst Wing SHAEF Mission France SHAEF Mission Belgium SHAEF Mission Denmark SHAEF Mission Norway SHAEF Mission Norway

1. Effective midnight 7/3 July 1945 this Headquarters will release Operational Control of the Troop Carrier units listed below as indicated: US. Ninth Proop Carrier Command, 314 and 442 Troop Carrier Groups to USSEAF British. 38 and 46 Groups to Air Staff SHAEF Rear.

2. AO from midnight 7/8 July, bids for airlift involving US eircraft will be made in accordance with instructions to be issued by USSEAF.

3. Bids for airlift involving British aircraft will continue to be made in accordance with existing procedure under SHAEF Ops memo number 29. USSTAF Main in 46409 (cont'd over)

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

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That is to Second TaF air movements for onward transmission to CATOR Rear or, in the case of those bidders who previously bid to CATOR Main direct, to CATOR gear direct.

USSTAF DISTRIHUTION:

Action : A-3

Info : A-1 C/S

USSTAF Adv AG Necords

USSTAF Main in 46409


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INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT PRIORITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: W-26166, 3 JULY 1945.

FROM : AGWAR FROM THE COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF

TO FOR ACTION: SHAEF MAIN FOR EISENHOUER

FOR INFO : AMESO FOR BRITISH CHIEFS OF STAFF

HEF: F.D-24955 - IS USSTAF IN 42468.

BOOK MESSAGE

FACS-256

Combined Chiefs of Staff approve your recommendation in Paragraph 3 of SGAF-454 except that the command of British Air Forces in NORWAY should be passed to the Air Ministry and not to British Air Commander-in-Chief, CERMANY.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: (SHAEF MAIN)

INFO : A-5 A-3 A-1

AG RECORDS C/S USSTAF ADV



USS PAF MAIN IN 46577

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

URGENT

In reply cite: S-94542 July 1

FROM: SHARF MAIN

TO : G-2 DIV USPET HGS 9TH AF MAIN HQS ALLIED ARMIES 1TALI PINFO: HGS USSTAF HQS COMM ZONE

INTERNAL ADDRESS: RUS': W 23672 (45999) S 93445 (45313) S 93452 (45265) FROM: SHALF LADA TO FOR ACTION: 1 12TH ARMY CROUP 2 STH ARKY GROUP 3 SHAFF HISSION FRANCS 4 9TH AIR FORCE 15TH ARMY CROUP 5 TO FOR INFO: 6 AFHQ 7 USSTAF EXPOR 8 9 2ND TAF 10 MILITARY MISSION MCSCOW 11 COM ZONE FROM: SHAEP MAIN SGD: TEDDER CITE SIECT

3

19

1. The following executive action will now be taken following \$93452 of 27th June.

2. Commanding on the lst July, or as soon thereafter as movement can be coordinated between 6th and 12th Army Groups, 12th Army Group will take over, occupy and govern that part of the United States zone in Germany presently occupied by French forces.


3. Commencing simultaneously and proceeding concurrently with the relief in paragraph 2, 6th Army Group, by direct arrangement with 12th Army Group will take over with French forces those parts of the French zone in Germany presently occupied by United States forces.

USSTAF IN 46058

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

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S--94542 July 1 (cont.--)

4. 6th Army Group by direct arrangement with 12th Army Group and commanding general, United States forces in Austria will take over with Franch forces that part of the French zone in Austria presently occupied by United States forces.

5. Military government personnel of the relieving nationality may precede the troops into their zone and military government personnel of the nationality being relieved, may remain for a short period after completion of relief as mutually erranged to ensure a smooth transfer.

6. Except for German personnel in disarmed provisional units attached to United States forces, German prisoners of war and disarmed enemy personnel in areas which change hands between United States and French forces, together with all stocks of indigenous foodstuffs earmarked for their use, will be handed over in sit. No indigenous civilians or uncontrolled displaced persons will be allowed to move between somes in advance of or with the departing forces. The orderly and controlled repatriation of United Nations displaced persons and assimilies will continue.

7. The above beliefs will be completed as soon as possible and not later than 10th July, 1945.

8. On completion of the above reliefs or on the termination of combined command of the Allied Expeditionary Forces, whichever is earlier, command of the 1st French Army will revert to the French High Command. On the 10th July, 1945 or on the termination of combined command of the Allied Expeditionary Force whichever is the earlier, command of the Army detachment of the Alps will also revert to the French High Command. Announcement of these changes will be made by SHAEF.

9. For the purpose of conducting the above reliefs the French zone in Germany will be defined as follows:

A. The Kreis of Lindau in Beveria.

B. Southern part of the Province of Nurttemberg including Signaringen south of Autobaha and railway connecting Karlarnhe-Stuttgart-Ulm defined by the following Kreis boundaries Leonberg, Boblingen, Nurtigom, Coppingen, Ulm and that portion of Munsiger our threast of Autobaha duclue ive to United States are para parased versions and while be warked with the secondry classification indicated mercor but corr will be safed about the safed and with the

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE EDITED LITERAL TEXT

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S-94542 July I (cont .-)

C. Kreis of Buhl, Baden-Baden and Rastatt, all in the Bezirke of Karlskuhe.

D. Bezirke of Kwnstanz and Freiburg.

B. Kreis of Oberwesterwald, Onterwesterwald, Unterlahn and Sanktgoarshaven. F. Best of Shine the districts of the Saar, Pelatinate, that part of the Province of Hesse situated west of the Rhine and the districts of Traves and

G. That part of the district of Coblenz which is situated east of the Rhine.

10. For the purpose of conducting reliefs in Austria, the French zone in that country will be defined as the Provinces of Vorarlberg and Tirol.

11. 12th Army Group will adjust United States forces into the proposed United States zone in Austria which is defined as the Province of Salaburg and that part of the Province of Oberdonau south of the Danube. Execution of this novement will begin as soon as coordination with the Russians has been effected. Should this adjustment not be completed prior to passing command to commanding general United States forces in Austria, he will be responsible for its completion,

12. Commanding general, United States forces in Austria and the French high command will designate their respective garrisons for their zones in Vienna, Commanding general, United States forces in Austria will be prepared at short notice to move the United States and French garrisons into Vienna on receipt of orders from SEARF/USFET effecting all necessary coordination with the Russians, 6th Army Group and the French high command as appropriate in regard to this movement. On arrival in Vienna national garrisons will revert to the sole control of their

13. Transfer of command of United States ground forces in Austria to commanding general United States forces in Austria and incorporation of Austria in European Theatre of Operations as mentioned in S93446 of 27 June and WX22672 of 28 June will take place within next few days at a time to be promulgated by SHAEF.

USSTAF IN 46058

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

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S-94542 July 1 (cont.-)

14. In the event that movements and reliefs ordered in this directive are not completed at the time combined command of the Allied Expeditionary Force is terminated, the appropriate national commanders will be responsible for their completion. Completion of reliefs will be reported to this headquarters or to national commanders as appropriate.

15. Mission (France) inform French of above executive orders which are in accordance with agreement reached at meeting with General Juin this headquarters 29 June

USS TAF DIS IRIBUTION:

ACTION: (SEE ADDRESS)

INFO: A-2 A-1 A-3 A-5 ATSGE C/S USSTAF ADV AG RECORDS

USSTAF IN 46058

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INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

PRIORITY SECRET

11 July 45

IN REPLY CITE: WARX 30438

FHOM: AGWAR SIGNED WARCOS

TO : USFET REAR

AAFPOA (PASS USSTAF GUARA): CHQ SAPA: PORT SHAFTERTH

Estabilished at Guam effective 16 July 1945 is headquarters US army Strategic Air Forces.

Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, US Army hir Forces Pacific Ocean Areas is redissignated Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, US Army Strategic Air Forces and is relieved from assignment to US Army Forces Middle Pacific effective 16 July 1945.

Effective 16 July 1945, the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron Eighth Air Porce less personnel and equipment is assigned to US Army Strategic Air Forces. Units and personnal presently assigned to Eighth Air Force in USFET will be reassigned by Commanding General USFET.

The Commanding General US Army Strategic Air Forces will inactivate the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, XX Bomber Command and absorb personnel and equipment in Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron, Eighth Air Force to the axtent practicable.

Effective 16 July 1945, the Readquarters 20th Air Force less personnal and equipment is assigned to US Army Strategic Air Forces. Personnel and equipment now assigned to this unit will be absorbed as directed by Commending General Army Air Forces.

Commanding General US Army Strategic Air Porces will redisignate Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron XXI Bomber Command as the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadton 20th Air Force at the earliest practicable date and abcorb personnel and equipment in Meadquarters and Headquarters Squadron, 20th Air Force to the extent practicable.

Units currently assigned to 20th Air Force are assigned to US Army Strategic Air Forces.

Balk sllotment of personnel now assigned to US Army Air Forces Pacific Ocean Are s will be transformed to US Army Strategic Air Forces as mutually agreed between Commanding General USASTAF and Commanding General MIDPAC;

> USSTAF Will IN 48422 -1- (cont'd)

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

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PRIORITY SECRET

For the time being, no change will be made in assignment of units now assigned to US Army Forces pacific Ocean Areas and operating under control of US Army Air Forces pacific Ocean Areas.

Initially, current administrative and logistical procedures of 20th Air Force will continue in effect for USASTAF.

Other administrative details are included in confirming AG letter to follow.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: STE ADDRESS

INPO : A-1 C/S A-3 USSTAF ADV AG RECORDS ATSCE A-2 A-5

USSTAF MAIN IN 48422

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

URGENT SECRET

IN REPLY CITS: \$ 96169

FROM: SHAFF MAIN 081225B

TO : USSTAF 091833B UK EASE LZTH ARLY GP 9TH AF R SLAYED HQ TAAF AFIQ LTO OTHERS

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9 JULY

INTERNAL ADDRESS:

TO : ANCXF MAIN, EXFOR, 12TH ARMY GP, 6TH ARMY GP, 9TH AF, 2ND TAF, COMM Z, SHAEF MISSION FRANCE, SHAEF MISSION DEMMARK, SHAEF MISSION NETHERLANDS, SHAEF MISSION BELGIUM, SHAEF MISSION HUXEDBOURG, SHAEF MISSION TORMAY, SCOFOR, INFO: AFWAR, AMSSO (AIR MIN FASS), NAVY DEPT ADMIRALTY, TROOPERS, AIR TIN, UIL TISSION MOSCOW, USSTAF, CHIEF COMBLINED OPS (WAR OFFICE FASS), AFH4 (IAR OFFICE FASS), UK BASE FOR OSS, US GP CC, CONTROL COMM FOR GERMANT, CONTAVFORGER, B RIIN AREA HQ (BR), US HQ BERLIN DIST (FAD), US HQ BERLIN AIR COND, US HQ BERLIN AIR COND, COMMAVED, FROM: SHAEF MAIN GCD : TODDER

øjm

REF : S 95710 USSTAF IN 47004

Delate paragraph 2 G of S 95710 and substitute "Command of all French Forces (except Army Detachment of the Alps see para 3 below) will be assumed by the French High Command"

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

ACTIC': SAE ADDRESS

INFO : A-1, A-2, A-3, A-5 C/S USSTAF ADV

AG MISC, ATSCE, AG RECORDS USSTAF IN 47577

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

SECRIF

In reply cite: 1220g From : NQS Minth Air Force 011616B To : Info NQS USSTAF 071850B

FRICRITY

Internal Address: Sgi, Weyland

ARC

Raf: Y126E is USSTAF Main in 46748

Preference Ninth Air Force teletype W1265, 5 July 1945. United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe has informed this Beedquarters that operational control of 314 and 442 Troop Carrier Groups will be retained by Headquarters US Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

Action : --Info : A-3 A-1 A-4 (Supply) A-4 (Transp) ATSCE C/S USSTAF Adv AG Records

USSTAF Main in 47236

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		USSTAF Digned	Cannon			
	:	JSFEP Rear SHAEP Mission Section: 8 Ba	France; SHAEF se Sub Area	Missior	Belgiur;	Seine
וזה הריוס		167-70520	יות בהדרוכו			

Operational control of IX Troop Carrier Command, 314, 442 Troop Carrier Groups, 301 and 302 Froop Carrier Founs (Separate), 144 Troop Carrier Group composed of 96 and 100 Troop Carrier Squadrons, and 302 Transport Ming is essured by this headquarters as of midnight 7/8 July SWAEE Air message A-215 of 3 July refers. One agency of this bealquarters will control and allocate all American air lift in this Theater with exception of Air Transport Command.

To avoid confusion and possible duplication it is directed that the Winth Air Force uncertare no commitments for any air lift whatso over with its presently assigned transport sincraft unless such commitment has been cleared by the agency of this headquasters sateblished for that purpose.

The function formely performed by CATOR for American hidders will be performed by the Al: Transport Operations Room (ATCR) which will continue for the time being to use channels and installations excellent by CATOR.

Effective michight 7/8 July bids for hir lift from American exercises will be submitted to ATOR. All bids for air lift are recuested to be submitted in consolidated form by an agency of Army Groups, Air Force, ETOUSA Com Zone, USE TAF and US Group CC (Germany Bids from subcriticate units of these headquarters are not desired.

REFERENCE	: SHALF Air staff	f A-215 (Action AG Opes) (ETO IN 69409)
	SeiNE Section	
ZNR0	: SOS 0-1 0-3 TC Air Section NEATC	Soluc Scolica AG Records Log Summary

TRADER BOTT

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
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ALFRED R. MARSELL, Brig. General, WEA, Asst 0/5, A-3.

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FRIGR TTY

7 July 1925

SHAFF & IR STAFF NINTH AIR FORCE NINTH SERV COMP IN TOC 31ATH TO GROUP 442RD TO GROUP 12TH ARRY GF SEVENTE ADAY THESE ARRY NINTH ARRY COM ZONE ETOHSA UK BASE SECTION DELTA BASE SECTION \$30000 TRAME WING SHAFF MISSION FRANCE SHAFF MISSION DELGIUM SHAFF MISSION FRANCE SHAFF MISSION SHAFF MISSION NOLLAND UN GROUP CO GERMANY SELME CHANNEL BASE SECTION OF SECHANDEL BASE SECTION

OPER I IONAL COFFROL OF IN TROOP CARE DE COSMAND, 314, 442 TROOP CARE DE ORONNE, 301 AND 302 TEODF CARELER SUDHS PARER SEPERATE PARER, 441 TROOP CARELER GROUP CORPORED OF 99 AND 100 TROOP CARLER SQUARDON, AND 302ND TRANSPORT WIRE IS ASSURED BY THIS READ-GRAFTERS AS OF LIDHIGHT 7/8 JULY. SHARF AIR HIS GAGE A 215 OF JULY 38D REFERS. ONE AGENCY OF THE HIAD JUSTERS WILL CONTROL AND ALLOCATE ALL AND RIGHE ARE LIST IN THIS THEATER WITH EXCREPTION OF AUR TRANSPORT COMMAND. TO AVOID COMPUSION AND POSTIBLE DUPLICATION IT IS DIRICTED THAT THE RINTH A IN VOICE UNDERTAKE NO COMMITMENTS FOR ANY A IN LET WHAT SO EVER SITS ITS PRESIMILY AS LENED TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT UNLESS SUCH CONMITMENT HAS BEEN CLEARID BY THE ADENCY OF THIS HEAD JURTERS ESTABLISHED FOR THAT FURPOSE. THE FUNCTION FORMERLY PERFORMED BY CATOR FOR ALER ICAN SIDDERS WILL AT PERFORMED BY THE AR TRANSPORT OPERATIONS ROCE PAREN ATCH PAREN WHICH WILL CONTINUE FOR THE TIME BEING TO THE CHANNELS AND INSTALLATIONS ESTABLISHED BY CATOR. EFFECTIVE HIDNIGHT 7/8 JULY, BIDS FOR ADE LEFT FROM ASTRICAN AGENCIES WILL BE SUBMITTED TO ATCR. ALL BINS FOR AIR LIFT ARE REQUESTED TO BE CONTINED TH CONSOLIDATED FORM DY AN AGENCY OF ANNY GROUPS, ADD PORCE, RIGHTA E CON DMD ZOME, UNITAF 🗃 US GROUP CC PARES CERMANY PARES. BIDS FROM SUBJEDURATE UNITS OF THESE MAD UARTERS ANE NOT DES DED.

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• SECRET

-37 16th MAY, 1944

ATTA CONAMAG

WASHINGTON Conferes: General MCCLELLAND, Col. MUNDELL, Col. ROTHHOCK, Lt. Col. DAVIS, Major JENSEN and Dr. MENTEN

LOLDON Conferrees:

Col. DIXON, Lt. Col. RAISEY, Captain RICHA DSCH, Captain McGINEY.

.....

MARKINGTON: DOCUMENTAND for DERCH. Subject is Agency to be responsible for UK-Caserta-Poltsva circuits. ANP/ATO is taking over from AAGS at Caserta. What are views of your Headquarters regarding other two terminals. I would like to withdraw AAGS from any participation as soon as another agency can take over. It is apparent that these circuits are tactical administrative and may involve command and deplomacy traffic. All of this is beyond normal AAGS responsibility. Furthermore evident expansions of traffic will require further diversion of AAGS personnel from ATC routes where strength is already weakened. Please give me your views.

LONDON: DIXON for MUCLELLAND. I have already discussed situation with SIRPEYTER and Day, and we had decided -

1. That present plans should be continued for installation of manually operated circuits, due to urgent request from SPA-TZ and BARMA that operations be commenced as soon as possible. We were working on a target date of 21 May.

2. That ALCS equipment should then be used in conjunction with R-T-T for the final sot-up of the Widewing-Maples-Poltava triangle. We are working on a target date of 21 June on this.

3. We had a greed that AACS should continue to maintain and operate Widewing and Polts a R-T-T stations, as most of the equipment is theirs, and they have the trained personnel to work with. SI MEMER and DAY anxies to boths call felt that it was a good plan in view of possible future expansions, which would be out of USSTAP territary. However if you wish to release the AACS equipment on this project to us, I can take over the maintenance and operation of the R-T-T circuits without any difficulty after the equipment is installed.

1.2

MASHINGTON: MCCLEMAND for DIXON Re. your pera 1. Yes, that was the reason in the boginning for giving the job to ALCS. I understood that the was the critical factor and ALCS was the logical organization to get in and get goin. However, these circults will have to be changed over to teletype as soon as possible and when that occurs ALCS should turn over to scheden else. The egalpment, though in tially AACS can be left intact only the personnel to be withdrawn. However, I propose no action now which will in any way interfere with speediest possible completion of project. Therefore, if you concur we can agree that for planning AACS will withdraw leaving equipment in place at whatever time you shall determine.

LONDON: DINCH for INCLELLAND. Understand your statement and agree fully. Suggest that as stated above we leave LACS operating circuits until NTT is installed and ready to operate.

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P A E Ι S U Ν L А S S I F I E D WASHINGTON: MCCIELLAND for DIKON: O.K. Thanks.

WASHINGTON: MUNDELL for BIXON: Gen. MCCLELIAND has just left. Col. LUNDELL can pass anything up to him that you have.

LONDON: DIXON for MUNDELL: Note for Gen. MCGLELLAND from DIXON. It would be appreciated if R-T-T maintenance teams for Widewing and Poltava could be fur-nished either from S.A.S. Person el or from the States.

MASHINGTON: MUNDELL for DIXON: I imagine that SAS will maintain maintenance personnel at each installation. However, will check and find out.

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TELETIPE CONFERENCE

22 MAY, 1944

To Col. DINON from DON MERTEN

Regarding Project WP-668-71 believe this information should be forwarded to Major General HUGH KNENR. Above project not electronic but have investigated same under belief that visit in States is for purpose of forwarding any information, that would help bombing of Europe and War effort.

Froject WF-666-71 is trainer used for bomb sight bombing of Europe. Trainer used for pilotage, intelligence and flab briefing of could crews for missions over eccupied country. Colored negatives projected on trans lux 12 foot screen of mossic land fall check points and bombing run IP to target. Recon photos taken at same altitude as mission used. Color clearly shows terrain and is viewed exactly the way it will appear from the aircreft and travelled at speed of the aircreft. Wind and drift can be set in as well as any clouds from 0/0 to 10/10. Invaluable in showing flak areas and way of avoiding same

Fossible to brief entire squadron 12 hours after photos secured. Should be invaluable for planning of missions, bomb assessments, pilot and bombardier training etc.

Equi ment built as part of GHT trainer and modified. Could be easily available in quantity from link trainer. 4 units available immediately.

Believe alvantageous to have at losst 1 or more units as sample shipped ETO.


Unit a pproximate cost \$350.

Trained Intelligence Officer with this device available 2nd Liout. P. J. MURDAY, Secret Weapons Leb., Wright Field.

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	UNITED STATES ARMY AIR FORCES	A WY	
	HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN DIVISION AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND		
	(1400th AAF Base Unit) APO 741 U.S.Army		
			DCGOPS
	1 December	er 1944	
	SUBJECT: Proposed Padiation of Data		
	SUBJECT: Proposed Reduction of Radar Govarage		AD CO OPS
	TO : The Under Secretary of State, Air Ministry, Attn: Director of Redar		
			DIR OPS
	1. This Division has received information to the effect that Radar coverage is to be eliminated in certain		
	particularly forth freland and the West of Scotland.		
	2. this facility has been of great velue in earliet		DIR INTEL
	And the bale operation of strerait incer the control as		
	the Air Transport Command. While the prime importance of this coverage has been to assist in the movement of tac-		
	tical sircraft bound for the United Kingdom, it is also considered necessary to leave sufficient R_dar coverage		DIR WEA
	or the continued sale operation of transport since the		
	chap and the proposed receployment of tactical aircraft.		
	3. it is therefore requested that consideration be		D CG ADM
	given to leaving sufficient Radar coverage in North Areland and the West of Scotland to insure the continued safe move-		
	specs ment of aircraft over these areas.		OIR PERS
	For the Commanding General:		
	TRANS /s/t/ GUY R. HOGARTH, CAPT	A R Com	
	/t/ COHN G. SALSMAN	, A.O. 101	DIRMAN
	Colonel, G.S.C. Chief of Staff		
	countint US Strategic Air Forces		
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	DIR PLANS		
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Grosvenor		c/o ADMIRALTY,
	20	P SECRET LONDON, S.W.I.
B	JCB/X/5247	16th January, 1945.
Ci U,	S. Strategic Air H	Porce. (Main)
	S.W.V., War Office	
U.	S. Naval Forces in	Europe Readiness Division,
		e. (Attn. Lt.Cdr. Mayer).
S. A.	H.A.E.F. MAIN COLM C. of S.G-3, Exper	ANDING GENERAL, S.H.A.E.F. imental Sub-Section (Attn.Col.N.N. Lack).
n j	e name or office of	s drawn to paragraph 2 of h December '44, requesting f holder.of the document of Near-Nan Viewing Equipment
2. bu th	t has not given the	as been received from your office is information. It is requested a may be furnished forthwith.
		10-0
25		Ask Charles
		Lieut. Cdr., R.N.V.R.

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
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> Secretary, BRITISH JOINT COMMINICATIONS BOARD.

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DATE SIGNED

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HEADCUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE Office of the Commanding General AFO 634

TOF SECRET

By authority of Commanding General Bighth Air Force

Initials: NWH Date 24 July 1944

25 July 1944

Nojor General F. L. Anderson Deputy Commender for Operations U S Strategic Air Force AIC 633, U S Army

Dear Fred:-

With reference to the subject of jet-propelled fighters, as discussed in your letters to me of 13 July and 19 July and your cable of 16 July, I would like to stress again my reason for desiring to have simulated combat tests against jet-propelled aircraft conducted in the UK by our fighters. More practical and valuable information can be obtained by conducting these tests in the UK under the control of the Fighter Command than can be obtained in the U.S. where active control by Fighter Command cannot be exercised. In the tests conducted in this theater, results are immediately available to the Command as the bests are conducted, and, as countermeasures are proposed, they can be immediately tested and the results immediately observed.

I am, therefore, most anxious to have made available to the Fighter Command at the earliest possible moment both american jetpropelled fighters and the British "Meteor" referred to in your letter of 19 July. I hope everything possible will be done to obtain from the British a "Meteor" as soon as the present restrictions on the aircraft are removed.

Your cable with reference to Fighter Command representatives for attachment to Jet units in the U.S. was answered under date of 18 July and was no doubt in your headquarters but had not come to your attention at the time you wrote your letter of 19 July to me.

Sincerely,

/s/ J. H. DCOLITIE J. H. DOOLITTLE Lieutenant General, U.S. Army Commanding

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HEAD HARTERS JU LE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AL PORCES IN SUROPE ADVISORY SPECIALIST GROUP APO 633

3 March 1945

MEMORANDUM TO: Lt. General Carl Speatz.

SUBJECT

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: Employment of SHORAN on a Limited Scale by the VIII Air Force.

Shoran has proved itself in medium bomber operations to be capable of as accurate bombing as can be done visually by any means. General Doolittle, after appraising the equipment in flight, has expressed the belief that it would permit bombing by the heavies more accurately than any of the instrument bombing techniques now employed by the VIII Air Force and possibly as good as visual bombing when the crews become familiar with the technique of employing it under the operational conditions of the VIII Air Force.

Although the VIII Air Force has in the pest year developed several radar bombing methods (H_X, Micro H, Gee H) to a point such that the bulk of their bombing is done by instrument, still the accuracy of instrument bombing leaves much to be desired when compared with visual bombing. The circular error of H_X bombing for the Last four months is about 1.8 miles, for Micro H .6 and for Gee H .6, and for visual .3. the VIII air Force experience over the last several months are such that the VIII air Force can only be counted on for accuracy against point targets when good visual conditions obtain.

An operation such as "Clarion" must now wait until good weather is assured over the several targets. This is a very severe restriction on the capabilities of the VIII Air Force to carry out attacks of the type that are becoming even more profitable now that we are entering the mopping up stages of the war. If Shoran duplicates visual accuracy in bombing, the heavies of the VIII Air Force could operate on target systems such as "Clarion" under FFF bombing conditions. With the coverage which will be made possible by stations behind the Russian lines plus those on the Western front, Shoran bombing can be done on over SOM of the important targets of the VIII Air Force.

It would not be reasonable to expect the VIII Air Force to undertake immediately a large program for installation of Shoran because of the heavy commitments in other equipment and because of the difficulty of introducing any new device on a large scale. Nor would it be desirable seriously to interfere with the program of the medium bombers for the use of Shoran, which may be expected to bring their effectiveness to a new high level. It is felt, however, that without material interference to the program of the medium bombers, enough Shoran equipment could be bat wings (six groups) affectively. This ability to provide accurate bombing by 216 heavy bombers on every normal mission of the VIII Air Force would, it is believed, make an important difference in the striking power of the VIII Air Force.

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To outfit two combat wings the following equipment is needed:

- 1. 42 sets of airborne Shoran equipment (AN/AFS-3);
- 20 sets of ground beacons (AN/CPN-2);
 Associated test equipment.

Although Shoran is in continuous production in the U.S., due to confusion in procurement only the first 200 airborns equipments are complete with computers and hence useful for this purpose. These 200 are now in the process of shipment to the Theaters in accordance with the following allocation:

- ETA = 65 sets; to be divided between the IX Air Force and lat 1.
- 2. XII Air Force 66 sets;
- 3. Desert Air Porce 50 sets;
- Miscellaneous equipments remaining in the U.S. 19 sets.

It is suggested that the most equitable way to provide the 42 equipments for the VIII Air Porce would be on a pro-rate re-allocation from each Air Porce. This would mean the diversion of the sirborne equipments from the above units on the following basis:

IX and 1st TACAF - 15 sets (leaving 50 sets);
 XII Air Force - 15 sets (leaving 51 sets);

3. Desert Air Force - 12 sets (leaving 38 sets).

If such a diversion were made now it is expected that the VIII Air Force could become operational with some degree of effectiveness by 1 May 1945. If the VIII Air Force were to whit for the next production equipments complete with computers, they sould not be operational before 1 August 1945.

There is an adequate supply of AN/GFN-2 beacons, I believe, to take care of this additional requirement by the VIII Air Force.

It is proposed to install this Shoran equipment in two of the combat wings of the VIII air Force that are not presently equipped with Gee H or Micro H. The rest of the Air Force will operate exactly as in the past and this special force will make up only 15% of the numerical strength of the VIII Air Force. However, it is anticipated that the effectiveness of this per simplane will be approximately twice as great as the rest of the simplenes with the other types of equipment.

Perhaps the most important factor in considering the desirability of such re-allocation of Shoran equipment is the fact that its employment by heavies of the VIII Air Force will result in a greater weight of bombs on the most critical targets than any other projected use of this equipment.

> DAVID T. GRIGGS Expert Consultant to the Secretary of Mar

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ATTED STATES STUDENING AIR PORCEJ IS STROP

5 February 1945

TALS UP

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TROBATION TO: Lieutenant Coneral Carl Spaatz

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: The sole of Controlled Buzz cabs 1 Derman Ser

O. BAL

Most of the cable discussion that I have seen between the TO and the U.S. relative to the use of the "Chinese Cony" of the Berman buzz bomb (JB-2) has made the tacit assumption that the American product would be in fact a Chinese copy and would differ in no important operational aspects. There has been little mention made of the program for accurate control of the JB-2 which is actively under way in the G.S. at this time. Jince the JB-2 must always be in direct competition with other means of achieving the same military objective, its accuracy may be the determining factor in deciding whether or not it is to be introduced into the EEO, and the scale of the effort. If around control can materially improve the acuracy, its importance as a military weapon will be greatly enhanced. Nince I have just had a chance to become familiar with the program for control of the JB-2, I thought it appropriate to report the outlines of this program together with any spess as to its tactical implications. I will preface this with a brief account of the JB-2 development as I saw it in a curpary inspection at again Field.

33-2 DEVELOR ENT

The JR+2 is in all important respects a realize of the standard type of German V-1. The vehicle appears to function well as a controlled airplane once it is launched. It is reported to climb to its pre-set altitude normally and to be stable in flight at all times. In level flight it seems to to about 400 mph. There are no good measurements yet of its terminal speed, but on one occasion it ran away from a P-GS.

There is still much to be learned about the mechanics of lauching the JE-2 in which we have departed from standard derman practice, largely because at the time work was undertaken the derman mechanism of lau ching was not known in detail. We have had to learn how to launch these weapons from scratch and there are some gaps in our understanding of the problems involved. Up to the time I left the T. S. E2 launchings had been attempted of which 7 were successful. All of these had been done by the use of rocket launching fear.

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The design of the ramp varied considerably. A 400 foot track inclined 8° to the horizon was the initial and standard ramp. Increaseful launchings were also made from a 400 foot horizon-tal ramp. One successful launching has just been made using ontinue their thrust after the launching cart had lott the ramp. This latter represents a considerable inprovement over standard lerman performance in the way of the failures were to recets burstlag, which presumably can be sured by a stand lesion chance. Considera le difficulty has also been stand with the jet motor and when the notor fails to his will be cured by experience since we have had to learn the standard erman bergenently covelops which destroys the radget. This will be cured by experience since we have had to learn the standard erman be starting the state without reference to er-ter to recet a starting the state without reference to er-ter to a station of launching or en-route failes to a cour when quantity launching or en-route failes the state are reasonably encouraging.

MP-SE-CRIT

there is as yet no data whatsoever on the accuracy of the J-8. All flights have been made over the dulf and no impacts have been plotted with any degree of accuracy. It is planned to get an overland range for assessing accuracy. It is also planned in the immediate future at film field to make tests in such directions that an Stable with XY plotting mark any trac the J2-2 to its point of live. Fore precise measurement of the point of impact is to be done b sighting on the splash and marker dye from an airplace equipped with thoran.

Since the launching car as used at present would contri-bute very greatly to the locistic and overall production pro-bles, stranuous attempts are being made to develop simpler and lighter part using non-critical materials. One of the methods now being pushed is a modification of the erman type mathematical by steam instead of hydrogen perceide. Another possibility is the use of a fly wheel launching mechan-iss in which the instic energy of the fly wheel is use to achieve rapic acceleration by winding a cable on a tapered from a rapp approaching zero length.

13-2 PRODUCTION SCHEDULS

Plans for JH-2 production have oscillated widely and rapidly. Mr. Lovett originally called for 3000 par month as a production goal. arly in January, General Arnold set up a program to achieve operational launchings on the following

eptember 1945 - 100 per day October 1945 November 1945

- 100 per day - 200 per day

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per day acember 1945 - 400 per day - 500 per day; and 500 per day abruary 1946 thereafter.

Toward the ond of January, based on catles between the Mar Department and ETC, and due to the conflict in production and logistics between this and the existing programs for the ETC, off made the decision to cancel all production of buzz books for operational use in the ETC. A pilot production of 2000 was still planned to carry out experiments, proof tests, and train-ing in the T. S.

AC/AS, COAR is in the process of establishing tables of organization and tables of equipment for the JD-2 organization. One has the squadron has been provisionally activated at the field with 500 men. This is estimated to be sufficient to run four ramps with an operational capacity of 100 per day.

OI OF 33-2

There is a large scale plan for the application of maker control to the JD-2. This is to be achieved by tracking the DD-2 with an SGR-504 equipped with an NY plotting coard and by passing control information to the ynoculation of the maker beam itself. In the DD-2 will be a beacon designation and be a beacon designation of the S84 radar transmissions and hick incorporates a discriminator which will receive modula-tions from the 584 and will operate the controls. This proves is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is being pushe jointly by ATRC and the Rosebul beacon which is beaching pushe is fighter already of the Steater. I have in early shill be fighter already on the securacy of control results with the 584. Due by not expect results from these experiments, however, for six works.

very attempt consistent with speed of production has been . Very attempt consistent with speed of production as been made to render the raisr control invulnerable to jammin . It will reply to the CCN-584 on a frequency different from that of the 584 transmission so that it will not be easy for the enery to determine the 584 frequency. Control will be exercised by a combination of pulse rate frequencies. In order for the enery to interfere with 504 tracking, he must trigger the bea-con by transmission on the appropriate frequency which will be, as we have seen, difficult to determine. In order for the enery to take over control of the JB-2, he will have to apply

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the proper frequency of the appropriate pulse rate modulations. dince this is exactly the type of control used in the deary willie, however, experience with cary willie would give him advance notice during which time as could be planning counter-measures which might apply to the J-2.

With remard to accuracy of control, it is appropriate to quote the figures obtained by Belin Field on the accuracy of positioning and the accuracy of bomb dropping with eary fillio afrematic similarly controlled. The probable error averaged by yards at 38 miles and 414 yards at 88 miles. Lowbs were dropped with a probable error of 266 yards at 23 miles. These runs were all made with inexperienced controllers and it is likely that these figures would be improved with practice. It is initially factor on controlled JP-2 accuracy will the signal to dive. This is, at the moment, very problematical and can be answered only from experiments in the 3. ...

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The possibility of radar countermeasures has been discussed above. The other possible types of countermeasures are aircraft interception and anti-aircraft. Judgins by our experience with oraft. With out prependerance of air power such attacks would heave the jet aircraft fairly side open to attacks by our interception which could be informed of JE-2 positions and of the presence of enemy aircraft. In any synth, this applies only curin wood weather and would detract from the enery's jet airraft activity spainst our own forces. Alth remer to actiaircraft, the only reason we had success against V-1 was because of the excellence of the 0.4684, the Mark 14 electric compution are believed to be possessed in advances of this contingtion are believed to be possessed in advances of this contingtion are believed to be possessed in advances that it is canticleated that the scurace by the lemans, so that it is canticleated that the scurace by the lemans, so that it is canticleated that the is canter the J-2 is such a momen that it would be and word difficult to hit than the straight-flying to an and be one difficult to hit than the straight-flying the can be form without interforms when the torologic

CONCLUSION

In view of the fact that the round centrol process is developing essentially in parallel with the JD-2 program, it is believed that the beater should reconsider its requirement for JD-2 is the light of the greater a curacy and flexibility which can be provided by ground control. If controlled JD-22 are desired for operational use next winter, a first theater requirement must be established now. Froduction contracts can not be initiated in the ". . until such a requirement estats.

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	TOP SECRET HNADQUARTERS AIR FORCE, ADVANCED AIR FORCE, ADVANCED AUTION AIR FORCE, ADVANCED AIR FORCE, ADVANCED AIR FORCE, ADVANCED ATO 696, U S Army 7 January 1945.
SUBJECT: Utilization of W.	illie Orphan in the Tactical Area.
T	al, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO
S and a conference with Major	a summary of information obtained at this Orphan Project from two messages received Henry J. Rand and Major R. K. Holbrook.
P 2. It is recommended t A a conference of responsible G ments of each agency second	hat US Strategic Air Forces in Europe call persons from each of the agencies enumer- ary with a view to determining the require- ary for the proper execution of the project rs necessary to implement the project.
	mmanding General:
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SUMMARY OF INFORMATION ON WILLIE ORPHAN PROJECT

1. DEFINITION: Willie Orpahn is the project designation of a plan for utilizing war weary radio-controlled aircraft as robot bombs.

2. <u>FURFOSE</u>: The purpose is three fold, each phase of which is remunerative.

a. To destroy or damage area targets in support of tactical and, in a limited sense, strategical operations.

b. To immediately counter the Cerman V-L and V-2 program with a controlled robot bomb of far greater destructive effect and consequent higher psychological value.

c. To obtain maximum utilization of aircraft which have become unfit for normal combat operations.

3. DESCRIPTION OF WMAPON: These aircraft, commonly termed "Weary Willies" are war weary B-17's and B-24's initially, and other types of aircraft at a later date, which have been stripped of all equipment that is non-essential for flight alone. Radio controls are installed which enable the aircraft to be controlled from either another aircraft (as in the Aphrodyte program) or from ground stations near the front lines opposite the selected target. The aircraft is then loaded with as much as 20,000# of TNT or Torpex and becomes a potential robot bomb weapon.

4. CONTROL TECHNIQUE: Volunteer pilots and co-ilots fly the aircraft from an solvanced and relatively isolated landing field, navigating to a prearranged point where contact is established by VHF radio with the SCR-584 ground station. The pilot sets up the aircraft on C l auto-pilot radio implemented controls and operation of the aircraft is turned over to the controller at the SCR-584 ground location. After remaining with the aircraft an adequate time to insure that the radio controls are functioning properly, the pilot and co-pilot bail out upon instructions from the ground station. The robot is then directed to the target area using the radio controls in conjunction with positioning references to the SCR-584 plotting board. As the robot approaches the target area the controller cuts the throttles at the time indicated by pre-computed data calculated to insure the robot's trajectory falling within the target area. It is conservatively estimated that at operational limits of control a target area of two miles square can be hit with reasonable certainty. Targets closer in requiring less altitude for line of sight control

5. PROPOSED OPERATIONAL USE:

a. Targets -- This headquarters has been advised that if the aircraft flies 5,000 or more feet altitude a maximum range of 50 miles could be expected. Inasmuch as the average location of SCR-584s

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in tactical usage is ten miles from the front lines, many suitably large and lucrative target areas are presented. In the XXIX and IX Tactical Air Command areas the western Ruhr area, Munchen-Glabbach, Dusseldorf, Koln, Duren, Bonn, Euskirchen and like areas can be reached. In the XIX and XII Tactical Air Command areas, Coblenz, Trier, Saarbrucken, Weisbaden, Frankfurt, Kaiserlautern, Baden Baden, Freiburg, Karlshrue, Stuttgart, Mannheim and Worms could be reached. These all are highly industrialized areas.

b. Technique -- Bad weather, instrument and night operations should be stressed in order to nullify as far as possible the cartain light flak defenses and visual heavier flak defenses and to minimize enemy fighter action. Targets currently under attack should be widely scattered to prevent undue concentration of flak at a few points. BBRL should prepare radar coverage diagrams of all SCR-584's from their present locations and implement this coverage data as the SCR-584's are moved or new ones are secured. Coverage should be prepared on the basis of heavy bomb type aircraft. This information would facilitate target selection.

c. Responsibilities -- The willie Orphan project will require considerable coordination and effort by both the Eighth and Minth Air Forces, as well as USSTAF. If this program is to get underway withcut unnecessary delays, the project should be given highest priority in all FTO channels of command and supply. It is believed that an organization conducting operations of this nature could not very well be considered tacticel inasmuch as the tactical benefits which might be derived from the attack of area targets with the present degree of accuracy would not be sufficient to term the Weary Millie a tactical weapon. In like manner, it is equally true that this weapon could in no wise be termed strategical due to its limited accuracy, frequency and range of operations. Since the project includes components of both tactical and strategical nature, it is recommended that this organization be operationally and administratively under the control of USSTAF. Should it be determined, however, that this should be a Minth Air Force project, it is urged that no division of responsibilities be inherent in the operations of the unit. Ninth Air Force operations should be responsible for the selection of suitable targets after consultation with Ninth Air Force and Air Ministry target information. All targets should be channeled through Ninth Air Force operations for necessary coordination and "lay on".

6. PROJECT REQUIRMENTS:

a. Equipment.

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(1) Completely equipped war weary robot aircraft should be delivered to the continental base through special supply channels.

(2) Explosive kits, complete with fuses and detonators, ready for loading in the aircraft would be delivered to the continental base direct from BADA, United Kingdom.



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(3) It is not believed that Ninth Air Force would have to furnish any additional redio or radar equipment as normally "Weary Willie" would be operating during periods when normal missions are grounded. Special radio equipment is being furnished from the Zone of Interior.

b. Personnel.

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(1) Base housekeeping personnel who would be responsible for mess, billets, supply, field maintenance, etc., should be made available from USSTAF sources.

(2) Tactical and technical personnel such as pilots, co-pilots, heavy bombardment maintenance personnel, technical specialists, etc. should be furnished by Eighth Air Force and be supplemented by the officers and enlisted men especially trained in the U.S. for this project and now enroute to this theater.

(3) Approximately 300 enlisted men and 25 officers would be required at the forward base for housekeeping alone. (This to include one full M.P. company as the security of this base should be in the Top Secret category.) Tactical and technical personnel would bring this total figure to 500 or 500.

C. Training -- The bail-out crews and radio control personnel must receive special training in the operation of Willle Orphan and tests and practice runs should be made under simulated tactical altuations. This would best be accomplished in the U.K. under the direction of the Nighth Air Force component which has been conducting experimental research on this project. Initially a minimum of two exceptionally well qualified SCR-584 controllers should be sent by Minth Air Force to the U.K. for training and the establishment of techniques necessary for controlling and plotting of robot aircraft by the SCR-584 rader. SCR-584 is are available in the U.K. at R.A.F. stations Bruntan or Milfield or BERL station at Great Malvern. It would also be advisable to allow a period of integration of the overall organization such that there would be an initially high degree of operating efficiency.

d. Bases -- It is felt that two bases would be necessary for the Matisfactory operation of the Willie Orphan project:

(1) A rear base should be established in the U.K., utilizing heavy bonbardment facilities of a service depot for all stripping, control installations and training of bail-out crews and technicians.

(2) A forward base should be on the continent where aircraft would be loaded and dispatched against their targets. Investigation of existing airfields with due consideration fortheir availability and possibilities of necessary development indicates that either A-58 or A-70 would be suitable and could be made available at the expense of other units now occupying those fields moving to less suitable fields.



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e. Communications -- The advanced base should have direct wire communication to the MEW and the SCR-584 being used for control of the operation. If this is not entirely feasible, circuits should be set up and plugged through directly on a pre-arranged basis for the duration of each operation. The F.M. frequencies of the present redic controls being used are within the G.A.F. fighter band. This should be thoroughly investigated and guarded against to preclude jeaming as far as possible.

7. FUTURE EMPLOYMENT: Information available at present indicates that approximately 25 robot aircraft per month can be launched initially. Additional sets of control equipment are being made up in the Zone of the Interior plus additional explosive kits. The developmental program in the Z.I. includes homing devices which will cause robots to home on heat targets, such as factories or stell mills, and a new control method which will permit the control of the robots by means of the SCR-5% radar beam which is almost entirely jemproof. These devices are to be available in approximately ninety (90) days in this theater. Within mix months additional SCR-5% with 100 mile control ranges and improved plotting boards will be available in the ETO for the control of Weary Willies.

8. CONCLUSIONS:

a. The Willie Orphan Project appears to have an application against tactical area targets.

b. The personnel and equipment essential for the proper prosection of this project appear at present to be divided between four agencies: UNSTAF, Eighth Air Force, Winth Air Force and EBRL.


c. With responsibilities of the project divided emong these four egencies the chances of success of this project are extremely small.

d. This air Force is prepared to furnish a sultable base, housekeeping facilities, necessary operations personnel to select suitable targets commensurate with the tactical situation and, if necessary, a Chief Project Officer.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe call a conference of responsible persons from each of the agencies enumerated in paragraph S above with a view to determining the requirements of each agency necessary for the proper execution of the project and preparation of the orders necessary to implement the project.



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d. There is a necessity for the development of high-speed controlable serial bomb. It is desirable to release bombs outside the range of anti-siroraft artillery. In order to gein speed, this bomb should be rocket assisted. Continued development in high resolution television control should make possible reasonable accuracy on moving targets. This type weepon should effect nevel werfare in about the same menner as the introduction of torpedoes.

G. The preceding paragraph is based on the assumption that we will continue to carry weapons to very distant targets. Filotless simplenes, buzz bombs and rockets may become long-range weapons but it seems to me that they would be too costly to expend. As abort-range weapons, present trends indicate a great future for buzz bombs and rockets, however, we must develop them into truly precision weapons. Use to their low accurecy, the present versions of V-1 and V-2 being launched on London represent an incredible investment when viewed in the light of the military damage done. The twelve tons of intricate and very expensive mechanery which V-2 requires to deliver less than one ton of explosive to London or vicinity could only be justified according to our standards if they could hit a precision military target with a high percentage.

1. We have proven the precision bombing principle in this war. Our precision however is in a relative not a literal sense. We must assume that our enemies will take this lesson to heart and prepare to house their vitals in very_{out inten-} anell or underground units. The very nature of the new concrete-piercing and earthquake type bombs will increase our air effort if we must depend on the laws of probability and pettern bombing. Therefore, we must develop bombsights and homberdiers, which, under all weather conditions, can not only literally drop bombs in "s pickle berrel" but in the correct barrel.

L. In the engineering of new sirplene designs, we should make proper provisions for inevitable future additions of equipment. We should plan not only the integrated function of such afterthought additions, but the space and weightaceasy locations in order not to estroy performance as a result of unplanned overloading. Thought should be given to simplifying production and maintenance; better accessibility and the maximum use of quick-change features; automatic and single-layer controls to simplify the operating problems of the erew. Automatic features implantence complicated machanisms and increased maintenance problems, but when we consider merial warfare is expanding our best young men, perhaps we should orient our decign and training programs so that in the next war we can have million dollar mechanics and expand ten dollar pilots.

h. I see no reason why we should limit the development of long range rockets solely as weapons. Fitted with proper decelerating devices, they might be made into carriers. Why not develop a rocket which will insure the accurate and safe delivery of paratroopers by incorporating automatic decelerating and jettisoning controls?

You have amply covered George Kenney's specific remarks, however, I should like to add a defense of the "Northrup Flying Ming". The next wer may be fought with rockets instead of sirplanes, but until a worthy substitute wearon is within our grasp, we must take the longestpossible steps forward in replacing our present obsolete designs. Even as presently conceived, the F-35 and the several experimental fighters built around the flying wing principle

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represent a great step forward in acro-dynamics. We should carry on with this design in spate of any resent development or roduction difficulties. To not the conduction of the figure wing and jet engines really are a "natural". Jet engines should overcome cany of the engineering difficulties which have furnished strong urguments for the angineering difficulties algoers. I believe that in a few years, this combination will a proach the interact thrust and power than now contangiated, we may be able to reduce the number of engines in large air lands. On the other hand, if we can have the engines entirely in the wing, we might include which under or of which would only be used for take-off or everyencies, and which under orulaing conditions, would penalize performance from the would standpoint only. From our experience with battle damaged engines in this war, military sirplement should nove allower to continue formation fight with at least one engine incy rlenge with battle damaged engines in this with at least one engine incy rsive signate power to continue formation fight with a standpring the fuel superlenge with battle damaged engines in this with at least one engine incy rsive signate power to continue formation fight with at least one engine incy rsive signate should straining the retaining engines or endangering the fuel super-

i know that you are taking care that the casis for research in the development of airplanes and aerisl weapons for the maxt war relain troad. Only by constant research and frank appraival of our weapons can we hope to conjete with the appressor nations of tomorrow in the preparation for warfare. It is continue research with the impetus which we have now.

Sincerely,

dadi Srandi Lieutenant Cenera, U.S... gomandin .

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CUINT TARONTS CONTINUE

.O.L. DEPOT WORKING COMMITTEE

BULLETIN NO.2

10 OCTOBER 1944

The organization of P.O.L. supply and storage was again discussed this week, and it was suggested that the evidence available on the Lurgau and Wehrkreis numbering systems be studied in an attempt to discover new depots. If any such discoveries are made, they will be reported in future bulletins.

A working arrangement was made between the Mediterranean and Medmenham to facilitate photo interpretation for assessing priorities on the depots located in the Mediterranean area.

A document, prepared by the War Office, on flak defences around P.O.L. Depots was submitted to the Committee for consideration. The Committee felt that the value of such a study was great, and expressed a desire to obtain this information regularly in future.

Prioritios for the coming week are shown under Table I, and the Japot Work Shoets comprise Table II.

P. O. L. DEPOT MORAING COMMITTEE.

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	TOP	SECRET	
	P.C.L. DE	ABLE I POT PRIORITY LIST	
PRIORITY	TARGET NO.	NAND <u>AE</u>	PLIDIX NO. [*] . 1
1	GQ 2014	DERBEN	1
2	2011	HITZACKER	1
3	2007	FARGE	
4	2026	EHMLIN	2
5 .	2025	NEUBURG a.d. DONAU	1
6	2015	FREIHAM	1
7	2012	Nienburg	1
8	2023	OLDINDORF nr. OSNABRUC	ik l
9	2031	LEANHAUSEN	2
10	2034	ANNABURG	2
11	1645	LOBAU	l
12	2021	ROUDNICE	1
	2033	WIISZENHORN	2
13	NOT TARGETED (1)		2
14			2
15	NOT TARGLIED (2)		2
16	NOT TARG "ED (3)	LICHELOH	2
17	GQ 2027		2
18	2029	NEURNHEIRSE	2
19	2019	LOCCUM	
20	2028	GHIJLINGEN	2
21	2030	RUTHEN	2
	D CO 2022	DULMEN	2
allarandu	<u>D</u> GQ 2022		vegous and rail

* APPENDIX 1 - Low level attacks against tank wagons and reil facilities recommended.

 APDANDIX 2 - Heavy bomber attacks recommended.

 MOTE: Pinpoints on G3GS 4081
 Photo Nos.

 (1)LUDWIG3HAFEN
 131/559801 593805
 3172, 3181 of 1060R/3137

 (8)MANNHEIM
 131/559852 593860
 4124, 5 of US7GR/3369

 (3)KOLN/NILHL
 94/454677
 4058, 59 of 106GR/3115

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DEFOT WORK SHEETS

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TABLE II

LAJOR WIFO DEPOTS

TARJET NO	LOCATION	SERVICE USER	ESTIMATED CAPACITY	TYPE OF STORAGE	LAST COVER	NO.TANKS WAGONS LAST COVER	LAST APTACK	RE-ARKS	
<u>G. 2014</u>	DERBEN	ARAY-GAF	1005 185,000	Buried tacks and cylinders	6.10.44.	145 +			
04 2007	FARE	ARAY-GAP	442,000	Buried tanks and cylinders	2.10.1µ1.	435			
<u>eq 2015</u>	FREIMAN	GAF-AR Y	131,000	Buried tanks and cylinders	12.9.04	97			
<u>G. 2011</u>	HITZACKER	AR IX-GAF	344 , 000	Buried tanks and cylinders	6 . 10 . 44.	16 +			
<u>GQ 2025</u>	MEUBERG a.	d. GAF-?AICII	100,000	Buriod tanks	18.7.44	52			
<u>GQ 2012</u>	NIMINURG		147,000	Buried tanks	17.9.44		5.8.44.	Vory slight danage	
60 2023	OLDENDORF	GJUF	45,000	Buried tanks	11.9.44.	18			
Gig 2021	ROUTHICE	ARC	38,500	Buried cylinders	28.8.44.	About 200?			
<u>69 1645</u>	LOBAU	ARAY	216,000	Buriod cylinders	7.10.44.	190	10.9.44	Moderato dun je	
				COMMAND DEPO	rs				
<u>G. 2034</u>	AUGUBURG	GAP	5,400	Sunded surface	21.7.44	-			
GQ 2022	DULGEN	GLF	3,200	Surface tanks	5.10.44.	6	26.8.44	Intact but apparently inactive after attack	

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				COLLEND DEPOTS (contd).					
TARGET NO	LOCATION	SERVICE USER	ESTLATED CAPACITY	TYPE OF STORAGE	L.ST COVER	NO. TANKS WAGONS	LAST ATTAC	K j	SNLIKES	
<u> 2031</u>	EBINGLUSEN •	GAF	13,000	Surface tanks - canouflaged and	9.9.44.	LAST COVER 92 +				
<u>(40</u> 2026	548 0-24	GJF	5,900	Mounded Suface tanks - compuflaged and	13•9•44+	21				
<u>G. 2027</u>	JICHESLO H	ARC	6,000	atounded surface tanks	2.8.44.	761				
<u>Ge 2028</u>	GEIS <u>LINGEN</u>	ARAY	6,000	Louided and caloufLaged surfa	30.10.43	-				
<u>GQ 201</u> 9	LOCCUM	GAP	13,500	tanks Surface tanks	17.9.44	Nil.				
00 2029	NEUEN . HEERSE	1.Ref	6,000	Surface tanks	13.5.44.	2				
<u>GQ 2030</u>	RUTHEN	I.R. IY	6,000	Munded surface tanks	28.5.44.	Ŷ				
<u>C. 2033</u>	WEI SZENHORY	G1 <u>0</u> *	10 , 400	Surface tanks surrounded by blast walls	30.9.44	37	13.9.44	Racilitics i	ntect	0
				COLLERCIAL DEPOTS						
NOT + T.JRGETED	KOLIZIL	NI	14,000	Surface tanks	28.9.44	Ŷ				
"	LUDWICS. H.FEN	AR Y	59,700	Surface tanks	29.9.44	30				
" + \$ ₀₀		.Jol	34,800	Surface tanks	19.9.44	14O				

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(<u>COPY</u>)	SECRAT
ATE	RATEGIC OIL INSTALLATIONS
	MUSTERN CERMANY
Locality	Flak defences (as at 3 Oct 44)
ACHIM	No information.
ANNABURG	No information.
EAD WILDUNGEN	No information.
BLIOKIDZ	No information.
TARE (Herrior Jund)	No information.
BR. MAR HAVAN	Pinpoint in centre of town defendes. 7 light within 1500 yds.
SfiddEn (Nr. Brunawick)	Pingoint outside ERUNSWICK defence area. No gans within 1500 yds.
RLVAIDUD	Pinpoint in centre of town defences. 4 heavy, 8 light within 1500 yds.
DARMJTADT	Pinpoint inside town defences. 12 light within 1500 yds.
.Y.RBAN	No information.
DULMIN	3 light within 1500 yds. Possible 4 heavy unoccupied and 6 light unoccupied in same area
NELINIAI AZM	Undefended. 4 heavy unoccupied within 1500 yds.
HOLLICH	No information.
1340221	Pinpoint in centre of town defences. 18 light within 1500 yds.
and an	No information.
FARGL	On edge of BREMAN defences. 10 heavy, 18 light within 1500 yds. of perimeter of installation.
FLANSBURG	Pinpoint in centre of town defendes. 10 light within 1500 ydc.
PT. 2010004	2 light within 1500 yds (on conal bank), 4 heavy, 3 light within 3000 yds.
TRATINA	Outside MUNICH defence area. No defences within 1500 yds.
MISLIMUN	No information.
HITZACIDE	No information.
AIEL (Monkeburg)	Pinpoint in centre of town defences. 4 heavy, 5 light within 1500 yds.

T H I S P A G E I S U N C L A

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SHORET

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	-2-
Locality	Flak defences (as at 3 Oct 44)
KISL (klausdorf)	On edge of KIEL defence area. No defences within 1500 yds.
LCCCUM.	No information.
LUDINGVORTH .	No defences. A/F 4 mile away defended by 9 light guns.
HUNGTER	Pinpoint in town defence area. 12 heavy, 15 light within 1500 yds.
IMUBURG a DONAU	3 light unoccupied within 1500 yes.
NILNBURG	No defences within 1500 yds of pinpoint. (Quary complete photographic cover).
NUULN HILRSE	No information.
OLDINDORF	No information
RUMAN	No information.
SCHAPSTEDT	1 light on KLLL CANAL within 1500 yds.
SCHWARACH	No information.
TRAVLMUNDE	Pinpoint is centre of town defences. 18 light within 1500 yds.
LISELNHORN	No information.
VILHELIGHAVEN	On edge of town defence area. 4 heavy, 9 light within 1500 yds.
RLINDGBURG	14 light within 1500 yds, includes gons for defines of pailway spidge.

N.I.15. 5 Oct 44.

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Distribution. Copy No. 6-2, CLLF (Attention: Col. Foord) a-2, A. F. Stennore air collect, Colmon Command J. of I. (Stend, Colonel Aughes J. of I. (), and interry, once St. acts, Ope, air Sinterry, Mitchall D. J. Ove, air Sinterry, Source Mod. Sth. Ar Source (Col. Sillelan) 5-2, 1515, any Group (Thru Siller) D. Sinterry, Source (Lt.Col. Sillen) Mog, 2nd T.F. G-2, Charl (Attention: Col. Foord) 1 - 5 1 copy 7-- 8 10 copies 9-18 27 - 28 Air Commodore L. .. Bufton, D.D.Cos., Air . inistry Colonel ... Hughes, J. of I., UCCT F Jalonel king Douglass, A.I.J, U.C... 2r/Japt. A. worley, 1.0ps.l., Air inistry, Aitenall //ddr. T. der ess, a.1.3.c.(2) . ajor M. Dailey King, 6-2, SHalF S/Lor. J. Strachey, Ope.1. orving Condittee (RI Second) O.L. Luwrence, enemy branch, F.O. and L.E. . Lajor J.K. Leeson, D. of I., USSIAF Cast. J.m. Follock, L.I.10(c), ar Office Jart. J.S. Mons, G-2, Shour Lt. J. D vies, A.I.3.e., Air Linistry O.F. Thompson, Sneay Granch, F.O. and A.E.Y. W/Odr. J.S.C. Verity, A.T.3.c.(1)

Working Counittee (RL Depots); (file) 1 copy

W/Gdr. D.A.C. Dewdney, H.S.E.

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	HEAD JUANTERS ALL IND EXPEDITIONARY AIR UNITED STATES ARMY	FUNCE
	APO 656	
	REF: ARAF/586/Air Plans	13 January 1944.
I S	SMPJECT: Rankin 'C' - Annex 12 - Minth Air '	
	TO : Contanding General, Ninth Air Ford (Attn: Signal Officer)	a, AFO 696, U.S. Army
	 Under date 15 December 1943, this a on the above Field Order. In this correct, of transformers to work on the Continental re 	
U N C L	2. The above referred to transformers British sources, and in order that they can be for pending overations, it is requested that as werly as receible.	
		/s/ 2. S. Orr, It.Col., a.C.
		/for/ A. W. EMPRIMER, Mrsg. General, USA, D/ASC-1Chief.
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	HEAD WARTERS, NINTH ALL FORCE, APO 696, TIS LITE, S. 2 C. D. E. T
	TO: ACCSC, Head marters, Allied Expeditionary Air Forms, 200 656, U S AMEY, ATTN: Brig Gen. A. W. Farriner, D/ASO-In-Chief.
	1. Reference information requested in basic communication. For Operations RANKIN "C" the Ninth Air Force wire operations will require the following trans- formers:
T H I S	110 230 - 115 volt 5 KVA 150 230 - 115 volt 2,KVA 200 230 - 115 volt 1 KVA 400 230 - 115 volt 1 KVA
P A C E	2. For radio moint to point operations the following estimates are min- mitted. One (1) each 22 KVA, 2 to 1 ratio nower bransformer to step-down 200 walts to 110 wolts for each of the following:
I S	266 53. 199, 199,1991s T.B.A. Sigipment. 115 SGR 259, 399, and 1991s - Over T.B.A. Sigipment.
	3. Transformer requirements for Minth Air Porce air to ground equipment ere as follows:
N C L	290 - 22 NVm 2 to 1 ratio, to step-down 220-230 volta to 110-115 volta 20.
	These transformers will be obliged for the following eudyment:
	SCR 572, 573, 574, 575, and 624's.
F I E	This covers the air to ground commitments for subordinate Commands of the Minth Ale Force, i.e., IX Fighter Command, 4X Bicher Command, and 14 Troop Carrier Command and Transport Sing.
D	For the Connucting General:
	DISTRINCTION: Cy.No. 122 - Addresses. 3 - Sec.Con.Off.6th AF. A - Sig.Comm.Off.9th AF.
(SECRET-SECURITY RANKIN "O"
	SEGREDBECURITY
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD SECRET SEC Auth: CG, ETQUSA Initials: 023 Date: 7/1443 HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS UNITED STATES ARMY 3/1.2 7 December 1943. Τ Н SUBJECT: Secret-Security Procedure for Gable 4-4741. I S : Commanding General, Sighth air Force - A.f. 0. 63). P А G It is desired that cublegram A-4741 of aGaAR, dated 6 December 1943, be handled in accordance with Secret-Decurity procedure. All copies will be marked accordingly. Ε I By command of Lieutenant General DIVIRS: U N La or, G.S.C. Actg. Asct. Auj. Gen. Τ. A 1 Incl: Gablo A-4741 I F I Е D SECRET-SECURITY B-178 # 67 copy 1 0 1 0 8 THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

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
	The making of an evert copy of this message is forbidden. Only such extracts as are absolutely necessary will be may and marked SECRET. This copy will be safeguare with the greatest of care 452.1
	SECRET A-298
	(EQUALS BRITISH MOST SECRET AND SECRET REFORMED AND SECRET REFORMED AND SECRET AND SECRET REFORMED AND SECRET AND SECRET REFORMED AND SECRET AND SECRET AND SECRET REFORMED AND SECRET REF
	INCOMING MESSAGE
	ETOUSA HID/jva
	From: AGirAR Ref. No.: A=4741
	To : OG EIGHTH AIR FORCE Dated: DEC 060950A'43 recedence: ROUTINE HULAYED TO LTOUSA FOR
	INFO BY 8th AF Rec'd : DEC 060968A Security : SECRET
	Leference: LTOUSA W-8085/508 Dec 3, 1943 (Relay of 0G 8th AF 508 to AGWAR for action per direct AG Misc. Concurred in by G-3 & S/GS) (48556)
	"IDITLD LITINAL TEXT"
	Interior Addresses: To : DEVEAS
	For : EAKER From : GILES
	Signed : AUNOLD
	To your Theatre, cover plan calls for small numbers of very heavy bombers and it is necessary that all concerned continue to believe B-29's will be employed in UK.
	Impossible at this time to determine dates and numbers. Minimum airdrome requirements AB based on experience will be forwarded by letter marked, Attn: Air Engineer.
	No, B-29 units are for deployment to UK in schedule for 1944.
	NEC'D AG ETO: DEC 0612222 M/C No. 1-293 FLFRODUCED : DEC 0613102
	LTO DISTRIBUTION: (VFH)
	helays: NOME
)	1. Cables 2. Records 3-4. S/CS 5. G-3 6-10. OG SOS
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	nog. an. 1030. MRAD DARIELD : S. H.D. H.S.V. : IDate: 14 Jun 1344:	
	Boy Bo. 2. AINTO AIR FORDE : Initials:	
	SECRET-SECURITY ME	
T H	While: Request for Designation of Sighth Mir Porce Units Filocates to North fir Force for Longin "2".	
I S	: Commaning several, Wighth sir Force, 10 ag), 1107.	
P A G E I	1. In accordance with agreement reached in conference at head- montane lints in Parce, 13 January 1944, it is no posted that you now designate and inform on of the station locations on 1 February 1944 of the following units which are necessary to inclement stage I of opera- line which we". Designations and present locations of units are neces- mery now for the preparation of new mat, subcreation and include tables:	
S		
U N C L		
A S S		
I F I	2. c. The LoF has made arrangements to furnish due black fighter	
E D	b. the folicil field staries has been regressed from this, etc.	
	D C/3-Plans	
	AMARENT-LENDUNITY HADRIN "C"	
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HEADQUARTERS : INITIALS 444

****************** TOP SECRET AUTH: CO, PAAA DATE: 11 FEB 45 IMITIALS 44

APO 740, U S Arry 11 February 1945

SUL/ECT: Flanning Starf Study for Operation "WILDFIRE"

: See Distribution.

1. Reference this Headquarters letter No F - 1104 dated 7 Sebruary 1945 on the above subject.

2. In view of the absolute priority now to be accorded to Operation "VARCITY", no further action is at present required in connection with Operation "WILDFIRE".

For the Commanding General:

Glait

F.L. PARKS, Erigadiar General, OSC, Chief of Staff

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Conv. Ho 4-0 - COC, 1ST WRITISH A/B COEPS 13-15 - C1, IX TROOF CAPRIEN COMMED 13-51 - SC, SUPEDE HEAD JURNERS, ALLIED EXPERITIONARY PORCH - G.S. CONTER IN ELLIGENCE SUB-DIVISION (CLASF (AIN) - 03, - 081 ONY BIO NA DEL TY MG, SUPRELL HEAD MAN TERS ALLIED EXTENTIONARY 70:005 24-25 TO SE 20 - C3 UNITON STATES IT ATALLE ALL PORCES 21 - LINE A CEPS & CAUF, EAF 25-89 - LAN & REEL AND OF ON ARMES 20 - C01 STATUS ALL AR OF C MATLES (DVANCE HEAD, GARTERS) 31-55 - ROTAGE AND (LINE) CENTRAL CROOP OF ARTIES 35-57 - C4, RIATY D & ARM 35-67 - C6, STILD O & ARMY 43-67 - C6, STILD O & ARMY 43-67 - C6, SOUTHER FOULD OF ARTIES 50-53 - HART ALL PORCE (NUMARC) 51-55 - ROTAGE (CUMARC) 51-55 - ROTAGE (CUMARC) 51-57 - ROTAGE (CUMARC) 51-57 - ROTAGE (CUMARC) 51-57 - ROTAGE (CUMARC) 51-59 - ROTAGE (CUMARC) 51-57 - ROTAGE (CUMARC) 51-59 - ROTAGE (CUMARC) 51-50 - ROTAGE - 03 26 Copy No. TOPBECRET TS / 1991

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (MAIN) AIR STAFF

> APO 757, US Army 17 February 1945

SHAEF(M)A1R/S.35102/A-3

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SUBJECT: Isolation of the RUHR.

TO : Minth Air Force (Adv.), Second Tactical Air Force (Main), First Tactical Air Force (Prov.).

1. The attached appreciation and outline plan for the isolation of the RUHR is designed to disrupt and cripple the communications leading out of and into this vital area. The products of this area are considered to be vital to the German war effort. The plan, as outlined, was agreed upon at the Air Commanders meeting at SHARF Headquarters on 15 February 1945.

2. g. In the execution of this plan the Ninth Air Force will :-

- (1) Attack the bridges designated for attack by the Tactical Air Force in priority as shown.
- (2) Attack, as alternate targets to the bridges, small railway centers West of the line of bridge interdiction and Bouth of the line LOHNE-HAME-RUHR AREA.
- (3) Attack stations, open lines, locomotives and other rolling stock in the area mentioned in pars. 2.s.(2) above.
- b. The Second Tactical Air Force will :-
 - Attack small rail centers West of the line of interdiction and North of the RUHR AREA-HAMM-ICHNE line.
 - (2) Attack small stations, open lines, locomotives, and other rolling stock in the area mentioned in para. 2.b.(1) shove.

3. Apart from the plan for the interdiction of the AUHA, it is desired that First factical Air Force (Prov.) attack similar targets to those mentioned of interdiction. These attacks should be designed primarily to disrupt communications to and from the SAAR Area.

4. A list of the most important small roll centers in the area to be isolated will be furnished your Headquarters at an early date. A similar

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list of rail centers South of the line of interdiction of primary interest to the First Tactical Air Force (Frow.) is being prepared and will be forwarded as soon as available.

- 2 -

5. The sir effort of the Tactical Air Porces required by this plan will be subject to the requirements for air cooperation missions in conjunction with ground operations.

For the Deputy Supreme Commander:

m.

H. B. THATCHER, Brigadier General, U.S.A. Asst. Chief of Staff, A-3

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Copies to: USSTAF (Main) Air Minstry RAF Bember Command (Adv.) Eighth Air Force SHAEF G-3

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ISOLATION OF THE RUHR

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The loss of UPPER SILESIA re-emphasises the importance of the RUHR to the whole German war effort. Through this loss, the armament industry, the railways, public utilities (such as gas and electricity works) become almost entirely dependent on coel and steel transported from this vital industrial region, which now constitutes the German life-line. The enemy therefore is in the vulnerable position of having almost his entire industrial output dependent on the smooth working of his communications in a limited area, namely those linking the RUHR with the rest of Germany.

2. The Strategic Bomber Forces are already engaged in ettacking these rail and water communications. It has been decided that the Tactical Air Forces will extend the scope of their present attacks against communications East of the NHINE in coordination with the Strategic Bomber Forces. These operations will be subject to the requirements of the ground forces for air cooperation missions.

METHOD OF ISOLATION

3. Previous experience has shown that it is the concentration in time and space of all types of effort (heavy bomber, medium bomber and fighter bomber) on all types of target (large and small centers, bridges, small stations, epen lines, moving and stationary trains) which produces a more rapid paralysis of the system than could be achieved by any one method alone.

4. The current operations of the Strategic Air Forces consist of attacks as follows:-

- (a) The attack of key rail centers on the following main routes running East and North East from the RUHR:
 - (i) HAMM BIELEFELD MINDEN
 - (ii) SOEST PADERBORN HAMELN
 - (iii) SCHWERTE ARNSBERG WARBURG
 - (iv) MUNSTER OSNABRUCK BREMEN
- (b) The attack of selected key viaducts and bridges on the main routes.
- (c) The attack of the major railway centors within and on the approaches to the RUHR itself.

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The targets involved in the above attacks are listed weekly by the Combined

Strategic Targets Committee

D

METHOD OF ISOLATION (Contd.)

5. By increasing the number of bridges for stack, complete interdiction of the RUNR can be obtained and the speed and completeness of the present strategic objective greatly enhanced. The completion and maintenance of this line of interdiction would mean that only an insignificant proportion of bulk economic traffic would move Eastwards out of the RUNR area, while military movements across the interdiction line both from East to Nest and vice versa would suffer delays.

- 2 -

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BRIDGES SELECTED FOR ATTACK

6. The Bridges selected for attack by the Strategic and Tactical Air Forces consist of 16 Targets listed from North to South at Appendix 'A' and shown on the map attached thereto. In addition, 2 Targets of primary importance are included on the highest priority since their destruction would immediately reduce by half the high capacity routes available to the enemy. At Appendix 'B' the selected bridges are listed in order of priority in relation to traffic capacity and importance. Medium bombers, if unable to attack their primary bridge targets, should attack as targets of opportunity, small railway centers west of the line of interdiction. A list of such railway centers is being prepared.

ROLE OF FIGHTER AND FIGHTER BOMBERS

7. Attacks by Fighter and Fighter Hombers on stations, locomotives, trains, open lines etc., East of the MAR, should also be carried out. It must be expected that the enemy will concentrate tremendous repair effort on the damaged structures, and therefore "policing" should be carried out by Fighter and Fighter Bombers where possible. It is considered that the repair of damage can be greatly delayed by attacks against repair personnel and material. Attacks of this nature, combined with rail cuts and attack of rolling stock, can make a large contribution towards paralysis of the rail system.

APPENDIX A. T. TOP SECHAT

BRIDGES SELECTED FOR ATTACK LISCED FROM NOETH TO SOUTH

		N OLDENILD I VIL	PT1000-913.50	FROM MOETH TO SOUTH	1
No.	. Mrino	Grid Rof.	Watutuoy	Mumber Length of Tracks	Construction
1.	BREMEN	№-3/706990	Essor R	2 620 ft.	5 steel spans (1 swing)
2.	A RBYRGEN	14-3/759929	n 4	2 1,850 ft.	3 main steel spans 15 approach spans
3.	NIENBURG	N-3/979535	н и	1 850 ft.	3 main steel spans 5 approach spans
4.	BAD OEYNHAUSEN	P-3/763022	11 11	4 620 ft.	3 steel spans
5.	VLOTHO	P-3/791971	11 11	2 850 ft.	4 steel spans
6.	HEREFORD	P3/651901	Werre R	l 100 ft.	
7.	LACE	P-3/718783	11 11	1 170 ft.	
8.	ALTENBEKEN (or MEUENBEKEN)	P-3/822524	Viduot	2 1,680 ft.	About 25 arcnes
9.	NIEDER MARSEERS	Q-3/784197	Diemel R	2 155 ft.	
10.	KULTE-WETTERBURG	R-3/929118	Twiste R	1 115 ft.	
11.	BERGHEIM	11-3/976862	Eder R ·	1 700 ft.	
12.	GOLDE (S.RMAU)	R-3/736527	Lahn R	l 281 ft.	3 s pan steel structura Eng. No. 35
3.	NINDER SCHELD (Nr DILLENBURG)	S-2/399359	Dill R	3 196 ft.	l span stael trus Eag, No. 173
4.	PRACHT (Nr. AU)	R-2/937417	Sieg R	1 436 ft.	6 span, stone arch Eng. No. 75
5.	DOTTESFELD (Nr. SEIFEN)	S-2/862252	Wied R	1 220 ft.	Steel or concrete
.ć	NEUWIED (Irlich)	S-2/794147		2 300 ft.	l steel gir- der span
L7.	BIELEFELD * (SCHILDESCHE)	P-3/575847	Johannes R	2 Ea. 1,152 ft.	2 viaducts 26 concrete arches
з.	ARNSBERG *	Q-2/225119	Ruhr R	2 475 ft.	

(*) These two targets, although not part of the line of interdiction, are included on the highest priority (see Appendix 'B') since their destruction would immediately reduce by half the high capacity routes available to the enemy.

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APPENDIX "B"

TOP SHORET

BIELEFELD	S
ALTEMBEKEN or MUUER 22. P.	S
ARISBERG	Т
BAD OEYIIHAUSEN	Т
VLOTHO	T
NIEDER MARSBEHG	T
PRACHT	Т
NIEDER SCHELD	Т
LAGE	Т
HEREFORD	Т
A RBERGEN	S
BREMEN	S
VOLKMARSEN (KULTE-WETTERBUAG)	Т
NIENBURG	S
DOTTESFELD	T
NEUWIED	Т
BERGHEIM	Т
GOLBE	Т

<u>T</u> denotes target selected by Tactical Air Forces <u>S</u> " " " " Stretegic Air Forces

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HEADQUARTERS NINTE AIR TORUE

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APO 696, U S Army 12 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Revised Key List Operations OVERLORD and RANKIN "C".

ATS

TO : See Distribution.

1. Attached Key List of individuals having knowledge of Operations OVERLORD and RANKIN "C" is forwarded for your information. Complete knowledge includes target dates and assault areas. Limited inowledge means knowledge of the operations generally, but such knowledge do is not include target dates and assault areas.

2. This list supersedes "Revised Key List for Operation OVERLORD and RANKIN "C", dated 23 March 1944, Minth Air Force Register No. 1900. All holders will destroy same and return a certificate of destruction to this Headquarters as soon as practicable. A form is inclosed for your convenience.

3. Any additions to or deletions from this list will be promptly reported to this headquarters, attention: TOP SECRET Control Section.

4. The Commanding General of each Command is responsible for the security briefing of members of his Command on matters pertaining to the above mentioned operations.

For the Commanding General:

RT B LEWIS Captain, A G D,

Asst Adjutant General

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1. Revised Key List Operation OVERLORD and RANKIN "C". 2. Certificate of Destruction.

DISTRIBUTION:-

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Copy 39- A C/S A-1 40- A C/S A-2 41- A C/S A-3 42- A C/S A-4 43- Adjutant General 44- Sig Comm Officer 45- Surgeon 46- Quartermaster 47- Chemical Warfare 48- Weather Officer 49- Fiscal Officer 50- Gen Schlatter Adv Hq 51- Lt Col Mahar Adv Hq 52- Adjutant General Adv Ha 53- Col Cody Adv. Hq 54- A C/S A-3 Adv. Hq 55- CG V Corp 56- CG VII Corp 57- Maj Grunder IX AFSC.

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	Operati	Revised Key I1 on OVERLORD and 12 April 196	RANKI 'O'		*
HAME	RAIK	KNOWLEDGE OF OVIRLORD (Complete)	LIOWLEDGE OF OVERLOEI (Thatses)	INOWLEDGE O OF BANKIN (Complete)	KNOWLEDGE OF RANKIN (Limited)
OFFICE O	F THE COMMANDI	IG CLINERAL, HEAT			
L M BRERETON	Maj Gon	х		X	
RALPH ROYCE V H STRAHM	Maj Gen Brig Gen	X		X	
C E Crumrine	Colonel	X X		X X	
George Milliken	L'ajor	х -		x	
Henry Bartosch	WOJG	X		X	
		V HEADQUARTERS	NIMTH AIR FO	ROZ	
JAVID M SCHLATTER Frank J Miter	Brig Gon	X		x	
Willard W Garvey	Celenal Captain	X X		X X	
Millard B Samsel	WOUR	x		x	
	D	0/S GROUND LIAI	SON		
W W Millard	Colonel	x		X	
Francis M S Miller Cleon E Freeman	Colonel Lt Col	X X		X	
Thomas C Quinlan	Major	x		X X	
Frank L Vachon	WOJG	x		x	
		D C/S PLANS			
Philip Cole	Colonel	. X		Z.	
K P Littauer Carter Glass III	Lt Col Major	X X		X	
Albert H Staton	Major	x		X X	
James G Burleson Walter A Rohr	WOJG	Х		X	
Chester H Thompson	T Sgt Cpl	X X		X X	
	NINTH AL	R FORCE PLANNIN	G GROUP		
⁷ ernon M Babcock	Colonel	X		X	
W Ehrgott	Colonel	X		x	
Louis E Hobbs J L Peterson	Colonel Lt Col	X		X	
Dunbar W Bostwick	Major	X X		X X	
J D Mahoney	Captain	х		х	
Joseph Shulim Edmond H Happner	CWC Sgt	x x		x x	5
William Swanson	Sgt	X		X	80
Bill S Foshier N J Zamarchi	Cpl Pvt	X		X	E
		х		X	
		LIAISON OFFICED	8		
E N Clifton T G Skinner	Gr/Capt W/Comdr	x	x	X	-
G F Lerwill	W/Cmdr	x	~	x	X
E N Alderman	Sgt	x		I	
		A C/S A-1			
Sory Smith	Colonel	x x		x	
Samuel T. Votac				X	
Samuel L Moise Veses S Pitney	Lt Col Captein	~	x	A	x

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Revised Key List, 12 April 1944 (Cont'd)

NAME	RANK	KNOWLEDGE OF OVERLORD (Complete)	NOWLEDGE OF OVERLOI (Limited)	KNOWLEDGE RD OF RANKIN (Complete)	KNOWLEDGE Of RANKIN (Limited)
					(armit vea)
		A C/S A-2			
Melvin Hall	Colonel	x		X	
J G Mahar W A Roseborough	Lt Col	X		X	
R Tower	Lt Col Lt Col	X		X	
B G Burnam	Major	x	X		X
John A Egan Gerald M Gordon	Major	X		X X	
T F Kornweibel	Major	-	X		x
C H Morgan	Major Major	X X		X	
F T Ahlson	Captain	-	x	x	*
E B Freeland F T Searls	Captain	X	-	x	x
E M Warburg	Captain		x		x
A F Derr Jr	Captain lst Lt		X X		X
JA Thomas	T Sgt		x		X X
Earl J Calvert J J Dunn	S Set		x		x
Joseph R Rec	S Sgt S Sgt	x	X		x
	E			х	
		A C/S A-3			
R E MUGENT	Brig Gen	X		x	
C G Peterson C W Schott	Colonel	Х		x	
J D Bleir	Colonel Lt Col	X X		х	
W G Booth	Lt Col	X		X X	
R D Curtin	Lt Col	Х		x	
Joseph Larocque K McIntosh	Lt Col Lt Col	X		X	
J T Quirk	Lt Col	X X		X	
G Sturdivant	Lt Col	• x		X X	
J L Zoeckler J H Bo yd	Lt Col	X		x	
L I Geyer	Major Major	X	X		х
F E Timlin	Major	X		X X	
H L Weber	Major	X		x	
H E Avery L Bryant	Captain Captain	X		X	
H Corbin	Captain	X X		X	
J S Evans	Captain	x		X X	
Samuel Green	Captain		X	А	T
J R Levering K P Siegfreid	Captain Captain		X		I X
M J Craig	WOJG	X		X	
R A Gambell	WOJG	Х	x	x	x
J H Pitman J T Foley	M Set		х		X
J = Franz	Op1 Op1	X		x	
R M Rohacek	Opl		X		x
Mrg Joan Palmer	Civ	X	4	x	X
Mrs C Campbell Miss Marjorie Freed	Civ Ci		X		x
Mr. L S Taylor	Civ Civ		X X		X
			4		X
D		A C/S A-4			
Besil L Riggs I 2 Woods	Colonel	X		x	
M 3 Amotater	Lt Col Major	x x			
J A Jours	Major	X		X	
John P Klep	Major	х		X	
C C Proctor E A Breen	Major Contri -	X		X X X X X	
	Captai n	SUCRET		X	
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1000 SECRET Revised Key List, 12 April 1944 (Cont'd) KNOWLEDGE KYCWLEDGE KYCWLEDGE CF CYLRLogd of OYARLORD OF RANKIN OF RANKIN (2 malety) (2 malety) (Limited) NAME RANK Deralet V Assistant Chief of Staff & 4 (contrá) R V Henry Gaptain Daphin X 3 W O Sturgeon X Geptain G E Robenolt 2na Lt Х m Sgt R A Bankes XN R W Cannon S SEt XX Thomas B Cook S Set L J Mikulay EEL E F Belota X 001 ADJUTAAT GENERAL 0 M Seebach Colonel À Χ C R Birbari It Col X Thomas W Zink Captain Х SIGNAL COMMUNICATIONS Thomas J Cody Colone Allen T Stanwix-Hay Lt Col Colonel XX XX Cito W.Knmmerer Lt Col X XX David H Likes Lt Col X Walter E Lotz Jr Lt Col Х X B T Bain Major X 7 Robert F Sladek Mator Х х . Harry R Turkel Major X X W L Zapponi R J Crofton Major X X Captain X Х Thomas D Kirwin Captain Χ X 4.1.4 J H Patridgo L W Stammerjohn Captain (AFS) х Captain X X Jerry S Stover W C Fahie Captain Χ -1 Χ 12 S Ldr (RAF) Χ Σ N F Rowe S Ldr (RAF) х Χ David McCurrah III X lst Lt Χ Charles L Rice Jr lst Lt Χ X W H Unterzuber M Set X X I H Rabinowitz T Set 1 19 Χ X Zaul R Vance S Set X A M Marinoif T 3 X X J L Shackelford S Sgt Χ X R C Manfelt T 4 2 x Edmund A Zachman Cp1 Х X CHEMICAL WARFARD Coseph Triner George W Miles Jr. Lt Col X X Major X х Timethy B Ingworsen Captain Χ X B Lager M Sgt Х Х L C Hall S Sgt X Χ WEATHER T S Moorman, Jr Colonel X X M W Roman Major X X N A Riley Captain Χ X G R Bingham S Sgt X Χ M E Mackenzie Set Х X

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Captain

T Sgt

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J F Gallagher

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Revised Key List, 12 April 1944(Con'd)

	×.,				
Name	RAFX	OF OVERLOID (Complete)	KNOWLEDGE OF OVERLORD (Limited)	OF THEFT	KNOWLEDGE OF RANKIN) (Limited)
		ORDNANCH			
William R Maxwell William W Converse		x		x	
"IIIIam " Converge	Coptain		X		X
		<u>CULRTERMASTER</u>			
R I Round I I Holt	Colonal Lt Col	X	x	x	
G E Miller A D Parsons	Cartain Opl		x		X
		FISCAL	~		X
D E Doddridge	Lt Col	x		x	
I E Dies Jr	lst Lt	x		x	
		EURGEON			
Edward J Kendricks George S Richardson	Colonel Lt Col	x		х	
Harry J O'Neil	S Set		x	Х	x
		PUBLIC RELATIONS			
obert E Parham fack Harding	Celonel	X		x	
Millian J Matson	Lt Col Opl	X	x	X	X
		PHOTOGRAFILC			
ohn E Felton	Lt Col	x		x	
	TO	P SECRET CONTROL SE	NOT N		
orbert B Lewis	Captain	x		x	
igh F Billings Diseph H O'Neill	WOJG S Sgt	X X		Х	
ed M Bennett nude V Etchison Jr	Set	X		X X	
wills (nmi) Growitz	001	X X		X	
bort H Marshall by H Long	Gp1 Pfc	X		x x	
a a bong		X		X	
7 E 3777797		FORCE SERVICE COM	<u>ALD</u>		
J F MILLER S BORUM	Maj Gen Frig Gen	X X		X	
H Daltor	Colonel	x x		X	
C Beil N D tcher	Colonel Colonel	Х		X X X X	
S Fisher	Colone1	x x		x x	
K Zelley J O'Hara, Jr	Colonel Colonel	2		X	
M Repuelds	Colo:101	X X		X	
R Rogers	Colonal	X X		X X	
H Stoole J Docher	Colonel Colonel	Х		X	
G Voss	Colonel	X	x	X	v
S Writtaher F Wortham	Colonel Colonel	x	x	x	X
		F005299	*		X
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LAME	RANK	KNOWLEDGE OF OVFRLORD (Complete)	KNOWLEDGE OF OVERLORD (Lipited)	KNOWLEDGE OF RANKIN	KNOWLEDG OF RANKI
IX AIR FORCE SERVIC	E COMMAND (CONTI))	7.4.4011.6.601	((fomplete)	(Limited
f H Lavies	Lt Col	X		x	
Syron Foy	Lt Col		X		X
M Frank	Lt Col	Х		X	
W Green	Lt Col	X		X	
D Honry	Lt Col	X		x	
I W Hopp	Lt Col		X		х
A Markson	Lt Col	x		x	45
D Paterson	Lt Col	x		x	
B Sentenne		*	~	A	
H Shea	Lt Col	X	X		X
	Lt Col			X	
E Thomas	Lt Col	X		X	
l Burr Jr	Major	X	-	X	
I Eisle	Major		X		X
R Grunder	Major	X		X	
. P Imhoff	Major		X		X
) H Jett	Major	X		X	
I P McGehee	Major	X		X	
A Nelson	Major	X		X	
B Niclson	Major		X		X
A Peck	Major		X		X
D Perry	Major		X		X
R Thomas	Major	х		X	21
A Wrigley	Major	**	X	4	х
A Andress	-		X		
	Captain		x		X
J Gerardot	Captain				X
J Hoffman	Captain		X		X
Van Every	Captain		X		Х
S Young	Cantain	X		X	
M Houser	lst Lt	X		X	
) A Groves	S Sgt	X		X	
Kanner	S Sgt		X		X
F Seelhorst	0p1		X		X
	IX TROO	P CARRIER COMM	D		
AUL L WILLIAMS	Brig Gen	X		x	
LEGLD L CLARK	Brig Gen	X		x	
aurice M Beach	Colonel	X		x	
I Berguist	Colonel	x		x	
ulian M Chappell				**	
		Ÿ		Y	
Contra T Tasles Tas	Colonel	X		X	
	Colonel	X		x	
obert M Graham	Colonel Colonel	x x		X X	
obert M Graham Lypne M Jones	Colonel Colonel Colonel	x x x		X X X	
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel	X X X X		X X X X	
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter S Rask	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel	X X X X X		X X X X X	
obert M Graham Lypne M Jones G O'Neil oter S Rask ohn T Sprague	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel	x x x x x x x		X X X X X X	
obert M Graham lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter C Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonol Colonol	x x x x x x x x		X X X X X X X	
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter S Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col	x x x x x x x		X X X X X X	
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter S Rask ohn T Sprague Llas R Hichards enton R Baldwin	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonol Colonol	x x x x x x x x	x	X X X X X X X	x
obert M Graham lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter S Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards anton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col	x x x x x x x x	x	X X X X X X X X	x
obert M Graham lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter C Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff wen G Birtwistle	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col	x x x x x x x x	x	X X X X X X X	x
obert M Graham Lynne M Jonos G O'Neil oter S Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff won G Birtwistle ay G Brown	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col	x x x x x x x x x x	X	X X X X X X X X	x
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter S Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff wen G Eirtwistle ay G Erown Lobard P Carr	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col	x x x x x x x x x x x	x	x x x x x x x x x x x x	x
obert M Graham lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter C Rask obn T Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff won G Eirtwistle ay G Erown Lohard P Carr rice F Disque Jr.	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col	x x x x x x x x x x x x x	X	x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	x
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter S Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff wen G Eirtwistle ay G Erown Ichard P Garr rice F Disque Jr. rant W Ernst	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col	x x x x x x x x x x x		x x x x x x x x x x x x	
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter C Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff won G Birtwistle ay G Brown ichard P Carr rice F Disque Jr. rant W Brnst en A Garland	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col	x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	x	X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	x
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter C Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff wen G Birtwistle ay G Erown ichard P Carr rice F Disque Jr. rant W Ernst en A Garland avil LoMay	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col	x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x		X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter C Rask ohn F Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Saldwin F Biggerstaff won G Birtwistle ay G Brown lohard P Carr rice F Disque Jr. rant W Brnst en A Garland aul LoMay obert G Minick	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col	x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x		× × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×	
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil eter S Rask ohn F Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff wen G Eirtwistle ay G Erown ichard P Carr rice F Disque Jr. rant W Ernst en A Garland aul LeMay obert G Minick rancis A McBride	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col	x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x		******	
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil oter C Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff wen G Eirtwistle ay G Erown ichard P Carr rice F Disque Jr. rant W Ernst en A Carland aul LoMay obert G Minick rancis A McEride rank C McCormick	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonol Colonol Lt Col Lt Col	x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x		× × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×	
anes E Tuke Jr obert M Graham Lynne M Jonos G O'Neil uter C Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff wen G Birtwistle ay G Erown ichard P Carr rice F Disque Jr. rant W Ernst en A Garland nei LoMay obert G Minick rancis A MoBride rank O McCormick ohn W Coerdorf	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *		× × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×	
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Neil eter C Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards anton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff won G Birtwistle ay G Brown ichard P Carr rice F Disque Jr. rant W Brnst en A Garland aul LeMay obert G Minick roncis A MoBride rank O McBride ohn W Coerdorf O Fruitt	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *		× × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×	
obert M Graham Lynne M Jones G O'Nail oter C Rask ohn T Sprague ilas R Richards enton R Baldwin F Biggerstaff won G Eirtwistle ay G Erown ichard P Carr rice F Disque Jr. rant W Ernst en A Garland nul LoMay obert G Minick rancis A McBride rank O McConnick ohn W Oberdorf	Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *		× × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×	

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wised Key List 12	April 1944 (Cont	KNOWLENGE	NNOWLEDGE	KNOWLEDGE	KITOWLEDG ;
NAME	PAIK		OF CVARLORD	OF RANKIN	OF PANKT T
IX TROOP CARRIER CON	Mill? (Contid)	(Complete)	(Limitod)	(Complete)	(Limiter.)_
W G Forwood	Major	X		x	
Archie C Fraser William A Kuchithau	Major Nator	X X		X	
Paul F Mueller	Major Major	А	x	X	x
G P Davis	Captain	X		х	4
Bon B Gayle	Captain	X		х	
Tom L Lightfoot Harmon D Bockholt	Captain ist Lt	x x		X	
G K Jonkins	Lt (REVR)	X		X X	
Harry F Nash Jr .	ilst It	X		x	
George D Yarno Robort F Todd	lst Lt	X		X	
Liston C. Gilroy	WCJG T S _E t	Х	x	X	
Themas O Payno	TSgt		x		X X
James M Waller Jr	T Set		x		x
	IX EC	. TR COMMAND			
S E ANDERSON G C Brown	Brig Gon	X		X	
J E Caldwell	Colonal Colonel			x	
W T Clement	Colonel	X		x	X
J C Kilborn	Colonel	X		x	
Millard Lowis	Colonal			x	
R C Maudo R C Sanders	Colonel	X		X	
H B Thatcher	Colonel Colonel	X		X X	
W R Wood	Colonal			A	x
A K Bolton	Lt Col		X		
A H Groen E 3 Quinn	Lt Col	-		X	
C H W Reuter	Lt Col Lt Col	X		x	_
Philip Sykes	Lt Col				X
Jefferson J Doolittle		X		х	
S H Nichols R H Roussel	Major	X		х	
F M Stewart	Major Major	X X		z x	
L A Kanuck	Captain	x		X	
M B Smith	Captain	X		x	
J L Sumpter Jr	2nd Lt	X		x	
J C MacWilliams Margaret Charckon	S Sgt Opl	X X		X	
E W Stiles	Major	~		X	
	IX AIR :	LAFENSE COMMAND		X	
WILLIAM L RICHARDSON	Brig Gen	x		x	
MATHANIEL A BURNELL	Erig Gun	X		X	
CHARLES C CURTIS William I Brady	Brig Gon	X		X	
Leslie S Morrill	Colonel Colonel	X	~	x	
Josephus A Bowman	Lt Col	X	x	x	x
Joseph C Brewer	Lt Col	X		x	
Sunner Carlisle	Lt Col	X		X	
Carleton R Ford Robert C Tridge	Lt Col Major	x x		X	
Goorge E Budd	Major	X		x x	
Willard S Magalhaes	Major	x		X	
Gareld E Marsh	Major	X		x	
Georgo L Poor Julian & Walker	Major	X		X	
James M Feaster	Major 2nd Lt	x x		X	
John F Stephens	2nd Lt	X		X X	
Ralph E Smith	M Sgt	x		X	
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Revised Key List, 12 A	pril (Cont'a)	ZISC'S L. DGP	KINOWI EDGE	KZOWIEDGE	KNOWLEDGE	
NAME	RATE	OF O WHILED	OI OWNELORD	OF RAPKIN	OF RANKIN	
11ALAD		(Complete)	(Linitod)	(Complete)	(Limited)	
IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAN	D (00141D)		1			
Frederick & Bowker	TSSt		X /		X	
K E Dodge	T Set	X		X		
Jack Bader	SSSt	Х		Х		
Frank J Brescher	S Set		X	X	X	
Lavid Parkman	Sgt	λ		A		
	1	X FIGHTER COMMANT	1			
	4	A same yourses	•			
A R Cyr	Colonel	X		X		
E B Garland	Colonel	X		X		
R J Stecker	Colonel	X		Х		
R I Fletcher	Lt Col	λ		X		
H & French	Lt Gol		X		X	
E B Kelso	It Col	X		X		
J J Lee	Lt Col	X		X		
A.J Stanley	Lt Col	X	~	х	x	
H L Taylor	Lt Col		X	x	~	
B T Bain	Mator	X X		x		
W H C Carhart	Major	X		x		
L H Coles F V Jones	Major Major	x		x		
Y Z Walk Jr	Major	x		X		
C D Clark (FAF)	W/Comdr	X		x		
H E Dear (RAF)	S/Ldr		X		X	
W W Gambel	Captain		X		X	
M J Sanborn	M Sgt		X		x	
J B Smith	T Set		X		X	
E J Cawley	S Est	X		X		
E I Mortensen	S Sgt		X		X X	
L R Smith	S Sgt		х	X	~	
" L Hughes	SEt	x		x		
A LeTan	Set	A	x	А	x	
h B Fratt. G O McGill	Set Pvt		x		X	
0 0 MOULL						
	IX	AIR SUPPORT COMM	UD CIL			
		v		I		
E R QUESADA	Brig Gen	X X		x		
NED SCHPAMM	Brig Gen Colonel	x		x		
Burton M Hovey Jr James W McCauley	Colonel	x		X		
R W McOlanahan	Colonel	x		X		
J E Pluennoke	Colonel	X X		х		
Homer L Sanders	Colonal	X		X		
J F Taylor	Colonel	X		X		
L N Tindall	Colonel	X		X		
J F Whiteley	Colonel	X X X		X		
Randolph 7 Williams	Colonel	X		X		
E W DeForrest	Lt Col	X X		x x		
J S Hopkins	Lt Col	X		X		
I P Murray	Lt Col	x		x		
F Parkman	Lt Col Lt Col	x		x		
H M Weeks J L Zimmerman	Lt Col	X		x		
J Beals	Najor		x		X	
W W Berg	Major	X		x		
A Gordon	Major	X		x		
A E Rayle	Major		X		X	
E Schmidt	llajor		X		x	
E H Marron	Major	_	X	-	x	
G H Wilson	Major	X		x		
J Gambill	Major	- x		x		
M Jscher	Captain	·, X		X		
H A Wooten	Captain	X SPC_7T		x		
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	Revised Key List 12	April 1944 (Cont	SECRET (d)			
	NAME	RAIK	· KNOWICIDGE OF OVERLORD	KNOWL DGE OF OVERLORD	KNOWLEDGE OF RANKIN	
	IX AIR SUFFORT COM R J Felheim F W Flynn P Garber C C McCabe	Captain Contain Captain Coptain	<u>(Complete)</u> Y X X X	<u>(Y.g. +ei)</u>	(Momplete) X X X X X	(Limited)
	R M Schultz A R Přleger B Wholan R L Callahan R P Hippchen J A Haney	Captain 1st Lt Mojo I Sst I Sst S Sst S Sst	X X X	X X	x x x	x x
	W L Kirk I W Snider J Blomgren	S SEt SEt Ifc	X	x x	x	x x
		XIX AI	R SUPPORT COMM	D		
	O P WEYLAND J H Cella J A Ellison D W Mayhue	Erig Gen Colonel Colonel Colonel	X X X X		x x x x	
	J F Thompson W L Whoeler W H Beard R C Byers G C Coloman	Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col	x x x	x x	x x	X X
	C H Hallett N M Matzgor A H Noar W L O'Hern R E Slack F G Alston	Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Major	X X X X X		X X X X X	
	L E Merrifield W Simon J C Spencer F G Vosburg W L Kidd	Major Major Major Major Major Captain	x x x	x x x	x x x	x x x
	R A Russel P F Dickmann J A Letts	Captain S Sgt Sgt	X X IGINEER COMMANT	x	x x	x
	JAMES B NEWLAY JR Harold K Kelley Karl B Schilling R E Smyser Jr D P Barnos J A Grist Saverio Dimeo Charles S Kunn J D McElheny C C Zeiglor Charles M Ackley J H GoodLoo J A Graf J H Hipps L J Hospodarsky M R Kiefer D O Price J (nmi) Sampson B Stanhope	Brig Gen Colonel Colonel Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Lt Col Major Major Major Major Major Major Major Major	x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x		* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *	
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NAME	RATE	FOOVLEDGE 01 OVERLOID	KICWLEDCE OF OVERLORD	KNOWLEDGE OF RANKIN	OF RANKIN
IX ENGINEER COMMANI	(Cont'd)	(Complete)	(Limited)	(Complete)	(Limited)
F K Bagby	Captain	X		X	
R M Carlen	Cantain	Х		X	
D E Field	Cartain		X		X
William L Glodhill	Captain	X		Х	
J A Hreha	Captain	Х		X	
H G Jones	Captain	X		Х	
A J McDermott, Jr	Captain	X	~	X	
R L Needham	Captain	X		Х	
R W Schatz	Captain	Х		х	
I J Slay Jr	Cantain	X		X	
W J Tanciz	Captain		Х		X
R T Ryan	Captain	X		Х	
R E Hoover	lst Lt		Х		X
R H Jones	1st Lt	X		X	
T J Kingsford	lst Lt	x		х	
J W Simpson	lst Lt		X		X
P R White	lst Lt		X		х
Paul H Berter	2nd Lt		Х		X
H E Blomquist	2nd Lt		Х		X
W & Guntrup	M Set		X		x
Albert L Schmitt	T Sgt		Х		Х
E J Aldrich	T Set		X		х
E S Backus	IT Sat		X		X
R D Urban	T SEt	X		2	
S G Jonson	S SEt		X		X
A E Krewer	S Sgt	Х		X	
B Lum	s bet	X		X	
William T Rodebaugh		X		X	
W J Woods	S SEt		X		X
Joseph Mohlin	T/3		X		X
M E Jamos	Cpl		X		X
H O Coolidge	Opl	x		Х	
Bornard M Bogue	T/5		х		X
Lloyd W Condor	1/6		x		Х
R M Hoppe	Pfc	X		х	
R J O'Neil	Fvt		Х		X
Roy SicEner	Pvt		Х		X
J M Warren	Fvt	Х		х	

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P A	DESTRUCTION	
G	I hereby certify that I have destroyed by fire the following documents:	
I	SUBJECT.:	
S U	Register No	
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Register No. 2234

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HEADQUARTERS

MINTH AJR FORCE

: <u>SECRET</u> : :Auth: CG, Ninth AF :

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APO 696, U S Army 12 April 1944.

SUBJECT: Revised Key List Operations OVERLORD and RANKIN "C".

TO : See Distribution.

1. Attached Key List of individuals having knowledge of Operations OVERLORD and RANKIN "0" is forwarded for your information. Complete knowledge includes target dates and assault areas. Limited knowledge means knowledge of the operations generally, but such knowledge does not include target dates and assault areas.

2. This list superscles "Revised Key List for Operation OVERLORD and RANKIN "C", dated 23 March 1944, Minth Air Force Register No. 1900. All holders will destroy same and return a certificate of destruction to this Headquarters as soon as practicable. A form is inclosed for your convenience.

3. Any additions to or deletions from this list will be promptly reported to this headquarters, attention: TOP SECRET Control Section.

4. The Commanding General of each Command is responsible for the security briefing of members of his Command on matters pertaining to the above mentioned operations.

For the Commanding General:

than t ARBERT B LEWIS Captain, A G D,

Asst Adjutant General

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1.	Revised Ke	y Lis	t Operation	OVERLORD	and	RANKIN	"C".
2.	Certificat	e of	Destruction.				

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 - 29-30- CG IX Engineer Command
- 31-52- CG XIX Air Support Command 15
- ¹ 33-34- CG Ninth AF Planning Op. Only 35- CG Ninth AF

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 - 38- RAF Liaison

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Copy 39- A C/S A-1 " 40- A C/S A-2 41- A C/S A-3 42- A C/S A-4 " 43- Adjutant General 44- Sig Comm Officer 45- Surgeon 46- Quartermaster " 47- Chemical Warfare " 48- Weather Officer " 49- Fiscal Officer " 50- Gen Schlatter Adv Hq " 51- Lt Col Mahar Adv Hq " 52- Adjutant General Adv Hq " 53- Col Cody Adv. Hq " -54- A C/S A-3 Adv. Hq

- " 55- CG V Corp
- 56- CG VII Corp 11
- 57- Maj Grunder IX AFSC.

688 SECRET Revised Key List. Operation OVERLORD and RANKIN 101 12 april 1944 E TOMINICE KITOWINDON KNOWINDON OF OVIRLOND OF OVIRLOND OF RANKIN (Complete) (limitel) (Complete) KNOWLEDGE NAME RATT OF RANKIN (Limited OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL, HEADQUARTERS MINTH AIR FORCE L M BRERETON Maj Gon Х X RALPH ROYCE Maj Gen Χ X V H STRAHM Brig Gen X X C E Crumrine ' Colonel X X George Milliken Mator X Henry Bartosch WOJG х X OFFICE OF CG ADV HEADQUAR PERS NINTH AIR FORCE DAVID M SCHLATTER Brig Gen X X Frank J Miter Gelonel X х Willard W Garvey Captain Х Χ Millard B Samsel WOJG х X D C/S GROUND LIAISON W W Millard Colonel X X Trancis M S Miller Colonel X X leon E Freeman Lt Col X XX Thomas C Quinlan Major х Frank L Vachon WOJG X Х D C/S PLANS Philip Cole Colonel X Z. K P Littauer Lt Col х Х Carter Glass III Major х Χ Albert H Staton Major X Х James G Burleson WOJG Х Χ Walter A Rohr T Sgt Х Х Chester H Thompson Cpl X Х NINTH AIR FORCE PLANNING GPOUP Vernon M Babcock Colonel X Х H W Ehrgott Colonel Χ X Louis E Hobbs Goloncl Х Χ C L Peterson Lt Col X х Dunbar W Bostwick Major Х Χ J D Mahoney Captain X х Joseph Shulim OWO X X Edmond H Happner Sgt X х William Swanson Sgt X х Bill S Foshier Cpl X X J Zamarchi Pvt X X RAF LIAISON OFFICER E N Clifton Gr/Capt W/Comdr X X T G Skinner X G F Lerwill X W/Cmdr X x E N Alderman Sgt x x A C/S A-1 Sory Smith Colonel X I Samuel L Moise Lt Col X X Ulysses S Pitney Captai n X

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NAME	RANK	KNOWLEDGE OF CVARLORD (Complete)	OF OVERLORD	KNOWLEDGE H OF RANKIN (Complete)		
		•				
		A C/S A-2				
Melvin Hall	Colonel	X		X		
J G Mahar	Lt Col Lt Col	X X		X X		
W A Roseborough R Tower	10 001		X		x	
B G Burnam	Major	X X		X X		
John A Egan Gerald M Gordon	Major Najor	4	X		X	
T F Kornweibel	Mayor	X		X X		
C H Morgan	Magor Gayrain	X	x	А	x	
F T Ahlson E B Freeland	Captain	х		X	-	
F T Searls	Captain		X X		X X	
E M Warburg A F Derr Jr	Captain lst Lt		Х		X	
J A Thomas	T Sgt		X		X X	
Earl J Calvert	S Sgt		X X		x	
J J Dunn Joseph R Rec	S Sgt	X		X		
		A C/S A-3				
R E MUGENT	Brig Gen	х		X		
C G Peterson	Colonel	X		X		
C W Schett	Colonel	X X		X X		
J J Blair	Lt Col Lt Col	X		X		
W G Booth R D Curtin	Lt Col	Х		X		
Joseph Larocque	Lt Col	Х		x x		
K McIntosh	Lt Col Lt Col	X X		X		
J T Quirk G Sturdivant	Lt Col	x		X		
J L Zoeckler	Lt Col	X	X	X	x	
J H Boyd	Major	х	~	x	A	
L I Goyer F E Timlin	Major Major	X		X		
H L Wober	Major	X		X X		
I Avery	Ceptain Ceptain	X X		X		
L Bryant E Corbin	Captain	X		X		
J S Livens	Capsain	X	v	X	x	
Samuel Green J R Levering	Captain Cartain		X X		x	
K P Stegfreid	Captain	Х		I	x	
M J Graig	WOJG WOJG	х	X	X	~	
R A Gambell J H Fitman	M Sgt		х		x	
J 1 Foley	Cpl	X	x	X	x	
J F Franz R M Rohacek	Cpl Cpl		X		x	
Mrs Joan Falmer	Civ	X	-	X	x	
Mra C Campbell	Civ Civ		X X		X	
Mics Marjerie Freed Mr. L S Taylor	Civ		x		x	
		A C/S A-4				
Bouil : Diago	Colonal	x		x		
Besil L Riggs I B Woods	Lt Col	X		x x		
M 3 Acstater	Najor	x x		X		
J A Jones John F Klep	Major Major	X		x x		
C C Proctor	Major	X		X X		
FA Breen	Captai n	SECRET		A		

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Revised Key List, 12 April 1944 (Cont'a)

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NAME	RANK	RHOWIEDSE CF OVERIORD (Complete)	CROWLEDGE OF OVERLORD (Simited)	KNOWLEDGE OF RANKIN (Complets)	KNOWLEDGE OF RANKIN (Limited)
Assistant Chief of 5	toff A-4 (contra)			and a second	
R W Henry	Captuin	X		X	
W O Sturgeon	Orphain	X		Х	
G E Robenolt	2 3 Lt	X		X	
R & Bankes	525 T		X		X
R W Cannon	S Sat		Z		X
Thomas B Cook	S Sot		X		X
L J Mikulay	fet		X		X
E F Felota	Col		X		X
	ADJU	MANT GENERAL			
C M Seebach	Colonel	X		X	
C R Birbari	Lt Col		X		X
Thomas W Zink	Captain		x		X
	SIGILAL	COMMUNICATIONS	2		
Thomas J Cody	Colonal	x		x	
Allen T Stanwix-Hay	Lt Col	X		X	
Otto W. Kammerer	Lt Col	X		X	
David H Likes	Lt Col	X		X	
Walter E Lotz Jr	Lt Col	Х		X	
B T Bain	Major	X		Х	
Robert F Sladek	Major		X	•	x
Harry R Turkel	Major		X		х
W L Zapponi	Major	X		x	
R J Crofton	Captain	X		x	
Thomas D Kirwin	Captain		X	27 27	x
J H Patridgo	Captain (AFS)	x		2.	
L W Stammerjohn	Captain	X		X	**
Jerry S Stover	Captain		X	-	x
W C Fahie	S Ldr (RLF)	Ä		X	
N F Rowe	S Ldr (RAF)		X		X
David McCurrah III	lst Lt	X		х	
Charles L Rice Jr	lst Lt		X		X
W H Unterzuber	M Sgt	e.	X		X X
I H Rabinowitz	T Sgt		x		x
Jaul R Vance	S Sgt	X X		X X	
A M Marinoff	T 3	A	~	А	X
J L Shackelford	S Sgt		X		x
R C Nanfelt Edmund A Zachman	T 4 Cpl	х	X	X	*
and the provinces		IICAL WARFARD			
		X		X	
Joseph Triner	Lt Col	А	x	A	x
George W Miles Jr.	Major				
Timothy B Ingwersen	Captain		X X		X
B Lager	M Sgt S Sgt		x		x x
L C Hall	0 050		~		
		WEATHER			
T S Moorman, Jr	Colonel	X		x	
M W Roman	Major	X		x	
N A Riley	Captain		X X		х
G R Bingham	S Sgt				X
M E Mackenzie	Sgt		X		X
J F Gallagher	Captain				x x x x
D Billmyer	I Sgt				X
C E Luckey	S Sgt				x
		SECRET		•	
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Revised Key List, 12 April 1944(Con'd)

14ME	RANK		IOWLEDGE O. OVERLORD (Limitad)		OF RANKIN
		CEDNATOR			
William R Maxwell William W Converse	Colonel Captain	, х	x	x	x
		QUARCERMASTER			
R E Round E E Holt	Colonel Lt Jol	X		x	
G E Miller A D Parsons	Captain Col		X X X		X X X
		PISCAL			A
D E Doddridge	Lt Col	x		x	
T E Diss Jr	lst It	X		X	
Edward J Kendricks	Colonel	<u>CURGEON</u> X			
George S Richardson Harry J O'Neil		<u>.</u>	x	x x	
	5 550	PUBLIC RELATIONS	*		X
Robert E Parham	Celonel	X		x	
Jack Harding William J Matson	Lt Col Opl	x	x	X	x
	-	PHOTOGRAPTO			~
John I Felton	Lt Col	x		x	
	TC	P SECRET CONTROL S	ECTION		
lerbert B Lewis Augh F Billings	Captain Wolg	X X		х	
oseph H O'Neill	2 Sgt	X		X X	
red M Bennett Inude V Etchison Jr	Sgt Col	x x		X X	
rwing (nui) Growitz	Col	X		х	
lbort H Marshall Ay H Long	Gpl 2fc	X X		x x	
	IX AI	R FORCE SERVICE CO	MAID		
J F MILLER S BORUM	Maj Gen Brig Gen	X X		X	
E Balter	Colonel	x		x	
J Boil	Colchel	X		X X X X	
W Ettcher S Fisher	Colonel Colonel	X		x	
Z Kelley	Colonal	X		X X X	
J O Hara, Jr	Colonel	X		x	
M Regniclds R Rogers	Colonel	X		X	
H Stoole	Qulonel Oclonel	X X X X X X X X X		X	
J Cocher	Colonal	x		X X	
G 7-88	Colonol		X		x
S Whittaker F Wortham	Colonel	X	· ·	X	
and a second of	COTOHOT		X		x
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Revised Key List, 12 April 1944 (Cont'd)

NAME	RANK	KHOWLEDGE	KNOWLEDGE		CIOWLEDGE
		OF OVERLORD (Complete)	OF OVERLORD (Minited)		(Limited)
IX AIR FORCE SERVICE	successive and the second se				
W H Davies Byron Foy	Lt Col	x		X	-
S M Frank	Lt Col Lt Col	x	x		X
R W Green	Lt Col	x		X X	
J D Henry	Lt Col	x		x	
H W Hopp	Lt Col		x	*	X
P A Markson .	Lt Col	x	-	x	4
R D Paterson	Lt Col	X		x	
R B Sentenne	Lt Col		X		x
E H Shea	Lt Col	X		X	
E E Thomas	Lt Col	X		x	
H Burr Jr	Major	X		X	
W I Eisle	Major		X		x
F R Grunder	Major	Х		X	
L P Imhoff	Major		X		X
C H Jett	Major	X		X	
H P McGehee	Major	X		X	
R A Nelson	Major	X		x	-
S B Nielson G A Peck	Major		X		X
A D Perry	Major		X X		X X
E R Thomas	Major Major	x	*	x	A
R D Wrigley	Major	~	x	А	x
E A Andress	Captain		x		X
H J Gerardot	Captain		x		x
E J Hoffman	Captain		x		x
B Van Every	Captain		x		x
J S Young	Captain	X		x	
I M Houser	lst Lt	x		X	
D R Groves	S Sgt	X		X	
T Kapner	S Set		X		X
C F Seelhorst	Opl		х		X
	TX TROOP	CARRIER COMMA	T.		
	14 14000	USIATINA OUMA			
PAUL L WILLIAMS	Brig Gen	X		X	
ELEOLD L CLARK	Brig Gen	X		X	
Maurice M Beach	Colonel	X		X	
E & Berquist	Colonel	X X		X	
Julian M Chappell James E Duke Jr	Colonel Colonel	x		X X	
Robert M Graham	Colonel	Y		X	
Glynne M Jones	Colonel	x x		x	
J 0 0'Neil	Colonel	x		x	
Perer S Rask	Colonel	X		x	
John I Sprague	Colonel	x		X	
Silas E Richards	Colonel	х		X	
Benton'R Baldwin	Lt Col	X		X	
J F Biggerstaff	Lt Col		X		X
Owen G Birtwistle	Lt Col	Х		X	
Jay G Brown	Lt Col	X		X	
Richard P Carr	Lt Col	X		x	
Brice P Disque Jr.	Lt Col	X		X	
Grant W Ernst	Lt Col	X	-	X	_
Ben A Garland	Lt Cel		X	-	x
Paul LoMay	Lt Col	X X		X	
Robert G Minick	It Col	x		x x	
Francis & McBride Frank & McCormick	Lt Col Lt Col	x		x	
John W Oberdorf	Lt Col	x		x	
J C Fruitt	Lt Col	x		x	
Fred D Stevers	Lt Col	x		x	
Paul S Zukerman	Lt Col	x		x	
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NAME	RAIK	KNOWLEDGE OF OVENLOSD	KNOWLINGE CF CV.RIORD	KNOWLEDGE OF RANKIN	
		(Complete)	(Linited)		
IX TROOP CARRIER CC. W G Forwood	Mejor	X			
Archie C Fraser	Fa,lor	x		X X	
William A Kuchathau	Major	X		x	
Paul F Mueller G P Davis	Najor Captain	2	X		X
Bon B Gayle	Crossin	x		x x	
Tom L Lightfoot	Capitad n	X		x	
Harmon D Bockholt G K Jenkins	100 110	X		X	
Harry F Nash Jr .	Lt (RIVR) Ast Lt	x x		X X	
George D Yarno	lst Lt	X		x	
Robert F Todd	WCJG	Х		х	
Liston C. Gilroy Thomas O Payne	T SEt T SEt		X X		x
James M Waller Jr	T Set		x		X X
					*
	IX BONES	R COMMAND			
S E ANDERSON	Brig Gen	x		x	
G C Brown	Colonel			X	
J E Caldwell W T Clomont	Colonel Colonel	x		**	X
J C Kilborn	Colonel	x		X X	
Millard Lowis	Colonel			x	
R C Maudo R C Sanders	Colonel	X		х	
H B Thatcher	Colonel Colonel	X		X	
W R Wood	Colonel			X	x
A K Bolton	Lt Col		x		
A H Groen E F Quinn	Lt Col			x	
C H W Reuter	Lt Col Lt Col	x		X	-
Philip Sykes	Lt Col				X
Jofferson J Doolittle		Х		х	
S H Nichols R H Roussel	Major Major	X X		X	
F M Stewart	Major	X		X	
L A Kanuck	Captain	x		x	
M B Smith	Captain	Х		х	
J L Sumpter Jr J C MacWilliams	2nd Lt S SEt	X X		x	
Margaret Charckon	Opl	X		x x	
E W Stiles	Major			x	
	IX AIR DEFE	ITSE COMMAND			
WILLIAM L RICHARDSON	Brig Gen	x		x	
NATHANIEL A BURNELL	Brig Gon	X		X	
CHARLES C CURTIS William I Brady	Brig Gon	X		X	
Leslie S Morrill	Colonel Colonel	X	x	X	
Josephus A Bowman	Lt Col	X	~	X	X
Joseph C Brower	Lt Col	х		x	
Summer Carlisle Carleton R Ford	Lt Col Lt Col	X X		X	
Robert C Bridge	Major	x		X X	
George E Budd	Major	X		x	
Willard S Magalhaes	Major	X		X X X X	
Gareld E Marsh George L Poor	Major Mejor	X X		X	
Julian & Walker	Major	X X		x x	
James & Feaster	2rd Lt	х		X	
John F Stephens	2nd Lt	х		х	
Ralph E Smith	M Sgt	X		x	
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NAME	RANK	OF OVERLORD	OF OVTRLORD	OF RAPKIN	OF RANKIN
IX AIR DEFENSE COMMAND	D (00) TID)	(Complato)	(Linitad)	(Complete)	
Fredørick & Bowker	I SEt		Х	x	X
K E Dodge Jack Baier	T Sgt S Sgt	X		x	
Frank J Brescher	S Sgt	v	X	x	x
David Parkman	Sgt	X		A	
	IX F	IGHTER COMMAND			
A R Cyr	Colonel	X		X X	
E B Garland R J Stecker	Colonel Colonel	X X		x	
R I Fletcher	Lt Col	X		X	-
H A French	Lt Col Lt Col	x	x	x	x
E B Kelso J J Lee	Lt Col	x		X	
AJJ Stanley	Lt Col	X		X	
H L Taylor	Lt Col Major	x	Χ.	x	X
B T Bain W H C Carhart	Major	X		x	
L H Coles	Major	X		X X	
F V Jones W E Walk Jr	Major Major	X X		x	
C D Clark (FAF)	W/Condr	X		x	
H E Dear (RAF)	S/Ldr		X X		x
W W Gambel M J Sanborn	Captain M Sgt		x a,		X
J B Smith	T Set		x 3		x
E J Cawley	S Bgt S Sgt	X	x	X	x
E I Mortensen L R Smith	S SEt		x		x
J L Hughes	SEt	X X		X X	
A Lefan B H Fratt.	Sgt Sgt	~	x		x
G Č McGill	Pvt		x		x
	IX AIF	SUPPORT CONSU.	17		
E R QUESADA	Brig Gen	x		I	
NED SCHRAMM	Brig Gen	X		X X	
Furton M Hovey Jr James W McCauley	Colonel Colonel	X X		x	
R W McClanahan	Colonel	Х		X	
J E Pluennoke	Colonel Colonel	X X		X X	
Homer L Sanders J F Taylor	Colonel	х		X	
L N Tindall	Colonel	X		X	
J F Whiteley	Colonel Colonel	X X		x	
Randolph P Williams E W DeForrest	Lt Col	X		X	
J S Hopkins	Lt Col	x x		x x	
I P Murray F Parkman	Lt Col Lt Col	x		X	
H M Weeks	Lt Col	X		X	
J L Zimmerman	Lt Col	X	x	X	X
J Beals W W Borg	Major Major	х		x	
A Gordon	Major	x	x	x	x
R E Rayle E Schmidt	Major Major		X		X
E H Warron	kajor		x	-	x
G H Wilson	Major	X		X	
J Gambill M Jscher	Major Captain	· x		x	
H & Wooten	Captain	· ′ X		x	
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NAME	RAITK	KNOT LEDG L OF OVERLAND	KNOWLADGR OF GUERLORD	KNOWLEDGE		
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IX AIR SUPPORT CC			······································		Lasting both	
R J Felheim F W Flynn	Gaptain Gaptain	X		X		
P Garber	Captain	x x		X X		
C C McCabe	Gaptain	X		X		
R M Schultz	Captain	X		X		
A R Pfleger	lst Lt	X		X		
B Wholan	WOJG	Х		X		
R L Callahan R P Hippchen	T Sgt		X		x	
J A Haney	I Sgt S Sgt	x	X		X	
W L Kirk	S Set	A	x	x	-	
I W Snider	Set	~ x	4	x	X	
J Blomgren	Ifc		X	~	x	
	XIX	AIR SUPPORT COMMA	<u></u>			
O P WEYLAND	Erig Gon	Σ				
J H Cella	Colonel	Å		X X		
J A Ellison	Colonol	x		x		
D W Mayhue	Colonol	X		x		
J F Thompson	Colonul	x		x		
W L Wheeler	Colonel	X		x		
W H Beard B C Broom	Lt Col		Х		x	
R C Byers G C Coleman	Lt Col Lt Col		X		x	
C H Hallett	Lt Col	x x		x		
N M Matzger	Lt Col	x		X		
A H Near	Lt Col	x		x x		
W L O'Hern	Lt Col	X		x		
R E Slack	Lt Col	X		x		
F G Alston L B Merrifield	Major		X		X	
W Simon	Major Major	X		X		
J G Spencer	Major	X	X		x	
F G Vosburg	Major	x		X X		
W L Kidd	Captain		x	A	x	
R A Russel	Captain		X		X	
P F Dickmann J A Letts	S Sgt	X		х		
	Sgt	X ENGINEER COMMAND		X		
JAMES B NEWMAN JR						
Harold K Kelley	Brig Gon Colonel	X X		X		
Karl B Schilling	Colonel	X		x		
R E Smyser Jr	Colonel	X		x x		
D P Barnes	Lt Col	x		x		
J A Grist Severio Dimeo	Lt Col	X		x		
Charles S Kuna	Lt Col Lt Col	Х		X		
J D McElheny	Lt Col	x x		х		
C C Zeiglor	Lt Col	x		X		
Charles M Ackley	Major	X		x x		
J H Goodlas	Major	Х		X		
J A Graf J E Hipps	Major	X		x		
L J Hospodarsky	Major	X		X		
M R Kiefer	Major Major	x x		х		
0 0 Price	Major	X		X		
J (nmi) Sampson	Major	x		X X		
A B Stanhope M G McGrory	Major	X		X		
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Revised Key List, 12 April 1944 (Cont'd)

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
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IX ENGINEER COMMAND	D(Cont'd)	1000.0400.00	140 01 0000	(000001000)	(Litilit Cour)
F K Bagby	Captain	x		X	
R N Carlen	Cantain	X		X	
D E Field	Cartain		X		X
William L Glodhill	Captain	X		X	
J A Hreha	Captain	Х		X	
H G Jones	Captain	X		Х	
A J McDermott, Jr	Captain	X		X	
R E Needham	Captain	X		X	
R W Schatz	Captain	Х		х	
I J Slay Jr	Cantain	X		X	
W J Tanciz	Captain		X		X
R T Ryan	Captain	X		х	
R E Hoover	lst Lt		х		х
R H Jones	lst Lt	X		X	
T J Kingsford	lst Lt	X		X	
J W Simpson	lst Lt		x	-	x
P R White	lst Lt		x		x
Paul H Berter	2nd Lt		x		x
H E Blomouist	2nd Lt		x		x
W A Guntrup	M Set		X		x
Albert L Schmitt	T Sgt		x		X
E J Aldrich	T Set				
E S Backus			X		X
	T Sgt		X		X
R D Urban	T Set	X		*	
S G Jensen	S SEt		X		X
A E Krewer	S SEt	X		x	
B Lum	S Set	X		X	
William T Rodebaugh		X		X	
W J Woods	S Set		X		X
Joseph Mohlin	T/3		X		Х
M E Jamos	Cpl		X		X
H O Coolidge	Cp1	X		Х	
Bernard M Bogue	T/5		Х		X
Lloyd W Condor	T/5		x		х
R M Hoppe	Pfc	Х		X	
R J O'Neil	Pvt		X		X
Roy Sicenor	Pvt		Х		x
J M Warren	Fvt	X		X	

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16 March 1944

Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces

Dear Tooey:

The last word from you so far is that neither Eisenhower, Postal or Harris has committed himself on your Plan of 5 March. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.), with whom I informally discussed the Plan, were entirely in accord with the selection of objectives but did not wish to take any action on it until they knew what Eisenhower and Portal thought of it.

General Arnold and I both feel that so far as starting the attacks against your selected systems is concerned, you already have plenty of authority. The last Combined Chiefs of Staff directive (13 Feb) provides that the German air force is the primary target. Certainly oil and rubber are just as necessary for the G.A.F. as fighter factories. Then too, the directive provided for attacks against Berlin and other industrial areas. Your systems come within that as well.

What concerns us most here is whether or not you are going to be able to sell Eisenhower on the necessity for letting you go ahead with your Plan without insistence that you be diverted prematurely. I feel that if Eisenhower makes an issue of a system or of a date he will be backed-up by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. So that places it right in your lap. We are willing to do anything within reason that you might suggest but we haven't thought of the method as yet. Certainly it is premature for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Please keep us informed of the progress there.

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Best regards,

Sincerely,

BARNEY M. GILES Major General, U.S. Army Chief of the Air Staff

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		HEADQUARTERS EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS UNITED STATES ARMY	26 mary	
	AG 676.3 TSCB Ref: Directive SC 676.3 21 Dec 43, and sme B-239 dated 12 Jan	ndment	26 March 1944	
	SUBJECT: Revision of Pe	riods of Radio Silence and Activ	ity.	
T H I S P A G E I S	Convending Gen Commending Gen Commending Gen Commending Gen Commending Gen Commending Gen	eral, FUSA eral, TUSA eral, NV Corps eral, USSTAF eral, American School Center eral, CBS eral, TBS eral, WES eral, SBS		
U	1. The scheduls of	redio silences is amended as fol	llows:	
N C L A	23 Å	oda: pr to 9 Apr pr to 2 May ay to 20 May		
S S I F	7 Å	place of these deletions: pr to 11 Apr 17 Apr ay to 16 Ney		
I E		intense radio activity is amende	ed an follown:	
D	Add the Collowin	ng period: r to terminal date to be set.		
		of the following period will at	a later date be identi-	
	Term	inal date of period of intense re o) to 4 May.	idio activity (par. 2	
	L. The following is	s an addition to "radio networks ed radio cilence and activity":	and catablichments which	
		airborne units.		
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD 5. Schedules for May may be subject to further change. Novisions of June and July schedules to accompose training activities will be issued at a later date, approximately a month from now. 6. Request for any further adjustment of this time table should reach this Readquarters before the period concerned. By command of General (ISSUE) Н J. Q. Hansiman F. I. HARRIMAN, Captain, F.A. I S Actr. Asst. /dj. Gen. P А G E Ι

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a. When sweeping in conjunction with the support of our bombers, serious interference with the Hun ground control must certainly result. This interference extends well behind his front lines as a consequence of the intermingling of Allied fighters and Hun fighters in vast areas from the deck up. It would be almost impos-

5. It is impossible to accurately assess the total results of our deep sweep operations by fighters, but it can be reasonably assumed that the following results

4. As additional F-33 and F-51 groups became available for the deep-in support of our heavy bombers (which heretofore had been a weak link in the chain of support), it became possible, by overlapping groups, to have the long range groups leave the bombers some five minutes early, drop down to the deck well into enemy territory and sweep wide areas on their withdrawal. Nover before in air warfare have fighters been able to operate on sweeps in the heart of enemy territory some 550 miles from their own bases. Almost immediately it was obvious that the Hun was confronted with a new menace for which a defense was extremely difficult for it meant being prepared to sounter low-level and on-the-dock sweeps over the entire

3. In January of this year, our fighter forces had reached a strength that permitted them to range out from the bombers after rendezvous and seek out enery fighters and destroy them. In other words if, after rendezvous was made with the bombers, there were no enemy aircraft attacking or in the vicinity, approximately two-thirds of each fighter group were permitted to search well out on the flanks of the bombers and well above and below them to engage and destroy any enemy sircrast encountered. Thus, combats occurred in a wide area from maximum altitude to the deck with the result that small units of two, four and up aircraft often returned to bases on the deck. These sircraft returning at low altitudes produced the effect of deep sweeps. They did ground strafing and attacked energy sircraft whenever gasoline and ammunition permitted.

2. The possibility of fighters sweeping deep into energy territory became evident concurrently with deeper penetrations by our fighter units equipped with external long range gas tanks in support of our heavy bombers. However, at the time of these initial deep penetrations, sufficient fighter units were not available to exploit the possibilities of deep sweeps. All our fighter units were required for the support of the heavy bombers and, in providing this support, they remained in the general vicinity of the bombers. They ordinarily flew to the ultimate limit of their endurance and remained at high altitude even for their return

outline of circumstances leading up to our recent deep fighter aweeps is offered as a preface to the answers to questions asked in the basic communication.

1. Referring to teletype message WAR X14785, 28 March, the following brief

TOP SECRET Office of the Commanding General APO 634

: Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 633



SUBJECT: Long Range Fighter Sweeps

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Office of the Commanding General APO 634

sible for the Hun ground control to vector his own fighters to intercept the many small Allied fighter units sweeping out. Should he decide to attempt interception, some of his already inadequate fighter strength would be drawn away from the bombers.

b. Serious confusion is caused at Hun airdromes by our fighters attacking installations or being present in the areas. Aside from the damage done by strafing, the possibility of second sorties being made by the Hun aircraft against the bombers is reduced. At these airdromes aircraft may be found in the landing circle or taking off and shot down. Deep penetration Mustang groups have reported that Hun fighters have been found at altitudes of 3,000 to 5,000 feet, stooging around in areas that blend well with their camouflage. These enemy fighters have made no attempt to engage bomber formations, but were apparently airborne to keep from being destroyed on the ground. As stated in preceding paragraphs, our fighters are directed to conduct low-level sweeps upon withdrawing from their escort duties if their remaining fuel supply is sufficient. These sweeps have

c. The attacks made by our fighters on sweeps against energy lines of communication produce results of great value. Well within Germany there are many railroad lines with trains which are susceptible to fighter attack. Locomotives are extremely vulnerable to ground strafing and the Hun rail transportation can and is being dealt a serious blow by our fighters on deep sweeps. Other means of communication, such as gas trucks, enemy truck convoys, etc., are attacked on

d. These sweeps can be countered either by enemy aircraft or by enemy anti-aircraft. It is believed that the Hun does not possess the capability of stopping this type of operation with his fighters and therefore he will make an effort to counter it with anti-aircraft. It is unlikely that he can quickly produce enough anti-aircraft artillery to adequately cover all of western Germany, but it is reasonable to assume that additional anti-aircraft defense will be provided for the most important and vital areas within Germany. This will make necessary a redistribution of his anti-aircraft artillery and will cortainly set up an increased requirement of AAA. It may facilitate the accomplishment of Over-lord by reducing the smount of light anti-aircraft available for perimeter defense.

e. The operations of our fighters in the backyards of the German people, so to speak, cannot have a favorable effect upon their morale.

6. Replying to the specific questions asked in basic teletype, the following statements are submitted:

a. Such operations should continue to be profitable and will therefore be continued until or unless our losses become prohibitive. They will contribute

b. A small force of Mustangs (41) was used because previous deep low level sweep operations by P-38's in the same area had failed to produce any enemy

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reaction and it was felt that a group was sufficient to cope with any concentration of enemy aircraft in the area which might be brought to bear against our fighters. This is primarily a training area for the last stage of German single-engine fighter operational training. Further, it has been found in the past that when there is a preponderance of our fighters disposed in a certain area over enemy territory the Hun will not make any attempt to oppose.

c. As a general practice the Hun does not become sirborne against fighter sweeps by either Mustangs, Lightnings or Thunderbolts. On the few occasions when he has become airborne he has made no effort to engage.

d. Definite information on the loss of the seven Mustangs on this mission is not available. However, it is believed that all losses except one were due to light flak. Only fourteen enemy aircraft were encountered in the air. Twelve of these were destroyed. There is no evidence that any Mustang was shot down by these enemy aircraft. One Mustang was observed to hit the ground and explode when attacking an airdrome. Pilots on the mission state that four of

e. Our operational plan was to cross the enemy coast at 25,000 feet in normal group formation above the flak, which has lately become a serious obatacle to low flying, and proceed to the Bordeaux area in the vicinity of Perigueux. At this point, the plan called for two squadrons to turn to starboard, drop down and sweep the area, paying particular attention to airdromes with intent to destroy enemy aircraft in the air or on the ground. Squadrons were to split into fourship flights. The other squadron was to turn port at Perigueux and use the same procedure. Due to the low cloud at 7,000 feet, the group flew on time and distance. At the time planned for the squadrons to split and drop down, weather cleared at a point believed to be in the vicinity of Perigueux. The mission from here was carried out according to plan. Very meager flak was encountered at airdromes in the vicinity of Bordeaux, viz. Landes-de-Eussac and Langon. More intense light flak Landfall out was made at the French coast at altitudes from the deck to 10,000 feet.

f. None of our fighters carried bombs. They could not carrybbombs and at the same time carry sufficient gasoline for the range. Fighter cover is still needed for fighter-bomber operations, depending upon the target attacked and the depth of penetration. The amount of cover will vary with the opposition that may be expected in any given area. Our P-47's have carried fragmentation clusters on wing shackles on some sweeps. Some success has been obtained, but definite information is not available as yet due to the limited number of operations to date.

g. As indicated in the prefacing remarks, low level fighter-sweeps over German areas have slready been made with a high degree of success. In clear weather navigation at high and medium altitudes is no problem on deep sweeps and no difficulty was experienced by the fighter group on its attack in the Bordeaux area. It is some times difficult to positively identify a specific airdrome deep in enemy territory but since a sweep covers a large usea this is generally not of vital importance. Under conditions of low ceiling and solid overcast, navigation on deep

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE Office of the Commanding General

penetration sweeps becomes extremely difficult. Navigational problems in moderately bad weather may be solved by the proper use of Pathfinders.

h. It is believed that sweeps in German areas prior to and following POINTBLANN raids do pay dividends as indicated in the preface. On two separate heavy bomber attacks on enemy airdromes, our flighters have dispatched a squadron to drop down and strafe aircraft on the ground immediately after bombers have bombed airdromes. On both occasions fighters were able to make numerous attacks covering a period of 10 minutes before any concentrated flak was encountered.

i. Thunderbolts can be used profitably for deep fighter sweeps within their range and are so being employed. The armament of the Thunderbolt and the radial engine which is less vulnerable to ground AA fire than the liquid-cooled engine with its radiators, makes this aircraft especially e fective on low level deep sweeps.

Not too much is known as to the capabilities of the Thunderbolt as a fighter-bomber. Limited dive-bomber operations have been conducted against energy airdromes in occupied countries with fair results. These operations have been more of the harassing type and were carried out on days when our fighters have not been needed as support for the heavy bombers and in an effort to force the Hun to become airborne. It is believed that the Ninth Air Force, which is at present conducting training with the Thunderbolt as a dive-bomber and carrying out initial operations, will soon be able to provide more information as to the future capabilities of the Thunderbolt as a dive-bomber than is available from our limited operations.

j. In reply to the query on an overall plan for future operations, it is expected to continue having our fighters sweep enemy territory at low level on withdrawal after having supported the bombers as indicated in the preface. On occasions in the past when fighter groups were available, one or more of the Mustang groups have been used to sweep in ahead of the bomber spearhead and on into enemy territory, and it is expected that this scheme will be used from time to time as the tactical situation warrants.

The tempo of bomber operations in the past two months has been such that our long-range groups, P-38's and P-51's, have been used to maximum capacity in support of the heavy bombers. Only on a few occasions have they been used on deep sweeps on days when, due to weather, a heavy bomber operation was not possible. At the present time it is the policy to permit these groups to recuperate, settle replacements, train and maintain their aircraft on days when they are not required to support heavy bombers on deep penetrations. Missions of P-51's and P-38's average five plus hours. With a shortage in experienced pilots, it is beyond human endurance for one man to fly every day under all conditions of time, altitude, combat, etc. There must be occasional breaks, to insure continuity of operations over a long period. As the situation changes to the point where all of the long range groups are not required in support of our heavy bombers, they will be used more often on deep sweep operations. The Thunderbolts, when not required for the support of heavy bombers, are being used on deep low level sweeps to the limit of

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their range. The time the P-47 pilots normally spend in the air in support of heavy bombers is considerably less than that of the P-38 and P-51 pilots, (except when the P-47's are required to do double sorties).

At the present time VIII Fighter Command is devoting almost all of its energy and time to the support of our heavy bombers and have not been able to go into the problem of fighter-bomber operations except on a small scale. They are, however, training and developing tactics as rapidly as their escort obligations will permit.

A study is being made of the use of Pathfinder Mosquitos to enable us to find and hit priority airdrome targets with fighter aircraft, using the Mosquito as a navigational aid to lead long range fighter groups to deep penetration targets.

k. Applies to the Ninth Air Force.

1. At the present time VIII Fighter Command has four especially selected pilots with two P-38's and two P-51's undergoing experimental operations on night fighting and night intruding under the supervision of RAF 100 Group. These pilots have completed a four-week special training course, add have engaged in several operations in conjunction with RAF heavy bombers. No definite results have been obtained to date and before any specific recommendations can be made as to the future possibilities of night fighting and night intruding by VIII Fighter Command aircraft, more experimental operations must be carried out. At the present time the aircraft appear to have worked out satisfactorily. Indications are that intruding offers the best possibilities against airdromes which are discovered lighted and are thus targets of opportunity. In other to find these airdromes, a wide area must be searched. The pilots for this type of work must be resourceful, of superior judgment and possess a high sense of responsibility. Prolonged specialized training will be a requisite if this type of operation is found feasible. Some modifications will have to be made in the aircraft used.

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J. H. DOOLITTLE Lieut. General, U.S.A. Commanding

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TOE SECRET

8 APR 1144

Lt General Carl Spaatz CG, USSAFE London, England

Dear Tooey:

Supplementing my cable to you last night on the successful rhubarb operations in the Berlin and Munich areas, I want to tell you that we are very keenly interested in the results of this type of mission. Air Ministry estimates for March indicate that U.E. fighter strength of the G.A.F. has gone up 200. This is serious because unless we chop the Luftwaffe down to reasonable size in the next few weeks we are going to be on the spot.

As stated in my cable we feel you would be wise to explore every possibility to bring the G.A.F. to action against our fighters or to destroy them on the ground. This will involve original and changing tactics and the problem is worthy of your best minds.

Please keep us posted on the details of these operations so that we can do our part in having our best men here try to furnish you with any bright ideas they may develop.

I would like very much to have you send me a detailed report of the operation against Berlin and Munich of April 5 when you so auspiciously initiated this particular type of operation.

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BARNEY M. GILES, Major General, U.S. Army, Chief of the Air Staff.

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GE	COMBINED CHIEFS OF STAFF AGREED THIS DATE TO SEND
T	A MESSAGE SUBSTANIALLY AS FOLLOWS TO THE BRITISH CHIEFS OF TAFFRFOR
s	PORTAL PD FARE TOP SECRET SPAATE FROM ARNOLD
U N	OF STAFF HUVE NO OBJECTION AT THIS TIME TO YOUR ORDERING ATTRACK
C L	ON PLOESTI AT FIRST WEATHER OPPORTUNITY
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18 February 1944

SUBJECT: B-29 Diversionary Project.

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I F I E D TO: The Commanding General, USSAFE.

1. The Directive issued you on the above subject on 2 February 1944 is hereby amended in the following respects:

> a. The departure date of the B-29 aircraft from the United States to the United Kingdom is now estimated to be approximately 1 March 1944.

b. It will not be necessary that this aircraft be returned to the United States, however, it is to remain in the United Kingdam a minimum of seven days before being dispatched elsewhere.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

BARNEY M. GILES Major General, U.S. Army Chief of the Air Staff

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SECRET SECURITY

2 February 1944

MEMORANDEM FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL, AIR TRANSPORT COMMAND: (Attention: Plane)

Subject: B-29 Ferry Flight.

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1. It is desired that you furnish expert personnel to proceed to a base to be selected by you and the Commanding Ceneral, XX Bomber Command, to brief a B-29 crew for a flight to the UK to depart the United States on or about 10 February 1944, final date to be determined by OG XX Bomber Command. It is desired that this flight follow the southern route: AFXINSON, NATAL DAKAE, MARFAKECF, ST. EVAL: alternate route, KENLEY FIELD, BEFENDA--MARRAKECH, ST EVAL. Upon arrival in the UK, this aircraft and crew will be immediately reported to the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, who will take charge. Through coordination with Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe you will again assume jurisdiction over this sircraft and crew in such time as to return them to the United States not later than 15 March 1944.

2. You will be responsible for the security and performance of this flight while under your jurisdiction. Although the existance of the 3-29 type is known to the Axis, it is desired that exceptional precations be taken to the end that information concerning equipment and performance remain secret. As mircraft and crew are not prepared for combat no flight should be undertaken which will unduly jeopardize the mission.

 To facilitate the planning for this mission, direct communication with the Commanding General, XX Bomber Command is authorized.

By command of General ARMOLD:

BARNEY M. GILES Major General, U.S. Army Chief of the Air Staff

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OMMANDING GENERAL, ARMY AIR FORCE WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ATTENTION

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES WASHINGTON

ET SEX



4 MAR 1944

REI

SUBJECT: Bombing of Balkan Oil Refineries

TO: Commanding General, United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 633, New York, N. Y.

1. The inclosed report from General Somervell is forwarded as a matter of interest to you, and for the information of the Combined Committees in London. As General Somervell indicates, the report was originally prepared for presentation to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as a memorandum from the U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

2. On 12 January 1944, a report on this subject was received from the Committee of Operations Analysts. In view of the time lag and percentage of ultimate curtailment of enemy production resulting from bombing of refineries, the Committee did not think present target priorities should be disturbed so far as a further attack on crude refining capacity is concerned.

3. In your operational directive dated 11 January 1944, you included Balkan refineries as secondary objective systems. This information was included in a memorandum for the Chief of Staff by General Arnold on 24 February with a statement that it appeared that General Somervell's recommendations had already been put into effect.

For the Commanding General, Army Air Forces:

Incl: Memo fr Gen Somervell 8 Feb 44 to C/S w/incl

arne no

Barney M. Giles, Major General, U. S. Army, Chief of the Air Staff.

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TOP SECRET HEADQUARTERS FIRST ALLIED AIRBOWNE ARMY TOP SEGLA AUTH: CG, FAAA DATE: 7 FLB. -5: INITIALS YS

APO 740, U S Armay 7 February 1945

ditte:

SUBJECT: Planning Staff Study for Operation "W.T.DFIRE".

: See distribution. TO

1. Attached Lereto, for your information is Planning Staff Study on Operation "VILDETRE'.

2. Attention is invited to the fact that all available airborne forces are presently engaged in action, and that a minimum of four weeks is required for reconstitution and refitting from the time of release before they can be condicted to a new operation.

For the Colmanding General:

F. L. PARKS, S. Brigadier General, CSC, Chief of Staff.

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16-21	-	SC, SUCKETE HEADQUARTERS ALLIED IN BOTH (SHALF MAIN) G-2, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUB-DIVISION (SHALF MAIN)
22	-	G-2, COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SUB-DIVISION (CHIES THE A
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62-63	-	CC, XVIII U. S. COLES (.IRBO.ME)
64-65		OC HE DOUALTERS, 38Th GROUP, R.P.
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67	-	CG, Fran
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T O P S E C R E T HEADSUARTERS FIRST ALLIED ALABORNE ARMY

TPO 740, U S Fray 7 February 1945

Plensing Steff Study Operation

- · 1. REFERENCES;
 - e. Meos: 1/100,000 Sheets S-1 (BONK)

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1/25,000 She ts 5305, 5305, 5307, 5308 5.05, 5406, 5407, 5403 5505, 5506, 5507, 5508

- b. Appendices:
 - (1) /ppendix "A" "ossicle LZ's and DZ's (1/100,000).

(2) Defence overprints - (1/25,000).

3. OBJEC1:

To assist the CLNAR/I GROUP OF /RAILS in their sivence to the RAINE by seizing witch points on the skis of advance thus showing the momentum to be maintained.

3. <u>/SSULFTIONS</u>:

It is resuled:

- r. That the CENTRAL CROWN OF ARATES will breach the SERCERIED line in SCHNEE - EIFEL-area and close to the R IND in the COLOGNE - BUNN area.
- b. That simborse forces can be profitably employed to assist the uninterrupt d sevence of the ground smiles, by seizing key terrain features, outting supply lines and limiting movement of energy reserves.
- c. That rirborne forces will be relieved on the ground within two to four drys of landing.
- d. That at least two sirborne divisions will be released from the line in the immediate future.
- e. That one or more simborne divisions be returned to the UNITED AIM DOM for reconstitution and mounting. ("referably one BRITISH Division).
- f. That IN Proop Cerrice Connend, 38 and 46 (roups R/F will be available in full for the operation.
- E. That a sufficient number of suitable sinfields on the continent to mount at least one division will be available to FIRST /LLIED /IRBOHNL /RM.
- I. That the necessary stratecical and tratical air forces will be available to support the operation.

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i. That simborne forces will be withdraws indediately upon being passed through in order to propare for subsequent sirborne operations.

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- . ARE/S UNDER CONSIDER/TION FOR / IRBORNE OPER/TION:
 - The following erers are considered those in which airborne forces can assist to the maximum degree the advance of the ground ammies.
 - c. TONDORF BLANKENHEIM SCHAIDTHEIM.

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- b. EUSLIRCHEN STOPE DIA ' DIDESHEIM.
- C. RETINE 'CH CELSDORF ST'DT-CKENLEIM.
-). INFORMATION:

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- r. Terrein.
 - (1) SCHMIDTHEIM 1602 BL/MIEM.EIM 2305 FONDORF 2708 erec: A ridge line connects the three towns of SCHMIDTHEIM; BLAMENHEIM and TONDORF; this ridge being the water shed for the entire area. Generally, the area is heavily wooded but interspersed with open flat ground situated mainly along the ridge itself. The three towns are the junction of many main roads; in addition, a railroad runs through the area connecting with the main line at SCHMIDTHEIM. Limited airborne landings can be made in these open areas, out parachute operations are more feasible than glider.
 - (2) EUCLIRCHEN 3530 STOTZHEIN 3426 WEIDESHEIM 2936 area: This area lies in the ERFT River Valley. To the south of EUCLIRCHEN the river runs through a narrow valley bounded on oither side by high, rough and wooded terrain. To the north and east the valley widens into an open plain containing many irrighted meadows with ditches up to seven feet deep. EUCLIRCHEN is the road and rail center for traffic running north - south as well as east - west for the area immediately west of the REINE in the COLOGNE - BONN area. Terrain will present no obstacles to large scale airborne landings, the most favorable ground being north and east of EUCKIRCHEN.
 - (3) RHEINBACH 4425 GELSDORF 5021 STADT-MECKENHEIM 4925 area: This area lies in the STIST-B River valley between the OFTEN, FLAGERSHEIMER, and ALR EHER Forest. It is characterized by its open t pe terrain, which is a continuation of the plain east of EUSKIRCHEN. The main roads and rail lines running through this area make it second in importance to EUSKIRCHEN. Terrain will present no obstacles to a large scale airborne operation as lancing areas are many.
- b. Possible LZ's and DZ's.
 - (1) For possible LZ's and DZ's see appendix "A".
 - (2) Of the three areas under consideration, the LUSAIRCHEN area affords the maximum number of possible LZ's and DZ's. In the BLANGNALL area LZ's and DZ's can be found, but for limited scale operations only. Therefore, it is the least desirable area of the three.
- c. Range.

The operational areas under consideration are within both paraclute and flider tow range from both United Kingdom and Continental airfields.

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d. Flak.

- (1) For flak defences see appendix "B".
- (2) Of the three areas under consideration, the BLANKENHEIM area is the least defended. Both the EUSKIRCHEN and RHEINBACH areas are Leavily defended by flak making them the least desirable as operational areas from a flak point of view.
- e. Ground Defences.

For ground defences see appendix "B".

5. MISSION:

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The Airborne Task Force will assist the uninterrupted advance of the CENTRLL GROUP OF ARATES by seizing key terrain features, cutting supply lines and limiting movement of enemy reserves in any one of the following areas:

- a. TONDORF BLANKATILIA SCHLIDTHEIM.
- b. EUSKIRCHEN STOTZALIA . UIDESLEIM.
- c. RHEINBACH GELSDORF STADT- ECKLIHLIM.
- 7. COMMAND:
 - a. Airborne Task Force.

Major General R. N. Gale, GOC, let BRITISH Airborne Corps will constand the Airborne Task Force. Upon landing the Airborne Task Force will come under the command of the CG, CENTRAL GROUP OF ARMIES.

b. Troop Carrier Forces.

Major General P. L. Villiams, CG, IX Troop Carrier Command will command all Troop Carrier Forces.

O. AIR FORCES:

a. Mission.

- (1) To transport and insure the safe arrival of airborne forces in the selected areas as prescribed.
- (2) To provide the necessar, resupply for maintaining the airborne forces until such time as this can be accomplished by other means.
- (3) To provide air cooperation to the airborne forces after landing and during resupply.
- b. Air Forces Available.

Eighth Air Force Ninth Air Force RAF Bomber Command Fighter Command (RAF) 2nd Tactical Air Force (RAF) Coastal Command 1st Provisional Air Force El Troop Carrier Command 38 and 46 Groups (RAF)

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c. Air-Bombardment.

- (1) Fre D-day bombardment should be conducted on targets that might affect the operation.
- (2) If D-day bombardment is considered necessary for flak neutralization the operation will have to be so scheduled as to allow ample time for visual bombing prior to arrival of Troop Carrier Columns over effected areas.
- d. Escort and .ir Sunnart.

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Fighter cover and escort should be provided Troop Carrier Columns at all times. In order to provide maximum flak neutralization encoute and at DZ's and LZ's, fighter and fighter-bombers should precede and accompany columns, and attack any batteries, guns, or troops firing on columns. Bomb lines will be determined and presented to Air Forces involved in order to provide planned and request air participation in the DZ-LZ areas after troops are on the ground.

e. Troop Carrier Lifts.

Troop Carrier aircraft will perform normal mission of transporting and resupplying airborne forces. Details on lifts, routes, and schedules will be provided by Troop Carrier Command.

f. Reconnaissance.

Prior to D-day, photographic and tactical reconnaissance will be flown as necessary. Oblique photos of selected areas and vertical photographs of selected areas will be furnished. Throughout D-day and thereafter when necessary, reconnaissance everage of the area affected will be maintained. Frequent weather flights will be flown as directed.

E. <u>Resupply</u>.

Scheduled parachate and or glider resupply will be flown. Necessary fighter protection will be furnished for all resupply missions.

h. Air-Sea-Rescue.

Normal procedure for Air-Sea-Rescue will be provided by RAF Fighter Command, Coastal Command, and ANCXF.

9. TING:

For planning purpose GOC, 1st BRITIS Airborne Corps will be prepared to marshall the Airborne Tist Force for Operation "WILDFIRD" by 10 March 1945. GOC, 1st BRIFISH Airborne Corps will be prepared to mount the operation three days after notice from the CG, FIRST ALLED AIRBORNE ARAY.

- ... FACTORS AFFECTING THE FLAN:
 - a. Airborne Forces.

In order to put into effect any airborne plan, it will be necessary to withdraw sufficient airborne forces from present ground operations at least 30 days prior to the contemplated date of the airborne operation in order to

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provide for reconstitution, detailed planning and marshalling. Since the area of the proposed operation is very heavily defended, it is considered that not less than two divisions should be employed, plus as many SAS troops as can be made available.

b. Troop Carrier Forces.

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It is appreciated that during the advance to the RHINE the usual heavy demands on Troop Carrier aircraft for resupply to the ground forces will continue. To mount an airborne operation of two divisions the whole offort of D. Troop Carrier Command, 38 and 46 Groups, RAF will be required. Therefore, no aircraft of these Troop Carrier Forces will be available to the ground forces during the period immediately before and during the operation.

c. Bases for nounting:

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(1) <u>Continental Airfields</u>.

at present insufficient airfields suitable for mounting an airborne operation have been allotted on the continent to FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY. It requires 14 suitable airfields to mount one U.S. Airborne Division. The requisite number of airfields should therefore be allotted to this formation at the earliest possible moment. In addition, present airfields assigned FIRST aL IED AIRBORNE ARCY cannot satisfactorily accommodate 38 and 46 Groups, RaF.

(2) United Kingdom Airfields.

Sufficient airfields in the United Kingdom are available and assigned to IX Troop Carrier Command, 30 and 46 Groups RAF. From these fields one or more divisions can be satisfactorily mounted.

(3) In view of the fact that 38 and 46 Groups RaF cannot at present be accomposited on the continent and are best suited to work with a BRITISH Airborne Division, the obvious clurse would be to withdraw the 6th BRITISH Airborne Division to its United Kingdom bases and one or more U.S. Airborne Division to their continental bases. This would then allow each division to reconstitute and mount the operation from its own established base. In the event of U.S. Airborne Divisions only being withdrawn, one could be mounted from continental bases and the other from the United Kingdom.

d. Weather.

During February and March weather conditions are poor for nounting an airborne operation simultaneously from the United Aingdom and the continent. The number of consecutive operational Gaves in either of these months is likely to be very few, making continuous resupply very doubtful. Therefore, is had not be possible to mount the operation on a pre-determined day. To ensure against feiture of resupply due to weather conditions, as much use an possible should be made of surplus aircraft to carry supplies with the initial troop lift. To obtain the maximum benefit of such an arrangement, divisions should be more aircraft for supply in each lift, as well as much be calcored for sufficient for several days operation.

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e. Advance of Ground Forces.

Due to the lack of heavy equipment in an airborne division and the type of enemy defences to be encountered, it is essential that the ground forces be able to relieve the airborne forces within two to four days of landing.

f. Mounting and Relief of Airborne Forces.


An airborne operation of this nature may be called for on short notice, however, it is essential that at least three days warning be given for mounting. As it is contemplated that airborne forces will be called upon to assist in the crossing of the RHINE when the ground armies have closed to it, it is essential that airborne forces used in Cheration "WILDFIRE" be released as soon as ground forces have passed through them.


- 11. PLANNING:
 - a. Such detailed airborne planning as is necessary to mount this operation on short notice should be carried out under the direction of GOG, 1st BRITISH Airborne Corps in conjunction with CG, IX Troop Carrier Command. Representatives of the CG, FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY (operation sections, offices of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 and G-4) will be present at all conferences. GOC, 1st BRITISH Airborne Corps and CG, IX Troop Carrier Command will notify G-3 and G-4, FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY of any conferences to be held.
 - b. If the operation is called for by CG, CENTRAL ARMY GROUP, detailed ground planning will be carried out between GOC, lst BRITISH Airborne Corps and CG, CUNTRAL ARMY GROUP, or such commander as may be designated by him.
 - c. The GOC, 1st BRITISH Airborne Corps is authorized to deal direct with the Commanding General of the designated U.S. Airborne Division for planning purposes.
 - d. If the operation is called for, COC, 1st BRITISH Airborne Corps will be responsible for mounting it under the direction and control of CG, FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARAY.
 - Demands for maps, defence overprints, photo cover and other intelligence information will be sublitted to Assistant Chief of Staff, C-2, Headquarters, FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARAY includiately.
 Details concerning air protection and demands for air support for the Airborne Task Force on the ground will be worked out by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, headquarters, FIRST ALLED AIRBORNE ARMY in conjunction with Air Staff, Shaff.
 - f. G-4, headquarters, FIRST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARMY will keep GOC, 1st BRITISH Airborne Corps informed of the current and future availability of BRITISH and U. S. resupply parachutes and containers.
 - 6. Details of artillery support, signal communications and ground administrative assistance will be arranged direct between BRITISH Airborne Corps and CENTRAL ARAY GROUP. G-4, FURST ALLIED AIRBORNE ARAY will give every assistance in arranging BRITISH and AMERICAN maintainance stores.
 - h CG, XVIII U. S. Corps (Airborne) will be kept fully advised of all plans regarding the use of the U. S. Airborne Division designated.

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5 Feb 1945

demorandum to General Spaatz Subject: The Role of Controlled Buzz Bombs in the German war

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Most of the cable discussion that I have seen between the ETO and the .S. relative to the use of the "Chinese Copy" of the German Buzz ${\tt Bomb}({\tt JB-2})$ ass made the taoit assumption that the American product would be in fact & "hinese copy and would differ in no important operational aspects. There has b en 1 ttle mention made of the program for accurate control of the JB-2 which is actively under way in the 1.5. at this time. Since the J-2 must always be in direct competition with other means of achieving the same military objective, its accuracy may be the determining factor in deciding whether or not it is to be introduced into the 270, and the scale of the effort. If ground control can ma scially improve the accuracy, its importance as a military was on will be greatly enhanced. Since I have just had a shance to become familiar with the program for control of the JB-2, I thought it appropriate to report the outlines of this program together with my gless as to its tuctical implications, I will preface this with a brief account of the Jh-2 development as I saw it in a cursory inspection at aglin Field.

JB+2 JAV SLOPANN

The JB-2 is in all important respects a replica of the standard type of German V-1. The vehicle appears to function well as a controlled airplane once it is launaned. It is reported to climb to its pre-set altitude normally and to be stable in flight at all times. In level flight it seems to go about 400 mon. There are no good measurements yet of its terminal speed, but on one occasion it

ran away from a P-63. "here is stil much to be learned about the mechanics of launching the

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JE-2 in which we have desirted from standard German practice, largely because at the time work was undertaken the German mechanism of launching was not known in letail. We have had to learn how to launch these weapons from scratch and there are some gaps in our understan ing of the problems involved. Up to the time I left the 1.5. 22 launonings had been attempted of which 7 were successful. All of these had been come by the use of rocket launching gear. The design of the rand varied considerably. A 400 foot track inclined d to the horizon was the initial and standard ramp. "uscessful launchings were also made from a 460 foot horizontal ramp. One successf 1 la noming man just been made using only 40 feet of the rame and with rockets inclined so as to continue their thrust after the launching cart had left the rang. This latter represents a considerable improvement over standar. German o chormance in the way of mobility an ease of camouflage of the launching coar. any of the failures were one to rackets bursting, which presumbably can be oured by a small esign change. Considerable difficulty has also been experiences with the jet notor an when the motor fails to start a gas fire frequently levelops which destroys to gauget. This will be cored be experience since we have had to learn the wolld arecedure of starting the motor without reference to German experience in this field. It is too early to make any prediction as to the number of launching or engroute fuilores that may occur when quantity launching has been achieved , but the prospects are reasonably enco raging.

"here is as yet no data whatspever on the accuracy of the JB-2. All flights have been made over the Gulf and no impacts have been plotted with any degree of accuracy. It is planned to get an overland range for assessing accuracy. It is also planned in the immediate future at aglin Field to make tests in such directions that an SCR-564 with ZY plotting bear may track the JB-2 to its point of sive, Here precise measurement of the point of impact is to be some by sighting on the splash and marker by from an airplane equippe with Shoran.

"ince the launching gear as uses at present would contribute very greatly to

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to wavelop simpler and lighter gear using non-critical materials. One of the methods now being pushe is a modification of the Gorman type ramp to be operated by steam increase of hydrogen peroxide. "nother possibility is the use of a fly wheel launching mechanism in which the kinetic energy of the fly wheel is use to active rapid acceleration by win ing a cable on a tagered dram. This also seems to offer the essibility of launoning from a ramp approaceing sero length.

JB-2 PRO CTION SUCCESS

. Plans for JR-2 production have oscillate widely and radialy. If Lovet originally called for 3000 per month as apro action goal. Sarly in January General Arnoli set up a program to somleve operational isomethings on the following schemale:

September	1945	**	100	.02	day
	1945	-	100	20.5	407
lievenber	1945	-	200	jer.	day
lecomber	1945		300	Jer	day
January	1946	-	400	ler	ay
February	1946	-	500	per	day; and 500 per day then

loward the end of January, base on cables between the partment and LTO, en ue to the conflict in production and logistics between this and the existing programs for two STO, OPD made the decision to cancel all projection of huzz boobs for operational use in the NO. A silot pro vetion of 2000 was still planned to carry o t experiments, proof tests, an training in the U.S.

eafter.

JE-2 OKGANIZATI MAL PLANS AC/AS, OCAR is in the process of establishing table of organization and tables of equipment for the JB-2 organization. One launching squarron has been provisionally activated at Eglin Field with 550 men. This is estimated to be sof icient to run 4 ramps with an operational capacity of 100 launchines per day.

GROUN CONTROL OF JB-2

-here is a large scale plan for the application of raisr control to the JE-2. This is to be achieved by tracking the JE-2 with and SCR-564 equippe with an AY plotting boar, an by passing control information to it by mod lation of the

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raise beam itself. In the -2 will be a boacon designated (Anw-1. which responds to the 554 radar transmissions and which incorporates a discriminator which will receive modulations from the 584 and will operate the controls. This program is being pushed jointly by ATSC and the Rediation Laboratory. The beacons are a modification of the Mosebu beacon which will be standard in fighter aircraft in this Theater. Orders for about 1800 of these beacons ha been let when I left the U.S. and deliveries were expected to start with 50 in March. In the meantime it is planned to use beacons of the type used in deary willie for experiments on the ascuracy of control possible with the 564. One may not expect results from these experiments, however, for 6 weaks.

overy attempt consistent with speed of production has been made to render the reder control invulnerable to jamming. It will reply to the 534 on a frequency different from that of the 584 transmission so that it will not be easy for the enemy to determine the 584 frequency. Control will be exercised by a combinatio of pulse rate frequencies. In order for the enemy to interfere with 554 tracking, he must trigger the beacon by transmission on the appropriate frequency which will be, as we have seen, difficult to determine. In order for the enemy to take over control of the dB-2, he will have to apply the proper frequency fo the appropriate pulse rate mode abstions. Since this is exactly the type of control use in the seary Willie, konever, experience with heary willie could give him a vance notice during which time he could be planning counter-measures which might apply to the dB-2.

with regard to accuracy of control, it is appropriate to quote the figures obtained by Lglin Field on the accuracy of positioning an the accuracy of bomb dropping with neary willie aircraft similarly controlled. The probable error averaged 150 yards at 38 miles and 414 yards at 46 miles. Sombs were dropped with a probable error of 266 yards at 23 miles. These runs were all male with inexperienced controllers and it is likely that these figures would be improved with practice. Probably the limiting factor on controlled JB-2 accuracy will be the external ballistics of the JB-2 after it has been given the signal to dive. This is, at themoment, very problematical and can be answere only from experiments in the U.S.

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Ground control would appear to bring the JB-2 nto the class of very Clexible, exremely long range artillery. It appears no unreasonable to assume assuracy of the order of 500 yards at 50 miles from the 584, or 1000 yards at 100 miles. with such accuracy, bombing of many types of battle area targets becomes profitable. Transportation centers, bivouac areas, troop concentrations of my sort, armor an motor vehicle parks are appropriate targets. The ability to subject critical targets such as those to 24-hour bombardment at appropriate stares of the battle can produce serious effects on the enemy's capabilities. Just as with artillary any appropriate target which can be ssigned geographic coor instes, either by ground observations, aerial observation, or photo reconnaissance, can be attacked by huzz bombs simply by transmitting these coordinates to the controlling SCA-584. This weapon would also lend itself to appropriate targets of opportunity discussed during the loveloument of a battle or large scale movement. Any such target within 100 miles of the front line w ich might be spotter by an armed reconnaissance or other aircraft coul be located in approximate geographic coor instes by the pilot who would transmit this information to the 504. If the JB-2 mere on the launching site prepare for take off, it would only be a matter of minutes te ore this JB-2 co I be belivere to the appropriate target. The plot wold then have the ability to supply spotting corrections to the SCr-584, which could then correct the fire. The effectiveness of such operations would not be as goat as an equivalent weight of bombs gropped by fighter-bombers. Lowever, it woul add meterially to the Clexibility of our Air Force because the JB-2's could be continua by on call up to the limit of the operational capabilities of the launching sites; whereas the ability of fighter-bombers to strike such a target depends on their being in the air and free at the proper time. It is thought that in a rapi ly moving campaign such a weapon could be of vital importance.

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The possibility of radar countermeasures has been discussed above. The other possible types of countermeasures are aircraft interception and anit-aircraft. Judging by our experience with V-1, aircraft interception would only be possible with jet aircraft. with our preponderance of air power such attacks would leave the jet aircraft fairly vide open to attacks by our fighters which could be informed of JB-2 positions and of the presence of enemy inircraft. In any event, this a plies only suring good weather and would detract from the enemy's jet aircraft activity against our own forces. With regard to anti-aircraft, the only reason we had success against V-1 w s because of the excellence of the SCR-584, the Mark IA electric computer and proximity fuses. None of the elements of this combination are beilieved to be possessed in anywhere near the same degree of accuracy by the Germans, so that it is anticipated that straight-flying buzz bombs will infrequently be nit by Terman anti-aircraft. In addition, groun control provides the capability of meneuvering the JB-2 in such agannes that it wold be very much more difficult to hit than the straight flying V-1. This can be done without interfering with the bombing accuracy.

CONCLUS ON

In view of the fact that the ground control program is developing essentially in parallel with the JB-2 program, it is believe, that the Theats, should reconsider its requirements for JB-2 in the light of the greater accuracy and flexibility which can be provided by ground control. If controlled JB*2's are desired for operational use next winter, a firm theater requirement must be established now. Production contracts can not be initiated in the U.S. until such a requirement exists.

> DAVID GRIGGS expert Consultant, Office of Sec. of Mar.

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ador General . G. Feber, melebant Chief of Air Maff, Missa, ashington, 25, 5.5.

Sonr Gerryt.

The contained in your letter of 22 December 1944 concerning the sale f f15t; (50) F-47th to the Bueder are in accord with my beliefs.

10 January 1925

The problem of the second south a shortage of F-6.7 fighters has developed. The break-through it has been necessary to use all the thester stocks of this the airplane in order to maintain the strength at all the Minth sir Forces. Following the suggestions set forth in table 10 (7020 dated 23 Revenber 1964 I included these fighters that had been set up for delivery to tweeten. Revertheless I fully supering that the obligations to the incluse should be not and I as prepared to deliver these singlenes as previously arranged as seen as possible.

his report to the training electron, as recommised in derivan's recease 600 of 60 pressor 1942, I feel as you do that such as electronic errangement is unrecotary. I inited muchar of factory service non-sent to invoice the provide instrumine should meet their valutements the basedes in flying the 1-47. This can be arranged upon request and should be headled through the filitary stacks. It is so epidecotest is estimated will be headled through the filitary stacks. It is so epidecotest is estimated and should be headled through the filitary stacks. It is so epidecotest is estimated and should be headled through the filitary stacks. It is so epidecotest is estimated and should be headled through the filitary stacks. It is so epidecotest is estimated an absolute states, and that all military personnel to invoice should werk under the filitary states.

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Continuent General, 1988, Containing.

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ADDRESS REPLY TO MMANDING GENERAL. ARMY AIR FORCES WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

ATTENTION

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES WASHINGTON



DEC 2212.

Lieutenant General Carl A. Spaatz Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe APO #633, c/o Postmaster New York, New York

Dear Tooey:

On 20 December the Munitions Assignment Board gave final approval to the sale of 50 Thunderbolts to Sweden. The Board approved this allocation some time ago, subject, however, to a dissent by the British member. The British objected on the grounds that their own requirements had not been completely met. It was stipulated that delivery of the sircraft would not be made until the British here received further instructions from the Air Ministry, pending which they announced their intention to appeal the Board's approval to the Combined Chiefs. On the 20th they withdrew their dissent. The British recently had a sizable aviation delegation visit Sweden, presumably for the purpose of promoting British aviation.

In a letter to Barney Giles, Air Vice Marshal Willock, of the R.A.F. Delegation, in Washington, has requested that delivery of the aircraft be delayed until the British have completed negotiations with the Swedes for installation of a radar station in southern Sweden. They express the belief that this would strengthen their case. We do not agree with them on this point, and feel that we are morally obligated to deliver the P-47's to the Swedes without further delay. However, we are still working on Willock.

There has been some discussion of the matter of providing a training mission to teach the Swedes to fly and maintain the P-47's they are to receive. As a matter of policy we feel that a training "mission" as such, is undesirable. Any military personnel sent to Sweden for training purposes should work under the Military Attache. If the program should reach any substantial proportions, it is thought that a training section should be organized in the office of the Military Attache.

Hardison's message number 688 on 26 November, which was also sent to you, contained an unacceptably long list of personnel types which he recommended for organizing a training mission. The Swedes certainly are competent enough to make such an elaborate establishment unnecessary. Furthermore, the sending of an unnecessarily large training mission to Sweden very likely would provide grounds for additional controversies with our Allies.

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It is our suggestion that the Swedes' training requirement could best be met, and in a manner most satisfactory to all concerned, by sending to Sweden a few factory service men to provide maintenance instruction, and a couple of well qualified pilots for instructing them in flying the P-47. I am enclosing a copy of a letter from Republic's Director of Exports to Joe Loutzenheiser. I should appreciate your early comment on this letter, in order that we might arrange with the company to have some of their men go to Sweden. I think a couple of personable young P-47 pilots of flight leader or squadron commander type, selected from your command for about three month's temporary duty in Sweden, could do a perfect job of teaching the Swedes to fly the aircraft and, at the same time, could give them some knowledge of their tactical employment. A captain Kenneth Carlson who, I believe, is in one of your units, was recently suggested as a good man for such a job, especially because he was said to have some knowledge of the Swedish language.

-2-

Sincerely,

L.S. KUTER

Major General, U.S.A. Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Plans

l Incl. Ltr fm Republic to Gen Loutzenheiser (cc)

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REPUBLIC AVIATION CORPORATION FARMINGDALE, LONG ISLAND, N.Y. Telephone Farmingdale 1100

December 17, 194

Brig. Gen. V. L. Loutzenheiser Hendquarters A.A.F. Vashington, D. C.

Dear General:

In compliance with your request during our conversation, the servicemen who are still in the European Theatre are the following:

> William Braemer Edward Driscoll Charles Holowchak Charles Jacobie

Charles Rend Charles Rend Malter Stock Francis B. Volpe

 \mathbb{A}_t the present time, we also have a test pilot, Mr. Joseph Parker, who is on a service trip to England to demonstrate the "M" model airplane.

All of these servicemen are on the Army Contract and it would seem perfectly foculate to give them a leave off of that contract in order to make the trip to Sweden and then return to England and place back on the contract. We can negotiate directly with the Sweden for reimbursement for their services during the period they are on that duty.

In respect to the pilot, we would prefer not to furnish the services of Mr. J. Parker, as he is our Chief Experimental Pilot and there is very much need for his services here. However, if General Spaats cannot furnish a pilot for the Swedes, we are willing to furnish his service.

Trusting this information is satisfactory, I am

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
Very truly yours,


REPUBLIC AVIATION CORFORATION

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H. W. Flickinger Director of Troats

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H				1945	Gen. Kuter's letter for Gen. Spaatz' signature.	
I S					June terster	
					ALFRED R. MAXWELL,	
P A		1 Incl:	Ltr fr Gen	Speatz	to Gen Kuter. THU Colonel, Air Corps, Director of Operations.	
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The jet simplane represents a very grive dan or to us and could on the great trouble is explored in the root reasons. Observing outa ntor, the jet sirving could statice the effectiveness of Finier eacort by fore and it on the defensive in redor to the board of the success for ince a thorn of so winy of an economics are irolenes.

I

every effort is below mode to kee you fully informed of the eltra-tion one i as well concerned to type are doing everything in y ur owner to help overcome this potential threat. The four (a) T-8 's have arrived, two (2) here and two (3) in the reditorranees. These trainees is monition to the limited use of the steer will encle us to study the problem in the sirie think and to develop suitable tection to leader to redenited on er. lessen the potential domer.

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The verse thilly of the jet simpline has an block the energy to employ it in various expective. Although the MR-62 has been used in a limited manner a simulation bookers, it has been primarily e stored as a faction booker and reconcates are shifted. And its is interesting to note that aspured documents react that the name of the MR-868 has been changed from "Fighter-Destroyer" to "Hitz-Romber", there are sufficient indications that it will be used here extendively as a fighter in the future. The she lot has a she of the loss of the test are reconned same fole. Moreover in view of its design and objectively as a maticipate that it will be used as a faction support weapon.

Inrol h by letters I have ander Youred to keep you fully informed on the development of the form in forma and shall continue to do so in the future. Similarit Colonel flack will be the to five you the very intest information not only on forman development but also on the Writish program.

> Licutement bench 1,0. . . Commandin .

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10 January 1946

bri adler General Som id Hison, Asot. Chief of Air Sterr, 16ms, Secturitors, Army Air Stees, Section for, 2. C.

Dert Dou:

This letter will serve to introduce Lieutenent Colonel James ... Lark, one of our outstanding fighter pilote who is now attached to the outstand in wondo .

Lt. Col. Clark hid a varied and creditable military record. Filer h vin served in AF Fighter command, he transferred to the result Forces and flew with fighter command for allost a year and a main, rising to the position of greap commander. During the past few months he has been studying the British jet development and has had has opportunity of flying the Seteer.

Ine potential danger of the German jet sirplane is a very real hare t to our embers if the sir lane should be employed in the proper state. Observe certain advantages over the standard fighter, it could lease the effectiveness of our fighter escort, foreing the escort on the defensive and thus leaving the backers winerwhic to attack. A particular danger today is the successful intersection of our reconnelessness irplanes.

Present intellience data defi itely indicates that the analy will note odd/doo MA-262's and 75/100 AM-255's operational b 1 orll. Have less information concerning residement flow but believe it very resonable to assume a flow of 175/200 ME-262's and 50/76 AM-36's per worth by June. These two sir lands have been employed primiting i thatist bomberd ont and recommissiones work but we have every resonant to believe that the KH-MO perticul riy will be employed mating our bombers in the near future.

We fully realize that you in tashis ton are doin everything cossible to help us solve these problems. The four () % - 50's have arrived, two (2) here and two (2) in the Hediterraneon, and will be a very areat help in workin out tactics in the air. Thus we can be fully prepared for the future.

Lt. Col. Clark will to able to give you a great deal of the intest information concerning the development of the German and Dritish jet program.

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F. L. Scherel, U.S.A. Deputy Concerler, Operations.

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10 January 1945

F. L. Senerel, D. Serie Long. Jepity do ma der, operations.

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Major Concret Oliver F. Schols, 1916, Materials Scintering & Distribution, Sector rters, Fray Sir Forces, conin ton, D. C.

This letter introduces Lieutemant Colonel Ciers, one of our best finter commanders who is presently attached to the Embassy Starr in London and makin, a study of the British jet program.

It. Col. Clark has a very creditable operational record. He first served in EAF F1 stor Command and, after transferring to the any air ordes, flew for algost a year and a hair with Sighth Fighter Comman, ising to the position of group commander. During the past few mentus he has been investigating the British jet development and has flown the deteor.

Present intendi once reports electing indicate that by 1 April the energy will have 325/400 MA-.62's and 75/100 AR-234's operational. While our information regardin replacement flow is not as complete, there is every reason to believe that a flow of 175/200 MR-232's and there is every reason to believe that a flow of 175/200 MR-232's and believes have been somether by June is an accurate estimate. These two believes on we been somether arises by in the test holder deatt and sirplanes nove been employed primerily in tactical backbardsent and reconnelsurnes work up to this time, but there is read reason to believ that the SA-252 perficalerly will be used assingt our bombers in the

The jet simplene represents a real threat to our bombers and The jet circulate represents a real threat to our contere and fighters. Having certain covents as over the standard fighter, the jet airplane, if properly coplayed, could leasen the size live she of the open to ittlek. It the present on the defensive and leave the backers accessful interception of our recommission of sirplanes. Ilture.

The four (4) YP-10s have arrived, two (2) note and to (2) in the Mediterrinesh so we can begin to evolve pairs is tratice and too migue to meet this future problem. We fully realize that over, this is being done in teamin ten to sid us to find the solution to the pro-

.t. Col. Chark will be this to give you a great deal of the intest form tion concerning the develo munt of the bornch and Britten jet TO 16.0.

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HEADQUARTERS, ARMY AIR FORCES Washington

6 January 45

Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz Commanding General USSTAF in Europe APO 633 - c/o Postmaster New York, New York

Dear Tooey:

Dr. Griggs brought your letter of 15 December to me, asking for a small number of aircraft fitted with AN/APQ-7(Eagle) equipment at the earliest possible date. As you requested, we are doing everything possible to meet your requirements. I doubt, however, if we can meet the dates Dr. Griggs established in his conversation with me. He asked that four (4) B-24's be ready to leave the Modification Centers not later than 15 January and twelve (12) aircraft preferably B-17's, be ready to leave the Modification Centers by I February. We will do our best but I feat that the delivery schedule will be delayed.

There is no shortage of the APQ-7 radar equipment but the Modification Centers are simply over-loaded in our attempt to meet delivery dates for the 315th Wing B-29's. If we were to divert B-24's scheduled for training for the 315th Wing, we would have to send this Wing out in a half-trained condition. In view of the commitments made for this Wing, we cannot allow other projects to interfere even though they are admittedly most desirable.

I am personally following this, as is General Echols, General McClelland and General Meyers and I assure you that everything that can be done will be done.

I am not sure that the APQ-7 equipment will solve all of your problems. It is true that it is high-resolution radar but it cannot be expected to make such a great difference in accuracy as one might expect. Dr. Griggs talls me that a circular probable error of your H2X bombing under conditions of 10/10 clouds is about two miles. Certainly the high-resolution of Eagle will not reduce this error to the 1500 feet now achieved under visual conditions. There isn't that difference in resolution between APQ-7 and the equipment you are now using. It seems to me that every effort should be made to determine the cause of the large errors in your present H2X bombing since we know that the equipment is potentially very much better than that. In tests here under Provinc Ground conditions, the circular probable error is of the order of 1200 feet. The difference between this and a circular probable error of two miles needs careful examination to determine the cause. While my views as stated above will have no influence on our determination to get this equipment to you as soon as possible, I wanted you to know that you should not expect the miracle some proponents of this equipment may, in their enthusiasm, anticipate.

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For such targets as Leuna and Politz which are poor radar targets even for a high-resolution radar such as the APQ-7, I think we will have to depend on a blind bombing system such as Shoran. I realize that these two targets, particularly the latter, are too far from territory under our control to permit the use of Shoran. Nevertheless, I think that you should have in your plans a provision for its use as soon as the Ground Forces have pushed close enough. Reports on the operational use of Shoran in Italy include a statement that this equipment is the real precision blind bombing system. An officer from the Ninth Air Force is now here in connection with a Shoran program and we are shipping equipment this month for use in the Ninth Air Force and the First Tactical Air Force. I recommend that you have your people investigate the possibility of using Shoran in a Pathfinder role for strategic bombing of such targets as Leuna and Politz.

TOP SECRET

Dr. Griggs will have full details on both the Eagle enuipped aircraft you have requested and on the possibilities of Shoran when he returns to your headquarters in the near future.

Yours sincerely.

/s/(?) Patrick . Timberlake

BARNEY M. GILES, Lieutenant General, U. S. Army, Deputy Commander, Army Air Forces and Chief of Air Staff

Gen. Giles asked that this be prepared before his departure - PMT

TOP SECRET

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TOP SECRET

D.C.A.S. Copy to: A.C.A.S. (Ops.)

With reference to our conversation this morning and to the discussions which took place at the Cabinet Meeting last night, I am still of the opinion that the C.A.S., Air Chief Marshal Tedder and General Eisenhower, in adopting the A.E.A.F. Transportation Plan, have perhaps been misled by a misinterpretation of the technical evidence submitted by railway experts.

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2. I attach at Flag 'A' a copy of a minute which I wrote to A.C.A.S.(Ops.) on this subject on the 28th March, 1944.

5. In paras, 4 and 5 of that minute I referred to the question of 'canalisation'. This subject was raised at the meeting last night when the C.A.S. expressed his belief that the attack of marshalling yards would result in canalisation. All evidence shows, however, that this is not the case. Canalisation can only be achieved by blocking and keeping blocked a number of routes. From the minutes of the important meeting held under the Cheirmanship of the Air C.-in.C.A.T.A.F., at which the railway experts were present, it is clear beyond doubt that the stack of marshalling yards will not prevent the running of through traffic other than for a very short period. It is, therefore, misleading to suggest that the strategic plan is complementary to the tactical plan; in that it will reduce the number of routes available to the enemy and thus narrow the task of our sir forces in the tactical phase. In confirmation of this, para.12(i) of the report by the A.E.A.F. Railway Target Committee, dated 50th March 1944 (Flag 'B'), states that from the limited experience gained to date it may tentatively be deduced that "a successful major attack will prevent through traffic for possibly 3 days".

4. Professor Suckerman yesterday questioned the rightness of the casualty figures obtained by this Directorate from R.E.S. and the C.A.S. accepted his revised estimate. I have since examined the basis of Professor Zuckerman's estimate which is outlined in his note at Flag 'C'. The latter is emplified by a statement at Flag 'D' which was given to me today by Squadron Leader Dewdney and Dr.Fisher of R.E.S. It will be noted from para.l of the latter statement that Professor Suckerman's estimate is based on a series of ideal attacks. It is thus academic and not realistic.

5. The original estimate was a realistic one which embraced operational factors based on experience. The factor of 3 which applies to the attacks by Bomber Command and which accounts for the major difference in the figures is compounded of two elements:-

- The O. N.S. Bomber Command mathematical estimate of the tonnage required is greater than Professor Suckermans.
- (ii) To the above, Bomber Command have applied a factor of 2 to obtain the operational estimate. At Flag 'F' is a note containing Bomber Command's estimate of the tonnages

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required to be despatched. These tonnshow were given to R.E. for the purpose of the casus ty estimates. <u>Results of accent raids</u> <u>confism the securacy of Bomber (amand's operational estimates</u>. The O.R.S. reports on the attacks on Trappes and 'e Mans are attached at Flags 'O' and 'H'. It will be noted that Bomber Command's tonnages are based on fewer strikes per acre than the 4 originally sticulated in the Plan.

6. In regard to the American attacks, the figures quoted by Professor Zuckerman were again the ideal figures, resulting in 2300/4500 killed. All American attacks certainly will not fulfil the ideal conditions. Recent experience confirms that, in the case of Bomber Command attacks, the ideal figures must on the average be trabled, and there is every reason to suppose that some operational factor must similarly be applied in the case of the American attacks.

7. In view of the above, I consider that, as a practical guide to the casualties we must expect, and without allowance for evacuation, Professor Zuckarman's figures give an unfair estimate of the position.

6th April, 1944.

(Sgd) S.O.BUFTON. D.B.Ops.

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HEAD WARTERS UNITED STATES STRITCHE AIR FORSTS IN SUBORD Office of the Director of Intelligence

25 January 1914

SUBJECT: Flanning conference at Norfolk House.

: Departy Commander for Operations.

1. Conference convened at 1700 hours 34 January at Norfolk House. Those present included Air Marchall Leigh-Mallory, General Butler, Air Commodore Kin aton McCloughry, Air Commodore Pendrid, two British Army Major Generals, Frofessor Sukerman, Mr. Sherrington, and Mr. Brandt of the Mallroad Research Service.

2. The plan was enerally discussed, and the chief point of interest which emerged was that the ritish Generals stated that the Germans had already anticipated rill interruptions, and of the ci ht divisions which which be rought to bear against our initial landings seven were new solarized and independent of the railroads. From this they deduced that the attack on rail facilities would not assist in the first battle, but solar event operations. The second to be mich more interested in the statecks on rail targets in second to be mich more interested in the citacks on rail targets in second Germany than on those in France and confront our own troops in that area as they advanced, and also expressed and that high political a proval would be obtainable.

3. Air Marshall Lei h-Vallory did not pay much attention to these objections and stated that they were matters to be decided between binaclf the first battle, and the British Generals had no ready solution to this question out stated they would examine it.

A. Air Marshall Leich-Mallory en uired from me shat the reaction to the plan was from the U.S. Strategic Air Forces. I replied that General opasts had stated that a large per centage of his available bomber effort cause of action he was prepared to initiate attacks against the German rail than ets issuediately in second priority to the remaining first priority Foint whitehall to issue a directive on these lines. He said that he would also include some French rail t rights. I objected to the latter on the followin Founds:

a. That we could not assume the responsibility for the destruction of more than the 39 German targets with the forces available to us.

b. That when Northwest France was clear we had a first priorit, in that area of Grossbow targets.

g. That the French rail targets were not politically cleared for

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5. Air Marshall Leigh-Kallory overrode my objections on the following grounds:

a. That the directive would not place the <u>responsibility</u> for the destruction of these targets on us. That anything destroyed by us in the next month or so would be considered by him as a "bonus" before the plan really came into effect.

b. That he would take up the matter of Crossbo priorities.

c. That he would arrange for political clearance.

6. Air Marshall Leigh-Mallory emphasized to his staff the necessity for making up a list of rail targets suitable for attack by R.A.F. Bomber Command, in order to have R.A.F. Bomber Command study and comment on them.

7. "Oboe" was discussed, and I stated that the Eighth Air Force could place no reliance on it owing to reasons well known to you. The Air tarshall appeared to agree.

> R. D. HUGHES, Colonel, A.C., Aes't D/I.

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.3319/A.C.A.J.(Cos)

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Secoures to delay an Jois advance into Spain.

I am directed to inform you that in the event of the enemy attempting to move into Spain it may become necessary to delay their troop movements by bombing rail communications.

3rd November, 1942

2. A general appreciation of the problem has been made by the Air Staff in consultation with the Mailway Research Service and a conv of this, together with a map, is attached at Appendix "A". I am to request that you will examine, in consultation as necessary with the Commanding General, U.S. Signth Air Porce, the possibilities of employing bomoer forces in the attack of rail communications through occupies grance into Spain.

3. In making your investigation you may wish to refer to the Mailway Research Service and the Air Ministry Intelligence section

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Royal Air Force, c/o G.P.O. Righ Tycombe, Bucks.

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APPENDIX "A" to Air Ministry Letter S.3319/A.C.A.S.(Ops.) dated November, 1942

POSSIBILITIES OF DELAYING BY AIR ACTION ENEMY TROOP MOVEMENTS BY BAIL 14TO SPAIN THROUGH OCCUPIED FRANCE

Routes.

There are three main routes through Occupied France open to the

- energy:

 (i) Sud-Ouest (P.O.) railway, which runs from Paris to Irun, via Orleans, Tours, Poitiers, Bordeaux, Bayonne and Hendaye.
 - (ii) Sud-Ouest (Etat) railway which runs from Paris, via Chartres, Saumur, Niort, Saintes and Bordeaux.
 - (iii) The railway system which runs from Brittany to Bordeaux, via Nantes, La Rochelle and Saintes.

2. The Sud-Ouest (P.O.) is the most important of these routes, and is electric throughout. The Sud-Ouest (Etat) is electric as far as Chartres and thereafter steam. Route (iii) is not of primary importance but would be used if the Germans decided to move troops and supplies from the Brittany area.

Electric Transformer Stations.

3. The destruction of the electric transformer stations at Chevilly, Chaingy and Pessac would cause considerable interruption to traffic on the Sud-Ouest (P.O.) line, (Noute (i)), if not total stoppage until steam locomotives could be found or the stations repaired.

4. Similar interruption would be caused by the destruction of two or three pairs of the sub-stations which exist on route (i). A study of these sub-stations has recently been made by A.I.3(c) in connection with possible attacks by Nos. 138 and 161 squadrons. At these small sub-stations, which are situate every 15 or 20 miles along the route, the current is finally transformed and rectified for use by the trains. The sub-stations should be attacked in pairs since, if only one were attacked on any given stretch of line, electricity could be supplied on a reduced scale by the sub-stations on either side of the gap.

Marshalling Yards.

5. <u>Houte (i)</u>. The marshalling yards recommended for attack on this route are as follows:

graphical ruer	Target	Priority Order
(a)	Juvisy	IV
(b)	Orleans (Les Aubrais)	III
(c)	Tours (St. Pierre des Corps)	II
(4)	Bordeaux (St. Jean)	I
(e)	Hendaye	V

/Route (ii)

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2.

Houte (ii). The best pards on this route are as follows:

Order (a)	Target Trappes	Priority Order
(b) (c) (d)	Chartres Bordeaux (st. Jean) Hendaye	II III . I IV

<u>Joute (iii)</u>. The only target on the route from Brittany (apart from Bordeaux and Hendaye, already mentioned) which seems worthy of attack is Nantes, where the target should be the railway centre on the east side of the town north of the loire and the loire Bridges.

6. It should be pointed out that as route (ii) is in the main alternative to route (i), route (i) should be attacked first and be regarded as worthy of our heavier effort. In particular, it should be noted that Bordeaux covers

Viaducts.

7. These targets should be considered for daylight attack. The following details are given for important targets of this class:

(1) At Bordeaux itself the line is carried over the River Garonne on

a bridge consisting of seven iron lattice girders (the two end ones 57 metres long, the five intermediate ones 77 metres long, each) followed by a 19 span viaduct with a total length of 129 metres.

(ii) At Libourne (some 30 Kms. short of Bordeaux) there is a bridge over the River Dordogne followed by a viaduct. After crossing the river the line crosses a valley 32 Kms. wide, which is subject to flooding, by a straight masonry viaduct prolonged at both ends by embankments. This viaduct consists of 100 - 10 metre span arches elliptical in shape. The arches are built of soft stone. The piers are built on a pile formation, each pier resting by a framework on 44 piles driven through the strata of mud to rest on

(iii) A few kilometres beyond Tours (St. Pierre des Corps) there is a viaduct over the Indre Valley. This viaduct is 751 metres long and 21 metres high and is thought to be of masonry construction.

(iv) Between the stations of Meung-sur-Loire (20 Kms. beyond Orleans (LEXE (Les Aubrais)) and Beaugency (7 kms. further on) there is a long viaduct over the tributary of the liver Loire.

Conclusions.

8. From the transportation standpoint, the greatest concentration of attack should be made at Bordeaux; in particular the bridge and viaduct at Bordesux form a complete bottleneck on the routes lying through Occupied France to Spain. Routes coming from Eastern France and joining the main route south of Paris prevent the Paris yards from being a bottleneck and so from having as high a priority as Bordeaux. Generally, it is suggested hat day attacks should be directed against transformer stations or substations and viaducts, and night attacks against the marshalling yards.

Air Staff. 3.11.42.

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ALFRED R. MAXWELL, Brig Gen, USA, D/Ops

18 April 1945

Approved for the Deputy Commander for Operations

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ALFRED R. RAISELS

Colonel, Air Corps Director of Operations

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ALFRED R. MARTIN

Brigadier General, MSA Director of Operations

Approved for DCG/Ops____

24 April 1945

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Director of Operations 28 March 1945

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TUD-OLUDE

INTELLIGENCE

GEORGE C. MCDONALD Brigadier General, USA Director of Intelligence

12 February 1945

DURING VISIT TO POLAND IN SEPTEMBER ONE NIME FOUR FOUR LEIUTENANT COLONEL OHARA CMA UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE CMA AND FLIGHT LIGHT MILKINSON AND BURDER CMA AIR MINISTRY CMA APPARENTLY GAVE CONSIDERABLE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO RUSSIANS AND RECEIVED CORDIAL INVITATION FOR FURT ER VISIT FROM COLONEL STUDYANOV OF LIAISON STAFF CMA THIS INVITATION RECEIVING THE CONCURDENCE OF COLONEL SHOR OF ARMAMENT RESEARCH SECTION PD SPAATZ TO DEANE PD IT WAS STIPULATED THAT ANY APPLICATION FOR A REPEAT VISIT SHOULD BE MADE DIRECT TO COLONEL STUDYANOV PD TE WISH TO TAKE ADVANTACE OF THIS INVITATION AND A E MAKING SIMULTANEOUS APPLICATION WITH THE BRITISH PD WE HAVE SELECTED THE FOLLOWING TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES SO THAT VISIT CON BE ARRANGED NOT CLM PAREN ABLE PAREN SCHLESIESCHER NERRSTATTE DR FURSTENNICMA LADUS PAREN RADAR BUUIPMENT FACTORY IN FORMER MONASTERY FOURTEIN MILES EAST NORTHEAST LEIGNITS IN BEND OF ODOR FAREN BAKER FAREN JANRHUNDERT HALLE PAREN IN EXHIBITION GROUND EASTER OUTSKIRTS BRESLAU PD RADIO ASSEMBLY AND STORAGE PD IT YOULD ALSO BE APPRECIATED IF PARTY COULD SEE ANY OTHER SUI ABLE TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES IN AREA PAREN PD IF POSSIBLE VE ARE ALSO PAR-TICULARLY KE N THAT PA TY SHOULD BE P R'ITTED TO INSPECT THE FOLLOWING TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES THICH ARE OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE CLN PAREN CHARLIE PAREN PERNEMUNDE PAREN NUMBER TWO TWO ON LIST AND SIGNAL NUMBER SEVEN NINE OHE FROM JIB ITEM CHARLIE PAREN PD PARE. DOG AREN RECHLIN PAREN NUMBER THO SIX ON LIST BUT THIS IS CHITE GNORGE ABLE FOX EXPERIMENTAL ESTABLISHMENT AND NOT ONLY CONCEPNED WITH CONTROLERD MISSELS PAREN PD PA EN EASY FAREN TRAVENMUNDE PAREN DIPORTANT GEORGE ABLE ROX EXPERIMENTALLESTABLIS RIENT PAREN FUX PAPEN TARMENITE PAREN IMPORTANT GEORGE ABLE FOX EXPERIMENTAL ESTABLISHMENT PAREN PD PAREN GEORGE PAREN KOTHER PAREN HEADDWARTE S OF AIR SIGNALS EXP. R DEENTAL

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Commanding Seneral, 1. H. Arnold, Commanding Seneral, ray dr Sorces, Sabinaton, S.

Joar Lags:

I as writing Admiral Wing Loday to catling the recent programs as have sale against U-boats. As you know, the decision of the Walts Conference was to allocate string facilities, however, Bosher Conversion has dropped a total of tem bundees and thirteen tens, while the United States sighth air Force dropped sole two thousand five hundred and fifty tono, unclusive of the attack ands with special rocket boshe.

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On the basis of damage to Hashary (Bloks & Yoss) in Jamary, the entput of that yard has probably been decrement by three of four subs per month, with the further loss of several by sinkings as a result of the state. The parts and further loss of several by sinkings as a result of the state. The parts and further loss of several by sinkings as a result of the state. The parts and further loss of several by sinkings as a result of the state. The parts and further loss of several by sinkings as a result of the state. The parts and books. In addition to delays in production caused by damage to the parts, damage to the residential sections surroussing the yards has undoubtedly reduced afficience at the works. The Friedrich frugp shippard, the feuteche forks thippard and the bowel decipard is fiel have been attached successfully. Trikes in mist instances were indiscernible, but mode rising through the undercost insidented explosions balow. Alel is particularly vulnarable to attack through the overcest.

Foortershaven and limiten have been suspended from our priority list due to the extent of damage received, and we intend to keep them both neutrilised. If which and recently at aches with our experimental recent bonks, with which we seered direct hits and near alesso on the sheltered pane. These special bonks, which esen to present an invediate answer to the problem of paretrating the thick reofed end, which is each the complete bonk being LLS inches long. The recent estar is fused with a mechanical time fute permanently sat for initiation after spressmately 15,000 feet of fall. Is are now working on a barometric fuse to actuate the recent to assure the desired penatrative power.

The Eussian advance has neutralized the Canaig poin, however all suchimpy on such expetile of moving were recoved. Unless there are facilities in which to place the machinery, it night be assumed that output of type EDP's has been reduced by tan (10) to thirteen (13) per four to six weak period.

The are keeping a very careful watch on these important manufacturing and fitting installations, and feel that by continuing our policing attacks we can keep the U-boat threat at a los obb. However, should it noticeably materialise, as will reconsider our priorities, as sugnated at the conference, and increase our effort proportionately against this system.

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MEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE office of the Director of Intelligence AAF STATION 101 ATO 63h

(1)-3-11)

11 Pebruary 1965

SUMJECT: Services Terformed by 325th Thoto Wing, Reconnaissance for Director of Intelligence, Highth Air Porce and Effect of Proposed Wing Novements to Continent.

o : Commanding General, Tighth Air Force.

1. Comenture between 75% and 90% of all its intelligence is obtained by the Eighth Air Porce from photographic sources. This photographic intelligence is provided by the four recommissance squadrons of 7th thoto Group together with the four squadroms of the R.A.F. 106 Group, who procure the photography and rive a quick interpretation thereof, and by Allied Cantral Interpretation Unit, located partly at McCommban and partly at AFF Station 101, composed of American and pritich personnel, which provides detailed interpretation of these photocrapte and produces may rial, such as target photos, maps, desare plots, etc., based on such interpretation for the use of this Air Force and R.A.F. Somber Command.

2. Intelligence from photographic sources covers a wide range, all of which is essential to the homisripent operations of this Air Porce;

2. Placeberry of Jarmets - Initial and basic information regarding German industry - the location of each plant, its size and probable productive capacity.

b. Discovery of New Fargets - Periodic coverage of such industry to determine current extent of activity, enlargement of factories or building of new dispersed factories. Thus energy oil production, capacity and location and acount of production of new lands much as Police, Frug and Plechhammer was largely derived free whoto study and the aircraft production at Marienburg, Regensions, reiner-Neustadt and a bost of others is the result of photo interpretation.

c. Discovery of Energy Weapon Developments - Discovery and identification of new broke of energy weapons, such as V-1 and V-2, the new prefabricated type 21 and 23 U-3 cats, the Me 163, Me 262, Arado 230.

- 1 -

d. Touloyment of Snew Tighter Defenses - The location, state of aervicestility and current activity of German aerodromes.

e. Wetching Presy Communications - The novement and concentrations from day to day of rall, road and canal transportation.

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f. Energy Static Defenses - The location and amount of energy flak defenses, location and effectiveness of scole across, and existence and nature of camouflage of the target. Our information on flak is almost 100% photographic.

c. Enabling Attack of Targets - Preparation of maps and photographic illustrations on which planning of the mission is made and which enable bomber crews to find and destroy the targets.

b. Terulta of stinck on "servets - Termany to the target resulting from our stinck.

i. Then Target Ready for De-Attack - Reconstruction or repair of target.

3. The represent of Fine units to the Continent under the proposed plan, which incolves transfer of three out of four 7 theto Group Squadrons to the Continent; the creation of the major file library on the Continent; the transfer of many interpretation units in whole or in part from the ".Y., and the shifting of nearly all production sections, including the formed Saction, means in offset that the only fully emirred thetographic intelligence service remaining in the ".", will be (h.) and reasily (i), Ter. 2 shows, demage assessment and reconstruction and receive (a) threads (c), Ter. 2 shows, will be transferred to the Continent. The sector of subly of units performing in the liber continent. This will result in delays in the furnishing of such intelligence estimated by the Commander of the Time to be accordinately 2h hours. The estimate that the delay will average a longer time, resulting from the very grout difficulty of coordination the activities of personal to whele separated in location.

h. It is believed that a 2'-bour delay in the furnishing of photographic intelligence services, will creatly reduce the operational efficiency of this air force, particularly during the approaching period of improved weather. Forth demare assessment is only me of the services which we require immediately - all of the others are equally eximut, may owen be more eximpt. Thus, for example, numbers today we stated a tank plant in the more eximpt. Thus, for example, number obsers are equally eximpt in denote the statest. The dotes taken by our hombers are equally eximpt in concentration on the target. Thick photo recommaissance and damare assessment is denirable but not essential. The forcecast for beneric is cool - what we need is another target. In Drumwick there is a tark elent and a factory making contract the statest. In Drumwick there is a tark elent and a factory making contract there still suffering from the effects of serieum need on exactly where that staring is taking place. The or target of the photographic time exactly where that staring is taking place. The state of the photographic and the factory and an immediate interpretation there of by the section and the section to advice on activity is essential to interim. Not constant of transmick and conformation and the factor, not immerse when the test alming point. Even if "D" section and "D" section have sufficient personnel left here to do the interpretation, and the plane limbs in the U.Y., making the new shotes physically available here, the interpretation they not be efficient. The main fill high range will be on the dominant. Thus call on the section is section by which and the interpretation is an important of the section and "D" section have sufficient personnel left here to do the interpretation and "D" section have sufficient personnel left here to do the interpretation and "D" section have sufficient personnel left here to do the interpretation and "D" section have sufficient, the main fill high range will be on the dominent. Thus carlier not

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Lesting wather are also good recommissance wather. This suddenly opens up a wast flow of new intelligence about new targets at the care time that the existing list of targets is warddy and successfully stacked. This intelligence must be forthwith evaluated and target material prepared or the flowting constrainty to desirely the new targets will be irretrievably lot. This isolated instance, such as the example shows given, might be handled under the deployment proposed in the plan, we believe that periods of two, three, four, five or six consecutive days of good wrather would so cumulate the benedicts photorankle in elligence requirements that the facilities of the wing, even if it all remained in the U.Y., would be strained to the utmost and that the difficulties of consumi stion attendent on the deployment would render the Wing unable to meet the argence of our meeds.

". Not only must new large a of the same target categories be discovered, but entirely new target systems may suddenly be estimated for attack. This was the our rience last memore in tanks, s/" cluste as originate denote. At this store in the war, it is quite likely that ward chances in highth dirforce o factives may occur as the attack on the energy at reaches a crescende. Refere has summer, when we did not have the Wine facilities, the record time for proper tion of target material was "days. Last summer, with the Vine facilities, we reduced it to 2h hours. With the Target Section and target whole reproduction facilities on the Continent, the time for preparation of exterial and delive re to us would be done had a size target. This might weat the loss of a floating or enturity to destroy with the gate.

6. The slove indicates the loss of 'enhandment efficiency attantant even delays in peak periods. But even in normal day to ay operations, the represent conjugative I result in delays which we let result in an uncertanted loss of efficiency of this stir Force. Thus the Induces interpretation section would be nowed in its entirety to the Continent. This collen feature the faith the noved in its entirety to the Continent. This collen feature the faith the noved in its entirety to the Continent. This collen feature the faith the noved in its entirety to the Continent. This collen feature the faith the noved in its entirety to the continent. This collen feature the faith the nove where the latter course of our in over the november the state of the source the interaction over the second to make the faith of the november of be alreading when the second here the second the second the second the second of the operation would assign the second to be all the operation of the operation operation of the operation operation of the operation operati

7. The recome mostions bordin for and are from the cals stand wint of the lighth Air Force in all size requirements and so not take into consideration the requirements of the ground for es or the factural sir for es on the Continent. They are as follows:

a. That one or a miximum of two sounderns of the 7th Thoto Proven, now and at ". Tarm, be sent to an advanced Continental tase (to be selected). This will give nor flying days and greater flexibility in overall coverse. Is an when these soundrons procure covera e for either the lighth Air Porce or "..., her will Land and process their film at "... lases, or ther permitting.

b. That only let phase interpretation to performed on the Continent ty personnel of the 325th thoto fint, Perconnelectnee. Thermach as Fighth tir Porce and P.A.V. shoto interpretation personnel are inter-dependent, this would also apply to R.A.P.

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD c. That no other units or detachments of the 325th photo Fing, Deconnaissance be moved from U.Y. and that consideration be given to recalling some units heretofore moved to the Continent, such as the Advanced Detachment of the 9h2nd Engineering Avn. Topo. Th. and photo production facilities. T Н 1 OMARINE V. VARATLE Defendier Gameral, D.S.A. Director of Intelligence P A Ε Ν А S I F I E D - h -0205 THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

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SIL	101:St	atus of	16 mm Scop	e Camera Project
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170.	- Callie	20	DATE	TAS Jo9 FORCE
			10 Mar	For your information.
	Opr			1. The Division and Wing Commanders are iate the possibilities of the 16 mm Scope
	just be Camera	project.	, but there	e are certain items that need a little more the maximum use of available personnel.
				areas installation and developing should
				SAP Camera project which is now functioning ational coverage and for PRO purposes.
				have decided to do the initial limited pro-
	cessin	g at the	Fighter W	ing headquarters and, as soon as more equal
	requ r	ements a	nd trainin	of Bomb Group personnel should be a Fighter of Division direction, as no additional per- ept the limited service infantry replacements
	coming	in very	slowly.	
	Lat Day	c. The	production	processing of selected films is being set up make the Army Air Forces independent of
	civili	an conce	rns.	
				could well be used to make the 16mm Camera their H2X preflight checks, thereby saving
	one ma	n per gr	oup origin	ally requested by the commences
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	HEADQUARTERS EIGTEI AIR PORCE AAF STATICE 101	
	APO 634 DC90-1-17	
	2 March 1945	
	MUDRAIDAM: Implementing the 16 MM Scope Camera Project.	
Т	10 : Commanding General, Nighth Air Force, APO 634.	
H	1. The Division and Wing Commanders are just beginning to	
S	appreciate the possibilities of the 16 MM Scope Camera project, but there are certain items that need a little more emphasis in order to make the machine use of available personnel.	
A G . E	a. The 15 MM Scope Camera installation and developing should take precedence over the GMP Camera project which is now functioning very well, both for operational coverage and for MMO purposes.	
I S U N C L	b. The Divisions have decided to do the initial limited processing at the Pighter Wing headquarters and, as soon as more equipment is available, to decentralize it to the Groups. Personnel requirements and training of Back Group personnel ahould be a Fighter Wing responsibility under Division direction, as no additional personnel are available except the limited service infantry replace- ments coming in very slowly.	
A S S	c. The production processing of selected films is being set up at Bovingdon in order to make the Angy Air Forces independent of civilian concerns.	
F I E D	d. H2% mechanics could well be used to make the 16 HM Samera installation along with their H2% preflight checks, thereby saving one man per group originally requested by the Commands.	
	WALTER S. RODD Brigadier General, USA Dep C/3 for Operations	

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				D 5 11 15 11 10100 D 5 14 10 101 APO 534 DCSO-F-1 10 Mar 45	
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L A S S		c. The tin don in is concer	order to	provising of selected films is being set up make the army sir forces into encent of	
I F I E	inste one m	il tion al	one stab.	bold woll be used to much the long Camara heir M2X precident checks, thereby saving hig requested by the Commands.	
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ISADQUARTERS 325TH PEOTO WING ASCONTWISSANDE Office of the Photo Officer (RIJ_FIGLER)

18 March 1945

CONTRACTO CONTRACTOR -

319.1

: Col. Pierce, Director of Plans, Eighth Air Force

1. Request that a teletype substantially as follows be sent to the Commanding General, each Air Division, for informational purposes:

"IT IS PLANNED TO CONNECT A TRAINING COURSE AT LET SAD FOR TWO (2) MADAR MOCHANICS FROM MACH BOURARMEENT GROUP PROSENTLY EQUIPRID WITH 16mm H2X SCOPE CAMERAS. THESE MEN WILL BE TRAINED FOR A PERIOD OF NOT LESS TON TWO NOR MORE THEN THEM WERE TO ENCOME QUALIFIED TO ADDRESS OF PARTONN FIRST POINTLON REPAIR ON THE 16mm INSTALLATIONS. THE EXACT DATE OF THE COURSE WILL BE ANNOUNCED LATER."

> JOHN L. FUGH Major, Air Corps Ass't. Ming Photo Officer

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE AFF STATION 101 AFO 634

ET- -19

22 January 1945.

MEMORANDUM

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TO

) Colonel A. J. Pierce, Director of Plans.

1. During the past two months the operational use of sixteen (16) H2X Scope Movie Cameras in the Eighth Air Force has instigated the installation of four (4) cameras (with two spares and eight potential operating positions arranged in aircraft) in each of the forty (40) groups during the coming year.

2. The proper execution of this activity as advised by the Eighth Air Force A-3 Training Section and the technicians who have been associated with this project to date, involves the following listed major items:

a. Addition of approximately five (5) officers and two hundred (200) enlisted photo technicians to the Eighth Air Force T.O. (Four (4) enlisted men added to each Group Photo Lab., and others at 1st SAD, Divisions' Readquarters, Eighth Air Force Meadquarters.)

b. Erection of forty-seven (47) buildings (similar to the air Corps E.2 Fortable Fhoto Lab), at the above mentioned stations.

c. Use of forty-five (45) vehicles (jeeps), two hundred and forty (240) H2X Scope Fhoto Cameras, one hundred and fifty (150) 16 M.M. Frojectors, ten million feet of 16 M.M. film, and associated processing equipment.

3. The attached "Report on H2X Scope Novie Photography" includes detailed recommendations for SOP for the project, and estimates of types and quantities of personnel, materiel, and expendables necessary to complete the program as effectively, rapidly and economically as is practical in this theater in 1945.

> JOHN S. SUMERHAYES, Captain, S.C.

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE Office of the Commanding General AFO 634

ET-E-19

SUBJECT: 16 12, H2X Camera.

Commanding Officer, 325th Photo Wing Reconnaissance, AFO 634.

1. This Headquarters has undertaken to equip each heavy Bombardment Group with four (4) subject cameras installed, two (2) spare cameras and eight (8) additional H2X aircraft fitted with group "A" parts.

2. For the present, these cameras will supplement the K-24, H2X camera and eventually will replace the K-24.

3. Effective immediately, the 325th Fhoto Wing Reconnaissance will:

a. Receive one (1) positive and one (1) negative 16 '1' from each Eighth Air Force Bombardment Group using the equipment, after each mission.

b. Frovide a projection room and make available each of the films received so that films can be selected by this Meadquarters for reproduction. An experienced H2X operator will be assigned to Captain Slakey's section, as discussed with Captain Elakey, to assist in the preparation of these films.

c. Reproduce the selected films upon the advice of Eighth Air Force A-3, and stretch each film by a factor of four (4) so that they can be projected without special projectors. Denham Laboratory is equipped to procure and process 16 MM film and has processed a sample lot consisting of the first thirty (30) films taken on operational missions. A room is available for lease at the Denham Laboratory and an Eighth Air Force stretch printer set up for immediate use.

d. Properly mark each selected film as to target attacked, direction

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	of attack and general route.	
	e. Distribute the film as follows:	
	2 - Retain in a library at 325th Photo Wing Reconnaissance.	
	2 - Eighth Air Porce, attention COFC.	
T H	1 - Each Air Division Headquarters.	
I	1 - Each Bombardment Wing Headquarters.	
S	f. Forward rejected positive films to 1st SAD for maintenance	
P A	analysis.	
G E	2. Maintain a file of an negative films whether or not they are	
I	selected for distribution.	
Ŝ	h. Captain John Summerhayes will be attached to the 325th Photo Wing	
U	Reconnaissance for sixty (60) days TDY, as project officer, and will be as-	
N C	signed to the Director of Training, this Headquarters, who will be responsible	
L A	for the monitoring of this program.	
S S	By command of Lieutenant General DOOLITTLE:	
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	Alguarizas Electra ale sonor Alguarization Alguarization
T H	Te. Z.C. IC D.TE REFERENCE your letter subject Implementation
I S P A G E I S U N C L A S S I F I E D	General Anderson 31/1/45 Reference your letter subject Implementation of willie Orphan project dated 17 Jan. This project previously recommended as impractical due to adverse wather in this theater and low state of project development. Since willie Orphan is considered essential request minimum organization be allocated for implementation of program. Recommended as implementation of program. Recommended as the station 342 (ATOMAN) as listed 5 Jan for basic structure this project. I have studied this and believe it the best solution. There are only two alternatives, one to get release on the 495th Hg & Hg Fighter Thg OF with the two Fighter Training Jas and use the service units at Cheddington or stand down the 492nd Bonb Gp at Harrington. Maxwe A. F. FLUCES, J/Fights & Reg.
	Attention: If the communication to which this routine alig is attached is either which or Confidential, <u>this routine alig was be so standed or marked</u> . To 2
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SAD_UARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE AAF STATION 101 APO 634

31 January 1945

SUBJECT: 16 K.M. Scope Camera Photography.

TO : Commanding Officer, 325th Photo Wing Recon., APO 634.

1. This Headquarters has approved the project for equipping each of the thirty-eight (38) Heavy Bombardment Groups with six (6) 16 M.M. movie cameras for recording of scope pictures during the actual operations of a mission. The 16 M.M. cameras will gradually replace the K-24 camera now in use and the developed film when processed and reproduced will be used for analysis and correction of errors in radar navigation and bombing in addition to possible advantages for training and briefing of crews on subsequent missions.

2. The Commanding Officer of the 325th Photo Wing Recon. will be responsible in general for receiving, reproducing, marking and cataloguing of the mission film and for furnishing technical assistance in the development of this program as rapidly as possible. Specifically it is desired that, in addition to the overall technical direction, the 325th Photo Wing be prepared to furnish the following:

a. Library and catalogue facilities for one positive and one negative film from every Bomb Group employing H2X equipment on the mission.

b. A projection room for reviewing and selection of the most representative film illustrating the objective referred to in paragraph 1.

c. Facilities to reproduce twenty (20) copies with a stretch factor of four (4) of the most representative film as selected by the operations eschelon of this Headquarters. In this connection Denham Laboratory is equipped and has processed thirty rolls of 16 M.M. operational film under an initial contract and it has available, facilities for procurement, stretching and processing sufficient film for the overall program.

d. Fersonnel to title and mark selected film as to the target, direction of attack, general route, and metrological data.

e. The distribution of reproduced films as indicated below:

2 Copies for the film library in the 325th Wing Headquarters.


- 2 Copies to the Headquarters Eighth Air Force, (Att: COPC).
- 1 Copy to each Headquarters Air Division.
- 1 Copy to each of the thirteen Headquarters Cambat wings.

f. The forwarding of rejected positive films to the 1st SAD for maintenance analysis.

3. Capt. John Summer 1245, project Officer this Headquarters, will be attached to your command for a period of 60 days effective 1 February 1945 to assist in the implementation of this program.

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ADJUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE AAF STATION 101 APO 634

31 January 1945

SUBJECT: 15 M.N. Scope Camera Photography.

: Commanking Officer, 325th Photo Wing Recon., APO 634.

1. This Headquarters has approved the project for equipping each of the thirty-eight (38) Heavy Bombardment Groups with six (6) 16 M.M. movie cameras for recording of scope pictures during the actual operations of a mission. The 16 M.M. cameras will gradually replace the K-24 camera now in use and the developed film when processed and reproduced will be used for analysis and correction of errors in radar navigation and bombing in addition to possible advantages for training and briefing of crews on subsequent missions.

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2 Copies to the Headquarters Lighth Air Force, (Att: COPC).

1 Copy to each Headquarters Air Division.

1 Copy to each of the thirteen headquarters Combat wings.


f. The forwarding of rejected positive films to the 1st Sal for maintenance analysis.


3. a. Capt. John Sumherboys, project officer this Headquarters, will be attached to your command for a period of 60 days effective 1 February 1945 to assist in the implementation of this program.

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DRAFT

Reference UA51197 dated & December 1944 via Spaatz:

1. This Headquarters considers the organization required to handle project should consist of one (1) complete group headquarters, 1/0 112, and one (1) complete heavy bombardment squadron, 1/0 117. It is anticipated that two (2) main establishments will be required, the rear base utilizing 34D field and personnel for modification of war weary aircraft and a flight and test section from the heavy bombardment squadron for testing, equipment and training personnel; and the staging base with the group headquarters and the remainder of the heavy tombardment squadron for first echelon maintenance and operation.

2. In the headquarters section all of the personnel would be used on the forward base for the primary assignment with the exception of: one Major --Assistant Operations Training, one Major -- Materiel, one Captain - Personnel. Enlisted men of headquarters would be split up between the forward and the rear bases, according to the need; most of the specialists would be carried in headquarters.

3. The majority of the personnel of T/O 117 would also be at the forward base or first echelon maintenance and operations. There would, however, be a rlight section, a test section and training section detached to the rear base. Equipment specialists would be detached to the rear base in a supervisory capacity to take charge of the modification and installation of the special equipment. The flight section would do the initial testing of the equipment, the training of the mother crews, the training of the baby crews and C-1 pilot and parachute jumping. In some sections, such as the turnet section, part of the men would be used to assist Ordnance in loading. Domb sight maintenance men would be used for C-1 maintenance, and in any section where there was an overage the men would be trained as specialists in equipment.

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
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Operations

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X6 December 1044

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ATT

REUR UA-51197 DEC 6 44 USE OF WAR WEARY ADFT AS WEAPON AGAINST GEREANS IS SUBJ. 1. PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATIONAL RORTS LISTED BELOW FOR EXAMPLED WAR WEARY ADFT PROJECT RASED ON ASSUMPTION THAT ROBOT ADFT WILL BE RECEIVED AT REAR RASE FROM DEPOT IN STRIPTED CONDITION AND WITH INITIAL INSTALLATION OF CONTROL ROUF CONFLETED, PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO PROJECT WILL MAINTAIN AND THAT ROBOT ADFT AND MOTHER ADFT AND CONDUCT THE NEC THE AT REAR RASE AND WILL MAINTAIN ADD THAT ROBOT AND EQUIP AND DISPATCE OPERATIONAL MISSIONS FROM FORWARD BASE.

2. TERSONCEL REQUIRED FOR AN EXPANDED WAR WEARY ACTY TROJECT IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. ONE COMPLETS AIR SV OP (SP) COMPRISING:

- (1) HO AND BASE SV SQ T/O & E 1-452T 15 APR 44
- (2) MATERIES, SO THO & I 1-458T 15 APR 14
- (3) ING SQ T/O & X 1-4577 15 APR 1044
- 3. ONE HO BORS OF (H) T/O & E 1-112 29 JUNE 14 0 92 AUGUSTED BY:
 - (1) & TELEVISION SPECIALISTS (1 CAPT, 1 T/SGT, 2 S/SOT)
 - (2) & RADIO CONTROL SPECIALISTS (1 CAPT, T/SOT, 2 S/SGT)
 - (3) 4 RADIO ALTIMETER SPECIALISTS (1 CAPT, 1 T/SGT, 2 S/SGT)
 - (4) 5 FLYING CONTROL OFFICERS (2 CAPT, 3 18T LT)
 - (5) 1 PARATROOP JUNPHASTER (1ST LT)
 - (6) 1 RESECCA-NURSKA SPECIALIST (8/807)

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PAGE THREE

(14) 4 C-1 AUTOPILOT SPECIALISTS

(15) 18 MUNITIONS WORKERS SPECIALLY CRAINED IN REBOT LOADING

B. THPOPARY DUTY

(1) 1 LT COL FILOT TECHNICIAN FROM NEW COD WRIGHT FLD

4. A. SPECIALLY TRAINED PERSONNEL LIGTED ABOVE CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR THIS PROJECT BUT MUST BE REPLACED BY AN EQUIV NO. OF PERSONNEL TRAINED IN STD HEAVY BOMB OFNS AND MAINTENANCE.

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B. THIS CHO CAN PURNISH 1 AIR SV GP AS PHE T/O & E 452T. 457T. & 458T EXCLPT FOR FOLLOWING SECTIONS OF THESE T/O'S OF WHICH THERE IS A CRITICAL SHORTAGE WITHIN THIS CHO: 9 Carte of prod for The area

(1) MEDICAL

- (2) CHENICAL
- (3) COMMUNICATIONS
- (4) DRAFTSMEN
- (5) FARACHUTE RIGGERS
- (6) FUOTOGRAPHIC PERSONNEL

C. IN GEF TO 2.8. AND 2.C. ABOVE THESE UNITS MUST BE IN ADDITION TO OUR PRESENT TROOP BASIS AS THE EXPANDED PROGRAM WILL REQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL COMMAT COMMITMENT

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HAD WARTERS SIGHTH AIR FORCE AF STATION 101 AFO 634

ST- -19

22 January 1945.

TETOLODIA)

) Colonel A. J. Pierce, Director of Flans.

1. During the past two months the operational use of sixteen (16) 12X Scope Novie Gameras in the Eighth Air Force has instigated the installation of four (4) cameras (with two spares and eight potential operating resitions arranged in aircraft) in each of the forty (40) groups during the coming year.

2. The proper execution of this activity as a vised by the Eighth Air Force A-3 Training Section and the technicians who have been associated ith this project to date, involves the following listed major items:

a. Addition of approximately five (5) officers and two humined (200) enlisted photo technicians to the Eighth Air Force T.C. (Four (A) enlisted men added to each Group Photo Lab., and others at 1st SAD, Divisions' "ealquarters, Eighth Air Force Headquarters.)

b. Erection of forty-seven (47) buildings (similar to the dr Corps E.2 Fortable Photo Lab), at the above mentioned stations.

c. Use of forty-five (45) vehicles (jeeps), two hundred and forty (240) H2% Scope Thoto Camerus, one hundred and fifty (150) 16 M.M. Projectors, ten million feet of 16 M.M. film, and associated processing equipment.

3. The attached "Report on H2X Scope Sovie Photography" includes detailed recommendations for SOF for the project, and estimates of types and quantities of pursonnel, material, and expendables necessary to complete the program as effectively, rapidly and economically as is practical in this theater in 1945.

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JOHN S. SUMMERIATIN, Captain, A.C.

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offlow of the Constanting General	
The community officer, 15th Thole Many Semaralaneses, and and	
will be furnished to a solat in saving talk selection.)	
c. Make tworty (20) copies of each of the selected films. It is propossible the initials of Johnse Lateratory be employed until arrangements for as made to process to 3.4. film by the 25th Thoto ing Decomplements. Instant Laboratory is capable of processing and proceeding to 3.4. file and make	
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e. Properly more with file as to target attached, direction of stream	
f. Cistrivets the twenty (2) positive copies as follows	
. Mintain a libr. or of each selected file.	
2. Captain Jam Demorrages is available for assignment to the Jopus there was been been as project officer.	
in command of limiterate demand Diviliant .	

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14 December 2044

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD HMDQUARTERS Office of the Commanding Officer Station 140 CDJAA Persfield ... E. mm APU 559 190 ct 44 18 October 1944. SUBJECT: Aphrodite Personnel. TO : Commanding General, Third Bombardment Division, APO 559. The following personnel have been associated with Project 1. H Aphrodite for approximately five months. Their experience, which consists of an extensive training program as well as combat operations, should prove valuable in the future success of the project: p 388 Gp. SATTERNHITE, R. B. Lt. Col. 0-388636 - Unit Coursander HOLEROOK, R. K. 0-417697 - Project Officer 0-430583 - Eng. & Modif. Officer 0-819020 - Operations & Training 0-1036322- Chem. & Ord. Officer Major HAYES, R. S. Major TILLEY, L. N. lat Lt 390 Gp. NIX, A. F. lst Lt 388 Gp. TOOMAN, W. F. Capt. 0-745764 - Pilot WOODFORD, J. A. 0-747539 - CP 0-664876 - N let Lt 12 DIX, R. W. lat Lt 437 Gp. MUMMA, J. F. 0-703775 - N 0-755559 - Controllor 16608806 - E 2nd Lt HARRIS, E. B. Fryer, J. C. 388 Gp. lat Lt T/Sgt S/Sgt 12 Sanchez, 0. 18199268 - AB Wilson, R. J. T/Sgt 13145921 - RO Vallenzano, J. Ouellette, V. R. Karrels, E. T. 19 S/Sgt S/Sgt 39001781 - AG 15 31000591 - AG 12 S/Sgt 36378272 - 70 388 Gp. GABLER, J. J. lot It 0-753996 - Pilot RAUFMANN, R. W. 0-815479 - CP lat Lt McGRE, D. L. let It 0-757836 - N 0-676383 - B 12 H RGIS, G. L. lst IA Keinath, W. F. 32168151 - E T/Set Cassidy, R. Middleton, J. T. S/Sgt T/Sgt 13018170 - AE 18 19101350 - RU

Miller, L. J. McKay, R. W. 14074588 - AR 11083589 - AG S/Set 10 Potenga, C. J. S/Set 15131217 - TG 388 Gp. LANSING, J. Y. 0-490566 - Pilot lst Lt CRETE, D. H. 1st Lt 0-761894 - CP FETERSON, A. E. LACY, J. W. lst Lt 0-701383 - N 11 1st Lt 0-701611 - B 452 Gp. SELDCMRIDGE, R. W. lat Lt 0-753251 - Controller 388 Gp. Baird, W. H. Teed, F. A. T/Sgt 13079154 - E 3/Set 11013722 - AE Beeman, J. R. McBwoy, J. J. HARMON, J. O. T/Set 18194867 - RO s/set 32831065 - AG 18041228 - TG

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388 Gp. LARNED, J. I. B.	lat Lt	0-693287 - Pilot	
" CRAMER, H. W. " PATTERSON, L. P.	lst Lt	0-760792 - CP	
" LEGH_PAGE. G. D.	and It lat Lt	0-701276 - N	
90 Gp. SCHRAM, C.	let It	0-702058 - B 0-808473 - Controlle	7*
388 Gp. Makar, G. JR. DePasquale, D. A.	T/Set S/Set	32806534 - E	
Hoffenberg, J. M.	T/Set	32732399 - AE 12150056 - RO	
Kirkendall, O. H. Maleshi, B.	S/ Set	15331837 - AG	
" Scatamacchia, C.	S/Set S/Set	35137889 - AG 32497074 - TG	
385 Gp. FALCONSTINC, F.			
" GRZYMKOWSKI, V. J.	Capt. 2nd Lt	0-813651 - Pilot 0-887010 - CP	
DIEFFENBACH, R. E.	lst Lt	0-700707 - N	
" MILLER, C. E. 96 Gp. HETHERINGTON, O. W.	lst Lt lst Lt	0-811723 - N	
385 Gp. Pemberton, J. L.	T/Set	19774386 - E	
" Eheinheimer, W. H. " Burns, J. F.	S/Sgt	35546903 - AB	
" Meyers, J. J.	T/Sgt S/Sgt	34684570 - RO 30283288 - AG	
Moore, R. J.	S/Sgt	11091707 - AG	
aoore, a. J.	S/Sgt	39292543 - TG	
The following g	round technic:	ians are listed in order	of
BAD 1. Gallion, K. H.	s/set	39270823 - Altitude G	antml Cont
440 TCC Smith, C. M. BAD 1. Lew, F. A.	S/Sgt W/Sgt	12100470 - Television	2
458 Gp. Kurs, B. M.	S/Set	39135831 - C-1 Auto P. 13099693 - Radio Cont:	ilot (
3d BD Fulkerson, E. M. 458 Gp. Resves, A. E.	S/Sgt	2)40/ - Television	
90 Gp. Ter Haar. C. A.	Set 7/Set	38397442 - Radio Contr 16045579 - C-1 Auto P	ol Equipment
458 Gp. Rugala, B. A. 388 Gp. O'Boyle, M. F.	Sert	10112925 - Radio Conti	01 Emimant
McKelvey, J. L.	s/set s/set	14200193 - Mebecca/ 1917	vales 1
Coppo, J. P.	Set	36179759 - C-1 Auto Pi 19160766 - C-1 Auto Pi	lot
" Sandford, H. "Hogland, W. O.	Sec.	39202093 - Rebecca/mm	
" Kirg, B. P.	Set	1/100477 - Altitude Cov	ton I cant
458 Gp. Lamb, E. E.		34036136 - Rebecca/Eure 39684259 - Radio Contro	dro.
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200.3 lst Ind. HEADQUARTERS 3D EOMBARDMENT DIVISION, APO 559.

C-B-12

TO: Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, APC 634.

1. The officers and enlisted men listed in basic communication have received training and combat experience which should prove invaluable in any further operations or training program that may be undertaken. It is suggested that the services of men listed in basic letter be utilized in the event that another project of this nature is contemplated. The utilization of the trained controllers will be of primary importance in the success of future operations.

2. The following named officers (Controllers) should be added to the list:

lst Lt Russell W. Betts, Jr. 0-758522 - 96th Gp - Radio Controller lst Lt Robert F. Butler, 0-819488 - 452nd Gp- Radio Controller

For the Commanding General:

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


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




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
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	O O P P P P P P Y HEADQUARTERS Y V UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES
	 INTED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE 17 January 1945 SUBJECT: Implementation of "WILLIE ORPHAN" Project TO : Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, APO 634 Commending General, Ninth Air Force, APO 696 Commanding General, Air Service Command, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, APO 633. 1. <u>DEFINITION</u>: Willie Orphan is the project designation of a plan for utilizing war weary radio-controlled aircraft as robot bombs. 2. <u>PURPOSE</u>: The Willie Orphan Project has been undertaken to accomplish the following objectives: a. To destroy or damage area targets in support of tactical and, in a limited sense, strategical operations. b. To immodiately counter the psychological effect of the German V-l and V-2 program with a controlled robot bomb of far greater destructive effect and consequently of higher psychological value. c. To obtain maximum utilization of a pircraft which have become unfit
T H I	Commanding General, Ninth Air Force, APO 696 Commanding General, Air Service Command, US Strategic Air Forces in
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S U	and V-2 program with a controlled robot bomb of far greater destructive effect
N C L	c. To obtain maximum utilization of aircraft which have become unfit for normal combat operations.
A S S I F I	3. DESCRIPTION OF WEAPON: The Willie Orphan missile is a war weary B-17 or B-24 which has been stripped of all equipment that is non-essential for flight alone. Radio controls are installed which enable the aircraft to be controlled from either another aircraft (as in the Aphrodite program) or from SCR-584 ground radar sta- tions near the front lines opposite the selected target. The aircraft is loaded with as much as 20,000 pounds of TNT or Torpex.
E D	4. <u>CONTROL TECHNIQUE</u> : Volunteer pilots and co-pilots fly the aircraft from an advanced and relatively isolated landing field, navigating to a pre-arranged point where contact is established by VHF radio with the SCR-584 ground radar station. The pilot sets up the C-l auto-pilot and radio control, and the opera- tion of the aircraft is turned over to a controller at the SCR-584 ground station. After remaining with the aircraft an sdequate time to insure that the radio con- trols are functioning properly, the pilot and co-pilot bail out upon instructions from the ground station. The robot is then directed to the target area by a con- troller using radio controls and referring to the position of the aircraft which is shown accurately on the SCR-584 plotting board. As the robot approaches the
	target area, the controller reduces engine power and causes the robot approaches the a trajectory that will cause it to fall within the target area. It is estimated conservatively that at operational limits of control a target area of four miles square can be hit with reasonable certainty. Targets which are located at shorter range and which require less eltitude for line of sight control could be attacked with somewhat better accuracy.

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5. <u>SCOPE OF PROJECT</u>: It is expected that seven (7) robot aircraft will be launched initially. Of these robot aircraft, five (5) aircraft will be controlled operationally from the SCR-584 radar site and two (2) aircraft will be equipped with Black Maria beacons and will be controlled operationally by a mother aircraft. On completion of this initial test decisions will be made as to quantities of war weary aircraft to expend in each manner per month. Fifty (5) Willie Orphan kits which include explosive and control equipment have been manufactured in the Zone of Interior and are being shipped to this theater. Fifty (5) additional kits will be available in the Zone of Interior within the next sixty (60) days. War weary aircraft will be stripped and redio control equipment will be installed at a depot in England. A rear base will be provided in the United Kingdom and necessary test equipment and the largest proportion of specialized personnel will be assembled at this base. A staging base will be provided on the Continent. This base to perform last minute maintenance and testing and to accomplish the final launching of the missile against its target in Germany.

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"WILLIE OFFICE" Project" dtd 17 January 1945

6. <u>RESPONSIBILITIES</u>: To achieve a highly coordinated program, it will be necessary to divide the various responsibilities among the Eighth Air Force, the Winth Air Force, and the Air Service Command, U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe. The following outline will be used as a guide in determining the responsibilities of the various Commands listed above:

a. The Air Service Command, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, will:

(1) Arrange to put in flying condition and strip seven (7) war weary aircraft immediately. It will also modify aircraft according to Eighth Air Force instructions. The amount of stripping will be left to the discretion of ASC.

(2) Set up facilities at an ASO base for specialist personnel now on route from Zone of Interior and cooperate with them in the installation of radio control equipment. It is understood these personnel will be attached to Eighth Air Force and will be responsible for the radio installation testing and maintenance.

(3) Arrange for the testing of war weary aircraft as may be necessary to assure that aircraft are air-worthy. Each modified war weary aircraft will be ferried to the Eighth Air Force base as soon as modifications and installations have been completed.

(4) Prepare estimate of cost in man hours and in interference with other priority projects of turning out twenty-five (25) such eircraft per month.

b. The Eighth Air Force will:

(1) Determine and forward to Headquarters Base Air Depot Area a list of necessary modifications for war weary aircraft such as the addition of e-cape hatches and the positioning of the control equipment.

(2) Supply the Base Air Depot Area with technical assistance for installation of control equipment in war weary aircraft. Technicians who will be attached to Eighth Air Porce and who were trained for this daty are en route from the Zone of Interior to ETO.

(3) Establish, maintain, and control a base in England which will be a central location for assembling necessary technical personnel, test equipment, and training equipment.

(4) Procure and train bail-out pilots in the use of C-1 automatic pilot, bail-out procedure, radio control set-up, and other duties necessary to accomplish the Willie Orphan mission.

(5) Confer with the Ninth Air Force and arrive at a practical S.O.P. which will achieve complete coordination of the Willie Orphan missions which are controlled from a SCR-584 radar site.

(6) Supply the Ninth Air Force with ground maintenance and technical personnel to handle maintenance and final testing at the steging field on the Continent and deliver fully trained bail-out crews to the Ninth Air Force staging field on the Continent as requested by the Ninth Air Force.

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(7) Deliver robot aircraft fully tested to the Ninth Air Force base on the Continent as these aircraft are requested by the Ninth Air Force.

(8) Plan, execute, and evaluate operational missions required to expend five (5) war weary aircraft per month. These aircraft will be equipped with Black Maria beacons and television and will be controlled by mother aircraft.

. The Ninth Air Force will:

(1) Have operational control of that phase of the Willie Orphan project which includes the expenditure of ground controlled missiles and will be responsible for the selection of targets, the planning and scheduling of missions, and for obtaining information concerning the effectiveness of this weapon.

(2) Provide a staging base and will be responsible for the security of that base.

(3) Take every precaution for the safety of the bail-out pilots.

(4) Confer with the Eighth Air Force and be responsible for the promulgation of a practical S.O.F. f r the operation of those robot aircraft which are controlled from the SCR-584 radar site.

7. It is desired that the Commanding General, Air Service Command, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, take immediate "action" on paragraphs 6 a (1) and 6 a (2) above. It is further desired that each addressee evolve a general plan for the implementation of his portion of the Willie Orphan project and forward copy of one to the Commanding General, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe.

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By command of Lieutenant General SPANTA:

/s/ R. S. BARMARD Capt., AGD Asst. Adj. Gen.

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FERSON EL ASSIGLED TO FROJECT WILL MAINTAIN AND TEST ROBOT ACFT AND MOTHER ACPT AND CONDUCT THE NEC TRG AT REAR BASE AND WILL MAINTAIN ACPT AND EQUIP AND DISPATCH OFFERATIONAL MISSIONS FROM FORWARD BASE.

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(2) MATERIEL SQ T/O & E 1-458T 15 AFR 44

(3) ENG SQ T/O & E 1-457T 15 APR 44

B. ONE HQ BOID GF (H) T/O & E-1-112 29 JUNE 44 TO BE AUGIENTED BY:

(1) 4 TELEVISION SPECIALISTS (1 CAPT, 1 T/SGT, 2 S/SGT)

(2) 4 RADIO CONTROL SPECIALISTS (1 CAPT, T/SGT, 2 S/SGT)

(3) 4 RADIO ALTIMETER SPECIALISTS (1 CAPT, 1 T/SGT, 2 S/SGT)

(4) 5 FLYING CONTROL OLD TORRS (2 CAPT, 3 1ST LT)


(5) 1 PARALROOF JU PROSTER (1ST LT)

(6) 1 REBECCA-EUREKA SPECIALIST (3, SOP)


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CONMAND AND COMPROL OF THE U.S. STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL AIN FORCES IN SUROPE

At the present time the Headquarters United States Strategic Air Forces in Surope has operational control over the Zighth And Fifteenth Air Forces (except for overriding requirements of SACMED for the battle in Italy) and administrative control of the Eighth, Minth and First Tactical Air Force (Prov). SHAEF has operational control over the Minth Air Force, First Tactical Air Force (Prov) and the 2nd Tactical Air Force (RAF) and operational direction of strategic effort allocated for battle requirements by the Eighth Air Force and the RAF Bomber Command. Although this system has operated with reasonable satisfaction it is cumbersons due to the inclusion of too many headquarters in the channel of communications, and it results in a violation of the principle of "concentration of force" and a failure to exercise the full flexibility of air power.

The strategic air forces are established on too rigid strategic principles and the tactical air forces are generally too tactical (due to the difficulty of breaking the habit of the ground commanders of expecting tactical air forces on their front to be continuously available). There are times when the greatest contribution to the war can be made by throwing the weight of the strategic air forces into the battle. This, however, insofar as possible, should be done in a planned fashion and not as an emergency. During periods of stabilization of the front the greatest contribution that the tactical air forces could make might be in the strategic sense. The tactical fighter groups are capable of much deeper penetrations against all types of targets than is customary, and could be more effective on counter-air operations if so employed. If oil and transportation, for instance, are the first and second best target systems for the strategic air forces it should follow that they are also the best targets for tactical air forces, within their capabilities, except when they are required on the battlefield. There are targets which are exclusively strategic in nature that are almost within artillery range of the front lines and there are targets which are tactical in nature, principally transportation targets, that are deep in the strategic area.

At present the tactical reconnaissance units are in practice controlled by the Armies; photo reconnaissance units are controlled by the strategic air forces, the tactical air forces, the Army Groups and the Armies; the reproduction and file library facilities are dispersed in a number of locations on the continent and in UK. There is considerable overlapping of flight areas for these units. Film libraries should be at the disposal of all concerned particularly in view of the rapid changes of Army and Army Group boundaries. As in tactical aviation, reconnaissance aviation should be flexible enough to concentrate on the areas where the weather is good or the front is active or to decentralize as the situation dictates. Strategic reconnaissance can add tactical reconnaissance both photo and visual, and vice versa. This flexibility can best be achieved through placing operational control of all reconnaissance units and tactical air units.

Although the U.S. Air Forces have made one of the most outstanding contributions to the course of the European war to date, it is felt most strongly that an even more poverful impact can be gained by centrelized control both operationally and administratively of all U.S. Air Forces under a single American commander. It is therefore recommended that:

3. Upon movement of the Twelfth Air Force to the Sixth Army Group front, the Headquarters, First Tactical Air Force (Prov) be disbanded and the units now assigned thereto be assigned to the Twelfth Air Force.

b. Operational control of the Winth and Twelfth Air Forces be vested in a single U.S. air commander.

c. Delegation of Operational control for tactical planning and air cooperation be made to the commanders of the Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces which are associated with the Twelfth Army Group and the Sixth Army Group respectively.

d. Coordination and planning allocation of strategic effort on tactical

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
targets and tactical effort on strategic targets be achieved as at present through SHAMF Air.

e. The command channel for the direction of U.S. strategic bombardment be from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, to the Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces in Marope, as at present.


<u>f</u>. Operational direction of the strategic effort of the Fifteenth Air Force in Italy remain with the Commanding General, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe, in accordance with present directives.


E. Coordination of the strategic effort of the US Eighth Air Force and the RAF Bomber Command continue as at present.





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
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
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
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Policy & Overall Planning for American Air Forces.

1. In a telephone call today, General Arbarac expressed considerable concern over the initiative taken by SHAEF Air Staff in policy and overall platning for American Air Forces. Headquarters, 100709, as the senior American air headquarters in Duropa, should meintain the initiative in all phases of sir policy planning involving exclusively merican Air Paresa.


2. It is granted that SHAEF should have the initiative in planning air matters that involve so stion of ground, air or neval forces and matters is which coordination of Allied Forces are involved.


3. General Anderson is desirents of having a bin of instances in which SHAEF Air Staff has usurpolplanning responsibilities of the Meadquarters, MANNY. Request that such a list be prepared, accompanied with such background information required to remain General Anderson to discuss instances with General Schlatter.

4. The necessity for foresaeing planning member and the prompt filling of same is explanized. Should HALF Air be able to show where it was necessary for HALF Air to assure USSTAF planning functions in order to fulfill critical planning requirements, ar position in protecting the invasion of our order of paramount interest would be indefensible. Our ideal position is that in which we are consistently necesiting our plans pertaining to describes the dist SHALF, rather than the reverse proceeding.


> THETUS C. COMM Colonel, Air Gerpe Asst Deputy Commander, Operations

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
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: WAR Info Hi USSTAN Internal Address; Srom Spantz Sgd. disenhower Action to ACMAR Info USSIAF

I. : # 04414 10 ULSTAF in 27131

Schaur (ref # 0442), Howenber 17) in the suggested supportation of 2 Cyles 32 Sgts, minitions workers Avn (902); and 1 Tech Sgt, 2 Staff Sgts, 2 Sgts wond 2 Cyle, remote control mediumics (960); and the deletion of 16 armorer Symmetric (612) and 5 lower turnet and guncight mechanics (678).

Request that the proposed augmentation of 4 2nd Lts bonbdr/navigators (1036) for augmentation of 2/0 flights be changed to read 2 Capts and 2 let Lts. The 2 Capts are required to supervise the bonbing and navigation notivities within the Sq. Also request that 16 americas (911) be furnished instead of the proposed 20, deleting 1 Sgt, 2 Opls and 1 Pvs.

bequest that the proposed augmentation of 8 additional contat errors be authomized as follows: 4 crews of 3 offs and 1 cal man odeh and 6 errors of 1 off and 1 cal men coch. 4 man prov to consist of Capt offst, 1st 1. atvigator, hat it bombdr and 1 cal man AF moch gunacr (748).

12 ondr navigetore requested in para 2 and 3 above plus the 5 builds navigater atrd by T/O will provide the necessary 5 man cross for Fit Lin for each fit of 9 siversit. A-35 aircraft are being atrd on ration of 1 glass acceant 2 gain nose for every 3 aircraft. Combat experience in this these has indicated that the 3 off crows for fit and Deputy fit Lins are 4 contact mediately.

in addition to augmentation proposed by war pagt request that the following additional errs be ated; f radar mache GKs (253), including 1 Toch Sgt 2 Starr Sgts and 2 Sgts; 3 cooks (050) and 1 cooks helper (590), including 1 cgt, 2 Cpis (cooks) and 1 .vt First Cl (cooks helper); 4 SP vehicle operators (32), including 1 Sgt, 1 Col and 2 Pyte first class or Pyte out a sheet metal workers (555) including 1 Sgt and Cpl (request equip We chast mand on the above requested suggestations).


USSTAF Main in 9842 (Contrd over)

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Ltr H1 1st TAF (Prov) dtd 12 Jan 45, subj: "Target Flow of Replacement Aircraft for First Tactical Air Force".

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE, APO 633, U.S. ARMY.

TO: Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov), APO 374, U.S. Army.

1. With reference to your request for information on the projected flow of replacement aircraft to the First Tactical Air Force (Prov), it is exceedingly difficult for this headquarters to estimate the flow of aircraft to your Air Force when subject types are committed to more than one Air Force. Insofar as possible, the theater flow is allocated to the Air Forces on a proportionate basis in accord with shortages and in proportion to specific Air Force authorization. Direct delivery to First Tactical Air Force (Prov) is to be initiated by Air Service Command, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, 1 February.

2. For your information, the Air Force authorization per Group and/or Squadron for B-26, P-47 and P-61 aircraft is as follows:

<u>a</u> .	TYPE OF UNIT	UNIT EQUIPMENT	AIR FORCE AUTHORIZATION	
	Medium Bomber Group (B-26)	64	88	
b.	Fighter Group (P-27)	75	100	
<u>c</u> .	Night Fighter Squadron (P-61)	12	18	

3. For planning purposes in preparation of hardstands and dispersal areas, the number necessary should be based upon the Air Force allocation of that particular type of aircraft. However, in arriving at the required number of hardstands, consideration should be given to the number of aircraft estimated to be on the station and in consonance with Air Force authorizations.

> F. L. ANDERSON, Najor General, U.S.A., Deputy Commander, Operations.

- 2 -

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HEADQUARTERS FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE (PROV) Office of the Commanding General APO 37/ U.S. Army

18 January 1945

SUBJECT: Target Flow of Replacement Aircraft for First Tactical Air Force.

TO : Commanding General, USSTAF, APO 633, U.S. Army.

1. Several projects now under consideration by the First Tactical Air Force require that an estimate be made of the flow of additional or replacement aircraft to this Air Force. These projects include the preparation of additional hardstands and dispersal areas and the planning for a pilot training program. At present the timing of these projects is handicapped by a lack of knowledge about the probable rate of flow of aircraft to the First Tactical Air Force components - XII TAC and First French Air Corpe.


2. It is suggested that a target rate flow of P-47, B-26 and P-61 aircraft be established to serve as a basis for project planning by the First Tactical Air Force.

3. It is fully appreciated that reduction in receipts from the U.S.A., modification delays, delivery delays, or changes in the tactical situation may adversely affect receipts by the First Tactical Air Force. Any reasonable estimate of aircraft flow to this Air Force is preferable, from a planning standpoint, to the current situation in which no forecast of aircraft flow is available.

> /s/ Ralph Royce RALPH ROYCE, Major General, USA, Commanding,

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	2. No other source exists for these units and your comments are requested as to the effect on operations of the transfer of this unit.	
	for the Director of Personnel:	
T H I	JACK RILEY, Colonel, Air Corps,	
S	Chief T & O Section.	
P A	4. DCG/Ops D/Ops 23-1-45 1. For approval.	
G E I S	D/Pers 2. This section concurs with the recommendation made by the Director of Armament in Memo 2, above. It is believed that the First Tactical Air Force (Prov) has a greater need for this Chemical Company than the Sighth Air Force.	
U N C L A	3. It is requested that the Director of Personnel. take action as may be necessary to affect the release of one (1) Chemical Company Air Operations from the Eighth Air Force and to make this Company available to the First factical Air Force (Prov).	
S S		
I F I	ALFRED R. MAXWELL, Colonel, Air Corps Director of Operations	
E D	5 0/1940 0/c Ops. 28.1.45 Concer in Ston 4 about.	
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	Request for Chem Co au ops
	1. Commical D/F 10-1-45 1. For remark and recommendation.
	For the Director of Personnel:
r H I	JACK RILEY, Colonel, Air Corps Chief of T & O Section
S P A G	2. D/P D/Arn 13-1-45 1. This Company is urgently needed by the 1st Tactical Air Force (prov) to service units for air operations in cooperation with the 6th Army Group as stated by SHAEF Air Staff in cable 0 2739, 2 January 1945, attached.
E I S U N C L A	2. The release of this Air Operations Company can be compensated for in the 8th Air Force by reallocating two of the eighteen Air Operations Companies which would remain in their command to secure a deistribution of one platoon per Group for Eight Groups and two paltoons per Group for the remains thirty two groups. Since the loading and fusing of all bombs, IE and Incendiary, are joint functions of Air Operations Companies and Ordnance personnel, a revision of loading schedules should insure adequate personnel to handle all operational calls made upon them.
S S I	3. It is recommended that the 8th Air Force be directed to release this Company to the 1st Tactical Air Force (Prov).
F I	tente for bie bie bienetter af strantad in impart a strantad in impart and in the strantad in
E D	HAROLD J. BAUM, Colonel, GWS
	1 Incl: Desity Director of Armament SHARP cable -
	3. D/Ops D/Pers 15/1/45 1. Attention is invited to Eighth Air Force 1st Indorsement, Supreme Headquarters Al ied Expeditionary Forces cable 02739 and to Item 2 above.
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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

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Page 2 cont'd. SOUTINE SECRET

one times line 25 columns 13, 14, 15 and 16, 1 toohnical sergeons 2 staff sergeonts and 2 sergeonts radar mechanics GEE (853) and 5 cross of 2 officers and 1 emlisted man and 4 crows of 1 officer and 1 salisted man will neet your requirements. Grades for various of-ficers and emlisted men as well as the grades in your table of ornan-ization change request will be considered in the processing of a new table of organization and equipment for light bomberdment units which is to be forwarded to the war boartment shortly.

The increase in personnal is not sufficient to justify the sub-ditional cocks and cooks helper requested. Special purpose vehicle operators are limited by the number of such vehicles authorized for-perionce indicates that you will require amorers and sheet metal workers in the number provided

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Into : D/Ops. Gen. Snerr AG Hecords

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INCOMING MESSAGE EDITED LITERAL TEXT

URGENT SECRET

In durly Card: A 288

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INTERNAL ADD.LSS:

FROM: AIR STAFF SHAFF 181435A

T. : USDT.F 221830A

TO : 1ST TACAF PROV LAFO: USSTAF LAIN SHARF ALA LIBBION TO FRANCE (LT COL FLAUDAUIN B HAND) G-4 SHARF (BY HAND) ISLO FAOM: ALI STAFF MARF

Effective this date the 1/15 Transport 3q French is attached to 1st Tactical Air Force (Provisional).

USSTAN DISTRUMPTIO :

ACTION: 1ST TAP

INFO : D/OPS (5) D/CG OPS D/SUPPLY (3) ASC (2) GIN INTER C/S ...CC.....S

USSTAF IN 13387

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
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G E			
I S U N C L	Proparing following novement to iTO one is same of Group. 3 Inctical Reconnectsance is Unit table of organization and equipment olading columns 11 and 12. Units prepare subruary 55 will have individual training on it and combines tastical training on jo remainens date will be 1 May 55. You will in the Photo Pocheical Units equipment. furnished from theater stocks. Resorve 1	1-769 cated 19 August 1944 in- d for a readiness date of 22 ; only. Bone personnel have had int maneuvers. If fully trained 1 be informed of any shortques Lais directif equiptent such be	
A S I F I E	reduced to 50 percent of unit equipment. tely adjunted to the objective of establi- and 297 F-65 for any equations. 39 Photo route in considered as fulfilling your Ph for the above droup. Due to short time I been of course.	Replacement flow will be international ishing and mainteining 192 F-5a becommaissance Squadron in noto Recommaissance requirements	
D			
	Info : D/Ops (5) D/OD Ops D/Intel (4) D/Buppls (2) Stat Control (2) C/S AuG (2) Usurbs (an Amer	Main in 11919	

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
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EDITED LITERAL TEXT ROUTINE SECRET

R REPLY CITCH EX 98651

13 6.13

20. : COLL ZONE 151107A

: INFO USSIAF 151605A

INTERNAL ADDRESS:

FIGN: ETOUSA TO : AQUAL ILPO: USSTLF FROM: SPAATZ SGD : DISUMOSER

REF : N 9537 BACHG REF EX 81482 USSTAF 1N 9843

Augustation of Ecch Sq (1) T/0 and S1-137 when equipped with A-26 aircraft is subjects

In addition to augmentation requested in EX 81482, the following personnel are remained: 1 areas Officer Sililary Occupational Specialty Olal per ST, and r Mechanics STA 50 per 80 and 10 additional radar mechanics 853 for 410 and 50 light. Mades officer required in each 5% to supervise radar and XSI intenance and open 30 radar mechanics 858 for each 5% required to maintain MARD-9 equiptent, now being installed in all a-26 strength being shipped from the states to this thestor.

Additional 10 moder machanics 853 required for raintaining additional radar outpeat installed in alread of 410 Bons Gp light for fire fly project.

WARTER DEST ISTICH

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
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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: A-219, FEB 13.	INTERNAL ADDRESS:
FROM: AIR STAFF SHARF 151000A	and the second second for an and the second for an and the second for the second
TO : RQ USSTAF 151202A SHARF MISSION TO FRANCE	FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE FROM: AIR STAFF SHARP

You are authorized and requested to attach the following paits of the approved 61 French Air Depot Group to First Factical Air Force (Prov) APO 374, for Supply: Hq and Hq Squadron 61 Air Depot Group, 61 Depot Repeir Squadron, 241 Depot Supply Squadron, 161 Quartermaster Truck Co Aviation, 121 Ordnance Depot Company, 176 Signal Company Depot Aviation, 126 Quartermaster Plan on Air Depot Group, 416 Modical Supply Platoon.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: D/PERS (2)

INFO : ASC (2) D/SUPPLY (3) GEN RMSHR AG RECORDS 0/3 GUN ANDERSON

USSTAF MAIN IN 17285

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B	R U	S STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE	
	۱	NCOMING MESSAGE	

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

ROUTINE SECRET

IN REP	LY CITE: Q-743, FEB 12.	INTERNAL,	ADDRESS:	
FROM:	FIRST TAC AF (PROV) 121145A	SGD:	SAVILLE	
TO 3	CC, USSTAF			

Request official notification of further attachment of the I/15 Transport Sq (Prench) to this Command for operational control.

This 3q was initially attached for supply only and we were notified by SHAEF that it was to be attached for operations in addition to supply in order to effect agreement with SOLOC.

SOLCO stipulated that this unit would have to be further attached for operations before it could be supplied.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: D/PERS (2)

INFO : GEN KNERR D/SUPPLX (3) D/OPS (6) AG RECOEDS ASC (2) C/3

USSTAF MAIN IN 17030



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2. D/Person- D/Ops nel 10-2-45 1. Concur in proposals as stated in Comment 1, above.

2. This Directorate believes that diversion of four (4) officers and forty (40) enlisted men trained in airborne radar maintenance to the First factical Air Force (Prov) is highly desirable from an operational standpoint, in view of the shortage of trained airborne radar personnel in that Command and the programs for use of Gee and Shoran now being initiated by the 42nd Bombardment Wing (%).

3. Forwarded for necessary action.

ALFRED R. MAXWELL, Colonel, Air Corps Director of Operations

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D/Ops 10/Comms. 9 Feb. 1945

D/Pers (In turn) 1. Your attention is invited to the attached correspondence concerning the requirement of 42nd Bomb Wing, Minst Sactical Air Force, for officer and enlisted personnel cameble of maintaining GES and UNERAN equirment.

42nd Bonb Wg, 1st RACAF -- Pors. for GT & SHORAN

J/BHR/1fc

2. As can be seen in the original letter from Headquarters 42nd Bomb Ming dated 23 December 1944, Wi/ng, and therefore no redar maintenance personnel are on hand to carry out the MAD and CHORAN program being undertaken by that organization.

3. The request cade to har Nepartment, cable it 29575, January 23, asking that the required personnel be shireed to this theater resulted in reply indicating that some time would clapse before trained personnel will errive here for this project. In an attempt at an interim molution, measure was sent by Director of Personnel to Headquarters Eighth Air Force on February 3 requesting that organization to lend First Tactical Air Force the necessary personnel or whatever Craction thereof could be spared. Eighth Air Force replied unfavorably, offering only two (2) officers and no enlisted men.

4. Becords of the Director of Personnel indirequisitioned in the last for months for the nighth air Force, some 800 ocd have arrived and have been assigned to units in the Eighth Air Force. The remainder are continuing to flow in small groups. Thirty-two (32) of these reder mechanics are expected to arrive in this theater about February M.

5. It is recommended that if the Director of Decrations considers it justifiable, the thirty-two enlisted men contioned above and that an additional eight (8) be diverted from the next shipment.

6. Further, word has been received by the depart from the United States by water about February 20, operatived for Mighth A'r Force. It is recommonded that if the Eirector of Operations considers it justifiable, four (4) of these officers be diverted to the First Tacticel A'r Force, and that a cable be sent through Theater Hascoustiers reconstant dir priority for shippent of these four from the United States.

Air Porce to low Lts. KUZGITZ and LEVINE for two months be accepted, and that

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ROUTINE SECRET

IN REPLY	CITZ: NX 35151. 9 Feb. 45
FRCM	r MR 0923152
TO	: EQ USSTAF 100723A HQ COM Z

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INTERNAL ADDRESS: To: Elsenhowsr For: Speats From: Arnold Sgd: Mershall

RSF: E 95555-UA 53761 W 89206- 11323

Scheduled for movement to you is the 93rd Fighter Control Squadron, REURAD & 95555 dated 6 February 45, and GURAD HX 39206 dated 9 January 45, with readiness date at home station 10 March 45.

Further details on the Tactical Air Communication Squadron and 2 Signal Contraction Battalions will be furnished chartly.

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ACTION: D/Pers (2)

INFO : D/Ops (5) D/C Ops Gon. Enerr C/S ASC (2) AG Repords


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INCOMING MESSAGE

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PRIORITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: A 253

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17 PMB

FROM: SHAEF MAIN 171910A

TO : USSTAF 171933A

INTERNAL ADDRESS:

TO : 1ST TACAF FROV RPTD: USSTAF, SHANF HISSION FRANCE PROM: AIR STAFF SHAEF

French Roman numerial III/VI Fighter 3q is attached to 1st TAF Prov for operations as of 1st of March 45.

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION :

ACTIO : D/OFS (5)

INFO : D/C OPS C/S CEN MMERR CEN ANDERSON D/INT (5) D/PERS (2) AG RECORDS

USSTAF IN 18169




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OP PRICRITY SECRET

In reply cite: A+248 Feb 16. Internal Address:

From: Air Staff SHAMP

To : USSTAF MAIN

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To 1 CG USSTAF Nptd to: SHAEE Mission(Brance), 10% TAF Prov

* Reference: A-288 Jan 18 - Not identified. A-219 Feb 13 is USSTAF MAIN IN 17285.

Request that units referred to in above signals be attached to First Inctical
 Air Force Prov for supply and operations only.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: D/FANE (2)

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INFO : D/Cpa (6) -D/Supply (3) ATSCE (2) Gen Knor? AG Recorde.


USSTAF MAIN IN 18051

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EDITED LITERAL TEXT

ROUTINE SECRET

February 16th

In reply cite: WASX 36544 From : WAR To : Hy USSTAF Main Ey Comm Zone

Internel Address: To Elsenhower For Spactz Sgd. Arnold

Ref. : MX-98651 Feb 15 is USETAF Main in 17729 MX-23103 Jan 18

Clarification requested. Are we correct in assuming that all the augmentations requested are for the 410 Bonb Group Light only? Did you receive WARK 23103 dated 18 January year present?

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

Action : D/Pars (2)

Info : D/Ops (6) Adv Spec Gp (2) D/Comm (2) AG Records

USSTAF Liein in 18024

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Н I S P А G Е I U N L A S 1 F I E D

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. /	• SECRET •	
	HQ US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE	
4	INCOMING MESSAGE	
	AP EDITED LITERAL TEXT	
	A. NOL	
	OP PRIORITY SECRET	
т н	IN REPLY CITE: MF-13432 FEB 16 INTERNAL ADDRESS.	
I	PD/M. CUITE ICCOTON (PRIME)	
S	PO A SUATE MATE AT STORE FRANCE	
P A	TO : SHAEF MAIN AIR STAFF INFO: CE UNITED STAFFS SED : LEWIS CITE MFDFA TO : SHAEF MAIN AIR STAFF	
A G E	INFO: CG UNITED STATES STRATEGIC FROM: WOOD TACTICAL AIR FORCE 160945A CG FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE	
I Z	ME: PS-388. 6 Feb - Not Identified.	
ŝ	French Air Force advise that 3/6 Fighter Squadron, now under operational	
U VO	that it be attached to First Tactical it Four unry. They therefore request	
N O C D	current. It is already attached for supply.	
L n) S	This is in compliance with message FS-388 of 6 February from First Tactice Air Force to Air Component SHAEP Mission requesting 2 week's advance notice of change in operational control of 3/6 Squadron,	
S I		

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

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ACTION: (SHAEF MAIN) INFO : D/OPS (5) D/CG OPS D/PERS (2) C/S AG RECORDS D/SUPPLY (3) GEN KNERR ATSCE (2)


USSTAF MAIN IN - 17892

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SECRET

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: A	-276, HAR 10.		AL ADDRESS;
FROM: AIR STAFF	SHARF FORWARD 101015A		USSTAF (MAIN) FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE
TO : UESTAP 10 CASERTA	1405A	FRON:	MAAF, COMM ZONE, SHAHF MICSION (PRANCE) AIR STAFF SHAEP FORWARD

REF: A-247 - IS USSTAP IN 21494.

Due to apparent error in transmitting our A 247 dated 6 March 1945, text is herein repeated: "You are requested to attach HQ and HQ Squairon Fifth French Fighter Group to First Tactical Air Porce (Prov) for supply only as of this date.

You will be requested by this Headquarters to attach 11/9 Fighter Squadron to First Tactical Air Force (Prov) for supply only when it arrives in Southern France latter part of March."

These Units are under operational control of MAAF.

USSTAF HAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: D/PERS (2)

1190 (1/SORPLY (3) 1780E (2) 1/028 (6) USSTAF ADV CEN KNERR C/S 19 RECORDS


USSTAF MAIN IN 22268

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OP PRIORITY

SECRET

INTERNAL ADDRESS :

In reply cito: A 247 March 6

FROM: AIN STAFF SHARF FORMAD OGILOOA

TO : USSTAF MAIN 062330A AST THO AF NO MAAF COME 2

FROM: AIR STAFF SHARF FRO TO : LIT TAC AF, USISTAF MAIN, BAAF, COMM ZONE, REFEATED SHAFF MISSION FRANCE

When it arrives in southern France Latter part of March you are requested to attach Hq and Hq Squadron 5th French Fightor Group to 1st TAC AF Prov for supply only as of this date.

You will be requested by this headquarters to attach 11/9 Fighter Squadron to let TAG AF Prov for supply only

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: D/SUPPLY (3)


INFO: D/PERS (2) D/OPS (6) ATSCE (2) GENERAL IMEER AG RECORDS

USSTAP IN 23494

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ROUTINE SECRET

IN REP	LY DITE: FARE-47283, MAR 3.	INTERN	AL ADDRESS
FROM	WAR 032356Z	TO: INFO:	BISENHOVER SPAATZ
VIA :	HQ COMMUNICATION ZONE 051945A	SGD:	ARNOLD
50	UN MOODAR MATH ACARASA		

HQ COMMUNICATIONS ZONE

REF: EX-12517 - IS USSTAF IN 19644.

Additional info required reurad EX-12517 of 24 Feb before spacial augmentation of 10 Radar mechanics (853) for 410 Bomb Gp Light on the Fire Fly Project can be effected (A) what Airborne Electronic equipment is used for firefly Project (B) has many aircraft equipped with this special Electronic equipment are to be used on Firefly project (C) is this project being used as a temporary ergenization or will it be permanent.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

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ACTION: (ETOUSA)

INFO : D/PERS (2) D/OPS (6) ADV SEED GP (2) D/COMM (2) GBN EMEER AG RACORDS

USSTAF MAIN IN 21254

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INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT NOUTINE SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: MARX-47283 3 MARCH 19

FROM : TAR 0323562

CO : HO USSTAF 0413284 HO CON Z INTERNAL ADDRESS: TO : MISTRNOTER INFO: SPAATZ SOD : ANNOLD

HEF: HL-12517 is DOSTAF IN 19444.

Additional info required reurad EX-12517 of 24 February before special augmentation of 10 radar machanics (853) for 410 boob gp light on the firs fly project can be effected (a) what sirborne electronic equipment is used for fire fly project (b) how many sirceraft equipped with this special electronic equipment are to be used on fire fly project (c) is this project being used as a temporary organization or will it be perspect?

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION : EFO

INFO

: D/Pers (2) Adv Spee Gp (2) D/Gamm (2) Gen Kherr D/Ops (6) AG Records

USSTAF MAIN IN 20997

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2. D/C Ops D/PHP 2 Mpr

Memo to General Anderson dtd 19 Feb 45, re Golonel Odom's Visit to lat TAF (Prov), 14-17 Feb 45.

1. It is believed that the condition cited in Para-Fraph 2a of Colonel Odom's memorandum has been largely eliminated.

Since Colonel Odom's visit, Colonel Chrisp has spent approximately four days at this headquarters in conference with members of this section, and has been thoroughly briefed on the current aspects of the problem. In addition he has established planning liaison with the Disarmament Staff of the Minth Air Force, and has appred to the acceptance in principle of the Minth Air Force disarmament directive which has been prepared through policy laid down by this headquarters.

3. It is believed that the Headquarters, First Tactical Air Force is now thorouchly conversant diff the nature of their disarnament responsibilities, and assurance has been received through Colonel Chrisp that attached disarnament units will be utilized for disarnament purposes and will not be diverted into such activities as guard, K.P. etc.

4. This headquarters does not issue disarmament manuals or detailed instructional material. However, ruidance material transmitted to the limith Air Force and First Tactical Air Force in most cases relates to highly classified information for which no downward revision is permitted by existing resulations. Therewer any latit de exists, effort will be made to insur the lowest possible classification consistent with semulting

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CHARLES W. TAYLOR Colonel, Air Corps Executive, Fost Hostilities Flammins.

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INCOMING MESSAGE

SECRET

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

OP PRIORITY

In reply cite: A 216

March 1st

From : Air Staff SHAEF Forward

To : USSTAF

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Internal Address: To First Tactical Air Force: USSTAF: SHAEF Mission France From Air Staff SHAEF Forward

French 111/6 Fighter Squadron will be released by MAAF for operation attachment to First Tactical Air Force when replaced by first flight 111/9 now in North Africa. Estimated date of release about 30 March.

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

Action : D/Pers (2) Info : D/Ops (5) D/CG Ops Gen Knerr

D/CG Ops Gen Knerr C/S USSTAF Adv AG Records


USSTAF Main in 20402

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OP PRIORITY SEGRET

In reply cite: A-206

From : Air Staff Adv

To : EQ USSTAF

Jebruary 27th

Internal Address: To MAAF uptd 18% Tac Air Force Prov. SHAEF Mission (France), USSTAF From Air Staff SHAEF Forward

Her. : A 270 is USSTAF Main in 18871

Reforence is our A 270 dated 21 February 1945. Request you expedite notification to this Headquarters of date when French XII/6 Fighter Squadron will be released for operational attachment to first Tactical Air Force. Pending reply from you, it has been necessary to curved attach ment of this unit us of lat of March to First Tactical Air Force.

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

Action : (MANP)

Dato.

: D/Pers (2) D/Ops (5) D/CG Opa D/Inbel (5) C/S USSTAF Adv Gen Knerr AJ Hacords


USSIAF Main in 20038

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ROUTINE

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JEAR 4256 In reply cite: WX 43850 FEB 26

FROM: WAR

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INTERNAL ADDRESS:

TO : Ho USSTAF Ho COMM Z

TO: EISENHON ER FOR: SPAATZ SCD: ARNOID

AEF: WX 23103 Jun 18 (12838) EX 12517 Feb 24 (19444)

Copies of change 2 for table of organization and equipment 1-137 being dispatched by courier pouch today.

This change 2 is substantially as outlined ourad WX 23103 dated 18 Jan 45.

Will reply soon to used KX 12517 dated 24 Feb 45 requesting additional authorizations for 410th Bomb Group light for project mentioned

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

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ACTION: D/PERS (2)

INFO: D/OFS (6) ADV SPEC GROUP (2) D/COMM (2) AG RECORDS

USSTAF IN 19904

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HQ US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE INCOMING MESSAGE EDITED LITERAL TEXT

ROUTINE SECRET

In rej	217	0101	a: Oni	1492			Fobruary	8.30
Rrom	:	IQ.	First	Tactical	Force	(Prov)		
To	;	GG,	USSTA	F (Main)				

Major General Robert M. Webster assumed command First Tactical Air Force 0001 hours A 23rd February.

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

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Gen Knorr Gen Anderson USSTAF Adv AG Records

USSTAF Main in 19259

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
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		SECR ER US STRATEGIC AIR F INCOMING M EDITED LITER	ESSAGE
T H I S		In reply cito: A 270 From : Air Staff SHARF Fod	February 21st Internal Address: MAAF: 1st Tao AF: SHARP
P A G E) Jac lur	To : MAAF Caserta First Tac AF SHAEF Mission to France ANW	Mission to France; USSTAF (Main) For Air Staff SHAFF Ford
I S	1.5.	Not. : A+253 is Unstar M SHAEF Mission advises that French III southern Frence to join Third French	16 10 10
U N C L A S S I	6	southern France to join Third French and request that this squadron be att. for operations as of 1st March. Fire A-253 dated 17 February. BEARF Missi this date that NII/6 Squadron has not proposed move. Request you notify this be effected to allow operational attac force as planned.	ached to First Factical Air Formary ached to First Factical Air Forma t Tao AF so advised by our signal on notified this Headquarters yet been released by MAAF form
F I	1	SETAP DISTALEUTION:	
E D	-	totion : D/Pers (2)	
		info D/Cps (5) D/CG Ops D/Intel (5) C/S Gen Knerr USSTAF Adv AG decords	RETEINED RETEINED
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PRIORITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: MF-13469, FEB 21. FROM: SHARF MISSION TO PARIS 210910A.

TO : HQ USSTAF 211238A

INTERNAL ADDRESS: FROM: AIR COLPONENT, SHAFF MISSION FRANCE SGD: LEWIS CITE: NFDFA TO: SEAFF FORWARD AIR STAFF INFO: CG US STRATEGICAL TACTICAL AIR FORCE FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE FROM: WOOD

REF: MF-13432 - IS USSTAF IN 17892.

Subject is Operational Control of French 5/6 Fighter Squadron.

Reference our MF-13432 of 16th February. French Air Force now advise us that they have not yet obtained the release of this Unit from Mediterranean Allied Air Forces under whose operational control it now is.

They state Commanding Generals of First Tactical Air Force and French Tactical Air Command require this Unit which has just been equipped with P-47 aircraft and which is normally a part of the Third Fighter Group.

Suggest your Headquarters contact Mediterranean Allied Air Force to straighten this out as we do not believe it has ever been proposed that the 3/6 remain under Mediterranean Allied Air Force operational control once it had been reequipped with P-47.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: SHAEF INFO : D/OPS (5) D/COPS D/PERS (2) C/S D/SUPPLX (3) USSTAF ADV GEN KNERR ATSCE (2)

USSTAF MAIN IN 18799

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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD HQ US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN FUROPE INCOMING MESSAGE EDITED LITERAL TEXT OP PRIORITY SECRET H In reply cite: A 266 Feb 20 FROM: AIR STAFF SHAEF 201700A INTERNAL ADDRESS: Р TO: H2 USST .. # 201749A TO: USSTAF (MAIN) FROM: ALL STAFF SHAFF (FORMARD) A Ε I French.3/6 Fighter Squadron is attached to 1st Tactical Air Force (Prov) for operations as of 1st March 1945. N L A S I F I USSTAF DISTRI UTION: E D ACTION: D/OPS (5) INFO: D/PERS (2) D/C OPS D/INTEL (5) GENERAL KNERR C/S REDLINE

USSTAF IN 18654

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AG RECORDS

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INCOMING MESSAGE

ROUTINE SECRET

In reply cite: E 73

From: First EAC AF 201104B

To : USSTAF 201355B Air Staff SHAEF Air Min Whitehall Ninth AF Main Internal address: To: Air Staff SHAEF Main Attn OPS Records Air Min War Room USSTAF MAIN Attn: Morements Branch Minth AF Main Attn Movements Branch Sgd: Webster

20 May 1945

Location of Tactical Units remains the same.

USSTAF HAIN DISTRIBUTION:

Action: AG (M)

Info : A-3 A-1 A-2

AG Records


USSTAF LATH-IN 37807



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HELDQULATERS : JUH: CG: USST.F: UNLITED STLATES SIN. TLOID ... IF FONCUS L. EUROPE: D. ATE: 20 May 45 : Office of the Commanding Ceneral : INTELLS: 45 :

> .PO 633, US .rmy, 20 Lay 1945.

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I F I E D SUBJECT: Transfer of Dalk Allotment (No 100).

0 : Commanding General, Minth Air Force, .PC 696. Commanding General, First Tactical Air Force (Prov), .PO 374.

The following listed bulk allotant grades are transferred from the 63d Fighter Wing (known as the First Tactical Air Force (Frov)) to the Minth Air Force, effective 20 May 1945:

Colonel	1 2	-	9				
Lt Colonel Major Captain 1st Lient 2d Lient Total	2 4 	1 2 3 7	11 14 16 15 70	1 1 1 - <u>1</u> 4	- - - - 2		10 14 19 24 23 <u>13</u> 103
Warrant Officer	2	-	3	~	-	-	5
M/Sgt F/Sgt I/Sgt S/Sgt Sgt Cpl Fic) Pvt) Total	2 5 9 14 18 18 	- - 1 - 2	6 10 30 35 42 75 200	1 4 7 16 52 142 222		- 1 1 1 1 5	10 1 20 47 67 114 236 495
Aggregate	88	9	273	220		5	603

Any contemplated changes in the distribution of the above bulk allothent grades will be submitted to this headquarters for approval.

By command of General SPALTZ:

2111 9989

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J. D. CCRDCN, Colonal, AGD, Asst adj Gen.

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DISTRIBUTION:

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CG, European T of Opns (26)

CG, Minth Air Force (10)

CG, First Tactical Air Force (Prov)

0G, First factical Air Force (Prov) CG, Air Technical Service Command in Europe (5) CG, Base Air Depot Area, ...SC, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (10) CG, Control Air Depot Area (Prov), ...SC, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (10) a-i, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe (5) D/Pers, .Air Technical Service Command in Europe (5) a-2 (2); a-4 (2); a-3; a-5 JA, US Strategic Air Forces in Europe JA, .dir Technical Service Commans in Europe Usa 0; ...maeent 0; Surgeon; Comm 0; C1; Hist: Ener: Stat 0; Postal Sec Wea 0; Annament 0; Surgeon; Coma 0; Q; Hist; Engr; Stat 0; Postal See Historian, US Strategie Air Forces in Europe, Adain Transp 0, Hq Air Tochnical Service Counand in Europe (2)

W/Condr Wood

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY SECRET

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I E D PROM: HQ IST TAC AF 1910308

TO : HQ USSTAF 1911A68 AIR MINISTRY WHITEHALL RELAYED BY USSTAF SIGNAL CENTER 19 May 45

INTERNAL ADDRESS:

ATTN: OPS RECROPS AT AIR STAFF SIMEF WOVEMENTS BRANCH AT USSLAF AND NINTH AIR FORCE

200

Location of Tactical Units remains unchanged

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: AG (M)

INFO : A-2 A-1 A-3 AG RECORDS

USSTAP MIN IN 37569

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

SECRET

PRICRITY

In roply cite: G-48 May 18

PROLIT HOS IST TAC AF

TO : HAS USSTAP LAIN HIS COMM ZONE HOS 9TH AP HOS 8TH AF AIR STAFF SHAFF HIS 9TH AF ADV HOS 12TH TAC AIR CLD RIS 12TH TAC AIR CLD REAR HIS 42ND BOLE LING SIG SED HOS COM ZONE INTERNAL ADDRESS:

RECEIVED

23

MULTIPIE SGD: WEBSTER

At 0001 hours 21 May Headquarters 1st Tactical Air Force Provisional closes permanently at Heidelberg Germany. At that time ell units and individuels assigned or attached to 1st Tactical Air Force become assigned or attached to 128h Tactical Air Command except 1st Tactical Air Porce Service Command which remains at Schwetzingen. Units and individuals assigned or attached to lat Tactical Air Force Service Command become assigned or attached to 9th Air Force Service Command. 12th Tactical Air Formand Rear at Darmatadt will be augmented as of 21 May by such personnel as may be needed from 1st Tactical Air Force Headquarters. All correspondence and messages previously addressed to Headquarters lot Tactical Air Force should be addressed to Commanding General 12th Tactical Air Command Main located at Danastadt Germany. All present 1st Tactical Air Force signal facilities at Heidelberg remain in operation with tielines and motor courier service to Darmstadt for purpose of passing correspondence and messages to 12th Tactic.1 Air Command Rear. In addition certain direct signal channels are being established from Darmstadt, details will be given separately to signal officers concerned. Telephone code name 12th Tactical Air Command Main is Georgia Rear which will continue to be av ailable over all present telephone means

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: A-1

INFO: A-5

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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PROM: FINST TAC AF 1811229

10 : USSTAF 181457B AIR STAFF SHAEF, AIR JENISTRY WHI-EHALL SIXTH AREY OF MAIN RELAYED BY USSTAF SIGNAL CELLE. TO MINTH AF MAIN 18 day ki

INTERNAL ADDRESS: SGD: IIIASIA

Location of Tactical Units remains unchanged.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRI-U. ION:

ACTION: AG (M)

INFO : A-3 A-1 A-2 AG RECORDS

USSTAP IN IN 37384

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

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FROM FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE 170915B

TO HQ USSTAF 171247B AIR STAFF SHAEF, AIR MINISTRY WHITEHALL , STH ARLY CROUP WAIN, 9TH AIR FORCE HR MAIN 17 May 45

INTERNAL ADDRESS:

TO : AIR STAFF SHAEF (JAIN (ATTN: OPS RECORDS), AIR MINISTRY WAR ROOM, USSTAF (JAIN) (ATTN: MOVEMENTS BRANCH), 6TH ARMY GP G-3 AIR (BY OURIER) 9TH AF (MAIN)(ATTN: MOVEMENTS BRANCH) SG0: WEBSTER BOOK MESS.GE

Location of Tactical Units record as unchanged.

USUTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: AG (M)

INFO : A-3 AG RECORDS A-1

A-2

USSTAP JUDN IN 37135

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HE. DOU. RTTRS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES : DATE: 16 May 45 IN TUROFE

................. $: \underbrace{S}_{AUTH} \underbrace{E}_{CG} \underbrace{C}_{G} \underbrace{E}_{USSTAF} \underbrace{T}_{USSTAF}$: : : :INITIALS:_ :

16 May 1945

GETERAL ORDERS)

.JR FORCE (PROV) .JU C.L .IR FORCE (PROV) DISB.ND ENT OF THE FIRST TACTICAL D THE HI & HI SO (TROV), FIRST TACTICAL AR FORCE

The First Tactical Air Force (Frov) and the Hq & Hq Sq (Prov), First Tactical Air Force (Prov), with the concurrence of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, are disbanded, effective 20 Lay 1945, at Heidelberg, Germany.

By command of General SPLATZ:

E. P. CURTIS Brigadier General, USA Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL:

HARRIS F. SCHERER, Colonel, AGD, Adjutant General.

DISTRIBUTION: F Flus 5 cys tub 15 cys CG, A.F 15 cys CG, European T of Opns 1 cy CG, Air Staff, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force (Forward) (Att: Capt Prisbec) C European Division, Air Transport Command 5 cys CG, European Division, Air Transport Command 20 cys CG, Twolfth Air Force 20 cys CG, Ninth Air Force 20 cys CG, Minth Air Force 20 cys CG, Minth Air Force 20 cys CG, First Tactical Air Force (Prov) 5 cys CO, 302d Transport Wing

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INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

OP PRIORITY

In roply cite: E 997

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From : First Rac Air Force (Prov)

: HQ UESTAF Main Air Ministry Whitehall Air Staff SHAEF Sixth Army Group Main Minth Air Force Main May 16th

Internal Address: To Air Staff SHAEF Main attn: Ops Records, Air Ministry War Room, USSTAM Main attn: Movements Branch, Sixth Aray Group G-3 Air (by courier), Minth Air Force Main attn: Movements Branch Sgå. Webster

Location of Pactical Units remains the same.

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

Action : AG(H)

Info : A-1 A-2 A-3 AG Records



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USSTAF Main in 36953

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY SECRET

14 May 1945

In reply cite: E 940

From: Has 1ST TAC AF 140845B

To : Hes USETAF LAIN 142530N AIr Staff SHAFF AIR MIN MULTEHALL He NIAth AF MAIN He SIXTH AGAY 6 P MAIN Internal address: Air Staff SHAEF MAIN Attn OFS Records, Air Min Mar Room, USDTAF Main Attn Movements Branch, OTH ANAY OF G-3 Air by Courier, Minth Air Force Main Attn Movements Branch Sgd: Jobster BOOK MESSAGE

Location of Tactical Units remains the same,

USSTAF HAIN DISTRIBUTION:


Action: AG (M)

Info : D/Ops. (6) D/Intel. (5) AG Records

USATAF MAIN-IN 36522

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

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E D PROM: FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE 130955B

TO : HQ USSTAF HAIN 131112B AIR HINISTRY WHITEHALL HQ NINTH AIR FORCE HAIN 13 May 45

INTERNAL ADDRESS:

TO : AIR STAFF SHAFF (MAIN) ATTN: OPS RECORDS (AIR MINISTRY WAR ROOM, USSTAF (AAIN) (ATTN LOVEMENTS BRANCH), 6TH ARMY GP G-3 AIR (BY COURIER), 9TH AF (MAIN) (ATTN LOVEMENTS BRANCH) SGD : WESSTER

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Location of Tactical units remains the same.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: (AIR STAFF SHAEF)

INPO : D/OPS (6) D/PERS (5) D/INTEL (5) AG M AG RECORDS

USSTAF MAIN IN 36308

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

OFFRATIONAL PRICEITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: E-905, MAY 12.

FROM: CONTROL COUNISSION MIL DIV 1209160

TO : HOS USSTAP MAIN 121257B AIR HIN UHITEHALL HOS NIMUH AP HAIM INTERNAL ADDRESS: TO: AIR STAFF SHAFF (MAIN)(ATTN OPS RECORDS) AIR MINISTRY WAR ROOM, USSTAF (MAIN) (ATTR HOVEMENTS BRANCH), SIATH ARMY GEOUP G-3 AIR (EY COURIER NINTH AIR FORGE (MAIN) (ATTS MOVIMENTS) SGD: WEESTER

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location of tactical units remains the same.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: AG (11)

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INFO : D/OPS (5) D/INTEL (5) AG RECORDS

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INCOMING AFORCES IN EDROFE

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INTERNAL ADDRESS:

SCED: DEBSTER

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ATTN: OPS RECORDS AFA: JEUS

AND JEZO ATTN MOVEMENTS

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: E-882, MAY 11.

FROM: FIRST TAF 110912B

TO : USSTAF 1111288 AIR STAFF SHAEF AIR MINISTRY SIXTH ARMY GP NINTH AIR FORCE

location of tactical units remains the same.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: AG (M)

INFC : D/OPS (5) D/INTEL (5) AG RECORDS



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USSTAF MAIN IN 35924

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HQ, US' STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE EDITED LITERAL TEXT

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY SECRET

In rep	ly cito; E 857
From	First TAC AF 100955B
20 \$	USSTAF 101110B

Internal address:

10 May 1945

Attn: Ops Records at Air Staff SHARE, Attn: Movements Branch at USSTAF attn: Movements Branch at Minth AF signed: Webster

43

There has been no change in locations of factical Units since our report of the Sth of May. All proposed noves have been temporarily frozen.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

Action: AG (M)

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Info : D/Pers. (5) D/Intel. (5) D/Ops. (6) AG Records

USETAF MAIN-IN 35708

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INTERNAL ADDRESS:

Sgd: MEDSTER

TO: AIR STAFF SHAEF MAIN ATTN

ARINY GROUP G-3 Air

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OPS RECORDS , AIR MINISTRY WAR ROCM, USSTAF MAIN ATTRE MOVEMENTS BRANCH, SIXTH

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INCOMING MESSAGE EDITED LITERAL TEXT

OFERATIONAL PRICEITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: E-722, MAY 4.

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FROM: FIRST TACAF PROV 040909B

TO : HO USSTAF 041044B AIR MINISTRY CHITCHALL AIR STAFF SHAEF FUD

location of tactical units remains unchanged.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: AG (M)

INFO : D/OPS (6) AG RECORDS D/INTEL (5) D/PERS (5)

USSTAF MAIN IN 34530

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IN REPLICITE: E-693, MAY 3.	COTTRUAL ADDRESS: TO: MFF (ATTN: OPS RECERDS)	
PROM: FIRST TAGAF 030343B	ANZ WAR ROOM JEUS (ATTE: HOVENENTS PRANCH)	
TO : HE RESTAP 031000B ATE STAFF SHAFF ADV ATE MINISTRY THITEMALL HE SIXIN ARMY GROUP	SOD: KEDSTER	
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AGTICS: AO (M)		
INFO : D/PERS (5) AG RECORDS D/OPS (6)		
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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

PRIORITY SECRET

In reply cite: E 609

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E D

From: First TAC AF 3014178

TO : HU USSTAF 010100B

Internal address; Sgd: Webster To: USSTAF HALD

30 April 1945

Ber: UAX 68249 April 29

Reference your message UAX 66249 dated 29th of April the following information is submitted:

 $\binom{1}{2}$ 27th Fighter Gp Biblis M-530205 Y-78 Colonel WR Nevitt. Fiftieth Fighter Gp Glebelstadt N-620205 Y-90 Colonel HL Case.

86TH Fighter Gp Braunshardt H-577461 Y-72 Lt Col GT Los. 324th Fighter Gp Luneville V-117999 Y-2 Col LC Lydox.

Group will move to schterdinsen S-080110R - 50 on or about the 3rd of May.

(5) 358 Fighter Gp Sanphofen M-530070 Y - 79 Col JB Tipton.
(6)17th Bomb Gp Dijon 0-080565 Y-9 Col W C Barrett.
(7) 320th Bomb Gp Dole/Tavaux C-350315 Y-7 Gol AE Woolridge
(8) 415 Night Fighter Sqdn Braunshardt M-577461Y-72 Major H F Angspurger

(9) 417 Night Fighter Squn Clebelstait N 620205 Y-90 Major F R Eltchcock.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

Action: D/Ops. (6)

Rafo : AG Records

USSTAF LATINATI 33806

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	HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EU	ROPE	
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H I S P A G E I	From: E.S. Minest PACAP PROVAF 290500B Int Air's To : AIR PRAFF SHART FAD Upa A Upa	ernal address: haff Hiladd inin Abar: box, Ulerad Main .ton onte Londo, dirth Co 0-3 dir by Courier .durber Book Leusege	
s U	Minster fan Distriction:		
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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE INCOMING MESSAGE EDITED LITERAL TEXT

OF PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply cito: E 386 April 24

FROM: 1ST T'CTICAL AIR FORCE 2408368

TO : HQ DESTAF MAIN INFO 24,2104B

SGD: WEESTER TO: AIR STAFF SHARF MAIN (ATTN: OPS

RECORDS) INFO: AIR MINISTRY HAR ROOM, 6TH ARKY GROUP G-3 AIR (BY HARD) USSTAF MAIN ATTN: MCWEMENT CONTROL

Location of Tactical Units remains unchanged

USINE OF STRUCTURE TON

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ACTION: (AIR STAFF SHALF) INFO: D/OPS (6)

INFO: D/OPS (6) D/INTEL (5) AG (12) AG REXORDS

USSTAF IN 32453

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INCOMING MESSAGE

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OPERATIONAL PRIORITY SECRET

IN REPLY CITE: E361

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TO : USSTAF REDIJNE HQS USSTAF MAIN 2212148 23 Apr 45

INTERNAL ADDRESS: SGD: ... EBSTER

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BOOK MESSAGE

Location of Tactical Units remain unchanged.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: AG (12)

INFO : D/C OPS D/INTEL (5) AG RECORDS D/OPS (5) D/FERS (5)

USSTAF MAIN IN 32111

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

ROUTINA SUCHET

IF REPLY CITI: \$310 21ST APRIL

21 Apr 45

TO : H2 USSTAF 2206578 H2 97M AF LAIN AND OTHERS

SOD : WEBSTYR

REF: GRIGOL-NOT IDEN

Reference your TWE GR304. Authority granted to disband Headquarters Provisional Recommissionce Group(12th Tactical Air Gond) at earliest practicable date. Notifthis Headquarters time and date of disbandment.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

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ACTION: D/FIRE (5)

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
USSTAF TAIN IN 31990



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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

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In reply cite: E277 April 20

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OP PRIONITY

From: 1st TACF Prov 2009298

To: Air Staff Shaef Fud

Info: Has USSTAF 202116B AIR MIN HHITCHALL Internal audress: Action to: Air Staff Shaef (Main) Attn: Ops Records Info: Air Ministry Mar Room,6th Army Gp G-3 Air(Adv), USSTAF(MAIN) Attr: Hovement control Sgf2 WEBSTER BOOK MESSAGE

415 Night fighter squadron now located at Braunshardt

USSTAF HAIN DISTRIBUTION: Action: (Air Staff Sheef)

> Info : ENGA (2) D/Ops(6) AG RECORDS

USSTAN LATIN IN 31541

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HQ, US STRATEGIC AIR FURLES IN EURUPE

INCOMING MESSAGE

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY SECRET

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		DRY WHICH		

INTERNAL ADDRESS: BOOK MEDSAGN TO: A S SHARF MAIN ANN OFS REGORDS, ANY WAR NOOH, USSTAF MAIN ATT: NOVEMBER GUN TROL SGD: WEBSTER

Location of testical mains remains the same.

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
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USSTAF MAIN IN 3124/



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
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EDITED LITERAL TEXT

ROUTING SECRET

IN HAPLY CITA: WX 64695

AFRIL .

FROM: WAR

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TO : USSTAP LAIN COLL LICL INTARNAL ADDR. SS:

TO : DISENHOUSH FOR : SPARTZ FRUM: DUOID SGD : MARSHALL

LAF : 21 12517 USSTAF IN 19444 24336 USSTAF IN 25297

Taking action to grant augmentations requested in cited cables. AG letter will confirm.

USSTAP DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: D/OPS (6)

INPO : D/COPU (2) D/PTRS (2) ADV SPLC GP (2) AG RLODRDS




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USSTAF IN 28616

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EDITED LITERAL TEXT

ER

PRIORITY SMORET

IN REPLY CITE: N-58776, MAR 24. INTERNAL ADDRESS: SGD: VANDENBERG FROM: CG, NINTH AIR FORCE 241025A TO : (1) CG, US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

> REF: EX-12517 - 18 USSTAF IN 19444. W-47283 - IS USSTAF IN 20997.

Reference WARX-47283.

Additional info required reured BZ-12517 of 24 Feb

- (A) Tail warning, GEB and IFF Airborna Electronic Equipment is used for Fire Fly project.
- (B) 75 Aircraft equipped with this Electronic Equipment are to be used on Fire Fly project.
- (C) This project is a permanent procedure in addition to daylight operations of Bombardment Group (L).

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: D/OPS (6)

INFO : ADV SPEC GP (2) D/COMM (2) AG RECORDS


USSTAF MAIN IN 25340

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17

March 23rd

Internal Address: Sgd. Webster

EDITED LITERAL TEXT

ROUTINE SECRET

In reply cite: E 3870

From : First Tac Air Force Prov

To : HQ USSTAF Main HQ MAAF Casorta SHAEF FwC

The following is quoted for your information from MAAF, MA 49138, 20 March "B flight of 682 Squadron should be returned to base. This detachment to be recalled under arrangements made by lase addressee." Last addresses is Second Tactical Air Force and the necessary authority will be issued by that Headquarters.

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

Action : D/Ops (6)

Info : AG Records

USSTAF Main in 25276

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23 March 45

INTERNAL ADDRESS: TO: AGWAR

Ausworing doff X47263, 3 Mar, information desired

(A) Tuil warning, GAN & HFF airborne electronic equipment is used for fire fly project.
 (B) 75 aircraft equipped with this flectronic equipment are to be used on Fire Fly Project.
 (C) This project is permanent procedure in addition to daylight operations of (L) Benburdment Group.


1100 : D/Pers (2). D/Ops (6) D/Commas (2) Adv Spec Gp (2) nC Records

USSTAF MAIN IN 25297

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SECRET

17 March 1945

COMMANDING GENERAL NINTH AIR FORCE

DIR OF P&O E

APO 696. US ARMY

COMMANDING GENERAL US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE APO 633. U S ARMY

CC CG NINTH AIR FORCE (ADVANCED)

MF-9AF-1102

REFERINCE WARX 47283.

ADDITIONAL INFO REQUIRED REURAD EX 12517 OF 24 PTE.

(e) TAIL WARNING, ONE AND IFF AIRBORNE FLECTRONIC EQUIPMENT IS USED

FOR FIRE FLY PROJECT

(b) SEVENTY FIVE AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH THIS ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT ARE TO BE USED ON FIRE FLY PROJECT.

(C) THIS PROJECT IS A FERMANENT PROCEDURE IN ADDITION TO DAY LIGHT OFERATIONS OF BOMEARIMENT GROUP (L).

VANDENBERG

OFFICIAL:

F. H. MCNOHAM Lt.Col., A.G.D. Asst Adjutent General

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SECRET

TUO 15 1832 A

REDLINE

ALFRED R. MAXWELL Colonel, AC

D/O

BC /AFM /MM

Director of Operations 15 Jan 1945

#1974

Approved by DCG /Ops. ____.

FIRST TACTICAL AIR FORCE

AGREEMENT HAS BEEN RE CHED WITH SHAEF THAT THE SITUATION JUSTIFIES FETURE TO STRATEGIC TARGETS WEATHER PERMITTING FOR THE TIME BEING PD TO ROYCE FROM SPAATZ CITE YOUR CHARLIE SUGAR TWO ROGER HOGER ONE FOUR JAN PD HR <u>10</u> CS PD EXCEPT FOR SPECIAL OCCASIONS CMA ONE THIRD OF THE EIGHTE AIR FORCE REMAINS AVAILABLE FOR TACTICAL TARGETS PD YOUR REQUEST FOR BRIDGE ATTACKS SHOULD THEREFORE BE PROCESSED THROUCH VANDENBERG WHO WILL FORWARD SURPLUS TARGETS THROUGH SHAEF FOR CONSIDERATION WHEN WEATHER PERMITS ALLOCATION OF ADDITIONAL EFFORT ON TACTICAL TARGETS

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HELD, CHATSHS UNITED STATES STATES IS ALL FORCES IN IN IN DPS

4 Maron 1945

LE2KO, CANDOM

AUX/2011 Contents on "Freedom of Action of Air Forces".

: Golonel Alfred R. Maxwell, Director of operations.

Gunderning paragraph 1 of Sarrier Sheet, subject as above, to DG/Ops from D/1. av remarks are as follows:

1. While I can see that from the lighth air Force point of view it would be very desirable to have more freedom of action in target selection, it is my opinton that this luxury can be ill afforded. Experience has shown that the attack of any priority strategic target system must be adhered to as rigidly as possible if effective results are to be achieved from the employment of strategic bombardsent, accordingly any delegation of authority which shill permit freedom of action in selecting targets and which will operate to reduce the impact or continuity of attace on priority target systems is untenable.

2. It is the function of UJSTAP to be concerned primarily with the volicies and programs designed to exploit strategic air power to the fullest degree, and of necessity, such policies and programs are dictated by the exigencies of war and cannot be subjected to liberal or loose interpretations by subordinate units.

3. Very broad freedom of action is given to the Air Forces in all matters pertaining to tactics and technique, and for this reason the recommendations of Colonel Gardner concerning variations of tactics and routes are unwarranted. We certainly do not compel the Lighth Air Force to "make repeated attacks in a certain manner, in certain territories on a certain course".

4. From the practical point of view, I am convinced that meither General Speaks nor any other commander is going to relinquish his control to the extent of permitting freedom of action in target selection.

5. I recommend that no further action be taken in resard to this matter.

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Colonel, A. C. Aset. J/Ops.

C/S ir D/I to DC/Ops, 4 Feb 45, subj: "Freedom of Action of Air Forges".

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Freedom of Action of Air Forces

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2. D/O D/C Ops 15.2.45

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IFIED

1. The above information is forwarded for any action you deem necessary.

2. It is recommended that consideration be given to have the Ninth Air Force assume operational control of Eighth Air Force fighters on the days when they are released for tactical missions. Since the tactical commands have up-to-the-minute intelligence and experienced controllers it would seem that the Eighth Air Force fighters would be more effective on the days they are released from escort, under the Ninth Air Force control.

> THETUS C. ODOM Colonel, Air Corps Asst Deputy Commander, Operations



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Freedom of Action of Air Forces.

. DC/Ops D/I 4 Feb

1945

1. At the recent A-2 meeting held at USSTAF (Main), the subject of freedom of action of Air Forces at the operational level was brought up by Colonel Cardner, then Acting Director of Intelligence Fighth Air Force. Inasmuch as this discussion involved operations primarily, it is re-printed here for your information and for any action you may care to take:

"While we are not concerned with matters of policy, I would like to make this suggestion. In considering the formulation of any bombing directive, a certain amount of freedom of action at the operational level should be reserved. This freedom should be in the way of substitute or alternate targets placed in some decree of priority to meet situations of weather and of route, which may change in the directive, I mean from the point of view of the targets which are recommended to to operations for attack. For instance, if we make repeated attacks in a certain meaner in certain territory on a certain course, we merely induce the energy to concentrate flak guns in that area. By variation of tactics, targets, or routes, we might be able to minimize flak opposition. To enable greater consideration of level in target selection.

As to the flow of information on tergets, I think it is most satisfactory, at least from the point of view of the Highth Air Force. Service from reconneissance comes through pretty quickly. When concerned with most tactical operations, however, information is slow reaching the Highth. With the co-operation of USTAF, the Highth Air Force has tried to speed up the passage of Intelligence directly to us instead of writing for it to go through channels. To illustrate the need for fast transmis ion of Intelligence, if Tighters are released from escort on a certain day, we must have information on flecting targets which would be most profitable for statek. There is necessity for having this Intelligence on hand although it may be but acldom used. Another problem erose in the designation of tactical targets on transportsion of the target to be designated on the following may. This delay is in selection of the target to be designated on the following may. This delay is intelligence on tactical targets has improved recently BME I think there can still be further 1 provement.

stantist of 14". A of the Berges

GLORGE C. McDOMALD Brigadier General, U.S.A. Director of Intelligence

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2. D/O

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Freedom of Action of Air Forces

2

D/C Ops 15.2.45 1. The above information is forwarded for any action you deem necessary.

2. It is recommended that consideration be given to have the Ninth Air Force assume operational control of Eighth Air Force fighters on the days when they are released for tactical missions. Since the tactical commands have up-to-the-minute intelligence and experienced controllers it would seem that the Eighth Air Force fighters would be more effective on the days they are released from escort, under the Minth Air Force control.

> THETUS C. CDOM Colonel, Mr Corry Asst Deputy Companyer, Operations

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DCG/Admin D/C Ops 4/3/45 3.

1. Forwarded to you for your information as a matter that is primarily of interest to you.

> THETUS C. ODOM Colonel, Air Corps Asst. Deputy Commander Operations

Н

4. D/C Ops DCG/Admin Mar 5 Headquarters USSTAF is responsible for the 1945 administrative control of all Air Forces in Europe and is vitally concerned in the organizational structure to be erected in Post-war Germany. If that organization contemplates the dissolution of Headquarters USSTAF, the administrative functions inherent thereto must be passed on to its successor whatever that may be. Some agency must be responsible for the administrative control of all Air Forces in Europe if hopeless confusion is to be avoided. Therefore, I concur in the stand that Lord has taken. It is assumed that Gen Spaatz' instructions to the D/PHP at the last Directors' Meeting to chart the proposed setup will include this over-all administrative function in the proper place. When that charting is approved by Gen Spaatz, we will be in a position to approach SHAEF as Gen Lord has done in his message.

> HUGH J. KNERR Maj Gen, USA DCG/Admin

1 Incl: USSTAF IN 19195


5.

D/PHP D/C Ops 7.3.45 1. Request that the charts being drafted for Cen Spaatz, covering Air Force Organization in Europe After Cessation of Hostilities, include overall administrative control.

> 2. Suggest that close coordination be maintained with DCG/Admin in drafting the administrative control aspects of these charts.

> > Colonel, Air Corps Asst Deputy Comdr. Ope

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


5. Because of D/PHP's responsibilities in post hostilities planning, it is requested that any action taken by DC/Admin on this matter be coordinated with D/PHP of DC/Ops.


logistical problems, the required action should be taken by DC/Admin.


CHARLES M. TAYLOR Colonel, Air Corps Deputy Director, Post Hostilities Planning.

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HERO CARDUM

SUBJECT: Mussian Incidents of 18 March 1945.

: Lieutenant General Ira C. saker, Cossanding General, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, APO 650, U. S. Army.

TOP SECRET.

1. Despite the establishment of a limited zone of operations in front of the Aussian armies, incidents, which may well be considered inevitable due to the proximity of operations, occured in conjunction with penetration of the Highth Air Force to the Berlin area on 16 March 1945.

2. As a result of encounters betwien American and Russian fighter aircraft, the bissians claim that six Soviet planes were shot down, killing two pilots and seriously wouning another. The Soviet attitude as set forth in a letter to General Deane is a very grieved one and places full blame of the incidents on the American Air Forces. Easy of the facts set forth in the letter are not in accordance with the facts of the situation.

3. Although the final results of the investigation being ande by the sighth Air Force have not been received, a thorough preliminary investigation has indicated that no dussian aircraft were shot down by American fighters, and that all attacks made against dussian aircraft were made in self defense. The sighth air Force has reported that two fighter flights were attacked by Aussian aircraft, one attack comsisting of two passes and that in addition, one straggling 5-17 was attacked by dussian aircraft.

4. The pilots have reported that recognition signals were ineffective and that recognition itself was complicated by haze and patchy cloud, also that mission aircraft were painted blue exactly like identified German aircraft.

5. Our attitude in the matter is that the bussians have committed as many hostile acts as they claim we have constitued, and that fault, if any, is as much theirs as it is ours. We have also pointed out again that adequate and close liaison in the front line areas is probably the only solution for the prevention of further incluents. Our attitude has not been particularly conciliatory, and we do not intend to shoulder the blaze for these incidents until such is definitely proved.

6. Measures which have been adopted in an effort to prevent further incidents are intensification of instruction in aircraft recognition, and briefing fighter pilots to adhere closely to escort duties when in or near the limited zone of operations. In addition, the Eighth Air Force now signals it's intention to attack targets or operate near the limited zone of operations thirty hours in advance of time over target. Concurrently, the Russians have been requested to intensify instruction in aircraft recognition and to brief their pilots to anticipate American operations in Eastern Germany whenever the weather conditions are favorable.



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F. L. ANDELSON, Major Gamerai, U.S.A. Deputy Commander, Operations.

DEFICIAL FILE TABA

25 March 1945

BC/FHM/RAH

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25 March 1945

HERORANDUM:

Challer : American Aircraft Torce Landed in Russia.

: It. General Ira C. Eakor.

1. General Hill, in Russia, has raised the question of our providing personnel for the repair of our aircraft down bahind the Russian lines. His recommendation is, that in order to save these simplanes which are repairable, we should provide a force of maintenance personnel adequate to proceed at once to the scene of every landing - to arrive if possible before the crew abandons the airplane.

2. The reason for such a recommendation is the statement that the Russians are chopping up, and otherwise rendering usclass, airplanes which night have been repaired and returned to operational status. In spite of strong protests to the Russian authorities, Ceneral Hill states that this prestice is continuing, and that therefore it is to our interest to provide adequate personnel to forestall such action.

3. There is a question in our minds as to whether we can realize a greater return from personnel if dispatched to Russia for the purpose outlined, or if retained here. To do the job General Hill recommends would require a rather considerable force, and the return therefrom in the form of airplanes restored to combat is difficult to estimate. Also must be considered the manpower shortage which we are experiencing here as weighted against our present relatively satisfactory supply of aircraft.

4. In the broader sense, this whole question can be considered as part of the larger problem of our request to Washington for general authority to dispose of aircraft intermed in foreign countries. The simplanes in Russia are not intermed, but if they are not to be repaired, there still remains the problem of authority for their disposition.

> F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, USA, Deputy Communder, Operations.



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ICHORADDAM: Post-War Mapping of Murope.

10

: Lieutenant General Ira C Saker.

1. A requirement exists for accurate mapping of most of the continent of Europe. These maps are necessary for use by the Ground Forces as fire control meps as well as for other purposes and can be accomplished only by large scale photographic effort.

2. Because of the scale and importance of the project and the anticimated difficulty in securing permission to map cartain of the areas, recommandations were received from various agencies, including War Department G-2, that we initiate at least the training for the program prior to the cessation of hostilities. These recommendations were prefaced on our "Deing able to spare the effort without influencing the course of the war".

3. After careful weighing of all factors it was determined that forces could not be spared from current operations.

4. At the present time complete plans have been formulated and the project is avaiting implementation. Action will be initiated to accomplish the project as soon as the course of the war allows us to make photographic units available.

F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, USA, Deputy Constantions.

25 March 1945

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SUDJET: Forecast of Aircraft Status in the 270.

: Lisutenant General Ira C. saker.

1. This status is based on present aircraft available in the theater and forecast of flow as per OC & R Allocated Flow of aircraft under date of 15 Earch.

Heavy Bonbardment Aircraft

Situation on B-17 and B-24 sireraft is quite satisfactory and if re-deployment of twelve (12) B-24 groups to the U.S. is implemented, drastic reductions in flow of B-24's to this theater can be effected.

Madium Mirer ft

<u>B-26</u>. After arrival of present aircraft enroute, theater stockage will be apple provided sufficient A-26 B and C aircraft are supplied this theater to implement present conversion program of one (1) B-26 group per month.

Licht Monbardment direraft

Indicated flow of 3-26 B and C aircraft should be adequate for the months of April and May, thereafter a distinct shortage evidences itself in both A-26 B and C aircraft. An increase in this flow will be necessary to adequately sustain present conversion program.

1-20. This type is in extremely plantiful supply, immofar as gun nose type are concerned, but the situation on the glass nose is somewhat tight due to the lug in arrivals of glass nose A-26's for which glass nose A-20's are presently being substituted.

Libber Airer ft

.1-38. Due to conversion of two (2) P-38 groups to P-57's supply of P-38 sircraft for remaining P-38 group indicates a surplus of this type aircraft which will serve as advance attrition for the remaining group.

<u>R-51</u>. This type aircraft is presently in adequate supply and the 8th and 9th Air Forces should be up to strength upon assembly and modification of aircraft presently in the theater assuming, of course, normal replacement flow is maintained. However if the 8th Air Force is unable to work out the bugs in the R-47W, additional F-51 aircraft will be required to equip and maintain the 56th Group of the 8th Air Force.

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<u>P-A7</u>. Situation has improved considerably in this type airplane and if approximately fifty (50) additional P-47's can be set up for late april arrival it is believed that authorized strength could then be reached and maintained.

The R and Photo K Aircraft.

E-3. Supply is adequate.

F-6. The theater is somewhat understrength on this type and if aircraft are available, forty (40) additional F-6's should be modified for late May arrival in this theater.

 $\mathbb{P}{-5}.$ Some shortage exists but present theater flow should bring theater up to strength by approximately the end of June.

Might Pichter Aircraft.

<u>F-61</u>. This type is in short supply at the present time even though indicates flow indicates adequate numbers should be svallable for combat in the mear future. My speed up in the availability of these aircraft would definitely assist in night operations for which there is more demand than our present resources will permit us to underwrite.

> P. L. ANDE CON, Major General, USA, Deputy Commander, Ops.

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25 Harch 1945 BC/FIE4/RAH

Linio when the

SUBJECT: Resume of the Jet Aircraft Situation.

: Lientenant General Ira C. saker, Gassanding General, Scatterranean Allied Air Forces, APO 650, U. S. Aray.

1. Although I am certain that you are as aware of the need for P-BU aircraft in this theater and the MTO as I am, certain recent information may not have been brought to your attention.

2. During a resent penetration to Berlin, the sighth Air Force definitely lost six boshers to jet aircraft, and this encounter reflects the growing determination of the German to commit his jet aircraft to aggressive interception. The energy apparently feels that his tactics for the employment of jets have developed to the point that it is time to commit them. In addition, so now know that he has several operational jet units for recommissance, ground support and interception use. These facts have only served to emphasize the threat which we are siready aware of.

3. A letter from General Gies dated in February outlined the revised production estimates of the F-EO and stated that it's production had received priority equal to that of the E-29. Evan so, it seems unlikely that the first group could become operational before fall, although enough equipment to formish one s uniron with F-14's probably will be available sooner. We had stated that procurement of the F-14 has priority over the fighter model F-80.

4. General Giles' letter also stated that experiments designed to increase performance of the P-51 were under way. We feel that if the Mustang's performance can be stepped up to the figure he suggested, it is entirely possible that it will serve as a stop-gap measure to hold the German jet in check until the P-80 is available. We feel that if this program is really promising and can be developed quickly, it should be pushed to the utmost.

5. In summation, it appears that the P-80 program has now received all the pressure and exphasis that can be placed upon it, and that production cannot be hastened beyond that already contemplated. On the other hand, the project to increase the performance of the P-51 should be emphasized as much as possible, and all imformation concerning the development as well as information of accelerated service test of the P-80 should be passed to us as rapidly as it becomes available.

> F. L. ANDERSON Major General, U.S.A. Deputy Commander, Operations.



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UDJ CT: Proposed Movement of Twelve (12) B-24 Groups to U.S. for Conversion to E-27 and dispatch to the Facilie.

: Licutenant General Ira C. Caker.

..

Two plane to implement this program are presently being presented to JCS and altimately to CCS for approval.

Flan A - Nonth indicated is time of departure from the MTO or STO.

No. of Groups		South of Departur	
	2 4 4 <u>2</u> 12	Juns July August September	
lan E -	4 2 6 12	Juns July August	

Flan A seems to more readily fit our capabilities especially in view of time lag required both to propare cadres for movement to U.S. and their subsequent training prior to actual arrival of their parent groups in the Z of 1.

It is also most important that replacements for these cadres arrive this side of the water before or concurrently with the departure of subject cadres.


It has been decided that the first four groups would be redeployed from the BIG with the reasining Might groups apportioned between the MTO and STO in as close a consonance as possible with present redeployment schedules.

is early a decision as possible with regard to the final schedule would be most helpful in implementing the preparation of subject groups for their altimate redeployment.

> 7. 1. ARDENSON, Najor General, USA, Deputy Commander, Ops.



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25 March 1945

OFFICIAL FILE TA3 G

2. . N. (N)

) Lieutenant General Ira C. Sakar.

Schivities in Sweden:

- (a) Primary objectives.
 - 1. Avacuation of American interness and escapees from Sweden.
 - 2. Release of interned sircraft.
 - 3. ATC route to Sweden.
- (b) action taken to implement primary objectives.
 - Ten (10) C-47 sircraft under operational control of ATC were set up to expedite movement from Lules, Sweden, to Eirkenes, Horway, of subdry M.F. Co's, supplies and a complete field hospital. (This movement is now nearly BOX complete.)
 - Sale to Swedes of fifty (50) 2-51 aircraft and spare parts with provision for instruction of Swedish air and ground personnel in operation of subject aircraft.
 - 3. Offer made to Swedes of sale of B-17 aircraft temporarily on loan.
- (c) Results obtained.
 - 1. Fractically all interness and escapees evacuated.
 - Negotiations presently underway for reclamation of operational aircraft although resistance is still being encountered from the Gweno.
 - 3. ATC granted sutherity to operate direct ATC route U.S. to Stockholm via NewFoundland and Iceland.

F. L. ANDERSON, Hajor General, USA, Deputy Commander, Ope.

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D.(\T) 102+

SUBJECT : airway Traffic Control.

0 : Lt. General Ira C. Maker.

1. There has been established and placed in operation an airway from London to Faris. All aircreft using this sirway under instrument conditions are required to be controlled so that altitude and time separation may be maintained for the greatest safety.

2. Additional airways, as yet uncontrolled have been designated London -Brussels, Paris - Brussels, St Nawgan - Paris, Brest - Paris, and Paris -Marseilles, via Dijon and Lyon. Proposed also, subject to British agreement, is the designation of an airway London - Frestwick.

3. Airway Traffic Control Centers are now in operation is Lonion and Faris and are being established in brussels and margeilles. Frestwick also will have a Control Center when the airway Lonion - Frestwick is designated. As the volume of traffic warrants, it is planned to establish uniform control on the present uncontrolled airways.

4. The Air Ministry and this headquarters have established a joint board to agree on air traffic rules which rules are then published by each in identical form. This board also acts as a coordinating agency with various interested parties as in the case of determining the location of airways.

5. The Army Airways Communications System, through the 5th AACS Wing here is to be responsible for actual operation of the airways and all traffic centers subject to policy direction of this benduarters. Personnel to assist in this are being transferred to AACS from our troop basis.

6. This effort being a joint one with the British, our present establishment is duplicated by the RAF. Each half of each center handles its own aircraft. Responsibility for operation of the centers rests with the British in London and Brussels and with the Americans in Paris and Marseilles.

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F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, USA, Deputy Commander, Operations.

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BC/TFM/mlf

OFFICIAL FILE TAB I

25 March 1945

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Lieutenent General Ire C. Eeker.

SHORAN FROGRAM

1. SHORAN IS already operational on a limited scale in the First Tectical Air Force, and initial installations are now underway in A-26 successful of the Ninth Air Force. Upon receipt of the sirborne equipment being released from the Mediterranean, a SHORAN program for the Fighth Air Force will also be initiated.

2. Requirements for SHORAN sirborne sats now established total 288 sets, as follows:

First Tactical Air	Force (Prov)	66 sets
Ninth Air Force		120 sets
Eighth Air Force		42 sets
	TOTAL:	228 sats

These are minimum requirements for an introductory program, and it is anticipated that additional sets will soon be needed, particularly for Eighth and Ninth ar Forces.

3. Of the initial 200 SHORAN sets furnished with K-1 computors, only 65 have been allocated to the Army Mir Forces in Europe. These, added to 24 sets available for diversion from the Mediterranean, make a total of 89 sets which can be put into operation in the near future, or less than one-half our immediate reguirements.

4. Telivery of additional complete SHORAN sirborne equipment is expected to be delayed until May, at the earliest, because of non-availability of K-1 computors.

5. Present indications are that SHORAN will prove the most accurate blindbombing system now available. Its range limitations are those of any ground-controlled radar system, but this is becoming a factor of increasingly less importence in the current operational situation. Any effort which can be made to axpedite production of SHORAN computors and speed delivery of complete sets to the Air Forces is believed highly justified.

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F. L. ANDERSON Mejor Ceneral, U.S.A. Deputy Commender, Operations.

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MERICENTRY DOUGH

: Lieutenant General Ira C. Maker

WINLOW

son a continue closes of the Mindow Program, which has a non-four most effective counterteneires erginst heavy flat, a non-tened by a shortage of that exterial in the face of acressing demends.

2 The was been used in great quantities by the bombers of all the air forces in this theater, and it is the only landout device which has been found antisfectory for use by redice and light bombers. Freeens plans for countering the new centimeter reder which the enery is expected to bring out during 1945 are based upon the extensive use of window and entors the dispensers.

The treater requirements for window have been increased apidly to keep pace will forman anti-jerning developments and to reator activity of our we sir forces. At the same bigs, it is form indicated that the sir force allocation of aluminum foll to corr cut because of a critical shortare in the some of the increase.

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BC/TTM/mlf 25 Morch 1945

MEMORANDUS

: Lieutenent Cenerel Ire C. Eeker.

AIRECINE RADAR BEACONS

1. The program for installation of airborne S-band redar beacons in all types of aircraft to extend the range and accuracy of ground control provided by MEW and modified CCR-584 sets and to permit effective radar identification of aircraft, is proceeding very slowly for lack of beacons.

2. Successful prototype installations of beccons have been made in most types of combat aircreft and the problems of providing suitable baseon receiving facilities for the rader ground stations have been substantially solved. Operational trials of both AN/ANN9 and AN/ANN-29 baseon equipment have demonstrated the value of this additional rader device in ground-controlled operations.

3. Overell requirements of the Air Forces in this theater for sirborne beesens total approximately 2850 sets. The AN/AFN-19 (Rosebud) is the preferred type of beacon and is essential for all P-51 installations. However, the AN/AFN-29 (airborne BUFS) beacon would be acceptable for about helf the total number of installations planned, if sveilable at an earlier date than the "Hosebud" beacon.

4. Present inform tion on bessen production is as follows:

5. Totel of 330 each AN/AFN-29 beecons to be available by the end of July. with deliveries at a rate of approximately 60 per month, beginning in March.

b. Total of 475 each AN/AFN-19 beacons to be available by the and of July, with deliveries beginning not before May.

5. The United States has been requested to investigate possibilities of ineressing production of these beacons, particularly the AN/ATN-19, but to date no definite reply has team received.

6. Incvision of adequate quantities of sirborne radar baccons, with necessary test equipment and spare parts, is considered an urgent requirement to enable us to exploit the full potentialities of MEW and 900-584 equipments used for ground control of tectical and strategic operations.

> F. L. ANDERSON Major General, U.S.A. Deputy Commender, Creretions

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26 Larch 1945

MEMORA NOUM :

SUBJECT : Recommissance Requirements of Minth Air Force.

: It. Conersl Ira C. Daher. TOT

1. Due to the expanding activities of the Ninth Air Force, that organization has stated that He recommissance reproduction facilities are inadequate. Likewise, the 325th Wing, Recommissance has been unable to satisfy the Winth Air Porce completely.

2. The 325th Wing, which is part of the Eighth Air Force, has assigned to it the bulk of the photographic facilities, aviation, in the theater, and has been attempting to satisfy the needs for photo reproduction, etc., of the Ninth Air Force, ETOUSA, and this headquarters plus those of the Eighth Air Force. In addition in order to avoid duplication of effort, work is being done by the 325th Wing in cooperation with the British for SHAFF, Air Hinistry, War Office, Admiralty, First Allied Airborne Army, 12th Army Group, 6th Army Group and 21st Army Group.

3. As a result of a decision by the Commanding General that the repro-duction and technical resources of the Eighth Air Force would be divided in order to make the Ninth Air Force more nearly self sufficient, a study of the problem has been made, in the course of which the following points became apparent.

g. The Ninth Air Force has requested the assignment of indicated units from the Eighth Air Force to establish its own Photo Center.

- 1 Photographic Recon Squadron
- 1 Photographic Technical Squadron
- 1 Photographic Interpretation Detachment
- 2 Engineer Topographic Companies (Aviation) 1 Station Complement Squadron

b. The loss of a complete Photographic Technical Squadron and the other units desired by the Ninth would leave the Eighth Air Force with in-sufficient facilities to meet its own air force requirements, without taking into consideration its cutside commitments to other agencies.

g. The photographic technical squadron and Engineer Topographic Battalion are not readily divisible. If divided in half, the loss of efficiency in each half would be 10 to 15 percent. In addition, a duplication of equipment would be required, since in these units only one set of equipment is provided,

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and this will be needed by both portions.

d. Obviously no division of the Eighth's facilities should be used without a commensurate division of the work load. A division of the work load would involve an additional loss of efficiency since coordination now had with British reproduction and photo units would be practically impossible.

4. In view of the above, and remembering the Commanding General's decision that the Ninth Air Force be given adequate reproduction facilities, the only solution to this problem now apparent is to cotain the immediate assignment of the desired photo reproduction units. It is not felt that this should be considered as a long range requirement for which personnel could be trained. Immediate transfer of existing units is our idea. Needed to emble the Minth Air Force to fulfill its own requirements and the immediate needs of its associated armies, while leaving undisturbed the outside commitments of the Lighth Air Force will be: 1 Hq Photo Wing, Recon. (or Hq Recon Group)

1 Ha Photo Wing, Recon. (or Ha Recon Group)
1 Photographic Technical Squadron
1 Photographic Interpretation Det.
1 Engineer Topographic Unit composed of the
following cells - (from T/O & E 5-400)
1 Ha Platoon, Repro. Co. (AD)
1 Operations Section, Topo Co. (AF)
1 Photolibrary Section (AG)
1 Photolibrary Section (AH)
1 Photomapping Platoon, Type 1 (AI)
1 Reproduction Platoon (AN)
1 Mess Team, Type 3 (AQ)

5. We feel that you may be in a position to explore the possibilities of having these units transferred to this theater from the Mediterranean Theater or wherever available. It must be emphasized that we do not have time to wait for any units to be trained.

> F. L. ANDERSON, . Major General, USA, Deputy Commander, Operations.

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CARRIER SHEET

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				Enter File Classification AG	
1	5/0	o/c ops	26-3-45	Request you prepare immediately, so that it can be handed to General Eaker to take back for discussion at Hq, AAF, paper setting forth our requirements to take care of photo-reconnaissance needs: specifically, one (1) photo-reconnaissance wing headquarters, plus a Topographical battelion.	
Incl	25 Mar L	5. w/1 inc	1 (Table	Beconn, dtd of Proposed nee Units.	F. L. WDERSCH Major General, UPA Deputy Commander, Operations
				prie	
				E SEC	
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HEADQUARTERS URITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE (MAIN) Office of the Director of Intelligence

25 March 1945

SUBJECT: Intelligence Material for General Eaker

TO : General Anderson, DOG/Ops

1. Last November General McDonald and several officers of his Intelligence Staff were sent to Headquarters, U.S. Army Air Forces, to present the Intelligence personnel requirements of this headquarters.

2. The Technical Intelligence requirements for this Air Theater were discussed at length with Generals Echols and Carroll. Our requirements for this type of officers were indicated at approximately 70. A note was made that an additional 100 civilian technicians would be required for the exploitation of Technical Intelligence objectives as our armies progressed into Germany. Generals Echols and Carroll stated that it would be impossible to supply Headquarters USSTAF with approximately 70 technically trained officers but that they would furnish us 10 key technically trained officers if we would provide them the critical MOS numbers. This was done and the names of 7 officers were furnished General McDonald's staff before they left. A requisition was submitted for these 7 officers by mame and the other 3 officers by MOS number. Included in this requisition was a request for a technically qualified trained administrative executive type officer, preferably a Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel, capable of serving as Executive Officer for the Technical Intelligence Division of the Intelligence Directorate of this Headquarters.

3. Some of the officers requested arrived and proved to be satisfactory for the particular type of work for which they had been selected by Headquarters U. B. Army Air Forces. However, the last two officers arriving, namely Lt. Col. John F. Jacobs, O155039 and Major Paul L. Hexter, 0913036, are not fully qualified as represented. We are trying to find a suitable assignment for Lt. Col. Jacobs and it appears that we will have to initiate the necessary papers for reverting Major Hexter to an inactive status as a civilian.



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4. There are now approximately 75 more technically trained officers being made available to this Headquarters for the purpose of exploiting Air Intelligence objectives in Germany. Air priorities will be set up for these outriers as soon as a letter, dated 21 March, from Headquarters U. S. Army Air Forces to Director of Personnel, this headquarters, listing these officers by name, grade and specialty, arrives. Should all of these officers prove qualified as represented, it is believed that our Technical Intelligence personnel requirements will be mst. Toster of technically trained officers in this Air Theater, being compiled by Director of Fersonnel, produces a sufficient number of officers to augment those now on hand plus those coming to us from the Zone of Interior.

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
ON ORGE C. MCDONALD Brigadier General, U.S.A. Director of Intelligence




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DRAFT

TO: Commanding Officer, 27th Air Transport Group (Attention Historical Transport Major Victor Alden).

P-G-5

26 January 1944

1. Following the completion of the special mission of dispatching aircraft from the UK to Torch, this Command was ordered by the Commanding General of the Eighth Air Force to retain the "complete and accurate permanent records" concerning this movement. My raug to pulltale the current and pulse use of

2. In pursuance to this order, and in accordance with the policy of this Command to centralized the technical function of cataloging and maintaining custody of historical records, the Historical Officer of this Command requested the Eighth Air Force Historical Section, now the Historical Section, USAAFE, to retain these records. This service has already been carried out in large part with the cooperation of the 27th Air Tansport Group.


3. It is desired that upon completion by the 27th Air Transport Group of the use of these records for operational purposes they be left with or despatched to the Historical Section, USAAFE.

By Command of Brigadier General Knerr.

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<u>B-17</u>	Planes	Cre	T	Pass	engers.
	spatched.	Off.	EM	Off.	EM
97 B. GP. 301 B. GP. 306 B. GP. 15 Photo Sq. 92 B. GP.	35 34 1 4	143 138 4 12 8	205 189 6 28 7	55 27 0 5 8	9 7 0 1 8
72 00 000		-	-		
Totals	76	305	435	95	25
<u>B-24</u>					
93 B. Cp.	24 m	95	145	23	71
	m 16 have	returned t	o U.K.		
<u>B-25</u>					
310 B.GP.	52	155	209	4	0
<u>B-26</u>					
319 B. GP.	26	78	70	11	0
<u>A-20</u>					
47 B. GP.	45	45	90		none
<u>DB - 7</u>					
15 (Light) Bomb. Sc.	13	27	25		none
<u>P-38</u>					
lst F. GP.	77	77	-		none
14th F. GP. 82nd F. GP.	54 80	54 80	-		none
Replacements	201	119	-		none
Totals	412	330			

76 Pilots of 78th F. Gp were assigned to P-38 replacement Project.
 6 Pilots of 27th Air Transport Group were used to complete Project.

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P-39	Planes	Cres	Crew		
Group	<u>Dispatched</u>	off.	EM		
Slat F. 350th F 68th Ob Replace	.GP. 80 s.GP. 36	78 80 36 45	:		

F-4

12th Sc.	13	13
5th Sq.	13	13
Replacements	3	1.

2 Pilots of 27th Air Transport Group were used to complete Project.

Total planes dispatched:

Crew Members dispatched:	Officers. 1,772	Enlisted Men. 1,281
Passengers Dispatched:	337	1.536
Totals:	2.109	2.817

For the Commanding General:

/S/ D.R. GOODRICH, D.R. GOODRICH, Colonel, Air Corps, Chief of Staff.

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	True
	Copy 452.1 lst Ind. E-P-3. HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE, A.P.O. 633.
	TO: Commanding General, VIII Air Force Service Command, A.P.O. 633. 1. Information contained in basic communication has been noted.
Т	2. Desired that complete and accurate permanent records of the forch acve- ment be retained by the VIII Air Force Service Command.
H I S	By Command of Major General EAKER.
P A G E	/S/ C. C. CHAUNCEY, /T/ C. C. CHAUNCEY, Brigadier General, U.S.A. Chief of Staff.
I S	A TRUE COPY:
U N C L A S	Heffren N. Hackpile S. H. Stackpole Cept. A.C.
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APD Files Report of Recomm. Scotland ? 10.13.41-Delivered to M.C. mulled 10/11/49. Anner No3 (Aviation) Report on U.S. Army Forces in Scotland. SEC - Left 1441 Carried out by Sth U.S. Special Observer Go. 15-18 September 1941. Wile reel PATE IL

16 ETO (SPOBS) File

1. Mission

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a. War Department Operations Plan - Rainbow 5 (Par.28 a(21)) provides that U.S. Army air units will be responsible for the air defence of those general areas in which U.S. Naval installations are located. The siting of two additional naval establishments in Scotland since Rainbow 5 was first drawn up has resulted in the modification of the plan to provide for the air defense of the Scotland area.

2. F


Recommendations for the necessary revision of tables of Org. for air base and air depot groups for services in G.B. are contained in a letter from this office to the Aset C. of S 7 Aug.1941. Office calls for Col. Ray A. Dunn A.C., to prepare a plan for air maintenance and supply - will be forwarded.


3. (last para. in report.)

Key personnel of air units earmarked for Scotland should come to G.B. well in advance of their units in order to study the operating and supply procedures peculiar to this theater and upon completion of their study return to the U.S. to direct the training of their respective units preparatory for service in this area.

Note The Report of which these armen and there a part was canned out by \$ 45 speend SECRET


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UNITED STATES STRAIGGE AIM FORCES IN EUNOPE Office of the Director of Operations

22 June 1944.

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/ Eajor General Anderson.

I. The following discussion was bred by your recent instruction to prepare a plan for the movement of this Headquarters to a more central location with respect to the area of operations.

2. It is believed that no practical benefits could be derived from moving tals Headquarters to another location at least until a place in Northern France, well inland, is evaluate. Frior to the time such a location can be found and mode available, it is feit that the Headquarters should remain as presently situated. It is not visualized that any change which could achieve effective ends can be obtained until the German armies are pushed back into German territory. Hence, this discussion is based on the acove assumptions.

3. In considering the movement of the Headquarters, cartain points must

a. That would be the general advantages to the war affort and offisiency of the Command as a result of such a move? In considering the present scope of the USSIAF Command, the answer to this question can be formed:

(1) The Headquarters would be brought much closer to its operational Commanus outsile the United Kingdom, i.e., Fiftsenth Air Force, Sastern Counsul, and possibly the Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces, thereby peraitting a closer liaison with them.

(2) The realm of operations would be closer, thereby permitting a better view of operational necessities and results.

(3) A closer lisison with the immediate ground situation and Communicould be possible thereby permitting a more effective direction of effort from a motical as well as strategic standpoint.

. g. what disadvantages would provail if this Headquarters were moved to the Continent: when given due consideration, certain of these appear highly imortant:

and set up. This would undoubtedly prove to be an intense undertaking due to the successive amount of land lines and radio communications that are so important to the efficient Command of air units, sepecially when those units are deployed over an entire Continent.

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(2) The meadquarters would be carried further away from its principal intelligence courses which are almost entirely located in London. The present shilly of this measquarters to gamer all the latest intelligence information with an absolute informatic because of our proximity to all the sources located in London has had considerable bearing on our ability to keep well abrass of the energy's novaments and capabilities. The political side of the intelligence picture also enters into this discussion as our present ability to maintain close contact with various political agencies permits a quick and close alliance of military and political intelligence. This ability would be seriously impaired if the Meadquarters were to nove to the Continent.

(3) The efficiency of the Administrative division of USHAF Would (3) The efficiency of the Administrative division administrative organs. Se seriously impaired by taking them away from their principal administrative organs. If the Operations division and Administrative division were to be divorced, this would again affect the efficiency of the Headquarters as major policies are set by would again affect the efficiency of the Headquarters as major policies are set by actions division and close coordination is essential.

4. In light of the outstanding advantages and disadvantages pointed out above, it a cars a more thorough debate of this suggestion is in order. Although a moveient of thit Headquarters to the continent would bring the Commanding General closer to dis outlying Commands and to the field of air battle in miles, he would be no closer in convenience. A special communications setup, similar to that now connecting this Headquarters with the Fifteenth Air Force and Eastern Command, would still have to be maintained and would be the only communication system available until telephone trance and itsly. A move to the continent would by the mitherswal of the Germans from officiency over that presently realized. On the other mand, the move would estail the statistic of an elaborate system of communications to the United Mingdes in order to maintain efficient communication with the Elephon Air Force and Air Gervice Command to an elaboraters. The close communications organization with only the inited states would demand com lete overnauling and reorganization of agencies in the United States would demand com lete overnauling and reorganization of

Though there would be a certain advantage in having the Hassquarters those to the air pattlefield, operations at the lavel of this Hasquarters are posed on longrange intelligence information. Our main sources of this type intelligence are right in ionion. Higher Headquarters on all fronts get their major intelligence from these sources. It a pears rather unreasonable to move any from these sources when they are much more important to our Command level than the immediate intelligence sources evalu-

The advantage of being closer to the ground commands is a questionable and. Inough it is fully realized that there is a strong possibility that this Headquarters may take control of the Ninth and Twelfth Air Forces, thereby adding tactical operations to its scope of Command, it is felt that the level of this Headquarters would be too high to take usable advantage of proximity to ground forces. The Communers of the tactical forces must of necessity be closely conversant with the ground force Commanders with whom they are coordinating but this Headquarters would command these tactical forces through the medium of broad directives and overall policies established through lisison with the Supreme Command. Any close lisison established by this Headquarters with field ground forces would be essentially superfluous to our purposes and necessities.

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The disadvantages to the administrative division of USSTAF and to ASC, USSTAF, in making a move away from their organs of administration, each as the depot systems, replacement centers, liaison agencies, etc., are quite povious and no further discussion of this chape is deemed necessary.

5. In view of the above discussion, it is strongly recommended that no further consideration be given to the movement of this Heatquarters to a more central location with respect to the area of air operations over the Continent. No contingency, prior to V-ray, can be visualized at this time which will demand such a move or will offer sufficient advantages to overcome the disadvantages. If it is still desired to prepare a plan to be hald ready for any contingency, this section will do so.

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ALFRED R. MAXMALL, Colonel, Air Corps, irector of Operations.

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3

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E-1-14

17 June 1943.

TO : Colonel John S. Hardy.

Notes taken at meeting concerning use of medium bombardment. This meeting took place at Marks Hall during the afternoon of 15 June.

1. Discussion concerning capabilities of German RDF and Operational Corps reporting system. There was nothing new brought out in this discussion that is not already generally known.

2. Flak Defenses. This discussion was carried mainly by the British and the flak liaison officer. It was concerned mainly with the coastal defenses. The statement was made that it could be expected that the entire Duropean coast is defended by light coastal guns. Conclusions reached as to expected amount of fire at various altitudes when crossing the coast are as follows:

a. From O' to 250' the least amount of danger.

b. From 250' to 2,500' very dangerous.

c. From 2,500' to 4,000' possibilities are fair.

d. From 4,000' to 8,000' dangerous as regards to light flak.
e. From 8,000' to 20,000' heavy flak very accurate.
f. Over 20,000' heavy flak loses accuracy.

It was brought out at this point that the light guns are very maneuverable and are frequently changed.

3. Types of approach possible:

a. Low level with much maneuvering (this demands a highly mancuverable airplane such as the Mosquito).

b. low level taking ordinary evasive action.

c. Low level with guns blazing.

d. Climb to 4,000' when two or three minutes from the coast and dive across the coast at full speed.

e. Same as 4 except climb and glide instead of power dive.

It was suggested that a change of altitude between the target was necessary so that the defenses at the target would not know at what altitude you were approaching. It was mentioned that RAF 2 Group was now worried about small arms fire.

4. A discussion of the types of anti aircraft fire to be exjected from sea going vessels:

a. Sperbrechers have eight (8) to thirteen (13) guns, usually an average of nine (9) with several set, on bigh platforms that swing through -1 - 1 - 1

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360°. They are very rough customers for low flying airplanes.

- h. Motor merchant ships. Not very much fire. c. Trawlers have lots of various caliber guns.
- d. Destroyers. Very dangerous to attack at low altitudes.
- e. Seibel ferries. Frobably won't see any.

This discussion was conducted by a Royal Navy liaison officer who also made the statement that when an attack was planned the Royal Navy would be in a position to give the location of any convoys or other vessels that might be in the vicinity.

5. A discussion on German barrage balloons. Information was given as to where balloons might be encountered, the altitudes at which they could fly and usually do fly, the size of the cables, what might happen if an airplans hit them at various altitudes and under various conditions. Some highlights that were brought out are:

a. They are usually found around ship building yards, submarine pens, important factories and other installations that might be attacked from low altitude.

b. They usually fly between 5,000' and 10,000'. There are un-confirmed rumors that some of them can go as high as 12,000'. Convoy balloons are usually at 800".

c. The cables are a quarter to a third as heavy as the British cables and the balloons are smaller. The cables will break the balloon on impact. A propeller or cutters are usually able to cut the cable. If the cables are hit under 2,000' altitude they are very dangerous.

6. Smoke screens. It was pointed out that there are 55 known locations of smoke screens. These are mainly at ports, factories and sub pens. Each acreen is formed by 20 to 40 generators in a circle, the generators bein 70 to 80 yards apart. At ports and sub pens the circle is complete. by the use of boats. It takes about 20 minutes to get a smoke screen serating, their efficiency depending on length of notice given by RDF and the type of wind which is blowing.

7. Fighters. This discussion considered statistics on the numbers, types, speeds, ar ament, units and control.

8. Targets. Ceneral Brady pointed out the present limitations on targets in occupied countries, mainly our desire toward the civilian population and the use of the long delayed fuse on bombs. Seven (7) types of targets were discussed with the main discussion being on the ground defenses which could be expected. These types were:

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- a. Aircraft factories.
- b. Marshalling yards.
- c. Convoys.
- d. Sub pens.
- e. Airdromes.
- f. Engineerin works.
- E. Power houses.

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9. Operations.

3 to 6 fighters for every bomber.

being trained for these operations.

ment and putting in the new Bell hydraulic tail turret.

g. At this point Colonel Porter of the Bomber Command gave some points on the operational tactics used in planning heavy bomber missions. b. A statistical study of operations of RAF 2 Group was presented.

Briefly, this covered the following:

(1) Tactics.

(a) Cross channel at 50° and cross the coast at minimum altitude. In case there is available cloud cover this may be used when

(b) Cross the channel at 50° to 100° till 30 miles off

the energy coast then climb to 8,000' to 14,000' depending upon type of

tions, 80% were lost to flak and 20% to enemy aircraft. In medium level operations 20% were lost to flak and 80% to enemy aircraft. Of returning airplanes in low level operations 20% were damaged by flak and 1% by energy aircraft. In medium level operations 33% were damaged by flak and 2% by

(3) In tactics for deep penetrations low level methods are

(4) Two Group always uses lots of fighter support, normally

(5) Low altitude operations are normally made with about 6

(2) Statistics regarding losses and damage sustained. Only 20% of sustained losses can be accounted for. Of these in low level opera-

used which consist of crossing the coast and channel at 50' taking constart evasive action, breaking up before reaching the target into units of 2 or singly, and retiring at low altitude. Shallow penetrations are normally made at medium level with the airplanes flying low across the

channel, climbing to altitude before enemy coast is reached, bombing, and

airplanes, usually Mosquitos or Bostons and at dusk. These are usually deep penetrations. Eleven second delay fuses are used. At present their losses are about 5%; however, they were up around 11% and 12% but fewer missions are now being run. They consider their general bombing results to be good. Medium altitude operations are usually made with about 12 Venturas or Mitchells during daylight hours. These are slight penetrations

with area targets, using instaneous or .025 fuses. Their losses are

about 45, bombing is considered poor to fair. These are normally new crews

10. A discussion by Colonel Lewis on the fire power of the B-26. Colonel Lewis used a series of diagrams to explain the coverage of each of the guns on the airplane. As a result of these discussions it was pointed out that the B-26 is quite vulnerable between 9:00 c'clock and 11:30 and 12:30 and 3:00 o'clock. Some new modifications are gradually turning up including opening up the side so that the waist guns would have more coverage, moving the turret forward to the navigator's compart-

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11. Colonel Lewis also carried on a discussion as to the flying characteristics of the B-26. He stated that it is generally satisfactory at low altitude although it is not highly maneuverable. It is quite satisfactory at medium altitudes up to 14,000°. The speeds of the various types of which the 3rd Wing is now equipped (it includes some 10 to 15 different kinds of B-20's) vary from 190 m.p.h. to 240 m.p.h. The absolute maximum radius of action that can be expected is 300 m.p.h. With regard to the engines, between 7,500' and 11,200' the engines will lose considerable power. The present Technical Orders require that high blower not be used until an altitude of 11,200' is reached. As to bombing accuracy, Colonel Lewis stated that under 250' the accuracy would be excellent. At medium altitude with the Norden sight or its equivalent, bombing accuracy can be expected to be good to fair.

12. At this point General Brady read the directive on medium bombardment put out by this Headquarters. He ordered the Group Commanders to submit their ideas on the best defensive formations for their airplanes at medium level. These ideas were to be submitted by 12:00 noon on Saturday. Attached are two (2) mimeographed communications which were passed out to the people attending the meeding outlining the subjects to be discussed at the meeting and a topical study.

2 Incl: As stated above.



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SUBJECT : Mosculto Aircraft for weather hight.

: Colonel Tames S. Ballace.

1. The exvination Limison officer and Captain Hosman visited the S.S.F. P. 1. Onit at J.A.F. Benson on 8 January 1944 in order to gain information on one and onlinest problems in complete aircraft. The Envigation Limison officer visited ho. 8 (U.M.F.) Group Weather Flight at Syton on 14 January to obtain Further information.

2. The sos bits avi is powered by two merlin All's which are merlin all's modified to supply pressure to the pressure cabin. Using to loing and epuip and difficulties and the height at which weather aircraft normally fly, the pressure cabin is not used as such.

3. The dos with AVI is most efficient at 20,000 fest although the wonther flight normally cruises at 29,000 to 02,000 fest in order to accelerate down to 20,000 fest in the event of being bounced. The following performance flightes are given for 20,000 fest and were arrived at by experience of crews on operations:

Actions continuous cruising -conomical cruising -conomical for warge flying wargescy (limited)	+12 +30 +0 +18	<u>1978</u> , 2,850 2,500 2,200 3,000	<u>True Alrepeed Mph</u> . All 354 303 430
Normal tankage Selly tank 2 Drop Ganks (50 gal. co.)	54 12 10	D lier gals. D a a	Adurance st <u>sconomical cruising</u> . 4 hrs. safe 1 hr. safe 45 ain. safe
		TOTAL	Shrs 45 min saie

Drop tanks can be obtained of 100 gallons capacity. These would bring endurance up to 6 hrs. 30 min. safe.

4. The cabin is extramely cramped even though a pilot and navigator only are carried. The navigator acts as Navigator, meather Observer and Madio

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Operator, and as a result requires training over and above normal Mavigation Training. R.A.F. weather flight consider that havigators need not be qualified leteorologists but need only be capable of describing accurately type, amount and heights of clouds in addition to logging instrument readings. If it is intended to broadcast weather data from the target area, the mavigator will be required to reach a 12 word per minute standard (sond and receive) as a minimum. This would require a minimum of 6 weeks training although 3 months would be preferable.

H.A.F. seather flight has found that 90% of sort done for U.S.A.A.F. involves both night takeoffs and lartings. Filots and nevigators should therefore, be competent in night flying and night navigation.

6. Space in this type of aircraft limits the amount and the combination The equipment carried in weather machines over and above normal aircraft e-uirment is set out below:

- not installes b. Marcohitransmitter and receiver.
- . A.

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- d. D.H. compass.
- L. Ar Position Indicator (projected,
- counte thermometer.
- n. Oblique and vertical cameras.

7. As a result of these visits and with regard to the above, the following recommendations are made:

a. Squadron commander should spend a week or more at sytom in order to familiarize himself with the aircraft and the special problems he is likely to oncounter. (This can be arranged with No. a Group through d.a.r. Donbar Gommand.

b. Initial crop of navigators should be recruited from VIII Air Force and given %/I training (this should be started immediately owing to limited time available. . Havigators with ten or more bombing Missions should know enough about weather to report cloud conditions intelligently.

g. The following equipment should be installed in addition to normal

- Lisison set for d/T transmission and reception.
 (2) Les for fixing on outward journey men d/T silence is required.
- T.H.F. for %/T., fixing and homing from energy coast on honemard journey.
- (4) Opro-fluxgate cospans as an accurate steering compass in all conditions.
- (5) Accurate thermometer.
- (6) Oblique and vertical cameras in order to improve reporting
- (7) Air position Indicator (when available) for accurate wind velocity finding.
- (8) Belly and Jettison tanks for long range work. 100 gallon

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD jettison tacks are not usually carried as 50 gallon tanks cover sont targets attacked to date. (9) Tail warning device (Monica). 8. The services of one filot and one navigator who have completed their tour with the weather flight should be obtained for training purposes. 2/1 V. Noore D.S.C., U.P.M., would be ideal for this job, being available for posting in the immediate future and having wide experience in this work. T Sing Convender, Н I S Nav. Idaison Officer. P A E I U Ν L A S I F Ι E D 0 3 9 2

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HEAD DAATERS & Less UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIM FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Director of Operations

27 April 1944.

ENDRANDUM)

Major General F. L. Anderson.

It has been suggested that there is too much waste effort expended in the attacks the Sighth Air Force have been making on airfields in France and Germany. It was further suggested that the same effort might be put to better use b, attacking with these suggestions.

Due to the snort time available it was impossible to make a complete or exact study of the situation. In order to provide some basis, all stacks on airfields (not including air parks and depots) during the month of March were studied. This involves some fifteen airfield attacks. The best indication of the results were given in the photo interpretation reports and bomb plots. It was found that most of these attacks accomplished very heavy damage to hangars, workshops and ourracks. A good percentage of hits were also made in dispersal areas though only box of the bombs dropped of airplanes were destroyed or damaget. Approximately box of the bombs dropped on the airfields or in open fields. The latter can be considered almost entirely waste effort.

On the whole, the bombing of these airfields can be considered very good from an accuracy stampoint. If we could achieve the same accuracy on all targets we altack, it is felt that our bombing dividends would be considerably higher.

The question therefore resolves into a discussion as to whether the airfields themselves are lucrative targets for heavy bambers. It is the opinion of the undersigned that certain airfield systems are profitable targets on days when other priority systems are inaccessable. Naturally, high priority PolWTBLANK targets, including air parks and depots, should receive first consideration. However, when it is impossible to reach these, key sirfield systems, such as control fields, .T.U. and U.T.U. fields and other training fields, can be attacked with a good divident expectancy. The disruption of maintenance, housing, classroom, office and other facilities must certainly decrease the efficiency of these units considerably. The knocking out of control field facilities would cause temporary stopgap measures to be effected until the facilities could be replaced, thereby rendering the fighting units less efficient. The denial to the energy of the full use of his training facilities, accomplished by the destruction of static installations of these fields, must certainly render his training system extremely inefficient, thereby forcing a greater strain on his pilot situation which, it is understood, is already serious. This must be especially true when an entire complex of these schools is hit simultaneously. Another dividend that is almost undertiminable, but

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	FOR : COMMANDING GENERALS ALL AIN UNITS SGD : AUNOLD
	Summary experience combat theaters and results AsF provide ground test on fuzing of bombs submited for consideration.
5	In general bomb and fuze recom endations contained in TC 50 subject effectiveness of bombs bery good guide.
	Nose fuze acting 1/10 second delay and tail fuze point 025 second delay suitable for use in GP bomos against most fairly resistant targets including shipping, this fuzing considered to offer best compromise between maximum penetration desired and case strength of GP comes plus ownerical effect tail fuze action against such targets.
5	Against more highly resistant and impenetrable targets recommend tail fize delay point OI in GP bombs, for the and AP bombs recommend approximately 1/10 second delay.
	Instantaneous nose fuzing with al03 which has superquick action has proven in con- trolled tests to give almost equivalent fragmentation and blast effect as nose fuze extensions or rods up to 18 to 24 inches length and effective against targets to be destroyed by blast effect.
	Against shipping experience indicates near misses with bombs 500 and 1000 pound sizes fuzed instantaneous effect not sufficient to stop or slow vessel materially.
	For medium or high level bombing alone against water targets instantaneous fuzing considered less effective with either hits or near misses than .025 tail fuzing.
	Instantaneous fuzing has proven effective in high level bombing supporting minimum altitude attacks in reducing anti-aircraft defenses preceding mast height approach.
	Fragmentation bombs both parachute type from 100 feet altitude and stabilized type from altitudes as migh as 20,000 feet proven very effective against airdromes and dispersed aircraft.
	100 pound and 250 pound GP bombs fuzed instantaneous have produced good results in lieu of fragmentation bombs against airdromes dispersed aircraft and anti-aircraft installations.
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For minimum altitude attack mater borne targets 4 to 5 second delay preferable but 8 to 11 second also suitable on basis direct hits obtained sufficient to sink vessel.

For minimum altitude attack of land targets 8 to 11 second delay recommended with further caution that from minimum altitudes unimpeded ricochets fuzed 4 second dangerous if airplane continues same line of flight and altitude.

In combined use of small incendiaries and demolition bombs against sume targets caution against excessive lag and difference in cross trail of incendiaries, bombing tables being prepared including complete date these factors.

Vigorous fuze development to meet other tactical requirements under way with good progress further information will be forwarded when new types are ready for shipment.

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATECIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Director of Operations APO 633

11 March 1944.

EMORANDUM:

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: Major General F. L. Anderson, Deputy Commanding General for Operations, Headquarters, USSTAF, APO 633, U.S. Army.

1. The following study and recommendations are submitted as a result of your verbal directive to the undersigned.

2. The problem in question resolved itself into conceiving a workable plan for the distribution of air units to conduct air policing of Germany following the cessation of hostilities.

3. The problem was attacked from the standpoint of one not concerned with the international political ramifications that undoubtedly will enter into any implemented plan. The conclusions drawn are those believed necessary and feasible from the standpoint of the USAAF. Flans that might be drawn by the R.A.F., Bussian Air Force, or Governments in Exile, were not considered, and, consequently, it is falt any plan submitted can only be considered a rough draft prior to integration of international plans.

4. In order to qualify any conclusions with logical reasoning, certain considerations must be pointed out and explained:

a. Is it necessary to use Air Forces for the policing of Europe? If so, at what time must they be made available?

There will undoubtedly be considerable turmoil throughout the Continent immediately following the surrender of Germany. Political factions now in power will go into hiding, and pooples presently enslaved will rise up and attempt to enforce their own type of justice upon those whom they consider the sources of their unhappiness. Immediate and firm control must be put into effect by the Allies or the actual peace will be delayed for some time. However, it is felt that the AMNOT, assisted by the Ground Forces, must bear the brunt of this problem and will handle the situation adequately. After things have quieted down semewhat, it is visualized that there will be a race for power amongst the defeated political machines acting under a new mame and other would-be political powers. Minor uprisings will undoubtedly spring up as a result of reactions to these factions. These rebellions could grow to major proportions, if not quickly controlled.

The easiest and best way to deal with people susceptible to such

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outbursts is to keep them ever mindful of what might befall them should they get out of hand. In view of the major part the air has played in the reduction of Cermany's war-waging capabilities and the will of the people to carry on the war, it is only logical that the same people should respect the threat of air power. It thus follows that the most effective big stick that the Allies can wield is an air force of sufficient strength and disposition to show all the conquered people, and people of occupied territory, that the threat is there and available for instant use in case of meessity.

The period of time, between cessation of hostilities and the organized control of the people by Allied elements, will allow the selection and development of proper facilities to house the air units. This period is visualized as being from two to six months.

b. Having established a case for the use of air police, the next consideration is the matter of the extent to which air police should be utilized. This consideration is interdependent with the matter of availability of forces. Hence, they will be discussed as one subject.

It is felt that every part of Europe, both Axis and Axis-occupied, should contain units, or be within easy range, of the air police. Hence, it is deemed most satisfactory to build a network of air strength around Germany proper and distribute adequate forces through territories whose sympathies were with the Axis. Full use of facilities in Axis-occupied territory should be made in order that the friendly populace may be strengthened by the sight of the Allied forces, and that they may benefit economically from the establishment of a garrison in their midst. Occupied territories would also be given protection against any revolutionist or subversive political agencies that might attempt to take advantage of the country's weakened political and economic condition.

It is assumed that the European war will reach its conclusion at about the time the hostilities in the Far East have developed to a state where air power can be utilized to the fullest extent. Consequently, the need in the Far East for air units that are released from the European Theater must receive primary consideration. It appears that there will be only a minimum need for medium and light bomb units in the Facific Theater. The need for present heavy bomb airplanes will be dependent upon the production of new models in the United States and the availability of facilities in the Far East. Because these latter considerations are rather difficult to determine at this time, it is necessary to consider almost the entire heavy bomb effort as being required to fight the Japanese. The availability of light and medium bomb units is considered entirely adequate for the purpose proposed.

Fighter bomber units can be taken from all Air Forces, using those whose equipment is the least adaptable for the requirements in the Pacific offensive.

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There may be a certain amount of sentiment in favor of equipping the air units with captured German equipment. Such suggestions should be promptly rejected. There are many reasons upon which to base such a decision. Foremost is the view from an economic standpoint. The United States will suffer considerably when returning from a war production standard to peacetime work. It is considered essential to ease this return as much as possible. The gradual tapering off of production permitted by the peacetime use of a type airplane not needed in combat, plus the opportunity to use up back logs of spare parts, etc., is believed sound economy. If foreign airplanes were to be used, it would necessitate the tooling up, etc., of facilities, either in the United States or in Europe, for the production of spare parts. It can readily be visualized that such a program could easily prove to be a large "white elephant".

a. The next matter to be considered, before the final evolution of a plan, is the location of the air units.

Considering the various points brought out in foregoing discussions, it developes that the most practical and logical method of locating units would be to establish them in presently occupied countries around the periphery of Germany proper (pre-war boundaries). There are two outstanding reasons for reaching this conclusion:

(1) As formerly pointed out, it will afford these beleaguered people an extra degree of protection to which they are entitled and will probably be happy to have. It will also offer them an economic gain.

(2) Cermany itself will probably be full of would-be saboteurs, working in an underground movement under the direction of the present government proteges. This would not be likely to be so prevalent in non-German countries. The attitude of the local populace, in the latter, would also afford an extra degree of protection against underground activities.

For much the same reason as (2) above, large cities should be avoided where possible.

It is further considered advisable to distribute units at strategic points throughout the Balkans because of the ever-present revolutionist nature of these States. The same is true of Italy and France, until such time as they clearly establish that they can be trusted. The forces in France would be placed in such a manner that they could be considered as being specifically placed for policing of Germany and the Mediterranean. British-based units would, of course, keep a watchful eye on the western French areas, thereby procluding the necessity of stationing units there.

Using the above conclusions as a preliminary basis, the actual selection of areas should conform to the performance capabilities of the airplanes and the desirability of having sufficient forces to allow the people of the entire area to be constantly cognizant of the fact that a policing air unit is nearby.

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The actual enemy areas must be policed the heaviest, as they would probably be the birthplace of any trouble. Other areas, such as the Balkans, because of their ob-streperous nature, must be well policed, but less equipment is believed required.

The nature of the terrain in the Balkans, as well as the nature of the people, seems to make the fighter-bomber ideal for the policing of that area. The German areas should be patrolled heavily by fighters and level bombers to keep them constantly cognisant of the great strength that air power displayed during the war, thereby providing a living threat of the consequences in the event of revolt

5. After thoroughly considering the complications, limitations and needs evolving from the foregoing discussions, several areas were selected for the establishmont of air units. These areas are located according to towns for convenience. The reason for each selection is given. The attached overlay affords a good view of the overall plan. Following are the recommended areas with reasons for their selection -

a. Strasbourg. This location was chosen because of its strategic im-portance in the much fought-over Alsace-Lorraine area. It is situated on the old German border, and is in the immediate vicinity of an industrial area much visited by our bombers. It is an ideal spot for a heavy bomb group, as the airplanes could range over the whole of central Germany during the normal course of their flying. It would provide a constant reminder to the people of the great part these airplanes played in the defeat of Germany. A group of fighter-bombers should also be placed in the vicinity.

b. Eindhoven. This area has housed many German units during the war and the people would probably be only too happy to have Allied units standing by to Quall any indications of another siege on the part of their ancient enemies. The area is important industrially and provides a link in the ring around Cermany. It is proposed to locate a bomber group and fighter-bomber group in the vicinity.

c. Copenhagen. A base in this area would patrol the great port areas of Germany and keep constant control over the Baltic see ports. Level tombers and fighter-bombers would be located in the area.

d. Posen. This area, close to Berlin, is advantageous from the stand-point of proximity to the German capital and the aircraft industry which is presently located there, whose shops could be used. Again, this is an ideal location for a heavy group because they could easily fly over any part of Germany during the normal day's flying, thus keeping the German people ever mindful of what could happen. Fighter-bombers would also be loosted in the area.

e. Praha. This area in Bohemia would form another link in the encirclement of Germany proper. It is strategic from the standpoint of being close to large German industrial areas and also within striking distance of the obstreperous Balkans. Level bombers and fighter-bombers would be located in the area.

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f. Salsburg. This area in Austria would complete the ring around Cer-It would also be useful as overseer of the Northern Balkans and Northern Italy. Level bombers and fighter-bombers would be utilized.

E. The Balkan countries themselves would be policed by four fighter-bomber units. These are believed most practical because of the peculiarities of the terrain and the temperament and geographical disposition of the populace. The people are mainly radical minded, with some being for and some against most anything. It is therefore assumed that any trouble could come suddenly in isolated areas, there-by permitting fighter-bombers to be a most potent weapon. The areas chosen are:

- (1) Budapost, Hungary.
- (2) Galati, Rumania.
- (3) Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
- (4) Pleven, Bulgaria.

h. Italy would bear considerable watching for some time until she finally settles down to normal political conditions again. Two centers of industrial and political areas of importance were chosen which would afford the opportunity of covering the entire country in routine flying.

- (1) Bologna.
- (2) Foggia. Facilities already located here make this area ex-

tremely useful.

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Although care must be taken not to offend the French people, it must be realized that there have been many changes during the war and many areas will bear close watching. The Mediterranean must also be overseered. Hence it is believed important to locate air units in the Toulon area. A fighter-bomber and a Mayal patrol unit would probably be the best selections.

j. The final area for policing would be North Africa. It is believed that the present French government can properly police the Tunisia, Algeria areas. It is therefore visualized that a group of heavies, based in the Bengazi area, would be best suited to cover the vast areas of Libya, Egypt, and the Southern Mediterran-ean. These areas are already well controlled and only a minimum reminder is deemed necessary.

k. It is further believed feasible and practical to place practice bombing and firing ranges in Germany proper in order that the German people can actually see what can be done, thereby serving as a more direct reminder to remain peaceful. No attempt will be made in this dissertation to specify these places because of a lack of knowledge of the actual areas suitable for such projects.

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6. As depots are considered the most vulnerable areas from a sabotage standpoint, it is recommended that possibly two large depots, now used by the USAAF in England, be retained. This would relieve the possibilities of revenge from continental factions and also take advantage of already efficient and functioning institutions. The continuation of strong Anglo-American relations would also be enhanced by such a move.

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MM. J. WRIGGLESWORTH, Lt. Colonel, Air Corps, Asst. Director of Operations.

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13 February 1944.

MENORAN J M:

TO : Colonel 3. 3. Williamson.

1. A study of the proposals for air amployment in connection with operation OVERLORD, as submitted by the A.S.K.T., brings about a demand for certain statements from the standpoint of the Strategic air Forces. It is felt by the underslowed that the general principles offered in this outline plan for employment are sound, but the implementation plan is discolored by some erroneous assumptions and a rise certaining of certain strate is associate.

3. The paper states that Fointlians is a indicemental incredient of Overlord. It is full that this state ent can be call even atronger to the extent of saying that fointblank is the algebra to overlord. In other words, if Printblank has not successed at the time set for overlord, either the latter should be restroned until such a time as fointblank paves the way, or overlord met expect to receive considerable encosition that would not other day be experienced. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have states that the scale exceedidant of foilt limit is a prerequaite for Overlord. This is here if a set. There is call a course that may be taken. That is, to which the entrepic air forces to prove diff at interm tion with the execution of their directive. If this is not long, the sense are set allowed a recovery period which call make the execution of overland, as interview strates is effort on behavior fointblank can well make the path of Overlord inconceivably easy.

A. The proposal to attack railroad centers and aleftelds is considered basically sound. The reasons for such attacks are logical and there is no need for further comment. However, these targets should be selected carefully and with much consideration. They must also be assigned as <u>secondary</u> bo the Fointblank targets. Then, and only then, should these decordary cargets be considered. When the latter sconstacked, they anothe se attacked heavil in order that the utmost destruction may be achieved and consequently reslue and rescards. For Pointblank has been

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accomplished to an end considered desirable, then the strategic forces may turn their full attention to the destruction of direct Overlord targets. This, of course, is contingent upon Pointblank completion being realized before Overlord takes place. If the latter is not realized, the strategic forces should be diverted to support of Overlord only to the extent necessary to paralyze rail can traffic at certain strategic points and to sany the Luftwaffe operational access to strategic airfields within easy range of the overlord forces. Again, this suggestion is made on the supposition that overlord will take place whether or not Pointblank has been accomplished

> 124. J. HHIGOLESHORTH. Lt. Colonel, Air Corps, Asst. Director of Operations.

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H AD WART 23 UNLIED STATES STRATEDIC AIR FORCES IN - -- SHRDPS

/ Golonel James H. Hallace.

Office of the Director of Operations

and activities and recommendations for improvement of same prepared by Colonel s. mossevelt. where are many statements and suggestions made which I cannot readily

Force and the R.A.F. take over the Photo Reconnaissance for the A.Sch.F.

those of the n.A.F. is sound. in fact, had it not been for the use of R.A.F. facilities, the sighth Air Force could never have obtained P.R. coverage or interpretation in many instances. This was forced due to the limited capabilities of our airplanes in the face of determined energy opposition and the fact that we did not have wall trained interpreters. The s.A.F. has always come to our aid with air-

to full advantage is beleived false. The F-5A airplanes were lighted in their operations because they were being continually intercepted by German fighters and could not successfully evade due to inferior performance. Hur lesses of F-5A aurplanes live sound backing to the decision to limit their redius of action. It is hoped the F-53 and C types will eliminate this necessity. It must be remembered, however, that the Sermans no longer complacently sit by and let photographic sirplanet operate as will. On the contrary, they are ever on the elect to intercept these airplanes, and their new type fighters can easily outperform many of our present photographic types, as have fount shrough experience that the only photographic airplanes capable of obtaining photos deep in Germany are the latest models of Spitfire and mosquito, and even these are fast becoming questionable. As previously stated, it is mored the 2-50 shall be able to operate successionly, but this remains

that the aighth wir Force facilities are being misused.

planes and has been training our interpreters.

1. The untersigned has read the report on survey of decompaissance units

2. Paragraph 5 of the covering letter to the report states: "The best use of existing facilities, and new facilities due to arrive in the theater are

3. The same type of statement is made in para raph 7, therein it is stated

#. It is felt that the prectice of coordinating PaU activities with

2. The insimuation that the American PS airplanes have not been used

to be disposed of in such a fashion as not to take fuil advantage of their potentialitles." The paragraph goes on further to add destructive oriticism to the Minth Air Force methods. Howev r, no proof of these statements is offered. The only solution offered to the alleged lack of understanding, etc. is that some of the Fnotogra hie units scheduled for the Minth Air Force be diverted to the sighth Air

31 January 1944.

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g. It is not mount to ine that the d.A.F. sethods are perfect and that we should follow them to the lotter. Conversely, it is felt many improvements in their organization could be made, However, it is fait that we can take best advantage of all opportunities by working integrally with the what ... 4. On the basis of the evidence presented, I cannot concur with the recontained tions offered. g. The activation of a seconneissance Command within the eighth dir rorce, operating individually and soparately from deals. units, eseme to me to be superfluous and a maste of mappemer, incompany increasions of network to been suc 2: A grail lision agency in deciquarters, Veredenders. for the surpose of coordinating activities of the highth and Fifteenth Air Force photo units is practicable, but should only be charged with the responsibility of keeping the two Air Forces informed of the others activities and obviating any amplication of offorta " g. the pressisation of a research whit is estimaty out of lines ine Commanding Unioraly wray air Forces has elways fromeen upon the iden of using a the ter of operations for a development and testing ground. The army air forces have the facilities of wright and aglin Fields for these purposes and, to date, we have alrays received the utmost in cooperation from them. ankny test and development program can prove to be an immense white elephant when not properly bandled, at is to felt that we should maintain the theater of operations to be just that and not build our own separate Air Force, and believe that maintenance to the policy of holding any cost program in a theater of operations to an absolute ainimum consistent with operational requirements is justifiably sound and should be strictly adherred to. get in la ht of the present strategie situation and the searaity of fecialties in this small island, the reasens of mobility and anderendenceroform operation put forth as the answer to why the sighth dir torse should break from the R.A.F. are highly questionable. cal appeararbnat, as this is asjoint war, so should join forces wherever possible in order to conserve men, material and space. Unless sore adequate proof of necessity is presented, I cannot realize what might be accomplished bewards winning the war by such a cove. Total the survey " geo en an efiched an tan roue same blan blan groues and robangs for al there newly activated units still be obtained from whits to be deactivated within the lights air force. The question naturally arises "that units?" It is beleived sout has all baraber areashes assimble use for all white presently assigned. No age our and do to sele stallable as the of papartment has flatly stated that the 2. The recommendation that the Commanding Officer of the Recommissance command also be a Staff member at Nighth Air Force deadquarters is a bit unusual.

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tail members are not ordinarily permitted to Command. It is, however, beleived to be a good policy to have the orhoto deconnaiseance communaer be available, in an advisory capacity, to the Air Force Commander, but not as a designated member of lis staff.

A. Dealing with the wanther equatrons, it is my understanding that the heavy weather reconnectsance squadron will be distanded when the 2.4.1. is in a position to accept complete responsibility. It is posed that this should be acceptable. The Mosquito weather squadren will only receive twenty (20) Mosquito XVI

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all told. These will arrive four (4) in Feb, four (4) in suren, four (4) in spril and one (1) each month thereafter through 1944. What plans were in the mind of Colonel Roosevelt when he stated that the squadron would operate sixteen (16) AVI are not known.

1. The need for ten (10) B-17s for courier service is beyond my comprehension.

5. I do not profess to be technically qualified to the extent that I can argue the technical duvantages or disadvantages resulting from the recommendations expressed in the attached document. However, after having observed the results obtained for almost 16 months, I feel that certain considerations must be taken into account when perpetrating a reorganization of Photo Reconnaiseance methods. Considering the various aspects of the problem that are peculiar to this thatter, I offer the following general recommendations concerning a suggested reorganization.

g. That the Air Ministry be a proached with the suggestion that all F.R. and Anterpretation activities, both U.S. and R.A.F., be consolidated under one Command. This Command should be staffed by R.A.F. and U.S. personnel with preferably an R.A.F. officer at its head. The Command should be organized in such a way that the A.E.A.F. units could break away, when necessary, with a minimum of disorganization within the Command. (An R.A.F. Commander is suggested as the majority of these units are R.A.F. units.)

b. That all P.H. flying units be controlled from a single operational headquarters to insure efficient operation and against duplication of effort. (It has often happened that two photographic alrplanes, dispetched from different controls, have arrived in a target area simultaneously. As photo recon pilots are justifiably leary of another simplane within sight, they have consequently cleared out of the area, and, as a result, neither obtained any pictures.)

g. That the A.Z.A.F. be approached with the suggestion that a complete study of their decon requirements be made with a view towards releasing any superfluous units. Thus, if the 10th Photo Reconnaissance Group was considered unnecessary, it could be assigned to the Photo Reconnaissance Command for strategic

d. That the units assigned to the Photo Reconnaissance Command be operated by that command and administrated by the Signth Air Force, Minth Air Force, or R.A.F. as the case may be. The Command itself would be essentially an operating

g. That, when the A.Z.A.F. units move to the continent, sucquate liaison be established to insure coordination of operations with P.R. units based in Angland.

f. That the senior U.S. officer on the B.R. staff be charged with the responsibility of properly coordinating U.S.S.A.F.S. photo activities and acting in an advisory capacity to the Commanding General, U.S. Sedelet shes and Commanding General, sighth Air Force, as necessary.

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g. That the present U.S. heavy seather reconnaiseance fright continue to operate with Coastal Command until such time as the R.A.F. takes over all of this

- 3 -

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD . Windtal Comment muchl room , buts an the M.A.F. Calero h: That the mosquito monther squadron be assigned as desired by the Commanding General, Sighth Air Force. A. That the need for a courier side between units of U.S.S.A. be studied and, if a need exists, the necessary makes of asspigues and orews be made available from the Bigsch and Firdeenth Ar Forces. This service would be under the matual control of the P.R. Compand and the 90th Reconnaissance ming. 2. Chan a static static static of a solution of the solution of a solution of the solution of robel by this command and administrated by one signed art force, many force at force is a transmission of force is a transmission by the command itentic works be committed in a community as provided in the command itentic works be assessed in a sparse. Н Lieutenant Colonal, A.C., Tr course de maargues se pite samp percentersenue commit tot artanalite 2. Sheb bis A. S. M.F. be myrbached arbit big suggestion black a dominant of prediction black a dominant of prediction black a dominant of the suggestion black a dominant of the suggestion black a dominant of the suggestion o P A L. Test all r.a. flying units be controlled from a single operation is be often by pend that two protographics any pendot of strong to be often by pend that two protographics althemas, dispetded from althemas control, have arrited in a target are dismittineously. So photo recon places are stiftingly losity of animar althemas althemas and, have concerned, cleared attribute losity of animar althemas althemas any placement, on of the area, and, so a result, nature consistent any placement, E N A S F I E D

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	HEADQUARTERS BIGHTH AIR FORCE
	Office of the Commanding General
MEMORANDUM	
TO	:) Colonel J. H. Wallace.
1. In (copy atta	n response to questions contained in your memo dated 10 January ched), the following answers are offered:
<u>a</u> .	. Ninth Air Force:
	(1) The operations of the Ninth Air Force are coordinated through the medium of the A.E.A.P. who have control of the R.A.P Tactical Air Force as well as the Ninth Air Force.
	(2) The Kinth Air Force is organized as follows: Bomber Command -
	3 Combat Wings (M)
	8 Medium Bomb Groups 1 Combat Wing (F)
	3 Light Bomb Groups.
	Fighter Command (Fighter Command to be dropped later) 2 Air Support Divisions
	5 Fighter Wings
	21 Fighter Groups (including 3 Groups from Africa) 1 Tactical Recon Group
	Troop Carrier Command -
	3 Troop Carrier Mings 14 Troop Carrier Groups
	Air Defense Command
	3 Night Fighter Squadrons. Anti Aircraft Units
	Air Warning Units 1 Fighter Wing (furnished by Fighter Command when needed)
	Service Command -
	2 Advance Air Depot Areas
	6 Advance Air Depots 1 Base Air Depots
	1 Intransit Depot Group
	l Rear Air Depot (more, if required) l Replacement Depot

T H I S


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Continent are to be organized as described in A.A.F. Regulation 65-1.

2. The question of Counter Air Force Operations is not quite clear. If this question is meant to concern Overlord operations, no decision has been made. If it means at present, The Strategic Air Force is committed primarily to destroy the German Air Force by attacking as first priority the Single Engine and Twin Engine ascembly and major component factories and Ball Bearing possible. They will also attack aircraft parks, repair depots and fields when targets whenever possible.

3. The question of the smallest forces of bombers to be used unescorted against targets at extreme radius of action is rather a vague one. We can send any size force we wish, if we don't care how many get back. On targets where such as the trip can be made over sea, and suitable diversions are available, may be put on one target with reasonable safety. For a deep penetration overland, beavy losses must be expected with any size force but 200 or more should be used to inet such at the force will not be wiped out.

we have no information concerning unescorted B-26 operations but believe they could successfully operate from U.K. to their maximum radius with 1/4 airplanes without receiving losses beyond their capacity to accept.

> W. J. WHIGHES CATH, Lt. Colonel, Air Corp, Ass't Director of Operations.

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, A-3

10 January 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Tactical Section.

1. In order that this Section may prepare a draft of a letter to General Giles for General Spaatz, the answers to the following questions must be obtained as soon as possible.

- a. With reference to the Ninth Air Force:
 - (1) How is it to be coordinated with the RAF?
 - (2) How many Divisions, Wings, and Groups will comprise the Ninth Air Force?
 - (3) What kind of mobile air warning units?
 - (4) Elements of control units, types and sizes, for operational control of the Ninth Air Force.
 - (5) Are Airdrome Squadrons contemplated?
 - (5) How are communications to be made mobile?
 - (7) Are Air Force communications to be independent of Ground Force communications?

b. Are Air and Ground Force Commanders fully aware of the limitations of air power in destroying enemy force implaced beach defenses? Is the necessity for smoke, instead of demolition bombs realized?

c. What type of Supply and Maintenance (Air Services) units will be organized to support the Tactical Air Force on the Continent?


2. What counter Air Force operations are to be undertaken by the Strategic Air Forces? By the Tactical Air Forces?

3. What is the smallest force of Heavy Bombers that can be dispatched against targets at extreme radius of action unescorted? Of Medium Bombers (B-26's)?


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JAMES H. WALLACE Colonel, G.S.C. Ass't C/S, A-3




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USSTAF Main in 23609 (cont'd over)

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EDITED LITERAL TEXT

Page 2, cont'd.

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OP PRIORITY

Para 4. I fear that I do not entirely agree with your views or those of the JIC on the value of (Churion), but no doubt you have more information than the excellent photographs which are the only data I have. I shell be interested to know why, when agreeing in principle to operation (Bugle), you select marshalling yards as the aiming points.

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

Action : Air Ministry Info : D/Ops (5)

D/Ops (5) D/CG Ops D/Intel (5) C/S USSTAF Adv T.S. Control

USSTAF Mein in 23609

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UA65620

approved for Deputy Commander, Ope.____

W/Ops

Colonel, Air Corps

Director of Ops. 10 March 1945


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EDITED LITERAL TEXT

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

IN RHI	PLY CITE: A-868,	MAR 10.	INTERNAL ADDRESS
FROM /	AIR STAFF SHARP	FUD 100900A	
70	NQ USSTAF 10 SECOND TACAP		NINTH AIR FORCE MAIN RAF FIGHTER COMMAND BOMBER COMMAND ADVANCE USSTAF ADVANCED
			FROM: AIR STAFF SHAEF FORWAR

) Baterence conversation today between A/C McCauley and A/C Mermagem on operation Bughe. There is no objection to 84 Group Fighters operating west of line Dinslaken-Borken-Gronau-Meppen or to attack by 2 Group sircraft on targets at Ahaus and Burgshenfurt between H minus 30 and H plus 120.

Grews should be warned to exercise caution and to be on alert for friendly stronaft if operating during this period.

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ACTIONS (SECOND TAC AF)

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USSTAF MAIN IN 22234

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TOP SECRET

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SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (FORMARD) AIR STAFF Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff A-2

Th. (78-1)		-	1 23 /000 202220/ 200
REF	1 SIGA	SF/	AIR/TS.37110/ A-2

SUBJECT : Operation "BUGLE".

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:Eq. Bomber Command. Attention: G/Capt. PuBoulay.

> HQ. U.S.S.T.A.F. ADV. Atta: Commanding General.

DECLASSIFIED SeeDef Memo 16 May 61

9 March 1945.

When Operation "BUGLS" becomes operative it is requested that every effort be made to reace all specific targets stacked, in order that this Haadquarters can evaluate the overall picture of the success of this operation.

For the Peputy Supreme Commander:

twocavery C.M. GRISSON, STCol Air Commodore, A.C. OF S.A.2.

75-21449 # 9366

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OPMATICHAL PRIMITY



D/Gpa

BC/FHE/ryl

alf all is Harrier

Colonel, sir Corps Director of Operations

9 March 1945

LA65565

PNT

Approved for DCO/Ops

BUELS OPERATION WILL TAKE PLACE AT EAGLIEST DATE WEATHER PROBINS, YOU WILL BE NOTIFIED OF THIS DATE APPROXIMATELY TOENTY FOUR HOURS IN ADVANCE, HAD HOUR WILL THEN BE DEGIDED BY YOU AND TRANSMITTED TO THIS MEAD DARTERS FOR FURTHER DISSEMIRATION AND COORDINATION. SYNTHETIC OIL PLANTS IN WHE AREA RE ULTING ATTACK AT THE TIME MAY BE INCLUDED IN BUGLE. THE RESTRICTION BARRING RAF FIGHTERS FROM CROSSING THE STOCKT INTIME IS CARCELLED, REDESCRAT, COORDINATION BETREEN SIGHT AIR FORDE AND BUILTER FORCES WILL BE ACHIEVED DIRACTLY BETREEN RIGHT AIR FORDE AND BUILTER FORCES WILL BE ACHIEVED DIRACTLY BETREEN RIGHT AIR FORDE AND BUILTER FORCES WILL BE ACHIEVED DIRACTLY BETREEN RIGHT AIR FORDE AND BUILTER FORCES WILL BE ACHIEVED DIRACTLY BETREEN RIGHT AIR FORDE AND BUT DESCRAD. URDARADED BRIDGES ON THE WINTH AIR FORDER DUTSEDIGTION PLAN WILL BE ATTACKED BY THE FORCES IN MOSE AREA THEY AND LOGATED.

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
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6	RFTD: FAF BAB COLD ADV USSTAF AFV JEDL: A BR STAFF SIGLEF FAD
Operation Hegel will not be exacut operation Leved in present coather fore-	led Saturday 10 March. Likely date for this mast is Sunday 11 March.
istaj el sergution:	
AUTILIE DYDPS (5)	DECLASSIFIED
IAN - INC OPS U/INP (5) C/A USSTAP (5V T.S. COLTROL	SecDef Memo 16 May 61
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OP PRICEITY

In reply cite: A-261 March 8.

From: SHAPF AIR ADV 0817454

To : HI USSIAF 0622014

Internal Address: To : 1. USSTAF DAIN 2. Air Ministry Dhiteball 3. Linth air Force Ady 4. Second TAF Main 5. First TAGAF Prov Rptd: 6. RAF Bouber Coud Adv by Hand 7. USSTAF Adv From: Air Staff SHARF Fed

Reference: A-229 - 20918 & 20060.

Reference possible repeat of operation Glarion in event it is decided to execute this operation approximately 45 hours notice will be given all concerned.

New subject is operation Bugle. It was agreed at the Air Communders conference this date that the operation would take place earliest date weather permits. Approximately 24 hours notice will be given. If hour will be decided by the Strategic Air Forces who will inform Air Staff Shalf Forward who in turn will inform the Tactical Air Forces concerned.

With vaforence to targets to be attacked by the Strategic Air Forces it is understood that Synthetic oil plants in the Ruhr which require attack may be

With reference to the restriction upon Royal Air Force Fighter Command contained in para 4 b of our 5 229 of 3 March it has been agreed that it should be cancelled and that any necessary coordination will be arranged direct between Eighth Air Force and Royal Air Force Boxber Command.

With reference to pero 2 a of our A229 the targets selected should include the undataged bridges of the present bridge interdiction plan now allotted to the Rinth Air Force.

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
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
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
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In reply ite: 231 306 MARCH 6

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RES NUMBER COMMANY DEPARTS OF STATE RESS STAFF FROM: ATT AININTIN ANTREMAN PARESHAL FOR C IN C ADVINTED CONSIND TO GENERAL REPARTED DIST IT STRAIGHT COMMANDER FROM: DEPUTY OFTHE OF THE AIN STAFF

Deference discussion at air Communders contarence of 1st Larch proposed operation " Dull" is agreed provided that it does not prejudice attack of sajor it targets in central Geneany and that any active or near-source synthetic plants in Kulr are included enought "DUDLS" targets.

for purched of the specific operation communications targets in Ruht and Luce couldance over bearel plante.

Consider opport, on should take place at capliest opportunity.

Computing operatives of GSTO will nominate computiousions targets for atrategic bombers in consultation with FADP (?) staff as necessary to endure pelection suitable to your tactical plan.

usaking ou since will sasist the USSEAF and SHARF similarly as required.

Request you undertake detailed planning of this operation in conjunction with Stheir Fords and through your advanced headquarters with SHARF and USERLY as required.

USSIAN AN 214.25

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MSW 306 MARCH 6 (CONT -)

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Suggest overablen be initiated by USSEAF on consultation SHAEF and Bomber Constand (adv) unless you wish to arrange otherwise.

SHARF signal add9 dated 3 March was sent in executive form in error but may be accepted by you as basis for discussion in planning stage

USSTAF DISTRIBUTION:

ACTION: H& BOWDER COMD

DLFO: D/OPS (5) D/C OPS D/INTEL (5) C/S USSTAF ADV T. S. COFTROL

USSELF IN 21625

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
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MOST LAEDIATE

In reply cite: A 245 5 March 45

From: Air Staff SHAEF FORMARD

To : USST I HAIN ALL LINISTAY dar BOMBER CHD ADV 9TH AF LST TAC AF 2ND TAC AF



Rof: A 229 (USSTAF MAIN IN 20928)

Reference plan Bugle, message this headquarters a 229, 3 Mard 1945, paragraph 3. There is no intention of limiting attacks to only those targets specifically included in the Strategic Target Committee's list. The intention was mainly to designate areas with selection of targets left to Strategic Air Forces to include those targets which will best affect the overall plan.

USSTAF MAIN DISTRIBUTION:

Action: D/Ops (5)

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Info : D/C Ops D/Intel (5) C/S USSTAF ADV T.S. Contl

DECLASSIFIED SecDef Memo 16 May 61


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USSTAF MAIN IN 21213

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TOD OFODET	
TOP-SECRET (
HQ US STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE INCOMING MESSAGE	
EDITED LITERAL TEXT	
URGENT	
In reply cite: A-229 MARCH 3, 1945 Internal address:	
Prom: AIR STAFF SHAEF FORMARD 031730A To: USSTAF, MAF BONDER	
To: HO USSTAF 031919A CCC MAND, 9th AIR PORCE,	
ist TACFICAL AF, 2nd TACFICAL AF,	
REP. A229 (USSTAF IN 20860) Prom: AIR STAFF SHAFF PORY.ARD	
Plan referred to in A 229 3 March 1945 this headquarters, will be referred to as operation BUCIE.	
referred to as operation BUCIE.	
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EDITED LITERAL TEXT

DECLASSIFIED SecDef Memo 16 May 61

March 3rd.

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In reply cite: A 229 E From : Air Staff SHAEF To : USSTAF

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Internal Address: To USSTAF, RAF Bomber Command, 9th Air Force, 1st Tactical Air Force, 2nd Tactical Air Force From Air Staff SHAEF Forward

1. At the Air Commanders meeting on Thursday 1 March 1945 a coordinated plan was discusses which would have the effect of complete paralization of the Ruhr and the areas <u>AVITHEN</u> the bridge interdiction line now under execution. This coordinated plan has no bearing on either Clarion I or Clarion II.

2. For implimentaion of the plan, areas are allocated as follows:

- A. To the Ninth Air Force: the area south of the Ruhr to the boundry of the bridge interdiction system inclusive of the line Soest-Altenbecken with particular emphasis on the 3 main channels through Soest-Altenbecken, Arasburg-Marburg, Altens-Dillenburg.
- B. To the Second Tactical Air Force: the area north of the Ruhr, inclusive of the line from Recklinghausen-Munster-Osnabruck-Bremen.
- C. To the Strategic Air Forces: the area in the Ruhr and in addition the main line Hamm-Eislefeld-Ead Ceynhauson.

3. In the Ruhr itself there are 17 key rail centers of which, at the present time, 8 remain active and in good order. As many of these targets as can be effectively attacked should be included, based upon the Strategic Targets Committees current list. Within the Ruhr, based upon those targets selected, Bomber Command and Sth Air Force will divide the area generally as follows:

USSTAF Main in 20860 (cont'd over)

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- A. West of the line of Essen-Vohninkel (inclusive) to RAF Bomber Command.
- B. East of the line of Essen-Vohwinkel to 8th Air Force.

4. For this operation D-DAY and H-4 will be announced by SHARF after coordination with USSTAF. In order to avoid conflicting areas, the following timings will maintain:

- A. From H-30 to H plus 2 hours, 2nd Tactical Air Force fighters will not operate in their area.
- B. RAF Fighter Command, escorting Bomber Connend, will not cross the Rhine.
- C. RAF Bomber Command will coordinate with 6th Air Force directly to insure effective target support from 8th Air Force fighters. In that 9th Air Force fighters will not conflict, no limitations in timing will be necessary in Trier area.

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
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
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USSTAF Main in 20860


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





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		Work Order Request		
T H I S	l Mr. Fuller, D/C Ops 15-5 Construction Superintendent	4.4 Request that painting be on General F. L. Anderson, Bui explained in conversation h completed Wednesday, 17 May	lding "A", Wing 13, as ald today. Work to be	
P A G E			JAMES S. PITTENNER, (Tel. 453) Captain, Air Corps, Aide to Major General F. L. Anderson	
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
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No.	TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT
-				Enter File Classification AG :
				CORRECTED COPY
1.	DCG/Ops C/S	AGD USSTAF	15/5/44	1. Informal leaves and passes are suspended from 0001 hours, 15 May 1944, until 0600, 17 May 1944, with the following listed exceptions:
	D C/S			a. Those on duty status.
	Postal O			b. Air crews on leave.
	PRO			c. Emergency cases having personal approval
	Liaison			of officers of the rank of Major General or higher.
	Air Inspec	Air Inspector Photo Serv. C.		2. All military personnel will remain in the vicin
	Photo Serv			ity of their camps, posts, stations or billets for the period of 0001 hours to 2400 hours, 16 May 1944, with
	D.Weather	Serv.		exceptions as noted in par. 1 above, when not on duty.
	D/Intel			J. B. GORDON
	D/Ops			Colonel, AGD Asst Adj Gen
	Historian			
			-40 P.4	
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES . ---IN EUROPE MEMORANDURE) T Н) Colonel Alfred R. Maxwell. I S 1. Coordination has been affected between Captain Turner, briefing officer at ATC; Colonel Ellis, of Eighth Composite Command and Colonel Smith, P C.O. Bovingdon, for the briefing set-up at Bovingdon. A 2. ATC representative will set up his equipment at Bovingdon, E normally spend two days per week at that office, and in addition will be available to brief at any time briefing is desired. I S U Ν FRANK P. BENDER, Lt. Col. A.C., Asst. D/Ops. L А S S I F I E D 0447



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1. Dir. of Capt. 10 May 44. Admin. Pittenger Brig. Gen. M. R. Wood Upon the suggestion of General Curtis, some special supplies were taken on General Anderson's trip for our personnel at his destination. General Curtis directed that the cost of these supplies be charged to the special entertainment fund under your control. Following is an itemized account:

2	CS.	Whiskey	0 9-10-0
100		special	cigars
		smoking	tobacco

19-0-0 4-9-3 <u>5-4-0</u> 28-13-3

JAMES S. PITTENGER Captain, A.C. Aide to Major General Anderson 1 Incl: Bill from Alfred Dunhill, Ltd., dtd 6 May 44



0449

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
No	10	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT
				Enter File Classification AG
1.	D/I	D/CG Ops	4/5/44	1. You are requested to advise the officers of your section not to eat in the SMAEF mess unless they are invited to do so by members of that mess.
				for P. L. ANDERSON, Major Jeneral, U.S.A., Deputy Commanding General for Operations.
2	stee of	D/I	4/5/44	All officer assigned to or on TD with this section have been
				advised of the DobI: For the DobI: Aram 5. Tooblion Aram 5. Tooblion Aram 5. Tooblion
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
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
THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Adjutant General -APO 633, US Army, 3 May 1944. LEMORANDUM: Deputy Commanding General for Operations, Air Inspector, USSTAF, Fublic Relations Officer, Н Liaison Officer. I S The Deputy Commanding General for Administration has directed me to request you to advice your officers not to eat in the SHAEF mess unless they P are invited to do so by members of that mess. А G E MARRIS F. SCHERER, I Colonel, AGD, Adjutant General. S U Ν L A S 1 F I E D -1-0451 THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526





THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED A.C. DCC/Ope 3/5/44 1. Request that Lt. Colonel J. E. Ames et 20 Grosvenor Top Secret Officer Sq. be made Ass't Top Secret Officer; phone ITORIA 5455. residence phone, Gros. 3464. Н 1 S OSCAR B. YOHKER Lt. Colonel, A.C. P Adm. Ass't DCO/Ope. A G E I S Ν L А S S I F Ι E D 12 OPS. 1231. 0453

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B/FLA/PG

25 April 1944.

MEDIORANDUM:

: Director of Operations.

1. It is evident that there has been considerable waste of our bomber effort in the past three to four weeks. It is believed that the number of bombe striking on airdromes, near airdromes, in fields, and in wooded areas, results in an entirely undue excessive waste of effort. Believe that the same affort on other target systems will pay more dividends for the over-all war effort than is obtained by the stacking of airdromes by heavy bombers in Germany and the occupied countries.

2. Request that a study be made immediately to: first, judge the proportion of our effort that is effective against these mirdromes; that is, the percentage of bombs that strike vital installations or mircraft, in relationship to the over-all percentage dropped; and second, to present pertinent recommendations as to the allocation of our effort.

3. This study should be completed by the afternoon of 27 April.

F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commander, Operations.

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	Ltr, 20 Apr M., Rq 8th AF, to CG, USSTAF, subject: Maximum Utilization of Available Fighter Force (320-2).
T H	D/O D/C Ops 25-L-LA For action, preparation of indersement after coordination with Director of Administration.
I S	
P A G	F. L. AMDERSON, Major Genaral, U.S.A., Deputy Commander, Operations.
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	MEALQUARTERS UNITED BEATER STRATEGIC AFR FORCES IN SURPES
	24 April 1944.
	in a state of the
Т	: Operations Officers, Sactical Section.
H I S	1. The following officers are designated operations Duty officers on the days listed below. Affective this date there will be no administrative officers assuming this function.
P A G E I S	April 24 Honday - Naj. Ouillou 26 Tuesday - Capt. Horman 26 Medneaday - Lt. Col. Wrigglesworth 27 Thursday - Cept Whitley 28 Friday - Maj. Hosman 20 Saturday - Lt. Col. Bendar 30 Sanday - Cept. Klette
U N C L A S	Mey 1 Monday - Lt. Col. Friglesworth 9 2 Foesday - Capt. Fhitley 8 3 Rednesday - Hej. Hosman 9 4 Thursday - Lt. Col. Dander 9 5 Friday - Capt. Siette 9 5 Aturday - Maj. Guillou 9 7 Sunday - Capt. Corean
S I F I E D	Acts - irector of operations.
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1. Custodian Dú T & Eldg. H I	CC/Ops 24/1/14 1. Request my desi	t that lock be installed on file drawer of k.	
S P A		OCCAR E. YOPKEP Lt. Colonel, A.C. Adn. Ass't DCC/ops.	
G	*****		-
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Transportation for Advisory Specialist Group

1. Motor DCG/ops 18/4/44 Trens.Off. Thru C/S

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1. It is requested that Dr. Rilenour or members of the Advisory Specialist Group be authorized to request transportation on call for any location desirable, even outside the fifty (50) mile limit. This is necessitated by the fact that the Advisory Specialist Group conduct their activities at Air Force Stations within the U.K., and must present themselves at that station at times which cannot be anticipated for enough in advance for formal request.

2. There will be occasions when a request from this group may necessitate an overnight trip.

0. 2. YORGEP It. Colond, Air Corp Adm. Ass t DCC/Ops

1/0078

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2	D/P TAC Staff Director	DCG/Ops 17/4/4 USCIAT	The balance of	tment now has three (3) W the personnel is used in rtment which operates twee	Massage Center	
			2. All of the therefore, WAC advisable.	personnel are subject to substitutions for enliste	night duty, and d men are not	
				OCA B. YOMMR Lt. Col., Air Corps Adm. Ass't DCG/Ops.		
				4	TE	

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		Recommendation for Promotion.	
	1. D/I D/C for 15/4/44 D/O Ops. . D/MS	 Recommendations for promotions will be made out on form (Cir. 79, ETOUSA, 29 Sept, 1943) for signature of Deputy Commanding General for Operations. 	
T H I S		 In all cases except those from 2nd Lt. to 1st Lt. copies of orders promoting officer to present grade must accompany recommendation. 	
P A G E I		OSCAR B. YONDER. Lt. Col., A.C., Adm. Asst. to D/C for Ops.	
S U N C			
L A S S I			
l F I E D			
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~	TOP SECRET CROSS INDEX	
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	Requisition.
T H I S P A	<pre>1 Post GM Aide to 13-4-44 Request that one (1) ton of broken coke be delivered to</pre>
G E I S U N	JAMES S. PITTEAGER, Captain, Air Corps, Aide to Major General F. L. Anderson.
C L A S S I F I E D	
	RECEIVED 11 APPR 1944 1/2 OPS. 1055
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
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1.	CG	AGD UBGTAF	11/4/44	1. All military personnel will remain in the im- mediate vicinity of their post, camp, station or billets, as the case may be, for the period of 0001 hours to 2400 hours, 13 April, with the following exceptions;
				B. Those on duty status.
				b. Air Crews on leave.
				c. Emergency cases with the personal approval of officers with the rank of Major General or above.
				2. Section Chiefs will inform all officers of their section reference the showe instructions.
				/s/ J. B. COHDOM J. H. GCHDOM Colonel, AGD Asst Adj Gen
				Read & Initial:
			-	Lt. Colonel Oscar B. Yorker Lt. A.C. Reid Capt. J.S. Pittenger T/Sgt. E. G. Fehdman T/Sgt. Kelly S/Sgt. Baum Sgt. Flaa Sgt. Warren Cpl. Muller Cpl. Dunbar Cpl. Greco Pfc. Meyer Pfc. Harth Sgt. Graham
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	TO	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT
1.	DCG/Ops	AGD USSTAF	10/4/44	Enter File Classification AG: No mention will be made, directly or by inference, by any person in the European Theater of Operations sub- ject to U. S. Military law, in personal or unofficial correspondence, including cablegrams and telegrams, of stoppage or cancellation of leaves, passes or furloughs J.B. GORDON Colonel, ACD Asst adj Gen
				Read & Initial T/Sgt. Feldman T/Sgt. Kelly S/Sgt. Baun Sgt. Flaa Sgt. Graham Sgt. Warren Cpl. Marsh Cpl. Miller Pfc. Meyer Pfc Harth M.M.
				CONFIDENTIAL

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	SECRET
T H I S	1. Stat. Asst. 10Apr ¹⁴ 1. Attached cables forwarded for your information. Control D/C Ops.
P A G E	ALFRED R. MAXWELL Colonel, Air Corps Asst. Deputy Commander for Operations
I S U N C L A	
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1.	D/C, Ops.	Ass't. D/C, Ops.	8 Apr 44	1. While I have been in the hospital, I have observed a condition which must certainly be a bad

and wounded personnel in the hospital. For example, there is an officer in my ward here,

a bombardier who was wounded about March 13th, and who was taken directly from his plane to the hospital. He, therefore, did not have a full uniform, any money, his pay data book, nor any other of the things essential to his peace of mind or well-being particularly since he has become convalescent. No one has ever even called up to find out how he is getting along, and no one has bothered to send him any of his clothing or any other items of his personal property, or any messages telling him what has become of his property. Since this officer had been over here only a week or so before he was wounded, he did not know how to get in touch with his unit so as to obtain items necessary when he is released from the hospital in the near future.


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
2. Although I have helped this particular officer by asking Miss Miller to contact his station, discussion with the Ward Surgeon here discloses that instead of being an isolated case, this is merely a sample of the general attitude of Air Force units to their sick and wounded personnel. The commanders concerned seem to take no interest whatever in any of their junior officers or enlisted personnel in the hospital, and this has frequently caused serious inconvenience to individuals, particularly to those so seriously wounded that they do not return to their units. It certainly doesn't help the morale of wounded men who are so quickly forgotten, and it is causing some inconvenience to hospital staffs who do not appear to be in a position to correct the difficulty.

3. It is not entirely clear to me whether this is an administrative or operational matter, but there is no question about the effect of morale upon operations. Therefore, I suggest that it be made the joint concern of the Directors of Operations and Personnel to see that a standard procedure is set up for rectifying this situation. It seems to me that it would be a very small addition to the duties of Chaplains and Special Services Officers to take care of such things automatically.

047








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T H I S	
P A G E	
I S U N C L	2. D/C, Ops. Dir. of 6/4/44. I have, this date, personally advised the members of the Weather Section of the instructions contained in the attached letter and warned them against dis-oussing with unauthorized persons any details of future operations.
A S I F	D. N. YATES, Colonel, Air Corps, Director of Weather Services.
I E D	
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	OFODET
	JEUNEI SECRET
	HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
	APO 633
	3 April 1944
	Bro.0/ MEMORANDUN:
	TO : Deputy Commander for Operations, Hq USSTAF,
	Deputy Commander for Administration, Hq USSTAF, Commanding General, Fighth Air Force.
	Commanding General, Ninth Air Force.
	1. Certain recent events indicate that there is a necessity for tightening up on security arrangements for OVERLORD. One particular instance
	information about the OVERLORD plan as the result of numerous conversations with
	responsible people, although probably no specific information was given by any particular individual.
	2. I desire, therefore, that you warn all members of your staff against discussing any aspects of future operations with persons whose duties do not re-
	tary writers and correspondents who may appear to be quite familien with what
	is going on.
	CARL SPAATZ,
1	CARL SFAATZ, Lieutenant Géneral, U.S.A.,
St.	Commanding.
	SEGRET
	8747



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5 April 1944

SUBJECT: Material for Quarters

TO : F/O J. Bailey, Post Quartermaster Section

1. Colonel Gabler from FTOUSA has secured a house at Cabiagate, Church Road for the members of the Advisory Specialist Group, Hdgs Deputy Commanding Ceneral for Operations. Colonel Gabler states that the linen, dishes and cutlery should be furnished by the Ministry of Supply.

2. I do not know the proper procedure for obtaining these, so seek your advise and help. The dwelling will need material for eight residents and four (4) staff, making a total of Twelve (12).

3. Any advise or help you can give will be appreciated.

OSCAR B. YONKER Lt. Colonel, A.C. Adm. Ass't to the Deputy Common ding Ceneral For Operations

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D/C OPS FILE

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1. D/O Ass't. D/C, 4 Apr Ops. 44

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1. It is desired that the Director of Operations prepare appropriate material for inclusion in General Sparts's weekly message to General Arnold, which is dispatched each Sunday evening.

2. Your contribution should be handed to General Anderson or myself, or, in our absence, dispatched to General Spaats late Sunday afternoon.

3. The material should be in the form of a short, eye-catching paragraph, highlighting the operations of the Highth, Minth, and Fifteenth Air Forces for the previous week. Statistics are not wanted, but unusual successes and new tactics should be mentioned. In addition to the paragraph on operations, any requirement matters, either in the discussion stage or action completed, which are appropriate for General Spaats to include may be submitted. Since this material is generally of a summary nature, it is not a substitute for transmitting messages to the Headquarters, Army Air Forces, unless they are most appropriate for this high level exchange. Remember, however, that General Spaats is interested in taking a certain volume of our business directly to General Arnold, and when appropriate, this is an indirect method of keeping General Spaatz informed of what your section is working on.

> ALFRED R. MARWELL Colonel, A.C. Assistant Deputy Commander, Operations



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1. Director DCG/Ops 28/3/44 of Operations

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1. In order to keep personnel chart for D^C/Ops up to date, it is requested that information on any changes in personnel of your directorate be forwarded to this office at time of change.

OSCAR B. YORKER Lt. Col., A.C., Adm. Ass't DCC/Ops.



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1. Weather Services

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> N L A

I F I E D Director DCG/Ops 28/3/44 1. In order to keep personnel chart for DC/Ops up to of date, it is requested that information on any changes in personnel of your directorate be forwarded to this office at time of change.

OSCAR B. YORKER Lt. Col., A.C., Adm. Ass't DCG/Ops.

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25 Haroh 19th

Destruction of Classified Documents

: All Fersonnel, Operations Division, USSTRF

1. It has been brought to the attention of this headquarters that confidential and secret documents have been found intact in the dump heap. To prevent a recurrance of this careless disposal of classified documents the following instructions will govern all percental under my command.

a. All waste baskets will be considered as burn baskets. These will be collected between 1615 and 1630 hours daily. Each section will have personnel designated to check at 1700 hours and varify that all confidential and secret documents which were to be destroyed were properly handled.

b. In the event that confidential or secret documents are to be disposed of after 1630 hours, such documents will be locked up and placed in baskets the next day.

2. It is the responsibility of each officer and enlisted personnel in this command to be certain that confidential and secret documents which are to be destroyed are properly handled.

> F. L. ANDRHSON Major General, U.S.A. Deputy Commanding General, Operations

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H F.L. 0.B.Yorker lication. The necessity is shown in attached correspondence. S Janderson Janderson P Janderson Janderson A OS CAR B. / TORKER Lt. Gol/, A.C. Adm.kef't DC/Ops		1. Major Gen. Lt. Col. 2		
S P A G Incl. It subject; Distribution of Classified Documents dtd 25 March 1944. S UNN C L A S S S S S S S S S S S S S		F.L. O.B.Yorker	lication. The necessity is shown in attached	
Lt. Col/, A.C. Adm.Ass't DC/Ops Lt. Sol/, A.C. Adm.Ass't DC/Ops Lt. subject; Distribution of Classified Documents dtd 25 March 1944. S UN C L A S S I E			OSCAR B. TORKER	
E Itr subject; Distribution of Classified Documents dtd 25 March 1944. S		Incl.	Lt. Cold. A.C.	
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 1. Deputy Director 20/3/44 Commanding of General, adminis- Operations, traine USEDF. Services. 1. The attached CONFIDENTIAL and SOCIET documents were found intact in the dump heap. While it is impossible to trace each document to its source, or to the initivitual discarding mean. Spanners, a general exam- ination thereof indicates that they apparently care for destruction of classified documents, and constitutes a serious breach of security. 2. The entire matter is being preferred to you for such action as you may deem mecessary. 2. Director Deputy 21/3/44 of Intelli-Commoding gence Demerding gence Demerding gence Demerding gence Demerding gence Demerding gence Demerding gence Demerding gence Demerding gence Director 23/3/44 1. An investigation has been made by this office to determine the recipients of the attached confidential actored the reconstruction of classifier documents. Matter all the report by indorsement. Matter all the the reconstruction of the documents. Director 23/3/44 3. Deputy Director 23/3/44 1. An investigation has been made by this office to determine the recipients of the attached confidential for these documents, it is bilinged to the state of the classifier of				T MOIO		
G Security. 2. The entire matter is being referred to you for such action as you may deem necessary. I I S UN S C Director of Intelli- Commending gence General, gence General, gence Deputy UBSTAF 3. Deputy On anding General, gence Operations, USSTAF. 3. Deputy Director 23/3/44 1. An investigation has been made by this office to determine the recipients of the attached confidential and secret documents. Although it has not been possible to definitely establish what offices were receponsible for the non-destruction of the documents. 'Intelli- gence USTAF. USTAF.	H I S P	1.	Commanding General, Operations USSTAF. careless d for destrue	of Adminis- ,trative Services. isposal of	such dod	1. The attached CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET documents were found intact in the dwap heap. While it is impossible to trace each document to its source, or to the individual discarding same, a general exam- ination thereof indicates that they apparently came from personnel of Sections under your command. This puments is in direct violation of existing resulations
 2. Director Deputy 21/3/44 of Intelli- General, Commanding General, USSTAF 3. Deputy Commanding of Intelli- General, gence Commanding Co	I S U N C		2. The a necessary.	entire mat	ter is be	Brighaier General, USA.
Com anding of Intelli- gence determine the recipients of the attached confidential and secret documents. Although it has not been possible to definitely establish what offices were responsible for these documents, it is believed that the following offices were possibly responsible for the non-destruction of the documents: Incl. 1. Field Orders: These were receipted for by the office of the Director of Operations.	S S F I E	2.	of Intelli-	Commandin General, Operation	æ	documents, or portion of same, were used in your direc- torate. 2. For action as you deem necessary, with a report by indorsement.
office of the Director of Operations.		3.	Com anding General, Operations,	of Intell		determine the recipients of the attached confidential and secret documents. Although it has not been possible to definitely establish what offices were responsible for these documents, it is believed that the following offices were possibly responsible for the non-destruction
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Incl. 2. Camera Reports: These documents are believed to have been received by the Photo Section, this headquarters (now extinct).

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Incl. 3. a. Redesignation of Units: The Director of Personnel, Director of Intelligence and Director of Operations each received two (2) copies of this report. It has not been possible to ascertain which of these sections may have discarded this copy.

b. Anti-Aircraft Notes: These reports are received in the Office of the Director of Intelligence, where they are circulated throughout the section.

c. Interpretation Reports: These are received by the Offices of the Director of Intelligence and the Director of Operations. A total of thirteen (13) are received within the two offices.

d. Air Ministry Reports: These are received in the Office of the Director of Intelligence.

e. Theater Intelligence Directive No. 2: This was distributed by Counterintelligence and was issued to any office needing the information. Signed receipts for this document were not required.

Incl. 4. Material and Equipment Lists: It has not been possible to determine to what office this was sent.

2. Attached are copies of directives issued by this office to prevent a reoccurrence of this nature.

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Incls: As above.

Thell Ph acken It lal

GEORGE C. McDONALD, Brigadier General, U.S.A. Director of Intelligence.

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	Destruction of Classified Documents.
T H I	1. Deputy Director of 20/3/44 1. The attached CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET document Commanding Adminis- were found intact in the dump heap. While it is General, trative impossible to trace each document to its sources, Operations, services. or to the individual discarding same, a general USSTAF examination thereof indicates that they apparently came from personnel of Sections under your command. This careless disposal of such documents is in direct violation of existing regula- tions for destruction of classified documents, and constitutes a serious breach of security.
S	2. The entire matter is being referred to you for such action as you may deem
P A	necessary.
G E	/s/ Myron R. Wood to Arrow Myron R. Wood
I	Brigadier General, U.S.A. Director of Administrative Services.
N C A S S I F I	2. Director Deputy 21/3/44 of Intalli- Commanding gence Cenarel, USSTAF 2. For action as you deem necessary, with a report by indorsement.
E D	F. L. ANDERSON Mejor General, USA, Deputy Commanding General, Operations
	3. Deputy Cos andizg General, USSTAF. Birector 23/3/44 of Intelli- gence USSTAF. Birector 23/3/44 of Intelli- gence USSTAF. Birector 23/3/44 of Intelli- gence USSTAF. Birector 23/3/44 of Intelli- gence USSTAF. Birector 23/3/44 I. An investigation has been made by this office to determine the recipients of the attached confidential and secret documents. Although it has not been possible to definitely establish what offices were responsible for these documents, it is believed that the following offices were possibly responsible for the non-destruction of the documents:
	Incl. 1. Field Orders: These were receipted for by the office of the Director of Operations.
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	of Personnel, Director of Intelli	ncl. 3. a. Redesignation of Units: The Director igence and Director of Operations each received two as not been possible to ascertain which of these	
T		b. Anti-Aircraft Notes: These reports e Director of Intelligence, where they are circulated	
H I S	received by the Offices of the 1 tions. A total of thirteen (13)	c. Interpretation Reports: These are Director of Intelligence and the Director of Opera-) are received within the two offices.	
P A G	ceived in the Office of the Dire	d. Air Ministry Reports: These are re-	
E I S	This was distributed by Counter- the information. signed receipt	e. Theater Intelligence Directive No. 2: intelligence and was issued to any office needing ts for this document were not required.	
U	been possible to determine to w	ncl. 4. Material and Equipment Lists: It has not hat office this was sent.	
N C L	2 office to prevent a rescourrence	. Attached are copies of directives issued by this sof this nature.	
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A S S I F I	Incls: As above.	GEORGE C. MCDONALD, Brighdier General, U.J.A. Director of Intelligence.	
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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Director of Intelligence

> AAF Sta 586 APO 633, U.S. Army 22 March 1944

MENCRANDUM:

TO:

All Personnel, Intelligence Section, Hq. USSTAF

1. The attention of this office has been brought to the fact that numerous <u>Confidential</u> and <u>Secret</u> documents have been found in the station dump heap.

2. This can happen only if such documents are being put in non burn basket.

3. In the future such documents will be placed in burn baskets. It is the individual responsibility of each officer and enlisted man assigned to this section to be certain that confidential and secret documents which are to be destroyed are properly handled.

4. Documents placed in burn baskets are collected between 1615 and 1630 hours daily. In case any burn baskets are not emptied between these hours, the section Warrant Officer, Mr.Gracia (Extension 491) should be notified.

5. In case any further confidential or secret documents are to be disposed of after the burn baskets are emptied each day, such documents should be either locked up and placed in burn baskets the following day, or turned over to the Section Duty Officer or Charge of Quarters, who will burn them the following morning.

GEORGE C. MeDONAID Brigadier General, U.S.A. Director of Intelligence

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Director of Intelligence

AAF Sta 586 APO <u>633</u>, U.S. Army 22 March 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO:

Duty Officer, Intelligence Section, USSTAF.

1. You will be responsible to see that no <u>Confidential</u> or <u>Secret</u> documents are left in any waste paper baskets within this section after 1700 hours each day.

2. If any Confidential or Secret documents are discovered, they will be locked up for safe keeping and placed in burn baskets the following morning.

GEORGE C.McDONALD Brigadier General, U.S.A. Director of Intelligence

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Director of Intelligence

> AAF Sta 586 APO 633, U.S. Army. 22 March 1944.

MEND RANDUM:

TO :

Charge of Cuarters, Intelligence Soction, USSTAF.

1. The Charge of Quarters is responsible for checking waste paper baskets in all offices of this section before 1730 hours each day to determine if any confidential or secret doc ments are contained therein.

2. In the event any confidential or secret documents are discovered, they will be turned over to the Intelligence Section Daty Officer for safekeeping.

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GEDRGE C. McDONALD, Brigadier General, U.S.A. Director of Intelligence.

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Director of Weather Services

25 March 1944

Draft For Organization Manuel



TUDE TON ON A RAINER SERVICES

1. Responsibilities and Duties:

a. Operates the Army Air Force Weather Service in the Suropean Theater of Operations.

b. Advises the Commanding Ganeral and staff on weather

C. Provides a weather information service within Headquarters, USSTAF, for the purpose of furnishing staff weather studies and forecasts and coordinating field operational forecast procedures.

<u>d</u>. Meinteins lieison with Allied Meteorological Agencies and coordinates the activities of the AAF Weather Service with those of the other Allied Meteorological organizations in the European Theater of Operations.

e. Maintains lieison with appropriate staff agencies of USSTAF and the Supreme Allied Command for the determination of weather requirements of United States Forces in the European Theater of Operations, and maintains a current program to meet these requirements.

f. Ascertains the weather requirements for future operations involving ground and air force units respectively, and recommends a current program to meet these requirements.

g. Meinteins information on the overall program of the Army Air Force Weather Service as affecting weather requirements in the ETO.

h. Insures adequecy of existing installations and originstes any action required for improvement of techniques and procedures to meet weather requirements.

2. Organization:

2. Forecast Sub-Section:

(1) Freperes long and short range weather forecasts for the staff, and to meet such special requirements as cannot be

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adequately handled by the Weather Services of the 8th, 9th and 15th Air Forces and the European Wing, ATC.

(2) Prepares for dissemination to the field weather services such forecasts, analyses and forecast aids as are reuired to assist these units in the performance of their assigned functions.

(3) Supervises and coordinates through telephone conferences, the preparation of operational forecasts issued by weather agencies of the 8th and 9th Air Forces and coordinates by radio, forecasts issued for operations in conjunction with the 15th Air Force.

(4) Coordinates with the British Meteorological Office and British Admiralty Meteorological services daily, forecasts required for allied operations. Prepares necessary briefing and forecast charts.

b. Synoptic Reports Sub-Section:

(1) Meintains current file of world wide weather stations, including types of observations and forecasts available.

(2) Maintains broadcast schedules and contents of broadcasts.

(3) Maintains coverage charts showing types of reports available by source.

(4) Determines synoptic requirements of European Weather Dervices.

(5) Supervises and directs activities of Plotting, lipher and Teleprinter Units.

(6) Distributes and maintains distribution lists of ciphers and registered documents.

(7) Coordinates development and distributes information on use of codes.

(8) Maintains current file on communications facilities available at both weather and radio stations.

(9) Maintains liaison with signal agencies to establish radio, landline, and facsimile networks.

(10) Maintains current file on communications net-

works.

Meinteins ligison on teleprinter installation

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c. Special Studies Sub-Section:

(1) Receives and processes all requests for special meteorological and climatological information.

(2) Prepares special meteorological studies for cilitary operations.

(3) Meintains lisison with members of ell air and ground units requiring special weather studies.

(4) Maintains liaison with Air Ministry Meteorological Office sections which compile and disseminate climatological and special weather information.

(5) Arranges for necessary publication and distribution of all studies and maintains records applicable thereto.

(6) Maintains library on operational weather research, climatology, and climatic data.

(7) Mainteins day to day historical analysis of weather as it affects air and ground operations.

(8) Advises Public Relations Officer on news releases of weather strategy in planning and execution of missions.

(9) Prepares non-routine reports and articles on the subject of weather for restricted or public consumption.

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
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	Director DCG/Ops 24/3/44 Ceneral Anderson desires that you prepare a draft for
T H I	1. Director DCG/Ops 24/3/44 Ceneral Anderson desires that you pup to of intelligence
S P A G	OSCAR B. YOFKER Lt. Col., A.C. Adm. Ass't to the Deputy Commanding General For Operations
E I S	Incl. Itr cpy. subject; Visks of Students at RAF Staff College to USAAF Stations, dtd 13/3/14.
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	1/C 0P3. 832.

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23 March 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO : Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, USSTAF, APO 633, U. S. Army.

1. During my recent visit to the MTO, the question of the distribution of EOU Aiming Point Report folders was mentioned. Distribution in the Fifteenth Air Force goes as far down as the Mings.

2. What is the distribution in the Eichth Air Force and how far down in the command echelon does it extent at present?

3. I would like to have provisions made for distribution down to and including Combat Wing Headquarters.

F. I. ANDERSON Major General, U. S. A. Deputy Commanding General for Operations

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
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	HEADQUARTING UNITED STATES STRATEDIC AR FOR Office of the Director of	Operations
	OLLIGE OF SHIP PARTY	20 linreh 1944
	MERENALDUM:	p Griffise.
	TO : All Sections, A, B, C, D Buildings, Cas	
T H	1. There will be a meeting of Command, Win	ag and Group Recognition Training
I	1. There will be a meeting of Command, Win officers on Weenesday, 22 March 1944, in the Auditor	rine in the second and fourited to
S	a Interested staff and Special starr out.	icers of this post are invited
Р	attant any of these sees and	the most inc
A G	sttend any of these sessions. 3. It would be appreciated if officers de would call Enjor Bijur, ext. 492, in order that ade	quete seating accosmodations can be
E	would call sajor Bijur, ext. syn,	
I	0930 - "Recognition at Night."	Wing Commander John Cunningham RAF Ace Hight Fighter Filot.
S		a to Decempt
U	1030 - "Enemy Shipping Destroyed as a Recult of Good Ship Recognition	G/C reared Senior Intelligence Officer RAF Constel Command.
N C	From the Air."	
L	1115 - "Analysis of Current German	Wing Commander Allow Al2A, Air Ministry.
A S	Alrerat Francesson	stan commander taker Lee
S	1145 - "Order of Battle of the German Air Force."	Algs, Air Ministry.
I F		Designer, Hawker Aircraft
I	1900 - Lanch. 1400 - "Design Features of New British Fighter Aircraft."	Ltd., Makers of the Hurricane, Typhoon and Tempest.
E D	1500 - "General Discussion and New Training Films.	
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	No	USE ENTIRE WID	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT "OTTLED D"	
					Enter File Classification AG	
1	1.	Col. "illianson Asst.D.C.	A.G.	16 Peb 44.	I have in my possession letter of Administrative Instructions No. 1 for "OVELOLD", dated 14 February, cory No. 69.	
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S P A			RECEN	VED	I also have Amendment No. 2 to Joint Cutline Laintenance Project "NE TUNE", copy No. 351
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	*	Williamson Asst D/C Op:		Feb 44	for RANKIN "C" Cys 115 & 116 also Amendment No. 1 to 9th AF Flen for RANKIN "C", Cys 115 & 116.	
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11 March 1944

MEMORANDUM

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: Director of Operations Director of Intelligence Director of Weather Service

1. The number of copies of operational massages and communications required for distribution has increased to a point where, under the present system, some copies are not legible. As these communications are primarily used for reference and working information, all copies must be legible. Enfore submitting communications for dispetch, all copies should be checked for legibility and none released that are not.

2. It is recommended that six (6) copies be the maximum for one typing. If additional copies are required, a second series should be made.

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Adm. Ass't to the Deputy Commanding General for Operations.



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	ERRATIONS EVISION CORPORANCE
T H I	 D/I. D/O D/O. Ope. 11 Nar 44 It is requested that you and such other personnel of your section as may be necessary attend an Operations Division conference at 1430 hours today. In General Spants's office. Wing 15 in this building. It is desired that you cone to this meeting
S P A	Sivision, Readquarters, USSTAY.
G E I S	tier, froep bases, etc.
U N C	(2) Fromesing escapeos (3) Headquarters Kap Library
L A S S I	2. Establishment of a system for maintaining the enemy and furmishing pertiment advice to technical concors on this subject Allied propagnuon agencies (0.3.5. 0.7.1.
F I E	derive maximum benefit from propaganda leaflets during present and fushire rapidly changing situations.
D	2. Public Balations policy 2. War Boom passes 3. It is also desired that you bring to this
	secting pertinent data on any other subjects which you believe should be discussed in such a conference.
	7. L. ANDERSON Major General, U.S.A. Desuty Commender, Operations

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r H I	1;	D/C Ops.	D of I	9 Mar. 1944.	Enter File Classification AG 1. Attached herewith for signature and dispatch are copies of fourth revision, dated 5 March 1944, to Air Ministry letter S.46368/A.C.A.S.(Ops) dated 10 June 1943.
S P A G E					GEORGE C. McDONALD, Brigadier General, U.S.A.,
I					Director of Intelligence.
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3.	DC/Ops	D/Ops	8 Mar 44	 The responsibility for adequate snow plans has bee delegated to the Senior Flying Control Officer at each station and he puts the plan into effect as necessary. This was carefully covered last summer and the results seem satisfactory. During the week 27 February to 4 March, 1944, when
				there were general snows throughout the U.K., 48 RAF airfields became unserviceable and 10 only partly serviceable through delay in snow removal. During the same period only 12 U.S. airfields became unserviceable because of snow and 8 of these were IX Troop Carrier stations on which there are no operational units. Only one U.S. station was listed as partly serviceable.
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				ALFRED R. MAXWELL, Colonel, Air Corps, Director of Operations.
4.	N.			Director of operations.
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	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT Snow Renoval.	
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D/Câr fo Administ	r ^P ngineer retion	14/3/111	 Snow removal is a Com which are covered with Memorand Sighth Air Force, 3 November 19 Hendquarters, Eighth Air Force, copies attached. 	un 35-3, Headquarters 42, and Memorandun 35-3A.
provides	st of the R. fer a comor	shensive	2. The general scheme of we have cooperated with them. show removal blan and that each	Sensibly the overall sche
			Johnson Snow Plough (Heavy Duty Bunce, Snow Plough (Light Duty) Gritter (Sand Sprender) Mechanical Sweeper Shovels Snogo) 2 2 1 1 1 1 00 1 for each group of 3 to 4 stations
Alr Divi	sion indicate	d that n	 A snow removal exerci- roe on 20 December 1943. Report roper equipment was evoilable an stations from which reports were 	s received from the 2nd i that the operation was
	Horsham St. Attlebridge Reckheath Shipdham		Hardwick Bungay Vendling Seething	Hethel Mibenham Old Buckenham
		hat enam	4. With reference to the os are available at Hardwick, Shi	provision of the snogos
my recor St. Fait Air Divi	h, which are	adequate	by located to service all operati	ipton, Hethel and Horshar ional airdromes in the 2n
St. Fait Air Divi the infe Failure Commend of	h, which are sion. rence that af to utilize th and we have f	adequate equate pr is equip one all	5. I am not aware of any 5. I am not aware of any rovision of snow removal equipment ant properly is definitely the r that we can through directives ar dis responsibility.	ional airdromes in the 2n reason which would just: it had not been made. resubnsibility of the
St. Fait Air Divi the infe Failure Command of they would 1 Incl:	h, which are sion. rence that af to utilize th and we have f	adequate equate pr is equip one all	5. I am not aware of any for a snow removal equipment is of snow removal equipment is definitely the p that we can through directives ar	ional airdromes in the 2n reason which would just: it had not been made. resubnsibility of the

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E E S T.R I G T E D UELL, ULTURS STORTH ATR FORCE STORE

APO 633 3 November 1942

SALLAS W.L ... TREE ES

1. Attention is directed to attached latter from the .ir Ministry dublect; 'Snor Clearance - .irdecass 1940/43', file S 3717/D.D.C.L., ind specular "." and "9" therato. This latter indicates the general plan for enew rea val at R...F. stations, and will serve a 's give for catilled plans much at stations of the Mighth .ir Force.

 In connection with the attached latter, the following interpretations are furnished for the odd mee of fighth dir Fores personnel.

1. The end work to be furnished or ch an ith the Force sindress is no specified in ..., and not. Leftelonder in equipment will be impoletely recubitioned from:

(1) R....F. Equipment Limiton Officer at stations occupied by United States .neg .dr Larger.

(2) R....F. Equipment Officer at shored stations.

h. For new airdromes, the Carandin General, VIII air Force Service Command will submit reputations one month prior to the date the simirone is can balled for exception.

2. The British snow plouses can be actimizatorily employed with the following type U.S. vahidles:

(1) Studibaker, 2) ton truch, cargo.

(2) Fodge, 3 ton truel, cargo.

If the notestary number of webicles of these suber are a towallable, intent to react will be made to the Communing Scherel, WIII wir Force Dervice Commund, of the number on hand, and the required number for snow removal.


d. Repardin pressuph 1, pp ondix "B", it has been decided that the mir Himistry Reparint onding Angineer is to be responsible for the control, minterates and operation of 20030's.

2. Station Corrand we shald also arrange with the U.S. District Inclusors, to receive conversely assistance from contractors or

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE APC 633

> AAF Station 586 14 January 1943.

MEHORADUM

NUNDER, 85-31

SNOW REMOVAL AT AIRDRONES

1. Per. 2d Henerandum No. 85-3, 3 November 1942 is reveled and the following substituted therefore:

* * * * * * * * * * * * *

22 Reference paragraph 4, Appendix B, the Air Ministry Superintending Engineer is responsible for the control, maintenance, and operation of SNOCOS belonging to the R.A.F. Certain Eighth Air Force stations are included in the coverage initially provided by R.A.F. SNOGOS. Mones of stations thus covered are listed in Secret Letter, Eq. Eighth Air Force, File CSC, Subject: Snow Removal at Airdremes, dated 14 January 1945, to Commanding General, All Certain's and Certainding Officer, All Stations.

2. The appr priato Cormand of the Eighth Air Force is responsible for the control, maintenance, and operation of SNOGOS assigned to Eighth Air Force, and utilized to service these U.S.A.A.F. airdremes not included in the R.M.F. plan. All U.S. SNOGOS will be distributed by this headquarters without request as son as they are available in the United Mingdom.

3. Upon receipt by Cormands, SNOGOS will be assigned to a definite airdrone strategically located to permit a minimum less of time while travelling between stations. Initially, each machine will have to service approximately six (ℓ) stations.

4. Operation and maintenance of SNGGOS will be the responsibility of the Station at which the SNGGO is quartered. At least three drivers should be given instructions in the operation of this machine so that in the event of heavy snow, the SNGGO can operate continuously, and all stations can be cleared in the minimum addit of time, time, before the Board on the obtained within the Certand, immediate report will be made to this Headquarters. Operators will be warned that the SNGGO will beg down if operated on the shoulders of the runway, therefore, snow plough operators should be instructed to clear the snow only to within approximately 12 foot of the shoulder. This will give the SNGGO a hard surface to operate on and will expedite the clearance of snow banks. SNGGO operators will be instructed not to risk their machines on floaded grass airdremes. If the airdreme is considered to be too wet, the SNGGO should not clear the banks on that station.

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5. The importance of having a standard snow removal plan must be realized. A supported plan for each airdrone is cutlined in Appendix D, Par. 3 of Memorandars 85-5, Eq. Eighth Air Force, 3 November 1942. In addition, close liaison should be maintained with U.S. District Engineers and Commanders of U.S. Troop Duits. Assistance in snow removal may be obtained in confermance with Operations Memorandum No. 4, Headquarters ETCUSA, 11 December 1942, Subject: Clearing Snow from Rumways.

By cormand of Major General F MEA:

C. C. CHADNCEY, Brigadior General, U.S.A., Chief of Staff.

OFFICIAL: MYC It., II. G. OULFON, Colonel, ACD., Actg. Adj.Con.

DIST. IFUTTON: "C".

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	- Officers Cnly -	

1- . THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD SZCRE D/CG Ops D/CG Adm 2-3-44 4. Unless you desire otherwise, I do not intend to alter the present arrangements of permitting men to billet off the post on approval of their Commanding Officer, with the exception of the enther of this unjustified complaint. ont'd contentment under our peculiar circumstances. opinion the present method tends to maintain morals and Atchi: Rpt of Investigation for Administration 1 March 1944, Sta 566 Н I Ass't. 1. Note and forward direct to the Deputy Commanding D/O 4 Mar 44 3. D/C. Ope. General for Administration. 2. This office concurs in the recommendations of P General Knerr. pp is the Inspector General's report on A E CHARLES G. WILLIAMSON Colonel, G.S.C. Assistant Deputy Commander, Ops. N L A 1 F Ι E D 051-7 THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

	SECRET
	Colonel, G.S.C. Assistant Dennty Commander, One.
	CHAPLES G. WILLIAMSON
	1. Herewith is the Inspector General's report on
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	evidence clearly establishes the fact that the ining two are
	not pertinent to the occasion and represent the non on
	highly spectra method tends to main wain
	opinion the present our peculiar circumstances. contentment under our peculiar circumstances. 3. It is requested that suitable action be taken to id occurrance of these unnecessary incidents. (over)
D/CG Ops D/CG Adm 3-3-34	word the artes of desire otherwise, I do not the
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I S P					2. Office of Assistants to Dr Bowles is established in Room 1, Wing 1, A Bldg. Phone Ext. 439.	
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD File HEADQUANTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Deputy Commander for Operations 29 February 1944 14 IEMORANDUM: : All Concerned. OT SUBJECT : Distribution and Routing of Correspondence and Cables. . . . 1. Distribution of correspondence, cables, teletypes, and other documents will be made to the three following main divisions of the Deputy Commander for Operations sections as subsequently discussed: a. Deputy Commanding General for Operations, message center located infront room in Wing A-13. b. Director of Intelligence, message center located in rear room in Wing A-10. Target (formerly A-5). Operational Intelligence and "Y". Fhoto Recon and Intelligence. Secret Intelligence and Liaison. c. Director of Operations, message center located in rear room in Wing A-12. Tactical Operations. Training. Air Safety. -Crganization (as applies to Air Forces Build-up, flow and allocation of tactical units and aircraft). C.O.P.C. d. Director of Weather Services, message center, located in room 2, (night room 5) Wing A-5. Weather (personnel, equipment, codes and ciphers, procedures, forecasts etc.) Operations (8th Air Force, 9th Air Force and 15th Air Force). Organization (as applies to location and requirements of new Tactical and ATC Units). Plans (Movement and employment of 8th, 9th and 15th Air Force Units). Intelligence (enemy and allied meteorological services, practices, installations and procedures). Communications (Operational and weather.) Liaison (U.K. USSR U.S. Navy on meteorological matters).

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2. All correspondence on subjects pertaining to operations, intelligence and weether, in the sense indicated by the above listed composition of this headquarters division, and which would under prior procedure have been referred directly to the Commanding General without first passing through a General or Special Staff Section, should be routed d rectly to the Office of the Deputy Commander for Operations, (see paragraph 1 g above).

3. All other correspondence on the subjects indicated above, including routine reports, should be routed directly to appropriate staff sections and offices exactly as in the previous organization.

4. All caples to be approved by the Deputy Commanding General for Operations, will have enough "comeback" copies so that two are marked for the Deputy Commanding General for Operations. Comeback copies will be distributed to originator immediately upon dispatch. by Deputy Commanding General for Operations Message Center.

5. All cables approved for or by the Deptty Commanding General for Operations and initiated by the directorate head will, have two copies marked Deputy Commanding General for Operations, which will be delivered to the Deputy Commanding General for Operations Message Center by the originator immediately upon dispatch. This procedure must be adhered to in order that the Deputy Commanding General for Operations has complete information available at all times.

6. In the event there is a mistake in the routing or action assignment of any item, or whenever it is apparent that information copies of a particular item should go to agencies not shown on the distribution, it will be the responsibility of the particular officer discovering the evror or omnission to take necessary corrective action.

7. This communication supercedes instructions contained in letter, same subject, dated 14 January 1944.

By-order of Major General F. L. ANDERSON:

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
Charles G. WILLIAMSON Colonel, G.S.C. Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations

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
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То

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Deputy Com Adm

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I F I E D 1. Attached is a copy of a letter sent to General Doolittle by General Arnold. A like letter was sent to General Twining of the Fifteenth Air Force on the same date. General Arnold forwarded these letters to General Spaatz for his information and emphasized the necessity for putting requirements of the letters over. I have sent to General Spaatz, General Arnold's original letter and a copy of the letter which was sent to Twining, telling him that the information was passed on to the Deputy Commander for Administration.

B/FLA/PEA

2. It is suggested that any comments reference these letters and recommendations as to action to be taken by General Spaatz, be prepared for General Spaatz' consideration.

F. L. ANDERSON Major General, U.S.A. Deputy Commander, Operations 1 Incl - Cy ltr to Gen Doolittle fr Gen Arnold, 11-2-44.

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11 February 1944

Major General James H. Doolittle APC 633, c/o Postmaster New York City, N. Y.

Dear Doolittle:

A situation has arisen with respect to return to the United States of combat crew personnel which requires immediate action in all combat theaters. I am calling upon every Army Air Force theater commander to give his most careful and immediate attention to the question. I have considered the policies adopted by our Navy and by the Royal Air Force, and have studied the various possibilities in detail.

As you know, we originally based our plans on the assumption that losses in combat would not exceed 15% loss in combat crews per month. However, with the exception of heavy bombers in the United Kingdom, our losses have actually been far less than this figure. This has permitted us to increase the total number of airplanes per squadron and in some instances to increase the number of squadrons per group. We also planned to include the provision of dual crews and the maintenance of a substantial reserve of combat personnel, all of these to be provided for by means of the anticipated savings in attrition.

A serious factor which is causing a critical shortage of crews is the institution of local theater policies covering the return of combat crews to the United States after completion of an arbitrary number of missions.

When the opposition was much stronger than now it might have been all right to establish local policies such as returning combat personnel after an arbitrary time period, without regard to the adequacy of replacements, the importance of the operation, and above all, the actual capacity of the individuals in question for continued combat. However, conditions will change once the German and Japanese air forces pass their peak. The life expectancy of all of our crews will improve with the increase in strength in our Air Porces and the decrease in strength of our enemies.

If you have made any policies or understandings that combat personnel will be returned to the United States after fulfilling such arbitrary conditions as I have just described, those policies will be rescinded at once. Our combat personnel must understand that we plan to use combat crews in accord with war demands. Folicies covering relief for combat crews must be an overall Army Air Force matter, based in all war zones upon the importance of our operating and human considerations. Such relief has to be a flexible proposition, for our leaders to determine, based on the time, and place, and means available, and the condition of the individual himself, and above all on the waging and winning of this war.

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You, as an Air Force Commander, must always have the authority to relieve your combat crews on any basis you may see fit to the extent that replacements and means are available to you. But a sharp distinction must be drawn between this privately held consideration of a commander for his men and the existence of announced inflexible policies which in effect become an irretractable pledge from the commander to his men that jeopardizes his bringing his full available strength against the enemy when and where he has the vital need to do so.

SECRET

A dangerous corollary has grown up as a result of what I have just discussed. That is that the completion of one operational tour means that combat crews will not subsequently be sent back to an active theater of war. Some men are coming home with that idea, and some of the trainees and replacement crews ready to go for their first time have already picked it up. It is again beyond reason that a trained fighting man, seasoned, rested, and able, should be consigned to a permanent homeland job because he has once already been in combat. This wrong impression must be unmistakably corrected. Experienced combat personnel are a vital asset in winning this war, and they have got to be used as needs dictate.

In spite of what I have said and my insistence that arbitrary local policies be rescinded for the reasons I have given, I view the future replacement situation with optimism. We are now set up to provide your air force at the earliest possible date two replacement heavy bombardment crews with each replacement heavy bombardment airplane, although in some cases this may not be accomplished for several months. It is apparent that if we continue to concentrate in cur present drive to crush Germany, the victory will mean the release of vast resources in aircraft and combat crews for employment against Japan and will provide throughout the remainder of the war a flow of replacements wholly adequate to all needs.

I fully appreciate that I have thrown a lot at you in this letter, and I do it with the realization that this radical change in personnel policy will present difficult problems, particularly insofar as morale is concerned. It will be a challenge to and a very great test of personal leadership all the way down the line. I deeply and sincerely feel that the impression of "______missions and quit" has been spread through the Air Forces to such an extent as to make this change necessary for the good of the entire Army Air Forces. I have absolute faith also in the intelligence and good, hard, common sense of the American fighting men in understanding the necessity for the change and accepting it. I know I can count on you.

Sincerely,

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"ith my high personal regards and best wishes,

H. H. ARNOLD General, U. S. Army Commanding General, Army Air Forces

<u>COPY</u>

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	С Ани Али
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T H I S	 Director D/O 28-2-44 Birector D/O 28-2-44 Request that an officer be produred for duty in this Section with the following qualifications: executive ability, experience in Airplane and Combat Crew Allocation Planning, preferably in the grade of Major; age, preferably over thirty-five (35). Qualifi- cations should be equivalent to those of Major Harold A. Valk, Headquarters, Army Air Forces, Mashington, D.C.
P A G E I S	2. It is understood that Major Valk is releasable without replacement at the present time, and it is desired to obtain this particular officer, if possible; inesmuch as experience in Allocations Planning is available in only a few individuals, most of whom are in the Headquarters, Army Air Forces.
U N C L A	ALFRED R. MAXWELL Colonel, Air Corps Director of Operations
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I E D	A construction of the second sec
	. 1.
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD SECRET TELETYPE CONFERENCE 1. Attached hereto, for your information, is a copy of the teletype tape for a conference held by this Headquarters with Washington at 5:30 p.m. on 1. D/C. Admin. Ass't. 28 Feb 44 D/C. Ope. February 27. Н 2. Request this copy be returned to this office for file when you have finished with it. I P A CHARLES G. WILLIAMSON G Colonel, G.S.C. E Assistant Deputy Commander, Ope. I S U Ν С L A S S I F I 2004-12 E D TO AG-1100 loss SECRET 0 5 2 9

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M/MCG/TH

HEADQUARTERS AIR SERVICE COMMAIN USSTAF Office of the Surgeon

> AAF 586, APO 633 25 February 1944

MEMORANDUM TO: Deputy Commander for Operations, USSTAF, APC 633

1. In compliance with your verbal request regarding operational exhaustion of combat crews in sustained operations, the following opinion is submitted, following consultation with "Care of Flyer" Section of my office and Operational Research Section of the Eighth Air Force.

2. On the basis of a 'two to one' sustained operation, it is believed that this can be continued for sixty (60) days for a shallow penetration with fighter cover before the reduction of man power from operational exhaustion would become extensive, although in the meantime, it might mount up considerably. For deep penetration with fighter cover, the estimated period was thirty (30) days.

3. With continuous operations, it was estimated that the very maximum would be ten (10) days assuming that the missions would be mixed shallow/deep penetrations.

4. It is my firm belief that the above is possible only if the crew are advised of the necessity for the sustained operations, and are fairly accurately advised of the time of its termination. In other words, an operation of this type which is launched without any explanation or without any apparent aim or necessity can have a very bad effect on morale.

5. It is my opinion that in some respects, concentrated operations are less wearing on combat crews than prolonged operations since the overall period of strain is short.

6. Should heavy bombardment operations remain at their present level or extend beyond thirty (30) sorties, the combat crews should have their tours interrupted by a weak's leave, no more and no less, at about the center of the tour.

M.C. GROM, Brigadier General, USA, Surgeon.

Original sent to Dir of 27/2

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Weterkashing: Priorities for assembly of Aircraft.

: Coputy Commanding Comeral for Administration, Headquarters, 508767, 490 625, 0. S. Army.

1. Toquest that this monorandum be substituted for memorandum on the same subject, dated 12 February, and that the latter be removed from files and dis-

 Pequest that priorities for fighter type airplanes be so adjusted as to place P-51's and P-47's on an equal priority, with P-38's being given consideration next.

3. General priorities (encept for the A-20 type) should remain as indicated on your inter-office routing alip of 28 Geoember 1963, which listed the following:

- M. Pichter Aircraft
- h. Heavy Bonbardment Airpraft
- o. Sodian Bosto rement
- de Other.

6. Netwoost the Winth Air Force be furnished fifty-seven (57) A-200 or A-200 eirplanes as (uickly as possible without interforing with the above fighter priorities. Under the same condition, request that the flow of A-200 type airplanes be mintained thereafter.

F. L. ANDETSON Major Conerel. S. J. A. Deputy Commanding General for Operations

co: CO, Eighth Mir Force, AFO 636. CO, Binth Mir Force, AFO 696.

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	23 Pebruary 1966.	
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I S	TO) county Connanding General for	
P	yo) county Consisting General For administration, Couldr.	
A G E I S	1. In accordance with memorands on the above subject dated 3 February 1944 and as averaded 7 February, request that the 365th Fighter Group, equipped with 2-57's, be now considered an operational unit. This group, assigned to the Linth Air Force, performed its first combat mission on 22 February 1944.	
U N C L A	F. L. Skiller H. Bajer General, D. S. A., Deputy Commander for operations.	
S S I F I	ees C.G., Minth Air Porce.	
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	COME BACK TO RECEPS DEODET	
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD 1. Dir Int. "Authenticetion of Messeges" it is desired that Directors of Sections, send one copy of all Redline and personal messages, to Deputy Commander, Operations at the same time messages are sent to AG Cable. This will be in addition to the normal "Comeback" copy required by Deputy Commender, Operations Н Deputy Commander, Operations. I P A /s/ F. L. ANDERSON, /t/ F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, U.S.A., E Deputy Commander, Operations. I N A F I Ε D 0 5 3 4 THIS PAGE IS DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 13526

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
CARRIER SHEET HEADQUARTERS USSAFE Must remain with attached papers NUMBER EACH MEMO OR REPLY IN LEFT BORDER DRAW LINE UNDER EACH AND INITIAL IN RIGHT BORDER USE ENTIRE WIDTH OF PAGE FROM DATE SUBJECT AUTOMITICATION OF MELTICES Enter File Classification AG D/C Ops 15 Feb 44 1. 1. Cobles, including redio and teletype messages. may be initiated and approved within any of the directorates or by the Operations Division Duty Officer under the conditions stated herein. 2. This outhority is granted primarily for the purpose of expediting communications and particularly those not deemed of sufficient importance to the personal attention of the Commanding General or of either of his deputies. It will, therefore, be the responsibility of the perticular Director or Juty officer concerned to make the decision in thet metter, and to indicate on the face of the message form whether the message has been approved by or for the Deputy Commandar. g. When a measurge has been initiated by either the Lecuty Commander or the Ascistant Deputy Commander, but not signed or initialed by either of these officers, or when a parephrased version of any other message has been given telephonic approvel by either the Deputy Commander or the Assistant Deputy Commander, the motation "ipproved by the Deputy Commander, ope." will be placed on the face of the message form and initialed by the officer responsible for forwarding it to the AC Cable Section. b. The, in the opinion of the officer formarding the message for trensmission, it is not doemed necessary to obtain personal approval of the Deputy Commander of of the Assistant Deputy Commander, he will place the notation "Approved for the Deputy Commander, Ops." on the face of the measure form and will initial as before. g. The motations specified in "a" and "b" will be made in addition to the regular signature of the initiating officer and will be Succepted by the Adjutent demarel as sufficient authorization for the dispatch of any B-8904 (90. 3. Although it is not entioipeted that there will be any considerable difficulty in determining whether or not a perticular measure should be brought to the personal attention of the Deputy Commander or of the Assistant Deputy Countender, it is desired to impress upon all concerned the necessity for discretion in the supercise of this authority. Whereas it is not feasible to lay down rigid rules for guidance in this matter, the routine nature of many masseges is generally obvious, while the importance of other subjects is equally apparent. It can, however, bo stated as a rule that no mesonge containing either a direct or an implied order or directive will be transmitted without personal approval, telephone or otherwise, by the Deruty Commander or the Assistant Deputy Consender. A. It is desired, elso, to wern all concerned of the necessity for proper poordination with other interacted staff agencies prior to referring a message to this office for approval or to the Adjutant General for transmission. F. L. ANDERGON injor General, U.S.A. PAGE No. LIFT HERE. USE OTHER SIDE Deputy Communder, Operations.

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Lighting Alterations.

1. Hq. USSTAF

Utilities D/C Ops. 23/2/44 1. Request lighting alterations be made in the Deputy Officer, Commanding General for Operations Section, Wing 13, "A" Building.

OSCAR B. YORKER;
Lt. Colonel, A.C.,
Adm. Asst. to Deputy Commanding
 General for Operations.

0537

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22 February 1944.

MEMORANOUM:

TO : Captain Nelson, Commanding Officer, WAC Detachment.

1. It is desired that Pvt. Margaret Miller, Secretary in the Office of Deputy Commanding General for Operations, be relieved from all company assignments which would necessitate her being absent from this office during normal working hours.

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OSCAR B. YURKER, It. Colonel, A.C., Adm. Asst. to Deputy Commanding General for Operations.

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DAILY OPERATIONAL REPORT MESSAGES TO GENERAL ARNOLD

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1. D/O Ass't. 21 Feb 44 D/C, Ops.

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1. It is desired that each daily operational report message to General Arnold be prepared with greater emphasis on reasons for certain incidents

reported as well as on pertinent opinions as to significance or implication of matters covered. Only on special occasions in the past has this idea been followed, when this office took special action regarding the content of particular messages.

2. Since it is now believed that sufficient future messages, it is directed that necessary arrangements be made within your section and through coordination with the Intelligence Section to have the daily Arnold messages written along these lines and in the office of the D/C, Ops. by 10 a.m. of the days upon

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CHARLES G. WILLIAMSON Colonel, G.S.C. Assistant Deputy Commander, Operatia

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Request for Office Space.

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D/C Ops. 21/2/44 1. Request three (3) rooms in Ming 3, "A" Building, being vacated by Photo Section be assigned to Deputy Commander for Operations for use of Dr. Bowles party.

2. It is also requested that one room now vacant and across the hall from the above three be assigned to Deputy Commander for Operations for the same purpose.

> F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commander for Operations,

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	Functional Chart
T H I S	 D/Ops D/C Ops 21/2/44 A new Functional Chart is being prepared for the Deputy Commanding General for Operations. The attached statement of the functions of the Director of Operations has been prepared and is submitted for your approval or rewrite. The requirements for the statement are the overall functions of the Director of Operations Section.
P A G	2. Please return approved sheet or rewrite as soon as practicable as the Deputy Commending General for Operations desires chart published without delay.
E I S U N	OSCAN B. YORKER Lt. Col., Air Corps Administrative Asst, D/C Ops
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Functional Chart

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I F Ι E D D/Int. D/C ops 21/2/14 1. A new Functional Chart is being prepared for the Deputy Commanding General for Operations. The attached statement of the functions of the Director of Intelligence has been prepared and is submitted for your approval or rewrite. The requirements for the statement are the overall functions of the Director of Intelligence Section.

> 2. Please return approved sheet or rewrite as soon as practicable as the Deputy Commanding General for operations desires chart published without delay.

> > OSCAR B. YORKER Lt. Col., Air Corps Administrative Asst., D/C Ops

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PREPARATION OF LIST OF FIGHTER GROUPS

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1. D/O Ass't. 21 Feb 44 1. Request that you coordinate with the office D/C. Ops. of the Deputy Commander for Administration in the immediate preparation of a list of fighter groups expected to become operational within the next ten (10) days.

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
2. At the same time, you should make arrangements whereby you can anticipate and report to the Deputy Commander for idministration future changes in status of fighter groups well in advance of such changes.

3. It is also thought that some consideration should be given to the possible necessity for modifying the present definition of "operational" so as to make allowance for units whose personnel and airplanes have participated in combat more or less as temporary members of other units.


> CHARLES G. WILLIAMSON Colonel, G.S.C. Assistant Deputy Commander, Proritions

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
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
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FIGHTER TRAINING

1. D/O Ass't. 20 Feb 44 D/C. Ops. 1. Request you prepare a directive to the Eighth Air Force on the subject of fighter training must be support of ground troops. Such training must be eupport of ground troops. Such training must be groups equipment in the sircraft. 2. Since it must be recognized that a training reduction in escort capabilities, it is necessary that the syllabus include an evaluation of the necessary reduction in POINTBLANK fighter support.

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I F I E D CHARLES G. WILLIAMSON Colonel, G.S.C. Assistant Deputy Commander, Ops.



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Outgoing Messages.

AG D/C Ops Coble Section

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D/C Ops 17/2/44 1. It is desired that one (1) copy of all outgoing sables originated by Deputy Commender for Operations. Director of Operations. Director of Intelligence and Director of Weather Services be sent to Deputy Commender for Operations as soon as practicable after message has been sent.

> F. L. ANDERSON, Mejor Cenerel, U.S.A., Deputy Commander for Operations.

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY COMMANDER, OPERATIONS APO 633

16 February 1944

MEMORANDUM)

All Concerned

TO

1. Except when certified as provided in paragraph 4 below, no one will be permitted to enter the War Room unless he possesses a properly signed pass. A sample of the only authorized pass is attached hereto.

2. The pass, when filled in with the name, rank and title of the bearer, and properly signed by the Director of Intelligence, permits the individual to enter the War Room at any time during the day or night except during the daily Operations Conference. Unless the guard is absolutely certain of the identity of any individual, he will require the pass to be shown to him prior to permitting access. Guards will, however, attempt to remember certain officers, particularly general officers, who regularly go to the War Room and will avoid causing unnecessary delay when identity is certain.

3. Since there is no special pass permitting access to the War Room during Operations Conference, the guard on duty will be expected to pass officers who have the regular pass. However, unless he knows that they are authorized to attend the Conferences, he will advise any officers seeking admittancest such times that a conference is in progress. It will then be the responsibility of the officers in the War Room to see that only authorized individuals are allowed to remain during the Conference. The following named officers will, from time to time, be present for at least a part of some Conferences:

> Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, Commanding General, USSTAF Major General F. L. Anderson, Deputy Commanding General, USSTAF Brigadier General H. J. Knerr, Deputy Commanding General, USSTAF Brigadier General Edward P. Curtis, Chief of Staff Colonel Charles G. Williamson, Assistant Deputy Commander Air Commodore R. B. Jordon, Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel E. R. Cook, Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel G. McDonald, Director of Intelligence Colonel J. N. Yates, Director of Weather Services Colonel Joseph J. Nazzaro, Officer in Charge of Tactical Section Lt. Col. W. Palmer Dixon, Liaison Officer MAAF & Air Ministry Lt. Col. L. P. Weicker, Deputy Director of Intelligence Lt. Col. Julian B. Allen, Assistant to the Director of Intelligence


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	Mamo, Feb 16 44.	
	4. Persons who do not have passes may enter the War Room if	
Т	accompanied by:	
H I	a. A General Officer who has a pass;	
S	b. The Director of Intelligence;	
Р	c. The Director of Operations;	
A G	d. The Director of Weather Services;	
E	 The Assistant Deputy Commander for Operations; f. Or who are certified by one of the officers listed above, 	
I S	in paragraph 3, or as follows:	
U	Colonel F. J. Sutterlin, Lt. Col. Frank P. Bender,	
N C	Lt. Col. A. S. Tootelian, Lt. Col. William J. Wrigglesworth,	
L A	Major A. V. Guillou.	
S S	CHARLES G. WILLIAMSON CREAREDY	
I F	CHARLES G. WILLIAMSON Colonel, G.S.C.	
I E	l Incl.:	
D	Incl. 1 - War Room Pass.	
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16 February 1944

MEMORANDUM)

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) All Concerned

1. Except when certified as provided in paragraph 4 below, no one will be permitted to enter the War Nocm unless he possesses a properly signed pass. A sample of the only authorized pass is attached hereto.


2. The pass, when filled in with the name, rank and title of the bearer, and properly signed by the Director of Intelligence, permits the individual to enter the War Room at any time during the day or night except during the daily Operations Conference. Unless the guard is absolutely certain of the identity of any individual, he will require the pass to be shown to him prior to permitting access. Guards will, however, attempt to remember certain officers, particularly general officers, who regularly go to the War Room and will avoid causing unnecessary delay when identity is certain.

3. Since there is no special pass permitting access to the War Room during Operations Conference, the guard on duty will be expected to pass officers who have the regular pass. However, unless he knows that they are authorized to attend the Conferences, he will advise any officers seeking admittances such times that a conference is in progress. It will then be the responsibility of the officers in the War Room to see that only authorized individuals are allowed to remain during the Conference. The following named officers are regularly in attendance at Operations Conferences, but others will, from time to time, be present for at least a part of some Conferences:


Lieutenant General Carl Spaats, Commanding General, USSTAF Kajor General F. L. Anderson, Deputy Commanding General, USSTAF Brigadier General Edward F. Curtis, Chief of Staff Colonel Charles G. Williamson, Assistant Deputy Commander Air Commodore H. E. Jordon, Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel E. E. Cock, Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel G. C. NcDonald, Director of Intelligence Colonel J. N. Tates, Director of Weather Services Colonel Jeseph J. Kazsaro, Officer in Charge of Tactical Section Lt. Col. M. Palaer Dixon, Liaison Officer MAAF & Air Ministry Lt. Col. Julian B. Allen, Assistant to the Director of Intelligence

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	14 Pobruary 1914.
H I	
	Air Vice Marshal W.A. Coryton, C.B., F.W.D., D.T.C.
P Ă	Air Ministry, King Charles Street, Whitehall,W. 1.
G E	
I S	Dear fir Vice Marshal Coryton: In accordance with sy telephone conversation
۰. U	with you yesterday, inclosed herewith are access
N C	poluosted.
L A	.incerely,
I F	F. S. ANDER.ON, N jor General, J. A., De uty Cormander, Over tions.
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	De uty Communder, Oper tions. Incl 1 - Cy 1997 18187, 5 Feb 44 9 - Cy SEAF/S.18186, 5 Feb 44.
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SECURITY CONTROL

1.	AG A	ss't /C. Ops	14 Feb 44	Request that Capt. W. W. Eostow, AUS O.S.S. 0-2044528, be registered as having access to Secret Security documents pertaining to OVERLORD, NEPTUNE and related plans.				
					C. G. WILLIAMSON Colonel, G.S.C. Assistant Deputy Commander Operations			

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Signal Officer


D/C Ops 12/2/44 1. It is desired that you install a teletalk system in the offices of the Deputy Commanding Ceneral for Operations as shown in attached sketch.

> Six boxes that is D/C Ops, asst D/C Ops, Dir Ops, Dir WS, Dir Int and Adm Asst D/C Ops to have telephone attachment.

F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commander, Operations.

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	Report, Status of Mircraft.	
T.	1 Lt. Gen. D/C Ors -10-44 Do you wish to get the attached record Searts deily: if so, we will have it wit in your book.	
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			THIS PA	GE IS UNCLASSIFI		
T H I S	l. General Speatz	D/C Ops 4-2-	-14 l. The USS Fold	stteched copies of AFE are forwarded fo der.	Directives issued by R & insertion in your Dir	l Poctive
P A G E					F. L. ANDERSON. Najor General, U.S. Deputy Commander, G	A., persticut
I S U			*****			
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<text><text><text><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></text></text></text>		UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
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<text><text><text><text><text></text></text></text></text></text>		SUBJECT: Abbreviation of United States Strategic Air Forces In Europe
I Grand and Arman and A	Т	
P B <t< td=""><td>I</td><td>United States Strategic Air Forces In Europe will be abcreviated USSTAF instead of USSAFE.</td></t<>	I	United States Strategic Air Forces In Europe will be abcreviated USSTAF instead of USSAFE.
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Const. AE. Addition Deneral.	G	
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	UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES DUD	
	EUROPE D/O	
	452.1 3 February 1944.	
	Se l'all'Allandia al ministra dana anno 1	
Т	TO : Deputy Commanding General for Administration, USSAFE, APO 633.	
H I	4	
S	1. Request you establish appropriate priority in the equipping of Fighter units, as between the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces, to accomplish the following:	
P A	P-47's	
G E I	Maintain all operational units of the Eighth and Ninth Air Forces at the same average level, thus making distribution in proportion to the operational P-47 units in each Air Force. In calculating this ratio, the 56th and 78th Groups should be considered each as one and one-half of normal full strength Groups.	
S	<u>P-51's</u>	
U N C L A S	First; maintain the 354th Group at full strength. Second; fill, and maintain at full strength, the 357th Group. Third; fill, and maintain at full strength, the 363rd Group. After the acove has been accomplished, first priority should be given to maintaining full strength in these three (3) Groups, with all remaining F-51's to go toward re-equipping pertinent units of the Eighth Air Force.	
S I	F-381s	
F I E D	Since P-38 unit arrivals are comparatively well staggered, it is not be- lieved specific priorities will be necessary except for the units arriving in Pebruary. (The 364th, 370th and 474th Groups.) First priority should be maintenance of operational units, with all excess being diverted to new units. For the February Groups, the flow of excess airplanes should be allocated evenly to the 364th, 370th and 474th Groups, effective as of the date each unit arrives, without attempting to adjust the respective strengths within these units.	
	2. As F-51 airplanes are fed into Eighth Air Force units being converted, F-47's should be released on a plane for plane basis, concurrently with the feed-in, as specified above.	
	/t/ F. L. ANDERSON Major General, U. S. A. Deputy Commanding General for	
	cc: CG, Einhth AF CG, Ninth AF	
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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STAATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE	
AAF-586 3 February 1944. SUBJECT: Command Jurisdiction.	
TO : Commanding General, Eighth Air Force, AAF-101, AFO 634. Commanding General, VIII AFSC, AAF-586, AFO 653. Commanding Officer, Eighth SADA, AAF-506, AFO 635.	
1. Pending the final reorganization of the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe and the receipt of authority to redesignate the VIII Air Force Service Command, A.F-586, APO 633, as the Air Service Command, USSAFE, and the Eighth S.DA, AAF-506, APO 655, as the VIII Air Force Service Command, it is directed that these above-named handquarters function as they will after the complete reorganization and redesignation.	
2. The next higher echelon above the present VIII Air Force Service Command will be Headquarters, USSAFE. The Eighth SADA will function as a unit of the Eighth Air Force.	
3. Official correspondence will be routed in accordance with the in- structions contained in paragraph 2 above. The use of direct correspondence on routine technical matters not involving matters of policy between the VIII Air Force Service Command and the Eighth SADA is advocated and encouraged.	
4. Instructions of this Headquarters contrary to the above are hereby rescinded.	
By command of Lioutonant General SPAATZ: Hart Shun HIRRIS F. SCHERER, Colonel, AGD.,	
DISTRIBUTION: A Flus 25 cys CG Eighth AF, AAF-101, AFO 634 5 cys CG VIII AFSC, AAF-586, AFO 633 25 cys CO Eighth SADA, AAF-506, AFO 635.	
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
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	M.
	Operational weather.
T H I S P A G	 Director Teather 1/2/44 Attached herewith is Report on Teather as it of Section Operations Director Teather 1/2/44 Attached herewith is Report on Teather as it affected operations during the period January 16 as to 30 inclusive. Your remarks are requested on future reports of this paper and recommendations that these reports are to be furnished regularly covering the preceding helf-month's operations.
E	
I S	D.N.YATES Colonel M.C., Director of Weether Service
S U N	2 Mether 7/3 Ops 1-2-44 Noted. Please furnish these on the 1st and loth.
S U N C L A	2 mether 7/3 Ops 1-2-44 Noted. Please furnish these on the 1st and loth. /s/ F.L.A.
S U N C L	2 mether 7/3 Ops 1-2-44 Noted. Flease furnish these on the 1st and loth.
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т	1 February 1944 WEMORANDERS)
H I S	TO J Lt. General C. A. Spantz
P A G E I S U N C L A S S I F I E D	 In order to revide you sith meterial for servide our facture to General Arnois, I as having sprace in the service of January. To you sith me to continue to provide out in the service of January. To you shall be to continue to provide the set of January through 10 January - for your intermetion.
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		1 Pobruary 1944	
T H I	M MORASDUR)		
S P	TO) Director of J REPERSICE) Attached stud Balkans on Ba	ntelligence y Preset of Allied Bowling of Ivan Situation.	
A G E I S U	and establish priority fo	that au spendment be preserved Air Force advising of situation r attacks in Palkans below orist- raft fostories and Pall-bearing	
N C L	P. In addition, disasteb of attached stud	authority should be obtained for y to Saker.	
A S S I F I E D		P. L. ANDPROON, Major General, 7.8.A., Deputy Commander, Operations.	
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		1 Pebruary 1944 B/TLA/AWT	
MEMORANDER	2		
TO) Director of Opera	tions	
for submis	1. It is desired the sion to General Arm information:	at you preserve immediately old a tabulation giving the	
	a. Available num	b r of boobers in theatre.	
	b. Available num	ber of bombers discatched.	
	c. Total number (of bombers disastehed.	
	d. Tonnage of ber	nbs dromped.	
	e. Tabulation by beginning 1 Ja	days of targets stracked anuary through 21 J nuary.	
St) AT and	2. This is to be dor DAT Bomber Command.	ne "or the 15th AF, 8th AF,	
of effort	3. The final tabuint	tion will show corrections In -blank tergets.	
		this be completed by 5 c.m.	
C.			
		F.L.A. OPRICON, M-jor General, M.L.A. Denuty Commander, Ops.	
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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STATESIC AIR FORCES IN ENROPE Office of the Commanding Ceneral

1 Dele 44

CUBJECT: "Crossbow".

To : Operations Duty Officer.

1. During your tour of duty you may receive a telephone call from the Duty Air Connection, "AF Fighter Command, mentioning the word "Croasbow" other than in connection with an <u>Allied</u> attack on targets in that category.

2. Ask no questions of anyone as to what "Crossbow" is, but ascertain from the person calling whether the matter partains to enemy action.

3. In the event you receive such a call, open the attached envelope marked "Grossbow", and carry out the instructions contained therein.

4. Before opening the envelope marked "Crossbow", be sure that the call was from <u>Duty dir Cosmodore</u>, <u>RAF Fighter Command</u>, and that it is not merely a routine call regarding our operations.

By command of Lieutenant General SPAATZ:

F. L. ANDERSON Major General, U.S.A. Deputy Commander for Operations.

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BC /FLS /MM

1. Director Deputy 31-1-44 of Commanding Personnel General for Operations

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1. Request one (1) stenographer, WAC, and one (1) clerk-typist, WAC, be furnished for assignment as follows:

Deputy Commanding General for Operations - 1 stenographer-typist. Director of Operations - 1 clerk-typist.

2. It is understood that Sgt. Lolette B. Moon, stenographer, and PFC Jeruld S. Bloom, typist, may be available for these assignments.

> F. L. ANDERSON Major General, USA Deputy Commanding Gen. for Ops.

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATECIC AIR FORCES IN SUROPE

042.2

JAN 3 1 1944

TO : Commanding Ceneral, Eighth Air Force, AFO 634.

SUBJECT: Air/Sea Rescue Activity Reports.

1. In order that exact studies of the problems involved may be prepared and appropriate counter-measures instituted, it is necessary that a standardized system for reporting Air/Sea Rescue incidents be placed into effect. Information contained in these reports will be influential in the improvement of equipment, perfecting of procedures, and in bettering this phase of combat training.

2. It is desired that a report of all such incidents will reach this Head-Guarters prior to the tenth day of each month. These reports will include all incidents occurring during the preceding month. The initial report covering January 1944, should reach this Headquarters not later than 10 February 1944. This report to be in the following forms

a. For all aircraft down at sea regardless of whether search is initiated:

(1) Date and hour of incident.

(2) Type and model of aircraft involved.

Col. A.G.D., Aust Adj. Gen.

- (3) Parent organization of aircraft (Group, if known).
- (4) Name of pilot (if known).
- (5) Number of personnel involved; report of any parachutes seen; number of personnel rescued alive.
- (6) Approximate position of incidents (latitude and longitude).
- (7) How aircraft was reported and position determined (i.e., by accompanying aircraft, ship or shore personnel, M/F D/F section, M/F D/F station, VH/F D/F station, etc.).
- (8) fine first report was made and to whom.
- b. For those aircraft from whom a radio transmission was received:
 - Type of transmission (i.e., "O" priority, 5.0.S., emergency I.P.F., Mayday, dinghy radio).
 - (2) Time transmission was received and by whom.

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- c. For those aircraft for whom search was initiated:
 - Time information was received at Headquarters directing search operations.
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(2)	Time	search	-	initiated	by	aircraft;	EFFERDO L	ana	e3.he		
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- (3) Time search was initiated by marine craft; number and type used.
- (4) Report of any special rescue apparatus dropped (i.e., Spitfire Rescue Gear, Lindholme Rescue Gear, Airborne Lifeboat), whether drop was successful and any pertinent details.

3. The importance of prompt and accurate compilation of these reports is emphasized. Future plans and improvement of the Rescue organization depend, in a large measure upon them.

4. This report in no may replaces or changes the questionnaire for each successful incident as outlined in Policy No. 50-1, "Air/Sea Rescue", Headquarters United States Army Air Forces in United Kingdom, 23 December 1963.

5. This monthly report will include all aircraft reported forced down or lost over mater, whether search action was initiated or not.

By command of Lieutenant General STAATZ:

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) Same of pilot (if passed).

JAME	S B.	GORDON,
Col.		
Ass't	Adj.	Gen.

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3. It is desired that a repart of all such inside all reach this Secondary relation to the boost day of such most. These reports all incluse all notes of instants during the preseduct north. The install reports all incluse all notes.

1. In order that sume studies of the robbus involved may to repaired and spiragrate sounder-resonance insidence, it is measury that a properties of reparting dir/for Second invidence in placed into effect, information exaction in these reputes will be influented in the legend when a feature is contained in these reputes will be influented in the legend of equipment, performent of propedures, and to betarring this place of equipment of equipment, performing of


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HEADQUARTENS HEADQUARTENS EUROPEAN STELLTS, OF OFERATIONS UNITED STATES ANAY

AG 000.73 OPG GB

29 Jan 1944

SUBJUT: Responsibility for Violation of Military Consorchip Regulations.

TO : Major Converte, ETCUMA.

TD Letter, 20 Jan 1944, file AC 000.73 (13 Jan 1944) 08-2-3, subject as above, is cuoted for information, midance and compliance:

"1. The reasonability for cheavance of additary conserving requiries ions is that of each individual obser communications are governed thereby. Submission of such communications to a cilitary conser does not lessen that responsibility.

"2. It is the responsibility of each silitary concor, whether in a unit or in a base concording detached, to incure that each communication passed by his contains we violations of silitary consorching regulations. If a comnumeration containing such violations as passed without orclasion of all consorable material, the military concor relating the communication and the sector thereof will both be concluded responsible for those violations.

"3. Furagraph 10d, Var Department Training Circular 15, 1923, entitled Military Concording: and paragraph 40, Mar Department Training Circular 66, 1943, entitl 4 Unit Geneorship, are hereby accorded to read as follows:

"The sender of a communication will be held ultimately responsible for any violation of military consorship regulations contained therein. A "unit or base consor who passes a communication containing any violation of military concership regulations ill be bald scually reported by ith the sonder thereof for that violation". "

By constand of General Electronice:

R.F. F. esk

ALCPAID P. FICK, 14 Col, A C D, Arsistert Adjutent Conoral.

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	HEADQUARTERS
	UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Deputy Commender, Operations APO 633, U. S. Army
	22 January 1944
T	MEMORANDUM)
HI	TO) Colonel Cook, Deputy Chief of Staff
S P A C	1. General Arnold is extremely anxious to ex- pedite the production of the training film "Target for Today". In your absence, I approved a request for motor transportation to help this situation.
E I S	2. Request that the attached trip ticket be signed.
U N C L A S S	F. L. ANDERSON Major General, U.S.A. Deputy Commander, Operations
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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

SUBJECT: Submission of Reports.

TO

: Commanding Ceneral, Fifteenth Air Force. (Through Commanding General, MAAF.)

1. Reference letter this Headquarters, subject as above, dated 11 January 1944, it is desired that the following change be initiated. Change paragraph 1 c. as follows:

"Proposed strategic operations for the ensuing twentyfour hour period will not be reported except when these operations are to be directed against POINT BLAK targets. Until such time as a courier arrives from this Headquarters with code designations of targets, all proposed strategic operations against POINT BLAKK targets will be reported in general terms."

2. The submission of all other reports as required by subject letter referred to in paragraph 1 above, will be continued as in the past.

3. With reference to my Red Line message number 2236, dated 13 January 1944, the requirements for reports as specified in puragraph a. of that message, may be disregarded for all operations except those directed against POINT BLANK targets. In the event of a POINT BLANK operation, all information required by paragraph a. of above message will be forwarded to this Headquarters with the following exceptions:

aircraft dispatched, will be discontinued for all operations.

b. The requirements for information concerning POINT BLANK target or pargets will be fulfilled as set forth in paragraph 1. above.

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P. L. AMDERSON, Major General, W.S.A., Deputy Commander, Operations.

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Hand Mr. 1973

Office of the Committing General

ED STATUS AND AIR FORD S IN

In reply refor to: 471

suparty es aper

AAF Station 526 ALO 633, U.S.Aray 20 January 1944

SUBJECT: Allowances of Cherical Ant re Service Training Supplies and Actualition.

To: Cormandian Officers, all Units, USAAF IN UK.

. . .

1. The following basis of CWS training supplies and argumition has been approved by the Cormanding General, MTCUSA, for USAAF IN UK Stations. The quantities listed are based on experience in conducting station gas defense exorcises, and modified in accordance with availability of supplies.

2. Requisitions will be submitted through normal channels except as noted. Itens <u>not</u> listed are <u>not</u> available for training purposes, and will <u>not</u> be requisitioned. Bases will be amended if additional supplies become valiable and are needed.

3. All requisitions should be marked "For Training Furposes", quoting this letter as authority. There additional quantities in excess of these allowances are needed, a request will be submitted to this headquarters, setting forth the reason for the need.

4. All publications issued of this or suborlinate Headquarters which are in conflict with the provisions of this latter are a scinded.

5. Allowances.

	Itin	Unit	<u>Desis</u>
	Adomt, decontaminating, 10 ("Noncorresive")	5-71 container	2 per and Station per 3 menths
b.	Blacking atorial (Brade B (Chioride of Line)) lound	1000 per nAF Station per 3 months
			1000 additional per jowar- driven accontanisting
с.	Brush, docont in ting, 11	Interi	apparatus per 3 months 2 per mas station per 3 months
			2 dditional per power- driven decontaminating
d.	Cuj sula, CN	linch	4peratus per 3 aonths 1 per 10 individuals per 3 aonths
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	Iten	Unit	<u>3.sis</u>
٥.	Chlorins (Note 1)		
f.		(Note 2)	
g.	Eyeshields, Ml	Each	l per individual per 3 nonths
h.	Generator, lacrymatory, British	Each	25 per ANF Station per 3 nonths
i.	Generator, smoke, British, No. 18	Each	30 per Aar Station per 3 conths
j.	Gronade, hand, irritant (CH4DH), H6	Each	4 per AnF Station per 3 months
k.	Gronade, incendiary, AN-M14	Each	10 per AFF Station per 3 months
1.	Impregnite, shoe, ML	a-pound	50 per A.F Station per 3 menths
m.,	Kit, rophir, gis mask, company, H2 (Note 2)		
n.	Mine, 19nd, chemical,ona- gallon, must and-filled, wit burster and datomator (Note		
0.	Cintaent, protective	Tube	50 per ANF Station per 3 months
p.	Faint, liquid vesicant dutector, M5 (Note 2)		
d •	Paper, liquid vesicant detector, N6	Bock	10 per AAF Station per 3 months
r.	Sack, gas-resistant, MI	Each	50 per A. F Station per 3 months
3.	Set, drawings, uncolored, C S material	Each	1 per AsF Station
t.	Set, gas identification, detonation, M1, with detona	Eich tors	<pre>l per AAP Station per 3 nonths (Empty container to be returned immediately.)</pre>
u.	Sleeve, gas detector	Each	50 per AAF Station per 3 months
v.	Solution, tour gas, CICB	Gallon	15 per mar Station per 3 months
14.	Vial, austard, for skin test	Each	<pre>l per A.F Station (to be refilled locally)</pre>
х.	War Gases (smelling set), British	S.t	<pre>1 per A.P Station per 3 rooths (Bupty container to be returned.)</pre>
			12 additional per Cornand Chemical Officer (To be

<u>Mote (1)</u> - Basis of issue of chlorine is 2-pount per 100 individuals per three nonths. 70-pound cylinders only be available, and must be returned empty to the source of supply within a few weeks after initial receipt. It is therefore desired that his forces coordinate requisitioning to allow the use of one cylinder by two or more stations, and to expedite return of the empty cylinders. Chlorine will be available only it whF-517 and AAF-541, and requisitions will be forwarded to these advance

refilled only is needed.


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	Cherical Firks by Cherical Officers of the next echelon of cormand over Stations. (Por example, benderanant Divisions or Fighter Wings.) <u>Note (2)</u> - No training allowances, as such, are authorized for these items, inas- much as the quantities regularly used for the operations indicated are	
	adequate. <u>Note (3)</u> - H-filled land mines are available on the basis of ten per AAF Station per three months. Mines may be requisitioned direct from stations to AAF-517 or AAF-5A1. One week should be allowed for delivery.	
T H I S	By occannel of Idouton at Ceneral SPARTS, Hubbins F. Souther, Colonel, A.D.	
P A G E	acjutant General.	
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2. Under no circumstances will unclaimed or unidentified baggage be shipped to Deput G-30 without instructions from OCOT.

3. Upon receipt of detailed list, OCOT will advise disposition.

By cormand of Lieutenant General SPA TZ:

Stander J. B. GONDON, Colonel, AGD, Asst Adj Gon.

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Deputy Commander for Operations APO 633, U. S. Armay

18 January 1944

SUDOLULADUS:

TO : All Concerned

SUBJECT : Duty Officer, Operations Division, Headquarters, USSAFE.

1. Effective immediately there will be established within the Operations Division, Headquarters, USSAFS, a Duty Office for the purpose of coordinating and expediting matters pertaining to functions of this Division which arise between 1700 hours and 0900 hours, and which must be handled immediately.

2. The Operations Division Duty Office will be supervised between those hours by two (2) officers, one designated by the Director of Operations and the other by the Director of Intelligence. The ranking officer of the two on duty at any one time will automatically be in charge and will be responsible directly to the Deputy Commander for Operations for the proper functioning of the Duty Office. For purposes of identification, the senior of ficer will be designated as the Operations Division Duty Officer while the junior will be the Operations Division Assistant Duty Officer. They will, however, be appointed by their respective section meads as Operations Duty Officer and Intelligence Duty Officer.

3. The normal place of duty of both duty officers will be in space matually satisfactory to and specified by the Directors of Operations and Intelligence, and will be in the vicinity of the War Room (exact location and telephone number will be specified hater). It is mandatory that except in emergencies at least one of the two officers be at that normal place of duty at all times, and that neither one shoent himself from that office without leaving with the other officer detailed information as to now long he will be gone and how he can be located immediately. In any event, except in emergencies neither officer will leave the physical limits of this Headquarters or otherwise remain out of reach for periods of more than a very few minutes at a time.

 Only the most thorough, conscientious, and energetic performance of duty will be acceptable.

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5. The two daty officers will begin their tour of daty at 1650 hours by reporting to the Chief of the Tactical Sur-rection of the Container Section to familiarize themselves prior to 1700 hours with matters which must be handled through their period of day. They will terminate their tour of duty at 0900 hours by reporting to the Chief of the Same sub-section to pass on to the matters which they have handled and which are still in process.

5. specific instructions to the Duty Officers are as follows:

e. Receive all communications coming in during the tour of duty.

2. Determine whether deformant of action until following day will be detribented to the interests of the Service.

<u>c</u>. If such deferment is considered detrimental, or if in doubt as to the consequence of deferment, refer the matter in appropriate sequence to one or more of the following: Director of Intelligence, Director of Ups, Executive to the separty Commander Ups, The separty Commander Ups.

g. Inform the Executive to the Deputy Commander Opp of any matter which you consider of aufficient injections to warrant indexists attention of that officer, or of the Deputy Commander Ops.

g. Goordinate with D/C again pary Officer and the Hy Senior Dary officer as necessary.

i. Tou will keep a journal of your tour, containing items other than routling and upon being relieves all summit the journal to the productive to the deputy commanier Ops. This journal should record in chronological onear a summary of the official events occurring during the tour shielt are not routing.

g. A complete written report of any important and unitual occurrences marin, your bour will be submitted to the Executive to the Deputy Commander Ops at the end of the tour.

A. Your responsibility with regard to the receipt of mail, telegrade, parcels, etc., will include proper notation in the journal. This motition will include description emoting quantification of addresses, thus of receipt, action taken, and official disposition. In the case of resistored and insured mail, article number given it by the Registery Office will be noted.

1. Changes in your tour as Ops Daty Officer may be made by mutual agreement between you and the officers concurned, provided that the Office of the Executive to the Deputy Commander Ops is notified in advance. Such changes will not affect the standing on the roster.

1. Tou are personally responsions for security of contents of messages received during your tour.

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g. Upon completion of your tour the folder containing general and special instructions will be returned intact to the Chief of the factical Sub-Section, Ops Section.

1. Nothing in these instructions will be interpreted as requiring you physically to transact business belonging to the Deputy Commander Ope except as your specific duties stipulate. You are the guardian of tusiness during the period of your duty, and you are the agency which notifies the director of intelligence, Director of Cos, Executive to the Deputy Commander Ope, or the Deputy Commander Ope of unusual and urgent matters that may arise during that period. If unable immediately to locate use of these officers, you will take such other modified to whom you will report any action you have taken. In no event will you allow any urgent matter to be delayed if it is at all possible to do anything.

7. Any officer in the staff of the Deputy Commander Ops, Director of Intelligence, or the director of Ops, she has anosladge of or expects any questions to arise during the tour of the B/C Ops duty officer, will notify the union of the factical cus-bestion, operations Section, of such expected matters, and will have instructions as to the disposition or completion of the perticular ester. That officer all provide this information for the Ops duty officers at the time of their going on auty.

For the Deputy Conserver for Operations:

Colonal, C., Lascative, 2/0, Opns.

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FONCES IN EUROPE Office of the Deputy Commander for Operations APO 633, U. S. Army

18 January 1944

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j. The normal place of duty of both duty officers will be in space mutually satisfactory to and specified by the Directors of Operations and Intelligence, and will be in the vicinity of the Mar Room (exact location and telephone number will be specified hater). It is mandatory that except in emergencies at least one of the two officers be at that normal place of duty at all times, and that neither one absent himself from that office without leaving with the other officer detailed information as to now long he will be gone and how he can be located immediately. In any event, except in emergencies neither officer will leave the physical limits of this Headquarters or otherwise remain out of reach for periods of more than a very few minutes at a time.

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5. The two duty officers will begin their tour of duty at 1630 hours by reporting to the Chief of the Tactical Sub-section of the Operations section to familiarize themselves prior to 1500 hours with matters which must be handled through their period of duty. They will terminate their tour of duty at 0900 hours by reporting to the Chief of the same sub-section to pass on to him matters which they have handled and which are still in process.

6. Specific instructions to the Duty Officers are as follows:

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g. Inform the Executive to the Deputy Commander Ops of any matter which you consider of sufficient importance to warrant immediate attention of that officer, or of the Deputy Commanier Ops.

g. Coordinate with D/C Adain Dary Officer and the Hq Senler Dary Officer as necessary.

I. You will keep a journal of your bour, containing items other than routing, and upon being relieved will submit the journal to the Executive to the Deputy Commanier Ops. This journal should record in chronological order a summary of the official events occurring during the tour which are not routine.

g. A complete written report of any important and unusual occurrences during your tour will be submitted to the Executive to the Deputy Commander Ops at the end of the tour.

h. Your responsibility with regard to the receipt of mail, telegrams, parcels, etc., will include proper notation in the journal. This notation will include description enabling identification of addressee, time of receipt, action taken, and official disposition. In the case of registered and insured mail, article number given it by the Registery Office will be noted.

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For the Deputy Commander for operations:

Charles G, Williamson, Colonal, G.S.C., Executive, D/C, Opns.

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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Deputy Commander for Operations APO 633, U. S. Armay

18 January 1944

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For the Deputy Commander for Operations:

CHARLES G. WILLIAMSON, Colonel, G.S.C., Executive, D/C, Opns.


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No	70	FROM	DATE	SUBJECT Supervision and Goordination of GRS (Operational Research Sections). Enter File Classification AG
	Difector of Operations	10	17-1-44 100	1. The supervision and coordination of On5 (Operational nessarch Sections) in the Sighth and Minth Air Forces deals with U.S. Army Air Forces operations, equipment and tactics. For this reason it is believed that this work should be coordinated and administered by the Director of Operations and not by the Director of Intelligence.
				2. Will this be agreeable to you?
				/s/ LOTELL P. WEICKER GRORGE C. McDONALD, Colonel, AC, Director of Intelligence.
- 1	D/C Cis.	Director		
		Operations		both the sighth and Minth Air Forces, with a further sec- tion at the VIII Fighter Command. It is believed that the air Force Commanders concerned should utilize these sec- tions as they see fit and that this Headquarters should
	reta NHTAR	is child the state of the	lians ang ct OKS cr	not enter the picture at all, except in matters of an- ployed. These matters should not be referred to this Fesh- manner, but should come through command channels. Further, otters is a normal function of the administrative staff.
100	c. Cooriin considered	ation of u necessary.	ne activi Any att	thes of the various on Sections by this Headquarters, is hiles which require coordination between Air Forces would two Commanders without any prompting from this Headquarters
agre Litte	). Froposa ed that the ligence da	l in note studies m ta, it is n	l above, sde by Of not conce	is not entirely agreeable to this office. While it is Sutilize much operational data and little, if any, and that the resulting conclusions are of particular his Heauquarters.
				s headquarters remain out of the ORS picture altogether.
				/s/ JAMES H. MALLACE JAMES H. MALLACE Colonel, G.S.C. Director of Operations.
				CONFIDENTIAL

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	3. D/C for Ops	Director of Ops	17/1/44	1. In accorda note 2 precedi	nce with the instructions contained in Mg, recommended rosters are furnished as
		and Director		below:	
		of Int.			
	a.	Senior Du	ty Office	r.	
		Director	of Operat	ions	Director of Intelligence
		Col. H. A.			Lt. Col. Alfred . Lawson
		*Lt.Col	J. arigg F.F. Bend	lesworth er	Lt. Col. dichard ⁰ . Surbeck Lt. Col. Ara. S. Tootelian
		Lt. Co Lt. Col. (			Lajor Caleb Coffin
		Laj	Ottinger	~*	-ajor Daniel T. Serko
		Hajor E.V.			
	Deputy command	ler for auni	nistrati	on far exceeds t	fficers under the jurisdiction of the he number under the Deputy Commander for
	peractions, a	na iurther.	that most	t of the above o	fficers, particularly from the office of or more times a month as Deputy Commander
	Operations Du	Ly Ullicer.	1t 15 th	herefore recomme	nded that, of the above only ton (10)
	an asterisk.	1010 101 018C	Selitor	Ducy Officer ros	tor. Desired deletions are designated by
	b.	Deputy Comm	ander Ope	erations Duty Of	ficers:
		Director of	Operatio	ons	Director of Intelligence
		Lajor A.V.	Guillou		Lt. J. Molan
		Lt.Col. F.P	. Bender		Lt. J.A. D'urbal
		Lt.Cold Major E.V.		esworth	Lt. H.B. LOW Lt. G.A. Compton
		Major	Ottinger		Lt. F.C. Bodtke
		Capt. A.M. Capt. C.L.			LtB. Campbell CaptH. Thompson
		Capt. H. 41			Capt. J.A. Simone
		Lt.Col. 0.B			Capt. C.J. Heed
		Capt. T.A.D Lt. T.J. Jo			Capt. W.H. Fellowes Cap., R.H. Growe
		Lt. F.H. Hi	lpatrick		Capt. L. Denson
		Lt. E.D. in LtE. ii		-	Capt. J. 4. Thornton Lajor 4.4. Haines
		Lt. A.W. Qa			Lt.Col. J.B. Allen
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ros	A 1 sters becaus	imited numb e of the ex	er of as acting r	igned senior officers are excluded from the above equirements of their normal duty assignments.
				2. Attached is the recommended letter of instructions to the Duty Officer for the D/C for Operations Section.
		C. McDonald McDONALD , Air Corps r of Intell		/s/ James 4. Mallace /t/ JAMAS H. MallaCo Colonel, air Corps Director of Operations
		or furer	-00m00	precise of perations
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UNITED STATES STATES AIR FORCES IN ELP-TE Office of the Consending Goreral

17 January 1944

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TO : See Distribution.

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1. Jublications of this headquarters will normally be distributed as follows:

DIST IDUPTOR A. Staff sections Hq. UFSAFE

Distribution 5. Distribution A plus higher Hq, Commanding Control Sachth Air Force, Cornecting Control Vill AFSC (will pronumbly be receiptions as ASC, SCARS), Controling Sectral, Fifteenth fir Force and Community Sectral, Ninth Air Force.

DISTRIBUTION C. Distribution a plus major sub relimate corrants of the Highth Air Force and the VIII AFCC (ASC, USBAFL).

DISTRIBUTION D. Distribution C plus all station commanders of the Elekth Air Force and VIUL AUSC, (ASC, USAARD).

PLETRIBUTION E. Distribution D plus all units and detechnents of the Fighth Air Force and VICE 4000 (ASC, USAAF).

2. Sopies of publications included in Distribution P. C. D. and E which are intended for rajor subordinate communds, station commanders, and unit and detachment communiers under the control of the Eachth Air Porce and the VIII AFSC (ASC, USAFFS) will be furnished in back to summarize the adapters which will be responsible for the reflectivibution to telestimate commands, station commanders, and will and detachment of resulting to end and the VIII AFSC (ASC, USAFFS) will AFSC (ASC, USAFFS) will be responsible for the reflectivibution to telestimate commands, station commanders, and will and detachment of resultance. The head marters of the Dighth Air Force and the VIII AFSC (ASC, USAFFS) will keep this head-quarters alvieed as to the mether of explose required by them to rake distribution in accordance with peragraph 1 above.

3. The number of copies for each installation is given below:

		<u>Å</u> .	<u>B</u> .	<u>C</u> .	<u>D</u> .	<u>E</u> .
1.	I.G					5
2.	ARAF		5			
3.	HQ. ETCURA				5	5
	HQ. 3(S		5	5		
5.	AIR HINISTRY		1	1	1	1
6.	ALLIED FURCES			2	2	2
7.	ENATC		1	1	1	1
8.	HQ. COSSAC .			2		2
9.	HQ. USEAPE, Each Staff Soc	1	1	1	1	1

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


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11.	FQ. STU AIR POLCE		75	75	75	75
12.	HQ. 9TH AIR FORCE		30	30	30	30
13.	EQ. 15TH AIP FACE		30	SO	30	30
14.	VIII AFSC (ASC, UCBAPE)	5	5	5	5	5
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By contratal of Lieubenart General SPARTZ:



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	HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Deputy Commander, Operations
T	16 January 1944 MEMORANDUM)
H I S P A C E I S	TO ) A-3 It is desired that you prepare a latter as of the fifteenth and last days of each month covering the operations and such other interesting details pertaining to the activities of the Strategic Air forces in Europe as may interest General Arnold. This letter is to be written in an informal tone, from Spasts to Arnold. The letter should be ready for my review on the sixteenth and first days of each month.
U N C L A	F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commander, Operations.
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E D	Red .
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HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE Office of the Deputy Commander, Operations APO 632, U. S. Army

15 January 1944.

#### MENORANDUM)

TO

Colonel Charles G. Williamson, Executive.

Desire complete capers to turn over to General Giles, to take back to Washington, from this Headquarters. These papers to include:

1. Complete policy directives, Fighth and Fifteenth, with Target Appendices attached.

2. An Organizational Chart of this Headquirters.

3. The answers to the questions in General Eubank's letter.

4. The two requirements issued to General Doolittle; that is, a plan for using the forces fanned out all over the Continent, and the plan for the use of the glide bomb.

This should be ready to hand to General Giles tomorrow afternoon. I wish you would organize this; get it set up so that it can be given to me tomorrow noon.

Anything else which you feel would be desirable to give to General Giles should be included therein.

> F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commander, Operations.

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	UNITED STATES STRATEGIC ALL FORCES IN RUROPE Office of the Deputy Commenter for Operations
	14 January 1944
T	MENICHANIZUM:
H 1	TO : All Concerned.
S	SUBJECT : Distribution and Routing of Correspondence and Cables.
P A	
G E	1. Distribution of correspondence, cables, teletypes, and other documents will be made to the three following main divisions of the Deputy Commander for Operations sections as subsequently discussed:
1	6. Deputy Commander for Operations, message center located in rear
S	rang in wing A=12.
U N	<ol> <li>Director of Intelligence, message center located in resr room in wing A-10.</li> </ol>
C	Target (formerly A-5). Operational Intelligence and "Y".
L A	Photo Recon and Intelligence. Secret Intelligence and Lisison.
S	e. Director of Operations, measage center located in rear room in
S I	
F	Tectical Operations.
E	Air Safety. Organization (as applies to Air Forces Build-up, flow and allocation
D	of Tactical Units).
	C.O.P.C.
	2. All correspondence on subjects pertaining to operations and intelligence, in the sense indicated by the above lated composition of this neadquarters division, and which would under prior procedure have been re- neadquarters division, and which would under prior procedure have been re-
	headquarters division, and which would under prior processing through a ferred directly to the Commanding General without first passing through a General or Special Staff Section, should be routed directly to the Office of the Deputy Commander for Operations; (see paragraph 1 g above).
	tests testested above including
	3. All other correspondence on the subjects indicated decisions and routine reports should be routed directly to appropriate staff sections and offices exactly as in the previous organization.
	-1-

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Heat to All Concerned, dtd 1b Jan 1944, subj: Distribution and Routing of Correspondence and Cables, Cont'd.

4. Routing out of the various sections and sub-sections of this headquarters division will be similar to the in-routing, and therefore will require pick-up service such as for the former organisation.

5. In the event there is a mistake in the routing or action seeignment of any item, or whenever it is apparent that information copies of a particular item should go to agencies not shown on the distribution, it will be the responsibility of the particular officer discovering the error or ommission to take necessary corrective action.

By command of Major General F. L. ANDERSON:

CHARLES G WILLIAMSON, Celonel, G.S.C., Executive, D/C, Opns.

Cepies sent to AG-Disg Int-Vage. Martin Larget (A.S

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HEADQUARTERS. UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES in EUROPE Office of Director of Operations

13 January 1944

MEMO ANDUM:

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70 : Deputy Commander for Operations.

1. In compliance with your memorandum of 13 January, the following list of RAF and Royal Navy personnel, now on duty with this Section, is submitted.

> W/C N. T. Tangye (Transfer of Airfields from RAF to U.S.) W/C N. N. Fleming (Mavigation) Commander I. T. Clarke (Royal Navy) Flight Lt. E. Evans (RAF Liaison, Neather)

Of the above, it is requested that only W/C Flowing and Flight Lt. Evans be retained.

2. W/C Fleming is now, officially, the Navigation Liaison Officer from Air Ministry. He is currently assigned to Air Ministry Unit. It is our desire that, in the future, he perform Liaison with RAF Somber Command, thereby keeping us informed of EAF bomb activities and maintain a current line of contact with the RAF at Southdown. This function to be in addition to Navigation Liaison. A memorandum to Air Commodore Jordan is now being prepared, in order to accomplish the assignment of this additional duty to # / Fleming.


3. Flight Lt. Evans functions under the Weather Officer. He is a trained meteorologist. The Moather Officer desires to keen him. His duties include coordination of Meteorological, Communications, and Personnel problems between the British and American Weather Services.

Iniquel delivered personally to C/S, non 13 gan. Ho other lieson officers in Ops Div.

Approved by D/c apa

JAMES H. WALLACE Colonel, G.S.C. Director of Operations





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ERADQUARTERS UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE FLA/g Office of the Deputy Commander for Operations AFO 633. U. S. Army

11 January 1944.

#### MEHORAHDUM

20: 4-3

1. It is desired that Field Orders be laid out on the map in my office, to be complete by 0830 hours each morning. Layout should include the following:

- a. Route.
- b. Time of departure.
- c. Time over English coast.
- d. Time over enemy coast.
- e. Time over target.

f. Designation of target and brief memorandum as to the importance of the target. For example:- "Marienburg, _____per cent of aircraft production."

2. It is contemplated that at a later date some information will be available as to the planned operations of the Fifteenth Air Force. When such information becomes available it is desired that it also be laid out on the map in my office.

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
F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, U. S. Army, Deputy Commander for Operations.

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I       FO       ) All Concerned         S       SUBJECT;       Official Signatures         P       A       The official signatures of officers in the immediate office of the Deputy Commander for Operations are as follows:         E       F. L. ANDERSON,         I       Major General, U.S.A.,         Deputy Commander, Operatione.       JAMES S. FITTENGER,         Colonel, G.S.C.,       Deputy Commander, Operatione.         V       ChafLES G. WILLIANSON,         Colonel, G.S.C.,       Aide de Comp.         C       For the Deputy Commander for Operations:         A       S         I       Colonel, C.S.C.,         D       For the Deputy Commander for Operations:         A       S         I       Contains G. WILLIANSON,         CLARLES G. WILLIANSON,       CLARLES G. WILLIANSON,         CLARLES G. WILLIANSON,       CLARLES G. WILLIANSON,	
I       FO       ) All Concerned         S       SUBJECT:       Official Signatures         P       A       The official Signatures of officers in the immediate office of the Deputy Commander for Operations are as follows:         E       F. L. ANDERSON, Major General, U.S.A., Deputy Commander, Operatione.         I       Charles G. WILLIANSON, Colonel, G.S.C., Executive, D/C, Ope.         V       Charles G. WILLIANSON, Executive, D/C, Ope.         I       For the Deputy Commander for Operations:         A       S         I       Source for the Deputy Commander for Operations:	
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
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		Assignment of Personnel.
1.	A-1 D/C Ops 12/1/44 Hq USAAFE AG	1. The following is a list of Enlisted personnel to be assigned to the Office of the Deputy Commander for Operations, Hq USAAFE: T/Sgt. Edward G. Feldman, 13029610 Cpl. Catherine E. Bartlett, A-602005 WAC Cpl. Faul Graham, 32632494 Cpl. Sidney Feldman, 1406221A Pfc. Morris Harth, 12190989 Pvt. Margaret C. Miller, A-205027 WAC Det. Margaret C. Miller, A-205027 WAC Det. Margaret C. Miller, A-205027 WAC
		Pvt. Margaret C. Miller, 35253686 Pvt. Chester R. Meyers, 35253686
		HEMRY LIPP, Captain, Air Corps.
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THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIFD A FIN: Asciave Noxwell ALS, Planning and Organization for Large Scale Raids on Chief of the Air Staff 30 Mab Bid P 10 AC/AS, Plans HWB/j#/ewm 172700 Т Н 1. Gen Ciles requested copy of all data furnished the Soviets. Ι S 2. It is requested that data be returned to AC/AS, Plans. Р А G E Colonel, G.S.C. Incls: 1 - Cable 6466, dtd 6 Jan 44 2 - Ltr dtd 12 Jan to CG/AAF w/1 incl - Rpt 12 Dec 43 w/ennexs A,B,C and D. Acting Chief, Opr Flans Div U N L A S DECLASSIFIED S EO 11652 I F Ι E D 4 0610

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From: MA London To: AGWAR

io: 6486, 6th Jan 1944

Book message to Denne action and AGWAR information from Eaker and Sphatz signed Devers.

Being forwarded immediately via military pouch is complete information roured 1 December 29 NFT regarding strategic bombing plans as abbreviated data pequested too voluminous to send by wire.

No Sig

3.

COPY No.

See CM-IN-18799 (30 Dec 43) OPD.

ACTION: OPD INFORMATION: G-2

CG AAF

CM-IN-4030 (7 Jan 44) 0508Z eng

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г	HEAMARTERS ARMY AIR FORCES SEGRE	
ORIGINATING OFFICE	(External)	1/17/44
AFMMD-2A	AC/AS Plans	
	IDENTIFICATION	
Ltr 1/12/44 "Planning	and Organization for Large Scale Raids	on Bezlin". w/incl rpt
Wannexes & Chru D.		
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PLEASE SIGN AND RETURN I	Commanding General, Army Air NNEDIATELY 10: Attention:	Forces, Washington 25, D. C.
RECEIVING HEACOUARTERS		DATE RECEIVED
TYPED NAME	SIGNATUPE	
	R ORGANIZATION	
ARR, SERVICE O	E UNGARIZETTUR	
FILE DATE	COUPIER *0. PE	GISTERED NO.

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#### INSTRUCTIONS

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The originating office will prepare this form in duplicate whenever a receipt is necessary for a document transmitted to an office outside of this headquarters. The original and copy will accompany the document to the Central Mail Section where the appropriate number (courier or registered) will be inserted on both copies. The Central Mail Section will inclose the original with the document sent forward to the addressee, returning the copy to the originating office to indicate the dispatch number. Upon return of the original through the Central Mail Section to the originating office, the copy will be destroyed.

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SECRE ............................. :  $\underline{S} \underline{E} \underline{C} \underline{R} \underline{E} \underline{T}$ :Auth CG, USSAFE. :Date 12 Jan 44. UNITED STATES STRATEGIC AIR FORCES : Initials Z-fm IN SURCES ........................

381 X823

JAN 12 1944

SUBJECT: Flanning and Organization for large Scale Raids on Berlin.

: Commanding General, United States Army Air Forces. Mashington, D. C.

1. In accordance with the recent Soviet request, the inclosed papers have been prepared and submitted by pouch to the United States Military Attache for Air, American Embassy, Moscow.

2. It was planned to send Colonel S. M. Poster to present this report before the proper authorities, but the Soviet General Staff has expressed its desire to acquire this information in the manner by which it is being accomplished.

3. This copy is for your information and file.

#### FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

061

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1 Incl. (with Annexes):

AC# 9141

Report - Planning and Organization

Annex A - Anti-Aircraft Defenses -

Derlin, 1:100,000 Trace. Annax B - "German AA Guns and Automatic Neapons" Tabulation.

Annex C - Diagram of Compat Box Formation. Annex D - Paper "Civil Defense of Cermany".

HARRIS F. SCHEREK, Colonel, A. G. D.,

Adjutant General

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F I E D SECRET By Authority of G.G. 8th Bomber Command Initials: Date: 12 Dec 1943

REPORT

PLANNING AND CADANIZATION . FOR LANGE SCALE RAIDS ON BENLIN

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1. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM THE ASSUMPTIONS GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

- 2. COMPOSITION OF FORCES
- 3. WEATHER CRITERIA
- 4. ROUTE
- 5. FIGHTER SUPPORT
- 6. BOMB LOADINGS
- 7. ENELY REACTION: FIGHTERS
- 8. ENELY REACTION: ANTI-AIRCRAFT
- 9. ENEMY REACTION: SMOKE SCREENS AND DECOYS
- 10. ENERY REACTION: A.R.P. AND FIRE FIGHTING ORGANIZATIONS
- ANNEX A. ANTI-AIRCRAFT DEFENSES BERLIN, 1:100,000 TRACE ANNEX B. "GERMAN AA GUNS AND AUTOMATIC MEAPONS" TABULATION ANNEX C. DIAGRAM OF COMBAT BOX FORMATION
- ANNEX D. PAPER "CIVIL DEFENSE OF GERMANY"

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1.

INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM THE ASSUMPTIONS GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

Headquarters, VIII Bomber Command on 6 December, 1943 received the following message from General Arnold, Commanding General, U. S. Army Air Forces, by telephone from Headquarters, Eighth Air Force:

"For planning and organization for large raids on Berlin, Soviet has requested information as follows: Time necessary for finding objective and bombing methods; Anti-aircraft organization and defense system of Berlin; At what distance does Berlin fighter and anti-aircraft defense take effect? At what height is German anti-aircraft effective? How is departure from target area planned? What organization is used by enemy to clear up results of raids? What methods do they use in fighting fires?"

The Commanding General, VIII Bomber Command directed that the report include the information, both from an intelligence and an operational standpoint, on which a Commanding General would need to be briefed in order to make a plan for the attack. He further directed that it include a statement as to suggested loadings for aircraft, stating percentages of high explosive and incendiary bombs, and their fusings.

The following assumptions have been made:

a. The airplanes to be used will be 4-engine bombers similar to the B-17 Fortress or the B-24 Liberator.

b. Formations to be flown will be similar to those of the VIII Bomber Command.

c. Fighter support will be available.

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d. Diversionary sweeps or attacks and simultaneous attacks by other Air Forces can be arranged.

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e. Altitude: 25,000 feet or above.

f. Proper equipment or accessories to load all types of bombs will be available.

g. Long range tanks are available capable of carrying 2700 gallons of gasoline.

This report includes the general considerations applicable under each of the headings, the specific information available as to the defenses of Berlin and bomb loadings, together with some of the recommendations that have been made to the Commanding General, VIII Bomber Command for a similar attack from the United Kingdom. For an attack of this importance, the forces must be large, and high losses must be expected. It must be emphasized that coordinated diversionary attacks involving other Air Forces situated in the United Kingdom or in Italy must be planned and carried out simultaneously.

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#### COMPOSITION, OF FORCES.

2.

a. Fighter Opposition. It is believed that the energy will defend Berlin with his maximum fighter effort. Within 60 miles of Berlin, there are now only 90 single engine fighters, of which 30 are night fighters, and 55 twin engine fighters. However, there are on the Western Front, 790 single engine and 865 twin engine fighters in initial equipment status. If given ample warning, the enemy could draw for reinforcement on 30% or 40% of this force. To attack a target of such vital importance to the enemy, the composition of the force must be of sufficient size and employed so as to engage effectively the defenses and still deliver a decisive attack.

b. Force Required. Considering the number of fighters that could engage a bomber force on this target, employment of at least ten Combat Wings of approximately 600 airplanes are considered necessary to make the attack. The Combat Wing formation consists of three combat boxes of 20 airplanes each; the combat boxes are flown in a vertical wedge formation and each box is staggered at 1,000-foot intervals. A combat box is made up of three squadron formations staggered in altitude and flown in a "V". The attached diagram (Annex C) gives the composition of a Combat Wing formation.

c. <u>Penetration of Defenses</u>. In order to penetrate the enemy fighter defenses most effectively, it is believed that the Combat Wings should be divided into three separate forces. Each force would consist of three or four Combat Wings flown in a column and spaced at approximately 3-minute intervals between the Combat Wings. Recent studies of enemy fighter tactics indicate an increasing tendency to concentrate all the fighters on the lead Combat Wing when the Combat Wings are flown in trail and routed over the same courses.

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When the forces have been employed in this manner, the energy has been able to concentrate a large number of fighters and make mass attacks on the lead Combat Wing. This has tended to swamp the gun positions in the lead formation with resultant heavy losses being sustained by these units. The following Combat Wings have not been in a position to give supporting fire and rarely received but a small number of attacks in comparison to the number of energy fighters that made interception. Succeeding Combat Wings do benefit from position support but are not capable of using the maximum fire power available to the bomber force when the energy concentrates his fighters on a flank position. For this reason it is believed more desirable that the three separate forces should be flown in line, abreast, at approximately a 10-mile interval between each force. This compels the energy to divide his fighter attacks against a greater number of bombers and tends towards decreasing his opportunity to concentrate his fighters so as to make mass attacks on a limited number of airplanes.

d. <u>Attack on Target</u>. In order to divide the three forces, a point 50 or 60 miles short of the target should be used to make the separation so that each force will have flexibility and sufficient room for maneuverability in making the bombing run to the target. By proper routing and timing the three separate forces can be arranged so as to converge on the target at the same time, thereby delivering the attack in the shortest time interval, and dividing the fire power of anti-aircraft defences. By making the attack on the target from three different directions at the same time anti-aircraft defenses will not be able to engage successive waves separately.

e. <u>Operating Sance</u>. The range of the B-17 and B-24 airplanes will vary to a considerable extent with the time flown at high altitude and the

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operational speeds used. To launch an attack on this target from angland, it is desirable to flank the energy fighter defenses and follow a course that would go out across the North Sea, central Denmark, and approach the target from the northwest. An altitude of 12,000 feet would be flown to a point approximately on the east coast of Denmark, at which time a climb to altitude would begin. Considering the anti-aircraft defenses on this target, it is desirable to take an altitude of 25,000 feet or higher. Considering that this flight plan was used, B-17 and B-24 airplanes, with additional wing tanks capable of carrying 2,700 gallons of fuel, would have an operating range of approximately 1700 miles.

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#### MEATHER CRITERIA

The necessary conditions as to weather for an operation of this size will vary with the losses in airplanes and crews that can be allowed. As this is an extremely important target, it may be necessary to accept other than the best weather conditions and to take losses because of this poorer weather. The following criteria are given with this in view:

a. For a visual mission, take-off visibility at bases should be in excess of 200 yards. During the climb to the rendezvous at flight altitude, there should be no high icing index. En route at flight altitude, the visibility should be sufficient to include each Combat Wing formation, that  $is_{7}$  to 4 miles, and there should be no heavy persistent contrails. For bombing at the target, there should be 5/10 or less total cloud, and the ground visibility should be at least 3 miles.

For the return, the bases should have at least 1g mile visibility with a 1500 ft. ceiling for daylight landing. For night landing, there should be at least 2 miles visibility with a ceiling of 2,000 to 2,500 feet. During the winter months with the limited daylight hours, the flight proposed would require either a dawn take-off or a dusk return. For either of these, the visibility conditions must be much better than above.

b. When blind bombing is necessary, as the efficiency of the bombing would not be as great as that for visual bombing, the same chances on poor weather should not be taken. The visibility at the base, at the rendezvous point and en route should be such that there is small chance for collision and icing. Over the target between 5/10 and 10/10 cloud should be forecast with a cloudless area at the altitude of routing and bombing. The top layer should

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not be above 20,000 feet if the bombing is to be done at 25,000 feet.

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Active cold fronts which extend above the operating altitude are extremely hazardous for flying. Therefore, this type of cold front between the bases and the target would preclude such an operation. It is possible for heavy bombers to operate above weak cold fronts which extend only to 20,000 feet.

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#### 4. ROUTE

Deciding the most favorable route involves:

a. Disposition of energy fighters en route and in vicinity of target.
 (See par. 8).

b. Disposition of energy ground defense, particularly anti-aircraft,
 en route and within the gun-defended area. (See par. 9).

c. Fighter support possible, with rendezvous points upon entrance and withdrawal. (See par. 6).

d. Best priority headings of entrance and exit at target from antiaircraft viewpoint. (See par. 9).

e. Mind at ground and at altitude.

f. Best route for route check points and for target identification.

g. Coordination with other simultaneous attacks.

h. Most favorable heading at target for efficient bombing dependent. on shape of target, construction, area, shape of bomb pattern for formation flown.

With an attack based on the Leningrad area, the best route would appear to be over the Baltic Sea, making landfall between Danzig and Swinemunde and approaching Berlin from the north. Fighter support would be necessary until the bombers cleared the active area of the Eastern fronts; the bombers however, could be out of friendly fighter range for most of the route. A minimum practical altitude could be flown for most of the route, so that oxygen could be conserved; the range could be increased with a climb to 25,000 feet being made before crossing the coast; and the enemy Radar warning system over the Baltic Sea could be confused as long as possible.

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The question of finding the target is largely one of proper navigation, of check points en route, and of target identification. This is, therefore, a continuous process from the time the crews are briefed as to target identification to the actual time that the bombs are dropped. The target folder for the particular target contains photographs of the target on recommended scales of 1:6,000, 1:18/20,000 and 1:32,000. An RAF map for night operation to a scale of 1:63,000 and a perspective target map for daylight operation to a scale of 1:72,400 are usually included. The perspective target map gives oblique views of the target as it would appear from an elevation of 25,000 feet at distances of 15 miles and 7 miles, for various heatings

of the bombing run. In clear weather, the bombardier should be able to pick up the

general target area at about 40 miles. Definite check points must be recognized at least 25 miles from the target. A turn is usually made at an initial point between 10 and 25 miles from the target. As forces become larger and in early stages of training, the initial point would be at the greater distances. It usylight bombing by visual means, the bombing run varies from about 45 seconds to 2 minutes, and during this time, the airplanes are maintained on a straight and level course and the bombardier must be able to pin point the target. In daylight bombing, our aircraft do not remain over the target area looking for the precise objective but make a bombing run and make a withdrawal as speedily as possible. Only over targets with light defenses have we gone back to make a second or third bombing run in order to increase the bombing

accuracy. With "unseen" methods with radio apparatus, check points should be

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made with water, or towns having good radio reflective power, at about 40 miles away. Berlin, Paris and London are poor targets from a radio screen viewpoint because they are too large. In approaching these cities, it would be necessary to pick out smaller cities in the vicinity of the main target which have good reflective power and to drop the bombs on the main city by dead reckoning or estimated time of arrival (ETA).

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Bombing is usually done by group formations of from 18-21 planes,

all of the planes dropping the bombs on the leader. Immediately after the boabs are away, a turn is usually planned to the right or to the left and a rendezvous is made by combat wings of three groups at a rallying point, 15 to 25 miles from the target. The return is usually different from the penetration route so the fighters that have been stirred up during the penetration cannot follow the withdrawal. In the case of Berlin, the best withdrawal is to the East, particularly with a westerly wind. with the wind in the Southern sector, the best route is entrance from the Southeast and withdrawal towards the Northeast. With the wind in the Northern sector, the best route would be entrance from the Northeast and withdrawal to the Southeast. When an attack is made from the mest, the best route from a fighter point of view is in from the Southwest (from the direction of Frankfurt) and out towards the North over the Baltic. In this case, it would be necessary to split the fighter forces by requiring a simultaneous attack on the Stuttgart area by the NWAAF. If the attack is made from over the Baltic from the North with withdrawal toward the SW, there should be a simultaneous attack in the area Northeast of Berlin (towards Danzig).

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#### 5. FIGHTER SUPPORT

Unler the present disposition of German Air Force, an attack on Berlin from the west would be routed so as to outflank a considerable amount of the enemy fighter defenses. If a route were chosen over the North Sea for penetration of German territory in the Hamburg area, it would only be possible to give fighter support in the vicinity of the coast on the route in. By routing the bomber force so as to penetrate the enemy territory in Denmark, the limited operating range of fighters based in England would not enable them to give fighter escort to the bombers to a point when the enemy opposition is expected to be encountered.

If an attack were made on Berlin from the East, it would be desirable to support the bomber force with fighter escort through the fighter defense belt of the Eastern front. The German fighter defense is considerably stronger to the West of Berlin than it is to the East of Berlin and the initial operation made from the East is considered to encounter only moderate opposition in the vicinity of the target.

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#### 6. BOMB LOADINGS

The suggestions made below as to bomb loadings are of necessity general in character and will vary with particular target characteristics and operational factors.

German city areas should be attacked with about equal weights of high explosive and incendiary bombs. Although by far the greater portion of the damage expected will be due to fires originating with the I.B.'s, the H.E.'s are essential in preparing the area for the I.B.'s and in disrupting the fire defenses. In addition to their primary destruction, the H.E.'s assist the origin and spread of fire by blowing off roofs, breaking windows and in general opening up the buildings to the access of both the I.B.'s and the air necessary to support the fires, and by breaking water and gas mains, blocking streets with craters and debris, denying access with long-delay fuses and in other ways hindering the fire fighting.

Concerning the type of I.B.'s to be used, it is anticipated that the 4 lb. magnesium bomb (M-50) will be the most effective for the average residential areas of German cities; this will be available in 500 lb. aimable clusters. For industrial areas, the 68 lb. gasoline gel bomb (M-47) will probably prove superior.

The type of H.E. bomb and fuse to be used will depend on the particular city or portion of city area to be attacked. The most effective H.E. load for the average German city would consist of about equal weights of 4,000 lb. Light Case fused instantaneous and 100 lb. G.P. fused 1/40 sec. delay (about 10% long-delay fuses should be used, about half of these having 15 to 30 minute delays, and the remainder various delays up to and including 12 hours). For cities that include large dock areas, industrial areas or

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modern commercial areas with steel or concrete frame buildings predominating, the 500 lb. G.P. fused 1/40 sec. delay (with 5% long-delay) is recommended.

The 4,000 lb. L.C. with instantaneous nose fuse is approximately twice as effective per unit of weight as the 500, 1000 or 2000 lb. G.P. bomb for destroying houses and wall bearing structures in general and for opening up buildings for incendiary attack.

The 100 lb. G.P. with 1/40 sec. delay fuse (with 10% long-delay fuses) is the best boab for the destruction of underground services, gas and water mains, for temporary delay of transport and for hindering fire fighting in general.

The 500 lb. G.P. with 1/40 sec. delay fuse (except for 5% with longdelay fuses) is the most effective bomb for multi-story industrial and commercial buildings with steel or concrete frames, for longer term delays to transport, and for dock areas.

The particular high explosive bombs to be loaded on each plane will depend upon the ability of the plane economically to load specific bombs. With mixed loadings at our present operation elevations between 20,000 and 30,000 feet, it has been recommended that the H.S.'s and I.B.'s be released separately in order to take into account their different times of flight. At and below altitudes of 15,000 feet, the bombs can be released without any time interval between the H.E.'s and I.B.'s.

In the advent of night operations, it is not contemplated that the VIII Bomber Command would use bomb loadings different than those mentioned on the previous page. However, the RAF have used the following loadings in recent operations:

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In the last five night attacks on Berlin by the RAF, they have dropped about 8000 tons, of which approximately 46% have been incendiaries and the remaining 52% H.E.'s. The predominant H.S. bomb was a 4000 lb. N.C. with a varying number of other bombs, ranging from 8,000 lb. H.S.'s to 500 lb. G.F.'s. A number of long delay fuses were used.

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The Berlin fighter defense is extended towards the West and arranged with a control system using satellite airfields. Shen the stack comes from the West, fighter reaction is possible from 40 miles inside the constline all the way to the target and return. It is estimated that with a single, heavy attack about 300 single engine fighters and about 230 twin engine fighters would engage our formations between the Buhr and Berlin, upon entrance and upon withdrawal.

Within a radius of 60 miles of Berlin, there are now 90 single engine aircraft (60 day fighters plus 30 might fighters) and 55 twin engine nicht fighters. The maximum interception range for the twin engine fighter is about 300 miles and the usual range, 150 to 200 miles. The maximum interception range for single engine fighters is 175 miles with an average of between 75 and 100 miles.

If an attack is made from the Sast, the reaction would be very much less than if made from the Nest. Mowever, such an attack would plok up the single engine and twin engine fighters now on the Russian front. This would probably not be the case if the attack came in directly from the North over the Baltic Sen. There are six fighter airfields between Berlin and Josen. The present order of battle shows none of these occupied with day fighters.

There is probably not a good alroraft warning system to the East of Berlin, but after the first operation from this direction, it must be assumed that a warning system would be placed in force. The whole German fichter system has been extended towards the Mest, the defenses towards the

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East at present being poor, both as to organization and accuracy. It is felt that upon an initial attack, the fighter defenses would not be extended more than 50 miles beyond the Serlin airfields as the ability to vector planes Sast of Berlin is thought to be of low order. In approaching Berlin from the East in an initial operation, it is considered important in planal-g, that a feint be made towards Danzig or Frague so that the actual target would not be disclosed until the last moment so that the fighters could not be centered on the berlin area.



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It is estimated that in an area approximately 16 miles radius from


the Tiergarten the defenses of Berlin consist of:

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400 guns, heavy, occupied positions 186 guns, heavy, unoccupied positions 354 automatic weapons, occupied positions 84 automatic weapons, unoccupied positions 192 heavy searchlights.

The above is based on photographic cover of most of the area referred to us of 12 October, 1943. It is probable that including the area not covered, there are A00 guns heavy, 400 automatic weapons and 225 heavy searchlights available for action. These figures include the equipment on the three pairs of flak towers located in the Fiergarten, Husboldthain and Friedrichshain respectively upon which it can be reasonably stated that 128 mm., twin barrelied guns with necessary fire control equipment are maintained.

The above figures do not include railway flak as this is liable to frequent alteration. Since the recent series of heavy MAF attacks, reinforcements of railway flak have been sent to Berlin, but these can be removed again at very short notice if the main offensive were to be switched to another area. The exact locations of the interpreted positions are a own on Annex A of this report, this being AFD Tracing No. 181 furnished by the MAF attacks, in the second of the British Mar Office. It is of interest that most of the heavy positions are 6-gun and that nearly all of these are sited in pairs. 6-gun positions have been very common in all areas for some time, the primary notive for their adoption being probably sconony in manpower, since fewer instrument numbers and ancillary personnel are required per gun in such positions. The siting of gun positions in pairs (and sometimes in threes) also reflects the fairly general trend in Flak policy towards larger



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fire-units (known as "Grosskampfbatterien"), the object of which is presumably to obtain improved control of greater gun densities and at the same time to achieve still further economies in manpower "overheads".

Detailed information as to the effect on the defenses of recent heavy RAF attacks is not yet available, but there are indications that a considerable increase in deployment of searchlights in the approaches to Berlin from the NM, West and SW have probably been effected.

The methods of fire control against day operations when there is less than 5/10 cloud is that of director control using continuously pointed fire. Then the cloud cover increases and the planes can be seen intermittently, some type of plotter control with the object of firing predicted concentrations is usually practiced. When cloud cover is such that the planes cannot be seen, radio direction finding is used, either to use continuously pointed fire or to furnish date upon which a barrage can be fired. At present the accuracy of Cerman "anseen" fire is approximately 1/10 that of their "seen" fire so that losses at high altitudes under unseen conditions will be relatively light.

The methods of fire control against night operations have been radically affected by the intensification of the MAF's policy of concentration and by the introduction of "Mindow". In face of these developments the system of defense at all large German GDAs is to fire a flak barrage (usually some 5,000 feet in depth) covering the average height of the main force of bambers and to employ night-fighters above the ceiling of this barrage. Teather conditions hereitting, searchlights and fighter flares provide illumination of the whole area, primarily to enable might-fighters to attack, though illuminated targets will also frequently be engaged by the ground defenses. "Onseen" predictor-controlled fire of any accuracy is generally only possible against

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sircraft which are not flying in the main concentration.

The major heavy gun defense is still with the old, low velocity 88 mm. Flak 18 and 36 AA gun. Not many not, high velocity 88 mm. Flak 41 AA ouns are at present sited. However, the flak towers in the center of the city have twin-barrelled 123 am. guns. The effective heights given below are those from which the gun could fire for 20 seconds at a directly approaching plane, traveling at 300 miles per hour. The maximum ceiling is the fuse altitude at which a sincle burst would be secured or to which a barra e or

		ntrab	a shake	10.62	The second se
predicted	CONTRACT	TTAL COM			

<u>000</u>	Iffective Geiling			
88 sm. old 2690 ft. par sec.	26,250	32,500		
38 mm. new 3280 ft. per sec.	35,000	42,500		
128 m 2890 ft. per sec.	33,000	40,000		

The great rejority of automatic weapons are 20 mm., either single or four barrelled, with a paximum fuse ceiling of 7200 feet and an effective celling of about 3500 feet. It is possible that some of the automatic searons are of 50 pm. caliber with a maximum fuse celling of 19000 feet and an effective ceiling of 10,000 feet.

at an elevation of 25,000 fact, the anti-aircraft defenses are effective at the following distances from the Wilhelsetrasse:

11	-	17 miles
112	-	13 miles
2	-	12 miles
SE		14 miles
	-	16 miles
12		16 miles
MI	**	19 miles

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The AFIS trace of the British War Office, showing the pin point position of heavy guns, automatic weapons and searchlights, has been analyzed with the system of flak analysis used by this head uarters. Under a "no wind" condition with a target in the center of the city near the Silhelastrasse, the priorities of entrance from a flak viewpoint are in the following order of headings: 2100 (best), 270°, 300°, 240°, 330°, 0°, 180°, 60°, 90°, 30°, 120°, 150° (worst). With a wind of 50 miles per hour from the West (270°) the defense becomes quite evenly balanced for entrance; however, the best entrances are on headings of 60°, 90° and 210°, with the worst entrance on 150°. The priorities of exit are on headings of 90°, 120°, 30°, 60°, 130°, 160°, 0°, 240°, 210°, 270°, 300°, 330° (worst). For this wind the best headings would be 18 on 75° and 607 on 90°, or 18 on 210° with a 1.5° turn and 607 on 120°. The priorities of entrance and exit headings depend very much on the wins, particularly for this defense.

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#### 9. ANDY & CTIN: SACK SCHORD NO DECOYS

Under "lassive Defense" are included these measures taken by the enemy to prevent or delay visual recognition of the target or to induce attacking aircraft to drop their busis elsewhere. It is considered under the headings of Smoke Screens, Jumies and Decoys, Canouflage and Ba loons. Radio interference is not covared.

Spoke Screens

Snoke screens were first observed before October 1941. It that then they were used in port areas, chiefly as a defense against night bombing. They proved relatively ineffective against area bombing at night.

The number and size of smoke screen installations has since even greatly increased as a defense against precision bombing in dailight. Sourly all important ports and coastal cities in Germany are now equipped with effective screens and the number of inland cities and targets so protected is increasing rayidly.

Ordinerily, the screens consist of an inner and an outer row or ring of generators, those in the inner ring being spaced more closely than those in the outer ring. The distance from the target area to the cuter ring may be as much as two or three miles. In areas of industrial concentration, the screens are such more extensive, the one in the Bremen-Vegesack area being at least fifteen miles long and five miles wide.

The "smoke" used consists of chlorsulphonic acid which is forced from the generators under pressure. Under average wind conditions, the screen is effective in about twenty minutes. Some tendency has been acted for effectiveness to diminish after prolonged operation. It is believed that

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# all penerators are turned on, regardless of wind direction.

capter screens, perticularly the larger ones, are quite effective egainst high-level diglight attacks on provision targets. [hiers complete surprise is effected, details of the target and many landwarks are obscured, and prompt identification of the target is made very difficult or impossible. They are also effective against low level attacks, especially sheen

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combined with balloon defenses.

On the other hand, make screens are not effective against area borbing, either by day or night, when navigational aids are used.

Suche screens have been reported in the Berlin area, and there is reas n to beli ve that they exist, but no information has been received which is sufficiently scourate to pareit their extent or location to be determined. The best available evidence indicates that there is a stoke screen southeast of the center of the city.

#### Decoya and Dusples

Decoys and dussies are in wide use in German, as a parsive defense against night bombing. Their purpose is to induce attacking aircraft to drop their bombs in open country, away from impo tant cities or industrial targets. They are often successful against visual bombing by night.

- The chief types are:-
- s. Decoy fire sites and walled rectangles.
- b. Usedy marshalling yards and docks.
- c. Decey oil storage tanks.
- d. Decoy towns.
- e. Dursy industrial targets (simulating commine targets).

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f. Decoy airdromes.

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Decoy fire sites are more widely used than any other type and are quite effective. Decoy aerodromes are also numerous and are sometimes effective, even against daylight attacks.

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Decoys and dusmies are frequently protected by real anti-aircraft Latteries.

In the Berlin area, at least twelve decoys and durales have been identified within a radius of thirty miles from the center of the city. These consist of fire sites, lighting systems, decay tooms, decoy oil storage installations, railway facilities, etc.

The types and locations of the known instalistions are as follows:-

		the second second second second second
"Dimberg"	(52°35'10"N, 13°36'50"S) 101 miles #5 of center of Berlin	Provable fire site.
"Rotzis"	(52020'00"%,13031'08"S) 14 miles 35 of center of Berlin	Fire site and lighting
"Allensdorf"	(52018'16"N,13011'27"%) 16% siles 3% of center of Berlin	Pire eite
"Genenagen"	(52°19'27"N,13°20'25"E) 12 3/4 miles 5 of center of Serlin	Fire aité and lighting spater
"Suhlenbeck"	(52040'00"H,13024'52"2) 9 miles North of center of Berlin	Fire sites and lighting system
"Hennigsdorf"	(52939*40"F,13011*41"E) 112 miles MW of center of Berlin	Scall lighting aystem
"Bauen 1 (Facain)"	(52937'09"N,13903'28"S) 14g miles MW of center of Serlin	
	This is a very large decoy which con 3 x 4 miles and includes the village Manadorf. It consists of a decor se decoy railway terminals, decoy stree sites. It bears some resemblence to Berlin	rodrome, two

"Nauen 2 (.tzin," (52°31'09"N,12°54'19"E) 16 miles 3 of center of Berlin

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Dummy oil tanks, buildings, fire sites and lighting system.

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"Reuen 3 (Lachow)"

#### (52°30'28"N,12°46'42"3) 8 miles SN of <u>Neuen</u>.

This is a large oil decoy comprising durany tanks and chimneys, decoy railway system and sidings, fire sites and lighting units.

"Poisdan 1 (Eshnadorf (52015'25"N,13002'10"E) 10 miles S of center of <u>Potsdar</u>.

Possible fire site.

Pire sites, durny oil tanks, durny

system.

(Schmergow)" (52°25'58"H,12°49'09"E) (Schmergow)" 10 miles %N# of center of <u>Schmergow</u>.

"Potsian 3 (CSttin)" (52°27'06"N,12°55'30"%) 6_ 11100 MM of _otening. Durny oil tanks, buildings, railway (with durny trains) fire sites and light-

From the foregoing it will be seen that most of the known decoys the on the north, south and west of the center of Berlin, those to the west being the largest and most elaborate. Like anoke acreens, they are ineffective a, ain't non-visual bonking.

#### Garou(1s. e

Various Forms of canouflage have been used by Germany to prevent or dolay target identification. The asthods used include such sell-known devices as netting, disruptive painting, "toning down" or painting with dark colors, painted roads and agricultural patterns (particularly on aerodromes), the use of real and duray trees and shrupbery, duray buildings and structural easouflage to change the characteristic shape of prosinent structures such as honcore, oil tarks, stadis, racetracks, etc.

The officercy of this canouflage is hard to assess, but it understandly makes quick target identification one difficult, particularly at eight or

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#### in conjunction with stoke screens.

Recent developments are the painting of patterns in open squares to destroy their value as landmarks and the painting of roofs of <u>undamaged</u> buildings in heavily bunked areas to simulate bonk damage.

alloons:

Cartive balloons are widely used to defend ports and industrial targets in Germany and occupied countries against low level attack. Their maximum height is about 10,000 feet, although they are usually flown such lower.

balloons have been reported in the Berlin and Potadas areas, but

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#### 10. ENDIT TEACTION: A.R.P. AND FIGE PIGHTING CROANIZATIONS.

The A.M.F. defenses of Germany follow approximately the same organization as the Sritish and the unorican systems; that is, the organization block by block of the city, together with a central control. • Berlin is supposed to be divided into four cantral control areas - MA, MM, SE and SM. Norb discosal squads are sent to places where ducks and delayed action boxes are spotted. These equads are highly trained in unorming and disposing of boxbs.

The first are divided into:

 Non - apparatus fires which are handled by the block organization and,

b. superstum tires which are subject to central control. In the case of fires out of control, blasting is done. Flasting has been practiced in cortain areas prior to raids with the idea of setting up fire lines.

In new, saturation raids, there are two pain objectives; first, to chear lanes so that people may escape and second, to concentrate an eaving p blid and official buildings and factories. In such severe attacks, the local fire brigades are hard out oven to attach to achieve these two objectives, and fires in the residential areas may not be brought under control for several eavys. In the last two raids on ber in, fire brigades from as far even as ledgels and Hasturg sere called in to assist.

The new phosphorus incendiary bombs used by the R.A.F. are particularly troublesons since masks are needed by personnel seeking to extinguish them. It is known that as a result of night raids, the s.M.F. organization

is very highly organized within the factories and within the industrial areas.

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A higher density of 1.8.'s is therefore required for effective bonbing in the industrial areas as compared to the amounts used for residential areas. In heavy reids, every evailable person in the city is called upon to assist in classrance. The s.d.t. impresses soldiers on leave, by-standard, and myone that they can be their bands on.


stinched hereto us Annex D is a paper on "Civil Defende in Certany" from the Ministry of Home Security (Intelligence Branch) Multeholl, deted 10 Feb., 1943. This agency is now engaged in revising this information to cover the changes in the past ten months.


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



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#### ADDEX B: ANTI-AIRCRAFT MELO. NO. 4 (REVISED)

German AA Guns and Automatic Weapons.

GUNS (HEAVY)

Ca	liber	luszle Velocity	Nomenclature	Horizontal Range Maximum	Fuze or Haximum Ceiling	Effective Ceiling	Weight Projectile HE.	Lethal Radius Burst	Practical Rate of Fire	Elevation
1.	in.	ft./sec.		yas.	ft.	ft.	1b.	ft.	rounds/min	degrees
75	2.95	2780	Flak 1/60	15,500	(30,000)	(25,000)	14.3	(25)	20	-5 to 85
88	3.46	2690	Flak 18&36	16,200	32,500	26,250	20	(30)	15-20	-3 to 85
88	3.46	3280	Flak 41	22,000	(42,500)	(35,000)	20.7	(40)	20	-8 to 86
105	4.14	2890	Flak 38&39	19,100	36,750	(31,000)	33.2	(50)	10-15	-3 to 85
128	5.04	2890	Flak 40	19,600	(40,000)	(33,000)	57.2	(65)	8	0 to 85
	5.91	3450		34,000	(42,500)	(36,000)	88.6	(75)	6-8	

Maximum Coilings quoted for Guns (Heavy) are based on maximum fuze range; this is the maximum altitude for predicted concentration or barrage fire (single burst).
Effective Coilings are based on 20-sec. engagement of directly approaching aircraft flying at 300 miles/hour, last round being fired at quadrant elevation of 70°.
Guns (Heavy) fire HE time fuze against aerial targets, HE percussion fuze or AP against ground targets.
( ) Estimated.

) Estimated.

All Flak guns are dual-purpose AA/AT, except 150mm, which is AA/CD.

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# AINEX B: (Continued) ANTI-AIRCRAFT MELO. NO.4 (REVISED)

German AA Guns and Automatic Veapons.

#### AUTOMATIC MEAPONS

Caliber	) juzzle	Nomenclature	Horizontal Range	Ceiling	Effective Ceiling	Weight Projectilo HE	Practical Rate of Fire		Flight to	ng.
	Velocity		Maximum yds.	(ruze) ft.	ŕt.	lb.	rounds/min	degrees	sec.	-
mm. in.	ft./sec.	1		7215	3500	0.26	120	-12 to 90	6.0	-
20 0.79	2950	Flak 30	5230		3500	0.26	180-220	-20 to 90	6.0	
20 0.79	2950	Flak 30	5230	7215			700-800	-10 to 100	6.0	
20 0.79	2950	4-barrelled	5230	7215	3500	0.26		-5 to 85		
	2950	Madsen	6015	6960	3000	0.25	200			-
20 0.79			7200	13775	5000	1.4	60	-5 to 85	+ F14.0	
37 1.45	2690	Flak 18836		16200	6000	2.2	80	-5 to 90	11.7	
40 1.57	2950	Flak 28	12300		-	3.3	20	-7 to 85	12.6	
47 1.85	2620		10350	17000	7000				12.9	
50 1.97		Flak 41	14765	18370	10000	4.8	130 D(125)		1	6
		a Hashing Cun		B(2400) C(3000	A(2400)		E(500)		+	-
.92 0.31	2500/300	0 . Hachine Gun			A(1500)		1		1	
.92 0.31	н	Rifle			and the second se	- which self-		tober pluge	at	


Maximum Ceilings quoted for AUTOLETIC VEAPONE denote heights at which self-destruction takes place at


Effective Cellings quoted for A.W. are the heights up to which accurate engagement is considered likely, maximum quadrant elevation.

Automatic Wespens fire HE percussion-fuse self-destroying tracer against aorial targets, and AP tracer against aerial or ground targets.

A - Effective Slant Range B - Limit of tracer, slant, C - Limit of observed fire, slant D - For long periods of fire E - Short bursts up to 100 shots with cool gun. F - New type shell asl7-destroying 7-10 sec., up 9185 - 11480 ft.







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#### SECRET.

#### IL DEFINE IN GERMANY

based on information available at lst January, 1943, graded according to the following classification:-

A. Recent reliable evidence.

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- . Pre-war evidence which we have reason to suppose remains unchanged.
- G. Pre-war evidence upon which we have no further information.)

The German term for what we now call "divil Defende" comprising air raid precautions, evacuations, casualty services, fire fighting and fire prevention, is "Luftschutz" or "Air Protection", as distinct from "Luftabwehr" or "Air Defense" in the active sense.

I. ONGAMISATION.

#### (a) General Control. (A)

On 1st December 1942 each Gau (Province) in the Heich was declared a Meich Defence District (Meichsverteidigungabezirk) and each Gauldtor became a Heich Gozzinstioner for Defence with functions similar to those exercised in this country by the Megional Commissioner. The Gozzinstoners were given authority for the co-ordination of Sivil Defence measures in their area.

The Meich and occupied territories are divided into a number of areas known as Air Districts (Luftgaue) each of which, spart from Schnistration is responsible for the defence of its territory so far as the German Air Force is concerned. There are eleven Air Districts in the Greater Meich and the Air District Gemand controls the "permanent" Flak defences, fighter units, observer corps, balloon berrage units and, formerly, controlled the whole of the Civil Defence organisation. An A.A. "Home Guard" (Meinstflak) has recently been formed to man light anti-aircraft defences.

The A.A. Home Guards (Flakeehrmanner) wear a blue uniform and perform duty at night after their working day is ended. Hours of duty vary locally but are usually arranged so that after several mights on duty up to twice as many nights off duty are given to enable gun crews to rest.

They receive the same pay as the armed forces and are granted additional rations of food.

The A.A. Home Guard supplement the regular A.A. and go into action size by side with them.

Whilst the household A.R.F. organisation and Mardens' service remains under the general supervision of the Air Ministor, the rest of the Civil Defence services, which were always closely associated with the police have, since 31st May, 1942, been transferred to the control of Himmler, the Reich 3.3. Leader and Head of the German Police.

at the same time as this change was made known the title of the war emergency organisation was changed from "Security and Assistance Dervice" (Sicherheits und Hilfsdienst) to "Air Protection Police" (Laftschutspolizei).

(b) The Melch Air Protection League. (B)

Sautier.

The Heich Air Protection League (Reichsluftschultsbund) was founded in April 1933, under the patronage of Field Marshall Goring and its President is at present General der Flakartillerie Hirochauer. There is also a Managing President, at present General

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The League is responsible for divil air protection and for all propaganda and training measures throughout the Reich. It is directed by a Fresident who is under the orders of the Reich Finister for Air and Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force, who lays down the broad lines of policy and to whom the Fresident is responsible.

It is organised in provincial and country groups and a town group in every large town. These in turn are divided into borough and rural groups and these again into parish and ward groups respectively.

The final stage is the sub-group which is civided into blocks, each consisting of a group of houses or a single large building.

Each stage of the higher organisation corresponds to a stage in the German administrative system, and the Givil Defence organisation is built up in parallel with that of the League, starting from the 'House' # Warden.

#### (:) The Air Protection Organisation. (A)

The organisation of the Air Protoction Service (Luftschutzdienst) comprises the following services:-

1. The Aircraft Reporting (Observer) Service (Flugmeldedionst) which is controlled by the Air Force and works in conjunction with the motive defence.

2. The Civil /ir Protection Organisation.

This consists of:-

- The Air Baid warning Service responsible for the warning system and light restrictions and which is controlled by the Police.
- (ii) The Air Protection Police (Inftachutzpolizei) (formerly the Security and Assistance Service (Sicherheits-and Bilfadienst)) responsible for police, fire-fighting, first aid services, has detection, rescue work, decontamination and repair work, and veterinary services.
- The Works Air Protection Carvice (Merklaftschuts) responsible for the protection of large factories and commercial and industrial untertakings.
- (iv) The felf-Protection Service (Selbstschutz) responsible for the protection of the ordinary householder and including the equivalent of our warden pervice.
- (v) The Extended Self-Protection Service (Erweiterter Selbstschutz) for the protection of business offices and factories too small to have a Forms Air Protection organisation.
- (vi) The Bural Air Protection Fellowship (Landhuftschutzgemeinschaft) to provide fire-fighting and salvage squads in rural areas too shall to be served by one or other of the above services. (This is a new development consequent on the heavy raids of 1942. Previously there was no Civil Defence organisation in rural areas.)

* N.B. House - In the German sense concredity a tenement block or a block of flats.

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#### (1) The Aircraft Reporting (Observer) Service. (A)

The Aircraft Reporting Service consists of two types of Air Observation Units: (1) the Flugmeldereservekompanien, which are responsible for manning a fixed dystem of Observation Posts throughout a given area: and (2) the Flugmeldekompanian, a motorised organisation intended to augment the fixed system by extending it, by replacing my posts which may be destroyed by energy action, and by reinforcing it at important strategic points according to the requirements of the active Air Defence Forces.

The whole of Germany is covered by a network of Observation Stations (Flugwachen) placed about 10 km. from each other along a line parallel to the frontier of the country. Hotween this line proceeding indend there are gaps of about 50-70 km. varying in depth according to the importance of the area, and closing to as little as 30 km. in the principal Air Defence areas. The siting of the Stations depends to some extent on suitable points for vision and sound at approximately the right intervals, but in the absence of suitable sites artificial high points may be constructed. The system is extended beyond the coast by reports from shipping. By this means any perticular object of main attack may be recorded by series of rings of Observation Posts. There is a close ring of Fosts 40-50 km. from the object known as the "near alara ring"; a second ring about 100-120 km. from the object known as the "near warning ring" or "distant alars ring"; an outer ring some 200 kt. from the object known as the "distant warning ring." The region within the "near warning ring" is called the "near report sone", that within the "distant alers ring" is the "distant report zone", and beyond that is the "outer some." These distinctions correspond to different tasks of the Observer Units called the "near reporting service" and the "distant reporting service."

The observers report to Watching Centres and through them to the Air Protection Warning Exchange (Warnzentral).

(bserver posts are equipped with field-glasses, a graduated bearing are (Helderese) divided into numbered sectors, and a telephons directly connected to their hesdquarters.

It is the duty of observers - who are siected from local residents above silitary age - to report the type, numbers and direction of flight of all sircraft and the times when seen; also any unusual occurrences such as parachuts descents or forced landhurs.

Each headquarters is divided into two sections, one dealing with incoming reports and the other with their transmission to the Air Protection Marning Exchange. The commander of the headquarters sits in a room between the two sections, sifts the reports and detaraines the form and substance of the outgoing messages to the marning Exchange.

#### (2) The Civil Air Protection Organisation.

The Air Maid Marming Service (Dee Section D. p. 1c)
 The Air Protection Police (fermerly the Decurity and Assistance Service. (A)

Assistance Service. (A) The Air Protection Police are under the orders of the Police District Superintendent who acts as Air Protection Leader for his area, and the organisation of the Police District into divisions and sub-sections (wards H) is followed exactly as in the Air Protection organisation.

The Jerman term is "Nevier" and the area corresponds approximately to that of a sub-section of a Matropolitan Police Division. Greater Berlin, for example, was organised in 5 districts, 20 divisions and about 200 words. (1938).

It is a parely urban service and had up to 1912 no counterpart in the rural areas. There is now however, the Rural sir Frotection Fellowship, a much simpler organisation adapted to rural needs.

The forces available in a Felice district cover the following services:-

- (8) Folice;
- Fire fighting;
- (c) Gas detection and decontamination (to which technical personnel of the public utility undertakings are attached for repair work on gas, water and electricity mains, etc. /;
- (d) Rapair and rescue (organised by the Technical Smargancy Service (Technische Nothilfe) and dealing also with the removal of depris, and obstructions);
- (a) Redical and First and (in collaboration with the
- (f) Veterinary.

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In the pre-war organisation of the above forces, which seems to have remained largely unchanged, they were divided up as follows: Each ward leader normally has at his disposal the following detachments in addition to the ordinery police;-

- (A) A fire and rescue squad;
- A medical detachasent:
- (c) The gas detectors.

These ward forces are known as the "Emergency Detachments" (Minsatzkrafte) and their task is to reinforce the efforts of the "Self-Protection" forces (consisting of the householders, wardens, house fire detachments, and first aid workers) when they are faced with a situation beyond their powers.

In each ward there is a First wid Post and a "Detection Post" at which samples of wir taken in the soreets can be tested for gas.

At the next stage of the organization, i.e., the division, the leader has the so-called "Reserve Forces" at his disposal; these comprise:-

- (b) Fire detachments (including, where necessary, fire floats, trailer pumps, stc. ;
- (c) Medical detachments and amoulance sections;
- (d) Decontradiction sounds;
- (e) Repair parties;(f) Demolition parties;
- (g) Technicians of the public utility undertakings.

The divisional and district headquarters also have decontamination stations and repair workshops under their

The "Meserve Forces" are employed in dealing with such emergencies of more serious dimensions as the "Emergency letachmants" are unable to cope with unaided. In small towns where there are no "divisions" the "Heserve Forces

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are directly controlled by the district (or borough) leader.

fechnically qualified advisers are stached to the divisional and district leaders whom they can consult regarding the exployment of the technical detachments concerned.

The removal and temporary accomposition of persons who are rendered homeless is a matter for which the district leader is responsible. (For post raid services see Dection All p. 19.) (N.B. Something analogous to our system of rest centres established in blitzed areas a pears to be provided under arrangements made by the police in each gau (Province). Some evidence has become available that wooden hutments have been built on the perimeter of target towns and laterly more builting of emergency dwellings has been undertaken to relieve the acute housing shortage. In January 1922 the fown bounded of susseldorf took possession of duraged houses in order to expect the execution of remains.)

No recent figures are available but under pre war plans the Security and Assistance Service employed maskers ranging from 1 - 25 of the population, according to the minerability to air attack of the area concerned. This meaber is exclusive of the "Seif-Frotection" organizations of wardens, "house" fire detachments, etc.

Furthermore, at least one per cent of the population need to be trained in first aid, in addition to the organisation of first aid and medical detectments, the sim being to have one or more women in every group of demilings who would be depable of giving first aid treatment.

#### (111) The orks Air rotection pervice. (A.)

In large industrial and conservial organisations the management is responsible for its own air protection and may only in exceptional cases call upon the local Air Frotection Police for assistance. The organisation is under the general direction of the Reich Industrial group and follows the same general lines as the latter service. It is under the control of an Air Protection Leader appointed by the management, the personnel being redruited from the employees.

The works air Protection scheme is organised so that each member has his allotted duties. Any factory exploying more than a hundred hands is obliged to provide artificially ventilated shelters, a system of telephone constnuction and smoke projectors.

Under a meich Air Minister's Decree of the 4th July, 1942, cortain changes are make in the conditions of service. Make members of the staff over eighteen years of age can no longer be called for duty more often than six times per month and those between sixteen and signteen not more than four times per month.

In the case of women the liability for service will continue to be determined by the age of the somen and whether or no she has children. Those over eighteen years with no children, or none under fourteen, can only be called for duty four times per month, and those with children under fourteen years not more than twice, and then only where it has been established that provision has been made for the care of the children. Momen between sixteen and eighteen years may be

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called not more than twice a month for duty, and mothers with children under three, or with at least three children under fourteen years, expectant mothers and women working under particularly difficult conditions are not to be called for duty, nor are make or female members of the staff under sixteen years. No differentiation is to be made between officials, black-coated workers or work people.

Free time of at least six hours is to be granted either at the beginning or end of the next following period of work to all performing duty as stand-by where there has been any considerable strain caused by duty. For young people between sixteen and eighteen and female members of the staff, at least four hours additional free time is to be given in any case.

Working time lost as a result of the extended rest period must be made up if possible by overtime up to the limits which obtain under the regulations concerning working hours. If it is not possible to make up the working time with the result of a loss in wages a refund may be claimed for the time lost by reason of the rest period. To meet special conditions the competent supervising authority may consent to the making of special arrangements.

#### (iv) The Self-Protection Dervice. (A)

The protection of the ordinary householder is based on a system of wordens and "house" fire parties. Under a Reich decree of August 1942, survice in the Self-Protection Service may be made computer for all citizens from 15 to 70 years of age except invalids and cripples and those with especial responsibilities such as the mothers of young children. This decree has been applied in most of the large towns.

Each "house" in the German sense, i.e., generally a tenament block or block of flats, has a "house warden"; in outer residential districts where single family dwelling-houses or villes are to be found, the house warden supervises a group of villes. These units form the "Luftschutzgemeinscheft" or "Air Protection Fellowsnip" which is the lowest element in the Givil Defence organisation.

Over the house warden is a "cell-warden", responsible for several "houses" or groups of villas, and above him again a "block warden" who controls, it may be, several streets or one large building, according to the size and the number of occupants.

The "block warden" comes under the ward or parish air protection leader.

A new group in the organisation of the wardens service has recently (December, 1952) been introduced and a "Lesder" now takes charge of several "Self-Protection Groups" with power to transfer reinforcements from one area to smother.

The house warden is rea onsible for appointing the "fire" warden (see section VI - Fire Fighting). (N.B. The whole organisation in these lower stages corresponds with that of the Nazi Party).

(v) The extended "el -Protection Service. (A)

The Extended Self-Protection Service for commercial undertakings and small factories is developed to the extent

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appropriate to each individual case and is based on the organisation of the Self-Protection Service.

It constitutes a separate unit in the local organisation but is not independent nor is it so self-contained as a unit of the Works Air Protection Service.

#### (vi) The Fural Air Protection Fellowship. (A).

The oural Air Protection Fellowship is for the protection of thinly populated places and is ment to ensure that in every such locality sufficient forces are available for fire fighting and rescue work.

All able bodied men and women, including forein workers and prisoners of war, are liable for service. A local director is appointed who is carefully selected as being of sufficient responsibility and personality to ensure that all necessary measures are taken for the protection of the community and its possessions. All residents are to be trained to carry out their share of the duties of the fellowship.

II. THAINING AND FRACTIONS (A).

For many years, even before the war, air raid precaution schemes were frequently practized and all large German towns, in conjunction with the Air Force and the anti-ercraft formations, and "Black-out" practices were held.

Instruction on sir-raid precaution measures is given to all children in every German school, and a July 1941 Order decrees that German youth must be systematically trained in Civil Defence. During 1941/42 all boys and girls 19-14 years of age had to receive instruction with compulsory attendance of at least four hours per month.

The training of the adult population is carried out in three classes of school: the ordinary Air Protection Schools, which instruct the rank and file; the Frincipal Air Protection Schools established in each borough, or urban or rural district, to train officials from block wardens upwards; the Provincial Air Protection Schools for instructing officials from war leaders upwards. There is also a National Air Protection School situated near Berlin which trains the section officers and instructors. The pre-war syllabus of the School sistem covered all aspects of air raid presentions, including special courses for architects concerned with structural precautions and the building of shelters etc. It is not known whether this has now been extended in the light of war experience.

In addition to the regular training schools, travelling exhibitions are known to be in use in Germany and one such visited Munich in August 19h2 and demonstrated the method of dealing with the British 4 lb. Incendiary Bomb.

TP Attendance a courses of instruction is compulsory and cases are recorded of individuals being fined for non-attendance.

III. RUGULATIONS ARGANDING PERMONNEL.

#### (a) Method of Recruitment. (A)

Since 1937 all physically fit persons of either sex have been liable to perform civil defence duty and in many towns conscription of the whole available population has been ordered.

There has been recent confirmation from a reliable source that; -

(i) The Bolf-Frotection (Wardens) Organisation is staffed mostly by unpaid voluntary personnel, mainly women, who come on duty only when a warning is sounded.

(ii) The Air Protection Police is manned largely by full-time personnel, mostly men over 40, who constitute a uniformed force encodited closely with the folice. They wear a uniform similar to that of the German Air Force and are reported to be equipped with old vehicles considered unsuitable for further use by the Armed Forces. The vehicles are primarily used as ambulances but also for the transport of personnel from one sector to another.

(iii) As a result of the extreme shortage of man power it has been found necessary to employ members of the Hitler Youth movement (Hitler Jugend) as auxiliaries in the fire fighting force. It is believed that all members of the Hitler Youth are required to undergo training in fire fighting. A German official report has announced that up to the end of 1942 200,000 boys had been trained but that military service had taken many of the older ones and at the end of December 1942 25,000 trained boys were available.

(iv) For a like reach it was found necessary after a particularly heavy raid to call in the essistance of the Armed Forces to assist the civil defence personnel who were unable to cope with the situation.

(v) In western Germany it was decided to shorten the University Spring Term of 1942 by four weeks and to use the students to assist in overcoming the arrears of clearance work which had accumulated.

#### (b) Compensation. (A)

Although the services are, in principle, unpeid, it is leid down t at all civil defence workers should receive, while on duty and subject to Government regulation, food, equipment and travelling expenses (or cash allowances in lieu thereof), together with such special compensations as is payable to members of the marning, and escue Service and Air protection Folice. Compensation is payable in the following circumstances:-

(a) Fart-time workers receive: -

 Travelling expenses for all journeys of more than 2 kilometers (1; miles).

(ii) RC*. 0.50. For wear and tear of clothing.
 <u>Note</u>. In present circumstances no exact sterling equivalent of the Heichamark can be quoted; it may, however, be taken very roughly at one shilling, the standard value prior to 1931.

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(iii) A payment of NM. 1.50 for periods of duty in excess of five hours,

(iv) Where duty involves absence from home at night, subsistence allowance is paid in accordance with the scales laid down for the personnel of the Armon Forces.

(b) The pre-war rates fixed for full-time workers were from 21. 0.50 to 24. 2.25 per day according to rank, and subsistence allowances are paid in addition, unless free board is provided.

In January 1942 it was amounced that the subsistence allowance paid to German Givil Defence workers is not subject to tax.

### IV. STADUTURAL PARCADITIONS AND SHALLSS POLICY. (A)

On a warning being sounded the whole population (other than those actively engaged in dealing with the energency) must take refuge in shelters, and, in practice, very few even of the wardene and police remain in the streets. Compliance with this compulsory regulation for taking shelter is assued by the fact that those who do not do so will not be eligible for air raid compensation if they are injured; moreover, periodical visits are paid by the warden to ensure that all are in the shelter. The domestic shelters for the most part are in the shelter. The domestic shelters for the most part are in the form of cellars, rendered proof against splinters, incendiary books, and debris from collapsed buildings - in principio, they are also gasproof but this aspect of the construction was in practice neglected until recently (cf. sub-section (d) page 11/.

Large basement shelters, gallary type unlerground shelters, and towar or heavily protected surface shelters of spiral storeys are provided in the larger towns as public shelters.

### (a) Shelters in Private Houses. (A)

As early as any 1937 it became a statutory requirement that a cellar, or ground-floor shelter, should be provided in every new house or in an existing house where major rebuilding operations were undertaken. There is some doubt whether in fact this requirement has been generally fulfilled.

only in exceptional cases may refuge rooms be situated on an u per floor. The "building police" (A.B. The German term "Baupolizel" is equivalent to our building plans inspectorate of a local authority, were made responsible for supervising thre execution of this order. A single refuge room must not be occupied by more than fifty persons. This order was entended by a decree of 17th August, 1939, which made the provision of shelters compulsory in all existing buildings.

The standard form of shelter is, therefore, the strengthened celar, since in all German towns the normal form of habitation is a first in a multi-storayed building in which extensive basement accommodation is available for communal use. In March, 1940, owners of property were ordered to plarce the walls between cellers of adjacent buildings to provide additional means of escape in an emergency. There is strong evidence that particular attention was been paid recently to the fulfilment of this order.

shelters must be accessible day and night and if the door is not open a key must be in the possession of every resident.

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it is interesting to note that there is a complete absence in termany of anything corresponding either to the "anderson" or "Morrison" table shelter, for use in small houses, but small surf of shelters have apparently been provided recently in suburban areas where villa-type residences prodominate.

### (b) Public Melters. (A)

Evidence was received early in 1941 that large public shelters were either completed or under construction in Berlin and some other large towns, and reports indicate that tiers of deep underground shelters are under construction beneath Vienna parks. The depth of the Berlin shelters is given variously as 20, 40, or 50 feet, but it is thought that, in view of the standy subsoll, the first figure is more likely to be correct. The construction of six chelters is reported providing accommodation for 2,000 - 15,000 people per chelter; all are said to have heating and lighting systems.

Reports received in Janu ry 1943 describe shelters known to have been constructed in Hamburg, Anien and Sesen.

These shelters are of two winds, some being underground and others being of several storeys part of which are above ground.

All reports agree that internally the shelters are constructed of a large number of small rooms or cubicles intended for the use of A persons. The shelters are built of reinforces concrete with outside walls of from 0.70 m. to 1.50 m. in thickness, The roofs are of concrete with a layer of ashes which is about 0.40 m. thick in the centre and thinning out towards the edges, the whole being covered by a layer of concrete which is variously reported to be from 3 cm. (c. 11/3 ins.) to 10 cm. (4ins.) thick. ...instang and heating are provided and some of the sheaters are reported to be as much as six storeys high. All are reported to be gas-proof.

Carlier information, which was confirmed by reliable sources at the end of 1941, indicated that in all the large cities enormous works had been undertaken for the construction of very large shelters 25 - 30 feet below ground level, with headcover of about 4 feet of reinforces concrete, and earth superimposed up to ground level. These shelters are constructed in the squares in front of railway stations and other available spaces, the largest being estimated to hold as many 6s ten thousand people, this figure is, however, probably exaggerated. Built by "eut and cover", they are divided into comparisants and provided with modern bunks in tiers, heating, lighting and ventilating plant, etc. Construction is carried out any asses by prisoner- of-war labour under beman technical supervision.

So-called "inkel" or tower shelters have been built in various parts of Germany. These reinforced concrete towers v ry in size, are conical in shape and built of reinforced concrete about 1.10 metres thick at the sides thinning to 0.50 metres at the base, of the spex. The roof is reported to be from 2 to 3 metres thick. In a model designed for 400 people there is stated to be d or 9 storeys with a contral ramp or staircase.

In saarbrucken, amongst other places, ti has been ordered that those suffering from a contagious disease are not to be addited to a public or private shalter and if no special shelter accommodation is available they are required to remain sithin the outlaing.

(c) Shelters in Factories. (B)

In factories, splinterproof shelters are arranged for the emergency staff who reason on duty during raids whilst the rest of the employees, not required for the air protection detachments

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are accommoniated in grapproof and artificially ventilated underground shelters. All industrial premises employing more than a hundred persons must be provided with such gasproof and splinterproof shelters for workers. They must have an approved air raid preductions scheme and be subject with smaller projectors. In the case of public offices, shops, stc. special refuge rooms must be provided for members of the public likely to be cought in the building suring an air raid. The refuge rooms have to be designed to accommonate the average number of persons present in the building at one time.

there are also strongly protected shelters inside vital factories for key personnel and for essential records, and tools.

There is evidence that the same disectisfaction is constinues expressed by workers in factories in Germany as in the United Fingdom, that they are enjoying better protection than their families during air attacks.

### (d) Progress of Goastruction. (8)

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No direct technical data is available reg ruing the legree of reinforcement of ordinary callar shelters, but froghent references to the subject in the press would suggest that progress in equiping shelters was sumewhat slower than the autorities witnes, the impact of our neavy boobing ruids has unionbleady caused modifications to be made here and there in a policy which appears to fundamentary unchanged.

A certain amount of evidence has accumulated that some of the earlier work on the strengthening of roots of besenent or cellar soliters has proved inademate for its purpose and a new arive for more efficient moving has been uncertaken.

At was take down in the uriginal bornam regul tions that every air valu sheiter should be rendered sheproof. This, however, seems to have been enforced with some ladity, and it was not until the end of 1940 that reports were received of large-scale efforts to render all shelters gasproof. At is probable that in practice gasproofing was found to be difficult and expensive, and therefore deferred until labour and materials could be so red for the purpose,

Although periodic of Las have been made during 1941 and 1942 to have dellar shelter remained gasproof it same extremely hyprobable on the evidence available that anything like all domestic cellar shalters, are yet complete in this respect.

In all cases where there is less than 100 cubic feet of air space per occupant accommodated, artificial ventilating a paratus of the mechanical in-put type mult be installed in the anelter, and the regulations call for it to be capable of maintaining a pressure of about one-fifth of an inch mater gauge to prevent gas panetr ting into the shelter. The use of regenerative ventilating systems is prohibited.

### V. and a base on a property was a busic the second and a second a

(a) Assue of Respirators. A

As in this country, there are three types of respirator: the Dervice type for use by the Defance Forces, the Civilian Duty (known as the "S" Mean), and the General Civilian or "People's" mass (V.M.37). An improved type of Civilian respirator (the V.M. AO) was introduced in 1940 but there is no evidence yet that this has been wheely issued.

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It is understood that the Civilian buty much is provided at Government expense. The Givilian rempirator is issued against payment, the price depending upon the means of the recijient. An average figure of the charge made is 5/-. Every cutimen to given the opportunity of trying his much in a lachrymatory gas chamber. The distribution of the "People's" much to the public has been slower than was expected. It was estimated that at the outbreak of war about 12 million were issued. Evidence in september, 1940, however, suggested that even in the damper zones, only 20-30% of the population were issued with gas masks and reports received recently state that only a small proportion of the civilian population as jot have their own respirators.

In vital factories there is good evidence that workers are issued with civilian respirators but these have to be kept at the place of work, one up not become the property of the isolvidual.

In Germany some of the instructions anvocate the use of a gas much onen attaching some upper of incendiary boxes and insistence is take on the necessity for all fire finiters to obtain a much.

# (b) <u>arden's equipants</u>. (0)

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The present equipment for house varians, etc., consists of atrong boots, a working suit, a belt, a length of rope if necessary, and some protection for the head against sparks and bood splinters. In addition to a resultator, the equipment must include an electric torch, and some simple device for arousing the occupants of the building.

# (c) roted we Globalan for Decontrainet for squade, etc. (c)

one form of protective clothing (19)6/, and by a servan firm specializing in anti-gas splipment, consists of a jacket and trousers with a hood forming part of no jacket, both muse in a fabric rule rised on both sides. The jacket closes by press battons and fils over ordinary clothing. Anable is used at the ouffs and ankles to secure a gos-tight joint. There is also another type consisting of a one-lises garment of the same material secures by a belt at the waist.

# (a) <u>Fire Prevention and Fire Actual</u>.

in each house the house warden a points a fire warden and a spad of happens, either can or waren, from amongst the occupants, who have been passed by the police as sultable for such duties.

The House Fire Farty thus constituted receives one or two hours' training from the difficults of the local fire brigade or the which air Protection League. This training is very considerably sugmonted and constantly refreshed by displays and practices at least once a month, and the subject is also frequently dealt with in articles in the press.

Serbers of the Hitler Jugend (ditler Youth) are now trained in fire finiting. They are suplied with a uniform consisting of a kind of battledress, a triangular badge to denote the district, an arelet and a shield fire brigade badge which is awarded when the individual is trained. They are not obliged to serve in sangerous conditions, but are intended to reader ancillary assistance. There is evidence that no pressure is used to restrain them from taking an active part in fire fighting and several have been decorated with the Iron Gross for their devotion to duty.

Fire guard duty in a large factory near Berlin, which may be taken as typical, was performed up to the beginning of 1941 only by the male employees. Their turn of duty came round about once every week. - 12 -

In order has been issued in Berlin and other large towns that every house must now have fire watchers on duty throughout the might.

ttics in all buildings must be cleared and fire fighting sourpoint provided, towards which the occupants of each house contribute. The equipment consists of a tub of mater with two buckets, a large box of sand with showed, axe or hatchet, preventer, a irs-boater, and astirrup-puxp (copied from the initian model of the spray and jet. An .T.r. first did box mest that a movided.

here recently the equipent required has been increased to at least ) sondbags to each average sized room and several mater containers, which are to be filled at the latest on going to bed and in no case after the sounding of an alarm since the drawing off of so much water would reduce the pressure of the mains. The ordinary firequard is recommended to wear a hard felt hat - such as a towler hat - scaked in water as a protection against sparks from incremiary books since it is not the German practice to issue steel helests on a large scale as is one in this country.

In order by coring as insider or air and domainter-in-oldef of the in orde issued in November, 1942 requires owners of buildings of istoric or artistic interests to treat all wooden parts ith fire-resistant raint. The enst may be alained on a recomment basis from the Covernment. In view of the explosive charge spectimes used with the Fritish 4 bb. Incondiary cab, a whiting the of minutes is ordered if ademate over is not available. As in this country, however, fire wards must attack inmediately incondiary bombs which fail in a clace where they may cause vital damage and pay no regard to the consequences.

rement folice order issued in becauter 1942 requires the removal of carriets and handings from all staircases. This is probably of ceneral application.

In capta her 1/A2 the inister of the Interior issues an order that no of islal non-ants were to be stored on the top floor of a ulidized, are possible a chipapers are to be stored in the manual provided it is not day. In case of damage to the building as a result of an air faid priority in salvage is to so there to all official papers.

The fire-fighting equip ent in densary does not seen, according to a reliable sorce, to have been augmented on anything like the scale adopted in this country. The croinary peace-time fire-quipment is in use, an it is beliveved that in many recent raids as provid quite inadequate. Not inclequivalent to our trailer pusp has been reported, though portalls pages are known to be in use.

static water supplies are provided in streets here and there, but still not, apparently, on anything like the same scale as in the lited finites. We additional steel siging has so far been reported as having been laid in German tooms for use when water mains are usuaged.

In rural areas where there is continuous danger of air attack the people are exhorted to wild daws in streams and to construct ponds to ensure a supply of atter for fire (inting and ave mater carts ready for instant use.

aperience of air raid conditions has brought evidence that the organisation, speaking generally, has operated according to plan. odifications, however, of the fire-matching policy have occurred.

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ertian regulations obliged the fire-watcher to stay on the roof in watch during a raid. This was found in practice to be rather damentus and he was allowed to to down to shelter with the rost o the party as soon as the sirens sounded, and emerge then the "raiders passed" signal was heard for the inspection of buildings. ore recently, this policy has also been found inadequate, and firestohers are now required to leave the cheiters and inspect buildings at frequent intervals, preferably during a lull in the confire.

The "average" size household is supposed to produce three firetchers, but in practice the recruitment of personnel is evidently difficult. If a Pouse Fire Farth is unable to control a fire, it is their duty to summen the help of a mainteducturing Farty; and only if this proves indequate may they call for assistance. From the fire-brigade through the folice. An official announcement of the Shief of the A.R.F. in Stattgart dated 20th Beember, 1942 criters that each local warden must ensure that on moonlight nights, that is the four or five nights before and after full moon, half the able bodied inhald tanks of every building must be at home from 8:00 p.E., and person not appending the night at home must sust at once take shelter and return have insectiately the all clear sounds; an all conscholders should arrange a will sheek over of all fire fighting conjugated to ensure that it is ready for instant unc.

Fee realisions were issued in June 1/42 to bring the nural Fire bringes up to standard by calling up for personant service the deputy district leader of every voluntary fire bringes, by making the local authorities consider the calling up for for fall time service of the leader and deputy leader of each voluntary fire brigade, and the appointment of a leader for each of the or parishes (commons). The object is obviously to obtain a close control of voluntary fire brigades and to ensure that they are adequately trained.

### VII. ______. (4).

Although it was not the official policy to adopt evacuation at the outbreak of hostilities (as it was considered that it would be likely to remain in panic and obstruction of communications at a critical juncture) the impact ofevents forced a change of policy and a steady stream of evacuation has been maintained ever since beavy air attacks developed.

In January 1941, ..., raids were believed to be the reason for the extended evacuation of school mildren, though it was the effect on their health and not any sampler to their lives hat as stressed in published official statements. The evacuations which radially took place during the course of that year area thus presented to the popular an extension of the normal sensing acay of team hildren to the country on health grounds. Compulsory evacuation of school children was to take place from all large towns is estern and northern Gen any, in holding orlin, liable to suffer from ..., raids. All school are and types of school ore included in the achema so that pupies of index also he assured of ininterrupted education.

In January 1941 it was stated that childred of 6 - 14 years sere illeted on facilities and those of 14 - 16 years, in particular to boys, sent to campa. They sere accompanied by teachers, loaders of the littler Touth and Carman Laidens League, and other trusted members of the Party. Thousands of boys and irls from famburg, for instance, were sent to Upper Davaria, an these appear to have been accomposated mainly in camps.

There was a good deal of voluntary evacuation in 1941 from the beavily bomted towns such as famburg to resorts such as firebaden and district.

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As a result of the heavy attacks during 1942 evaduation was specially organised. Many children have been sent for longer or shorter periods to Austria and the Eastern Provinces of Germany and to Hungary, Bohemia, and other Axis-occupied countries. More recently several conveloscent and maternity homes have been opened for mothers in various of the less vulnerable parts of the country.

Constant articles in the press assure sothers that the evacuated children are being very well cared for and that Health Insurance Doctors of the district look after them to the best of their ability. In the larger camps medical men and women students assist in their care.

### VIII. MIDICAL GERVICES. (A)

All doctors holding official positions, such as medical officers of health, etc., were obliged, even before the mar, to take a course of training at a Reich Air Protection School, and the organisation of First Aid Posts was well advanced. About 200 such posts were established in Barlin - one to every police "havier" or mard corresponding roughly to a sub-section of a Metropolitan Police Division - to the mearest of which shall numbers of wounded would be directed. In the original scheme, in the event of a large musber of casualties occurring in one spot, they were insediately reported by telephone and the necessary number of motor ambulances sent to convey all the wounded, whether alight or severo, to the mearest hospital. The great shortage of bed accommodation however, and an order issued by the Chief of the a.R.F. In Stuttgart in December 19.2 requires that all casualties will be dealt with first at the First-Aid Post and any person sho reports direct to a hospital will be sent on to a First-Aid Post unless his injury requires argent hospital treatment.

Originally, operating theatres sore provided in all Versan First aid Posts with doctors in charge, with a view to preventing congestion at the hospitals, and also because in many districts in Berlin the nearest hospital is too far away, but recent reports suggest that possibly because of the shortage of doctors this is no longer the case.

Seconts and unburt people are forbidden to remain at a Firstair Post. Should it be advisable for a casualty to be sent on to a heavital all arrangements including the provision of transport will be completed by the Post. It is stressed that in view of the limited bed accumadation available all cases must, so far as possible, be treated at the Tirst Aid Post of that the available heavital beds are not all filled in the same stages of an attack and more serious casualties, such as persons who may be buried by debris, find themselves without auitable medical accompodation.

The medical services take orders only from the Air Protection Police.

Shelters are provided in hospitals for non-movable cases. The doors and windows of hospitals and First Aid Posts are made gasproof and air looks provided. It is announced in the Garman Preas that in Hamburg a number of bomb-proof overating theatres has been constructed; they are stated to be on the second and third floors of six-storey buildings and fitted with all modern appliances and conveniences.

Frequent references in the press suggest that there is a very serious shortege of doctors and the public are warned not to summon one unloss it is argent that they should do so, and, wherever possible, to warn the doctor before the morning of the day upon which they wish him to call, so that he may plan his visits to the best advantage. Sources recently in Germany have confirmed this.

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### sal ING Yalles

The arring wohange is usually sited close to the Observer Readquarters with which it has direct telephonic communication. It is also connected with the local ivil is frotestion Headquarters (the leader of which is the Chief Constable or Police uperintendert), with public utility undertakings, and with the one industrial extablishments in the area concerned.

### live types of warnigh scanate from the Exchange:-

- (1) dvance Tarming (Urreatoned air attack);
- (2) Llort;
- 3) General arming
- (4) Laiders passed
- (5) all clear

The concender of the arning techange is responsible for warning the public. He has conjecte discretion regarding the issue of warnings and it is explasized very strongly that persons chosen for this post must pessess an iron nerve and clas judgent to emable them to perform their task with full sense of the enormous responsibility laid upon them.

The suvence arming is conveyed by telephone to all parties connected frechly to the Warning exchange (i.e. the divid sir retection leader and the chief industrial indertakings in the district) and takes the form of the words "suvence saming" followed b an estimate of the time which should elapse before the threatened raid takes place.

The flort is sounded when enery dirertit are approaching but a heavy attack is not expected to develop. Traffic is permitted to continue and workmen do not leave their workshops. Fublic and private life costines as usual. The warning is used only during the destine.

The Constal farming is normally sent out at least ten sinutes b fore a rail is expected to develop and is conveyed by telephone and repeated to the public by sirens, or, in outlying districts, by conge and canual simals. The sirens are electrically operated on a remote control system using a closed circuit, either directly into the farming schange or from the Civil ir instaction Readcuarters and have a power communition of 5 k.s. It is considered that auxiliary alarms are necessary inside large private houses and fastories to ensure the warring being heard everywhere.

The all lear may be encounicated by a rens or by verbal order.

The standard signals which have seen adopted throughout the felch are: for the alert three blasts on a siren, increasing and diminishing in volume, with 15 second intervals between the blasts; for the general arring signal a deep note, the intensity of which varies at regular intervals; for the "All Chear" a higher note of uniform intensity. Ill signals now continue as in this country for one sinute instead of two, as forwardy practised.

"House" wardens are responsible for passing on the warming by any convenient means to the occupants of their "houses".

A warning is given whenever air craft come within a certain range of a large town or city. It is not nown exactly to what distance from the centre this area extends.

· LLATING CONTINUE (A)

The black-out is very strictly enforced, and there is, speaking generally, no street lighting beyond traffic signals, very feeble blue guide lights at street inter-sections and the illumination of notices indicating the whereabouts of shelters. On an alara

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sounding at might, everything is extinguished, including lights on webiles. eports have been received, however, that at certain periods in the remoter areas out of the danger zones, show relaxation of black-out regulations has been permitted to omable increased production, or in the case of mechaelovakia and Poland, for reasons of security to prevent black-out crimes.

Towards the end of Novamber, 1942, German lighting regulations were revised and cortain minor alterations were made. The main difference would seen to be a reversion to the blue instandescent harps instead of white ones at street corners and in the porches of such public buildings and shelters as are allowed to have screened up of lighting.

The regulations specify a maximum of 25 watts for each unit, as against the previous regulation with was visibility at not more that 1,650 feet. The other alterations concern display lighting at botels, cinemas, shops, etc., and are of minor is ortance. To alteration was made in respect regulations affecting demestic lighting.

eports received from the sir inistry in 1941 indicated that our bomber pilots considered that in the past the black-out had been indifferent and the realisation of this by the deman authorities no doubt caused them to enact the azended regulations.

For the winter, 1942-43, the Freedent of Police in Berlin has peraltied a modification of the black- ut in so far as it entrances of such shops are exempted from the black-out from 6 a.m. to 7 p.m. but all illuminated signs and highls actually in the windows are still prohibited. Exceever the light permitted to escape from any window must not extend farther than two-thirds of the width of the foctpath. It is part of the responsibility of the shopkeeper to see that no "blinding" is caused to drivers of vehicles on the roads. Should a warning be issued during this period the blackout must be enforced strictly. The relaxation in lighting is also reported from other towns.

In eccapter 1942, Mirmler as thief of folice issued a decree which required all obstacles to traffic on roads and pathways to be fainted with huminous paint which must remain visible at a distance of 1 metre for at least 12 hours in darkness. The same decree also permite the use of luminous paint instead of a lamp at street corners, on Lamposts, trees etc., and to indicate the position of bus stops.

## (a) Jerman Vehicle-Lighting Mestrictions. (A)

Index a decree published on the 23rd Lay, 1939, eneral lighting regulations were given, the general principle being that no light must be visible to the naked eye from the height, measured at any angle, of 1,650 feet. As regards vehicles, the large of notor curs, transcurs, trains and bioyeles has to be visible up to 330 feet, but not visible beyond 1,650 feet. The normal form of headlight screen at that time was a marrow allt is an opaque of ver fitted inside the headlary glass. A subsequent decree dated 3 the scenber, 1939, provided that all motor vehicles were to be equipped before the lst October, 1940, with a screened headlight of the type issued to the defence forces. It was provided also that the headlight mould be firmly fixed so that the light aperture above the readway should not be reater than 4 feet and not less than 22 feet and as to be inclined downwards so that, at a distance of 60. Feet in front of the larp, the uppermost edge of the beam of light should be at least 2 inches lower than the top of the light aperture. It was also provided that the headlight should be so wired that it could be switched off independently and not be used

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### only simulaneously with the side-lasp.

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In agast 1941 the existing regulations were confirmed in so far as they apply to havy vehicles alth the additional restriction that bulks for distance and disming has to be recoved from headlarps fitted with masks and all remaining lamps, such as fog lamps, auxiliary lamps, and the like, must be put out of action by removing the bulbs.

For motor-cycles with a maximum speed of 30 k.p.h. dimming of the headlamps as for bicycles is sufficient. All rear lights are to be blue (not red) and brake lights are to be painted so as to leave a horizontal slit 1 cm. wide. For interior lighting on vehicles dark blue lamps only may be used. Horse drawn vehicles and hand carts must carry at the rear a red lamp in the centre during the blackout and in foggy weather.

Ricycle laces are to be dimmed so as to leave a slit 1 cm. wide in the siddle of the dimmer and no light may be thrown upwards. The lamps must be visible at 650 feet but not at 1,650 feet.

Other devices are only permissible if they bear the authorised mark TTM (physikalisch-Technischen Seichsanstalt). Those lasps waring t is sign and fitted with bulbs 6 7/0 844 do not require to be diamed.

### (b) estriction of Salway Lighting. (5)

Instructions have been issued that Station lighting must be concealed in the same way as that in other buildings, that no place from glowing dinders thrown from locomotive fire boxes must be visible, while signals must be screened so that their lights cannot be seen from above ground lovel, and all train lighting must be reduced to a minimum.

a recommendation has been made that railway buildings and the roofs of rolling-stock should be campuflaged so far as possible by painting them a dark shade to render them non-reflecting.

### NI. SCAD AND PAIR GAT TRAFFIC. (C)

on a warning sounding, all trans, and p blic service vehicles generally, cease running. Trains, however, still continue.

The Geman railways before the war were respond blo for preparing their own air raid presations scheme, and for organising their own warning service (which was in direct communication with the aircraft observer service). They were to aim at keeping their services in operation as long as possible, warnings being passed to departments successively and not in the form of a general warning throughout and area.

It is believed that these principles are still applied and that traffic is kept running during air raids but diverted, where necessary, from threatened centres. On a warning being diven, passenger stations are closed, but personnel sho have to remain on duty are provided with isprovised shelters or splinter-proff cover and are emipped with respirators. The remainion are sent to collective shelters protected to the same degree as ordinary civilian shelters.

All building workshops, meds, etc., are rendered resistent to incendiary boxts, timber roof trusses treated with a fire retardant paint or wash, and attics with a fire-proff flooring and cleared of lumber.

The German railways have their own fire-fighting units and personnel are trained to deal dth incendiary boxbs.

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### armine is given by telephone or visual signals.

Tassengers are not informed, but must obe; any orders given by railway officials, and must not leave the trains during a warning period. In large towns the main stations are avoided during raids and passengers are set down at smaller stations outside.

Special shelters are provided at the main railway stations and to these admission is reserved to those in possession of a ticket for a train journey. Passengers in possession of an express train ticket a c allowed to continue their journey to the station if a warning is sounded but all other passengers are required to outer the nearest shelter, just as are the ordinary pedestrians in the streets.

### XII. POST RAID SERVICES.

### (a) General organisation. (A)

Immediately an alarm is given the control centre of the Party gives a warning to its Borough groups (Ortsgruppen) which are then manned by a party leader. At the same time the fires are lit under the boilers in the Nazi Women's Organisation (Mazional-Bozialistische Volkswohlfahrt) kitchens so that food mey be applied to any homeless persna.

During and after the attack the political leaders of the nearest Borough Group gather the homeleas and take them to the nearest collection contro where they receive a meal and are registered.

In some towns, for example Cologne, the Ortsgruppen function as the centers which issues ratios cards, identity papers and pocket money to the bombed out but in other places this is done by the local a thority. In all cases the work of the Municipal Administration and the Party is closely linked, but it is quiteclear that the more spectacular services are administered by the Party in order that any propagands value they may possess is adequately exploited in favour of the Party.

This side of post raid activities is highly organised and it is a common practice for a heavily bombed town to be given supplies of commodities otherwise unobtainable such as real coffee. Socialed "catastrophe stores" are known to be kept in reserve in a number of towns.

In some cases the Gauleiter has ordered that after a heavy attack certain household goods are to be sold only to those in possession of a voucher certifying that they had been "bombed out", but it appears that the continued heavy R.A.T. attacks have made it impossible to continue this practice size the supply of goods has become exhausted. Another result of the raids is the advice that small jobs should be undertaken by the householder and even the putty removed from broken windows to save the time of the glazier when he comes to replace the place.

When a warning is given between 8.0 p.m. and 6 s.m. it is customary for schools to open 2 hours late on the following morning.

### (b) <u>Clearance</u> of debris.(A)

The clearance of depris has alweyablen treated as a matter of treency in Germany and such mean reset the clocing down of Universities for some weeks, the calling in of the assistance of the armed forces, and the recent threat that idle onlookers are liable to be ordered to lend a hand give an indication of the steps adopted to this end.

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(c) Ne-housing. (A)

To house persons who have lost their homes special measures have been taken.

After bombed-out persons have been assembled for registration at report centers where they are given a hot meal, they are expected to find accommodation, in the first instance, with friends or relations, or they may be housed in hotels and inns requisitioned for the purpose. In some cases compulsory billeting is arranged but it is officially recognized that this is no more than a tem over; measure and must not continue longer than is necessary because of the difficulties which too often result when two households are living in a single flat.

In most towns liable to air attack all accommodations which is available for letting must first be offered to the authorities for housing bombed out persons and may not be let without permission.

So great is the housing shortage however, that even this has not proved sufficient and it has proved necessary to order the reconversion of all premises turned into offices since 1933 whoever the tenant may be.

An additional measure in some districts is the provision of so-called 'barrack towns' on the perimeter. These consist of a number of wooden buts for the temporar, accommodation of bombed out persons.

Another method of housing the bombed out is the building of very simple temporary houses. These are believed to be without supplies of water or gas and to be constructedof brick or concrete.

Under a decree of the General Commissioner for the Building Industry dated October, 1942, a Commission appointed by the Minister of Armaments and Munitions decides whether a building damaged during an air attack should be repeired, and, if so, what order of priority should be accorded to it.

For agricultural and horticultural buildings the decision is taken by the General Trustee for Building.

Special stocks of iron and timber are held available for the repair of bomb damage.

### (d) Clothing etd. (A)

In view of the known shortage of clothing and many other essential articles of daily life the authorities have always laid particular stress on the use of the 'Shelter bag'. This should contain everything which might be required to enable the owner to live for a few days should everything else be lost. The most recent list of cominets is that published in October 1942 as follows; - Warm blankets, pillows, food, a thermos flack with a hot drink, meedlework, books and papers, games and toys, personal documents ('the most important'), cash, jowellery, ration cards, all of which were in the original list. To these are now added those things found essential in the light of experience; underwear, peir of socks or stockings, shaving gear, comb, toothbrush, handkerchief, spoon, matches, and a meas tin, knife and fork ('so that the next day at the mobile kitchen it is not necessary to wait until someone can land you their's') "In fact, the article concludes, everything must go into it that keeps our compatriots healthy and fit for work until the community can help".

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As an additional safeguard it is recommended that a complete chance of clothing be stored with a friend and a set accepted in return.

### (e) Mutual assistance. (A)

Mutual assistance pacts between howvily burbed areas and those not in target areas are encouraged. Under the scheme residents in a bombed district are sent to a quiet area for six weeks and replaced by persons from the reception area. Residents in Cologne, Dusseldorf and Hamburg are known to have been relieved by civil servants in Dresden, Chemnitz, and Leipzig.

### (f) Compensation. (A)

In the matter of compensation distinction is made between total and partial loss. Vict.ms of damage claim compensation on a form which must be certified by an authorized political leader. Settlement is made as soon as possible and, as a matter of policy, claims are sealt with generously.

Those who suffer total lo s a e given an immediate issue of two suits of clothing or dresses and two sets of underwear.

The replacement by their exact equivalent of goods lost or damaged in an sir raid is, however, rarely ossible and the sale price of an article is normally taken as the valuation for compensation. In the case of workman's tools, however, full compensation is paid so that they may be replaced.

# XIII. REPORTING AND DISPOSAL OF UNEXPLODED BONDS. (A)

The general procedure for reporting unexploded bombs is similar to that in the United Kingdom.

The Air Protection Police, acting under the Local Air Protection Leader, are responsible for reporting the presence of uner, loded bombs and for carrying out the safety precautions laid down. The disposal of all unexploded bombs is entrusted to specially trained personnel of the Armed Forces known as "Feuerwerker".

When reporting an unexploded bomb full details of its location and position, and information as to any inter erence which it may cause to the life of the community, has to be given, the area roped off and a warning notice "Danger-Unexploded Bomb" exhibited. If possible the time of alling of the bomb is added to the notice. All objects dropped from the air, including fragments, fuses, tail sust be left in situ until the arrival of the "Feuerwerker". The Feuerwerker are under the orders of a Bomb Disposal leader who advises which objects may be used for experimental or training purposes and which are to be sent for scrap.

In normal cases disposal of unexploded bombs is not undertaken until seven full days have elapsed. If earlier disposal is considered necessary the Local Air Commander suit authorize it. In industrial premises the Local Air Commander will determine priority of disposal. If possible three full days will elapse before disposal is permitted. If an unexploded bomb is lying on the surface it may be disposed of immediately, in which case the Local Air Commander's authority need not be obtined. All unexploded bombs which cause no particular dislocation may remain until further notice but must be enclosed. The shaft of entry has to be carefully preserved by stuffing it with straw and a splinter pr of enclosure built about 4° 6" high, covering an area of about 3 yards square, made of some such material as tales of straw, turf,

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### (a) APRET Souforthout (y)

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consistention. In the same of represent's book, report of 1:

over 200 Kg	2.000 m.	(100-300 yris)
ouried deeper than 1 m. In the ground.	250 m.	(50 yda)
side up to height of 1 h	100 m.	
Doabs after 7 days but if enclosed		(10 ys cr less
during the first 7 days	35 m.	
after 7 days	15 10.	

Bostos unburied up to 200 Mg. ... ... 1.000 e. (50-300 yes)

afety distances for unaxploded boobst-

of 100 m. (d) For the burning of lose explosive 25 m.

to be burned in a ditch 1 m. deep, from a distance

(c) For burning incendiary boobs and parachute fliress-

been thrown up abo	nit a		
meter high		300 m.	500 m.
Under an enclosure		200 m.	300 m.

Unburied baabs	1,000 m.	2,000 m.
Bombers where earth has		
been thrown up about a	m. Second	
and the second se	19 12 13	ETT -


<u>200 Kg.</u> <u>200 Kg.</u> Unburied boabs ... .. 1,000 m. 2,000 m.


(b) During detonation Borbs below Borbs Above 200 Sc.

The normal procedure for disposing of an unexplosed both is to defond to it, either in alte or in a both constery.

The normal proceeding for disposing of an unavaloade borb

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4. Certain target systems have been put forward in earlier directives or in recent proposals as deserving of attack after air supremacy has been won. Submarine yards, bomber aircraft, aircraft engines, cil, tires, motor transport, railroad transport, grinding wheels, tanks, tank engines and tank gearboxes, and morale, are separately examined. This examination is preceded, however, by an analysis of current strategic position and its implications for air warfere.

5. It is concluded that the program best calculated to exploit air supresacy and shorten the war consists of:

- a) the completion of POINTBLANKb) the policing of FOINTBLANK to prevent the recuperation
- of production in fighter sircraft, ball bearings or rubber attack on a few targets in bomber aircraft and tank engines
- d) attack on 54 targets in oil

DECLASSIFIED SecDef Memo 16 May 61

ECU/END, 40, Berkeley Square, W.1

28 February, 1944

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# THE USE OF STRATECIC AIR FORTER AFTER 1 MARCH 1944

### 1. INTROSUCTION

The following paper examines the present position of the sir war against Germany and presents an outline program for American heavy bomber forces for the period 1 March 1944 to German capitulation. Reconsideration of the program is required:

- a) by the prospect of early completion of the first place of the program set forth in the C.A.S. directive of 10 June, 1943;
- b) by the approach of operation CVERLORD; and
- c) by the change in strength and capabilities of our bomber forces.

The foregoing developments and the passage of time appear to have rendered obsolete the program for exploitations of air supremacy formulated nine months acc. The paper rehearses earlier directives, reexamines target systems therein suggested, and puts forward an outline program believed more suited to the present situation.

### 2. THE COMPINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE

American strategic bomber forces in Europe are now engaged in carrying out operation FOINTHLANK, operating under the Combined Bomber Offensive Plan of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (i.e. the Casablanca directive of January 21, 1943 No. C.C.S. 166/1/d, as implemented by the Chief of the Air Staff directive (No. S 46368/A.C.A.S. Cps, issued 10 June, 1943). The Casablanca directive stated the primary object of the strategic bombardment program to be:

"The progressive destruction and dislocation of the

CASABLANCA Ge man military, industrial and economic system, and

Objective the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened."

For the accomplishment of this objective five primary target systems were selected, and set forth in order of priority:

	2)	German submarine construction yards	
100	223	The Carl And	

The German aircraft industry

Target iii) Transportation

Systems iv) The German cil industry

v) Other targets in enemy war industry

This selection however, was qualified:

who highly the	"The above order of priority may be varied from time to time according to developments in the strategical
Jualification	situationOther objectives of great importance either from the political or military point of view must be
	attacked" (e.F. subscrime operating bases. Revis)

In the C.A.S. directive implementing the foregoing, the objective of the program remained as stated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Taking note of the increasing capacities of German fighter defences, however, the CAS considered destruction of German fighter aircraft industry as the first task of strategic air attack. The assignment of the Eight Air Force under this directive was to deal with the following objectives in order of priority:

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# Intermediate Objective

# i) German Fighter Strength

### Primary Objectives

- Cerman submarine yards and bases The remainder of the German aircraft industry 11)
- eres.

- iii)
- iv) Ball bearings
  - Oil (contingent upon attacks against Ploesti v) from the Mediterranean)

### Secondary Objectives

- vi) Synthetic rubber and tires
- vii) Bilitary motor transport vehicles
- In implementing the foregoing program, the CAS requested that the Eighth Air Force bombing be directed to the following specific tasks:
  - i) Destruction of the German sirireme, engine and component factories and the ball-bearing industry on which the strength of the German fighter forces depends;
  - ii) General disorganization of the industrial areas a sociated with the above industries;
  - iii) Destruction of those aircraft repair depots and storage parks within range and on which the energy fighter force is largely dependent;
  - iv) Destruction of enemy fighters in the sir and on the ground.

Sajor Sighth and Fifteenth Air Force attacks, under this directive, have been undertaken against a series of targe's grouped toghether under the operation named FOINTELANK, These targets and the dates of successful attacks against them are set forth in Appendix I. It is there indicated that as of 1 March 1944, single-engine fighter production has been reduced from 950 per month to 250; twin-engine fighter production (including the output of fighter versions of the Ju. 88 and 188) from 225 to 50; ball bearing production to 45 percent of pre-raid; while synthetic rubber has suffered no net reduction in output. Five primary targets in the field of fighter production remain to be attacked; two in ball-bearings; five targets remain in synthetic and reclaim rubber, one of which, however, is believed to be out of range. These targets and secondary objectives which are currently deserving of some attention are listed in the conclusion to Appendix I.

Completion of the program a ainst these primer, targets in the immediate future should reduce single-engine fighter production to 15 percent of preraid levels, twin-engine fighter output to 10 percent, ball bearing output to 40 percent; rubber to 30 percent. Still deeper cuts in output in FCINT-BLANK systems can be achieved through early attack on small producers which constitute secondary objectives useful in conjunction with other operations. These goals are in sight. Resulting damage to the German military, industrial and economic machine is calculated not only to slow down German war capabilities in general, but also to give Allied Air Forces comparative freedom of the skies over battle lines, invasion beaches and Cermany itself. The question has been asked how this fr edom should be exploited.

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# 3. APPRECIATION OF CUREENT ENEMY STRATEGIC SITUATION

Reexamination of the various target systems suggested in the Casablanca and C.A.S. directives must be preceded by an appreciation of the current German outlock on the war for the full power of our air strength must be applied against those points in the German military structure calculated to achieve RANKIN in the shortest possible time. Although present strength is great, errors in judgement will inevitably be translated into a lengthening of the wer.

It is our view that the German government and the German High Command are prepared to continue to accept the drain of manpower losses in Russia, Italy, and the Balkans, and to bear the weight of our air attack on German cities and industries in one hope: that of defeating operation GVIRLOAD and producing dissension amongh Britain, the United States, and Russia. What Germany expects to gain from such a success is not clear, but the C.K.W. may believe that separate prease with Russia right be salvaged or that the United States would shift attention to the Far East.

The United Nations are fully committed to operation OVERLAD. Invasion of Europ by Allied Forces was once locked for in the spring of 1943, then in September of the same year, and is now promised for the spring of 1944. It is believed that Germany intends to continue defensive warfare on existing fronts with little or no air cover and will submit to bombardment of dities and industry until its ability to prevent the establishment of a western beachhead is tested. Under the circumstances, the air forces can pound German armament production and German cites with little chance of reproducing Fantelleria.

One possible exception exists. Germany might concede the hopelessness of its present battle if the Allies were prepared to announce that victory would be sought solely through air power, and that no attempt would be made to invade Western Europe. It is believed that present commitments among the major United Narions make such an announcement politically impossible. It may also be doubted whether it would be militarily wise.

If this appreciation of enemy intentions be correct, it follows that the success of operation CVERICED, once assured, will lead rapidly to an enemy request for Armistice terms. The last hope of creating major dissension among the Allies would be gone. The prospect of Allied air bases in Eastern France, from which the whole of the continent of Europe could be blanketed would be imminent. The C.K.W. would correctly evaluate what the future had in store.

### 4. AIMS OF AIR MARFARE, 1944

This appreciation, if valid, also has evident implications for air force strategy in exploiting its mastery of European skies:

- the success of operation OVERLOAD must be assured by an adequate allocation of effort in close support, both well before D-day, and in the period proximate to D-day;
- in attack on Germany, targets must be chosen, the destruction of which will affect the German military position in the field on existing fronts and, if possible, German defensive capabilities against operation OVERLORD.
- iii) More specifically, the destruction of such targets must promise to affect German defensive capabilities in the first month after invasion, or be capable of being made to have such an effect by

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their extension to the tactical level; e.g., if the strategic target system of gun production were chosen for attack, it must be buttressed with tactical attack on guns in place or in being.

iv) Since the German people are judged impotent to effect their will, the morale of the German people is not a prime target; useful morale effects can be obtained, however, by influencing the military anticipations of the High Command.

## 5. REEXAMINATION OF PREVIOUSLY RECOMPENDED INDUSTRIES

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Appendices 2 to 11 examine in abbreviated fashion the current target potentialities of seven industries, other than fighter aircraft, antifriction bearings and rubber, which the C.A.S. and Casablanca directives have specifically mentioned, together with grinding wheels (for which special consideration has been asked), tanks and tank engines, and the elusive target system offered by German morale. The relevant conclusions of that examination may be summarized as follows:

- Morale This not a useful target system. Panic, wer weariness and fear of impoverishment of Germans in general or particular, achieved through daylight bombardment of towns in general is not likely to speed disintergration of Nazi controls. (Appendix 11).
- ii) <u>Railroad transport</u> Axis railroad motive power is not a useful target system. The interdiction of railroad communication, judged as a tactical objective, is not considered. Strategic attack on railroads, however, is judged to present too many targets, have too great a cushion of civilian and long-term industrial use, and stand too deep in time to offer a chance of schieving military effects. (Appendix 8)
- iii) <u>Submarines</u> This is no longer a useful system. The strategic importance of submarines has declined with the full use of effective means of defeating them at ses. German U-boat construction is slacking off. No effects on enemy capabilities could be achieved in time to affect OVERICED. (Appendix 2)
- Aircraft engines This is not a useful system. Heavy German losses in fighter assembly capacity have created an engine surplus. Destruction of engine capacit, would rebalance the German industry but achieve long-run attritional rather than short-term military effects. (Appendix 4)
- v) <u>Hilitary motor transport</u> This is not a useful system. Low rates of turnover in civilian and military trucks protect military holdings from rapid reflection of the current level of output. Complete cessation of production would probably reduce military holdings only by 20 per cent in a year's time. (Appendix 7)
- vi) <u>Grinding wheels</u> This is probably not a currently useful system. In depth, it lies schewhat behind bell bearings with which it overlaps, and like rubber, it consists of another cut through the entire German economy. Seven plants produce 90 percent of European controlledstructurg wheels, or 60 percent of grinding wheels of all types. (Appendix 9):
- vii) <u>Tires</u> Six targets in the field of tires constitute not a tire system, but a moderately useful opportunity of destroying halfa-month's supply of rubber and somewhat advancing the time at which the latter system will catch hold. (Appendix 6)

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SECRET viii) Tank engines and gearboxes. - Three targets, two of them closely adjoining, offer a means of depriving Axis armies of 1000 tanks and assault guns within a six-month period beginning two to three months after successful attack. (Appendix 10) ix) Bomber aircraft - Five bomber assembly factories marit early attack to reduce the weight of unsupported homber night assault which the Luftwaffe can mount against OVERLORD. Since bomber turnover is slow, 5 months instead of 22 months for fighters. strength cannot be much reduced by D-day. Components, moreover, are not deserving of attack. (Appendix 3) x) (i1 - 23 synthetic plants and 31 refineries currently account for over 90 percent of total Axis refinery and synthetic oil output. If the 12 refineries in the Ploesti area are successfully attacked, major refineries elsewhere whether fully or partly working may be followed up; and idle refineries in France, the Low Countries, Italy and Germany must be watched. The undertaking is large; destruction within the next three months of less than half of all oil production will not affect OV_RLOAD or enemy fighting value in the period D plus 30. With present air force capabilities, however, cil offers the most promising system of attack after fighter siraircraft and ball-bearings, to bring the German armies to the point where their defeat in the field will be assured. (Appendix 5) CIC BOMBARDMENT OF GERMAN EUROPE - March 1944 A positive program for the employment of heavy bomber forces, it is suggested, emerges from this examination of POINTBLANK and other previously recommended target systems. This program divides into three time phases; A) from (arch, 1944 to D-30; B) D-30 to the establishment of firm beach-heads; and C) from the establishments of beachheads to German capitulation. A) Feriod I - The exploitation of air supremacy to D-30 Allied Air Forces might appropriately be charged with three major and several minor tasks in the period between now and D=30. The major tasks are: i) the completion of POINTELANK; ii) the policing of POINTBLANK, to prevent the recuperation of production in fighter aircraft, anti-friction be rings and rubber; iii) the additional major target system, oil. The minor tasks include: i) attack on a number of secondary targets linked to FOINTELANE including: a) damaged small plants which are recovering: b) morginal producers; ii) attack on three targets in tank engines and gearboxes; iii) attack on five bomber assembly plants; iv) six tire factories as a follow-up on rubber; v) attack on ancillary targets related to POINTELANK targets such as airparks, airfields, repair depots, etc.; vi) initial exploration of the tactical target field in preparation for Feriod II operations, including: a) operational training for new types of targets; b) provision of cover in time and place;

c) attrition of men, equipment and supplies in Western Burope, which can be effected without relevance to D-day.

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### B) Period II - D-30 to the establishment of firm beachheads

The main and overriding aim of Allied Air Forces in this interval must be direct support of OVERLOWD. Means to this end are not discussed in detail here. Attempt should be made, however to channel a portion of the overall effects of strategic attack again t aircraft, cil and tank engines into the relevant tactical area by follow-up bombardment of airfields, cil storage gepots and tank parks.

A small amount of effort might legitimately be allocated to the policing of POINTELANK and cil targets, if only for the purpose of preventing German defenses from being concentrated in forward areas.

### C) Feriod III - The establishment of beachheads to German capitulation

It may confidentally be estimated that, subse uent to the beachhead operations, the Luftwaffe will be virtually incapable of defending Germany against daylight bombing attack. The main aim then must be to complete the mission of strategic bomber forces, i.e. to shorten the war by attack on the center of German military strength. In this period, the burden of tactical support must be borne by medium and light bombers.

The following target priorities are suggested:

- the policing of FOINTBLANK, including the searching cut of targets previously out of range, from new bases in Europe;
- ii) tactical support if absolutely required;
- iii) the completion of attack on oil which alone among, the remaining target systems offers the op ortunity, if completed, of bringing the German war effort to a close.

Enemy Objectives Unit Sconomic Carfare Division American Embassy

28 February 1944

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The Use of the Heavy Bonbers from March 1, 1944, forward.

### I. Introduction.

The following paper presents an outline program for the incrican heavy baber forces mounted against German intege for the period harch 1, 1944, to German capitulation. In the case of strategic targets, specific objectives are listed. In the case of tactical targets, the general nature of the targets is indicated, and the relative priorities as between strategic and tactical targets. The whole forward period is divided, for purposes of analysis, into four rough intervals, in each of which the main aim of attack will differ.

### II. Period I, March 1 to Air Supremacy over Germany.

A. The main initial aim of heavy bomber attack remains the completion of Pointblank to the maximum within our capabilities, in the shortest possible time. This will confront the Germans with the choice of wasting their remaining fighter force in the defence of Germany,of grounding it, in order to preserve a force in being for defence against Overlord. It is impossible to predict which choice or compromise will be elected; but the creation of that dilemma remains the highest priority aim in the precision bombing of Germany.

B. Due to the limitations of weather it is likely that a substantial scale of effort must be allocated in excess of that which can be expended in fointblank. In order of priority the following appear the optimum supplementary types of attack:

- (1) tactical targets, in direct support of Overlord, which are immediately subject to useful attack; for purposes of attrition against the German military establishment and for the training of our bombers.
- (2) precision attack on non-Pointblank targets within fighter range, when only such targets are weather-free; such targets would include thre and rubber plants, and important war production units where systematic attack is not now contemplated, e.g., Opel, Teves, V.D.E. Hamburg, etc.
- (3) blind bombing of German cities within easy fighter range, so long as the Germans vigorously defend: in order to impose operational attrition and to impose such limited damage to war production as is possible. Since the possibilities of direct damage of significance are so limited, the scale of German reaction, and consequent attrition, must be closely watched, and the value of this type of attack frequently re-examined.

## III. Period II, The Exploitation of Air Supremacy to D Linus 30.

A. The main aim in this interval is defined as the exploitation of air power in such a way as to convince German military and political leaders of the hopelessness of further resistance. It is believed that this aim is most quickly to be decomplished by extended attack on targets of military significance. It is believed that German government policy is now basel primarily

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on fending off the Russians and ruthlessly containing the civil population until such time as its ability to prevent the establishment of a western beach-head is tested. It is believed that this policy will only be reversed in face of . hopeless.military or military supply situation. It is, then, believed that, because of the present structure of the German government, and its present appreciation of the military position, the bombing of cities in order to affect "morale" will have a lesser effect, longer delayed, in detonating the German government's decision to ond the war.

D. The priority among targets in Germany is suggested to be as follows:

1. The folicing of fointblank: recovery must be prevented in the plants already damaged, and the attack driven home against secondary and tertiary targets in the field of fighter production and bearings.

2. Subber and Tires: the completion of the attack on bearings will severely limit the production of all forms of now military equipment. The aim of attack on rubber and tire factories (the latter representing a month's rubber in process) is to strike at the serviceability of existing equipment, especially motor transport. Given air supresacy and measure weather conditions this system could be quickly put out, with little prospect of recuperation for 4-6 months (5 rubber targets, and about 5 tire targets).

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3. Parks and Military Equipment under Assembly: this range of targets would include collections of tanks and artillory, within Germany, as well as such equipment as is to be found in the final stages of finished production.

4. Oil: if air supremacy is achieved early, in relation to D, and if successful attack on Ploesti can be carried out, the oil system would be the optimum means of attack against the servic ability of existing equipment and the mobility of the Germany rmy. It is a system so extensive, however, that attack should not be undertaken unless our capabilities appear adequate for its consummation in the time period available. If excess effort beyond 1-j above is available, however, attack on the oil system might be begun, in anticipation of Beriod IV.

It is believed that against the background of Fointblank, these attacks, by striking at military strength in being, will directly shorten the period of continued Comman resistance, and represent the best hope of ending that resistance before D.

C. All effort available bayoni that which can be expended in the precision bosbing of Germany should be allocated to tactical targets in direct support of Overlowi.

### IV. Period III. D minus 30 to Securing of Firm Bonch-Head.

A. The main and overriding aim in this interval must be the direct support of Overlord.

B. A small amount of effort might legitimately be allocated to the policing of Pointblank and rubber targets, if the rubber system has been completed in Period II.

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# V. Period IV. From Securing of Firm Beach-Hand to German Capitulation.

A. It may be fairly reckoned that, subsequent to the beach-head operations, the Germans will be virtually incapable of defending Germany against daylight bombing attack. The main aim must then be to complete the mission of the strategic bomber force; i.e., the shortening of the war by attack on the center of German military strength. In this period the main burden of tactical support must be carried by polium and light bombers. support must be carried by nelium and light bombors.

The following target priorities are suggested: B.

1. The policing of Pointblank targets and rubber.

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- The policing of Fointblank targets and rubber.
   Tactical support is absolutely required.
   The completion of the attack on oil, which alone among remaining strategic target system offers the opportunity, if completed, of bringing the German war effort to a close.

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# APPENDIX 1

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# PROPERT CONDITION OF FOINTHLANK SYSTEMS

### CONCLUSION

While it is far too early to make definitive statements about much of the damage inflicted during the final week of February, it appears thatGerman planes per month, or 25 per cent of pre-raid peaks of production: twin-engine fighters to about 50 per month or 22 per cent of pre-raid rates; ball and roller bearing output to 40-50 per cent of November levels; while rubber supplies were still at the same figure.

Outstanding targets remaining in POINTHLANK systems are

## Single-engine fighters

Arado-Tutow Focke-Mulf, Posen Focke-Mulf, Kreising Focke-Mulf, Sorau Miener-Neustadter, Fischamend

## Twin-engine fighters

Duna Repulgepyar, Szigentziklos

### Anti-friction bearings

V.H.F., Erkner D.K.F., Leipzig

### Rubber

Schkopeu Hüls Ludwigshafen-Oppeu Hannover-Linner

Secondary targets which may usefully be attacked now on missions planned primarily to achieve other results include:

### Single-engine fighters Arado, Marnerginde Focke-Wulf, Marienburg

Focke-Wulf, Marienburg Fieseler, Kassel/Battenhausen Fieseler, Kassel/Maldau Wiener-Neustadter, Klagenfurt Erla, Leipzig/Abtnaundorf Hungarian Car & Waggon Works, Györ I. M. R., Brasov

### Twin-engine Fighters MIAG, Brunswick, Milhelmitor Junkers, Halberstadt Siebel, Schkeuditz & Halle

Anti-friction bearings Jaeger, Muppertal Muller, Nürenberg

Rubber

### Leverkusen

Of far. more importance than the foregoing secondary targets, however, is the determined policing of major POINTBLANK targets, now seriously damaged, which may receive repairs or be salvaged and transferred to new sites. An allocation of effort should be set aside for this purpose. In particular, recent attacks must be examined carefully with an eye to possible reattack; Norma at Bed Canstatt and the Walzlagerwerk at Steyr appear likely candidates.



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### PRESENT CONDITION OF FOINTBLANK SYSTEMS

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The tables below summ rize present knowledge of the degree of destruction imposed upon fighters, ball bearings and rubber. This information, as noted, is tentative.

### 1. SINCLE-EN INE FICHTERS

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OTHOR AN THE TROP	11.410	•		
	re-Attack Conthly Out- put	Dates of Attack	Present Pro- duction (25-2-44)	Remarks
Ago, Oschersleben	90	28-7-43 11-1-44 20-1-44 22-1-44	C	State of Demage under examination Ferhaps some Production
Ago, Bleiche	-	-	-	Control surface plant. Never attacked. Small.
Arado, Tutow	60	-	75 (?)	Twice attacked thru 10/10. No damage expected.
Arado, Anklam Arado, Marnemuno	- ie -	9-10-43 29-7-43	-	Slow repair. Repaired partially.
F.W. Marienburg	110	9-10-43	20 (?)	Under reconstruc- tion. Perhaps some assembly.
F.I. Csen	-	-	-	Peeds to both Tutow and Marien- burg; some to Sorau.
F.M. Kreising	-	-	-	
F.M. Sorau	50	-	50 (1)	Components from Sorau, Posen and Kreising.
F.W. Sorau	Ŧ	-	-	Perhaps 2 or more small factories.
Fieseler, Kassel/ Waldau	40	30-7-43	25 (?)	Estimate may be low.
Fleseler, Kassel Bettenhausen	1/	30-7-43 3/4-10-43		Repair under way.
Approximate Total: F.W. 190			170 (1)	
Me.109				
W.W.F. Werk I	250	13-8-43 2-11-43 30-9-43	50 (1) perhaps shared with Bad Vöslau	Under some repair
W.H.F. Werk II		13-8-43 30-9-43 2-11-43	HISH DEG FORTAG	Under some repair
W.N.F. Fischamer W.N.F. Mlagenfu	nd rt	16-1-44	-	Minor damage
W.N.F. Bad Vöslau			See above Werk I	
Pottendorf Textile Mills Voslau Textile Mills				Reported in com- ponent production Reported in com- ponent production

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Me.109 Assembly Components	Pre-Attack Monthly Out- put	Dates of Attack	Present Production (25-2-44)	- Remarks
Regensburg/ Obertraubling	(225 as of 22-2-44)	22-2-44 25-2-44	0	Damaged 22-2-44 Destroyed 25-2-44
Regensburg Präfening	250	17-8-43 25-2-44	-	Fully repaired as component plant by 25-2-44. Then destroyed.
Steyrwerke Steyr		23-2-44 24-2-44 24/25-2-44	-	Heavy damage
Erla, Leipzig/ Mockau Leipzig/ Heiterblick	225	20-2-44	25 (%)	Heavily damaged
Abtnaundorf Werk 5 Me.109 Approximate Totals	650 at peak	3/4-12-43	75 (?)	Heavily damaged Undamaged One half destroyed.
Single-engine Fight TOTAL	Approximat <u>950</u> at pea		245 (2)	
Me.110 Assembly Components	Fre-Attack Monthly Out- put	Dates of Attack	Present Pro- duction (25-2-44)	Renz rks
MIAG, Brunswick/ Waggum MIAG, heupetritor MIAG, Wilhelmitor Gothaer, Gotha B.B.F., Furth	50 - 65	11-1-44 20-2-44 21-2-44 20-2-44 20-2-44 25-2-44	0  0	Henvy damage Minor damage Heavy damage Heavy damage
Ne.110 Approximate total Ne. 210-410	115		O	
Me. Augsburg Duna Repulgepyar	30	25-2-44 25/2 <b>6-</b> 2-44	10	Some damage
Szigentmiklos Tokol A/F	30	-	-30	
Me.210-410 Approximate Total Ju.88 <b>4188</b>	60		1.0	
Ju. Bernburg Ju. Halberstadt Ju. Ascheraleben	50	20-2-1,4 11-1-4, 22-2-4,4		ieavy damage Some damage ieavily damaged

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Ju.88 & 188 Assembly Components	Pre-Attack Monthly Out- put	Dates of Attack	Present Pro- duction (25-2-44)	Remarks
Siebel, Schkeuditz	10	-	10	
Siebel, Halle	-	-	-	-
Ju. 38 & 188 Approximate Total	60			
(fighters only)	00		10	
Twin-engine fighters				
Approximate Total	225		50	
ANTI-FRICTION HEARING	<u>35</u>			
Plant	Percentage	Dates of	Percentage	
	Contribution as of 11-43	Attack	Present Out-	Remarks
GEFMANY			put of Nov.	
Augelfischer,	22.2	( 17-8-43		
Schweinfurt		(14-10-43	{	Present estimated based on possible
V.K.F. I & II Schweinfurt	20.3	( 24-2-44	5.0 (1)	dispersal
Fichtel & Sachs Schweinfurt	1.0 (?)	( 24/25-2-44 {	{	-
S.K.F. (Norma) Stuttgart-Canstat			'	
V.K.F.	t 5.8	25-2-44	2.5 (?)	
Berlin-Erkner V.K.F.	4.8		5.0	Increase indicate by ground sources
Berlin-Neuköln D.K.F.	3.9		3.0	
Leipzig	3.9		3.0	Fo sibly damaged in attack
Jaeger, Supportal				3/4-12-43
Lüller,	2.9		2.9	-
Nuremberg N.D.K.	1.9		2.5	Increased employ- ment reported.
Berlin-Lichtenberg	1.0			man a sport over.
Gebauer & Moller, Fulda			1.0	
Robert Eling	1.0		1.0	
Wetzlar	1.0		1.0	
Small Producers	2.0		2.0	
ICTAL	72.5	5	22.	9
USTRIA, POLAND, CZECH	SLOVAKIA			
Steyr, Steyr	10.6	23-2-44	5.0 (?)	
00091	21	24-2-44		
SKF		1 - J-2-444		
Puerstein Small Producers	1.0		1.0	
TOTAL	12.5		7.9	
R.I.V.				
Turin	3.9	8-11-43 )		
R.I.V.		1-12-43 )	.5	
Villar Perose Small Producers	1.0	3		
TOTAL	1.9 (?) 6.8		1.9 2.4	

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Percentage Percentare Plant Remarks Dates of Fresent out-Contribution put of Nov. as of 11-43 Attack FRANCE C.A.M., Bois Colombes 9-9-43 15-9-43 2-9 31-12-43 2.0 C.A.M., Paris Ivry 2.9 S.R.O., Annecy Small Producers 1.4 .5 1.0 3.5 Total 8.2 Note: The "100%" figure for November actually represents 91.6% of bearings available to Germany with Sweden and Switzerland supplying the differential. 4. RUBBER Cutput 1 March Output Place June 1943 Date of Attack 1944 Remarks (tons per year (tons per year. Output at this plant 40,000 Schkopau 30,000 ---may have been expanded as a result of the Huls raid. 22-6-43 15,000 30,000 Hals 15,000 Ludwigshafen Oppau 15,000 This is a plant now 5,000 Oswiecim under construction whose planned output is believed to be much larger than 5,000 tons. This 5,000 ton figure represents an allowance for small partial operation of the uncompleted plant. 5,000 5,000 Leverkusen 10,000 10,000 Others 90,000 Total 90,000 RECLAIM 20,000 annover-Limmer 20,000 20,000 20,000 Other 40,000 Total 40,000 130,000 TOTAL 130,000

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### APPENDIX 2

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### TARGET POTENTIALITIES OF SUBMARINES - MARCH 1944

### CONCLUSION

The self-imposed Cerman decrease in submarine production supports the conclusion that anti-submarine techniques have diminished the effectiveness of this weapon to the point where increasing the already large fleet is deemed unimportant. This fact plus the known slight vulnerability of building in-stallations and the long period between construction and operational use justifies the conclusion that attack upon submarine yards is no longer warranted.

### 1. PRODUCTION, NUMBERS AVAILABLE, DEPTH

Germany had 271 submarines under construction in June 1942, 270 in June 1943, but only 200 as of February 1944. Completions have failen from over 22 to less than 18 per month.

Since a minimum of 1 to 1 years elapses between the laying of a submarine keel and the day it joins the fleet, only a small addition (perhaps 50 submarines) to the present number is likely before OVERLORD.

450 units make up the German submarine fleet. Completions and destruction keep the number of U-boats in the operational fleet roughly constant.

### 2. STRATECIC RELATION OF SUBMARINES TO FUTURE OPERATIONS

U-boat are used chiefly against trans-oceanic supply routes. They may be used, but to an even less effective extent, against actual invasion shipping. Ships already in existence represent almost the entire potential for operations of either type. A slight increase in numbers will hardly affect the effectiveness of this weapon.

Furthermore, present anti-submarine techniques are believed to have diminished the effectiveness of submarines in either use to an extent justifying the conclusion that they will have only the most indirect effect on future military operations in the European theatre.

### 3. TARGETS

Submarines are produced in 19 yards in 12 German cities. Essentially these yards are assembly shops producing submarines from components manufactured all over Occupied Europe.

City	Yard	Submarines on Slips or Fitting Out (all types)	Percent of Total
Bremen	Deschinag	26	13%
Bremerhaven	Deschimag	2	1%
Danzig	Danziger Werft	15	7.5%
Danzig	Schichau	23	11.5%
Emden	Nordsee	7	3.5%
Flensburg	Schiffsbau	9	4.5%
Hamburg	Blohm & Voss	24	12%
Hamburg	Deutsche Werft	4	2%
Hamburg	Howaldt Werke	6	37
Hamburg	Stulcken Sohn	98	4.5% 4%
Kiel	Deutsche Werke	8	
Kiel	Cermania	7	3.5%
Kiel	Howaldt	10	5%
Lubeck	Flenderwerke	12	5%
Rostock	Neptun	8	4%
Stettin	Gollnow	3	1.5%
Stettin	Oderwerke	4	2%
Vegesack	Bremer Vulcan	15	7.5%
Wilhelmshaven TOTAL	Marine Wefft	8 200	100%

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### 4. WULNERABILITY

Damage assessment demonstrates that submarines under construction are virtually invulnerable to anything but a direct hit. With fewer submarines being produced the relatively higher percentage which may be built on covered slips makes this possibility of even lesser interest. Complete destruction of yard facilities such as power plants, metal working shops, slips, and the like has proved difficult, and the comparative resilience of the industry through ready replacement or repair has resulted in only minor delay from even the most successful raids.

### 5. STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF PROSPECTIVE DAMAGE

Ferhaps the best evaluation of the expected future importance of submarine warfare is found in Germany's apparently self-imposed decrease in production after Allied anti-submarine techniques had proved effective, as opposed to increased production during the period of heaviest attacks upon yards. This fact plus the small contribution to total strength possible during the next six months and the proved invulnerability of installations to attack renders the possibility of further yard damage of little probable strategic effect.

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### APPENDIX 3

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# TARGET POTENTIALITIES OF ROMBER AJRCHAFT - MARCH 1944

### CONCLUSION

The destruction of the German fighter aircraft industry deprives bombers of their most significant possible relevance to D-day, i.e. daylight attack on Allied beaches, shipping and ports of embarkation. Potentialities of night attack, however, are such as to merit some consideration to the target system.

Bomber aircraft production and repair now constitute 25 percent of total strength. Attack on final assembly factories for Ju. 88s and Do. 217s would have some effect on the forces available to the GAF on D-day. Deeper attack, felt later, would not be warranted. On qualitative grounds, attack on other types than those mentioned would be wasted.

### 1. PRODUCTION, STRENGTH, AND DEPTH

German cutput of bombers declined in December and January and suffered a further small reduction by the bombing of Rostock, Bernburg and A.T.C. in February. A summary of production and repair and their relationship to total strength follows:

	Fresent Monthly Froduction	Repair	Total Input	Strength	Percentage: Input to Strength
Long-range Bombers and Bomber-Recon- naissance	260	60	320	1325	24
Dive-Bombers and ground attack	85	30	115		
	~,	~	11)	900	16

These figures are fairly typical of the past months during which monthly bomber production and repair together have represented about 20% of total strength. In other words, the turnover of the bomber force has occurred about once every four or five months. In contrast, before the February raids fighters turned over every two and one half to three months.

The part played by repair in the maintenance of the bomber force is more important than for fighters. Monthly input from repairs is about 23% of total new bomber accessions against only 8% in the case of fighters.

# 2. STRATEGIC RELATION TO OVERLORD AND AFTER

An attack on bomber factories will have some effect on the firstline bomber force before D-day, but not as great proportionally as the impact of attack on fighters. For one thing, the interval is longer between acceptance of bombers by the GAF and their arrival at first-line units; for another, as outlined above, the rate of turnover is slower and the contribution of repair plants larger.

The strategic importance of reducing the bomber force, has been lessened. The numbers and effectiveness of the bomber force has declined during the past year as the GAF has gone on the defensive; and its effectiveness has declined even more as a result of the attacks against fighter producers. If fighter support can be cut down by at least 70% with the completion of the campaign against fighter factories, the tactical

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operations of the GAF bomber force in anticipation of D-day and thereafter will be limited in the main to night attacks of relatively low efficiency.

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### 3. TARGETS

The full range of bomber aircraft factories is set forth on the following page, with a rough estimate of current monthly cutput. Final assembly factories of value as targets consist primarily of:

### Ju. 83 & 183 Siebel, Halle Siebel, Schkeuditz Henschel, Schonefeld

Dornier 217 Dornier, Oberpfaffenhofen Dornier, Wisnar

### 4. VULNERABILITY

Subassembly and component erection plants containing machine tools, presses, heat treating apparatus, specialized jigs, etc., are highly vulnerable, but as shown in paragraph 3 they are well scattered. Final assembly plants are more concentrated but their recuperation period is little more than one month in contrast to three to six months for subassembly and component erection. Noither represents a particularly attractive target. Final assembly plants would probably be preferable because of the consequent more immediate effects on strength at D-day.

### 5. PROSPECTIVE DAMAGE AND STRATEGIC EFFECTS

In view of the dispersal of the German bomber industry, the possibilities of recuperation between raids, and the large role played by repairs, it is doubtful whether bomber production and repair could be beaten down to much below 150 from the present 420 per month. This achievement does not seem of sufficient importance, assuming that fighters have been properly dealt with, to warrant diversion from other target systems. With the possible exception of the Do. 217, the Ju. 88 is the conly aircraft that would justify any effort. Ju. 88 producers might be included in a system of policing the POINTBLANK list. Occasional attacks might be made on them by bombers detached from divisions pursuing other systems. Both Dornier and Junkers, however, should be watched for any signs that they are starting to produce fighters, and attacked as scon as such production is under way.

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		AIRCRAFT FACT		•	
	APPROXIMATE MONT	ILY PRODUCTION	AS OF 1 MARCH, 1	9 <u>44</u>	
	Long-range Bombers and Bomber Recor	nnaissance			
	Ju. 88				
	Final Assembly	Number		Percentage	
	A.T.G., Leipzig Henschel, Schonefeld Siebel, Halle ) Siebel, Schkeuditz )	10 60 35 10	(Damaged) 5	4 23 13	
	Components				
	Opel, Russelsheim A.E.G., Wildan /Also Junkers plants below/ Ju. 188				
	Final Assembly				
	Junkers, Bernburg	10	(Severely Damaged)	4	
	Components				
	Junkers, Schonebeck "Halberstadt		(Slightly Damaged)		
	" Aschersleben		(Heavy Damage)		
	Dc. 217				
	Final Assembly				
	Dornier, Oberpfaffenhofen) Norddeutsche Dornier, ) Wismer )	20		ß	
	Components				
	Bornier, Neuaubing Dornier, Lubeck Dornier, Berlin/Reinickerdorf Dornier, ^R eustadt Glewe				
	<u>He. 111</u>				
	Heinkel, Rostock ) " Cranienburg )	90	(Damaged)	34	
	Zome components from Ar	ado plants bel	low/		
	He. 177				
	Heinkel, Oranienburg Arado, Brandenburg /Some components from Arado, Babelsburg/ Ego, Cheb-Oberschön	30		12	
	FW 200 Focke Wulf, Kottbus )	5		2	
_	Ju 290-Junkers, Dessau )	260		100	

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#### Dive-Bombers and Ground Attack Planes Ju. 87 Number Percentage Weser, Bremen, Lenwerder ) ", Berlin/Tempelhof ) 70 82 Components Delmenhorst Hs 129 Henschel, Berlin/Johannisthal 15 18 --85 100

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### AP PENDIX 4

## TARGET POTENTIALITIES OF AIRCRAFT ENGINES - MARCH 1944

### CONCLUSION

Allied attack against airframe factories and assembly plants has already created a sizeable engine surplus. The shortage of ball bearings impedes engine production. Under these circumstances, attack on engine manufacture and assembly is not considered warranted. This conclusion is not subject to modification for special types. Attack should rather be pressed further against aircraft them-

### 1. PRODUCTION, STRENGTH AND DEPTH

Froduction of engines for operational aircraft before the February raids on airframe manufacturers was believed to be roughly 1100 June 211s per month, 1000 DE 603s and 605s, and 700 HMW 801s. Repair output of the three major types was around 1000, 1000, and 600 respectively. The rate at which engine manufacturers will operate following the recent destruction of aircraft plants, is difficult to estimate, first because of the lowered requirements, and second, because of the unknown effects of ball bearing shortages. Undoubtedly all engine plants will be cut back substantially. The following table shows the probable excess of previous production rates over the present requirements for engines to go into new aircraft:

	Airplane Production January 1944	Approximate Post Raid Airplane Pro- duction (March)	Resulting Engine Sur- plus	
Me 109 Me 110 Me 410 FM 190 Ju 88 (with	475 120 60 225	75 0 40 170	(DB 605) 400 (DB 603) 40 (BMW 801) 55	64.0 40
EMW 801) Ju. 88(with	& Ju. 188 75	10	130	185
Jumo 211) He 111	175 100	110 90	(Jumo 211)130 20	150

In addition, the decreased scale of operations forced on the GAF by the reduction in supply of new planes will reduce the demands on engine repair plants.

## 2. TARGETS AND PERCENTAGE CONTRIBUTION

Following is a table of the producers of the three major operational engines, showing their rates of production before February. In some cases, such as Wiener Neudorf, this does not present full capacity, but illustrates only the reduced level of operations following earlier stacks on airframe makers.

JUMO 211 Junkers Köthen Junkers Magdeburg	Number 300	Percentage 27
Mittledeutsche, Leipzig/Taucha	600 100	55
Prague/Cskovice	100	2
	1100	100

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Daimler Benz	605	603	Percentage
Berlin/Genshagen Niedersachsische/	600	100	54
Brunswick-Querum Henschel, Kassel Berlin/Marienfelde Flugmotoren Ostmark,	200 200	35	16 16 3
Wiener/Neudorf		150	_11
	1000	285	100
BMW 801		Number	Percentage
BW Munich/ ) Oberwissenfeld ) Munich/Allach )		360	51
BAN Berlin Basdorf ) Berlin Spandau )		260	37
lockner, Hamburg/ Moorfleth		80	12

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### 3. VULNE RABILITY

Engine manufacturing is fairly well concentrated. A large proportion of the casting and forging processes are subcontracted but remaining work is largely done at the main plants. These are largely typical of light engineering plants. The machines themselves are largely of conventional types, except a few special installations for gear cutting and cylinder grinding, and are moderately vulnerable to fire.

# 4. PROSPECTIVE DAMAGE POSSIBLE AND STRATEGIC EFFECTS

Because of the large excess of engine capacity over requirements, a disproportionate amount of damage would have to be inflicted on the entire engine industry before any strategic effect would be gained against final aircraft output. Even the production of the DB 603, which seems to be well concentrated, could be shifted to any of the other Daimler Benz plants. Attack against it would have to be directed against the whole Daimler Benz system. Direct results on the strength of the GAF in operational aircraft at D-Day and thereafter may much more effectively be gained by continuing to confine attacks to aircraft plants.

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### APPENDIX 5 .

### TARGET POPENTIALITIES OF OIL - MARCH 1944

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#### CONCLUSION

The major question regarding oil refineries and synthetic plants as a target system is whether, in view of the very largo number of targets, it can be successfully attacked in its entirety. Until the present, it appeared that a target system of about 50 to 60 targets was beyond Air Force capabilities. In view of the substantial destruction of German fighter production and the consequent lesser fighter opposition, this job may now be within USSTAF and RAF capabilities.

If this be the case, no other target system holds such great promise for hastening German defeat. Stocks of finished petroleum products are sufficient only for several months military operations. The loss of more than 50% of Axis output would directly and materially reduce German military capabilities through reducing tactical and strategic mobility and front-line delivery of supplies. It would indirectly affect military capabilities through weakening High Command morale and industrial ability to produce weapons and supplies.

The extension of attacks to storage facilities in Western Europe might directly impair German mobility in deploying to meet OVEFLORD. Indirect benefit to OVEFLORD would in any case result from the lessened mobility of German divisions in Finland and Norway, Russia, the Balkans, and Italy.

### 1. PRODUCTION AND STOCKS

If refineries and synthetic plants are not attacked, it is estimated that Axis production of liquid fuels and lubricants during the six months following 1 March 1944 will be 8.6 million tons, comprised as follows:

Crude and shale oil products	4.1	million	tons
Synthetic oil products	3.3	**	**
Substitutes, vegetable oils, etc.	1.2		

Estimated stocks of finished products at 1 March 1944 aggregate about four million tons, equivalent to about three months output and consumption. These stocks include reserves and the entire distributional pipeline, approximately as follows:

Military and civil reserves	1.0 mi	llion	tons	
Operating stocks at Consumption				
points	1.6	25	11	
Stocks in transit	.6	12	π	
Stocks at refineries and synthetic				
plants	.8	**	Ħ	
	1.0	17		

Not all of these stocks could be consumed by the military if output ceased. Some of the stocks at refineries and synthetic plants would be destrayed in bombing. And some of the reserves, operating stocks, and in transit stocks would not be the particular types of products needed (e.g., industrial fuel oil would not satisfy a need for petrol or lubricants.)

Note: Figures on putput, consumption, and stocks are taken or interpolated from papers by U.S. Enemy Oil Committee and British Harley Committee.

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### 2. STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF OIL PRODUCTION

The consumption pattern for the six month period following 1 March 1944, assuming an output of 8.6 million tons, is estimated as follows:

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Military	Millions of Tons	Percent
Army Air Force Navy	2.7 1.3 .9	31 15 11
Total Military	4.9	57
Non-Military		
Industrial & Civil Miscellaneous Increase in Stocks	2.9 .1 .7	34 1 8
Total Non-Militar	ry <u>3.7</u>	43
Total	8.6	100

The relevance of oil production for Army, Air Force and Navy operations is clear; as indicated, stocks suitable for military consumption. are sufficient for only several months military operations.

Denial of bil supplies to the Axis industry and agriculture would impose very severe economic restruction of an attritional character on the economy. This is not immediately or directly relevant.

The political and morale effects of idestroying Germany's ability to produce oil would be substantial. The will to resist of the German High Command and Wehrmacht, the German political leaders, and the German industrial leaders would be weakened. The will to resist of the German people would be less seriously affected, although they would no doubt regret the disappearance of oil for transportation, food production, power, heat, and industrial requirements.

### 3. YULNE BAB LITY

Oil refineries and synthetic oil plants are moderately vulnerable to bomb damage in terms of structure, industrial process, and plant layout. They are large in size, relative to other targets, and would probably require a larger scale of attack than is necessary for, say, aircraft plants. Recuperation time for a severally damaged plant is relatively slow, six months and more.

### 4. TARGETS

To reduce output in synthetic plants and refineries to virtually zero in the six minths following 1 March requires the destruction of 23 synthetic plants (about 3.3 million tons) and 31 refineries (about 3.7 million tons). The capacity of the 31 designated refineries is about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  times as large as their output; it is necessary to destroy this excess capacity as well as the capacity in operation. Additional excess capacity in France, Holland and Italy, inconveniently located, might be resorted to by the Germans as an extreme measure. Manyare coastal refineries which formerly handled crude oil from clean tankage. They are located within easy bombing range. A list of the 54 targets involved is attached.

#### 5. EFFECTS

The impairment to German military and industrial capabilities and German morale which would be achieved from actually putting the 23 synthetic plants and the 31 refineries out of action, is very great. If military oil supplies could be totally denied, their resistance to Russian offensives would collapse when stocks were used up; resistance to OVERLORD could be maintained only as long as sotoks endured; and GAP air opposition to USAAF and RAF

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activity would cease with the disappearance of stocks. Destruction of over half as much output, that is, about more than 3.5 million tons in the six months following 1 March would (a) deny to the Axis military forces one-quarter to one-third of their military re uirements of about 5 million tons; and (b) reduce industrial and tirilian supplies by one half. These effects would be militarily significant, directly through impairing military mobility and front line delivery of supplies and indirectly through affecting both High Command morals and industrial ability to produce weapons. Achievement of much less than half the program, however, would permit the decrease in output to be absorbed by changes in stocks, some decrease in non-military consumption, and insubstantial reductions in military consumption. It would not necessarily have significant direct or indirect military effects.

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The destruction of oil production would not affect the opening stages of OVERLORD if the Germans chose to allocate stocks to the Western Front. Although if production facilities were destroyed these stocks could probably be profitably attacked as tactical targets, the small volume of oil required for initial OVERLORD operations could not likely be denied the Germans.

The oil target system is a vast one and requires an effort greater than has heretofore been thought could be available. The prospective early completion of the aircraft targets in POINTELANK makes it appear for the first time that this effort may indeed be available (a) because bomber loss rates will be reduced, this permitting a larger USSTAF effort; and (b) because under conditions of much decreased GAF opposition, the RAF may be capable of daytime operation. If this be the case -- that a program of destroying three-fourths or more of enemy oil production can be achieved - - the three grounds of military impairment, economic attrition, and weakening the enemy will to resist argue that this is a most effective way for airpower to help win the war. If the program of attack can be achieved only in part, the strategic effect may be less than could be obtained from attacking other target targets.

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#### ANNEX - - OIL TARGETS

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#### The following tables require a word of explanation.

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#### Table 1 presents synthetic oil plants and their output.

Table 2 includes all Axis refineries capable of handling crude oil which are believed to be operating at more than 60,000 tons per annum. It also includes five large refineries of unknown activity which represent convenient alternative capacity. Table 2, in short, is the list of primary oil objectives in the refining field.

Table 3 lists major refineries not now believed to be engaged in crude oil refining. Some are definitely known to be inoperative and some are believed destroyed or dismantled. The great majority are inconveniently located; German efforts to use them would be an extreme measure. Aerial reconnaissance of these, particularly those for which inactivity is not certain, is essential to prevent major loopholes from arising in the target systems.

Table 4 lists all other European refineries capable of operating on crude oil. Current information on their activity, which could be improved by aerial reconnaissance, is indicated. Operating plants represent useful secondary objectives or targets of opportunity. The aggregate capacity of these plants is sufficient to refine the percent of crude oil output and represents to percent of total oil output. Their attack, therefore, is not an essential ingredient of the oil target system.

TABLE 1

#### Synthetic Oil Plants - March 1, 1944

Loc	Contraction and Contraction	Annual Output	Percent of Total Synthetic Output	Percent of Total Synthetic & Refining Output
1.	Brux	680	10	5
2.	Leuna	620	9	24
3.	Poelitz	620	9 8	4
40	Blech, S	520	8	4
5.	Gelsenkirchen Nordstern	430	7	3
6.	Scholven-Buer	380	6	3
7.	Schwarzheide	350	5	2
8.	Troglitz Seitz	340	5	2
9.	Böhlen Rotha	320	5 5	2
10.	Magdeburg	300	5	2
11.	Blech, N	270	4	2
12.	Wesseling	220	3	1
13.	Homberg	190	3	1
14.	Castrop Rauxel	150	2	1
15.	Lutzkendorf	150	2	1
16.	Lutzkendorf Mucheln	150	2	1
17.	Holton	130	2	1
18.	Krupp (Waune Bichel	) 130	2	1
19.	Welheim Bottrop	120	2	1
20.	Deschowitz	110	2	1
21.	Essener Verein	100	2	1
22.	Hoesch	90	1	1
23.	Kuhlman (Harnes)	30	1	-
24.	Unknown Plants	200	3	1
		6,600	100	45

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Primary Crude Oil Refinery Objectives.

TABLE 2

be 1	m to arge lucers.	Refinery	<u>Capacity</u> (In thousand of tons per annum)	is	Percentage of total usable capacity suit- ably located (In percent)
1.	Astra Romana,	Ploesti, Rumania	1,750	Capacity operation	n 14
2.	Concordia,	Ploesti, Rumania	1,300	Major portion in a	use 10
3.	Americana,	Ploesti, Rumania	1,100	Capacity operation	n 9
4.	Unirea,	Ploesti, Rumania	800	Major portion in a	use 6
5.	Harburg, Germany		550	Capacity operation	a 4
6.	Petrol Block,	Floesti, Rumania	550	Major portion in a	use 4
7.	Lobau, Austria		350	Capacity operation	3
8.	Hannover, Misburg		300	Capacity operation	2
9.	Shell, Budapest,	Hungary	220	Capacity operation	2
10.	Dacia, Rumania		220	Major portion in u	use 2
11.	Prahova Petrolul,	Bucharest, Rumania	200	Major portion in u	uge 2
12.	Pardubice, Czecho	slovakia	180	Capacity operation	1
13.	Almas Fuzito, Hun	gary	170	Capacity operation	1
14.	Bratislava		150	Capacity operation	1 °
15.	Columbia, Ploesti	, Rumania	135	Capacity operation	1
16.	Floridsdorf, Aust	ria	100	Capacity operation	1
17.	Breanen Oslebshaus	en, Germany	100	Capacity operation	l
18.	Caprag, Yugoslavia	a	120	Major portion in u	se l
19.	Merkwiller, Peche	lbronn, France	130	lajor portion in u	se l
20.	Drohobycz (Polmin	, Foland	120	Major portion in u	se l
21.	Magyar, Budapest,	Hungary	90	Capacity operation	1
22.	Drohobycz, Galicia	a, Poland	90	Major portion in u	se l
23.	Trbzebinja, Poland	1	90	Major portion in u	se l
24.	Czechowice (Dzieds	zice), Poland	90	Major portion in u	se l
25.	Rolin		80	Capacity operation for lube oil, not crude	1
26.	KAGRAN, AUSTRIA		75	Capacity operation	1
27.	Speranta, Ploesti,	Rumania	400	Unknown	3
28.	Eurotank, Hamburg,	Germany	400	Unknown	3
29.	Xenia, Ploesti, Ra		260	Unknown	2
30.	Redeventza, Rumani	ia	230	Unknown TOTAL	- 2
31.	Lumina Petromina,	Rumania	140	Unknown 10,490	1 84

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## Table 3

Major Crude Oil Refineries Which Are Unused or Whose Activity is Unknown

	0	<u>Capacity</u> n thousands f tons per nnum)	<u>Remarks</u> -
1.	Gonfreville, France	1,600	Believed destroyed
2.	Port Jerome, France	1,100	Believed destroyed
3.	Martigues, France	900	Unused; inconveniently located
4.	Petit-Couronne, France	800	Believed destroyed
5.	Etang de Berre, France	500	Unused; inconveniently located
6.	Rotterdam-Pernis	500	Very slight activity; inconveniently located.
7.	Pauillac	500	Believed destroyed
8.	Venice, Italy	450	Activity unknown; inconven-
			iently located.
9.	Dunkirk, France	410	Believed destroyed
10.	L'Avera, France	400	Unused; inconveniently located.
11.	Aquila, Trieste, Italy	350	Activity unknown; inconven- iently located
12.	Bec d'Ambes, France	350	Unused; inconviniently located
13.	Spezia, Italy	310	Unused; inconveniently located
14.	Ebano, Hamburg, Germany	300	Unused
15.	Courchalettes, France	250	Activity unknown.
16.	Gravenchon, France	250	Believed destroyed
17.	Frontignan (Sete)	200	Unused; inconveniently located
18.	Leghorn, Italy	185	Believed destroyed
19.	Donges, France (2 plants)	320	Unused; inconveniently logated
20.	Ostermoor, Hamburg, Germany	150	Unused.
21.	Ramsa, Fiume, Italy	120	Believed destroyed
22.	SIAP, Trieste, Italy	120	Activity unknown; inconven-
Section 0	orney arrowers, around		iently located
23.	Antwerp (Redeventza) Belgium	120	Believed destroyed
24.	Lunanowa, Foland	90	Used for storage
25.	Ghent, Langerbrugge (Shell), Belgium	85	Activity Unknown
26.	Novy Bohumin (Oderberg), Czechoslovak	ia 65	Activity Unknown
	Total Capacity exceeding		

Total Capacity exceeding refineries destroyed, or inconveniently located.

Percentage of total usable capacity suitably located.

7 per cent

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	Table 4	
	MINOR CRUDE OIL RE	2STT STUTT
Refinery	Capacity	
	(Th thousand	Remarks
	(In thousandis	
	of tons per	
Rumania	annum )	
Noris	50	Antiputt .
Brasso-Vacuum	35	Activity unknown
	"	Partial operation
Austria		
Schwechat		
	50	Capacity operation
Kornenberg	45	Capacity operation
Vosendorf	40	Canadity operation
Drossing	35	Capacity operation
	"	Activity unknown
Hungary		
Fanto Budapest		
Hazaii	50	Capacity operation
	50	Capacity operation
Munkacs	25	Veder operation
Petfurdo	20	Major portion in use
Nyirbogdany		Major portion in use
Szoreg	15	Major portion in use
0	10	Major portion in use
Czechoslovakia		
Dibutosiovakia		
Dubova	60	Ma ion mantilan (
Prwoz (Moravska Ostrava)	55	Major portion in use
Kralupy		Activity unknown
	40	Activity unknown
Yugoslovia		
Smederovo		
	50	Activity unknown
Osijek (Ipoil)	25	Activity unknown
		ACCTATON AURIOWN
Poland		
Meglowice (Jaslo)	10	
Glinik-Mariampolski	60	
Drohobycz (Nafta)	60	Major portion in use
Dionobycz (Naita)	35	Major portion in use
Krosno	30	llead for stars
Lwow	30	Used for storage
	50	Major portion in use
Italy		
Fornovo Tara		
TOTHOAD TSLA	50	Activity unknown; inconveniently
		Theonvenient ly
Germany		located.
Dusseldorf	25	Automatica and
Regensburg (4 targets)		Activity unknown
Schonberg	00	Activity unknown
Templehof	18	Activity unknown
T out TOTOT	15	Activity unknown
		A CONTRACTOR
France		
Autun	15	Thele all in
	.,	Shale oil operation

P A G E I S U N C L A S S I

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	Table 4 cont'd. Refinery Morway Vallo-Toneberg	Capacity (In thousands of tons per annum)		
T H I S P A G E I S U N C L L A S S I I F I E D	<ul> <li>Belgiun Antwerp-Kiel Ghent Langerbrugge Hoboken (Soconj) Antwerp-Darse</li> <li>Holland Flushing Asphalt</li> <li>Total, excluding the few believed destroyed or inconveniently located</li> <li>Percentage of total usable capacity suitably located</li> </ul>	50 20 20 20 40(?) <u>1,253</u> <u>9 per cent</u>	Activity unknown; inconveniently located. Believed destroyed Activity unknown Believed destroyed Activity unknown Activity unknown	

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## APPENDIX6

### TARGET POTENTIALITIES OF TIRES - MARCH 1944

#### CONCLUBION

Tires do not constitute an important primary target system. The six major factories, however, have some value as secondary targets for filling out missions planned about more significant targets. The destruction of their contents by successful incendiary attack would liquidate stocks of rubber in bulk and in process, and thus reduce by half a month the time required for deep impact of the attack on rubber output.

It is not likely that the destructin of tire factories or tire stocks in military depots in Western Europe could affect enemy capabilities of resisting OVERLORD:

### 1. PRODUCTION, DEPTH. AND TURNOVER

(1) Axis tire production is estimated to be about 200,000 per year of which perhaps 15,000 covers are required for motor vehicles. The remainder are chiefly airplane tires. To a considerable extent, capacity is interchangeable among various types of tire output. A large volume of excess plant capacity exists. Shortage of rubber is the limiting factor on production.

(ii) Stocks of tires on military vehicles, in depots, and on civilian vehicles are probably sufficient so that no immediate effect could be gained by the loss of tire making capacity. Between five and ten percent of the tires in service must be replaced each month. Loss of synthetic and reclaim rubber capacity will produce effects on the service shilty of German military equipment in perhaps 6 months. The loss of rubber at tire plants is a moderately useful reinforcement of successful attack against rubber production.

#### 2. STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

(i) Most newly produced tires are used as replacements on motor vehicles in service. New motor vehicles absorb 10 to 15 percent of monthly output. Since tire replacement and retreading are to some degree postponable, the immediate effect of loss of both synthetic rubber and of tire output would only be to equire still further economies in German usage. After three months, however, tire stringencies would begin to impinge gradually and cumulatively on military mobility and industrial activity.

(ii) It may be seriously doubted that the loss of tire output now would affect German ability to resist OVERLORD. Even if the tire depots on Western Europe could be located, their destruction by fire, superimposed on the loss of new output, would have attritional effects rather than impair tactical mobility.

#### 3. TANGETS

The following lists presents output figures for the six major targets, as well as for some of the smaller operating plants:

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Firm	Location	(	Capacity Output in thousands of covers per mo.)	\$ of Total Output
Continental	Hannover-Vahrenwalder- strasse Hannover-Nordhafen Hannover-Marienwerder	250) 125) ? )	85	43
Bata	Zlin, Czechoslovakia	25	25	12
Pirelli	Milan, Italy	70	25(?)	12
Dunlop	Haneu	100	19	10
Phoenix	Hamburg-Harburg	50	13(?)	6
Fulda	Fulda	60	12	6
Metzler	Munich	50	10	5
15-20 Others		670	_11_	6
	TOTAL 1	,300	200	100

### 4. VULNE LABILITY

Tire plants have the characteristic of high vulnerability to fire. They are also relatively small and compact in layout.

### 5. FROSPECTIVE LAMAGE FOSSIBLE AND STRATEGIC EFFECTS

About one-half month's loss of rubber supplies would result from successful attack upon the six largest targets listed above. This would hasten the impairment of military mobility and industrial activity which would result fr m destruction of the rubber target system.

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### APPENDIX7

### TARGET FOTENTIALTIES OF MOTOR TRANSPORT VEHICLES - MARCH 1944

### CONCLUSION

Attack on motor vehicle factories cannot significantly effect German military mobility within a short period of time. As a long run target system the impairment which such attacks would impose on the Wehrmacht and industry in a year would be useful but of disappointing magnitude; perhaps of the order of a 20 percent reduction in present holdings. Wastage is a small proportion of holdings.

#### 1. PRODUCTION, MILITARY USE, AND RATE OF TURNOVER

Production of trucks in Axis Euroe is estimated at 100,000 per year. At least 90 percent of this output is for military use. The remainder is for essential industrial use. Truck holdings are roughly estimated to total slightly over 1 million, of which about 500,000 are military holdings. Perhaps 200,000 civilian vehicles are suitable for military use. Wastage is estimated at 200,000 per year, of which 165,000 is military truck wastage. The rate of military truck wastage is thus about 35 percent per year, while civilian truck wastage is 10 percent or less per year.

2. DEPTH

On the average, completed trucks at assembly factories are one to two months behind military use in theaters of operation, or alternatively several weeks behind use in Germany and Western Europe.

#### 3. STRATEGIC RELATION TO OVERLORD AND AFTER

Adequate numbers of trucks are, of course, essential to German resistance to Overlord. Since the number of trucks which will be produced in the next six months is but 10 percent of the military holdings available to the Germans (and a somewhat smaller percentage of military holdings plus useful civilian motor transport), the significance of truck production to OVER-LORD is negligible. Supplemental stacks on motor vehicle parks could likewise not be expected substantially to affect OVERLORD opposition unless undertaken immediately prior to D-day.

If truck wastage over the next year were not replaced, probable requisitioning of 50,000 to 100,000 vehicles from the civilian economy would hold shrinkage in net military holdings to about 20 percent. The result would be useful impairment of military mobility and a greater impact upon economic productiveity.

#### 4. TANGETS

The major truck producers and their estimated output are presented in the following table. Plants without cutput figures contribute in unknown amounts to the other plants of the same company.

Firm	Location	Output	S of Total Output
Ford Motor Co.	1. Köln-Niehl	22,000	22
	2. Antwerp	?	7
	3. Amsterdam	?	?
	4. Berlin-Johannisthal	?	7
Adam Opel A.G.	1. Brandenburg	17.000	17
Daimler Benz A.G.	1. Gaggenau	10,000	10
	2. Unterturkheim	1,500	2
	3. Sindelfingen	1,500	1
	4. Mannheim	?	?
	5. Marienfelde	?	?

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### Appendix 7 Contd.

Fire	Location	Output	% of Total Output
Citroen	1. Clichy ) 2. St. Ouen ) 3. Epinettes ) 4. Grenelle ) 5. Gutenberg ) 6. Javel )	13,000	13
Carl F. W. Borgward	1. Bremen	6,000	6
Bussing-Nag	1. Brunswick	6,000	6
Auto-Union	1. Siegnar	5,000	5
Others	-	18,000	
		100,000	100

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## 5. VULNAMABILITY

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Truck factories have the same moderate order of vulnerability as other light and medium engineering plants. Most German plants have only the conventional machine tools which could be replaced after bombing.

# 6. FROSPLCTIVE DAMAGE FOSSIBLE AND STRATEGIC EFFECTS

Successful attack of this target system would not have significant military effect for at least a year. This is due to the low ratio of truck production to military holdings and to the possibility of requisitioning civilian trucks. The magnitude of effect which would then take place would be less than that which can be expected from successful attack against the rubber target system, to which it is an alternative.

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### APPENDIX 8

## TARGET POTENTIALITIES OF AXIS EURCIEAN THANSPORT - MARCH 19/4

### CONCLUSION

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Acis European transportation cannot be recommended as a target system for strategic attack. Military traffic forms a small proportion of total traffic; at its maximum it will not be more than about one-fifth of total traffic. A reduction of at least 30% could be made in European rail traffic (the most important part of the traffic system, and the part which is relatively vulnerable to air attack) without affecting enemy military potential for a year. To effect a reduction of this order would demand attack on more than 500 targets. At least 250 of these targets are major workshop areas of heavy construction, requiring a large weight of bombs. Attritional strategic attack on Axis transport is therefore considered undesirable. The present report does not treat the merits of interdiction of lines, which constitutes mainly a tactical problem.

#### 1. THE TRAFFIC SYSTEM

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Total freight traffic in Axis Europe is currently estimated at about 2 billion tons, or 400 billion ton kilometers. Of this, about three-quarters (both in terms of tons and ton kilometers) is carried on the railways, and nearly a quarter on the inland waterways. The contribution of coastal shipping, while important for certain specific hauls, is small in overall terms, and highway traffic is negligible.

Attritional attack on transport in general ( which is the only type considered in this note; as contrasted with attacks on specific movements at specific times) must be directed chiefly at the railways. The waterways carry only a quarter of the total freight traffic, which consists of coal, building materials, timber, and grain, while practically none of it consists of military supplies. Further, most water-borne traffic is on natural river waterways relatively invulnerable to attack. At present, direct military trafficmunitions and other supplies shipped to field units - constitutes about one-sixth or less of total rail traffic. Most of this is on the Eastern Front. In the period of heavy fighting and maximum troop movements in France, the average proportion of military traffic over any period of time will not rise over about one-fifth of the total, and may not rise at all if the retreat in the East continues.

#### 2. DEPTH

More than two-thirds of the total railway freight traffic consists of coal and coke, construction materials, iron ore and other minerals, unprocessed bulk foodstuffs, fertilizers, and iron and steel mill products. A reduction in the supply of these items would not make itself felt on the fighting fronts for a considerable time. None of the classes is, on the average, less than six months away from finished armaments in the production cycle, and the existence of stocks and pipelines means that they are seven or eight months from the front line. Some items, like fertilizers, and construction materials, may be as much as twenty months deep. The average depth

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### Appendix 8 (contd)

of the whole rail transport system is certainly as great as the average depth of the whole production cycle; this is at least nine months, and may be as much as a year.

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#### 3. STRATEGIC RELATION TO OVERLORD AND AFTER

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The fact that direct military traffic is not expected to constitute more than one-fifth of total rail traffic even during the period of intensive fighting and high reinforcement rate which will follow the invasion of Western Europe means that a 30% cut in traffic will have no effect on OVERLORD.

The great depth of the transport system means large reductions could be made in rail transport without affecting military capabilities for some time. It is estimated that a 30% reduction in railway traffic, falling largely on coal, iron ore, fertilizers, construction materials, and agricultural products could be sustained for at least a year without affecting the strength of the Whrmacht in the field. Thus the military position of the energy would not be affected within a relevant period by any attack on transport in general which could be mounted. (See below, paragraph 4).

#### 4. TARGLIS

A sustained reduction in the carrying capacity of the railway system in general can best be achieved by an attack on serviceable locomotives. Attack on other possible sub systems such as rolling stock or permanent way facilities would each require a much larger effort to achieve the same effect. Locomotives are in relatively shorter supply than freight cars on the continent today. Moreover, the destruction of a similar proportion of the total stock would demand attack on a greater number of targets. The railway network of Germany and Western Europe is so dense, and repairs to most permanent way facilities so quickly effected, that no considerable sustained reduction in traffic can be achieved by feasible effort against the rail network.

In order to achieve a reduction of 30% in rai way freight traffic, enough locomotives would have to be put out of action to eliminate all passenger traffic above the absolute minimum possible (estimated at 50% of the present passenger train mileage) as well as to cut down freight service. There are a total of about 54,000 serviceable mainline steam locomotives in Axis Europe today, and about 10,000 more being overhauled in major repair shops. The reduction of freight traffic by 30% would require a reduction of this number by nearly 20,000 locomotives, in addition to normal wastage and eabotage.

At any one time serviceable locomotives would be found more or less equally distributed between open railway lines and locomotive sheds. There are about 3000 locomotive sheds in Axis Europe. The 20 largest would at any one time contain a most 1400 locomotives; the next 40 might contain another 1400. Heavy attack on these 60 targets might thus result in the destruction of about 2500 locomotives. It is doubtful that heavy attack on the next 100 sheds would contribute more than another 2500 locomotives.

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During a six-month period, the 36 producers of main line steam locomotives will produce about 15000 locomotives. Destruction of these 36 plants would mean the reduction of the total by 150 locomotives. In the same period, a out 13,000 locomotives will go to major repair shops for overhauls. There are about 200 major repair shops in Axis Europe; the 50 largest do about one-third of the total repair work. Destruction of these 50 would result at most in an increase in unserviceable locomotives and a destruction of locomotives of 5000 in this six month period.

An additional burden on the railroads equivalent to the loss of about 3000 locomotives could be achieved by stopping traffic on the Mittelland Canal in Germany. Successful attack on 16 targets - 2 ship elevators, 5 squeducts, 7 locks, and 2 embankments, would render the whole canal unusable.

Thus successful attacks on 262 targets would result in a reduction of the locomotive supply by about 14,500 units. The reduction of efficiency in handling the locomotives in the neighborhood of the larger sheds which have been destroyed might be equivalent to another 500 locomotives, bringing the total up to 15,000. Thus the destruction of 5000 locomotives by other means is required to fulfil the program. This could be done in part by strafing and bombing individual locomotives - Which has up to now achieved a maximum rate of destruction of considerably less than 1000 in six months, and in part by further attack on locomotive sheds cortaining fewer than 20 locomotives each.

#### 5. VULNERABILITY

Except for the 16 waterway targets, all the targets discussed above require heavy attack to produce major damage. The buildings of locomotive sheds, repair shops, and producers are all large and strongly built, with gantry eranes and generally with steel framing. Minor damage to these buildings will have little effect on activity, since equipment and contents are very heavy.

The average locomotive shed and surrounding track area on which locomotives are parked consists of about 10 acres, of which the shed comprises 3. A major repair shop or factory may have a plant area of 100 acres or more, of which about 50% is covered by buildings.

#### 6. POSSIBLE DAMAGE AND EFFECTS

It is doubted that any scale of attack can be mounted which will achieve destruction of the listed targets in six munths or even a year. If this were achieved, no military effect would be felt for more than 9 months following the completion of the program. Therefore no significant military effect can be expected from attack on this system in any relevant time period.

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### APPENDIX 9

## TALGET FOTENTIALITIES OF GRINDING WHEELS - MARCH 1944

#### CONCLUSIONS

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A concerted series of attacks upon seven grinding wheel plants will have a useful effect in decreasing the productivity of a wide (if unpredictable) range of armament and engineering industries. Such effect will begin to make itself felt upon German industry within 3 - 4 months and upon military capabilities within 5 -7 months of completion of the attacks.

### 1. FRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION AND STOCKS

German European production and consumption of grinding wheels were both recently estimated to be of the order of 36,000 tons per annum. Stocks were believed equal to two months requirements. Since grinding wheel requirements have presumably decreased as a result of recent attacks on ball bearing, aircraft and other machining plants without any significant parallel decline in production, present stocks may be roughly estimated equal to 3 - 4 months requirements.

## 2. STRATEGIC RELATION TO OVERLORD AND AFTER

Available stocks render unlikely effects from even immediate attacks on grinding wheel plants before OVERLORD. However, within 3 - 4 months of simultaneous or nearly simultaneous destruction of key grinding wheel plants, production of all types of engines and components, crank-shafts, piston rings, ordnance components, gears, machine tools and other products requiring close tolerances would be seriously (if perhaps unpredictably) impaired.

#### 3. TAIGLTS

Nearly 60% of all German European grinding wheels are produced in seven plants. These plants account for 90% of all controlled structure wheels (reputedly of higher precision):

City	Plant	Percent of Total All Types	Percent of Controlled Structure Wheels
Dresden Alt-Benatek	Dresden Reick A.G. United Electrit and	12%	20%
near Prague Frankfurt Le Bourget/ Paris	Carborundum Naxos Union Meules Norton	12% 8% 6%	18% 12% %
Offenbach Wesseling Dusseldorf	Nayer & Schnidt Deutsche Norton Deutsche Carborundum	7% 7% 6%	10% 10% 9%

#### 4. VULNERABILITY

The kilns in which grinding wheels are fired are highly vulnerable to H.E. and are probably quite vulnerable to blast. Replacement times vary from six weeks to six months depending on the size and type of kiln. It must be particularly noted, however, that the limited number of experienced repair and construction personnel would impose serious delays if several plants were attacked at the same time.

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### Appendix 9 (contd)

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### 5. STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE DAMAGE

Concerted attacks against the seven leading producers will have an important overall effect upon production of a great but unpredictable variety of military equipment and machine tools. Because many consumers employ semi-skilled help, variations in the specifications of grinding wheels produced by smaller firms and presumably to be made available to high priority consumers who are deprived to their normal source of supply, will offer a significant bonus in the form of decreased productivity.

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### APPENDIX 10

### TANGET POTENTIALTIES OF TANKS, TANK ENGINES, TANK GEARBOXES - MARCH 1944

### CONCLUSION

Three significant targets exist in the field of tank engines and gearboxes. Their destruction would produce a material loss of tank output in the third to six months following attack. This result would not affect early enemy resistance to OVERLORD, except perhaps by inducing him to employ his tanks more conservatively (a qualitative benefit to our landing), and through slowing down tank allocations to the Eastern Front. Once our landing had been assured, however, the lack of tank replacements would gradually be felt quantitatively.

#### 1. PRODUCTION. STRENGTH AND DEFTH

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Ground evidence of German efforts to increase tank production appears to justify increasing estimates from 400 (based on analysis of serial numbers) to 500-600 units per month. First line strength is believed to be of the order of 4000 tanks. The normal intervals from completion of engines and completion of tank assembly to delivery to first line units are four and two months respectively.

### 2. STRATEGIC RELATION TO OVERLORD AND AFTER

Destruction of tank assembly or tank engine plants all not affect first line strength before D-day. Thereafter, within the relatively limited defensive importance of tanks, inability to replace tanks should detract from German defensive capabilities by imposing limitations upon the mobility of overall available weapons. The prospective loss of replacements may, moreover, result in the conservative employment of tanks in first line units, except in the energy's exploitation of major opportunities.

#### 3. TAHGETS

There are eleven or more tank assembly plants; in the absence of evidence of relative size, these are assumed to be of approximately equal importance. Because of the possibility of using other heavy industry plant, the relative invulnerability of such factories and lack of evidence of a higher degree of importance of any of the plants, attack on assembly plants is not recommended. Several of them have suffered varying degress of damage.

Serial number analysis indicates that two plants, Maybach Motorenbau at Friedrichshafen and Norddeutsche Motorenbau at Berlin produce all or nearly all tank engines. Maybach designs all and produces approximately twice as many engines as Nordbau. Mayback also may be important as an engine repair center and gear box producer.

The Zahnradfabrik in Friedrichshafen supplies a majority of all tank gears.

#### 4. VULNERABILITY

Tank engine and gear plants contain some specialized but more general purpose machinery. The three plants named under paragraph 3 are fairly typical light engineering plants of a type believed vulnerable to HE attack.

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## Appendix 10 (contd)

5. STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE DAMAGE

Assembly plant stocks of engines and gear boxes are sufficient to prevent any decline in final assembly for approximately two months following severe damage to Maybach, Nordbau and Zahnradfabrik. The six months following such damage, however, would result in an overall loss of approximately 1000 tanks, with consequent impairment of enemy military capabilities.

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1. Fully tracked self propelled guns are treated as tanks in this report.

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#### ANNEX - - OIL TARGETS

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The following tables require a word of explanation.

Table 1 presents synthetic oil plants and their output.

Table 2 includes all Axis refineries capable of handling crude oil which are believed to be operating at more than 60,000 tons per annum. It also includes five large refineries of unknown activity which represent convenient alternative capacity. Table 2, in short, is the list of primary oil objectives in the refining field.

Table 3 lists major refineries not now believed to be engaged in crude oil refining. Some are definitely known to be inoperative and some are believed destroyed or dismantled. The great majority are inconveniently located; German efforts to use them would be an extreme measure. Aerial reconnaissance of these, particularly those for which inactivity is not certain, is essential to prevent major loopholes from arising in the target systems.

Table 4 lists all other European refineries capable of operating on crude oil. Current information on their activity, which could be improved by aerial reconnaissance, is indicated. Operating plants represent useful secondary objectives or targets of opportunity. The aggregate capacity of these plants is sufficient to refine 14 percent of crude oil output and could represent 8 percent of total oil output. Their attack, therefore, is not an essential ingredient of the oil target system.

TABLE 1 Synthetic Oil Plants - March 1, 1944

Loc	ation	Annual Output	Percent of Total Synthetic Output	Percent of Total Synthetic & Refining
1.	Brux	680	10	5 Output
2.	Leuna	620	9	/
3.	Poelitz	620	ģ	7
4.	Blech, S	520	8	7
5.	Gelsenkirchen Nordstern	430	7	3
6.	Scholven-Buer	380	6	3
7.	Schwarzheide	350	5	2
8.	Troglitz Zeitz	340	4	2
9.	Bohlen Rotha	320	5	2
10.	Magdeburg	300	5	2
11.		270	4	2
12.	Wesseling	220	3	1
13.	Homberg	190	3	1
14.	Castrop Rauxel	150	2	1
15.		150	2	ī
	Lutzkendorf Mucheln	150	2	1
17.		130	2	1
18.	The second manufacture and	130	2	1
19,		120	2	1
20.		110	2	1
21.		100	2	1
22.		90	1	1
23.		30	1	-
24.	Unknown Plants	200	3	1 45

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## TABLE 2

## Primary Crude Oil Refinery Objectives

Known to be large producers.	Refinery	Capacity (In thousand; of tons per		Percentage of total usable capacity suit- ably located (in percent)
1. Astra Romana,	Ploesti, Rumania	1,750	Capacity operation	n 14
2. Concordia,	Ploesti, Rumania	1,300	Major portion in a	use 10
3. Americana,	Ploesti, Rumania	1,100	Capacity operation	n 9
4. Unirea,	Ploesti, Rumania	800	Major portion in	use 6
5. Harburg, Germa	ny	550	Capacity operation	n 4
6. Petrol Block,	Ploesti, Rumania	550	Major portion in a	ase 4
7. Lobau, Austria		350	Capacity operation	3
8. Hannover, Misb	urg	300	Capacity operation	2
9. Shell, Budapes	t, Hungary	220	Capacity operation	2
10. Dacia, Rumania		220	Major portion in u	250 2
11. Prahova Petrola	ul, Bucharest, Rumania	200	Major portion in a	156 2
12. Pardubice, Cze	choslovakia	180	Capacity operation	1
13. Almas Fuzito, H	lungary	170	Capacity operation	1
14. Bratislava		150	Capacity operation	1
15. Columbia, Ploes	sti, Rumania	135	Capacity operation	1
16. Floridsdorf, Au	astria	100	Capacity operation	1
17. Bremen Oslebsha	usen, Germany	100	Capacity operation	1
18. Caprag, Yugosla	via	120	Major portion in us	se l
19. Merkwiller, Peo	helbronn, France	130	Major portion in u	50 1
20. Drohobycz (Polm	in), Poland	120	Major portion in us	se 1
21. Magyar, Budapes	t, Hungary	90	Capacity operation	1
22. Drohobycz, Gali	cia, Poland	90	Major portion in us	se 1
23. Trbzebinja, Pol	and	90	Major portion in us	10 1
24. Czechowice (Dzi	edsice), Poland	90	Major portion in us	10 1
25. Kolin		80	Capacity operation	
			for lube oil, not orude	1

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26.	KAGRAN, AUSTRIA		75	Capacity operation	1
27.	Speranta, Ploesti, Rumania		400	Unknown	3
28.	Eurotank, Hamburg, Germany		400	Unknown	3
29.	Zenia, Ploesti, Rumania		260	Unknown	2
30.	Redeventza, Rumania		230	Unlanown	2
31.	Lumina Petromina, Rumania		140	Unknown	1
		TOTAL	10,190		84

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### Table 3

Major Crude Oil Refineries Which are Unused or Whose Activity is Unknown

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	•	Capacity	Remarks
	Refinery	(In thousands	
		of tons per	
		annum)	
		1,600	Believed destroyed
1.	Gonfreville, France	1,100	Believed destroyed
2.	Port Jerome, France	900	Thused: inconveniently located
3.	Martigues. France	800	Dallared destroyed
4.	Petit-Couronne, France	500	Unused; inconveniently located
5.	Etang de Berre, France	200	
2.	2000	500	Very slight activity:
6.	Rotterdam-Pernis	500	inconveniently located.
0.	100000	500	Bolieved destroyed
-7	Pauillao	500	Activity unknown; inconven-
7.	Venice, Italy	450	iently located.
8.	101100,	1	P-11 and destroyed
	Dunkirk, France	410	Unused; inconveniently located.
9.	L'Avera, France	400	Unused; moonthat
10.	L'Avers, rianoo		Activity unknown; inconven-
	Aquila, Triesta, Italy	350	iently located
11.	Aquila, iriesco, iou-		Unused; inconveniently located
	Provide	350	Unused; inconveniently located
12.	Bec d'Ambes, France	310	Unused; inconventences
13.	Spezia, Italy	300	Unused
14.	Ebano, Hamburg, Germany	250	Activity unknown
15.	Courchalettes, France		
		250	Believed destroyed
16.	Gravenchon, France	200	Unused; inconveniently
17.	Frontignan (Sete)		located
		185	Believed destroyed
18.	Leghorn, Italy	320	Unused; inconveniently located
19.	Dongas, France (2 plants)	150	Unused.
20.		1)0	
		120	Believed destroyed
21.	Ramsa, Fiume, Italy	120	Activity unknown; inconven-
22.	The The The T	TEO	iently located
		100	Believed destroyed
23.	Antwerp (Redeventza) Belgium	120	Used for storage
			Activity unknown
24.	s s and s and s and s a state of s a state o	Belgium 85	ACCIALOJ
25.	allon of the Or a co		
01	Novy Bohumin (Oderberg).	1-	Activity unknown
26.	Czechoslovaki	a 65	VOOLAT AJ CHIMAN H
	Total Capacity exceeding	g	

Total Capacity exceeding refineries destroyed, or inconveniently located 940

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Percentage of total usable especity suitably located

7 per cent

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### Table 4

### MINOR CRUDE OIL REFINERIES

Refinery	Capacity (In thousands of tons per annum)	Remarks
Rumania		
Noris	50	Activity unknown
Brasso-Vacuum	35	Partial operation
Austria		
Schwechat	50	Capacity operation
Kornenberg	50 45	Capacity operation
Vosendorf	40	Capacity operation
Drossing	35	Activity unknown
Hungary		
Fanto Budapest	FO	A
Hazali	50	Capacity operation
Munkaos	50	Capacity operation
	25	Major portion in use
Petfurdo	20	Major portion in use
Nyirbogdany	15	Major portion in use
Szoreg	10	Major portion in use
Czechoslovakie		
Dubova	60	Major portion in use
Prwoz (Moravska Ostrava)	55	Activity unknown
Kralupy	40	Activity unknown
Yugoslavia		
Smederovo	50	Activity unknown
Osijek (Ipoil)	25	Activity unknown
Poland		
COLOR STREET, STRE	10	
Meglowice (Jaslo)	60	
Glinik-Mariampolski	60	Major portion in use
Drohobycz (Nafta)	35	Major portion in use
Krosno	30	Used for storage
Lwow	30	Major portion in use
Italy		
Fornovo Tara	50	Activity unknown; inconveniently located
Germany		
Dusseldorf	95	
	25	Activity unknown
Regensburg (4 targets)	80	Activity unknown
Schonberg	18	Activity unknown
Templehof	15	Activity unknown
rance		
Autun	15	Shale oil operation
orway		
Vallo-Toneberg	50	Activity unknown; inconvenient]
		located.

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Table 4 cont'd.		070 100
		SEC HET
Belgium		
Antwerp-Kiel	50	Believed destroye
Ghent Langerbrugge	20	Activity unknown
Hoboken (Soconj)	20	Believed destroye
Antwerp-Darse	20	Activity unknown
Holland		
Flushing Asphalt	40 (?)	Activity unknown
Total, excluding the few believed destroyed or		
inconveniently located	1,253	
Percentage of total usable		
rereating of the article		

capacity suitably located 9 per cent

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#### APPENDIX 11

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# PROSPECT FOR ENDING WAR BY AIR ATTACK AGAINST GERMAN MORALE

### CONCLUSION

Day raids by American heavy bombers against German towns as such are considered to have little merit as a means of exploiting air supremacy over Germany. Neither fear, war weariness, nor the prospect of impoverishment is likely to be sufficient to enable impotent political and social groups to overthrow the efficient, terroristic Nazi social controls and bring about RANKIN. It is believed the German armies will have to be defeated in the field. At best, the prospect of such defeat as inevitable might induce the Army to purge itself of Nazis and assume power. The likelihood of this, prior to OVERLORD, is be-

German towns, therefore, constitute targets for daylight bombardment only during prolonged periods of bad weather when precision objectives of direct military importance cannot be attacked. In these conditions, industrial towns are preferable to towns in general; and the industrial areas of towns, if selection is possible, are more advantageous targets than residential zones. It is not believed that administrative or commercial portions of the major cities like Berlin, Munich or Vienna constitute exceptions to these targeting

### 1. MORALE BOMBING

Attacks on German morale may be considered in terms of (a) terror; (b) war weariness and disgust; (c) concern for German post-war prosperity in general or particular. The methods usually considered as possible USCAF means of producing one or more of these effects consist in the daylight bombardment of

- German towns in general
- b) large German cities
- c)
- industrial targets chosen for their symbolic value industrial targets chosen for possible political effects d) on specific key business or Nazi interests (aside from direct military target systems).

## 2. GERMAN WILL TO RESIST

The morale of the German people is already widely believed to be bad. To the extent that this means that the German civil population has little hope of victory and is anxious for defeat, this is probably correct. It is gravely doubted, however, whether the German people can take overt steps to hasten the acceptance of defeat by the German nation; or that further deterioration of morale will lead significantly closer to a position from which such steps can be taken by them.

Morale in a totalitarian society is irrelevant so long as the control patterns function effectively. The Nazi party controls have functioned well. Air raids have produced temporary local outbreaks, but opposition has had little opportunity to take overt advantage of the breakdown of communications, transport, and services in these periods. Social control is required to reestablish the conditions where life is possible. This the Nazi party has been sufficiently adaptable to provide.

# 3. THE MORALE OF THE NAZI PARTY

The will of the Nazi party to resist Allied military pressure springs from strong, simple urges. It is generally agreed, and is doubtless clear to the party's leading members, that their chances for survival after RANKIN are slight. Their motivation in resistance is

The Nazi party's ability to organize recuperation is a possible point of attack. If the administrative problems thrust upon them by

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destruction of major cities were too large to be coped with, administrative breakdown might leave the party powerless. This has in fact occurred with the failure of the evacuation scheme. But the impotence of other social and political groups is such that the war continues until gradually the party reassumes an adequate measure of control. Short of military defeat and occupation by United Nations' forces, no group in Germany has shown itself sufficiently strong even to contest the party's position in moments of administrative breakdown.

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#### 4. POTENTIAL OPPOSITION GROUPS

It is not believed that industry is likely to become a center of opposition to the Nazi party. Exerting its power through other social groups, it has never played an open political role. Moreover, in the last ten years it has been infused with Nazi leaders in key positions of management, and tied closely to governmental administrative institutions.

Banking and finance have no national leaders. The judiciary and the civil service are Nazi in complexion. The Church has no independent role or means of expression. The middle class has long been eliminated as a political factor.

The working class, from which effective opposition to the Nazi party might be expected to come, is profoundly war weary, but in no real sense organized to impose its will upon the nation. Its impotence in the face of Nazi controls, moreover, is a reflection not only of the ineffectual role it played in the '20s and '30s, but also of the negative character of its assumption of power in 1918. The monarchy was not overthrown by the working class. Power fell from its grasp, and the working class was sucked into the vacuum created by the absence of political control.

Finally, the Army. This has for some months been infused with reliable Nazis, both in the High Command and in the younger officers taken in directly from the Hitler Youth. Yet it alone has the chance of providing opposition to the Nazis. Its interest in so doing would be based upon desire to disassociate itself in defeat from guilty Nazi political leadership, and preserve some semblance of dignity for German military tradition. Its capacity for so doing lies in the possibility of forceoly removing outstanding Nazis from power in the Army, then seizing political control by force or threats of ceasing resistance.

#### 5. RELEVANCE OF DAYLIGHT BOMBARIMENT OF TOWNS TO POLITICAL POWER

If the Army is the only social or political group in Germany capable of wresting control from the Nazi party, it follows that neither aerial bombardment of towns calculated to terrorize, nor destruction of wealth in the control of influential individuals will avail much in producing German defeat on grounds of morale. A breakdown of Nazi party control is not excluded. The circumstances under which any group other than the Army can restore control, however, is minimal. And the Army is likely to oppose the party on such an occasion only when it has judged inevitable its defeat in the field.

Army calculations of advantage are not in the least likely to be affected by the fears of the people or their weariness. Their refusal to work or of soldiers to fight would be another matter, Mass refusal is unlikely since the first several thousand, at least, would be shot. Of far more importance to the Army are factories in which German people may work, and weapons with which the Wehrmacht may fight. Attacks on industries of direct military importance, therefore, are far more capable of producing significant effects on Army political moves than bombs in non-industrial areas.

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AIR SUP ORT OF OVERLORD

1. The major use of air power in support of OVERLARD, it is understood, is to delay energy divisional movement to the area of our assault as long as possible. The relevant period in which this delay must be imposed is from D to D plus 10 or at the most, 15. After a firm beachhead has been secured, the Army is believed to be confident of its ability to deal with energy forces.

2. In addition, air power can to a degree, impose general attrition on troops and defensive positions. This may reduce the effectiveness with which the energy can oppose our initial assault and consolidation of the beacheas. The amount of such attrition which cannot be made good by the energy in the time allowed his, however, is limited.

3. Finally, air support must protect our ships, supply lines and advanced positions from energy air attack. The major contribution of the Air Forces in this connection has been and will continue to be the accomplishment of FONT-BLANK. Thereafter, continued attrition of the German Air Force, counter-air force attacks on local GAF targets, and a fighter unbrella over the beachhead are called for.

#### MEANS

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The plan blocked out below involves the use of British and American les heavy-, modium-, and fighter-bombers, R.D. fighters and fighters. Special attention has been given to the use of American heavy bombers; this emphasis will be continued in any elaboration of the plan prepared at a later date. The roles of other types of aircraft have, of necessity, been sketched in. It is considered that all types of aircraft will be devoted to the support plan to a limited extent prior to D-60, more intensively from D-60 to D-30, and almost exclusively between D-30 and the establishment of firm beachheads. The extensive use of these aircraft in the period D-50 to D-30 is required for a variety of purposes: to acquire proficiency, for cover, to evoke reactions from the energy, and to achieve results which limitation of effort will not later persit. The only possible exception to exclusive use of all aircraft for OV RLOED support in the period D-30 to D plus 10 or 15 would be if effort deeper in Germany were required to prevent the forward movement of the GAF, to maintain adequate cover on the timing of our assault and to complete attack against a POI TBLANT target system.

# Plan g

5. b The plan consists of attacks against a variety of types of targets, grouped together unler the heatings a, counter air force; 3. Communications; 0. Ground Forces. Perticular target systems are listed as follows: Each of these is examined separately in a brief appenlix.

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
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7. The essence of the plan consists in the delaying of lateral movement of enemy mobile forces deployed along the stretch of coast on both sides of the assault area. Attack against major bridges on his lines of communication will force the enemy to choose between crossing the rivers by inefficient means - pontoons or ferry, and travelling circuitously to the assault area. The gap left by possible circuitous routes themselves involving some delay, can be partially closed for hours or days by cutting rail and road junctions and open line. The major effort involved in outting bridges and blocking other lines will be repaid if it delays the movement of divisions expected in the assault area on D plus 1 by six hours or more, those expected on D plus 2 by one day, those due between D plus 2 and D plus 8 by one and one-half to two days.

8. Tentative examination of the communications plan leads to the conclusion that it involves a high expenditure of effort to achieve certain results of a limited character. Horeover, certain risks attach to the plan: it might coccasion a new deployment of German mobile divisions less favorable to interruption than that now prevailing. On the other hami, however, the plan offers the possibility of considerable bounses, i.e. it might occasion German moves much more favorable to our assault than the present order of battle; and the delays imposed on the first divisions scheduled to arrive in the assault area on D plus 1 might be of a large order if German reactions were anything less than sharp and incisive. It appears that responsibility for the adoption of the plan, after weighing risks and possible bounses, must rest with the Army.

9. A rough outline of the plan is contained in Tables I and II, attached.

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10. No cover as to place is required for attritional attacks under counter air force, against ground force personnel, or communications or ground force equipment and supplies. Attacks against communications and defensive installations must be covered, however, by the extension of attacks to irrelevent areas, chosen, so far as possible, to produce some benefit. Cover in time may be achieveable by building up attacks in crescendes on two or more occasions in the period D-60 to D-5, so that the mounting scale of attack in the period D-4, through D-1 would not be unique.

11. Agreement is requested of G-2, MUMAG and Targets Section, CDI, USSTAF that the outline plan broadly offers a suitable basis for detailed investigation.

17 February, 1944.

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TABLE 1

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TACTICAL TARGET STOTENS BY TYPE

Time Period	: : : Communications	: : : Counter Air Force	: : : Counter Ground Force
D = 60 to D = 30	Cover bridges	: : Airfields : Repair facilities :	: Camps & bivouacs : Headquarters rear : (occasional) : Cover coastal positions
D - 30 to D - 15	: Cover bridges : Relevant bridges : U/T Parks, fuel dumps :	: Airfields : Depots, Dumps :	: Camps & bivouacs : (complete) : Inundations : Cover and relevant : coastal positions
) = 15 to	: Relevant bridges : Follow-up cover : bridges	Final dumps, depots Lower headquarters	: Headquarters : Coastal radar :
) - 3 to ) - 1	: Relevant bridges, Junctions, roads Interrupt bridge repair	Top beadquarters Top airfields	Relevant coastal positions Top headquarters
- Day	: Remaining bridges : : junctions : : Patrol of rivers :	Fighter unbrella	Strafing roads, Bashing troop congestion
+ 1 to + 15 or more	Maintenance, Communication Interruption Attack open rail & road in use away from battle	Fighter usbrella Follow-up on airfields, healquarters	Attack troops deploying for battle, and detraining areas.

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# TABLE II

TACTICAL TARGETS BY TUPS OF AIRCRAFT

: Time Period :	Heavy Bombers	: Medium Bombers :	Fighter Bombers	Fighters
D = 60  to $D = 30$	Cover bridges airfields, camps bivouacs Cover coastal positions	bridges airfields headquarters	bridges airfields headquarters	strafing bridge repair strafing airfields strafing camps
a = 15	Airfields Cover bridges Belevant bridges Coastal positions Inuniations Dumps, depots Camps, bivouncs	beadquarters	al Pielda	strafing bridge repair strafing atfields strafing camps
D = 15 to D = 3	t : Bridges : Headquarters t	: Bridges : Dumps, depots :	bridges bealquarters	: strafing bridge : repairs : coastal raiar
D - 3 to D - 1	: : Complete bridges : Junctions : Coastal positions :	: Headquarters	: Bridges : Headquarters : Airfields : Junctions : Open rail, road	Patrol repair bridges, junctions.
D - Day	: Bridges : Troop concentra- : tions on road	: Brilges : Troop concentra- : tions on road	Junctions Open line	: Cover assault : area : Strafe troops
D + <b>1 to</b> Pirm Beachhead	: Bridges : Junctions : Troop Concentra- : tions : Detraining sites	: Readquarters	: Bridges : Airfields :	Cover assault areas Strafe troops Strafe bridge sites

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General attrition resulting in decreased performance can be imposed on the GAF during the three to five days in which their forces can operate at peak effort (after the completion of POINTELANK) in resisting our landings by continued, heavy attacks on airfield buildings. It will probably prove impossible to prevent the GAF from operating on forward airfields and landing strips, refuelling, and reloading amaunition from trucks. Attacks can be made continuously from now until effort is needed in the period immediately preceding D-day, for more important objectives.

### 1. PURPOSE

- (1) The purpose of stack on GaF airfields is to enforce the abgriomment of forward fields, if possible; to reduce the serviceability of the GaF by the destruction of repair facilities (and concurrently to enhance the decline in serviceability which will come with peak effort); to destroy planes under repair; and to kill officers and men. It will probably prove impossible to prevent the GaF from operating forward airfields and landing strips altogether; repairs to runkays can be effected underly, and refuelling and reloading of assanition provided by truck. Similarly, few aircraft can be destroyed through attacks on alsoereal areas which are widely scattered.
- (ii) A bomus of concentrated attack on airfield buildings is the destruction of energy will to fight.

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- (1) Buildings at airfields consist of hangars and alainistration buildings, with widely varying tendencies to cluster or spread apart. Adequate study has not been made of those fields where the separation of clusters of buildings warrants more than one aiming point.
- (ii) A tentative count of the mumber of targets in France and the Low Countries suggests that attacks sight be limited to a selection among 32 airfields with major repair facilities and 24 additional targets with secondary facilities. Thirty-mine other airfields and a miscellaneous assortment of landing strips in the area are probably not worth attacking unler any circusstances;
- (111) The C.P would probably react to this continued attack by moving major and some minor repairs into Preach and Low Bountry cities and back to German stations. In the former case, a distinct gain would have been made because of the slow pace of repair work in local factories, which will increase in all likelihood after D-day.

### J. WILHRABILITY

- (i) Damage to aircraft repair facilities and administrative buildings consists mainly of the loss of buildings, tools, a few aircraft under repair and the killing of personnal. Occasional bounses may be achieved by landing bombs in a barracks, meas hall, or full office building. Careful examination should be given the potentialities of combining strafing attacks with bombings, timing the fighters to arrive five minutes after the alarm has sounded, and patrol the roads.
- (ii) It is unlikely that the GAF will attempt building repairs. Destroyed equipment will be replaced, if possible, by traving on higher echelon depots. These are recommended as the subject of separate attacks.

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(i) Attack should be continuous with occasional flurries of concentrated attacks to achieve cumulative effects. It is not particularly important to increase the scale of attack close to D-day, unless concentration of fighters or bombers are known to have moved into the area.

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5. GOV R

4. TIMA

No cover is required.

# 6. WHILE STROLD

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The effects sought are general attrition, rather than a specific limitation of GAP capabilities. It is impossible to estimate these with any degree of precision, but a major effort against airfields spread out in time eight reduce GAP efficiency during the relevent , riod after 2-day by as much as 10 or 20 percent.

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### German Air Force Headquarters

### Conclusion

Attacks on German Air Moree headquarters in the period D minus 30 to D minus 5 or 3 may produce a useful reduction in the efficiency of German air defence against our assault. Substitute headquarters, systems of communication, and replacement for officer canualties will be found, but the makeshifts will be inferior to the original personnel, facilities and equipment. The importance of the target system, however, must be judged in terms of the allocation of affort made for counter-air force attacks.

### 1. Purpose.

(1) The purpose of attacks against operational and administrative headquarters is to disorganize and disrupt GAP operations at the critical period when the GAP must operate under strain. The imposition of casualties, disruption of communications, destruction of other facilities and operating patterns are all means to overall disorganization.

(ii) A possible bonus consists in forcing the enery to use  $\mathbb{V}/\mathbb{T}$  communication.

### 2. Tarnets

(i) Headquarters are of two types - operational and administrative. Operational headquarters are responsible for the direction of combat.operations. Administrative headquarters are responsible for airfield defence, signals, maintenance, accomposition etc. All are located in complexes of compact buildings. Operational headquarters have elaborate systems of communication including buried cables and WAT.

(ii) At the highest echelons, there are twelve operational headquarters and six administrative headquarters in Northern France, and the Low Countries, and Northwestern Germany. Ten of the twelve operational headquarters have been pinyointed, but of these three are in towns. Administrative headquarters for western France are both (Laftgau and Equipment Group) in chateaus outside towns; these for Belgium and Holland, however, are, with one encoption, in Brussels and Amsterdam.

(iii) It is not known, but considered likely, that standby facilities for headquarters and communications are available to the GAF. It may be possible, after attacks, to learn the whereabouts of alternative headquarters.and attack them.

### 3. Vulnerability

(i) Most of the targets have blast wells; some have bond proof excavations. Direct hits on most, however, would produce effective results.

(ii) According to accepted military practice, headquarters can be moved in a few hours. It is doubtful, however, whether this could be achieved if attack on related units were made simultaneously.

### 4. Timing

(i) It is suggested that in order to obtain the best effects, operational headquarters for four relevant fighter commands three outside towns and one in Hennes, should be attacked simultaneously, if possible not more than four days before D-day.

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Attacks on administrative headquarters at Etampes and St. Georges Notel, could be advanced to an earlier date, perhaps D-20 to D-15 but should be concerted.

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(i) No regional cover is required.

(14) Timing cover might be partially obtained by earlier attacks on lower schelan headquarters.

# 6. Achievable Effects

(i) Affects might reduce capabilities of energy against our shipping, beachheads positions etc. by as much as 20 per cent in the J to 5 days in which the Luftwaire is capable of putting up a sustained effort. This would involve a bonus. Otherwise, the normal expectation would be simply a slower response on the part of the GAP to our air action.

(11) Possibly 500 officers might be killed in addition; and officer morale, already low in the GAP, might be weakened further.

^{5.} Cover

GAP DURPS AND DEPOTS

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The main targets in this field are signals equipment and airfield maintenance depots. The "could be attacked at any time since signals equipment is generally tight in Germany. The airfield maintenance depot attacks should follow a series of attacks on airfields themselves.

1.

To impose general attrition and disorganization on the GAF.

- 2. TARGETS
  - (i) The principal types of GAF depots and dumps, aside from those located at repair organizations, are for signals equipaent, machine gun testing, airfield equipment, assumption and fuel. Only the signals and airfield equipment systems are of particular interest, since sperations at the others can be postponed or 1 supplies quickly replenished from Germany.
  - (ii) Signals equipment parks are three in number, located at St. Gyr mear Paris, in Vilvorde near Brussels, and in Apeldoorn in Holland. The first is associated with a major Field Air Park, and the last with a barracks and possibly with an annunition dump. Airfield maintenance equipment in echelone above the Regional Commands is held by the GAP Main Works Depot in Aunsau and the Central Depot for Sorks Materials and Equipment at Moley-Le-Sec. The last named depot consists of three buildings and a store of materials stacked out of doors in an area 270 x 130 yards.
  - (iii) The GAF would be hard put to it to bring additional signals equipment into the area at any time; airfield maintenance equipment might be componsated for by replenishment from Germany, but, it is believed, only with difficulty.
- 3. VULNERABILITY

It is believed that the targets would be vulnerable to attack by HE and especially to ID attack.

- 4. 21.11G
  - (i) One successful attack on each of the five depots made fairly early in the period D-60 to D-50 would probably cause the transfer of the depots to new locations. If these could be ascertained, they would repay additional visitation.
  - (ii) Effects of successful attacks made early would have little direct relevance to D-day, but would impose general attrition on the GAF and enforce a small reduction in efficiency of operation throughout the pre and post-D-day period.

5. COV R

No cover would be required.

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# WT Parks and spare parts depots.

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Conclusion. W/T parks and spare parts depots are useful attritional targets. Although they may be attacked early, they should be attacked within a minimum time period. The system will then have to be re-examined.

## 1. Aupose.

- (i) The aim of attack on W/T parks and depots is to impose general attrition on the W/T pool attached to the German forces in the west, to reduce its efficiency, and to force substitution of less efficient equipment for present allocations.
- (ii) In view of the increased burden which the attack on lateral transport routes is likely to throw on MAT resources, and the reduction in new production that the completion of <u>Fointblank</u> (bearings) may impose, a slight possibility exists of affecting the mobility of German divisions in the period D to D + 15.

2. Target.

- (i) These depots appear to be converted factories, garages, and other buildings, when stores and servicing facilities are involved, or open spaces of ground.
- (11) 27 parks and depots have been identified as of 29/1/44. These are reported to contain of the order of 25,000 vehicles.
- (iii) At some loss in efficiency of administration and serviceability these pools could be dispersed into units too small for heavy or modium bomber attack.

3. Vulnerability of Target.

- (1) As at present constituted, the pools of vehicles appear subject to effective attack by small unit bombs. The depots and servicing facilities not too close to built-up areas would be subject to conventional factory attack.
- (11) Time required for replacement depends in part on the scale on which such attacks are carried out. Local replacement might range from a few days to a week. Over-all replacement, by withdrawals from Gemman resorves or other uses might range from one to three weeks.

# 4. Timing.

- (i) Since, on present evidence, the effects of these attacks are likely to be attritional at best, they can be allocated to the period beginning D minus 60. It is suggested, however, that as many such targets as possible be attacked within a short period of time, in order to forestall dispersion measures and produce cuaulative effects. After such attack the vulnerability of these installations would have to be re-examined.
- (11) The slight effects the attacks in D = 60 to D = 15 might be felt in the period of maximum strain on M/T facilities; i.e., from D to D plus 15.

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# 5. Cover.

No cover is required.

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6. Achieveable Effects.

(i) Perhaps a third to a half of M/T allotted to German divisions in the west appears targettable, / Mithout allowance for eliminations required by restrictions on attack in built-up areas. This high proportion appears in depots because current requirements are low in relation to the large number required for transport to the area of assault. Despite this broadly favorable situation, attack is not likely to be decisive, due to the existence of reserves in Germany which can be drawn from depots, or from other lower priority uses.

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(ii) As noted above, inefficiency or inadequacy of N/T will affect the decisive D to D plus 15 period.

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# Commin cations, Road and Rail

1. Purpose

The purpose of an attack on the communications system of the energy is to delay as much as possible the arrival in the beachhead area of energy units in immediate reserve which can be expected to join battle in the period D to D+15.

It is possible that attack on commun cation facil ties initiated before D day will head the enemy to make new defensive dispositions. Attacks on lateral communications along the perimeter of his defensive system might result in a withdrawal of some mobile units from the coast and in order to free them from reliance on facilities unler attack and increase their lateral mobility. Any such change in dispositions, delaying the first counterattack by mobile units, even by hours, would be an important bonus. Conversely, the plan outlined runs the risk, if the enemy should correctly forecast the area of main assault, of leading to withdrawal of mobile units from the coast only in irrelevant areas.

# 2. Specific Probl m

At present (see latest order of battle issued by G-2, FUSAG, dated 15 February, 1944) the enemy is believed to have eight mobile offensive divisions in the West. He also has four offensive infantry divisions, although these are not motorized. Additional units near coastal fortifications, und rgo training and are attached to the Lattwaffe; these defensive formations are considered immobile and not relevant to the present problem.

Of the eight mobile divisions, (panzer and motorized, two are so near the NEPTURE area, at Lisieux and Alencon, that no interruption of their movement is feasible, except by harrassing attacks on the march. One is in Western Britany, another not definitely located, is probably in Southern France. The remaining four are in northeastern France and Belgium: one immediately west of the Seine from Mantes-Gassicourt, one near Amiens, one near Cambrai and one near Liege. The problem is to select a transport target system within the capabilities of the combined air forces which will produce the maximum delay in the arrival of these divisions in the NEPTUNE ARGA.

### 3. The Target System

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Attacks on communications equipment and supplies offer little prospect of significant interference with the energy's communications. (See TTS B 3). Attacks must, therefore, be directed against right of way facilities themselves. Open stretches of railway line, railway junctions, open stretches of road and road junctions are all easily damaged and can be temporarily blocked by craters. Such blockages, however, can be repaired quickly, in seven or eight hours for railroads and in half that time for roads. If open lines, either road or rail, are chosen as targets, therefore, they must be attacked on D-day; such attack must be repeated every day after D day for which stoppage is required. For a road and rail network as dense as that of northern France, the task would require a number of targets and an accuracy probably beyond air force capabilities.

Bridges, especially large overwater bridges, offer targets which, when damaged, are more difficult to repair. Serious damage to bridges over large rivers will make them unuseable for three weeks or more; those over small rivers may take one to two weeks to repair. On this account, attacks on bridges can be initiated at D-20, if the purpose of attack is adequately concealed.

Overwater bridges alone, however, constitute an uneconomical system; it is necessary to add certain vialuots, overbridges, and small bridges over roads which require attack in the period D-3 to D+1.

It is believed that maximum possible delay can be achieved by directing attack against the communications of the four divisions in northeastern France

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and Helgium. (The single division in Brittany results too great a concentration of effort for the expected return; the division in Southern France will probably be contained by operation ANVIL.) Three primary systems and one cover system are proposed as targets: the primaries are read and rail bridges across the Seine below Forts (Conflans St. H more), the read and rail bridges across the Size from the Seine to Complegne, and a series of targets on the railway system around Paris. The cover targets are the read and rail bridges across the Soume above St. Quantin, and possibly some on the Heuse and Sathbre.

# 4. Timing of the Attack and Covor

Each bridge system contains "excess capacity" viewed in terms of total German transport requirements, civilian and mil tary. It is felt, therefore, that early attack, present to D-30, on selected less important bridges on the Seine and Oise will lower the number of targets requiring attack in the later period. These should be accompanied by early attacks on the most important Somme bridges, which will serve as cover and also consume some German repair resources. Bombariment should be followed up by harmaning fighter and fighter-bomber attacks on repair operations and concentrations of material, designed to hinder repairs. Early attacks will also improve techniques of bridge attack, making the later, vital task casier.

It is thought that successful attacks on ten of the twenty Seine bridges and twenty of the twenty-four Gise bridges in the period from the present to D-30, (with covering attacks on seven or eight important bridges over the Same), will reduce the number of turgets to be attacked later to approximately fifteen on the Seine and twolve on the Size.

Later attacks would fall into two periods. From D-15 to D-5 all but four of the Seine bridges would be attached, leaving the more important to the end of the period. Four spared would be the rail bridge and one road bridge at Roam and the rail bridge and one road bridge at Mantes-Qassicourt. These lie on the best routes along which the two divisions arross the Seine and at Asiens could nove into the Martune area. All four are links in Genan priority routes. The Genans may continue to plan on using them, especially if there is a pause in the attacks on the Seine at about D-5. Between D-10 and D-5, all bridges along the Chase - presumably twelve - would be attacked, again taking the more important toward the end of the period. During the entire period D-15 to D-5, fairly heavy cover attacks on the Seine would have to be made. Some of these hight usefully be devoted to bridges on the upper Gise or the Sambre. At the same time, fightere patrols would be required to interfere with attempts at repair operations on all rivers.

Starting D-5 and continuing through D+1, nine targets must be attacked in and around Paris. Their destruction will immobilize rail traffic through Paris for several age. During the same period, the bridges across the Seine at Mantes-Gassicourt and Rouen should be attacked. Cover must again be provided by attacks on the Sound, preferably at Abbeville and Aziens.

On D+2 and 3, another round of attacks on the Faris targets would be useful.

### 5. Achievable Results

The maximum success of the operation will be achieved if all three targets aysters are successfully attacked; a certain small additional benefit may also result from the cover operations. If the three systems are completely cut, the four divisions mortheast of the line of the deine will be forced to take circuitous routes to the MSTUME area. The total delay achieved will be of the order of five to six division days; i.e., the equivalent of delaying one division five ays. All four units will be delayed to nearly the same extent; the total delay will be folt from the second to the seventh ay of fighting. The achievement of this delay will mean that the maximum weight of counter attack which mobile energy forces can deliver in the first seven days of fighting will be reduced by 30 percent.

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If the plan is to show any results at all, the operation against the Seine bridges must be successful. The bridges scheduled for latest attack have sufficient capacity to handle all four divisions. Provided the Seine bridges were cut, less than complete success on the other two systems would not invalidate the whole plan. If the operation against the Cise bridges failed and enough accessible bridges were left to carry all the necessary traffic, the delay under those circumstances would fall to 3 to 4 division days. Failure to destroy the Paris targets would be more serious, and the delay would fall to about  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to 3 division days. It is not entirely certain how many misses constitute failure in this system. If only the Seine bridges were successfully interdicted, the total delay would be about  $1\frac{1}{2}$  division days.

The achievement of these results depends on certain reactions on the part of the Germans to the earlier attacks and a high operational efficiency on the part of the air force, as well. These reactions cannot now be predicted with confidence, (nor can confident predictions serve as guides to action in this matter). It is an important function of early attacks to elicit reactions. If most of the bridges then damaged are determinedly and expeditiously repaired, the whole program cannot be carried through, since the number of targets remaining for late attack will be too great. On the other hand, it is possible that the enemy will react to the threat to his lateral communication lines by withdrawing his mobile units nearer to Paris. Such dedisposition would not materially lessen the benefits to be expected from the complete system proposed above. It might also necessitate the substitution of Marne for Oise bridges as targets. It would give rise to an important new increase of some hours in the time required for the arrival of the enemy's first mobile attack forces in the battle area.

If the German reaction to the early attacks leads to the abandonment of the complete plan, the Seine bridges and Paris targets alone might be attacked. This would mean 29 targets for attack in the period D-15 to D plus 1, with 12 of them requiring stack on the last four or five days of the period. In addition fighter and fighter-bomber effort would be required for policing the river to prevent repairs.

### 6. Possible Alternative Systems

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The plan presented in the two sections above requires a very large expenditure of affort. It is believed, however, that it will yield larger returns, in terms of the Army requirement for assists ce to OVERLORD than alternative systems so far examined.

An alternative system often discussed is one of cuts along open lines and at junctions, both road and rail. It has been previously pointed out (Sec 3) that damage in such places is quickly repaired, unless attack is directed against retaining walls in cuts, overbridges, underpasses, etc. A system of cuts has been examined for the railroad and major roads leading into the NEPTUNE area. This system would cut all such lines about 70 miles from the beachhead area, but it would not interdict the movements of the nearest mobile division, at Lisieux, and would only partially interdict the movement of the panzer division near Alencon. For the cuts on the railroads, attacks on 13 targets would be required. To cut the roads, at least 90

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targets would have to be attacked to block only major roads (those marked in red and yellow on the revised Michelin road map). Lamage to the rail targets would block the lines for several days. Acads would be blocked for a day at most, and at many of the cuts all the tracked and many of the wheeled vehicles could move cross country to avoid blockages. If all attacks on roads were made on junctions, the number of targets could be reduced by half, but blockages could not in general be expected to last for more than several hours.

The effort required against such a system would have to be expended on D day, and repeated either daily or every other day against most of the targets. Thus the total effort in the most vital period would not be much less (if at all) then that required for a bridge system. The benefits would not be as great, since blockage would be far from complete; and poorer quality rather than longer routes would be taken by German forces. Complete rail blockage alone would achieve no important results, since the distance of the rail heads from the battle area would not be great. If the cuts were moved further back, a greater number would be required.

### 7. Types of ffort squired

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The proposed system requires a large expenditure of effort over a period in which there will be other pressing claims on available bomber effort. The problem of meeting this demand will be eased by the fact that not all sorties required need be made by heavy bombers. Targets on the Seine and cover targets on the Somme will be within range of mediums and dive bombers; both can be used against the type of target proposed. Boreover, all of the operations are within fighter cover, RAF hencesters might be used for some of the deeper targets out of range of the mediums. It is probable that only Bth AF heavy bombers can attack the Paris targets.

No data are available on which a calculation of effort can be based.

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16 February 1944.

# Fuel Dumps

Conclusion. Fuel dumps represent a potential target for systematic attack in the week preceding D, if they can be fully targetted, and if the scale of effort available is regarded as adequate. They fall, otherwise, in the category of attrition targets to be attacked from D minus 60 forward.

1. Ruppose (i) To restrict M/T movement.

- (11) No further purpose is envisaged.
- 2. Target.
  - (i) Major dumps are in conventional storage facilities, in Bruasels, Antwerp, Ghent, Faris, and Rouen. Substantial dispersed lumps are located in woods, factories, tank wagone, and underground tanks. Divisional dumps are in woods and trenches.
  - (ii) As of 29/1/μ₄ 5 major dumps and fluinor dumps are roughly targetted, although in some cases pin-points are not operationally adequate by present standards. The majority of divisional dumps are known.
  - (iii) The major escapes from such attack are replacement and dispersal.

### 3. Vulnerability of Target.

- (i) Targets consist of tank farms, storage tanks in towns and cities, and dumps of 45 gallon cans piled in separated trenches in woods and covered with earth. Only the first is very vulnerable. The second type presumably is not available to attack. The divisional dumps in woods are believed not very vulnerable, but a bomb pattern laid on them might upset enough separato piles of cans to start a first-class conflagration.
- (ii) The replacement of oil will create no major problem, although difficulties in storage might arise from concentrated attack. Quantitatively, it is estimated that the total amount of stored oil in the west (about 80,000 tons) could be moved into the area in a week.

# 4. Timing.

- (i) To the extent that attack is regarded as attritional, the main dumps and most secondary dumps can be attacked at any time from D minus 60 forward. Dumps and storage facilities in the attack area (5 of first and 5 of second priority, as of  $29/1/h_4$ ) should be reserved for after D.
- (ii) The effects, if any, from attack on fuel dumps would be felt in the period of most intense fuel utilization, probably D to D + 15.

### 5. Cover.

(i) Forward fuel dumps would have to be attack in all areas

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# or in none, until after D.

(ii) No time cover is required.

# 6. Achievable Effects.

Τ Н I S P A G Ε I S U N L A S S I F T E D (i) If the full range of fuel dumps should prove targettable, and if our capabilities and more urgent conmittanents should permit thoroughgoing attack in the week preceding D, fuel supplies might be reduced sufficiently to force the enemy to rely more on rail transport. The prospect for this sort of attack and result, however, is not bright. If this system should not be accepted for thoroughgoing attack, concentrated in time, the effects will be broadly attritional.

(ii) The main impact of effect will come in the period of most intensive oil utilization, i.e. D to D plus 15.

# RATIGAT REPAIR SINCES

# OCNULUS I ON

It is believed that no useful purpose will be served by attack on railway repair shops, except as cover and as a possible minor device for absorbing German repair resources.

- 1. FURPOSE
  - (i) The main aim of attack would be to reduce the efficiency of locenetives allocated to sectorn Burope for purposes of military transport.
  - (11) A possible bonus would be the chance reduction of serviceability at a crucial point, at a crucial time; e.g., in the Paris area, in the week after 0.
- 2. 7. 10.12
  - Repair shops are strongly built sheds, located in or near railway depots and marshalling yards.
  - (ii) There are about one hundred (100) major and minor repair shops in northwestern France, Belgium and Hollani.
  - (iii) The escape would be, primarily, in the use of undamaged or slightly damaged shops; secondarily minor repair on open track; finally, repair in eastern France and western Germany.
- 3. YOLN HABILITY OF TAXAR

Several Sirect hits per sepair shop would be required to render them unserviceable for more than (say) a week; if successfully attacked, however, and the structure including gantry cranes brought down, repair would require several months at least.

### 4. TINIG

- (i) Due to the long repair period after successful attack, bombing of these objectives might begin as early as D minus 60. To achieve the desired effect, if chosen as a main target, the repair shop system would have to be thoroughly and successfully attacked, throughout its length, due to large excess capacity in relation to military regularements.
- (ii) The military effects of successful attack would, presumably, be felt in the period of most intensive military rail utilization; i.e., after 0. Civil effects might be felt carlier.
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to cover required.

6. ACRITANIA RETROTO

If fully and successfully attacked this target system might cause a considerably greater expenditure of locomotives, to accomplish the required military movements, than would otherwise be used.

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# CAMPS AND BIVOUAC AREAS

### GLW WISI

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Attack on personnel concentrations for purposes of direct attrition would be useful, especially if such concentrations can still be Found in the period D minus 15 to D.

- 1. MRr JE
  - (i) To will or wound German military personnel with a consequent impairment of military opposition on D and beyond; by creating precautions against concentration, to render somewhat less efficient the final phases of training and movement to the area of assault.

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(ii) To kill or wound key personnel, and render the affected units less efficient over the decisive period.

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- Most troops are billeted in towns, but there are a number of casps outside the towns in sufficient concentration to constitute boobing targets, by conventional means.
- (ii) As of 12/2/bb, some 50 camps and German military schools are reported in Prance, each containing more than 500 personnel or more than 50 huts.
- (111) Personnel losses would probably result in some permanent impairment of strength. Such attacks, however, would probably lead to dispersal within towns, and avoidance of large concentrations in the country.
- 3. YULNERABILITY
  - (1) The vulnerability of all of these troop concentrations with respect to personnel casualties has not yet been fully examined. Some of these targets are, however, clearly vulnerable concentrations.
  - (ii) It is not believed that the repair of damaged barracks, etc. would be undertaken on a substantial scale.

### 4. TIMING

Attacks prior to D minus 60, unless successful on a very large scale, would impose general manyower attrition, with probably little direct effect in D to D plus 45, due to the possibility of mobilizing scale replacement, even if inferior, for bulk losses. Attacks in D minus 15 to D might have greater direct effect. Meceasity to conferve effort will probably make these (in the later period) most suitable for major attack throughout the period and occasional day

5. COV-9

No cover required, except that the attacks would have a general alorting effect, if they came in a period patently close to D.

6. ATTWARL REPERTS

As a means of direct attack on the German divisions, attack on personnel has obviously much to recommand it. The extent and efficacy of such attack will depend considerably on our policy with respect to the bombing of French towns. The possibilities of attack of small concentrations by fighters and fighter-bombers should be extensively explored.

CONCLUSION

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If headquarters located within towns are regarded as legitimate targets, and sufficient accuracy can be obtained, useful results could be achieved by persistent attack on headquarters of all echelons, begin early. Minor results might be achieved by late attack on a few higher echelon

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1. FURPOSK

(i) To disorganize military direction in the period D to D plus 15.

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(ii) To kill or wound German military personal, particularly key military personnel.

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- (i) Targets will tend to be small: hotels, chateaus, etc.
- (ii) It is suggested by T.I.S. that five higher army headquarters appear to be adequate targets; and four additional special headquarters. If hotels in towns are regarded as legitimate targets, others can be pin-pointed.
- (iii) Dispersal would constitute the main escape.

# 3. VILA RABILITY OF 7 MG T

Targets are scall, but generally volnerable. (see 2 above)

4. TIMING

It is accepted doctrine that attacks on head-marters should shortly proceeds the assault, D sinus 7. This involves some violation of time security. It is believed that the possible advantages, including cover, of persistent attack, begun eachier, should be fully explored.

5. LOV R

See 4, above.

6. ACHI VEABLE ME TS

If operationally feasible, systematic and persistent attack on beadquarters, begun early, might have a considerable effect on the organization of the German defense from D forwar. Limited attacks, immediately preceding D, would probably have little effect.

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### CONCLUS ICHS

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On and after D, German troops in being, become a prime target for attack, despite the difficulties created by their dispersion and their sovement.

TROOPS ON THE MARCH

### 1. LUMBOSE

(i) To kill and wound G rean military personnel, and delay the movement of energy formations, especially on route to the assault area. Boobing and strafing Attacks against such concentrations, the only a few hours after H, constitute the prime, and practically sole opportunity of slowing down the movement of the three or four divisions located less than 75 miles from the area of assault.

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(ii) Such attack offers some opportunity for 1 wering the energy's will to fight. In addition, some useful damage to M/T, equipment, roads, and bridges might be done in the course of the attacks.

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The target will usually be scattered in space, and it will be in movement. By normal standards bombing attack will be wasteful, and the postentialities of continuous strafing of crucial formations should, therefore, be thoroughly explored. Careful study of the likely range of routes, given energy dispositions at the decisive time, might serve to permit concentrated attack on the primary formations.

# 3. VULMERABILITY OF THE TARGET

Personnel, M/T, and other light equipment will be vulnerable to direct hit and fragmentation from light bombs, and to strafing. Tanks and guns, for these purposes secondary targets, will be vulnerable to virtually direct hit by fairly heavy bombs.

# 4. Thurs

At all times, concentrations of troops should be regarded as good attritional targets (see 3 1 a); special provision for concentrated attack, however, should be made in the articl on and after D, when such concentrations become a prime objective.

### 5. COV R

No cover is re uired.

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### Coastal Fortifications - Medium

# Coastal Batteries

### Conclusion

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Medium coastal batteries represent a useful attritional target in any period from D - 60 forward. If effort is available and they could be successfully attacked in period D=5 to D, the energy's ability to interfere with sea operations immediately preceding our landing would be significantly reduced. It is important to investigate the feasibility of attacking these with RAF heavy boahers employing <u>Oboe</u> and MZX. Strafing attacks on D-day may also prove desirable.

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1. Furpose

(i) To decrease the efficiency of enemy counter-shipping artillery by destroying explaced guns and forcing the substitution of less efficient mobile pieces;

(ii) It is possible that the energy may prove short of artillery. If so, the number as well as the quality of coastal guns could be reduced. Some military personnel will be killed as well.

(1) A medium coastal battery consists of 6 six or eight inch guns, emplaced in open pits surrounded by blast walls. Each pit is about 30° in diameter and the whole battery stretches along a distance of about 600 yards.

(ii) There are five medium coastal batteries in the landing area, and 35 more in other parts of the coast.

(iii) Destroyed batteries would probably not be rebuilt by the enemy. Instead, non-emplaced guns would be set up. These would be less efficient against shipping and less defensible against infantry attack.

### 3. Vulnerability

(i) The vulnerability of the target is low; direct hits by fairly large caliber boabs would be required to do significant damage.

(ii) Substitute pieces could be brought up and put into position in a relatively short poriod - say, a week. The number of substitutes might be limited, however, by the energy's stock of suitable weapons in the west.

### 4. Timing

Fairly continuous but intermittent attack against these batteries might be made, making good use of cover (see below) in time and area. The relevant batteries could appropriately be attacked hard on the night of D-1.

### 5. Cover

(i) Extensive cover in space would have to be employed. At least two other stretches of coast would have to be attacked in heavy concentrations.

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^{2.} Target

(ii) Cover attacks should be made prior to and simultaneously with attacks in the relevant area.

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# 6. Achieveable Effects

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(1) Encay capabilities against our shipping might be reduced slightly by reductions in the quality and quantity of medium coastal guns opposing the landing.

(ii) The effects of the attacks would be felt in the crucial short period of D to about D plus 2, while fighting on the beaches is still taking place and ships are standing offshore with reinforcements and supplies.

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# COTLAND ONS

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Constal strongpoints, machine gan posts and blockhouses covering mined and wired areas are rejected as a possible target system. The initvidual targets are very small and nearly invulnerable to aerial bombariment, being housed in four to six feet of concrete, covered with earth. The number of targets in the relevant areas is very large and they are widely soattered and very widespread. and Cover would be required as well. Thus, a very large effort would be required to attack a sizeable proportion of the installation, and little damage can be expected.

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constal radar stations are a useful target for the period ismeilately proceeding D-day, especially if accompanied by attacks on the bealquarters of coast watching ralar activity. Auccossful attacks on two relevant targets and appropriate cover attacks will reduce ensay ability to actect, plot and attack our shipping just before H-hour and increase the possibility of surprise. They will also interfere with guidet artillary fire and thus reduce the efficiency of energy anti-shipping barrages.

COLITIS RATE STATIONS

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- (i) To reduce energy ability quickly to discover major allied shipping movements off his coust and to reduce his ability to direct the fire of anti-shipping batteries.
- (ii) Complete success against the targets attached may make more contain the element of surprise in the timing and location of the first wave of Landings. Some casualties may be caused among trained military personnel.
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- The target consists of radar installations proper, similar to a Preya, and the associated facilities for communications.
- (ii) There are two such installations in the relevant area, and twelve in the whole coastal stretch.
- (iii) If these targets are destroyed, it is possible that some of the aircraft detection stations may be used for the urgose. Some tile will be required to make communication arrangements for this purpose. These will not therefore be available if the targets are attacked as recommended.

3. VUINTABILITY

- It is believed that these targets will be fairly valmerable, so that even low densities of attack should cause widespread damage.
- (ii) If the communication facilities of the stations are damaged as well as the radur installations, it is not expected that repairs could be affected or alternative facilities put into operation in less than a week.
- 4. TIMING
  - The targets selected should be attacked thoroughly once between D-5 and D.
  - (ii) Effects will be felt chiefly on D-day and in the period D to D + 2 when fighting is in progress on beaches and ships are standing offshore with reinforcements and supplies.

5. COV R

- (i) Extensive cover will be accessary. At least half the total number of targets should be attacked.
- (ii) Cover attacks should be made simultaneously with or immediately after attacks on relevant targets.
- 6. ACHIEVEABLE AFFECTS

Destruction of both the targeted stations can be expected, as well as the destruction of possible alternative facilities attacked for purposes of cover.

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# DIKES AND INUNDATI NS

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# CONCLUSI N

Attacks on control points of one or possibly two mundation systems in the relevant area, involving ton or twenty targets, will remove an important obstacle to our attacking infantry. The initial attacks should be made about D-45 to D-15, and must be followed up to prevent repairs. Targets are suitable for fighter bombers or RP fighters. Extensive cover is required.

- 1. PURPOSE
  - (1) To breach dikes and lock gates retaining water in certain immediated areas immediately behind the beaches which will provide an obstacle to our advancing infantry. These sust be opened in sufficient time to allow the water to drain.

### 2. T.RG.T

- (1) The targets are small timber and concrete dams and small lock gates.
- (ii) Only one f the two relevant systes has been studied in detail. This has eight control points. The other and sore important is believed to have forcer. Further study is proceeding.
- (iii) If the targets are breached, the only means available to the energy to maintain the inumiations is repair. This can be prevented by follow-up and strafing attacks.

### 3. YULMER BILITY

- (1) The targets are small dams and gates, of the order of 5' high and 12' to 15' wide. It is believed that low-level NP fighter attack will suffice to breach them, and water pouring through the initial gap will increase the samage. They are located from one-quarter to one sile behind the coastline.
- (ii) Repair time is under study. If the flooded areas are drained, about 15 to 20 days are required to reflood them fully. If is not known what obstacle they present to our assault troops when less than full.

### 4. TDAING.

Initial attack should begin about D-45, and repeated as often as necessary. If possible, dikes should be kept open from D-15 on, so that fairly complete trainage can take place.

### 5. COVER

- Extensive cover will be required and at least three or four other immutation systems should be attacked.
- (ii) Cover attacks should be sale more or less simultaneous with the relevant operations, and must be followed up in similar fashion.

# 6. ACHIEVRABLE REJULTS

Successful results on the one or two relevant systems will remove a difficult obstacle to the advance of our troops inland from the beaches. It will speed our advance, and hence impose a relat ve disadvantage on the deployment of the enemy.

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# dinefields

# Conclusion

T H I S P A G E I S U N C L A

S I F I E D

Some heavy or medium boaber sorties may be required to detonate minefields on and directly behind beaches in the relevant and cover areas. This may be done only within a short time of D-day, say on D-3 and thereafter. Insufficient information is available to enable a further statement to be made at this time.

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### CONCLUSION

For slight attritional effect, parks and depots in Germany might be scheduled for early attack. For the possibility of reducing the effectiveness of divisions post-0, the targettable parks in France might be attacked in the period D minus 5 to D.

- 1. PULCEDE
  - (1) To impose general military attrition.
  - (11) No other result is envisaged.
- 2. T.PG.T

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- (i) Targets consist of scattered stores buildings with bulk of equipment more or less concentrated in their vicinity.
- (11) Two likely targets in Germany (Ingolstait and Konigsborn) and two in France (Mailly to Camp and Versailles/Matory) are known. Although further targets of lesser size and concentration may well be uncovered, they are not likely to be numerous.
- (iii) The only escape from actual losses inflicted is to draw upon such reserves as may exist in Germany, or to draw from other fronts. Ifter attack, however, these concentrations will undoubtedly be dispersed, at some minor cost in efficiency.
- 3. WILSTERABILITY OF PARGET

(i) Tergets comprise heavy equipment, vulnerable virtually to direct H.E. hit alons. Spare parts dumps and servicing equipment might prove screwhat more vulnerable.

(11) Repair time for damaged emuipment would be relatively short. Repair installations in France would probably be soved after attack.

4. TIUNG

With respect to parks in Germany, attack might usefully take place any time from the present forward. With respect to parks in France late attack, say D minus 10, would have the advantage of permitting little time for drawing up and disposing reserves. Unless it is believed that such pools of equipment will be allocated before D, inte attack is recommended, since the number of parks is not large.

5. GOVER

No cover required.

# 6. ADI WEARLE PRAZE

Some lowering in the effectiveness of divisions in the post-D period might be expected, especially if substantial parks in France are still targettable in the period D minus 10 to D, and they are then successfully attacked. Since such equipment is likely to be in reserve, it is unlikely that effectiveness in the period D to D plus 15 will be affected. Barly attack on reserves in Germany might influence strength immediately post-D, although the loss is more likely to be absorbed on other fronts.

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### And All M

Moither systematic or random, early or late attack on examinition dumps can be recommended.

### 1. FUREOSS

- (1) To reduce the supply of annunition available to an extent sufficient to affect the fire power of the German divisions, from D forward.
- (ii) To increase the burden of supply by forcing the use of less efficient routes of supply.

### 2. T RG T3

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- (i) At the level of GH, targets are usually located in forests, come rail served (about tasky in all). They are of two types: old French and Belgian dumps, mostly rail served; and 15-20 newly erected German dumps, spread out, and largely road served. There may be other German dumps, as yet not identified. The coastal divisions have local dumps believed adequate for several months. Other divisional dumps are likely to comprise fully ten days supply.
- Local damage would be met out of regional reserves; systematic and successful attack would be met out of German reserves.

## 3. VULNERABILITY OF TIRG P

- (i) The older Preach and Belian dumps are regarded as moderately vulnerable to attack; the German dumps as virtually invulnerable. Divisional dumps are believed well dispersed.
- (ii) The problem of transport, not believed so ious under memal conditions, would detamine the time required for replacement. A new days would normally suffice for local replacements; permaps a week for replacement from German stocks.

# 4. TI ING

- As an attritional target, dumps can be attacked at any time from the present forward. Any effort to influence the supplies available to forward divisions, would have to be concentrated in the immediate pre-D period.
- (ii) The efforts, if any, would be felt after a period of intensive expenditure, probably well after D.

### 5. COVER

No cover required; although systematic attack would have alerting affect.

# 6. ACHIEVA DUS HEFELT

Systematic attritional attack would have virtually no effect, except possibly to increase somewhat the problem of transport and organization in the area. Concentrated attack on local, forward dumps, immediately pre-D might achieve some embarrassment; although effective attack does not seem tactically feasible, on present evidence.

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# THE VALUE OF MARSHALLING YARDS AS TARGENTS:

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MEDITERRANGAN EXPERIENCE

### Summary

- 1. The following examines Professor Zuckerman's evaluation of air attacks on transport facilities in the Mediterranean, in the course of the first half of 1943.
- 2. On the evidence presented in that evaluation it is argued that the decisive factor in the fall in traffic between the mainland and Sicily was damage done to the Messina ferry; and that the bombing of railway facilities was largely irrelevant to the result.
- 3. Evidence from other sources knowledgeable in the Mediterranean experience is then adduced, tending to show the superior effects in that theater of attacks of direct interdiction over attacks on basic transport capacity.

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4. In general it is argued that the distinction between strategic attack on transport potential and tactical attack of direct interdiction is misleading both for an appreciation of the Mediterranean operations and for the planning of operations in the West. It is urged that the appropriate single criterion/the degree to which attack prevents energy movement in the relevant area over the relevant time period; and that this should not be confused with the amount of physical damage achieved.

Enemy Objectives Unit Economic Warfare Division American Embassy

22 February 1944

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THE VALUE OF MARSHALLING YARDS AS STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL TARGETS

# AS MEASURED IN SICILIAN AND S. ITALIAN EXPERIENCE

An Analysis of "Air Attacks on Rail and "oad Communications"

1. "Air Attacks and Rail and Road Communications", a report submitted to Air Chief Marshall Sir Arthur Tedder, G.C.B., Air C.-In C., MAAF by Professor S. Zuckerman, Scientific Adviser, MAAF, under date of 28 December, 1943, presents a series of sixteen general and nine special conclusions. Among them are:

- a) "If the measure of success of air attacks on enemy rail and road communications is taken as the destruction of the means of communication, then the offensive carried out against rail targets in Sicily and Southern Italy must be regarded as an outstanding success. If, however, the measure of success were taken as the complete cutting and blocking of railway lines and roads, then the offensive could be regarded as having partly failed in its purpose. There is little indication that the attacks prevented the enemy from moving from place to place within the limits imposed by the capacity of the transport at his disposal." (para. 1, p. 11)
- b) "The two factors which contributed most to the strategical and tactical success of the offensive were the destruction and damaging of rolling-stock and repair facilities. Largely because of such damage, the Sicilian and Southern rail systems had become practically paralyzed by the end of July 1943 - as a result of attacks on only six railway centers..." (para. 2, p ii)
- c) "After the railways of Sicily and Southern Italy had been severely hit, they were inadequate to deal with the enemy's military needs." (para. 7, p. 111)
- d) "The strategical effect of destroying the enemy's means of rail communication is best achieved by attacks on large railway centers which contain important repair facilities and large concentrations of locomotives and rolling-stock. The sub-targets (e.g. tracks, rollingstock, warehouses, repair sheds, etc.) in a large railway area are very concentrated. As a result, the general risk of damage from bombing, if the attacks are carried out in adequate strength, is very high." (para. 10, p. iv)
- e) "A far more costly air effort would be needed to achieve a tactical success, in the sense of a sudden blocking of communications at any given series of points, than has proved necessary to produce the strategical effect of reducing traffic potential by the destruction of rollingstock and repair facilities." (para. 14, p. iv)
- f) "Reilway and road bridges are uneconomical and difficult targets and in general do not appear to be worth attacking except where special considerations demand it in the tactical area." (para. 18, p. v)

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2. It has been suggested in an EOU paper ("Critical Analysis of 'Delay and Disorganization of Enemy Movement by Rail'", dated 7th February, 1944 para. 13) that Sicilian and S. Italian experience may not constitute an adequate basis for broad generalization applicable to areas with dense systems of communications. This is particularly true of the value of attacks against Sicilian marshalling yards, to which the subject paper's statistical material is relevant, since the island possesses only 4 important yards. It is the contention of the present paper, however, that the evidence presented in "Air Attacks on Rail and Road Communications" is insufficient to support the conclusions cited above in para. 1. On the paper's showing, it is believed more appropriate to argue:

- a) The distinction between a strategic air offensive against the enemy's capacity for rail transport or means of communication <u>in a given area</u> and a tactical air offensive designed to interdict communication at specific points is invalid. The appropriate criterion for the success of attacks on transportation in an area is the degree to which attack prevents enemy movement and not the amount of physical destruction achieved.
- b) Neither the lack of locomotive repair facilities nor the destruction of rolling stock imposed a limit to German ability to move military traffic in Sicily or Southern Italy.
- c) The limits to German movement imposed by air attacks were achieved in Sicily by the gradual diminution of ferry capacity for transporting railroad cars across the Messina Straits; and in Italy by cutting lines, temporarily at marshalling yards and for longer periods of time at bridges.

In addition, Appendices I through IV below present evidence drawn from Mediterranean experience beyond that available in the subject paper, leading to the conclusions:

- d) If it be assumed that effort were equally required to block traffic by rail at marshalling yards and bridges, complete interdiction of enemy communication in Italy could have been achieved with great economy of effort by attack on six targets.
- e) Cuts to line are achieved with less effort at bridges than at marshalling yards.
- f) Cuts to line achieved at bridges produce more lasting interdiction of enemy communication by rail than blocks in marshalling yards.

1. Neither of the two copies seen contains the six appendices which together encompass more than 120 pages.

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3. Concrete evidence in the subject paper on the effects of the allied bombardment is presented primarily for Sicily. While the argument relates to the bombing both of Southern Italy and Sicily, the measure of its success is tested almost entirely by Sicilian data for the first six months of 1945. The statistical course of the argument, moreover, is semeshat difficult to follow in detail. Its major thesis may perhaps be summarized as follows:

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a) Attacks on Sicilian and S. Italian railway facilities reduced the "import potential" of Sicily during the first half of 1945 by 500,000 tons, below the 1,250,000 tons imported during the last half of 1942. Actual imports amounted to 900,000 tons and the actual reduction in imports amounted to 300,000 tons. This was due to the fact that the Germans succeeded in offsetting 200,000 tons of the reduction in the import potential by the expedient of using small coastal vessels to carry cargo from the Toe of Italy to Messina and nearby ports. Of the 500,000 tons reduction in import potential, 260,000 tons was recorded in the traffic imported via the Messina train ferry, and 240,000 tons was achieved in the "momal" sea routes. The expedient alrealy noted, however, limited the actual reduction in sea traffic to 40,000 tons. (pp. 5.22,27).

b) The reduction of 500,000 tons in the Sicilian import potential was due in the main to the inability of the Sicilian railroads to cope with the traffic demands placed upon them, in turn anoribable to the air attacks against Sicilian marshalling yards. These attacks limited the average daily run of serviceable locanotives (p. 21). The reduction in the Sicilian railroad "potential", as measured by freight cars handled in Falarno, Massima and Catania in the first half of 1943, amounted to 400,000 tons (p. 22).

4. Since the reduction in freight handled by the Sicilian railroad system affected both exports and imports, the decline in import traffic carried by rail may have been on the order of 200,000 tons. If the decline in imports amounted to 300,000 tons, and the decline in imports handled by rail 200,000 tons more or less, there seems to be no apparent reason why the import decline should have been caused by the decline in freight handled within Sicily. In fact, the former phenomenon adequately explains the latter. Moreover, the decline in traffic provides a full explanation for the reduction in the average daily run of serviceable locasotives. The prime cause of the reduction in imports appears to have been the decline in ferrying capacity at Sessing. This is discussed in more detail below. int may be noted now, however, that attacks against railway facilities in Italy did not limit the flow of traffic across the Straits. The flow of goods through "attipaglia, south of Maples on the mainland, decreased less proportionately and in total amount than the flow across the Straits. (p. 17) Horeover, it is not clear how damage to Catania and Falermo could have affected the movement across the Straits. The role of damage to railway installations at Messina, Reggio and Can Giovanni is discussed in para. 7 below. Finally, the reduction of 240,000 tons in import potential handled by normal sea routes, which was offset to the extent of 200,000 tons by ad hoc coastal shipping may have been related to the bombariment of the ports, but does not appear to be attributable to the destruction of railroad motive power or rolling stock. Figures are given for one port, Palerao, only. In this connection, it is stated (p. 6) that only 30 per cent of the imports discharged on the quays were handled by the port railway. The remainder, presumably, were handled by road transport (p. 6), or transshipped by sea.

5. The number of locamotives actually in service in Sicily on 30th June 1943 was only 15 per cent below the 15th December 1942 figure (p. 33). If motive power had been a limiting factor, these locamotives would have been used more intensively. In fact, however, the average daily run of locamotives declined (p.21).

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6. No evidence is adduced to suggest that the decline in rail traffic was occasioned by shortages of rolling stock. Cumulative damage in five yards resulted in the destruction of 18 per cent of cars standing in yards, serious damage to 14 per cent more and moderate or slight damage to 29 per cent more (p. 35). If 60 per cent of all cars in Sicily were standing in yards at one time, destroyed and seriously damaged cars would have amounted to about 20 per cent of the cars in the system! But it is recorded in the paper that cars were returned empty to the mainland (p. 15).

7. On the paper's own showing, it seems likely that the major cause of the contraction of imports into Sicily was the reduction of the Messina train ferry capacity. This factor is given weight by the paper on a number of occasions (pp. 12, 21, 23). In summing up, however, it is merely stated that the ferries did keep running (p. 30). It is further claimed that evidence in the appendices "suggests clearly that disruption of railway installations in Messina and San Giovanni contributed as much to the fall in traffic as did actual damage to the ferry-boats themselves" (p. 30). This is difficult to credit. Damage to railroad unloading facilities in Messina did not become sigmificantly large until 14 July 1943 when ferry traffic was below 19 per cent of the average for the last half of 1942 (p. 12) And a comparison of actual ferry traffic with ferry capacity, measured from the details of ship serviceability derived from the data on p. 14, and interpolated for months, shows that traffic fell little if any below the capacity of the ferries to handle it. Traffic through Battipaglia is also

1943	Avg. Daily Traffic thru Battipaglia Jan. = 100	Avg. Daily Cap. Messina Ferries Jan. 2 100	of Avg. Daily In- comings to Messina Jan. = 100
Jan.	100	100	100
Feb.	91	91	91
Mar.	96	91	
Apr.	91	75	98
May	68	41	81
June	39	27	46
July	58	34	24
Aug.	28	15	no data
Sept.	no data	10	

In the conclusions of the paper, no mention is made of the decline in ferry capacity. This decline, it may be noted, is similar to that achieved by the interdiction of a communication route.

8. It is not established in the paper that the reduction in imports impinged seriously on German or Italian military supplies. It is stated that 80 per cent of the 260,000 ton reduction in goods moved across the Messina Straits can almost certainly be deducted from Axis military shipments (p. 27). No indication

1/ This result was achieved with an average density of 6 X 500 1b. bombs per acre. Using the equation given in the paper (p. 45), damage to 40 per cent of the cars on the island, if (0 per cent of all cars were standing in yards, would have required a density of 24 X 500 bb. bombs per acre.

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is given, however, of the character of the 990,000 tons of imports actually received, except to the extent that this character is reflected in the total internal rail traffic in Sicily. In this traffic including exports as well as imports, civilian goods accounted for 43 per cent of total traffic during the second quarter of 1943 (p. 7). Since the data do not adequately differentiate the character of the goods actually imported, it seems rash to attempt an estimate of the military proportion of the 300,000 tons of goods which were not imported.

9. Certain differences in the interpretation of the material presented in the subject paper have been presented above. In addition, it may be noted that new material is available on later experience with air attacks against communication targets in central and northern Italy. Much of this is relevant to discussion of the comparative target attraction of marshalling yards and bridges. Appendix I sets forth the CSDIC account of the testimony of an escaped Italian general on the subject. Appendix II comments on this testimony with explanatory material, in an extract from MAAF Weekly Intelligence Summary. The Italian officer, it may be noted, takes exception to the policy of attacking marshalling yards. He points out that successful attacks on communications which would interdict railroad traffic have achieved marked effects on German supply problems, whereas damage to marsha ling yards has been quickly repaired. Moreover, he quotes an officer of the German General Staff in Italy, made 15th November, 1943, "If the bombing of our communications had continued as in September and October, we would have had to withdraw North of Rome."

10. This conclusion is sharply at variance with that expressed in the subject paper (p. 56): "Analysis of the NAPRS reports (on the effort against rail and road bridges during September and October) suggests that the results of the attacks against rail bridges were disappointing. Occasionally rail traffic appeared to have been blocked as a result of hits on approaches to bridges ... Only seven bridges were cut or half destroyed in thirty five raids....Damage to tracks, however, occurred in 10 other cases".

11. Finally, statistics on MAAF operations against marshalling yards and bridges for the period 5 October 1943 to 22 January 1944 have been gathered by Lt. Dorr of 2677 Hq. Co., AFHQ, Algiers and are submitted in Appendices III and IV. These documents argue that it is easier to cut communications at bridges or even on open line than at marshalling yards; and that communications when cut by the destruction of a bridge are interrupted for a considerably longer period than that resulting from blocks to marshalling yard track. In the latter connection, Appendix II makes certain observations comparing attacks on three Italian rail lines - the east coast, the west coast, and the Rome Florence moad, which are in point, Bridge attacks were made on the east coast and the Rome-Florence lines in the period from the 17th to the 24th of October, while the west coast line was attacked at marshalling yards beginning late in September. On November 22, the east coast line and the stretch from Rome to Florence were still in-operative as a result of the attacks the month before. Attacks on the west coast line produced only temporary cuts; in no case did adequate repairs require much more than a week to reestablish through traffic.

12. Lt. Dorr's report, like that of the Italian general, shows that in a long narrow railroad system like Italy's, the simultaneous destruction of six targets could have cut railroad transport between central Italy and the north. Since accuracy has **improved**, it is believed that the subject paper's conclusion on the costliness of air attack on bridges are in error. They doubtless derive from the actual experience of MAAF in bombing bridges in depth over a wide area rather than selecting the smallest possible system of bridge and other blockage targets and pursuing attack on these unremittingly.

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13. It is admitted that the subject paper makes no claim for cutting communications by attacks against marshalling yards. Yet it is difficult to see in it what "a strategic reduction in the capacity of a communication system" means that is not implied in the interdiction of movement. Sicily was an island. The only type of result which air attack could reasonably have been expected to achieve was to keep goods off the island. This was gradually accomplished by the reduction of ferrying capacity. It was accompanied by enormous damage to the railroad system of the island, most of which was irrelevant to the result. The paper is impressed by the amount of damage which can be inflicted on railway centers. It is correctly noted that this damage is harsh on the civilian population (para. 8, p.iii) and lasting in effect (para. 9. p. iii). Moreover the damage (and enemy demolitions and withdrawals of equipment) have made it difficult for Allied Forces to operate the system (pp. 31, 32) especially since the damaged marshalling yards and ports are required by us as loading and unloading points in a self-contained system, i.e. one without a much larger railroad network behind it, capable of feeding it. It is probably incorrect, however, to characterize the vast destruction wrought by these attacks as a "profound strategical result" (p. 31).

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
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
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# PLAN FOR:

The Use of the Strategic Air Forces - Mid-March until V-day.

# INDEX

THE PLAN	-	Plan for use of the Strategic Mir Force Effort until V-day.
Appendix	A -	The German Gil situation.
Appendix	B -	Railway Targets in a limited Area.
Appendix	C -	Tank Production and Ordnance Depots.
Appendix	D -	Assumition Assembly and Filling Depots.
Appendix	в –	Jet Aircraft.
Appendix	F -	Submarines.
Appendix	G -	General Arsement and Engineering plant filler targets.

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### PLAN FOR

# THE USE OF THE STRATEGIC AIR FORCES FROM MID-MARCH 1945 UNTIL V-DAY

### I. Present Allied Position

In the West and the East Allied hand armies are now mounted for attacks on Central Germany. These promise to bring decision in the European war over the next four months, possibly within six weeks. Virtually all targets must, therefore, yield effects within a short time period. A criterion of less than two months is applied within this plan.

The forces under USSTAF stand at peak strength. With the approach of increasing visual weather and the apparent impotence of the German fighter force, it may prove possible to attack precisely many more targets than have hitherto been envisaged within our capabilities.

Following sets forth a plan designed to exploit the present position.

II. Aim

The aim of the following plan is to bring the full striking force of the Strategic Air Forces to bear on all the vital installations insediately supporting the German ground force effort, and where possible on the German troops and field installations themselves. It is designed thus to bring hostilities to a close in the shortest time possible with minimum Allied casualties.

III. The Plan

### A. Direct Attack:

With the period of decisive field operations issinent it is obvious that maximum possible weight should be brought squinst energy troops and installations currently in combat position. Recommendations with respect to such direct attack are set forth below. (Para IV). Targets under this category are to be selected in close coordination with army Groups, armies and the Tactical air Forces.

### B. Attack on Current Military Supplies:

Largely as a result of strategic bombing sttack at the present time the German armies are under-equipped, dangerously immobile, and operating under the virtually unopposed offensive weight of the Allied Tartical Air Forces. The reduced flow of equipment, fuel, supplies, and reinforcements that still comes forward is, nevertheless, the principal support for continued German resistance. An appreciable part of the heavy bomber effort must continue to be devoted to the denial of fuel and other military resources directed to front line use within a period of less than two months.

### . insurance Attacks:

Only two energy threats are judged worthy of special allocation of effort for purposes of insurance; namely, jet sircraft and subsarine construction.

The following target systems, in order of priority, are recommended:

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	Syste		
	1. Direct At German Gr	ttack on (Targets to round Forces	be selected currently)
G - Current ( Military ( Supplies (	2. Oil 3. Communica 4. Tank Prod 5. Ordnance 6. Augunitic 4 Fillir	fuction 10 Depots 32	A B C C D ···
- Insurance (	7. Jet Aircs 8. Submarine		E F

Note: Armansent factories as filler targets are discussed in Appendix G. A list of 142 such targets has been prepared and passed to Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces.

IV. Direct Attack on German Ground Forces:

#### A. General:

It is appreciated that the use of heavy bombers in direct attack on ground forces, as recommended below, involves difficult problems of intelligence and operations, as well as the establishing of improved close liaison with the Allied field forces. It is felt that in the prosent situation the development of such operations represents the most promising field for a new profitable employment for the heavy bombers.

#### B. Troops and Field Positions:

Over the past nine months various efforts have been made to use the heavy bomber forces in direct attack of the front. These efforts have met with varying success. The principal weaknesses have been:

a. Lack of prompt follow-up by ground forces; and

b. Lack of continuity in air force attack.

It is, further, clear that the selection of suitable heavy bomber aiming points for such attack has been and will continue to be a difficult problem; for the German army in the field does not present large concentrations. A solution may lie in the capabilities opened to the heavy bombers in Operation "CLARION". The areas in which such operations can be successfully carried out are now very extensive, due to the reallocation of German flak, the shortage of flak ammunition, and the impotence of the G.A.F.

USSTAF will sponsor and effect the closest possible coordination among the Sighth Air Force, the Army Groups, and the Tactical Air Forces, with representation of both Operations and Intelligence. The purpose of this coordination will be to plan:

5. Sequences of attack over a period of days, designed to destroy key defensive positions and concentrations in the path of the spearhead ground forces, on decisive sectors of the front; and

b. Attack on unloading points, forward depots, headquarters, and other installations in ismediate support of German Army units, which

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targets are not included in the strategic priority lists in Fara III above. The purpose of the latter attacks will be to aid the Tactical Air Forces in causing disintegration of the German Army structure on decisive sectors of the front.

In formulation of direct attacks the capabilities exhibited in "CLARION" will be exploited.

The necessity for prompt action, on the basis of the current Allied position and current intelligence, demands this close liaison on the operational level.

USSTAF will study and evaluate the results of these attacks, and make recommendations with respect to the suitability of targets selected and operational tastics employed.

#### V. The Role of the USSTAP Fighter Forces

The intent of this plan is to bring the maximum Mir impact on the German armies in the field. Supplementary to the use of the heavy bember forces in this plan additional impact on the German ground forces will be brought to bear by the fighter and fighter-bomber forces attacking tactical targets of importance in direct coordination with the Allied Ground Armies.

#### VI. Expected Results

Aside from the suggested element of direct attack, the target systems suggested above constitute main immediate sources of fael and armaments supply to the German armies in the field. From firm intelligence it is evident that limitations of supply have already gravely impaired the fighting value of the German armsed forces, and aided significantly in bringing them to their present desparate position. The length and intensity of further resistance will depend in substantial part on the quantity of the flow which the air Forces permit them. Continued successful and systematic attack on these targets will shorten the war.

The contribution of direct Air attack will depend on the success of operations and intelligence in overcoming what are difficult problems. The largest single contribution the Strategic Air Force could make would be in facilitating the general break-through over the Shine, and helping to maintain ground force momentum in subsequent stages. To this problem the maximum energy and imagination must be promptly applied.

#### VII. Conclusion:

It appears to be the will of the Mazi leaders to continue armed resistance, until that resistance is literally broken in the field, and the German armies are captured. This is not an objective the Air Forces can independently achieve. So long as the Mazis remain in control of the German government, German fighting strength in the field and the immediate sources of that strength, appear to be the sole profitable objectives for Strategic Air Force attack.

The Strategic Air Forces have already made decisive inroads on the fighting value of the German armed forces. They must now facilitate their capture. The successful execution of the present plan will fulfill that aim.


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#### OIL

#### Current Status

1. The German oil position presently is at an all time low through successful attacks on the 135 major oil targets. Present oil output has been reduced to 362,000 tons per month, or 27% of pre-raid capacity. In like manner the German output of gasoline and its substitutes have been reduced to an estimated output of 82,000 tons per month, or 16% of pre-raid capacity.

2. The current status of oil priority list indicates that there are 18 Live oil targets (including benzol targets) on the priority list for attacks from the United Kingdom. There are 9 live oil targets on the present priority list for the Mediterranean Theater. In addition to these there are presently on priority 16 oil or benzol targets which have been attacked recently but on which adequate cover is not available for an assessment of damage inflicted. It is anticipated that, providing widespread operational techniques are utilized and adequate visual bombing weather available, the oil priority list in the very near future will consist of not more than 10 targets which are considered of importance, come into operation. The amount of effort necessary to keep the oil system under control should continue to shrink.

#### General Intelligence Discussion.

3. Intelligence has from the inception of the attacks on oil mounted in ever increasing volume to show the tremondous military benafits which these attacks have produced for the Allied Mir Forces and Ground Forces. There is abundant evidence that the operational efforts of the luftwaffe have been seriously curtailed by lack of fuel. The Luftwaffe training program has been so embarrassed that present pilots are compotitively extremely inferior to the well-trained Allied pilots. The Tehrmacht, while in static defence positions, has proved to be a most effective fighting force, but in mobile warfare all Intelligence indicates that its movements are seriously curtailed through lack of fuels. The German Havy has been forced to abandom its major naval program with the exception of submarine and "5" and "8" boat warfare. The training of these creas has been curtailed in order to conserve the diesel fuels which are becoming increasingly short. The plethors of orders captured, prisoners of war interrogated, and reports of our own fighting units, confirm the tremendous aids which this program has contributed to all fighting fronts.

4. The time factor between gasoline and fuel producing plants and the front is one which is extremely difficult to visualize today. A plant such as Ruhland is undoubtedly producing fuel for ismediate shipment to active fighting units. It is believed that all fuel producers in Germany are presently shipping their product on a pipeline in one to two weeks to front line units. This does not include those benzol plants in the Ruhr, which at present are believed to be acting in the nature of tactical fuel depots in supplying their products to Fanzer and other mobile units.

#### Conclusions and Mecompendations.

5. In view of the fact that the oil program has produced such magnificent results on all fighting fronts, and in view of the Germans desperate attempts to repair the plants and to provide dispersed fuel producing units, it is firmly recommended that the Air Forces continue their attempts to keep production of fuel in Germany under 50,000 tons per month. This goal will not raise insuperable difficulties, since the



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majority of heavily defended oil targets, such as the Central Corman Synthetic Plants, will not require the affort in the future which has been expended in the past. It should be borne in mind that the Germans are still making every effort to repair Central German plants, and that with their shrunken frontiers they need less fuel than formerly for fighting withdrawing actions to their last haven of allout effort. All oil targets are presently protected by Plak. It is not felt from an Intelligence standpoint that the major producers of fuel, which are the only oil targets presently on priority list, may be attacked other than at high altitudes in order to prevent high operational losses.

6. In order that the oil program may not slip from its present status of supreme importance, it is considered necessary that it be maintained on a priority superceded only by direct and carefully designed tactical aid to the front lines. It is believed that the Working Committee on Oil appreciate the necessity of maintaining the priority list on oil to as few targets as possible in order to contain the German fuel production within the goal of 50,000 tons per month. It is recommended that the attacks on oil continue on high priority based on a wisely chosen list of active fuel producing targets.

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COMPLNED STRATEGIC TARGETS CONMITTEE

Working Committee (011 Production and P.O.L. Depots)

WEIKLY BULLETIN NO. 1945 - 11

March 13th, 1945.

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#### CONBINED STRATEGIC TARGETS CONTITUES

orking Committee (Oil Production and P.O.L.Depots)

#### WEEKLY DULLETIN NO. 1945 - 11

### March 15, 1945.

### I. ATTACKS AND RECONTATESANCE.

Attacks during the past week have mainly been directed against benzol plants in the West as shown in <u>Appendix I</u>. All of the stasks have been carried out by P.F.F. methods and in most cases post-raid cover has not get been received. Owing to tad weather no oil targets have been attacked by N.A.A.F. during the past week.

### II. OVERALL STREETS ON PRODUCTION.

Estimates of the performance of individual plants are set out a <u>Appendix II</u>. These co not include the two GELLINNERG dispersal plants now indiced to be in operation the exact location of which is not yet known. The probable output of these plants has, however, been taken into account in the estimate of total production is <u>Table I</u>, which also takes account of the probability that these plants and some other German refineries are now operating on Hungarian crude. Revised estimates of production on this backs are summarized below:-

	100 - 10 -	40 001	no per mun	
	All Produ	eta	Motor & A	dation Fuels
Pre-roid normal output	1,3h4,000 (		532,000	(100.5)
Estimated production in:-				
) <u>1944</u> September October November December <u>1945</u> January February Merch 23	0,000/360,000		105,000 150,000 170,000 150,000 105,000 75,000 5,000/85,0	(32.5) (28.5) (20.5) (14.5)

Revined catimates of the output of the principal refines

	Fobraar	97		
	metric tona	pre-raid	metric tons	10.01 pre-raid
Gasoline Kerosine Gas/Diccel Oils Fuel Oils Lube Oils	75,000 15,000 108,000 129,000 29,000	14,5 1555 40,5 46,5 20,5	82,000 18,000 94,000 134,000 30,000	
TOTAL	356,000		358,000	27/3

/III. CURRENT

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#### III. CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS.

#### (a) Synthetic Plants.

The recent stracks on MACDEBURG are now known to have ensured the long-term immobilization of this plant and all prospects of renewed production at SCHOLVEN have been frustrated by devastation in excess even of that achieved in other recent successful attacks.

In these directistances RUHLAND is the only synthetic plant which is positively known to be in production, though LUTZKINDORF is probably by now achieving a limited output and ROHLEN is likely to resume substantial production in the last week of March or the first week in April.

The current rate of synthetic production is accordingly no more than 20,600/30,000 tons per month of all products of which 10,000/15,000 tons per month may consist of gasoline.

The probable resumption of production on a significant scale by LUTZKHEDONF is apported by reliable evidence that one train of crude oil is being despatched on alternate days to the unloading point for this plant from the VIENNA area. This may indicate that the Bergius section is now to operate on a crude feedatock with a view to increasing the sacoline yield, but this is not certain. The enemy may morely be taking advantage of excess refinery espacity in the plant; alternatively this crude may be the normal feedatock for the preparation of the high-grade lubballs which the LUTZKENDORF Bergius section is known to produce.

#### (b) German Refineries.

With the temporary immobilization of the H.RBURG refineries and of the distillation units at MISBURG, the only unit of major displicance in the German refinery industry which is in meduation at present is the cracking plant at MISBURG. All three of these refineries, however, are expected to be in substantial production again within one to two weeks and recent reliable intelligence indicates that they will be operating on Hungarian crude. This is being tempatened to HANGVIN (probably for MISBURG) at the rate of one train (500 tons) per day. The use of three trains (1500 tons) every two days and to HANGVIN (probably for MISBURG) at the rate of one train (500 tons) per day. The use of this crude, as is well known, will give a gesoline yield on straight distillation of 50%, compared with the 10, to 12, obtainable on German and Austrian erades; in the case of MISBURG this yield would be further improved by the cracking of the residues. Assuming that the whole of the Hungarian crude coming forward to the above destinations is fed to these three plants their probable performance in the near future might be approximately as follows:-

#### metric tons per month

6

#### All Products M.T. & Aviation Fuels

HARBURG HARBURG MISBURG	(Rhenanis) (Ebano)	12,000 10,000 15,000	4,000 3,300 7,500
		2,000	1,200

A proportion of the crude shirped to ELIBURG is consigned to the EUROTALK refinery but is certainly not treated there. This plant has been regularly covored and remains inactive. On the other hand much tank-wagon activity has always been seen in the vicinity of the refinery in connection with the considerable atorage capacity in the PETROLEUMELFEX. It how seems certain that this storage is used to hold crude at the disposal of the ELEBURG and HARBURG refineries generally, most of which have lost the greater part of their own crude storage tanks. /The same

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The same source reveals that crude (probably Hungerian) is also being despatched; at the rate of 15,000 toms per month to two consignees in Northern or Central Germany described as "OFEN 5/8" and "OFEN 19/22". It is conditioned that these designations denote groups of stills erected (four to s site) under the GELLENDERG clapersal programme and now evidently in operation. Their precise location is not ret known. The rate of cryde shipments indicates that the monthly throughput especity of each group of stills is 7,500 tons; if Hungerian crude is the feedstock, gasoline output would consequently be 2,500 tons.

The designation of these "OPEN" indicates that a total of 22 (or more) such stills may be in existence or contemplated. If these are similarly arranged in groups of four, a possible total of six installations is indicated. There is however, as yet, no information regarding even the general location of other groups and the presumption is that the majority are still under construction.

Making allowance for the existence of two "GEILENDERG" plants and assuming the officiation of 45,000 tans per month of Hungarlan crude in these plants, the current rate of projection by the German refinery industry may be estimated at 35,000/79,000 tans per month, of which 10,000/15,000 tans per month toy consist of gasoline. The marsin in these figures represents the possible subject of refinerics in fLUDERG and elacthere which have been attacked in the past few days with undeserved results.

### (c) <u>Control Durorson Polinepien</u>.

If, as indicated alove, Hungarian crude is now being shipped to Germany at the rate of 45,000 tons per month, there may be a balance of 15,000 tons per month available for refining locally, accuming that the fields are producing at full copacity. Previous numbers of this Bulletin have accumate that the Hungarian refineries reads and a oneng hands are capable of treating 10,000 tons of crude per month and it not seems more probable than ever that they are dainy so in the light of the information available regarding the rate of export to Germany. A check on the status of these plants by fresh cover is badly needed.

There have been no further stacks on the sustrian or Gascho-Slovek refineries, the status of which remains unchanged, with the MOOSHINKWILL refiner; now coucibly in partial operation, according to the evidence of cover obtained in the past two weeks.

The total current rate of production in the Central Buropean industry is therefore estimated at 55,000/75,000 tons per month, according to activity at MOODELIRIAN, of which 7,500/10,000 tons may consist of geopline.

### (d) Miscellaneous Sources.

The majority of the major coke-oven benzel plants remaining in Geneen bands have now been brought under sir attack or artillery fire. The position, expressed in terms of coal throughput capacity is an follows

RUHR and SAAR

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	-		
· · ·	lo.of Plants	Cosl Throughp Million tons	ut Capacity % of
RUHR and SAAR		per year.	total.
Out of action Attacked (results outstanding) In battle area Balance of available capacity	14 8 13 51 86	19.3 6.0 10.2 <u>17.9</u> 54.2	28.5 10.0 15.0 26.5 80.0
OTHER GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA .	& AUSTRIA.		
Ib battle areas Balance of available capacity	13	7.2	10.5

100.0 7.6

In these circumstances, it is doubtful whether the current production rate of crude cake oven benzol is ir excess of 20,000 tons per month, compared with a production of 50.000/55,000 tons per month in the autumn. At the same time, the principal tar oil refiberies are dither out of action or working at a greatly reduced rate. The enemy should nevertheless still be able to maintain supplies of M.T. fuel from miscelleneous sources, including an admixture of alcohol, at a level of 20,000/25,000 tons per month.

#### (e) P.O.L. Depots.

There have been no further attacks on P.O.L. Depots. Several ecomercial storage installations on the fast bank of the Khine, believed to have been used formerly for the distribution of Army fuel, are now under shell-fire.

Two Wehrmacht depots in the North now show little activity in conformity with the worsening position in Army fuel supplies in the West. On the other hand a G.A.F. depot in the same area shows increased activity, possibly owing to transfer of functions from damaged installations elsewhere.

# (f) Overall Gasoline Supply Position.

.11 ms jor producers of svistion gasoline remain out of action and the prospects of resumption of activity by SCHOLVEN have now been decisively eliminated.

The current rate of total motor and aviation fuel production is estimated to lie between 47,500 tons and 65,000 tons per month. These figures assume full utilization of Hungarian crude production and include an allowance for production by two CELLENDERG refineries. The margin is due to uncertainty regarding the status of LUTZKENDORF, MOOSHLIRH.UM and a number of anall refineries and benzol plants on which post-raid cover is outstanding. RUHLAND, LUTZKENDORF, NISBURG, MOOSBLERN.UM and VIE MA-SCOWEGUET, assuming all these plants to be active, would account for about one-third of the higher figure.

### IV. SUTUATION IN PRODUCING AREAS.

The current status of the significant synthetic oil plants, refineries, coke-oven benzol plants and tar refineries remaining in German hands is summarized, with estimates of their current output of motor and aviation fuel, in <u>Table III.</u> The present situation is for ther described below:-

/(a) <u>Synthetic</u> Plants

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#### (s) Synthetic Plants; (i) Bergius Hydrorenation Planta.

There is no prospect of any further production from the four Bergius plaute in the West which remain in German hands. SCHOLVIN is even to have been devastated in the stateks of March 8 and 10; repairs would require 4 to 8 months to complete. No stampt has been made to begin repairs at HORDSTRIM, DOTTROP WILLING OF LUDWIGGLIPPEN.

In Centrel Commany MACDERURG is seen to have been comproheasively hit is the attack of Harch 5; heavy damage to all vital actions of the plant will require at least 2 months to repair.

BOILDI see less severely hit by the attacks of March 2 and 6 but is out of action and unlikely to resume before the last work in March or the first work in April.

Litration F has not been covered since March 2 but from the appearance at that time the Dergius section should by now be in lighted predention. If not, no Dongius hydrogenetics plant is in section of the present time as FOLITZ is derolict and reprint at AMM have herily begun.

#### Property Plents: (11) Pischer Trongch Plante.

All of the Firsher Troppen plants in the Ruhr are inactive, with fittle or no r pair sctivity. There is a theoretical tasketbility that production could be resured at the end of March by CLETTP PLATE and DORTHING but the speed of repair work seen co for incoment suggest that this will be achieved.

In Central Germany Hillind presumably continues in production at 751 of conseily or merc. The Fischer Trousch section of LO 2012 DONY, like the Bergius Section, may now have resumed partial production.

### (c) <u>Caronny; Ecclimation</u>,

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The actacks of March 5 and 6 inflicted considerable fresh oncare to enciling facilities at the E.RDURG refineries, Rhemanie beins more severely hit was heard; nearly all the remaining inchage has desproved in these stacks. Cover of March 12 shows that both plants are inactive and that repairs have not yet back togen. It cannot yet he said whether these hatest allocat have and read the enery from further statempts to repair these reads and provides experience states that they may be got to work spain before the end of the month.

At MIRNURG, cover of March 9 shows that the distillation unit, though still apperently intact, has storned production times the inflicted at the end of last year has new been repaired and the plant is fully setting. Is the distillation unit may also be hade in production econ, Historic may become a significant gaseline producer within a week or two.

Within the post has weeks strocks have been made, with unbrown results, on the refinerics in the PANNURG dock area, "Algorithms," DOLT IND-INPUTATING, MINDU-MINIMUM and MINIMUM. With Remining, Thistolk, Minimum Pantal and Dollarmanis known to be insective, there may therefore have been a sharp decline in production many the scaller refineries of which only the following are now positively known to be active:-

OSLEBSH.USEN DIDDIMLUSEN DORTMUND (Schwitz)

/(d)austria.

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#### (d) .ustria: Refineries.

There has probably been no change in the situation in Austria where all the refineries in the VINNA area are active, except VINNA-LOBAU. In the light of recent cover it is also possible that NOOSHIDDAUM is now in limited production.

#### (c) Cadeno-Slovakia: Refineries.

There has been no fresh opver of refineries in Czecho-Slovskis where activity is likely to be confined to KOLIN, KFALUPY, MOLANIA COTRAWA and, possibly DUBOVA, with FARDUNICE a possible producer before the end of the month.

#### (I) Hun Wary, Serinerico.

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The fact that Germany appears to be able to ship crude from Hungary at the rate of A5,000 tons per month suggests that the balance of the crude oil production may be treated in the local refinerics. This supports previous summitions that at least ALM.SPUEITO and SZONY are in wartion production.

### (G) Rensel Flanks and Tar Oil Refineries.

The coke-oven benzol plants have been attacked during the past week, mostly for the first time. Results are known only in the case of HNDCHUR LIPPE where the Southern section has been put out of action but the Marthern Section remains inactive.

Educion plants are known to be completely out of action due to cample in past attacks.

Of the <u>fourteen</u> significant plants which remain active, <u>seven</u> are within range of artillery fire in the Puhr or Saor.

and roundning plants retaining substantial tenset value enact

SALZGITTUR LITIZ LITIN D.HLSUSCH KONIGSISSEN S.CHERK HEIVRICHSHUTT

### ILIGATICASHOTTI

The important tar oil refiners at NCLBIS-MSPINILAIN is temmorarily inactive following damage on the might of March 5/6. The principal damage is in the larger of the two L.T.C. coking scattons but as the treatment plant has only been alightly damaged, distillation of the from the remaining L.T.C. bettery should be record almost immediatoly. The plant may therefore scop be active again at 50% of caracity.

The ROSITZ tar oil refinery is probably still inscrive following damage inflicted. March 2.

It the Ruhr the CLETROP RLUXIL tar distillery, which has been active at obcut 50% of caracity was attacked again on March 7, with unknown recults. The tar distillery at DUIGBURG-MANDERICH, where activity has been on a small scale, is now within range of artillery fire.

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#### CONDITION OF P.O.L. DEFOTS.

The Wehrmacht dopot at ZARRENTIN, near Hamburg, frequently reported by ground intelligence, has now been located. It is of the normal forest type and appears to be inactive. Recent cover also suggests that the Wohrmacht depot at DICKELOH may no longer be in use.

On the other hand the G.M.F. depot at BUCHEN-HUSSAU shows a considerable increase in activity. This depot is believed to handle jet fuels and may have been specially designed for the purpose as its layout differs from the normal dispersed pattern of G.A.F. depots. On the other hand recent alterations in the loading installations show that more than one type of fuel is habiled and it is possible that distribution of conventional aviation fuel has been transferred to this depot following the damage to DULMEN and EXMIN.

As the tanks in this installation are closely grouped and have not yet been buried, BUCHIN-NUSSAU presents a much more volnerable target for air attack than any other regular Webrmacht or G.A.F. deput.

### VI. FUTURE POLICY.

The long-term inmobilization of M.GLEBURG and BOHLMH has further reduced the commitment meeted for the total colinse of the leading sources of Commany's oil supply. To complete the process it will be necessary to eliminate RUHLAND, and to prevent recomption of sciencetist production by the LUTZKIEDORF and BOHLMH synthetic plants and the HIGBURG, MARKING and MOOSBIERELUM refineries. Achievement of these objects would reduce the rate of M.T. and aviation fuel production to lead than 55,000 tons per month, accurate the progress of the GRILLENDERG programme and the energy's re-acquisition of control over the Hungarian colfields.

The latter development could also be offset in some degree by harassing at send directed a minat topping plants, tank famid and losding instellations in the oilfields themselves. This form of stack merits examination by U.....P.

The stiack of sources of substitute motor fuels has used such good progress that, with the assistance of permitorial losses, production has probably Seclined by more than 50% in the rest aix months. Main counce of the revices allocations of bensel for one as M.T. fuel could now be usistained only by the virtual elimination of all other uses. Allocations may therefore siready have been request and further successful attacks will ensure that they are reduced further.

### VII. PRIORITY RDCO MLND. TIONS.

The usual list of recommended target priorities is not out in Table V.

Mos.1 to 3 are the remaining active or n ar-active synthetic plants.

Nos.4 to 11 are the principal active or near-active refineries In Germany and Control Jurope, prinrities being subject, in the cases, to post-roid cover.

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105.12 to 17 are the rewaining active refinerics in wastria and Gzecho-Slovakia.

/ Nos. 18 and 19

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Nos.18 end 19 are the tar oil refineries in Central Germany.

Nos,20 to 23 are minor refineries in Germany, on all of which post-raid cover is awaited.

Noc.,24 to 38 are the remaining significant producers of cokeoven benzol. In nine cases, priority is tentative, pending post-raid cover.

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Nos.39 to 40 are very small German refineries.

C.S.T.C. Working Committee (Oil) Flat 52: 40 Berkeley Square,W.1. March 13, 1945.

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	TABLE II.

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GASOLINE	KEROSINE	GAS/DIESEL OILS	FUEL OILS	LUBE OILS XX	TOTAL
532	100	284	280	148	
21 14 15 25	1 14	18 12 56 22	47 82	1 2 15 11	40 29 147 140
75 14,3	15 / 15%	108 40/5	129 46,5	29 20%	356 27,5
5 15 37 25	2 16 -	5 11 56 22	- 52 82	2 17 11	10 50 178 140
82 15%	18 18%	94 34	134 48%	30 20%	358 27%
	532 21 14 15 25 75 14,5 5 15 37 25 82	$ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$	532 $100$ $284$ 21       -       18         14       1       12         15       14       56         25       -       22         75       15       108         14,5       15,5       40,5         5       -       5         15       2       11         37       16       56         25       -       22         82       18       94	532 $100$ $284$ $280$ $21$ - $18$ - $14$ 1 $12$ - $15$ $14$ $56$ $47$ $25$ - $22$ $82$ $75$ $15$ $108$ $125$ $143$ $15%$ $40%$ $45%$ $5$ - $5$ - $5$ - $5$ - $5$ - $56$ $52$ $57$ $16$ $56$ $52$ $25$ - $22$ $82$ $82$ $18$ $94$ $134$	532 $100$ $284$ $280$ $148$ $21$ - $18$ - $1$ $14$ $1$ $12$ - $2$ $15$ $14$ $56$ $47$ $15$ $25$ - $22$ $82$ $11$ $75$ $15$ $108$ $129$ $29$ $75$ $15$ $108$ $129$ $20%$ $75$ $15$ $108$ $129$ $20%$ $5$ $ 22$ $82$ $11$ $75$ $15$ $108$ $129$ $20%$ $5$ $ 2$ $11$ $ 2$ $5$ $ 2$ $11$ $ 2$ $57$ $16$ $56$ $52$ $17$ $11$ $82$ $18$ $94$ $134$ $30$

XX NOTE: The figures shown for lubricating oil output are largely theoretical.

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
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7454 (Figures in brac) Ficcorrica status	tels refer to estimated fulle in thousands o	eurent monthly rate of e f mitric tenu) 24 oction anticorine	IL FLATTS, Suiput of motor and avi	Addion 42 BERNEL AND TAR PLANS VOLKLINGEN (1. ADDI BASK (C. ADDI BASK (C. A	
7454 (Figures in brac) Ficcorrica status	tels refer to estimated fulle in thousands o	eurent monthly rate of e f mitric tenu) 24 oction anticorine	Dutput of motor and avi	Adion 42 BERNEL APP TAR PARTS -VOLALINGEN (1. ADID BUSCH (0. ADID BUSCH (0. ADID BUSCH (0. ADID BUSCH (0.7 ADID BUSCH	
7454 (Figures in brac) Ficcorrica status	Note percep to estimated fuels in theusents o 15 SYNTHETIC PLANTS	euront monthly rate of o f matric tens) 24 oddian Ratingangs EMERICAUSER (0.2)	Dutput of motor and avi	Adion 42 BENEOL APP TAX PACES  VOLSULTON ADACOM BUILENSCH C.1 BUILENSCH C.2 BUILENSCH	


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REPORT NO. D.O. 114							SECOTO
GERMAN OIL STORAGE		The f	igures given below ar	a provi st	•		<u>SECRET</u> 9• 3•45
JUL OID STORAGE	•		a contraction data	provisional.	A. Commercial S C. Buried Cylin	torage B.	Surface Storage
						uers D.	Buried Tanks
LOCATION	TYPE	ESTIMAT	D DATE OF LATEST	DATE OF LATEST			
		CAPACIT		COVER	NO. OF TANK WAGONS (LAST COVER)	WATER T.A.SP	ORT REMARKS
MAJOR WIFO DEPOTS: DERBEN					(LINDI COVER)	ACTIVITY	
FARGE	C. D. C. D.	183,000 442,000	14.1.45	14.1.45	Over 40		
FREIHAM HI TZACK ER	C.D.	180,000	? Fighter on 18.1.45	2.3.45	40 plus	? Nil	Damaged, fire.
LOBAU	C.D. C.	344,000 216,000	-	15.2.45 6.3.45	80 [?]	Nil	Minor construction continuing. Part cover.
NEUBERG A/D	D	100,000	27.11.44 25.2.45	25.12.44	115	Nil 2 tankers	
NIEMBURG ROUDNICE	D	147,000	5.8.44	25.2.45 21.2.45	About 75	- Galikers	2 units of tanks damaged.
STASSFURT	C D	38,500	28.12.44	7.2.45	NL1 75 ?	Nil	Pipe lines probably damaged.
	~	Unknown	-	8.2.45	12 1	Nil	Possibly minor damage.
C + 12					163		
G.A.F. DEPOTS: ANNABURG					163	-	stored Underground in Mine.
ANNABURG BAD BERKA	B	5,400	-	26.12.11			Stored Underground in Mine.
ANVABURG BAD BERKA BUCHEN NUSSAU	B B D	6,500	=	26.12.44 26.12.44	42 plus	Nil	Intact.
ANVABURG BAD BERKA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULMEN	B	6,500 20,000 6,500		26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45	42 plus 19 66		Stored Underground in Mine.
ANNAEURG HAD BERGA BUCHIN NUSSAU DULIGN EBERHAUSEN EHKEN	B	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500	14.2.45	26-12-44 26-12-44 6-3-45 21-2-45 9-9-44	42 plus 19 66 12	Nil -	Intact. Large stores of petrol drums.
ANNAEURG BAD BERKA BUCHIN NUSSAU DULIGN EBERHAUSEN EMEEN LOCCUM	B	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 6,500	14.2.45 14.1.45	26-12-44 26-12-44 6-3-45 21-2-45 9-9-44 22-2-45	42 plus 19 66 12 92*	N11 - -	Intact. Large stores of petrol drums. Gapacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact
ANNAEURG HAD BERKA BUCHIN NUSSAU DULIGN EBERHAUSEN EBERHAUSEN EMEEN LOCCUM LANGENSELBOLD	B D B B B B D B B D B	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 6,500 13,500 6,200	14.2.45	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 9.9.44 22.2.45 23.12.44	42 plus 19 66 12 92+ 10 Mil	Nil -	Intact. Large stores of petrol drums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Peils
ANNAEURG BAD BERKA BUCHIN NUSSAU DULIGN EBERHAUSEN EMEEN LOCCUM	B D B B B D B D B D B D	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 5,200 45,000	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 9.9.44 22.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Ni1	N31 - - -	Intact. Large stores of petrol drums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change.
ANVAEURG HAD BERGA BUCHIN NUSSAU DULIGEN EBERHAUSEN HMEN LOCCUM LANGENSELBOLD OLDENDORF WELSSENHORN	B D B B B B D B B D B	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 6,500 13,500 6,200	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 9.9.44 22.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Ni1 Ni1 Ni1	N31	Intact. Large stores of petrol drums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change. Big. repaired. Intact, work progression.
ANNAEURG HAD BERGA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULIOEN MERHAUSEN EHMEN LOOCUM LANGENSELBOLD OLDENDORF WELSSENHORN MEHRUACHT DEPORS.	B D B B B D B D B D B D	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 5,200 45,000	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 9.9.44 22.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Ni1	N11 	Intact. Large stores of petrol drums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change.
ANNAEURG HAD BERKA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULKEN EDERHAUSEN HIMEN LOCCUM LANGERSELBOLD OLDEIDORF WILSENHORN <u>KIHRUACHT DERVOYS</u> . ERRACH EICKELOH	B D B B B D B D B D B D	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 6,200 45,000 10,400	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 9.9.44 22.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45 21.2.45 28.12.44	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Nil Nil Nil 17	N31 	Intact. Large stores of petrol drums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change. Blg. repaired. Intact, work progressing. One, possibly two tanks dmgd.
ANNAEURG HAD BERKA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULMEN HERHAUSEN HERMEN LOCCUM LANGENSELBOLD OLDENDORF WEISSENHORN MIHRUACHT DE OFS. HERACH EICKELOH GEISLINGE/AUSTROVES	B D B B B D B D B D B D	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 13,500 6,200 45,000 10,400	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44 Fighters on 18.11.44	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 9.9.44 22.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Ni1 Ni1 Ni1 17	N31	Intact. Large stores of petrol dums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change. Big. repaired. Intact, work progressing. One, possibly two tanks dmgd. Intact.
ANNAEURG HAD BERKA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULHEN HERHAUSEN HEMEN LOCCUM LANGENSELBOLD OLDENDORF WELSSENHOEN HERHADHT DE YONS. HERACH MICKELOH GELSLINGEL/AUSTETTEN NEUENHERGE	B D B B B D B D B D B D	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 6,200 45,000 10,400	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44 Fighters on 18.11.44	26-12-44 26-12-44 6-3-45 21-2-45 9-9-44 22-2-45 23-12-44 14-2-45 21-2-45 28-12-44 16-2-45 2-3-45 2-3-45 17-2-45	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Mi1 Ni1 Ni1 17 75 Mi1 20	NA1	Intact. Large stores of petrol dnums. Gapacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change. Blg. repaired. Intact, work progressing. One, possibly two tanks dngd. Intact. Intact.
ANNAEURG HAD BERGA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULKEN NUSSAU DULKEN EDERHAUGEN HENGENSELBOLD OLDENDORF WILLSIENHORN <u>AIHRHADHT DEPONS</u> . EERACH EICKELOH GEISLINGE/AUSTETTEN NEUENKERGE RUTHEN	B D B B B D B D B D B D	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 6,200 45,000 45,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44 Fighters on 18.11.44	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 9.9.44 22.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45 21.2.45 28.12.44 16.2.45 2.3.45 17.2.45 22.2.45	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Ni1 Ni1 Ni1 17 75 Ni1 20 29	N31	Intact. Large stores of petrol dnums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change. Blg. repaired. Intact, work progressing. One, possibly two tanks dmgd. Intact. Intact. Capacity now 5500 tons
ANNAEURG HAD BERKA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULKEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN LOCOUM LANGERSELBOLD OLDENDORF WEISSENHOEN MENSEN ENCKLOH GEISLINGEN/AUSTETTEN NEUENHERGE RUTHEN ZARRENTIN	B D B B B D B D B D B D	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 6,200 45,000 10,400 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44 Fighters on 18.11.44	26-12-44 26-12-44 6-3-45 21-2-45 9-9-44 22-2-45 23-12-44 14-2-45 21-2-45 28-12-44 16-2-45 2-3-45 2-3-45 17-2-45	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Nil Nil Nil 17 75 Nil 20 29 Nil	Nii Nii Nii Nii Nii	Intact. Intact. Large stores of petrol dnums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change. Elg. repaired. Intact, work progressing. One, possibly two tanks dmgd. Intact. Intact. Capacity now 5500 tons. Intact. No damage
ANNAEURG HAD BERKA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULKEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN LOCCUM LANGENSELBOLD OLDENDORF WEISSENHORN WHREACHT DEFORM MERACH EIGKELOH GEISLINGEL/AUSTETTEN NEUENHERGE RUTHEN ZARRENTIN XANSHIPIGENT DEPORTS	B D B B B D B D B D B D	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 6,200 45,000 45,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44 Fighters on 18.11.44	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45 21.2.45 28.12.44 16.2.45 2.3.45 17.2.45 22.2.45 22.2.45 22.2.45 22.2.45	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Ni1 Ni1 Ni1 17 75 Ni1 20 29	N11 	Intact. Large stores of petrol dums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change. Blg. repaired. Intact, work progressing. One, possibly two tanks dugd. Intact. Intact. Capacity now 5500 tons. Intact - Active.
ANNAEURG HAD BERKA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULKEN HERHAUSEN HERHAUSEN HERHAUSEN LOCCUM LANGENSELBOLD OLDENDERSE WELSSENHOEN HERACH HERACH MICKELOH GELSLINGE/AUSTETTEN NEU ENHERGE RUTHEN ZARKENT DEPOTSE AKEN	B D B B B D B D B D B D	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 6,200 45,000 10,400 5,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44 Fighters on 18.11.44	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 9.9.44 22.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45 21.2.45 28.12.44 16.2.45 2.3.45 17.2.45 22.2.45 22.2.45 3.3.45	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Mi1 Ni1 Ni1 17 75 Ni1 20 29 Ni1 Ni1	Nii Nii Nii Nii Nii	Intact. Intact. Large stores of petrol dnums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change. Elg. repaired. Intact, work progressing. One, possibly two tanks dmgd. Intact. Intact. Capacity now 5500 tons. Intact. No damage
ANNABURG HAD BERGA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULMEN EDERHAUSEN EMMEN LOCOUM LANGENSELBOLD OLDENDORF WEISSENHORN MENNELSENHORN MENNELSENHORF DEPOTSI ANNA DEPOTSI	B D B B B D B D B D B D	6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 6,200 45,000 10,400 10,400 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44 Fighters on 18.11.44 	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45 21.2.45 28.12.44 16.2.45 2.3.45 17.2.45 22.2.45 22.2.45 22.2.45 22.2.45	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Ni1 Ni1 Ni1 17 75 Ni1 20 29 Ni1 Ni1	NHI NHI NHI NHI NHI NHI NHI NHI NHI	Intact. Intact. Large stores of petrol dnums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change. Big. repaired. Intact. One, possibly two tanks dmgd. Intact. Intact. Capacity now 5500 tons. Intact - Active. No damage Intact
ANNABURG HAD BERGA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULKEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN LOCCUM LANGERSELBOLD OLDEIDORF WEISSENHORN <u>ALHRUACHT</u> DEVOYS. PERACH ELICKELOH GEISLINGEN/AUSTETTEN NEUENIKERSE RUTHEN ZARRENTIN URANAHIPIENT DEPOTS: AKEN DEGGENLORF DRESDEN		6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 6,200 45,000 10,400 10,400 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 21,000 21,000 36,165	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44 Fighters on 18.11.44 17,18.1.45	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 9.9.44 22.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45 21.2.45 28.12.44 16.2.45 2.3.45 17.2.45 22.2.45 22.2.45 3.3.45 1.8.44 1.2.2.45 1.8.44 1.2.45 1.8.44 1.2.45 1.8.44 1.2.45 1.8.44	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Ni1 Ni1 Ni1 17 75 Ni1 20 29 Ni1 Ni1 20 29 Ni1 Ni1	Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil Nil	Intact. Intact. Large stores of petrol drums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repair No change. Blg. repaired. Intact, work progressing. One, possibly two tanks dmgd. Intact. Intact. Capacity now 5500 tons. Intact - Active. No damage Intact
ANNAEURG HAD BERKA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULKEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN LOCCUM LANGENSELBOLD OLDEIDORF WEISSENHORN <u>KINRUACHT DEVONS</u> . PERACH EIGKELOH GEISLINGEN/AUSTETTEN NEUENHERGE RUTHEN ZARHENTIN UANAHI PIENT DEPOTS: AKEN DEGENIJORF DREJEN		6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 45,000 10,400 10,400 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,500 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,00	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44 Fighters on 18.11.44 17,18.1.45	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 9.9.44 22.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45 21.2.45 28.12.44 16.2.45 27.2.45 22.2.45 22.2.45 3.3.45 1.8.44 14.2.45 19.12.44 8.2.45	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Ni1 Ni1 Ni1 17 75 Ni1 20 29 Ni1 Ni1 20 29 Ni1 Ni1 20 29 29 Ni1 Ni1	Nil - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Intact. Intact. Large stores of petrol drums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repain No change. Blg. repaired. Intact, work progressing. One, possibly two tanks dmgd. Intact. Intact. Capacity now 5500 tons. Intact - Active. No damage Intact
ANNABURG HAD BERGA BUCHEN NUSSAU DULKEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN EDERHAUSEN LOCCUM LANGERSELBOLD OLDEIDORF WEISSENHORN <u>ALHRUACHT</u> DEVOYS. PERACH ELICKELOH GEISLINGEN/AUSTETTEN NEUENIKERSE RUTHEN ZARRENTIN URANAHIPIENT DEPOTS: AKEN DEGGENLORF DRESDEN		6,500 20,000 6,500 6,500 13,500 6,200 45,000 10,400 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 6,000 12,000 5,000 21,000 12,000 5,000 21,000 5,000 21,000 5,000 21,000 21,000 5,000 21,000 5,000 21,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,0	14.2.45 14.1.45 Fighters on 18.11.44 Fighters on 18.11.44 	26.12.44 26.12.44 6.3.45 21.2.45 9.9.44 22.2.45 23.12.44 14.2.45 21.2.45 28.12.44 16.2.45 2.3.45 17.2.45 22.2.45 22.2.45 3.3.45 1.8.44 1.2.2.45 1.8.44 1.2.45 1.8.44 1.2.45 1.8.44 1.2.45 1.8.44	42 plus 19 66 12 92* 10 Ni1 Ni1 Ni1 17 75 Ni1 20 29 Ni1 Ni1 20 29 Ni1 Ni1	Nil - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -	Stored Underground in Mine. Intact. Large stores of petrol drums. Capacity now about 2,500 tons. Intact Capacity now 1500 tons. Rails repain No change. Blg. repaired. Intact, work progressing. One, possibly two tanks dmgd. Intact. Intact. Capacity now 5500 tons. Intact - Active. No damage Intact

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LOCATION	TYPL		DATE OF LATEDT ATTACK	DATE OF LATEST COVER	NO. OF TANK WAGONS (LAST COVER)	WATER TRANSPORT ACTIVITY	REMARKS
VAL DEPOTS:							1
ACHI 1	G,D		-	23.12.44	79 +	2 oil barges	Intact
BLECKEDE	D	345,000	_	23.12.44	49	n of a corrector	Oil pier not covered.
BREACH AVEN		65,200		8.2.45	Nil	1 oil barge	Intact
CUXHAVEN		80,000	-	8.2.45	13	Nil	Intact
ELDEN		43,400	6.9.44	8.2.45	Nil	Nil	Intact
FLEMHUDE SEE	D	274,000	-	6.10.44	204	2 oil barges	Part completed.
FLENSBURG		13,200	-	5-1-45	Nil	Nil	Part completed.
NI EL/NONE EBERG	C.D.	168,600	- 200	21.2.45	31	NH1	
NCEDHOLZ (LUDINGWORTH		740,000		2.3.45	60 plus	-	Intact, partly incomplete.
SCHAPSTEDT	D	48,000	-	6.10.44	-		Intact.
WINE UNDE		171,600	-	6.10.44	50	1 tanker	Intact
WILHELISHAVEN	В	57,700	27.8.44	8.2.45	38	Nil	
MINCIAL DEPOTS: ESSEN SEDAN	A	22,100		19.2.45	1	Nil	
FRANKFURT (WIFO)	A	30,660	5.11.44	22.2.45	18	Nil	
HAMBURG/HARBURG	A	120,000	7-8-3-45	8.2.45	74	Nil	Awaiting D/A.
HAMBURG/PETROLEUM HAF	EN. A	412,000	20.6.44	8.2.45	288	Nil	Active
KARLSRUHE	A	6,000	-	22.2.45	8	Nil	
KIEL/HOLTENAU	à	25,400	-	29.11.44	7	Nil	
LUDWIGSHAFEN	A	6,390	15-16.12.44	8.2.45	22	Nil	Storage facilities reduced.
	À	6,085	-	14.2.45	Mil	Nil	
MAINZ	á.	24,445	15-16.12.44	8.2.45	5	Nil	
MANNHEIM	25		16-16 12 11	8.2.45	10	NHI	
MANNHEIM MANNHEIM/INDUSTRIEHAFI		7,000	15-16.12.44		11		
MANNHEIM		7,000 19,600 8,300	15-16.12.44	15.2.45 8.2.45	64 Nil	l oil barge Nil	Tank damaged.

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#### March 13, 1945.

### OIL TARGET PRIORITIES.

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		Terget Number	Western Thestre	Mediterranean Theatro	Nature <u>Parg</u> et	10
	1. 2.	<u>69 1519</u> 69 1512	RUILIND LUIZKIRDORF		Fischer ' Bergius '	Propsch and Tropsch
	3. 4.	00 15144 00 1625	1 OHIAN MISTURO HIPPURO(Nicosniş		Bergius Refinery	Tropoon
	5.	00 1053A 00 1053B	H.R.P. URO(Richards)	)	11 11	
	7.	68 192		MOOSINILIUBAUM	11 12	
	8. 9.	60 1622D	2 ILANGURG-WILLON	INNA-SCHVICHAT (SBURG	v	
	10.	GQ 1644	(DPAG & Rhensu:		**	
	11.	62 1527	* PUIDE-H.PD/INGS: OSLASS LUBIT		u	
	12.	69 1639		KOLIN	11	
	13. 14.	GI 5315 GQ 1607		VILLA-FLORIDSDOI	UF "	
	15.	GQ 1655		VISUNA-KAGRAN KRALUPY	11	
	10.	<u>60 1608</u> 76 1616		KORIDUBURG VILUULA-VOSDIDORE	11 1 tt	
	18.	CO 1270B	MOLDIS-ESPENHAII		Tar Refi	nery
	19. 20.	GU 15-5	× NICHILGEN		Refine	
	21. 22.	02 1615 Go 1622m	# SALZBERGEN # FLABURG-NEUMOF		11	
		- second second second second second	(Schindler)		11	
	23. <u>51</u> 24.	071/P/3	a Dorthund-Hirph Salzoittir		11	
	25.	<u>qq 18297</u> 105 or	* CONSOLIDATION I		Benzol	Plant
	27. (01 5	(17 2224)	× LITL		11	11
		00 1934 (11 162)	LRIN		11	*1
	28 29 30 31 32 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35	(01 162)	* AUGUSTE VIKTORI DAHLBUSCH		**	11
	30.	arout	* ROFERT MUSER		11	11
	51.	Bank restricted and sending and	# HOERDLE VEREIN		XI.	11
	22.	017 2206		LINZ	0	11
			A GURISLAAU A CASTROP RAUXEL		11	17
	5e.	Restriction of allocations	A BRUCHSTRASSE	2R		
	36.	(00 1036)	a MATHIAS STIME	S III/IV.	11	
	37.	GW 2234	IMINRICHSHUTTE	0 111/10.		
	38.	(GH GUI)	MISCHER LIPPE IN	0.0771		
	59. 5	210E/H/1	DEDEMIAUSEN	····	Refi	
1		GQ 16177	DORTMUND (Sehm:	itz)	Refin	

* Indicates attack since last cover.

Target numbers in brackets refer to station-list material covering these targets. Co-ordinates relative to station-list illustrations have been notified direct to Commands.

/ IN ABBYANCE.

III ABS	MANC	<u>E.</u>	
1. <u>Germany: Synthetics.</u>		. <u>Hungar</u>	y: Refineries.
GQ 1507 ERIX GQ 1551 POTLITZ G 1515A LEVIX GQ 1505A NORDEFERN GQ 1525 ZEITZ GC 1516 MAGDINURG	6	3 1509R	ts. <u>A Tar Plants.</u> NORDSTERN BENZOL HANSA
We W Internet	CH X Cl GI GI	1892 1809A 22290 1536B 1532B 2267D 1041B 15340 15340 1071A	CARCLINENGLUCK BRUCKHAUSEN PROSPER MULDERICH BENZOL OSTERFELD KAISIRSTUHL SCHOLVEN BENZOL VICTOR
R 1620 MONINIM R 16284/B.DOLLENRCHN	x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x		EWALD-FORTSETZUNG WOLKLINDEN MEUNKIRCHEN ALMA PLUTO MINSTER STEIN KAMEN BENZOL JACOBI PROENIX-WESTENDE SHAMROCK III/IV CONCORDIA NEINDERICH TAR MORLVSKA OSTRAVA
• Austria: Refineries C 1645 VIINGA-LOBAU			
. Caecho-Slovakia : Refineries.			

x Rocommended for ortillery sttack.

/INTELLIGENCE LIST OF P.O.L. DEPOTS.

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		INTELLIGENCE L	IST OF P.O.L. DEPOTS.	
		•	as secondary targets)	
	Crude Storage for i	HANPURG Refine	rics	
	GQ 1630 MANBURG			
			h Army and G.A.F. Depots)	
	GQ 2014 DERBAN (1 GQ 1720 SIASSFUR GQ 2011 HUTZACKE GG 2015 FINSTRAM GG 2015 FINSTRAM GG 2021 NOUNILOE GG 2025 NEUENING GQ 2012 NILKJURG	(U) .(U)		
	Army Depots (supply		rn Front)	
	Northern Sector 5	51061/4606/8/1 60 2029 60 2030 60 2027	DUISBURG- LANHRIMERORT (5) MEURIMMERSE (8) RUTHIN (8) EICHELCH (8)	
	Central Sector 1	1908n/H/10/11 5008n/U/1 60 1713	MARMIEIM-RHETHAU (S) VRAMKPURT/MAIN (S) ENRACH (S)	
	Southern Sector		GHIGLINGEN (AMSTETTEN) (S)	
	<u>GF. Depots.</u>	03 2023 00 2026 06 2035 06 2022 06 2034 06 2031 06 2031 06 2035 06 2035	OLDINDORF (U) MANIM (S) BUCHIN-HUSSAU (U) DULMIN (S) ANNABURC (S) LANGINGILLBOLD (S) EBIMHLUSIN (S) WEISZINHORN (S) BAD BERKL. (S)	
	Transhipmont Depote			
	River Elbe 5 5	00 1715 00 1716 00 1717 211E/N/1-5 113E/E/1-4	AKEN (S) TORGAU (S) RIDSA (S) MAGDIBURG (S) DRESD A (S)	
	River Denube	01 860 03 1718	NEGINGBURG DINGGENDORP	
	Rhine-Herne Canal	5106E/H/11	ESSIN-SEDAN	

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### APPENDIX I.

Altocks on Oil Production & P.O.L. Depots.

Dago	Location	Company	Tone	Air Force
5.3	HARBURG	Rhenania Ossag & Ebano	324	8
0.5 11	BOHLEN 1201.DIG-DSPERMAN GALZERROIN	Brsbag Sachslache Werke	} 867	RAF
7.3	DORTHIND-HOUDI	Friol Raffinerie Selzbergen Dartmund-Horder Hutten	548	PAF
		Verein (HORDER VEREIN Benzol Right)		8
	ORTIND-FARPENSINT	C o		
*!	DATITION	Gew. Buscher Lippe		
		(MISCHER LIPPE Benzol Plants)		
	CARES COREEAN NATION CORESCIENCIES CORESCIENCES NATIONAL			
8.3	and the second s	Ges.fur Teerversertung		
11		Rhenanie & Lbano	1013	RAF
11	has had the man we have been a first the	?	711	RAF
		Har, ener Derchau	1 +	1. AT 1.
		(ROBIRT MUSLE Bennol Plant)		
		Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks		
11		(ILUCHSINASSE Denzol Plan	t)204	8
	DORTHUND			
		(GUEISENAU Benzol Plant)		
10	ALTINISGIN	( The second Plant)		
11		(MILL Benzol Plant)		
		Stimmedehon Zoohan		
		MATHIAS STIMES III/IV		
11		Benzol Plant)	205	
		The intermedian data at	105	
11		Hydrierwerke Scholven		
		Gev. Auguste Viktoria		
		AUGUSTE VINTORIA Benzol		
		Plant)	328	
2.3	L. TILLN	Gow, Enscher Lippe	240	
		SCHOR TITEL Despire		
10.3		ASCHER LIFPE Benzol Plants)	793	RAF
11.3		n, dellerwerke Scholven	755	RIF
		D.P.A.G. ) ·		
	•	Rhenania		
		Schindler )	1124	8
		Schillemann )		

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APPENDIX II.

CURRENT STATUS OF SUNCHDIEG OIL PLANTS

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MINERAL CIL PERINCRIES

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PAGE 1 - BERGIUS SYNTHETIC.

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		4					here are a		SECRET
		SYNTHET C	n thous	- BLRG		e tono	PION PLAT		OMURAL (
	LOGATIÓN AND COMPANY	Normal A Output	lo. ES'	THAT	ED OUTPU		Date of Last Attock	(1.04/2 List Cover.	STATUS
		Corneit; 68	3G		Feb.		1.2		Inactive. Some renairs.
							5.2	3.3	Inactive. No repairs.
	Larierworks Toelits A.G.						15.1	22.2	Inactive. Repairs in
	Annoniak Works (1.6.Forban) ORISERVING (1. (100 DSTERS)						83.11	1.3	progress. Inschive, So repairs.
	Gelsonberg Bendin A.C. GELSIPHIRGHEN (SCHOLVEN) Lydrierwerke Scholven A.C.						10.3	12.3	Inactive. Heavy damage.
	ZAITZ-TROGLITZ (IKAING III)						17.1		Inactive, Heevy comage.
2569	NLECHNAMMER BOUTH ≠≠ I.G.Forben					0	26.12 6.3		Captured. Inactive. Modernte damage.
	NORLEN-ROTIN (NRLEAG I) LUYZKEIDORF MUCHELN *	25 . 10					9.2		Insetive on last cover. Now
	Wintershall A.G. MAGDERIRG (POTHENSEE)						3.3	9.3	probably octive. Insetive. Heavy mange.
	(BRARAG II)						30.10	14.2	Captured.
	Rheinische Felurkohlen A.G. ELECHLAMUR NORTH						19.12	14.1	Coptured.
	(I.G.Yarben) POTTROP-WELMEIM Ruhroel A.G.						11.11		Inactive. Repairs to power station only.
38 11	LUDVIGSLAFEN I.G.Forbon						1.1		Capturel.
	OSWINCIN (AUSCOUTZ) I.G.Forben						20.12		

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### SYNTHETIC PLANTS - FISCHER TROPSCH FLANTS

Figures in thousands of metric tons per month)

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Torget Number	LOCATION AND COMPANY	Normal Mo Output Capacity	E	STIMATE Jan.	D OUTF Feb.	<u>UT</u> March	Date of Last Attack	(1964/45 Lest Cover.	STATUS
62 1519	RUHLAND-SCHWARZHEIDE	29	22	22	22	22	3.3	3.3 .	Active 75%. No
GQ 1511A	(BRABAG) HOMBERG (MOERS MOERBECK)	16	0	0	0	0	21.11	22.2	apparent damage. Captures.
	Rheinpreussen A.G. LUTZKENDORF-MUCHELN	13	7	7	3	5	9.2	2.3	Probably setive 25%.
1) <u>60 1517A</u>	Wintershall A.G. STERKRADE HOLTEN Ruhrbeuzin A.G.	10.3	0		0	0	22.1	22.2	Inactive,
00 1 <u>0</u> 54A	CASTROP-RAUXEL Klockner-Wintershall	8.5	0	0	0	2	22.1	21.2	Inactive. Repairs slow.
<u>30, 1515A</u>	KAMEN (DORTMUND) Chemischewerke Essener	8.5	0	0	2.	0	4.3	3.3	Insctive. Moderate damage on last cover. Results of further
Ng 1518	WANNE EICKEL	11			0		9.2	3.3	attack unknown. Inactive. No repairs.
10 1535A	Krupp Treibstoffwerke A.G. DESCHOWITZ BEUTHEN (ODERTAL)	7	7	0	0	0	26.12	19.1	Ceptured.
Q 1555	Schaffgotsch Benzin - DORIMUND (WAMBELERHOLZ)	7	0		2	1	26.2	3.3	Insetive. Slight
1.447 <u>A</u>	Hoesch Benzin G.m.b.H. HARNES (LENS). Courriers - Kuhlmann	2.5	0	0	0	0	-	4.8	odditional damage. In Allied bands.
	TOTALS	* 113	36	29	29				

2 2 - FISCHER TROPSCH SYNTHETIC PLANTS.

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# GERMANY - REFINERIES

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(Figures in thousands of metric tons per montb)

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Turget Sumber	LOCATION AND COMPANY	Normal Mo. Crude Intake Capacity		TMAPEI Jon.		UT z March	Date of Last Attack	(1944/45) Last Cover	STATUS
<u>ig 16774</u>	HAMBURG (HARBURG) Rhenania-Ossag A.G.	46	20	10	3	15	8.3	9.3	Inactive. Moderate damage. May resume
<u>Q 16336</u>	HAMBURG (HARBURG) Ebono Asphalt-Worke A.G.	33	0	0	10	10	8.3	9.3	shortly. Inactive. Stight damage
16.30	HAMASRG Europaische Tanklager A.G.	33	C	0	0	0	8.3	9.3	Resamption imminent. Inactive. Some addition
<u>q 1625</u>	MISBURG (Nr. HANNOVER) Deutsche Erdelraff.	25 .	7	5	10	15	3.3	9.3	damage. Storage in use Distillation plant inso
<u>g 1644</u>	HEIDE HEMMINGSTEDT (HOLLE) Hermin stedt (Nr. Heide)	16	12	6	7	72	8.3	8.2	Gracking plant in use. Active 50% on last cove
1613	OSTERMOOR (Nr. BRUNSBUTTELKOO Mineralol-a. Asphaltwerke A.C		0	0	С	0	20.6	2.3	Resalts anknown. Inoperable. Storage in
<u>1622D</u>	HAMBURG (WILDELMSBURG) D.P.A.C.	10	9	4	6	92	11.3	3.3	Active prior to attack.
: 162 <b>2</b> 0	HAMBURG (WILHELMSBURG) Rhenania	5	14	2	3	42	11.3	3.3	Results anknown. Active prior to attack.
1620	MONHEIM (Nr.Dasseldorf) Rhenania	10 ****	7	7	5	С	20.2	22.2	Results anknown. Inactive. In battle
1627	BREMEN OSLEBSHAUSEN Deatsche Vacuam	2	8	8	8	8	4.8	3.3	Active. Slight
078/P/3	DORTMUND (HALPENDRWEG)	8	0	0	4	72	7.3	19.2	damage. Inactive on last cover.
	& B DOLLBERGEN D.P.A.G.	7	4	0	2	С	3.3	9.3	Resalts anknown. Inactive. Fresh
	SALZBERGEN (hr.Rheine) Erdcl-Raf.Selzbergen	6	5	5	5	51	6.3	22.2	damage. Probably active prior t
11263	REISHOLZ Rhenania.	6	5	5	3	0	21.2	9.3	attack. Results anknown Inactive. In battle
8590	EMMERICH Deutsche Guaolin A.G.	5 .	0	0	0	0	7.10		area. Inactive. In battle area.

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Tar ot	LOCATION AND COMPANY	Normal Mo. Grade Intake		IMANAL		March	Date of ( Last Attack	1944/45) Lust Cover	STATUS
Namber		Capucity	Duce	e lilie	TOP*	Jacobson	as u y ca ca de	OCTO:	
69 1622E	ILAPURE (NEWHOF)	14	C		1	2?	11.3		Active prior to attack.Resalts asknown.
00 11903	SCHULAU	4	C	6	C	1	6.3	9.3	Inactive, May resume shortly.
<u>64</u> 16 58	Doatsche Vucaam MINNAGAR <del>ea</del>	2	2	2	2	29	3.3		Active prior to attack. Results poor.
52104/11/1	D.P.A.G. EEDEMLUSIN	2	2	2	2	2	3.3	5.3	Active.
<u>66) 16174</u>	Phoenix Cil Refinery DORFAUND	2	2	2	2	2	-	13.2	Active.
<u>G. 1614</u>	Sehnitz Philu: Schindler	2	2	2	2	0	22.2	2.3	Inactive. Moderate damage.

89 60 75 91

BRICATING OIL PROCESSING PLANTS.

	2.4								
r te t abje <b>r</b>	LCCATION AND COMPANY	Rormal Mo. Oatpat Capacity	EST	INATED Jan.	GUTPUT		Last	944/45) Laşt Cover	STATUS
	HAMBURG (GRASBROOK)	10	5	2	6	1	9.3	9.3	Inactive. Presh
1622J	Rhenania R.MEURG (WILLELMSBURG)	5	2	0	С	2?	11.3	9.3	Inactive.
16220	Schliemann's HLMBURG (GRASBROOK)	2.5	1	0	0	1	24.2	9.3	Inactive.
	Albrecht 4. Schliemann's		C	0	0	0	24.8	17.12	Inactive.

FEMITAL (Nr. Dreaden) C O O O 24.0 * Estimated output of finished products after allowance for dama e und refining losses.

PAGE 4 - GERMANY: REFINERIES (Cont'd) - LUBRICATING OIL PROCESSING PLAN

ar Oilfield topping plant; output figures represent gasoline only.

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		A U S T R	A -	R E F	I K E Ic loi	RIE 15 per	month)		CONFIDENTIAL
	LCS. 210. AND COMPARY	lormal Mo. Crude #		TIMATE	o outri		Date of (J Last attack	Last Cover	<u>87.19723</u>
	PC3 210 AUD CONTRACT	Capacity	Dec.	Jan. 1 20	20	0	20.2	25.2	Inactivo. Heavy damage.
	ataurilacho			6		6	14.2	28.2	Probably active.
	VIELA (FLORIDEDCRF) Shell Floridedorfer		6	4	4	4	7.2	25.2	Probably active.
1607	VIIIIA (KACRAL)		4	6	12		26.2	25.2	Active.
1611	VINCIA (SCINICHAI)	15 • .	3				15.2	25.2	Active.
1600	Rendular Visier						27.12	22.2	
<u>1610</u> 192							1.3	6.3	Possilly vetive. Jum distillation unit has started operatio .
	Lonnu Gamio A. S. TOTAL	95	22	42	48	43			
			1081.0V	- <u>AIXA</u>	RE 11	5	20.12	20,2	Incesive.
1635	PARDUBICE Fanto		0	0	0		14.10	14.2	Incelive except for lubri-
1640	BRATISLAVA Apollo	12.5			6		28.12	20.2	Active.
1639	KOLIN Vacuum	7.5	6 2?	2?		29	20.8	14.9	Possibly douly0.
1657		5	0			0	29.8	21.1	Inactive.
106P			1		4	4	28.12	16.2	
165	KRALUPY Weslupy Min.	24 24	4	. 3		3	19.12 # M		Partly active. onthis latake capacity of crus
1629	A MORAVSKA OSTRAVA Privozer Mineral 107ALS	53	23		15	20	R	stimet ed	output of rinished lived

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Normal Mo.			(1444/4)
Crade z	ESTIMATED CUTPUT ##	Lust	Last
	bec. Jan. Pak. March	Atteck	

Target Lamber	1.03.110. 110. 001		Grade z Conacity				Norch	Lust Atteck	Cover	<u>SERTIS</u>
<u>3H 22C</u>	COLLEGE (CENTEL)		18	0	0	0	0	17.9	21.9	Captured.
1816 71	GHLII Kooloj Jimar Kosloj				62	67	63	9.0	27.12	Probably some activity.
BH 103			7		32		32	28.8	22.11	lessicly some activity.
<u>BH 5</u>			7	0	0	0	0	17.9	13.10	Captarod.
<u>BH 50</u>			4	0	U			14.7	15.10	Captorou.
ън 70	Finto MILOODIANY		2	0	0	0	0		16.5	Cuptured.
EH 24	Lyirboyarny Purfundo		8	Q	C	С	02	14.7	22.11	Possibly same activity.
04 1656			2	0	0		0		22.8	Captered.
31 1.04	Del Karpati Foola Bhoman		l	0	0	С		-	21.8	Coptared.
<u>BH 73</u>	BUDAPES Hozai Koolaj		lį	0	0	U	0	-		Captured.
		TOTALS	67	6	9	91	98			

* Maximum monthly erade cil intake capacity.

** Estimated catput of finished liquid products after ellewance for dumage and refinery loss.


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PAGE 6 - HULGARY REPTNIR (ES

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BINZOL PLANTS (Figures in thousands of metric tons per month)

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Target Lamber	LOCATION / TO COMPANY	Corput Copyright	Number of Detteries	Butteries Working	Lust	(1944/45) Lost Cover	OTATI S
<u>C. 15058</u>	NCRDSTARN HATCL Gelaenkirchoter Bergwerks A.G.	2.1	4		28.2	9.3	Insetive. Heavy damage, Partly setive on last ecver.
<u>Q 1892</u>	HANGA Selsentircheter Dergworks A.C.		4		4.2	2.3	Results inknown. Inactive.
N. 1809A	CANCALLAR-CEPCK (BOGHUM) Colsenkirchener Bergwerks A.C.	2	<i>l</i> ;	C	*19.2	3+3	Inactive.
F 22504	SALA I TER Kalehawerka Lermann Gouring		6	26	14.1	3.3	Partly active.
F 22250	BRICHLASRY Collectioner Bergworks A.G.	1.9	5	0	2.2	22.2	Inactive. In battle
<u>q 1536B</u>	PROSEZE Rhoinische Stablwerke n.G.	1.7	7		4.2	3.3	inactive. he
<u>a 1532h</u>	KEIDERICH RELEON	1.07		1]-	12.12	2.3	Populy active. In
1 5953	Catchellaneshute	1.5		0	22.2	25-2	tattle area. Inactive.
<u>* 22671</u>	K.IBERGTUIL Reobak A.C.	1.5	£	0	16.2	3.3	Inactive.
10417	SCHOLVEN REFLEC. Borgwerksgesellschaft Hiberniu A	I.alt	ì.,	C	22.2	22.2	lnuctivo.
15340	VICTOR Klockmer-Werke A.S.	1.3	4	C	22.11	21.2	Inuctivo.
18714	EWALD-FORTSA ZUNG FWald-Korig Ladwig Persbar A.C.	1.2		C	15.1	22.2	Incetive.
<u>1 598D</u>	ROBE T MISZE Harpener Bergbes A.G.	1.2	4	21	8.3		Partly active on last cover. Results
	CONSOLIDATION I/VI Mernesmannpelrenwerke A.G.	1.1	5	2	5.3	22.2	unknown. Pertly sctive en last cover. Kesalts
GE 7 - 1	ENSCL PLANTS.	z Ma	squito atta	ick.			anknowr.

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Torget Lumber	LODATION AND COMPANY	Normal Mo. Output Capacity	Number of Batteries	Batteries Werking	Dute of Last Attack	(1944/4 Last Cover	5) <u>BRATUS</u>
<u>CF 2205B</u>	VOLKLINGEN R chling'sche Eisen und Stahlwerke	1.1	6	6	-	6.10	Active. In
(F 22C3B	PERFECTED Eisenwerke A.G.	1.1	3	1	30.11	15.2	Partly uctive. In
CF 2206	LINZ Hermann Göeringwerke	1.1	24	142	25.2	8.3	battle area. Active,
<u>48184 90</u>	GHEISEAU Horpener Berghaa A.G.	1	2	l.	8.3	16.2	Partly active on last cover.
CH 555C	ALMA-FJUTO Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G.	1	3	0	27.2	9.3	Results anknown. Inactive.
CF 2267E	MINSTER STEIN Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G.	1	2	0	16.2	19.2	Inactive.
CQ 1513B	RAMEN BENEDT. Essener Steinkchlenbergwerke A.G.	1.0		0	1.3	3.3	Inactive.
( 1103/ (F 2224	EXIL Hoesoh A.G.	0.9	2	21	8.3	3.3	Active prior to attack. Results
<u>en 691</u>	EMSCHER LIPPE Gewerkscheft Emscher Lippe	0•9		1	8.3	anknown 9.3 North r activo. damaged	anknown. North plant active.Seath plant damaged and probb inactive.
570/ 1531	ERIN Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G.	0.9	3	3	-	19.2	Active.
M.I.P.	FRIEDHICH HEINRICH I/II Steinkohlentergwerks Fried Heimrich A.G.	0.9	14	0	-	20.2	Captured.
CB 555	JACOBI Gutehoffmangshitte A.G.	0.9	3			22.2	Active. In
<u>ts 162</u>	AUGUSTE VICTORIA Gewerkschaft Auguste Viktoria	0.4	5	5?	8.3	3.2	hattle area. Active on lost cover. Resalts
(H 555	DAHLBUSCH Bergwerksgesellschaft Dahlbasch	0.8	3	3		9.3	anknown. Active.
PAGE 8 - 1	BENZOL PLANTS (CONT'D)						0
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Turget	LOCATION AND CONTANY	Normal Mo. Output	Nanbar of	Batteries		Lust	) <u>stlatus</u>	.0
Turget Number	LOCATION AND CONTANY		hadbor of Baltories	Batteries Working		Last Covor	SULATS	-
	LOCATION AND CONTRANY	Output Capacity 0.7	Nanbar of	Batteries	Last	Last Covor	STATUS Active. In Lottle	-
<u>Aunter</u>	LOGATION AND COMPANY Promitication of the Colombiation part Borga arks A.	Output Capteity 0.7 0.7	hadbor of Baltories	Batteries Working	Last Atlack	Luat Gover 3.2	SULATS	-
<u>Namker</u> <u>GF 2205</u> <u>611 597</u>	LOGATION AND COMPANY Protector for General release Bergearks A. Sear Rook III/IV Thereft Hiber	Output Consolity 0.7 0.7 0.7 13	Narbar of Haltories 3 3	Botteries Worldng 3. O	Last Atlack	Lust Covor 3.2 22.2	<u>STATUS</u> Active. In Little aros. Inuctive.	-
<u>Number</u> <u>OP 220</u> <u>611 597</u> -	LOGATION AND COMPANY PRODUCTOR FROM Constructions Borgerorks A. Bhankook III/IV Arthous Francis Lischeft Hiberri Construct Clischeft Hiberric Construct Clischeft Hiberric	Output Gapseliz 0.7 0.7 0.7 du 0.7	haiber of Battories 3 3 4	Battories <u>Working</u> 3. 0 0	Lost <u>Atlack</u> - 21.11	Lest Cover 3.2 22.2 14.2	<u>STATOS</u> Active. In Lettle area. Inactive. Ceptared.	-
<u>Namker</u> <u>OF 2205</u> <u>611 597</u>	LOGATION AND COMPANY PRODUCTION AND Concentrate per Berraurka A. Bearbook III/IV Marcheological lischoft Hibernis Concentration 11 Concentration 11 C	Output Output 0.7 0.7 0.7 ds 0.7	Narbar of Haltories 3 3	Botteries Worldng 3. O	Last Atlack	Lest Gover 3.2 22.2 14.2 16.2	<u>STATOS</u> Active. In Lattle area. Inuctive. Coptared. Active.	-
<u>Number</u> <u>OP 220</u> <u>611 597</u> -	LOCATION AND COMPANY P CONTRACT ON MOR Obligation of the Bargaarks A. Sharacon Till/IV A trace from Tischeft Bibern Converkage collideratt Hibernic Converkage collideratt Hibernic Nor Denoid Finchmer Ferke A.C. Konstant Strike	Output Copycitz 0.7 0.7 da 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7	haiber of Battories 3 3 4	Battories <u>Working</u> 3. 0 0	Lost <u>Atlack</u> - 21.11	Lest Gover 3.2 22.2 14.2 16.2	<u>STATOS</u> Active. In 19111c area. Inactive. Coptared. Active. Active on last cover.	
Number OF 220 611 597  N.I.P. OF 22680	LOGATION AND COMPANY P. OMNIC-D'M AND O-LOOMATCHE NEW Borgs orks A. SHARACON III/IV A COMPANY OF Thecheft Hibernic COMPANY DEFINITION NOT DEDOTE Forke A.C. HOMMENY DEFINITION Communic-L'rder Witten Verei	Output <u>Copecity</u> 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.7 0.7 0.6 n	hunber of Balteries 3 3 4 4	Battories <u>Working</u> 3. 0 0 4	Lost <u>Attack</u> - 21.11	Lest Gover 3.2 22.2 14.2 16.2 20.1	<u>STATOS</u> Active. In 19116 area. Innetive. Ceptared. Active. Active on last cover. Results anthons. Active on last cover.	
Number <u>GF 2200</u> <u>611 597</u> - N.I.P. <u>GF 22680</u> 00 1536	LOGATION AND COMPANY Promition and filler General filler and Bergeerks A. Stanfood III/IV Anticert of lischeft Hibernie Coverkasted Lischeft Hibernie KON DEDGEN Fortente Ferke A.C. Horner Ferke A.C. Horner Merke (Street) Fortente - L'rder Nitten Verei Mathias Stilles (Scret) III/ Stinnesselen Zecher	Output <u>Coproitz</u> 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.6 n IV0.6	haiber of Battories 3 4 4 4 3 4	Battories Working 3. 0 0 4 39 39	Last <u>Atlack</u> - 21.11 - 7.3 8.3	Lest Gover 3.2 22.2 14.2 16.2 28.1 25.2	STATUS Active. In Fettle area. Intetive. Ceptared. Active. Active on last cover. Resalts anknown. Active on last cover. Resalts anknown.	
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PAGE 9 - BENECL FLANTS (Cost'd)

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Terget Number	LOCATION AND COMPANY	Normal Mo. Oatpat Capacity	Number of Butteries	Batteries Working		Dr (1924/1 Last Cover.	45) <u>STATUS</u>
		TAR	OIL AND BENZOL	PROCESSING	PLANTS		
<u>GQ 1523</u>	ROSITZ Deutsche Ardol A.G.		tar capacity,000 tons.	approx.	2.3	17.2	Probably active price to attack. Results
<u>GO 1270P</u>	NOLBIS-ESPENHAIN A.G.Süchsische Werke		tar capacity ,000 tons.	approx.	5.3	7.3	believed good. Inactive, Moderate damage. May now have
<u>GQ 15324</u>	DUISBURG-MEIDERICH Ges: far Teerverwertang	Processes Ta	rs and Crade I	Jenzol	3.1	22.2	resamed at 50%. Active 25%. In battle
G <u>Q 1531</u>	CaSTROP-RAUXED Ges: fur Tearverwertung	-d	itto-		7.3	7.3	area. Active 50% on last
GF 22310	MORAVSKA OSTRAVA Rütgerswerke	Processes Ta	rs and Crade H	enzol		12.8	cover. Results anknown. In battle area.


PAGE 10 - TAR OIL AND BENZOL PROCESSING PLANTS

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T H I S

> Ρ A G E Ι S U N С L A S I F I Е D

C.S.T.C. WORKING COMMITTEE (OIL PRODUCTION & P.O.L.	DEPOTS)
NULLETIN NO. 1945 - 11	
Distribution	Copy No.
<ul> <li>A.2 S.H.A.E.F. (Air)</li> <li>S.H.A.E.F. NMAR (AIR) (Attn. G/Cept. Urmston)</li> <li>A.O.C. in C., R.A.F. Bomber Command 2 cm</li> <li>D. of I., U.S.S.T.A.F. (Lt.Col. J.K. Boeson) 20 cm</li> <li>D.C.A.S. Air Ministry, Whitehall.</li> <li>A.C.A.S. (I), Air Ministry, Whitehall.</li> <li>D. of I.(O), Air Ministry, Whitehall.</li> <li>D. of Air, War Office, Whitehall.</li> <li>G.2 (12th Army Group, A.P.O. 441,</li> <li>G.2 (12th Army Group, A.P.O. 350.</li> <li>A.2 H.Q. U.S.9th A.F. (Col. R.D. Hughes)</li> <li>H.Q. 2nd T.A.F. (through S.H.A.E.F.)</li> <li>J.P.R.C. R.A.F. Bennon.</li> <li>M.I.10(c), War Office, Whitehall.</li> <li>E.O.U./E.W.D., U.S.Imbessy, 40 Merkeloy Square, W.1.</li> <li>E.A.E.6, (T.O. &amp; H.E.W.), Lansdowne House, V.1.</li> <li>U.S.S.E.G. (Hr.W.C.Asbury)</li> </ul>	1 copy 1 1 copy 2 1 copy 3 opies 4-5 opies 6-25 1 copy 26 1 copy 26 1 copy 28 1 copy 29 1 copy 31 1 copy 31 1 copy 31 1 copy 32 1 copy 35 1 copy 35 1 copy 36 1 copy 36 1 copy 37 1 copy 38 1 copy 39 1 copy 41
Combined Strategic Cargats Committee	
Col. Maxwell, D. of Ops., U.S.S.T.A.F. Lt. Col. J.K. Beeson, D. of I., U.S.S.T.A.F. General Todd, D.C./S.Opz., U.S.8th A.F. Col. Jones, D. of I., U.S.8th A.F. A/Cdre. Paynter, R.A.F. Bomber Command M/Cdre. Barnett, R.A.F. Bomber Command Brigadier Foord, G.2 S.M.A.E.F. G/Capt. Morley, S.H.A.L.F. (Atr) Col. Kingman Dougless, U.S.S.T.A.F. G/Capt. Graham, D.D.B.Ops., Air Ministry, Whitehall. W/Cdr. Burgess, M.I.S.C.(2), Air Ministry, Monch St. I.N.Pincus, M.O.U./L.W.D., U.S.Embacsy.	L copy 42 L copy 43 L copy 44 L copy 44 L copy 46 L copy 46 L copy 46 L copy 47 L copy 49 L copy 50 L copy 51 L copy 52 L copy 52 L copy 53 L copy 55
Working Connistees,	
Lt.Col. J.K. Beeson, D. of I., U.S.S.TF. D.L.Wright, Petroleum Atache, U.S.Mubasay I O.F.Thompson, M.A.B.6. (F.O. & M.E.W.) Wing-Cdr. Verity, A.I.J.c. (1) Air Ministry, Whitehall 2 Wing-Cdr. Deveney, R.M.C., B.Ops., Air Ministry, Whitehall Cept. Withind, C.2, S.H.M.E.F. Captain Pollock, M.I.10(c), War Office, Whitehall. 1 F/Lt. Kent, A.C.I.U., R.A.F. Station, Medmenhom. 1 Lt. Kahn, DOU/FUD, U.S.Embasay, 40 Berkeley Square, W.1.1 Capt. J.S. Davies, A.I.J.C., Air Ministry, Monek Street.1 Working Committee (Gil Production): File. 1	. сару 62 . сару 63 . сару 64



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#### MAIL AY TANGETS IN A LIMITON ANDA

#### Surrent tatus of the System

1. The present CSTC program of rail transport attack is directed chiefly against a list of targets which lie in the area bounded roughactive zone of operations on the estern front: the area bounded roughby by Sheine, Breach, Kassel, and Koblanz. The program is designed to complement the efforts of the Tactical Air Forces against rail transport in the same area, to the end of forcing back the enemy's railheads as far as possible, thus further decreasing his already agail tactical mobility. The current target list for the Strategic Air Forces contains five bridge targets (and three more have been suggested) which are part of an interdiction plan to be carried out jointly by the Tactical and Strategic Forces; and 20 rail centres inside the area to be cut off. In addition, the present program lists 23 rail centers in SM Germany for attack as filler targets in that meather area, of which 15 are active and 8 are currently suspended.

2. The program is also expected to produce an additional benefit in the general economic sphere, by preventing or sharply reducing the shipment of raw and semi-finished materials - notably hard coal from the Ruhr to the rest of Germany.

#### Current Intelligence on the Rail Transport Situation

3. The pressure of stlack on transport targets in the selected area - Sheine - Bremen - Kassel - Koblenz - has imposed fairly severe reductions on total traffic movements in and out of the area, as well as in interfering with movements within it. No quantitative statement of the anguitude of this reduction can be made. It is clear, however, that the main aim of the program - the pushing back of the energy's railheads for military traffic a substantial distance behind his fighting troops has not been achieved except for a short period in the Sifel area during the German counter-offensive. So far, there is no reason to believe that - with the exception mentioned above - the energy has been unable to move troops both to and from the battle line and laterally behind it by rail, or has been forced into motor hauls - non-recoipt - of significant cuantities of supplies for any period of time. On the other hand, the program has certainly interfered with the general rate of movement, delayed individual troop movements, slowed down the rate of supply movement, destroyed some supplies in transit, and decreased the dependability and flexibility of the energy's supply and movement system. Any sudden call for a greatly increased rate of supply or evacuation movement, or for large scale movements on short notice has become much more difficult to fulfill.

4. It is clear that the reduction of total rail and could freight movements has been sufficiently great to decrease substantially the volume of coal shipped out of the Ruhr, though again no firm estimate can be given. This reduction has by no means gone so far as to have out off such exports completely, and it is unlikely that this aim will be achieved or nearly achieved unless the interdiction program is completed and maintained.

#### Timing of Effects of Transports Attack on Front Line Situation

5. The effects of a tactical transportation program on troop movements and supply shipments are falt on the front line almost currently. Delays in the arrival of reinforcements, and significant lengthening of the supply pipeline both continue to produce temporary local inalequacies which weaken the fighting power of the enemy. A genuinely tactical program of attack against the enemy rail system will further enhance the

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ismobility produced by the oil shortage, and further weaken the enemy's ability to carry out a fighting retreat.

6. In contrast, reductions in economic traffic, such as coal exports from the Suhr, cannot be expected to have a decisive immediate effect on the enemy's fighting power. They will cause further serious reductions in the production of steel, heavy chemicals, aluminum and similar basic materials, but in general, considerable time will elapse before this in turn means a decisive reduction of production of tanks, guns, rifles, armanition, vehicles, aircraft and other vital military supplies.


#### Conclusions and Tacommendations

7. Continuation of the transportation program on the basis of the current directive to attack transport in a limited area behind the active front with the aim of reducing the volume of military traffic which can be carried to the front by rail will produce current effects on the fighting ability of the German aray in the Ment. The program will produce such effects by virtue of concentration in a small area, in which sufficient damage to the rail system can be done to affect military traffic. Conterved and intermittent attacks on railway targets over a wide area will be of no use in achieving the tactical sim. The incidental results of the program in the reduction of large conomic traffics of basic raw materials should continue to be viewed as irrelevant to the important aims of the plan, since the effect of such losses of economic traffic will not make itself felt on the front for some time. Therefore the program should continue to be designed, and targets continue to be celected from the point of view of accomplishing the main aim - the pushing back of energy railhesis and the delay of such movement as goes on in the area behind the active battle zone.

8. It is recommended that the tactical purpose of the present program be further exphasized, and the target list be reviewed and revised from time to time as necessity indicates, eliminating such marshalling yards not currently of military importance to which damage will have only economic appeal.

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Combined Strategic Trageto Committee.	
Air Commodore Bufton, D.B.Ors., Air Ministry	
Col.Maxwell, D. of Ops., USSTAF	1 cory 1
Col.Beeson for D. of I. USSTAF	1 cogy 2
Col.G.W.Jones, D. of I., U.S. Sth A.F.	i cojy 3
Brig Gan Mass - of 1., 0.3.000 day.	
Brig.Gen.Toal, D.C./C.Ops., J.B. M. A.F.	
Air Commodore Paynter, R.A.F. Bother Command	1 coty 6
Group Gaptain Inness. R.A.F. Bombar Command	1 0057 7
Prig.roord, G-2; S.H.A.E.F.	1 copy 8
Group Captain Morley, 5.M.A.L.F. (Air) .	1 COLV 9
UDI.AIDMAANN JOURIASS. NEEMINA	1 cory 10
Group Captain Graham D.D.D. Des.	
C.L.LOWPEDGE, L.A. S. D. A. M. P. W. S.	
Wing-Car. Burgess, A. 1. 5c(2)	1 0005 12
Mr. Pineus, EOU/END, U.S. Embassy	1 cory 13
S/Ldr.Strachey, B.Ops. 1	1 00107 100
	1 cogy 15
G-2, S.H.A.E.F. (Attn:Brig.Foor1)	1
A-2. 0.1. A. E. F. (A17)	1 cory 16
A.O.C in C. R.L.F. Portion Command	1 copy 17
D.OI L. UCDIA. Lt. Gol. Kumbal	2 copies 18 & 19
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ACAS, OTS, Air Ministey, Whitehall	1 cory 41
DCAS, Air Ministry, Whitehall	
T D D C D T T THIS OF Y HAR BOINTY	1 cory 13
J.P.R.C. R.M.F.Donson	1 coly th
Dir. of Alr, War Office, Whitehall	1 copy -15
E.A.B.L. (F.O. & M.E.W.)	1 cory h6
EOU/EWD, U.S.Embussy, 40 Berkalcy Square	1 cory 47
Worklar Connittee	
Dente West (17 a start a	1
Derak Wood (F.O. & K.E.W.)	2 conles 48 & 19
Lt.Col.Kunkél, USSTAF Major Garbutt Tn.1(c)	
Major Garoutt Th. 1(c)	1 cory 51
S/Ldr. Whitehead. H.O-a()	1 COLV 52
Wing Cdr. Verity, A.I.3e(1)	2 copies 53 & 54
Major Esra, S. H. A. E. Y. G-2	A Design of the
Lt.Col. Focklen. c/o Kny Linison Screetister Con	1 cory 55
as a subliding dense.	
Sapt.Barnett, EOU/EWD J.S.Embassy	1 copy 57
ALdr. Wigglesworth,E. 3(c)	1 copy 58
Dapt.James A.C.I.L.	
interior in T dital Was Again	2 copies 60 & 61
Japt. Jones, M.I. 14(a) War Office	
lajor L.A.Bask, A.I.S. (U.S.A.)	
Capt.Kaysen, RÓC/EW2, U.S.Embássy '.Garatang (F.O. & M.B.W.)	

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## CONFIDENTIAL

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CONDITIED STRUTECIC TARGETS CODUPTES

WORKING COLOUTTEE (COMANUICACIONS)

#### WE MLY BULLEPIEL NO. 14.

#### 14.6h MAPOIL 1945.

( Covering the 7 days anding sunset 12.3.45.)

(NCTE: Figures of bomb tennages are subject to revision on receipt of final details from Commands.)

I. MITACKS AND PHOTOGRAPHIC RECONDANSABOR.

This work has seen a notable intensification of the attack on scheduled targets in the Ruhr communication system. Although weather restricted almost all the boshing to F.F.F. and instruments, the concentration of affort, both in space and in time, will at least have approximated the unfavourable transport situation caused by sarlier attacks, and particularly by the recent simultaneous cutting of the main water and rail routes connecting the Ruhr with the rest of Germany.

Altogether some 28 scheduled targets were attacked, some of them twice, involving a total of 38 attacks and approximately 14,500 tens of bombs.

Dorthand, on 12th March and Loson, on 11th March both attacked on area as well as transport grounds, received respectively from Benker Command 4,858 and 4,737 tens. The parks at Dorthand-Sud, Dorthanderfeld ord Dorthand-Dving Lad also been the tarrets for a 1,070 ten attack by the 5th Air Force on March 10th. Kaarol, analy the weather alternatives, was heavily attacked by the 5th Air Force on March 5th and again by Dember Command on the night of 8/9 March.

Important communication contros further afield and not included in the Priority List attached were Chemnitz on the night 5/6th March (1,979 tens) and Dessur on the night 7/8 March (1,708.tens).

The weight of bonks dropped by the Strategic dir Perces on scheduled targets during the work under review as compared with the previous work is as follows:--

	Int The	ok rv-5thlanch.	1945. 5/6 20 000	
	(Inclusi		(1 .3. and I.B.	nclusivo)
MUNIZERI CIRELITY (Rest of 10° Z)	Ērz	<u>Ni shu</u>	Daz	<u>113 24ht</u>
R.1.F.Bomber Connand	1,545	1,045	4,888	1,138
8th U.S.A.A.F.	<u>2,736</u> 4,261	- 1,045	$\frac{8.354}{15,242}$	1,138
TOTAL DAY ROD NICET		,326	<u>14.3</u>	
				20\

Of the 13,242 tons drop ad by day, 1,526 tens were drop of under visual conditions.

-2-

A total of 230.667 tons of books has been dropped on-communications targets since the Discretion of the Transportation Plan. Of this, the total weight of books dropped upon targets scheduled in the 0.8.2.0. (Communications) Priority List has been 25.135 tons.

Targets on the Priority List heavily attacked during the week were:-

### MAJOR DIFERDICILOS TARGETS

BIELEFELD (Schildesche) Vieduat (Twine), ARSBERG Railway Viedunt.

#### MAIN CENTRES

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SOBVI (Twice), SCHRIFFE, HADEN, RHEIDE, OSCHFRUGE Northorn Yord, SIEGEN (Three time), TEIZDOFF (Twice), DULLENBURG (Twice), LORALID-EVING (Twice) DURALIDERTRIE (Twice), DURALID-SUD (Twice), PAUERBORI.

#### TARGETS

NASSAL (Twice), MAGNURG, WETZLAR, FRIEDRURG, FRAMPURE/MAIN, FRAMPURE/MAIN- 057, GIEDREN (Twice).

The only priority targets visually or part visually attacked were Manster, Ocnabruck, Modine and Biolefold.

O"scholuled communications control attacked during the week under review only five were covered by pacto maphic recommissance in the same period, while cover has been obtained of six others which had been subjected to earlier at acks.

#### Dotails of dimine shown are as follows:-

#### % unsurvicontility

LLION DETERDICTION T.F	Date ei <u>Attack</u> GZTS		Through Augustry		leconstive <u>Acilitios</u>
DOFTMENT-ENS CLIME BIELEFELD(Schildesche) Viedust HAND CENTRES	(3/4.3.45 (9.3.45 (3.3.45 (10.3.45	2.00000		details Soc det	below. ails bolow
Hubt Monster Osmadruch, Alerth Preside Schushte	16.2.45 9.3.45 9.3.45 9.3.45 28.2.45 28.2.45	9.3.45 9.3.45 9.3.45 9.3.45 9.3.45 9.3.45	10% 10% 10% 40% 20%	60% 50% 75% 20%	35% 30% 1.5% 25% 60%
ALTERSON VER VELCER ALT FREINGRE FREING HARAU KASER DISCHOPSERIM	25.2.45 (12.12.44 (17.2.45 9.3.45	<u>OETS</u> 9.3.45 9.3.45 9.3.45 9.3.45 10.3.45	Nil Nil Nil 15% Nil	NAL 50% NAL 90% NAL	- 25% N11 10% 10%

COTTAGE CONTINUES

CTICER CENTRES	Date of Attack	Date of <u>Cover</u>	Through Running	<u>m/va</u>	Locomotive Tecilities
HAMLOVER-HAINZHOLZ	3.3.45 (Acrea)	9.3.45	N12	Nil	Nil
LE ROE LE IPZIG/EBGELSDORF MAGTERURG/ROTHE BEI OHENHAUSEN	24.2.45 27.2.45 9.2.45 4.12.14	9.3.45 9.3.45 9.3.45 9.3.45 9.3.45	N41 N41 N41 N41	N41 N41 N41 N41	Nil Nil Hil cloud
OSTEPFELD WANNE EICKEL	21.2.45 4.3.45	9.3.45 7.3.45	50%	90%	25%

Cover of 5.3.45 of the Bielofeld (Schildesche) Viaduct (attacked again on 7th and 10th March by the 8th U.S.A.A.F.) showed the northern viaduct to be inguasable, and repair work in progress to the southern viaduct. Two trains in steam were seen on the new single tracked by-pass line which, at the time of cover was grastically, if not wholly, complete. According to strike reports on the attack of 10.3.45, bonks covered the southern approach to the viaduct and the southern approach to the by-pass line.

Cover of 9.3.45 of the Glame By-pass section of the Dertmind-Ets Canal showed that section to be still 100% unserviceable after the stack of 3/4.3.45 by H.A.F. Bomber Command, with the squaduot hold and the marby gate near it damaged. Extensive repair work was already in hand - evidently in proparation for the next attack.

Cover of 9.3.45 reveals that during the attack on the DATTELN benael plant on the same date a breach was as to in the LIME-SHIME ernal just short of the paint where the eastern arm of this waterway leaves the DURANDE/EES Caral. The result of this welcare bonus has been to leave the water level of the DONTHED/INS Caral on a section lying between MATTERN and the RUR. It is not possible to any whether the full has been got t enough to provent new action but if this is so it will no inform the cristing cuts, in the DURIND/INS Caral, at LINERCON and GARMANDER by providing a further chatched to the newment of inland shipping between the HUR and Control Eastern GARMAN.

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#### II. PROPOSED AMENDED FRIGATY LIST.

#### (i) Major Intediction Targets.

As regards individual targets, the Working Committee considers that BIELEFEID (SCHILDESCHE Viaduct) should be relegated in the list. The North Viaduct is probably still 1005 uncerviceable and in the stack by the 8th Air Force on 10th March bombs were seen to fall in the immediate visinity of the South Viaduct. In any event the bottlenock value of this target has been considerably diminished by the completion of the evolding line (see para III).

In view of the increasing scale of attack by the Strategic Air Forces on the railway centres controlling the approaches to the Ruhr and the limited weight of effort, which on account of the development of the bettle, the IX Air Force has been able to devote to the line of bridge interdiction, the Working Committee considers that the execution of the joint programs of for the isolation of the Ruhr would be expedited if certain bridges (suitable for attack by heavy bembers) now on the Tactical Interdiction Programs were included in the C.S.T.C. directive for the Strategic bombers. It will be recalled that an arrangement already exists whereby in certain direumateneos major interdiction targets on the C.S.T.C. Friority List may be attacked by the IX Air Force.

Deridge targets proposed are BAD OYENMAUSEN (620 ft.) and VLOTHO (850 ft.) The former carries four tracks and the latter two; together they normally carry the great bulk of traffic converging on and Leaving the BIELEFELD Vieduets. As targets they form a valuable reinsurence against improvised working over or around the vieduets. The very recent provision of a smoke-screen at BAD OYENALUSEN is a measure of the importance the errory now attaches to it.

#### (ii). Main Contros.

Within the period under review, most of the listed targets in this category have been attacked on one or more occasions. The almost complete absence of cover to show either the effects of the most recent bombing or the progress of repair work after earlier attacks, makes it virtually impossible to arrange targets in any logical order of priority since noither the flow and direction of traffic nor the status of targets along the loss damaged routes can be ascertained. Within the limits imposed by this temporary lack of information, the current list aims, as did its predecessor, at (a) increasing the extent and degree of dislocation on the castorn pariphery of the Ruhr and (b) reducing the capacity of these main routes which cannot be or have not yet been interdicted.

The inclusion of HOLMACKEDE and GEISECKE (Ruhr) and the re-entering of the North Choke Point section of HAML are included with a view to achieving  $(a)_*$ 

The three main routes concorned in (b) areMUNSTER-OSLABRUCK-BREADEN, SCHWERTE-SCHERFEDE and HAGEN-KAPEL-SIECEN. The first and lest, in addition to being important as main routes for general traffic leaving and entering the RUHR, have assumed enhanced tactical significance. On the first of these routes OSNAHRUCK and MUNSTER, although fairly heavily deneged in recent attacks, are considered still to be capable of handling considerable traffic.

As soon and as often as cover is available, the Working Committee will make routine amendments in the order of priority, and suitable alternative targets will be provided to take the place of targets where the degree of damage is sufficient to warrant suspension.

(iii) Filler and Weather Alternative Targets.

As usual this list has been amended in accordance with the /latest

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### latest cover showing the activity status of the various contres.

As requested by the C.S.T.C. the Working Committee has reconsidered the desirability of re-entering the ROTHENSIM SUPPLIFT (MITTELLAD Canal East) in the directive. It is felt that although this important bottleneck on the Central German Waterway System still retains much of its former importance it is irrelevant to the current phase of the Communications Plan and should not, therefore, be included in the Frierity List of Major Interdiction Targets. As a target of opportunity, however, it warrants inclusion in the C.S.T.C. List of Weather Alternative and Filler Targets. Since a successful attack on this Shiplift would cause more widespread and sustained diclocation of traffic than a successful attack on any major railway centre it has been placed in a special category at the head of this list.

E.s.B., as requested, has propered and Circulated to Borber Command and D.B.Ops, a revised appreciation of the economic importance of the traffic now using this section of the MITTELLADD Gamal.

(iv) Ganeral

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The Sth Air Forces have questioned the desirability of including in the C.S.T.C. Priority List rail centres close to the REMACEN bridgehood. Since these new have a special tactical significance and will in consequence come within the scope of regular attack by the Tactical Airforces, the Committee may feel that they should be excluded from the List. The targets immediately concerned are LEBURG, SIEGEN, HETZDORF, DITAINED and WETZLE. The C.S.T.C. with also consider the desirability of caking S.N.A.F.F. to define a Tactical Area in this sector, in which case attack by heavy bombers would be limited to specific requests by S.H....E.F./Air.

#### III. <u>BIELEFELD (SCHILDESCHE) Vieduct.</u> By-pass Line

This loop line, construction of which was commenced subsequent to 25.12.44, was shown to be in active preparation on cover of 21.2.45 when the roadbed was seen to be laid with the work of track-laying in progress.

The line, built to avoid the windows, starts from a point a quarter of a mile south-west of the viaduot (569839), runs in a wide curve ensured to a point almost three quarters of a mile erest of the viadurt (582843) and swings in again to rejoin the main line (HLENEVER-REMERTED-HERE) approximately 12 miles to the north-east (Map ref: G.S.,G.S. No.4416 1:100,000 Sheet P.3)

The line runs through completly open country, is not very much embanked and at a single point on its stretch is carried over a stretch (JOHANDE) by a very small bridge which has itself been constructed since 19th November 1944. The line follows the natural contours of the land.

Photographic cover of 28.2.45 showed that on that date the line was not in operation, but cover of 5.3.45 has shown not only the original line to be under repair, but two trains in steam on the loop line. Examination of the photographs suggests that the trains may be constructional trains, and that the line is single teack, and has every sign of being very nearly complete if not already completed.

Since the new stretch of line is constructed on a low embankment and the sele bridge along its entire length is very small, it is as a target, no more wilnerable to attack than any other stretch of open line and could be easily and quickly repaired.

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The most deconomical method of neutralising the extra deconty provided by this loop line would appear to be the destruction of the Southern violant. The destruction of general facilities at CELENCION to the west and LENE to the East of the visities would further reduce the amount of traffic which could be handled either on the servicable visitot or on the loop line or both. It would no longer be necessary to devote any effort to the ERENTED Visities or the avoiding line if the three bridges at BLD CONTRALUSED, VLOTHO and HERPORD could be out and the interdiction upintuined.

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ROLE

With the exception of the BELINELD (Schildesche) Vielect and the according Railway Vielect which are deals with in the text of this Bulletin, no later information is evaluable on the convert state of the bridge interdiction programs with that contained in last work's issue of armost 0. As such as this is received it will be circulated in a surglass wirry paper.

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for C.S.T.C. Vorking Committee (Communications) Combined Strategie Targets Committee Lansdowne House, W.1.

# TOP CONFIDENTIAL

14th March, 1945.

	THE ISOLATION OF THE 1	RUHR.
Priority	Target No.	Target
PART I.	MAJOR DATERDICTION TARGETS	
<b>1</b> 2	<u>GH 5044</u> <u>GH 484</u> covers	ARNSEERG Railway Viaduot EREMEN Bridge (Grid Ref: 060H 035V on Illustration No.6(d)(V)14/1)
3	GY 4773 covers	ARBERGEN Bridge (Grid Ref: 054H 042V on Illustration No.3(0) 2/5)
4	(5208E/B/1 [M.I.P) but advance material distributed to IX Air Force	HAD OETHHAUSEN Bridge
5	5208E/D/2	VLOTHO Bridge
6	<u>GH 501</u>	BIELEFELD (Schildesche) Viaduct HM
7	GN 5852 covers	NIENEURG Bridge (Grid Ref:038H 120 V on Illustration No 3(K)77/17)
	SUSPERIDE	<u>D</u>
	<u>GH 502</u>	NEUEVESKEN nr PADERBORN Viaduct
	<u>GH 503</u>	ALTENERKEN nr PADERBORN Viaduct
	CH 695	CRAVE HORST nr RHEINE Embankment on the MITTELLAND Canal
	<u>GH 694</u>	LADHERGEN nr. MUNSTER Embankment on DORTHIND/EMS Ganal (GLANE By-pass section)

PART II. MAIN CENTRES.

22 23 24


GH 1440	LOHNE
CH 592	RHEDE
GH 436	HAGEN M
GH 5599	COESFELD Ø 10
GH 558	GEISECKE/RUHR Ø
GH 443	GUTERSLOH
GH 590A	OSNAERUCK Northern Yard (Key No.11 on Illustration No.6(d)VI 2/9)
GH 472A	MUNSTER
GH 556	SINSEN Ø H
5107E/4412/01	UNNA Ø
GH 619	HENGSTEY nr. HAGEN
GH 560	HOLZWICKEDE
GH 559	VOHWINKEL nr. SOLINGEN
<u>GH 593 A &amp; B</u> .	HAMM * (Northern choke point & goods loco depot:Koy No.28 on illustration No.6(d) VI 5/6)
07 0077 D & C	SIECEN * * *
GZ 2973 B & C	EETZDORF Ø n n
<u>GH 5597</u>	DILLENBURG Ø m m
GR 3390 -	DITURNOOR DE E

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	PARE II. MAIN CEN	CHES	
	Entered		and a starter by d as
		$\begin{array}{c} \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 5599\\ \underline{\mathrm{GH}} 558\\ \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 556\\ \underline{51076/4412/C1}\\ \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 556\\ \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 619\\ \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 560\\ \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 554\\ \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 554\\ \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 554\\ \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 560\\ \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 554\\ \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 561\\ \underline{\mathrm{CH}} 521\\ \underline{51072}/4709/C1 ~\&~ 2\end{array}$	COESFELD Ø * GEISECKE/RUHR Ø GUTLESLOH SINSEN Ø * UNNA Ø HENGSTEY NY,HAGEN HOLZWICLEDE DORTHURD-EVING * DORTHURD-EVING * DORTHURD-SUD * BARMEN/WUP_ERIAL
	Re-entered		
		<u>GH 5934 &amp; B</u>	Hadding (Northern choke point & goods loco depot: Key No. 28 on illustration No. 6(d) VI 5/6)
3		<u>GH 362</u>	PADERBORN
	Suspended	<u>GII 620</u>	SCHERCE >
	Gancelled	CH 595A CH 565 & G22861B 54062/4407/04 CH 5595A CH 5595A CH 554B ER & FILLER TARGETS	OSTENGELD nr. OHERHAUSEN ODERGIAUSEN STERRFADE TROISDORF AUGSDERG
	Entered	OH 673 CH 6209 GH 6210	ROTHERSEE shiplift, MITTELLAND Canal DONAUESCHINGEN Ø HMENDINGEN Ø
-	Re-ontered	<u>GH 5531</u>	HANAU
	Suspended	CH 637A CH 577A CH 577A	KASSEL FRANKPURT/MAIN * FRANKPURT/MAIN-OST *
	Cencollod	011 <u>5594</u> 663162 <u>8</u> 011 <u>5548</u>	BOWN COTLEVZ-LUTZEL NIEDERLAHNSTEIN nr. COHLENZ
	ж	Each astorisk ropres last available covor	onts an attack after the
	ø	Targets requiring pr	ocision attack
	117	to Tinted above and	naluded in the German Station List

T Н Ι S P А G E I S U Ν L А S S I F I E D

> NOTE: All targets listed above are included in the German Station hist although target material has not yet been distributed in all cases.

(i) Operational numbers printed thus <u>GH 501</u> or <u>GZ 2973 B & C</u> indicate that target material adequate for operations exists at Stations.

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-lin (ii) Cornational numbers enclosed in brackets and followed by the letters N.I.P., e.g.(GH 5553 M.I.P.) indicate that target material is in preparation and will be distributed shortly. (iii) In cases where the letters M.I.P. are likely to considerable period of time, due to there being no adequate cover available, the words "inadequate cover" will be added. (vi) In cortain cases in which target material is in In certain cases in which target material is in preparation, Stations already hold material for another target in the vicinity on which the new target can be identified. This material could be used as a temperary substitute until the new material is available. Such cases are indicated thus: (<u>GF 2246B M.I.P</u>) (but Ga 2537 covers)

Τ Н Ι S P А G Ε Ι S U N C L A S S I F Ι Е D

## TOPONTAL

## ATTACKS ON, AND PHOTOGRAPHIC COVER OF SCHEDULED COLMUNICATIONS TARGETS


WEIN ENDING SUNSET 12th MARCH 1945.

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## VEST EUROPE (WEST OF 100 E)

DATE	TABOET	110.	ALLING TOIMT	AT DEDIGATTA	TUNS	CALLY REPORTS	STRIKE REPORTS	FHOI: OTHER
.ar.7	SIDGEN	632 7 338-0	1,/2	8th U.S.A.A.F.	475	Uncuserred		
	1.2				71.0			
"	3.532		1/1		340			
u.	GIIIDAII (+)	GREAL	:	'n	334			
11.11	FADERU CIEN	037212		"	30			
"	BININID (Schildesche)	<u>11104</u>	TOLGATY	"	212			
Lar. 8	REFEDER	<u>c::::97</u>	1./1	"	169	"		
"	DILLENSURG	<u>a::5596</u>	1/1	"	173	"		
n		622973B&C	14/1	"	237	"		
11	FRAMEFURT/MAIN	<u>GH577A</u>	1:/1	и	50	"		
"	GIESSEN (+)	GH649	RAIL	"	215	"		
Mar. 8/9	HASSEL	GE1637A	ACA	R.A.F.	1138	n		
Kar. 9	K.SEL	GE1637A	1./1	8th U.S.A.A.F.	602	Visual - Pair- Good		Nany fi
"	100NSTER	<u>GE14721</u>	1/1	"	210	Visual - Fair		Sovere and rol
n	OSHLERÜCK	<u>GF5°CA</u>	11/31	"	170	Very good		
11	RHEINE	GE15/2	1/1		206	Visual - Good		Fresh (
n	FRATEFORT /1 AIL	<u>GEI5774</u>	1/1	"	532	Unclaserved	Good concentration	
n 	FPANKFULC/	<u> GHÓ14</u>	14/1	n	332	Visual - Good	Good. Numerous hits	
1.20.10	HAGEN	<u>au 36</u>	:/1	"	71	Unobserved		
	SCHUERCE	GH620	:/2	11	199	ч		
	CORSFELD	G115599	1./1	n	67	n		
u	SINSE	GH 556	1 1./1	"	147	n		
	PADERSORN	GH362	11/2	11	285	n		
17	DORTHIND (South)		1:/1	п	498	"		
	DORTIGID EVILG	GH554	11/1	n	332	"	2	
	DORTANDELFELD	CH1566	1./1	n	241	n		

(+) Suspended on Current Priority List.



## TEONFILTENTIAL

### ATTACKS ON, AND PHOTOGRAPHIC COVER OF, SCHEDULED COMMUNICATIONS TARGETS


WEEK ENDING SUNSET 12th MARCH, 1945.

### WEST EUROPE (WEST OF 10°E)

DATE	TARGET	170.	AINING POINT	ATTACLED BY TOIS	CREW REPORTS	STRIKE REPORTS	PHOTO RI OTHER RI
lar.10	SOEST	<u>GEE444</u>	м⁄т	8th U.S.A.A.F. 313	Unobserved		
n	HANDE (+)	GI1593 A&B	R/C	• 63	"		
n	BISUTFELD (Schildesche)	<u>GH501</u>	VIADUOF	n 277	Fartly visual		
"	ARITSBARG	GE50LA	VIADUOT	<b>n</b> 285	Un <b>observe</b> d		
ar.12	DORIMIND		AREA	R.A.F. 4,886	n		
		(11554) (11554) (11554) (11554)					
11	DILLENBURG	<u>G115596</u>	N/I	8th U.S.A.A.F. 213	n		
	BETZDORF	GH5597	M/T	" 234	n		
"	WETZLAR	GF2248 B	ы⁄т	167			
	FRI.DBERG	GH5550	14/Y	8th U.S.A.A.F. 158	n		
	MAREURG	GH445	M/Y	" 220	"		
	SIEGEN	GZ1973B&C	M/X	" 218	"		
"	FRAIEFURT/MAIN		u/I	" 36	n		

(+) Suspended on Current Priority List.





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#### TALES AND ORDINANCE DEPOTS

#### Garrent Lnamy Position

1. In addition to the front line oil shortage, certain other key military equipment and supplies are in short supply at the battlefront, actably tanks, ordnance supplies, and virtually all types of spare parts. The energy shortage of these major defensive iteams can be substantially aggrevated and his ability to inflict casualties upon allied forces reduced through successful attack upon significant final as eachly or repair sorks and depots. These installations and their products are 1 to 5 weeks behind the battlefront, where the products are in desparate short supply.

APPENDIA C

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#### Tank Ascendly and Tank Engine Ascendly Flants.

3. Intelligence is unequivocal in disclosing two important facts. First, the energy is placing very heavy reliance on his fanzer army and has given it very high industrial priority. Nevertheless he is short of armored equipment in terms of establishment and the functions the units are required to perform. Second, the Fanzer equipment the energy does produce is of superior quality and is very effective in inflicting high casualties on the battlefield, in addition to being influential in deciding the curve and outcome of engagements and sometimes battles.

4. Approximately 600 tenks are produced by 6 final assembly plants. Two identified tenk engine producers are believed to account for a significant proportion of total tank engine assembly. The Panthers, Tigers, and other tank and ar gun models produced by these plants reach front line units in less than a month from the time of completion at the examply plant. It is eminently desirable that the production flow of this major military weapon be eliminated or much reduced.

#### Main Ordnance Delots

5. The energy's main ordeance depote are at all times stocked with important supplies of guns, small arms, and spore parts, engineer equipment, etc., as well as with numerous tanks, other AFV's and vehicles. In addition, these depots are major repair and modification conters and sometimes serve as the refitting and assembly points for military units. while some depots have been effectively attacked over the last year, the target system as a whole has not been seriously damaged.

6. Mailable intelligence indicates that these depots are but 1 to 2 weeks behind front line battle operations. They have become more important than previously in supporting the battlefront, for two reasons. First, the need for haste in filling requisitions from the front or in refitting units is greater; second, the high rate of wastage on the front and shortage of equipment of certain types has increased the dependence on ordnance depot stocks.

7. Successful attack on a number of ordnance dopots takes effect both in setting back the time schedule for sapply through putting the depot including the extensive allitary sidings and loading facilities out of action

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for a time, as well as by actual destruction of the stocks of equipment " " - available for disputch.

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6. The energy fighting ability will be directly and curve by affected by interference with the flow of new tanks from tank plants and of repaired tank, guns, axail arms, and aparts parts from ordnance depots. The assault and angles protocian is comparizated in a fairly axail mumber of plants, a standed that on all known producers is recommended. Alls there are a large number of ordnance depots known, many are fairly small. There is no need to destroy a service portion of the system before an affect infail; such ascess ful stack produces some affect. It is therefore recommended that about 20 large active depote be attacked on priority.

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tariet Sumbor	Flags	Date Lagi Attack	Data Last Dovor	Jeeeri tion and Matlvity
un 260 <b>7</b>	Bayrouth		7 Oct 44	Grannes depot. Very active. Considerable stores. Small size.
G21 5903	Berlin/Grenienburg		29 Noy 44	Rain S. ordnance dapot. Activa. Equipment visible.
(3765) (3 5801)	Barlin/ jendau	6 Get 44	15 Feb 45	Whin ordnance depot and guns york. Active. Vehicles and guns visible.
UT 5903	Barlin/Schonaberg		31 Hey 44	Mein signals e bigenst depot. Very setive. Of large size.
Ca 5617	f <b>reils</b> seing		26 Oct 44	Ordnance depot. Activity low. Some trucks and other vehicles visible.
	Pirth		13 Sept 44	Ordnenee depri . V ry setive. Vehicles and much stores Visible.
GE 5813	Grafenwohr		16 ¥ab 45.	Grdmanse and tank depot. Very active. APV's, other equipment, and new construction.

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Tarrat Number	Flace	Date Last Attack	Date Last Cover	Description and Activity
	Graz		16 Oct 1de	Ordnance depot. Very active. Several hundred guns and othe equipment.
	Gustros/Friemerburg		12.8.44.	lain ordnance cepot. Very active, Lany guns. Stores.
	Hamburg/Olinde			Wain ordnance depot. Active, but seriously damaged on last cover. Support visible.
	Ingolatadi		9,2,43	alm ordnance depot. Very active. 220 gans, 60 lorries, stores.
6M 5219				Crimance and tank depot. Active, AFV's and M.T. visible.
	Fameradorf		15.6.44	Crdnance and tank depot. Active. Numerous tanks, AFV's, transports, stc. Visible.
	Leipzig/ ockern		20 Dec 13	Ordance depot. Active.
	leipsig/Johonefeld		7 July 44	Ordnance depot. Active. Some .T. and other suipment visible.
	Lizz	•	24.2.45	Ordnance and tank depot. Demaged on last cover. Activity unknown.

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Target Number	Flace	Date Last Attack	Date Last Cover	Description and Activity
GN 5804	Wagdeburg/Altengrabow		19 Nov.44	Ordnance and tank depot. Very active. 40 tanks, 40 other vehicles, and other equipment visible.
GN 3761	Magdeburg/Friedrichstad	it 12 Sept 44	6 CCE 44	Main ordnance depot. Serious damage. Some activity.
	Mahrostrau		8 Sept 44	Possible ordnance depot. Some activity. 20 guns, some AFV's visible.
GN 5850			7 Aug. 44	Ordnance depot. Active.
GN 3763	Munich/Milbertshofen	13 June 44	30 Oct 14	Main ordnance depot. Some activity but no reconstruction following very effective attack. New cover needed.
	Naunberg	16.8.44	12 Oct 44	Main ordnance and tank depot. Hepwired following attack. Active. Equipment visible.
GN 5811	Closoue		27 <b>.</b> 9.44	Wein ordnance and tank depot. Very active. 70 APV's, some M.S.,

such unidentified equipment.

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Tarrent Surbar	21.000	Into Inst.	Data Lass	Description and estivite
ar 3075	Tagua Atraovico		27 sept 14	Grammoc and M.T. do ot. one activity. Vahiolos and other equipment visible.
	lagan burg/Baheskraux		12 Oct 44	Ordnence depot. Humerous gaus and other equipment.
an 5030	Salokar		13 Sout 44	Grânesoe de st. Active 40 game.
45 ⁰ 47° 44° 10 0% 13° 12° 5	stattgert/Berg		16 Oct 44	urdnames de ot and M.I. dopot. Netivo. Marmarons vehicle and much e palpreet.
48° 47° 29" 11 9° 11° 51° 8		,		
an 3815	Ulm/Sau Ulm	307t 8 44	1 Hov 44	Main ordnanco depot. Vary active 300 gama, 20 M.T., 30 possible AFV's, stares.
.) (E) 102	Vizena/Johonbrana		13 Oct 44	Grânance and M.T. depot. Activo. Vehicles including 7 tente visible.
	Sola/ chleicebein		12 mg 44 ·	Grimance depot. Very sotive. Gume, transporters, vehicles, bridging equipment.
	Sein/Sorth	13 Pab 45	6 Nov 44	Main ordnerse and tank depot. Active. MV's, M.T., gans, transporters visible.
	Wien /stroberadorf		6 July 14	Main signals depot. Very active. Large sime.

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COMBINED STRATEGIC TARGETS COMMITTEE WORKING COMMITTEE (A.F.V.'s) WEEKLY BULLETIN # 5 12 March, 1945

#### **Q.S.T.C.** : WORKING COMMITTEE (A.F.V.'s)

BULLETIN No. 5.

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### COMBINED STRATEGIC TARGETS COMMITEE WORKING COMMITTEE (A.F.V.'s) WEEKLY BULLETIN #5 12 March, 1945

#### I. ATTACKS

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One priority tank producer, Henschel at Kassel, was attacked during the week. Since strike cover indicates numerous hits on productive buildings, the target has been suspended pending receipt of activity cover.

#### II. DEVELOPMENTS

1. Reconnaissance. Cover received since the date of the last report indicates that the 21 February attack on MAN, Murnberg damaged three additional buildings.

An interpretation of cover cabled from the Mediterranean discloses slight or nil activity at Steyr Walzlagerwork, formerly observed to be repairing tanks. The same cable describes much activity at Krottenderf, including the presence of 13 Panther or Tiger hulls.

Examination of cover at Kassel/Helsa, south of Kassel, discloses the existence of a very active tank depot or assembly plant. In view of the small industrial floorspace on the site, the former is more likely. About 60 new tanks are visible on excellent cover.

2. Estimates of Production by Plants. Estimates of final assembly by plants have been mode in response to CSTC request. Tank types, to the extent known, are specified. The estimates appear in Annex 2, attached. The course of German tank production over the mast three years is also described.

#### III. PRIORITY, DEPOT, AND INTELLIGENCE LISTS

On the basis of the revaluation of production made in the Annex 2 estimates, the priority list has been changed moderately. The new priority list gives greater weight to the heavier Mark V and VI (Panther and Tiger) models than to the lighter fark IV and Czech T38 models. The first three priorities are accorded to the undamaged tank producers, after which the identified tank engine producers appear as numbers 4 and 5. The next three priorities are allotted to undamaged SP gun producers, and the final two to the damaged plants at Nurnberg and Brunswick whose activity is unknown. The plants at Kassel and Mardeburg, severaly damaged in recent attacks, have been suspended from the priority list.

Tank and tank spare parts and repair depots at Kassel/Helsa and Sennelager have been added and Wiesbaden/hahn has been restored to the depot list. Linz has been removed.

The War Office, D.M.I., has expressed the opinion to the Working Committee that the major tank, spare parts, and repair depets at Magdeburg/ Altengrabow and Grafenwöhr are strategically and tactically very important

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to the land battles now raging. The Working Committee concurs in this view and recommends that CSTO direct that these depots be accorded priority for attack.

The Fahr plant at Gottmadingen has been added to the Intolligence list. It is now confirmed as a major component producer and finisher for Maybach.

> C.S.T.C. Working Committee (A.F.V.'s) 40, Borkeley Sq., Flat 52, 12 Whrch, 1945.

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### TABLE I

TARGET LISTS (A.F.V. 's)

#### 12 March, 1945

#### Priority Tank Plants

Priority	~	Tar	jet Number	Plant
1		GR	3712	Hannover/Linden (MMI)
2		GY	4683A.B	Borlin/Marienfeldo (Daimler Benz)
3		GIT	5055	St. Valentin (Nibelungenwork)
4 5		GS	5110B	Plauen (Vomag)
		GR	3682A	Friedrichshafen (Maybach)
6		GN	5052(MIP)	Berlin Micderschoenweide (Nord-
~				deutsche Motorenbau)
1		GN	5065	Berlin/Falkensee (Demag)
		GY	4682 B	Berlin/Spandau (Deutsche Industrie Werk)
8		GY	4658A	Prague/Liben (C.K.D.)
9		GR	3668	Nürnborg (M.A.N.)
10		GY	48 12	Brunswick/Neupetritor (MIAG)
Suspended		GH	637CD.E	Kassel (Henschel)
Suspended			608B,G	Magdeburg/Buckau (Krupp Grusonwerk)

Tank Depot and Repair Facilities (Alphabetical Order)

GN	5881	Aschaffenburg/Leider
GN	5813	Grafonwähr
	NT	Kassel/Helsa
GN	5819	Krugau
GN	5825	Kumersdorf
GII	5804	Mardeburg /Altengrabow
	TT	Sennelager
GN	3834B	Steyr (Steyr Walzlagerwerk)
GN	3860	Vienna/South
	NT	Wiosbaden/Hahn

## Intelligence List of Tank Component Producers (Alphabetical Order)

	1684D	Berlin/Reinickendorf (Bergmann)
GY	22580	Derlin/Togel (Alkett)
GZ	2849	Eochum (Eisen and Huttenwerk)
GZ	2906(MIP)	Gottmadingen (Fahr)
GF	2234	Hattingen (Henrichshutte (Ruhrstahl
GZ	2740	Hannover/Wulfel (MNH)(Eisenwerk Wulfel)
MT	( GZ 2740 co	vers)Hannover/Laatzen (MMH)
NT		Hradec/Kralove (3koda)
GN	3796	Kapfenberg (Gobrilder Boehler)
GN	5056	Krottendorf (Gebrüder Bochler)
GF	2206A	Linz (Hermann Goering)
GO	12110	Vienna (Saurer Werke)


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NT Not targetted MIP Material in preparation


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
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


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
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CONFI	rity Target Mumber	Location	Date Last Attack	Date Last Cover	Remarks	
			<u>A COROR</u>	And the second se		
and faci	depet repair litios				Active tank spare parts depct. Not	
(al) or	phabetical ler) GN 5881	Aschaffenburg/Leider			attacked when Scibert (GN5064) success- fully attacked 25.2.45	
	Gl! 5813	Grafonw ⁸ hr	-		Active tank and spare part dejet; AFV's seen in recent cever. Two large	
	64. 5515				buildings recently completed, another under construction.	
	177	Kassel/Holsa	-	9.3.45	Very active tank depot. 77 new tanks and much other equipment visible at	
					Very active this leadt. If her of at and much other equipment visible at 0116/TS/677533. (1066/4694, prints 4098,9)	
	GN 5019	Krugau	-	6.8.44	Active branch tank depot dealing mainly with Mark IV's. Repairs.	
	GN 5825	Kumme <b>rs</b> do <b>r</b> f	-	15.8.44	Active. Branch tank depot. 20 tanks visible.	
		Magdebur /Alton rabow	-	19.11.44	Koenigsborn personnel and equipment largely moved here making this most	
	GN 5804	istration () it constructs			important tank depet; many tanks visible.	
		Sennelager		19.11.44	Very active branch tank and tank repair depot. Leasted in tank train-	
	NT	ocumera ² 01			ing area at 4416/T3/677533.	
	NI: Not targetted		- 3 -			
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### ---ANNEX 2----

# COMPINED STRATEGIC TARGETS COMPITTEE

### WORKING COMPTTTEE (A.F.V.'s)

The Working Committee (AFV's), upon instruction from the CSTC on 7 March, 1945, has propored estimates of tank production. Attempt has been made to assess final assembly in each plant by type of tank. The estimates are as follows:

Plant	Monthly Output,	Type
Hannover/Lindon MMH	100	Mark V
Berlin Marienfeld Daimler Benz	100	Mark V
St. Valentin Nibolungenwerk	<b>1</b> 50	Mark IV and possibly other tank or SP models
Plauon		
Vomag	100	SP gun
Derlin - Alkett (Deutsche Industrie and Demag		
plants)	100	SP gun
Prague/Liben		
C.K.D.	100	SP gun
Mirnberg		
MAN	50	Wark V
Brunswick/Neupetritor		
MIAG	50	SP gun
Kassel		
Honschel	-	Mark VI & SP Jun
Magdeburg/Duckau		
Krupp Grusonwerke	-	SP gun
Possible other production	100	-
Total	25.0	

It should be noted that the estimates for the last four plants represent reduced or nil output due to bomb damage. Estimates given in these cases are tentative pending activity and repair cover.

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Future output in these plants depends upon German attempts to restore production and Allied air attempts to prevent it. Normal production in these plants totalled about 400 tanks per month.

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
German tank production in recent months has been subject to opposing influences. The attempts to increase production in 1943-45 achieved a very considerable success by allocating very high priority to the Panser program. Production more than doubled from 1942 to mid 1944. From this point the impetus given to production by Wehrmacht and Speer directives has been offset by the effects of bonding. Successful attacks upon the highly concentrated tank engine and pearbox production in mid-1944, attacks upon several tank associally plants in latter 1944, and particularly recent attacks upon major producers have combined to interrupt and set back the expansion program. The measure of success of attacks against tank plants, like that of the 1944 attacks against the aircraft industry, has been in the denial of many hundreds of units to the front lines, rather than in the reduction of output below the pro-expansion levels. The fair Corre of concentration in the tank industry still permits this latter possibility.

In the absence of further attacks, production may be expected to recover, and even advance, through repair or dispersal of damaged plants and increased output in undamaged plants. Such recovery or alvance is possible despite the general and widespread strain in the German concenty, if the very high priority of the Panzer program is continued.

In view of the complex and opposing influences on tank production described above, it should be noted that the production estimates, while made on the basis of all available evidence, must be viewed as rough approximations with a fair margin of error.

> C.S.T.C. JORAING COMMITTEE (A.F.V.'s) 40 Porkeloy Square, Flat 52 12 March 1945.

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#### Present Status of System

1. Assumition filling stations and dwaps (Heeres Munitionsanstalter) have not been subject to systematic Mir attack to date. A very few depots have been bushed as secondary targets or damaged in the course of area raids: - Murnberg/Feucht is an example of the first group and Massel/ Ihringhausen of the second - but as a whole the system can be considered a virgin one. There are about saventy five Main Army Assaultion Depots (Heeres Munitionsanstalten) and twenty for Main Army Assaultion Depots (Heeres Munitionsanstalten) and twenty to thirty branch depots (Heeres Sebenamitionsanstalten) known to exist in Germany. Of these, ground intelligence points out about fifty which are currently active and important. Not all these fifty have been located and covered; nor do all those located show the combination of filling and assessbly activity with storage which makes a desirable target. So far, thenty one major filling-station dump combinations have been targeted, and it is thought that detailed examination of photo cover now proceeding sill reveal about fifteen more.

### Current Intelligence on Ground Force Assumition Supplies


2. Current intelligence from rm, P/S interrogation speaks increasingly of usuanition shortages. Nost of these references are connected with references to fuel shortage and transport shortage - both M/T and horse, so that it cannot be firally concluded on the basis of this evidence alone that a general association shortage exists in Germany today. The same applies to the association conservation orders, no fire orders, etc. which prisoners continually report. Nonatheless, recently there have been references to rationing in training units, and shortages of specific types of association which may inflecte that something more general than the tactical transport difficulties alone lies behind the decreasing assaultion expenditures of the energy.

3. In the areas captured by the Russians the energy has lot a significant amount of his capacity for producing high explosives and propellents, perhaps as much as 20%; and possibly an even larger proportion of his capacit for manufacturing shall bodies. A number of important filling stations and dumps have also been lest in Brandenburg and east Frussia. While these losses need have no immodiate impact, since propellant and explosive manufacture - as opposed to shell filling and assembly - are still at least six months deep in the pipeline, they undoustedly have moved the Germans to measures of economy.

#### robable Time Lag of offects of Attack

4. No hard and fast statement can be made as to the current depth of the filling, assembly and storage functions of the large emmanition damps. On the everage, the overall depth may be of the order of six to eight meaks, with perhaps the weeks to a month stocks in the shape of assembled rounds ready for shipsent. This figure is of course variable, and shipsents from these damps are made both to army damps and directly to lower formations, so that the everage depth may not reveal the shell picture.

5. The effects of stack, however, will not necessarily be delayed for the complete period of the pipeline length. The fact that many currently active dusps are shipping directly to formations means that substantial bonuses will occasionally be achieved in terms of disorganization of the flow of supply. And at present, with the overall supply system much less than completely flexible, such disorganization will lead to real local shortages in active units from time to time. Other possible bonuses may be achieved as a result of specialization by types as between various dumps.



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
### Conclusions and Necosmondations

6. In view of the situation presented above, and the additional innortance of the large active dumps as the holders of most of the ammunition - in both finished and unfinished form - which will be expanded in the fighting of the next month or two, it is concluded that the attack of the large active filling and assembly stations and their associated dumps all produce definite and fairly quick though not precisely predictable restrictions in the supplies of armunition to fighting units on all fronts. It is recommended that only large installations, having both filling assembly and storage functions which are known to be active, be attacked. It is not necessary to cut through any specified portion of the system before a military effect is achieved; such successful attack will make some contribution.

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	Amminition Fi	lling and Assembly Pls	
Target No. or Grid Reference	Location and Plant	Cover	Remarks
4081/75/1183	Altengrabow (EMa)	J 898/7017	Filling station and dump.
081/96/0232	Allendorf D.A.G. and W.A.S.A.G.	7/864/945-9	Very large explosives plant and filling factory.
4081/49/0857	Bodinteich (HMA)	US7/1684/7096,7	Filling station and dump.
4081/61/6533	Celle (HMa)	106W/38/4095-4102	Filling station and dump.
05 8g	Duneburg D.A.G.	13 Aug hu	With Krummel forms largest explosives complex in Germany. Nanufactures powder, explosives, as well as filling shells.
(CS 12 ¹ )	Foucht (nr Nuremberg) (HMa)		Filling station and dump. Especially important for small arms ammunition.
4081/155/6006	Gelting 7	US7/2256/8092,3	Large filling station, explosive factory and dump.
4081/h7/1454	Hassel 7	US7/22h0/3083.h July 4h	Large explosives factory along with filling station and dump.
4081/48/3953	Rudemuhlen ?	US7/2365/3035-45. 4043-32	Filling factory and dump.
4081/76/6767	Juterbog (HMa)	1064/392/3383. 4 4372-4	Filling station and dump.
G <b>S</b> 89	Krummel D.A.G.		Together with Duneburg forms largest explosives complex in Germany. Manufactures powder, explosives, as well as filling

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## Target No. or Grid Reference

4081/60/0231

4031/18/1182

4081/76/76/2341

1081/60/6533

4081/131/0559

5005/4856 47°53' ¥ 16°18' E

4081/77/5401 4081/88/6815

GS 127 47055 # 11025 #

4081/82B/6928

Location & Plait Leibensu nr. Neuburg

(EMa) Leckstedter Lager (通知)

Granienbaum -(EMa)

Rehden (HNa)

Siegelsbach

(HMs)

Sollensu (nr. Wiener Neustadt) (HMs)

Topchin (EMa)

Torgay (ENa)

Wolfratshausen

D.A.G. and HNa

Hulfen (HMa) <u>Cover</u> US7/1992/3135 - 42 23137-43

E/448, 3119-21

3/273/3051.2

057/1704/3050-2

106%/330/3274-6 13 May 44

60PR/475/4010-13

1060/828/3174-7

1060/441/7003

Cover needs

US7/1980/3099 4099

checking

5 - 42

Remarks Filling factory and dump.

Filling factory and dump. Filling factory and dump. Filling factory and dump. Filling factory and dump. Filling station and dump.

very large, but scattered. Filling factory and dump.

Filling factory and dump.

Filling station, dump, and also explosives factory.

Filling factory and dump.

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#### TAN DELA IN

#### Frenent Position

1. The energy has, over the past several months, encountered difficulties in putting into effect his plan for a large jet striking and fighting force. These have included a variety of teething problems normally associated with the introduction of new types, as soll as a shortage of fuel and a shortage of aircraft, the latter two factors having been largely imposed by our boxbing operations. In addition, allied fighters have harassed jet operational and training airfields, and imposed a relatively high wastage on jet aircraft in combat.

2. In terms of the strength and fighting value of operational units the jet position is still weak. There is no doubt, however, that the energy is percisting in his intent to enlarge jet aircraft production and to expand the fighting force of jet aircraft, which he continues to regard as a last device for wresting air supremacy from the allies over Converse and over the estern battlefield. In the course of the next several months the rate of production of jet types must be expected to increase, unless bombing counter-measures are undertaken, or Central and Southern Germany are occupied.

3. Specifically, the Me.262 may have reached a production rate of 175 in February, of which 50 at least were denied to the G.A.F. by attacks on assembly fields. The rate, which has risen steadily since October 19/4, may be expected to increase. The Me.262 remains the principal immediate threat to our Air Forces.

4. The ar.234, of which 50 were probably produced in Pebruary, is being steadily employed for recommissance and close support boshing operations. Production is expected to rise at a modest rate.

5. The Me.163, of which perhaps 25 were produced in Pobruary, now appears of secondary importance, and is limited by fuel shortage and a variety of operational problems.

6. The single jet interceptor, 162, is in early production by Heinkel at "cheechat, and perhaps at other points. From tion and operational plans for this type are not known. It is known to enjoy very high priority in German production plans.

7. The following table presents estimates of jet sircraft pro-

	He.262	Ar. 234	11e.163	162	Total
September 1964		10	10	***	90
October "	105	25	10	**	140
liovember "	110	25	10		145
Gecember "	150	25	10	54 FE	185
January 1945	150	35	15	5	205
February "	(1757125	50	25	5 (2)	#205


# less 50 for attacks in February.

# # Aperimental series probably begun in December 1944.

### Status of the Jet Target Systems

1. In the Jockey Paper of 23.1.45. four types of attack mere distinguished: jet engine castings, Ju.004 component manufacture and assembly, jet air frame manufacture and assembly, fitting out and opera-

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tional bases. Following sets forth the present status of these systems:-

### a. Jet Engine Castings

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 Of the six casting plants listed for attack three have been attacked with some success:

Eastenbach, Solingen,	16.2.45.	(Ninth Air Force)
V.D.M. Heddernheim,	9.3.45.	(Eighth Kir Force)
Honsel, Meschede,	28.2.45.	(Eighth Mir Force)

Solingen has been suspended from attack; Heddernheim and Meschede have been lowered in priority, awaiting further photography.

- (2) Since these plants were placed on priority the case for their attack, as a means of long run insurance, has been strengthened:
  - by evidence that jet engines other than the Ju.004 may now be in the early stages of production;
  - (b) By the apparent operational difficulties of attack on Niedersachsserfen, asseabling the Ju. 004;
  - (c) by the likelihood that further Ju.004 production facilities will be underground by mid-1945.

It is therefore recommanded that the attacks on the casting firms be pursued promptly and thoroughly.

- b. Ju. 004 Component Manufacture and Assembly
  - As a result of the devastation of the town of Dessau by the R.A.F. (7/8.3.45), the testing plant at the Junkers factory has been suspended from precision attack. There have been no other direct attacks on Ju.004 production.
  - (2) Over the past several months the Ju.OOA has continued to be the only jet engine in substantial operational use. It is employed in the Me.262 the Ar.234 and almost certainly in the new single jet interceptor, the 162.
- c. Jet Air Frame Manufacture and Assembly
  - No jet component factories have been recently attacked. The following assembly plants more attacked:
    - (a) Schembisch-Hall, 25.2.45.
       (b) Obertraübling, 16.2.45.
    - The attack on Gertraubling was particularly succassful, probably destroying more than 20 Me.262's and damaging at least an equal number. These attacks undoubtedly weakened the abole Me.262 position for the month of February; but their effects can only be accounted transitory, especially in view of the dispersed technique for assembly now employed by the energy.

d. Fitting Out and Operational Rases

(1) The following airfields associated with the Me.262 have been recently attacked.

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(a)	ensendorf	31.12.14.	
(b) (c)	Neuburg Giebelstadt	16. 2.45. 25. 2.45.	
(3)	Cheb/Oberschon	DA. 2.45. (probably	repair)

Of these targets only enzendorf has been suspended. These attacks caused the destruction of a number of He.262's but did not impede the production programme.

#### Svaluation of Jet Target Systems

#### 1. General

a. The German jet program cannot be expected to mature until mid-1945. At present jet aircraft have increased the capabilities of the G.A.F. significantly with respect to reconnaissance, and have provided a small force of fighter bombers and fighters, of good uality, but thus far of indifferent operational effectiveness. Jet aircraft then, do not at present seriously limit the capabilities of our Air Forces. It is evident that the energy will pursist to the end, however, in his efforts to lift the weight of strategic bombing stack and to increase the effectiveness of his own close support.

b. If permitted to build a substantial force of jet aircraft he may, over the coming months, increasingly succeed in this aim.

c. Attack on jet aircraft, can only be regarded as a form of insurance, and constitutes an allocation to defensive effort.

d. Within the whole framework of American bombing policy, such attacks justify a limited priority status calculated not to interfere with the pursuit of the main offensive sime.

#### 2. Choice of Jet Targets

a. As set forth in the attached Jockey Committee Priority Hist (13.3.45.), the completion of the attack on jet engine castings and the attack on the Ju.004 are believed to be the most economical means of containing the German jet force. At the present time jet aircraft assembly factories, parts manufacturers and jet airfields are recommended only as filler targets particularly for the Fifteenth Air Force.

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JOCKEY COMMITTEE

RECONSTRACT TARGET FRICEITIES AT 13.3.15.

Ir.or	rity From:	lo Firm	Flace	10.1	Target
		and the second	/ 1906	Kake	Number
A. 1	JUMO JET SM	GINE FACTORIES			
1.	ÿ.K.	V. D.M.	Hildesheim	Jot engine castings	02.2913
2.	U.R.a	Megu	Leipzig		62.2703 B
3.	U.K.	Hautenbach	ernigerode		01.2634
h.	U.K.	Junkers	Riedersachswerfen	Ju.004	GN.5062
5.	U.K.	Junkers	Duldenstein		01.1695
6.	U.K. & Ded.		Frague/Cakovice		GY.4783 G
7.	0.1. 6 Wed.	Junkers	Dvur Kralove (Koniginhof)		67.4879
8.	0.8.	Junkers	Leiszig/Markkleeber	" 3	07.4696
	0.K.	Junkers	Kassel/Bettenhausen		GY.1766 D
10.	U.K.	¥.D.E.	Heddernheim	Jet engine castings	02,2805
11.	0.s.	Junkars	Nasserode	Ju. 001,	GY.4698
12.	0.8. 8 Med.		Venusberg		07.1697
1.	U.K. & Hed.	alter	Prague/Jinonice		01.4066
14.	U.R.	Mitteldeutsche	Leipzig/Taucha		07.4673
15.	0.8.	Hongel	keschede	Jet engine castings	61.2788
	T AIRPRARE	FACTORIST AND	MUJOR THAINING AN	REFITING	BLSSS
16.	0.K. & Med.	-	Neuburg, Nr. Ingolatadt	Ne.262	60.4114
17.	U.K. & Ned.	Nesserschmitt	Leipheim		GU.4198
18.	U.R. + Mod.	Keinkel	Cheb/Oberschoen	Me.262 re- puirs	GU.4369
19.	U.K. & Med.	-	Eitzingen .	lle.262	00.4221
20.	U.N. & Med.		Giebelstadt	We.262	00.1097
21.	U.R. & Med.	-	Lechfeld	Ne.262	00.4063



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rior	Accessibl ity From	e Firm	Flace	Hako	Target Number
22.	U.K. & Med.	. Messerschaitt	Baumenheim	Le.262	07.4890
23.	U.E. & Med.	. B.M.N.	Kampten	B.N	07.L871 8
24.	U.E. & Mod.	-	Schwabzunchen	Re.262	0Y.1900
25.	Med.	Messerschmitt	Kamaten	He.262	01.1876
26.	U.X.	-	Alt Lonnewitz	17.234	00.4252
27.	U.K.	Arado	ittenburg	Ar.234	07.1.801
28.	U.Y.	-	Brandis	Ne.163	CU.3979
29.	U.K. & sled.	-	Frieburg/Maslach	No.163	GI.1897
3.	0.7. 8 Med.	Hoinkel	Suffenhausen	Jet engines	GL.2656
31.	U.R. & Med.	Nesserschmitt	Leonberg	He.262	GY.4696
32.	U.K. & Eed.	Mosserschmitt	Eschenlohe		GX.4894


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SURVARINES

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1. Most recent estimates of the total number of U-boats expected to be in a state of operational readiness on the dates indicated are as follows:

1		1945		185	(including	19	type	XII	and	14	Type	XXIII)
1	February	1945	-	205	(including	32	type	TEL	and	14	type	V.IIIQ
1		1945	-	223	(including	52	type	17.I	and	21	type	(III)
1	April	1945	-	275	(including	74	type	IXI	and	25	type	MIII)

2. The time required in the various stages of the pre-facricated U-boat construction is estimated to be:

	LYDG ANA	24	AND ANALA		
(1) Manufacture of parts (2) Section construction		7 weeks	approximately		
(3) Final assembly	8 - 11 weeks	6-10 "			
(A) Filting out and trial	L 4 - 9 "	3-7 "			

3. The time taken to work up pre-fabricated U-boats is about two months on the average. This estimated period is chorter than the period required by old type boats as the new ones are being manned by transfer of ships' companies from boats which have already been operational.

. There are believed to be at present some 20 factories engaged in the production of submarine parts while approximately 14 shipyards and 10 inland works produce the various U-boat sections. Final assembly and fitting out is known to take place in 6 shipyards and possibly 2 or 3 heavy concrete shelters.

5. Attacks during the past month by the H.A.F. and Eighth Air Force against shipbuilding and U-boat yards have all been carried out under blind bombing conditions. Damage in any instance has not been sufficient to warrant suspension of the target from the U-boat priority list and there is no evidence as to what have been the effects upon the energy U-boat program.

6. Assuming that attacks take place upon the final stage of the comstruction work - as has heretofore been recommended - it is believed that a time interval of about two months would elapse before the effects would show on operational U-boat strength. The only method of shortening this interval would be to attack such places as the actual operating bases. As the more important of these targets are in Normay and also believed extremely invaluerable to attacks, a program of this type would present many difficulties.

7. It is agreed by intelligence that production capacity for parts and sections of the new U-boats is far in excess of demands. In addition, this capacity is well dispersed and photographs indicate accumulated stock of finished parts and sections at many of the assembly points.


#### lonclusions and Recommendations

8. Attack of final assumbly yards and operational bases offers some possibility of a reduction in the enemy's capabilities for waging submarine warfare. Attacks on operational bases will, to the extent that they meet with success, reduce the effectiveness of the enemy's operating fleet. Attacks on submarine asseably yards will serve as insurance against an increased build-up of the energ 0-boat fleet should the war last into the summer.



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#### ISTARAL INCLUERING AND ADAMANT FLANTS

#### Summary of Fresent Status

1. Five years of war, culminating in the loss of French, folleh and Cilesian plant producing important finished military goods and components, finde the enemy unable to meet present equipment problems with the resiliance which characterized his previous reactions. Sepairs to injured plant, spare parts for worn or damaged guns or trucks or tanks, components for new military equipment are problems of great magnitude against which the use of a ditional workers or stand-by plant no longer prove available in mount or quality sufficient to match the increasing tempo of Allied effort. Most important is the fact that while what is in short supply may be replaced given sufficient time, the present situation is now such as to justify the classification of many battle losses as irreplaceable.

#### Latest Intelligence

2. a continuing stream of PS and other intelligence reports bespeaks shortages of pistons, of bearings, of genrs, of gun parts, of small arms, of electrical equipment, of the whole vast miscellany of production and maintenance items, the absence of which renders a modern army impotent. Aggravated by difficulties in maintaining production rates in damaged plants and using medicers materials, production of components for new tarks, new gans, new military e-uipment of all types proceeds at rates below reuirements to meet planned output of finished military goods. Mefineries and synthetic oil plants are repaired at rates and at a degree of efficiency considerably below the previous norm. Battle damage or worm parts on military e-uipment, hastened by original quality defects, find front repair centres unable to cope systematically with even simple repair taaks promptly because of parts shortages.

### elationship of Attack and Front Line Impact

3. So varied are the types of plant have under consideration that no precise statement of the period between stiack upon them and conservent front line effect can be made. By careful selection of plants whose product is known to be in short supply and whose contribution to the total supply of such product is known to be significant, however, generally predictable impacts resulting in even greater inflatibility of enemy operations within periods of three months or less can be stained.

#### Conclusions and Recommendations

4. It is evident that attack as fillers of a side range of selected engineering and armanent plants in every part of Germany sell provide a more certain and more enduring weakening of the entire energy military e-sigment and supply structure than any application of effort which relies upon fortuitous occurrences for its effectiveness. Such selected attacks dony Germany the freedom of choice to shift the effects of damage to the least important sections of the war economy which hit-or-miss area or transport damage in Central Germany too frequently leaves open.

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Target Number of Coordinates	Location and Plant	Date last Attack	Date Dist Cover
50050 N	Chemnitz		
20571B	C emnits Manicipal		
LC071-2	Power Plant		
10 1191	GOLFA-Zschornewitz		
	(nr Bitterfeld)		
	LAAG (Kraftwerk		
	Golpaschornswitz)		
1142	Gross Kayna (nr Herseburg)		
	5A3Q		
10 1144	Harbke (nr Magdeburg)		
an transis	Braunschweigische Kohle	-00	
	Begwerke)		
	Hirschfelde (nr Zittau)		
30 1222	ASa (AG Sachsische serke)		
	You fag securitoria Markey		
510171N	Kulkwitz		
1201418	Landkraftwerke Leipzig		
Locally Li			
an and the	Lauta (nr Dresden)		
GF 23578	Laura (m product)		
	12-12-12-12		
510811	Meggan (sestphalia)		
804 15	Sachtlebben A.G.		
	· (Sama)		
51054 N	Rodleben (Saxony)		
12012'E	Deutsche Hydrierwerke		

### Rane rks

14 Mm capacity, possibly increased. Brown coal plant largely supplying wower needs of Chemnitz.

Second largest power plant in Germany. Brown coal thermal plant with installed capacity ov r 4.34 Ma. Important supplier to Berlin, Bitterfeld and to the grid.

Installed concity 56 MM employing local brown coal and serving neighboring requirements.

Thermal power station and transformer station of IMB. Installed capacity 136 Ma

249 Mm installed capacity employing local brown coll.

6 miles 5, of leipzig. 105 M. brown coel plant supplying local consumers and AS. grid.

Brown coal last with 222 Ma installed capacity fooding adjoining aluminum plant and the grid.

Nine and concentrator presently virtually only German source pyrites for sulphuric acid.

Important producer higher alconols for industrial proposes, solvents, synthetic fatty cids no rejorted manufacturing synthetic metalonol. Now not believed synthetic oil producer.

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Terget Number	Location and Name of Plant Last Attack	Last Cov	er Description and Activity
GB 2881	Berlin/Hlein Machnow Robert Bosch		MT, AFV, A/C pumps, ignition equiment, <u>Check</u> for <u>demage</u> .
GH 5509	Berlin/Lichtanberg Knorr-Eremse		Brakes for MT, AFV, RR, A/C: small arms, ammunition, Reported 7000 employees.
GY 4683 B	Berlin/Marienfelde Fritz Werner A.G.		APV components associated with Daimler Benz.
GZ 2852 -	Berlin/Oberschöneweide, Deutsche Messingwerke.		Motorcycles, MT components.
GB 3201	Berlin/Oberschoneweide, ARG		Important electrical equipment producer. Somewhat dispersed but believed active.
GB 3276	Berlin Siemens		Light and heavy electrical engineering equipment; telephone and telegraph, radio and radar. Reported employment 4000.
GY 4684D	Berlin/Reinickendorf Bergmann	6.10.44	Tank components, turrets, guns. Appears very active on last cover; tank sub-assembles visible.
GY 4684 GF 2258A	Berlin/Reinickendorf, (Maschinenfabrik Berlin/Tegel, Prometheus.) 5.12.44. Rheinmetal Borsig	7.12.44	Leading gear cutter. AA guns, bombs, ammo, small arms, weepons. Very large Reported employing 15/20,000. D.1363R - says probably active.
G¥ 2258 G `	Berlin/Tegel, Alkett.	6.12.44	Tank components, shells, guns, V-weapon components. Probably active.

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Target Augber	Location and Rame of Flant	Last Attack	Last Cover	Description 4 Activity
	Berlin/aittenau Borgiswelde Berlin/Sichbordam Deutsche affen u. Bunitions	2		Very important small erns, mobile gun and assumition center. Over 5000 employed.
H 527 A	Berlin/Wildeu Berliner Masch mendeu			Locomotive plants, torpedo components.
GS 245	Bitterfeld-NULFEN I.G. Farben	16.1.5	18,1,45	Very important chemicals, explosives, film, etc., plant; also light matals and fabrica- tion; reported synthetic rubber and oil. SA 3154: - showed plant operating shen attacked.
62 2349	Sochum Sisen u. Huttenwerk		19.11.44	Sted. armor plate, tank hulls, steel casting and forgings, guns, small arms, alloy steel. #3348 (14.12.44) shows some damage to shops.
∰ 2 <b>26</b> 6	Bochum Bochumor Verein	4.11.44	19.11.44	Small arm, flak guns, steel components. Stee armor plate, tank hulls, steel castings and forgings, shall and bombs, relivery points and crossings.
Gi 3761	Brandenburg Gpel	6.8.44	7.10.44	Medium trucks and components. D1713 (11.10.44) indicates some repair to damaged buildings, following attacks in which approximatelyhalf building area damaged. <u>Check covar</u>
GY 4978	Bromen Carl Horgward	26.9.44	26.9.44	MT, gearg, tenk & AFV components, beatle tanks. Meported amploying 5000.Poor quality post-raid cover. Check cover.

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arget Number	Location and Name of Plant
N 3787	Brnc (Czechoslovakia) Ceskoslovenska Zbrajovka
N 3807	Brunswi <b>c</b> k Bussing MAG
1 4775	Brunswick/ likelsitor
2 2941 B	Chemritz/Siegmar Auto Union
2712	Cernys (Czechoslovakia) Săř
30 451 N 30 501 E	Donauworth (N. of Augsburg) Easchinenfabrik Donauworth
.268	Dortmund Hörder Huttenwerein (Versialits Stahl)
n 5001)	Dubnica (Czechoslovakia) Herman Gosring Gan Factory

### A MATHER LAL

Last Cover

29. 10. 44

Last Attack

22. 10. 44.

### Description and Activity

and and amunition, vehicle components.

MT, AFV, repairs. Fresh damage in last attack. Previous damage repaired. Check cover.

Oil equipment producer. Oil tanks, boilers, etc.

Important MT, engine, armored cars, half track producer.

Producer bearings, especially for tanks, tractors, etc.

Producer of guns, mortars, APV components. Gover required.

Tank components, steel. Reported employing over 5000.

Guns, components. Cover required.

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Target Rusber	Location and Same of Plant	CONFIDENTIAL LASE ALLOCK	Last Cover	Description and Activity
0L 26 <b>3</b> 8	Roerswalds Ardeltwerke			Gun barrols, gears, cranes, bridges flak equipment; miscellaneous s/c, AFV and general castings. Very important artillery steel plant.
6Z 2714	Erkner (Berlin) ∀.K.F.		16.1.45.	Ball bearings, 1.5. 1589 (17.1.45). Considerable new damage, as well as reconstruction to all main buildings.
67 2224	Zasen Krupp		23.12.44.	Leading iron, steel, fabricating plant. Isportant engineering facilities. 2.3454 (9.2.45). additional damage.
68 2822	Fallersieben	5.8.hh.	6.5.44.	X 2865 - Considerably damaged - W?, smphibious vehicles, V-1, components for s/c, etc. <u>Cover required</u> .
GL 2643	Frankfurt/Hain Adler		22.11.44.	Genre, crankchafts, angines, AFVs, rep. Considerably damaged. Although production curtailed, considerable floor-space undoubtedly in use.
oy 4693	Graz Steyr			Bearings, gears, possible crankshafts and other components.
05 151	Hasburg/Harburg "Phoenly"		8.2.45.	Tires, Fubber reclaim, buns.K. 3733 (12.2.45). Hoderste damage.
0L 2639	Hamburg/Reinbeck Krupp Korbelwellwork			Kay cronoshaft plant.
02 2845 C	Hannover Vereinigte Leicht Metellwerke			Important light metal fabricators. a/c angine components. Light allow sheets, bars, pipes.

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#### Threat Anaber Location and lase of Flant Last At aci Last Cover (GZ 2740 covers) Hannover/Lesten 26.12.144. H.H.H. 65 5601 Hennover/Lisser Continental GZ 2845 Esnnover/Linden 5/6.1.45. 16.1.45. Mannover/Marenwalderstr. 68 152 Continental GZ 740 Mannover/Wulfel 27.12. ha. 08 2734 Hattingen 29.5.44. Ruhrstahl Heinrichshutts . of 2250. A.B. Hallenderf 14.1.45. 17.2.45. Rermann Goering. 480 40 3. Heidenheim 10° 10' 1 29' 1 51° 45' 1 17° Heinrichs, Volth Gustloff's Heinrich Walfenfebr.

### Description and Activity

Tank subassembly producer. D 1518 R (18.2.45.) Plant fully active.

Largest rubber reclaim plant, manufactorer of rubber goods.

AFV's, trectors, NT, engines, guns anno. Reported exploying over 10,000. X 3671 (23.1.95); Two machine shore and assembly shop damaged. Reconstruction to other shope providely damaged. Plant active.

Tires, tubes, miscellaneous rubber goods. Cover recuired.

Geers, tenk components.

Taik subassenblies, steel, shell cases, armor plate, U-boet components.

Steel, tank components, benzol, shells A configment. Also: key thermal power station, X 3764 (18.2.45); Sovers damage but considerable repair and reconstruction in progress. Flant active.

Machinery components, combustion, important MG, small area producer. Large.

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		CONFIDE	NTIAL		
Target Mumber	Location and Hame of Flant	00.0	Last Attack	Last Cover	Description and Activity
50° 12° 47" H 15° 48° 25" E	Bradec Erelove (Czechoslovakia) Skoda Worke			(11.12.44) ( 2.12.44)	Possible SF gum, tank, MT components. Latest cover doesn't permit product identification but shows considerably activity. MT depot nearby.
o::: 3796	Kapfenburg (Austria) Gebrüder Bochler		11.12. ¹⁴ .	22.12.44	Armor plate steel, tank hulls, guns (incl. AA and AT). Very large, employ- ment reported at 10,000 (22.12.44 - UB 285: (Kepfenburg). Slight damage to store building and possibly to foundry and machine shops on E side. Factory i active.
011 637 D	Kassel Nenschel II				Locomotives and components; bollers.
02 2717	Elosteric V.X.V.				Ball bearings, associated with Cernys.
(A.F.) I.A.6. 500 9' N 14° 6' N	Miadno (Crechoelovakia) Poldi Hutte				Important special steel, gun, component
03 5056	Arottendorf (Austria) Bebr. Boshler			28.12.44	Important steel AFV components. Flant active, extensions in progress.
GZ 2703	Leipzig/Leutsch DKF		•		Ball bearings for AFVs, and a/c
	Leipzig Huge Schneider		-		Metal fabrication, small ar s, amounit and motor components, machine tools, <u>Check cover,</u>
ar 2:06	Lins (Austria) Nermann Goering		16.12. ⁴⁴ .	30.1.45.	Tank hulls and other substates blies, steel and iron, benzol, guns. Very lar Reported employment from 3-10,000.Repa underway. Plant believed active.
08 3279	lugsigsburg .				Spark plus, ignition equipment, motor

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Ternet Humber	Location and Hame of Plant	Last Attack	Last Cover	
GS 36	Ludwigshafen-Oppen I.G. Farben	6.1.45.	1.45	Synthetic oil, chemicals, gas, rubber. Considerable damage.
GH 608 D.S.	Hegdeburg Wolf (Otto Gruson)	- 5 -		Associated in Krupp production: makes same types items except tanks.
<b>64. 17</b> 35	Nagdeburg Folte			Shell cases, ammo, mechinery.
as 3213	Nannhein/Kafertal Brown Boveri	16.8.44 、	g.2. ¹⁴⁵ .	Noters, turbines, components, oil equipment.K(5.1601 (12.2.45) Between 16.5.44 and 8.2.45 five of 33 destroyed or severely damaged bldgs, reconstructed. Other repairs visible. Some camouflage. <u>Check cover.</u>
	Mannheim J. Vogele		18.11. ¹¹⁴	K.S. 1559 (11.2.44) Reconstruction activity and extensive repairs. <u>Shack cover.</u>
on 5063	Mlada Boleslav (Czechoslovakia) Skoda			MT. half truck and components producer.
or 4653	(Nunich/Oberwiesenfald ( BHW (Nunich/Allach	17/15.12.14.	18.1% hh	Aero engines, possible tank engines and components.
GR 530 ~	( BHW Munich/Allach	•		Half tracks, armored cars, locomotives, rumored in tanks. <u>Check for demons</u> .
	Arauss Maffei			
02 2947	Munich Fr. Deckel	18.3.44	11.4.44	Anso, fuzes, fuel injection pumps, Reported employment 2000-4000. K.2006 - Plant danaged. Reconstruction and classrance under way.

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### CONFIDENTIAL Location and Name of Plant Last Attack Target Sumber Last Cover 1.3.45 GL 2051 A Neckarsula Schmidt Mackarsulm GL 2651 B Murnberg 2/3.1.45 7.2.45 Siemens-Schuckert Surnberg Norris Zundlich QZ 2807 Murnberg Surnderg Triumphwerks Nurnberg Nurnberger Schraubenfabr. Hurnberg 2findop (Dieselstraese) Murnberg Chillingworth A.G. EOU AP 11.0.7 Oberunel Humboldt-Deutz

Offenbach Collet & Engelhard

Oberndorf Nauserwerks.

03 3800

10,000 Workers.

Description and Activity

One of leading piston and light metal castings plants. Believed seriously damaged. <u>Check cover.</u> Reported 2500 employees.

Motorcycles.MT and AFV components. Excanded production. Reported 1500 to 6000 employees.<u>Check cover.</u>

Slectric motors, AA equipment, transformers, other electrical equipment. 5,000-10,000 employees. <u>Check cover.</u> K 3641 (7.2.45) Extensively demaged.

Engine components.

Alum castings and pressings.

Motorcycles, small components. Reported 2,000 employees.

Nuts, bolts, anduniti n, components, radio components.Reported employment 2,000.

Motorcycle components, B-4 tanks, small engines, 4,000 workers reported.

MT and A/C components, emmunition cases, reported 500 - 1000 workers.

Engine components.

Machine tools, a/c components. 1500

workers reported.

Small arms and amsunition, flak items, 10,000 workers. VERT IMPORTANT.

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#### CONFIDENTIAL Description and Activity Location and Mama of Plant Last Attack Last Cover Target Musber Priority engineering items for a/c, Offenburg (Raden) oil equipment, and APV's. Check cover. Gustav Huller Stahlbau Werks Steel, Shells, gun components, railway 19.2.45. 21.2.45. Osnabruck GH 590 B equipment and other engineering items. Klockner-Humboldt Deutz Slight damage. Ammunition ceres, fuzes, wire cables, 52°15' N Osnabruck small arms components. Check for damage. Osnabrucker Kupferdrahtfabr. 08005" E Steel, tank subasseablies, personnel 20.12.44 1.12.44 Pilsen (Ozechoslovskia) OX 4657 carriers, AA and other guns, carriages, Skoda a/c components, ammo. Very large. D.1367 (28.1.45) - Fully active, damage remained. Small erss, cartridges, etc. (GN 3843) NT Povazskee Bystrica Electrical equipment, searchlights, 16 Oct. 44 GT 4658 Prague/Vysocany components for oter CKD plents, guns for CKD tanks. D 1366 R - Plant appears active. Aircraft and aero angine repairs, Pregue/Karlin OT 4658 component production Tractors and semi CKD tracks produced. D 1366 R - plant appears active. Possibly tanks. Tank components. D 1366 50°13' 37" 3 19°05' 19" 3 Prague/Slany poor quality makes interpretation CKD impossible. AFV's, HT components, etc. GE 3851 Prague/ Rinchoffer Tetra Alusium cestings pressings. Reckwitz (nr. Leipzig) 66 2780 Leipziger Leichtmetall Works

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Terget Number	Location and Mame of Plant	CONFIDENTIA	L Last Cover	
GF 2253	Remacheid	and the second second second	MERC GOVER	Description and Activity
	Doutsche Edelstabl			Center of special steel work; prod
L 2612	Buhla nr Eisenach			creakshafts, other components. Theo
	Gebr. Thiel			Juzes for shells.
	Seuftenburg/Lzuchhaumer Hitteldeutsche Stahlwerk	8		
68 153	Schkopau			
	Bunawerks.		10.5.44	Leading synthetic rubber producer,
GL 2601 A.B.C.	Schrabburg			chemicals.
	Gebr. Junghans			Fuzes and other clockwork. Reported
GL 2002 A.H.	Schwennigen			10,000 workers.
	Gebr. Junghaus (possibly Kienzleuhrenfebrik)			Puzes, AA bombs.
GZ 2707	Schweinfurt	9.10.44	29.10.44	
	Fichtel & Sachs		29.10.44	Undercarrisge, clutch, cyclas, etc - Damaged but still believed operating K-3335 - further moderate damage but
(02 2799)	Sommerda			evidence of reconstruction and opera
	Aneimmetall Borsig			Detonators, caps, cartridges, fuzes.
01 3634 L	Steyr (Austria)			
	Steyr Salzlager		28.12.44	AFV's, ball bearings, tank repair, s
on 3534 h	Steyr Daimler-Puch			arms, MT, vehicle and a/c components guns: two plants, very large. 5-10,000
				employees. D 1419 (5.2.45):Moderate
an 400	St. Polten - J.J. Voith			underway.
18 3252			18.12.44	Guns, artillery pieces.
J202	Stuttgart Bosch	19/20 Oct. 44	1.11.44	
	Josen			Producing magnetos, spark plugs, etc: extensive dispersal reported. 2 3342
				(16.11.44) - Moderate damage; Some of

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#### Target Mumber CONFIDENTIAL Location and Name of Plant Last Attack 62 2704 Last Cover Stattgartflad Canstatt Description and Activity 9.12.44 V.K.F. 24.12.44 Important bearing producer repaired after sttack. X 3464 - No additional damage in GL 2569 A Stuttgart/sad Ganstett latest raid. (Miestron Metell Mahle) 20/21 Feb 14 9 Apr 44. Leading magnesium and aluminium fabricator specializing in pressure die casting, pistons, sic. E 1922 (17 Harch 44) -GY 4654 Stuttgart/Unterturkheim moderate damage. Plant considered active. 9.9.44 Deimler Benz. 14.1.45 Trucks, chessis, cars, a/c engine resair, components. XS 1590 - major damage not Stutterat repaired; little activity. Suddautsche Kolben Fabrik Engine components. Check cover. GE 3789 Suhl Heinrich Kreighoff Small arms producer reported employing 10 GJ 3789 Sunt J.P. Sauer Leading shall arms and small arms anno producer in this small town which is a 50°37' 1 Subl small arms center Guetloffwerke Ascendly and production of all components at works; also produces small erms emmo. Suhl BSW (of Wilheim Gustloff Stiftung) Produces MGs and rifles. Suhl C. G. Haenel. Employees reported over 3,000. Pistole, Juh1 J.P. Sauer & Sohn Producing rifles and pistols. 750 N/pistols GE 531 A Vierns/Florisdorf (Austria) reported produced per week. 2.12.44 Hiener Lokomotivfabriks. 11.12.44 Locomotives. Disel engines, tenk components and repairs. 9000 workers reported. 0443 (11.12.44) One assembly shop and unidentifi building demogod. Plant active.


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		OCNEDENTIAL	
Tanjet Humber	location and date of that	Last Willack PLATE Cover	Description descrivity
GH 531	Vienna/Florisdorf Austro fist		ET. AFV, wenicle components. Asported 4000 markars.
GY 4664	Vienna Braff und Stift		artillery tractors.
GY 22 <u>3</u> 1	Vitkovice Vitkowitz Iron & Steel Sork	is a fir a links	Very 1 rge special stool plant; Shell, bomos, armor plate plant. Al 265-27.5.64 - risht fully active (bomb wine trouble)
(uh 3805) MI	Vectin Caskosiovenska Loroj vka		seall aras, cortriduce.
W. 2557	etzier Leitz		Key optical glass, instrument, range finier, cimilar items.
6Y 43080 8	lener Heutstad (Austria) Haxaerke (Henschel)	· 11.12.4	D-1412 (4.2.45): moconstruction in progress. Main assy plant possibly in operation. Apoint projectiles, turbimes, tank components, locomptives, tanders, 1500 workers reported.
60 1211 C	ien Sismoring (Austria) Souror Berke	30.1.45	Half tracks, trucks, tank sub assemblies, wegons departed employees number 8000. Flant active.
500.,012 18 ⁰ 4012	Zella-Mohlis J.G.Anschutz Germania Maffenwerk A.G.		Produces rifles, MGs, detois, 6-7000 reported employed.
	Carl alter		wifles and autom to pistols produced.
	.elta-Mehlis asffenfabrik Hermann soihrauch		Produces rifles and bloycle components.
" a	Sevenr u.Fanradfabrik fr.Langerhas		Froduces bicycles, precision tools and rifles.
GI 5070	Zittau-Phanoman Werk (Gustav Mille	- 13 -	Engines, chasšis, tracks.

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# Exessi

WISCELLANDOUS INSTALLATIONS

12 March 1945

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			-	
Terget Eusber (Co-ordination)	Accetion and Name of Plant	Last Attack	Last Cover	Description and Activity
	AALEN (Wasser Alfingin) Maschinenfabrik Alfingen- Xessler A.G.			Reported important crankshaft and components producer for a/c, NT. U-boats, etc. 3500 workers. Chack cover.
51° 30' % 12° %	Ammendorf Gottfried Lindner A.G.			NEW rates largest individual works special- ising in bus and commercial vehicles.Possible AFV activities. Check cover.
	Apolde - Rheinmetal Borsig			Believed important fuze manufacturer. Check cover.
01 2618 50° 50° N 10° 56° 2	Arnstadt Signens & Halske			Instrument producer making precision items. Built 1938, enlarged since. <u>Check cover.</u>
GZ 2735	Augsburg Zahnradfabrik Augsburg			Produce gears, gear boxes, axles, other components.
52° 10' % 8° 50' 2	Sed Ceynheusen Eisenwork Weser Hütte			Recent cover shows great AFV-MT concentrations Believed active in repair and components production.
GB 3276	Berlin/Lichterfeld Osram			Radio and radar assembly and components. Electrical equipment. <u>Check for damage.</u>
on 5049	Berlin/Furstenwalde Julius Fintsch			PR equipment, bombs, V-weepon components. Reported employment 3000.
	Berlin/Rennigsdorf Rheinmetal Borsig.			MT components, AFV - other than tanks. Shown very active on recent cover.
GT 48430	Berlin/Johanistahl Ambi-Budd		3.2.45.	Trucks, pressed steel components. Reported associated with Volkswagon/Fallersleben. D.14768 (13.2.45) shows great activity, numerous MT on ground.

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T <u>Coordinates</u> 60 1229A 60 1273	Eccation and Plant Trattendorf (nr. Sprengberg) EWAG Vockerode (nr. Dessau) EWAC (Elbekraftwerke)	CONFIDENTIAL <u>Date Last</u> <u>Date Last</u> <u>Attack</u> <u>Date Last</u> <u>Cover</u> Brown coal thermal plant with 196 NW installed capacity. Key supplier for Breelau, Berlin- Spandau, etc. Began operation 1939 with estimated installed thermal capacity 175 NW.	

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#### T (Co-ordination) Location and Dame of Flant Description and Activity AALAN (Masser Alfingin) Reported important crankshaft and components Naschinenfabrik Alfingenproducer for a/c. HT. U-boats, etc. 3500 Kessler A.G. workers. Chack cover. 51° 30' 1 12° 1 Assenderf MEs rates largest individual works special-Cottfried Lindner A.C. izing in bus and compercial vehicles. Possible AFV activities. Check cover. Apolde - Meinmetel Borsig Selieved important furs manufactor er. Check cover. GL 2618 50° 50' N 10° 56' 8 Arnstadt Siemens & Halske Instrument producer making precision items. Built 1938, enlar od since. Check cover. 62 2735 Augsburg Zahnredfabrik Augsburg Produce ears, gear boxes, axles, other components. 52° 10' 3 Bad Gernhausen Recent cover shows great AFV-MT concentrations 80 50' E Risenwork Weser Hatte Believed active in repair and components production. -68 3276 Berlin/Lichterfeld Hadic and radar assembly and components. Osran Electrical e ui ment. Check for damage. 68 5049 Herlin/Furstenwalde PR equipment, bombs, V-verpon components. Reported employment 3000. Julius Pintsch Lerlin/Hennigsdorf HT components, AFV - other than tanks. Shown Rheinsetal Borsig. very active on recent cover. GY 48430 Berlin/Johanistahl 3. 2.45. Trucks, pressed steel components. Reported Asbi-Budd associated with Volkswagon/Fallersleben. D.1475R (13.2.45) shows great activity, numerous


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MT on ground.



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Working Commistee (Oil Production and P.C.L.Depots)

WHINLY ITTLETIN NO. 1945 - 11

#### March 13, 1945.

### I. ATTACKS A D RECON ALSSANCE.

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Attacks during the post week have mainly been directed epsings bended plants in the West as shown in <u>Appendix I</u>. All of the attacks have been carried out by P.F.F. methods and in most epsen post-raid cover has not ret been received. Owing to had vestion no oil targets have been attacked by M.A.A.F. during the mast weel.

#### IL. OVINALL DEFECTS OF PRODUCTION.

Retinates of the performance of individual plants are set out in <u>Appendix II</u>. These to not include the two GELLENBERG dispersal plants now believed to be in operation the exact location of which is not set known. The probable cutput of these plants has, however, been taken into account in the estimate of total production in <u>Taile I</u>, which also takes account of the probability that these these bad some other German refinerics are now operating on Langerian crude. Revised estimates of production on this badis are summarized below:-

	All Products	Motor & Atlation Puels			
Pre-raid normal output	1,3/4,000 (1005)	532,000 (100))			
Rotimated production in:-					

	1944	September October	$\begin{array}{c} \hline 316,000 & (235) & 105,000 & (205) \\ 335,000 & (295) & 160,000 & (305) \end{array}$
)			$ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$
	2945		395,000 (29)) 105,000 (20)) 355,000 (273) 75,000 (20))
			250,000/360,000 65,000/85,000. (22%/27%) (12%/14%)

·Revised vetimetes of the octput of the principal refined

	Formar		Morch (maximum)		
	matric tons	i of pra-rhid	notria Cana	jî dî <u>pre-rati</u>	
Soline rhaine s/Diesel Oils el Cils be Oils	75,000 15,000 106,000 125,000 29,000	14 ) 15 4 40 5 46 5 20 5	82,000 18,000 94,000 154,000 30,000	15 185 54 485 205	
TOTAL	356,000		358,000		

/ILI. CURRENT

### T Н I P À E Ι U N L A S I F I E

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#### III.

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#### (a) Synthetic Planus.

The recent stiscks on MACDEBURG are now known to have ensured the long-term immobilization of this plant and all prospects of renewed production at SCHOLVIN have been frontrated by devastation in excess even of that achieved in other recent processful attacks.

1

In these circumstances RUHLAND is the only synthetic plant which is positively known to be in production, though LUTZCENDORF is probably by now achieving a limited output and BOHLAN is likely to resume aubstantial production in the last week of March or the first week in April.

more than 20,000/30,000 tons per month of all products of which 10,000/15,000 tons per month may consist of gasoline.

The probable resumption of production on a significant coale by LU ZMILDONF is converted by reliable evidence that one train of crude oil is being despected on alternate dont to the unloading point for this plant from the VIENM area. This may indicate that the Bergius section is now to operate on a crude feedstock with a view to increasing the gasoline yield, but this is not certain. The enemy Lay merely be taking advantage of excess refinery capacity in the plant; alternatively this crude may be the normal feedstock for the proparation of the bigh-grade lubbils which the LUTZKE DORF Dergius section is known to produce.

#### (b) German Refineries.

With the temporary immobilization of the LARBURG refineries and of the distillation units at MISBURG, the only unit of theor significance in the German refinery industry which is in production and the distillation units at MISBURG. All three of theor refineries, however, are expected to be in substantial production assis within one to two weeks and recent reliable intelligence indicates that they will be operating on Hungarian crude. This is being deepstched to the rate of three trains (1500 tone is being deepstched to the rate of three trains (1500 tone) one train (500 tone) per day. The use of this crude, as is well how my will give a gaseline yield on straight distillation of 30%, compared with the 10 to 12 obtainable on Derman and Lustrian crudes; in the case of MISBURG this yield would be further instruced by the crucking of the realdnes, assuming that the whole of the Hungarian crude coming forward to the above destinations is fed to these three plants their probable performance in the near future might be approximately as follows:-

	All Products	M.T. & Aviation Fuel
MARDURG (Rhenenis) MARDURG (Ebons) MISBURG	12,000 10,000 15.000	4,000

A proportion of the crude chipped to MARDURG is consigned to the EUROTALK refiner, but is certainly not treated there. This plant has been regularly covered and remains inactive. On the other hand much tank-wagon activity has always been seen in the vicinity of the refinery in connection with the considerable storage capacity in the FETROLEUMAREN. It now seems certain that this storage is used to hold crude at the disposal of the MAEDURG and HARDURG refineries generally, most of which have lost the greater part of their own crude storage tanks. /The same

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The same source reveals that crude (probably Hungarian) is also being despetched, at the rate of 15,000 taus per month to two consisted in Northern or Central Germany described as "OTHN 5/6" and "OFEN 15/22". It is considered that these designations denote stagersal programme and now evidently in operation. Their precise lacation is not yet known. The rate of crude shippeness indicates inst the month? these final capacity of each group of stills is 7,000 tens; if Mungarian crude is the feedstock, paceline output would consequently be 2,000 taus.

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The designation of these "OFIN" indicates that a total of 22 (or more) such stills may be in existence or contemplated. If these are similarly arranged in groups of four, a possible total of mix imitalistions is indicated. There is however, as get, no information regarding even the general location of other groups and the presemption is that the majority are still under countraction.

Making ellowance for the existence of two "GEILEVENRG" placts and examine the utilization of 45,000 tons per conth of Hungarian crude in these month, the current rate of replection by the German refinery isometry has to estimated at 35,000/7,...0 tons per mouth, of which 10,000/10,000 tons per math as consist of passing. The margin in these figures represents the possible output of refineries in NATURO contracted which have been attacked in the past few lays with emohabered results.

#### to Londrei Gimorenn Refineries.

If, sain testel above, Hengarian crude is now being shiened to Souther at the rote of 45,000 teas per month, there may be a balance of 15,000 tene ger month available for refining lossing, an unners of tails Bulletin have scattered bat the function cofficerios remaining in the fields are console of treating 10,000 tens of crude per month and it test sects more probable than ever that they are dainy so in the light of the information available regarding the rate of export to Cormany. . . check on the status of these plants by fresh cover is bedly needed.

There have been no further attocks on the Adstrian or Greeko-Slovik refineries, the status of which remains unchanged, with the ROOSNUTRAILS reflect her possibly in partial operation, seconding to the evidence of cover stained in the past two weeks.

The fotal current rate of production in the Gentral Herorean industry is therefore estimated at 55,000/75,000 tons per menth, operated on activity at MODBHINGACH, of which 7,500/10,000 tons ray consist of gasoline.

#### (a) <u>Miacelloneous</u> Sources.

The majority of the major coke-oven bencel plants remaining in German mands have now been brought which significant or artillary fire. The position, contacted in terms of coal throughput especity is an follow

RUHR and Shak

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RUNIR and GAAR	No. of Plants	Casl Throughput Million tons per year.	at Capacity % of total.
Out of action Attocked (results outstanding In battle ares Palance of available capacity		19.3 6.8 10.2 <u>17.9</u> 54.2	28.5 10.0 15.0 26.5 80.0
OTHER GERMANY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA	é AUSTRIA.		
In battle eress Falance of available capacity	13 13 26	7.2 6.2 13.4	10.5 9.0 19.5
Contract, available for use	112 64	67.6 24.1	100.0 35.5

In these elecumstances, it is doubtful whether the current production rate of crude cake over benzel is in excess of 20,000 tons per month, compared with a prediction of bt 000/35,000 tons per month in the autumn. It the same time, the principal ter all refineries are either out of action or working at a greatly reluced rate. The energy anguld pevertheless still be sole to twinteld supplies of N.T. fuel from miscellancous sources, including at admixture of elechol, at a level of 20,000/2,000 tons per month.

### (c) P.C.L. Depote.

There have been no further stracks on P.O.L. Depots. Several commercial storage installations on the Hast bank of the Rhine, believed to have been used formerly for the distribution of Army fuel, are now under shell-fire.

Two Weinmacht depots in the North now show little sctivity in epstermity with the worsening position in Army fool supplies in the West. On the other hand a C.A.F. denot in the same area shown increased activity, possibly owing to transfer of functions from damaged installations elsewhere.

### (f) Overall Gosoline Supply Position.

and the prospects of recomption of activity by SCHOLVEN have now been decisively eliminated.

The current rate of total motor and eviation fuel production is catinated to lie between 47,500 tons and 65,000 tons per manth. These figures assume full utilization of Hungarian crude production and include as allowance for production by two GEHLENENRO refineries. The margin is due to uncertainty regarding the status of LUTZKENDORF, MOOSBIERLUM and a number of small refineries and benzol plants on which post-raid cover is outefamilie. Rublind, LUTZKENDORF, MINISTRE, UM and VIETER-SCHIMCHAF, adaming all these plants to be active, would accume for about one-third of the bigher figure.

### IV. STIUATION IN FRODUCING ANGLAS.

The current status of the significant synthetic all plants, reflectics, coke-over bennol plants and for refineries remaining in German hands is summarized, with estimates of their current subput of motor and swistion fuel, in <u>Table III.</u> The present situation is further described bolow:-

/(a) Synthetic Plants

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There is no prospect of any further production from the four as plants in the West which remain in German hands. SCHODYER on to have been demastated in the attacks of March 8 and 10; ra would require 4 to 6 months to complete. No attempt his make to begin repairs at NORDETTAN, DOTTACP WILLING or

- 5 -

Ourseny MAGDELEO is seen to have been comprising attack of March 3: busyr decage to all visil plant will regulat at hass 2 months to regain.

addy the beaution

### 3

or Transme plants in the Ruhr are intrive, mair estivity. There is a the retical Oution could be resumed at the end of Hareh I DORININD but the speed of repair work moch so that this will be achieved.

The situate of March 5 and 8 inflictsi considerable from the situate of March 5 and 8 inflictsi considerable from the second of the second states of the second states inflicts are institute and that repairs have bot we have that both plants are institute and that repairs have bot we have being. It ments we be used whether these latest stores have being inter and provide another situation units sprear to more being inter and provide considerable with they may be proved being and provide considerable with they may be proved being and provide considerable with they may be proved being and provide considerable with they may be proved being and before the end of the month.

At Finishe, cover of large 9 shows that the distillation unit, though officiently intert, has storged production since the stored of Morch 5. As the creating class, however, the store included at the end of last star has not been repaired one the plant is fully active. The the distillation unit not also be back in production, finited on fractor B significant passible producer , within a team or two.

Within the year has weeks uttacks have been made, with unknown provided, on the residences in the full like dock area, full with the post SD-Like SCH. With SCH. With and DELEVISION known to be inective, there as therefore have been a there decline in production short the scaller refinerics of which cally the following one new positively them to be active:-OSLINGLINER DETAILS, USER

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#### (d) .ustria: Refineries.

There has probably been no change in the situation in Abstria where all the refineries in the VINCA pres are suffice, except VINCA-LOBAU. In the light of recent cover it is also pensible that MCOSPIREMENT is now in limited production.

39

#### (c) Greeno-Slovakia: Refineries.

40

There has been as frich cover of refineries in Conche-Slowskie where notivity is likely to be confined to KOLIN, RPALUPY, NOLATILA OSTRANA and, possible DUROWA, with PARDUNICE a possible producer borare the and of the month.

#### (F) Black Print St. M. Martines.

The root that Cernany appears to be able to ship chude from functory at the rate of AC,000 tons per month suggests that the balance of the crude oil production may be trested in the local reliaries. This supports previous assumptions that at least INLASTING and CZONY are in certial production

### C) <u>Prusel Plants and Ter Oil Refinerica.</u>

the coke-even bened plants have been attacked during the past Took, mostly for the first time. Results are known only in the case of Disching LIFFE where the Southern section has been rul out of action but the Dorthern Souther remains insective.

Equipteen plotte and known to be completely out of action due to easily and past ectoerts.

Of the <u>fourtees</u> similizent plants which remain active, <u>seven</u> are within rolgs of actillery fire in the Rome or Sasr.

ine remutating plants relating substantial terrat value such

SALZGITENR LINZ INTI L.ILNUSCH KONIGSPORN S.CHSPIN HUINFICHSPURY SCHUR LIPPE NO

The important for oil refiners at NCLAIS-ESPECIALIN an important for following cample on the night of Hereb 5/6. The velocities dence in in the larger of the two L.T.C. eaking decisions but so the treatment plant has only been mlightly damaged, licitization of tar from the remaining L.T.C. Lattery should be record altern inordistely. The plant may therefore soon he setive again at 50,1 of cape ty.

The HOSITZ for oil refinery to probably still inscrive following issues inflicted Horeh 2.

Is the Robr the CLITROF PLUXIL tar distillery, which has been active at about 50, of capacity was attached again on March 7, with activity has been on a shall acale, is now within range of artillery fire.

/ V. CONTINUE OF

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### . CONDITION OF P.O.L. DEPOTS.

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The Webrascht denot at ZARRHWIIN, near Hamburg, frequently reported by ground intelligence, has now been located. It is of the normal forest type and appears to be inactive. Recent cover also suggests that the Webrascht denot at LICKELOH may no longer be in use.

24

On the other hand the G.m.F. depot at RUCHIN-NUSEAU shows a considerable increase in activity. This depot is believed to handle jet fuele and not have been specially designed for the purpose as its layout differs from the normal dispersed rather of G.M.F. ispots. On the other hand recent alterations in the loading instellations show that more than one type of feel is handled at it is possible that distribution of conventions? avistion fuel has been transferred to this depot following the loading to DILMENT and ELMENT.

As the tauks in this installation are closely gradied and have not yet been buried, EUCHIN-JUSSAU presents , much more vulnerable target for air strack than any other regular Webraucht or G.A.F. depoin.

#### VI. FUTURE POLICY.

The long-term inmobilization of M.G.M.W.G. and LOHLTH has further reloced the commitment needed for the total colinse of the leading sources of Germany's oil supply. To complete the process it will be necessary to eliminate RURLIND, and to prevent restaction of submantial production by the LUTZKAIDORF and BOHLEN arathetic plants and the HISPURG, MARKING and HOOSFHIRE.UM refineries. Achievement of these objects would reduce the rate of M.T. and aristics fuel production to leas than 51,000 tons per worth, destite the promotion to leas that 51,000 tons per worth, re-acquisition of control over the Hungarian cilficlic.

The latter development could also be offset in some argree by herosolng at some directed spainst topping plants, task forms and lossing installations in the allfields themselves. This form of stated merits examination by M......F.

The stick of sources of substitute motor fuels has made such good progress that, with the assistance of territorial losses, production has provedly declined by more than 50% in the yest six mother. As interance of the previous ellocations of bened for use as M.T. fuel could now be unioraised only by the virtual eligination of all other uses. Allocations may therefore siredy have been reduced and forther successful attacks will ensure that they are reduced further.

#### VII. PRIORITY KOCO HEAD. TIONS.

The usual list of recommended target priorities is set out in Table V.

Not.1 to 3 are the remaining active or non-active synthetic plants.

Nos.4 to 11 are the principal active or near-active refineries In General and Central Aurope, prioriti a being subject, in two casus, to post-raid cover.

Nos.12 to 17 are the remaining active refineries in Justria and Caceno-Slovakia.

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/ lion. 18 and 19

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Nos.18 and 19 are the tar oil refineries in Central Germany.

Nos.20 to 23 are minor refineries in Germany, on all of which post-raid cover is awaited.

Not,24 to 38 are the remaining significant producers of cokeoven benzol. In nine cases, priority is tentative, pending post-raid cover.

Nos.39 to 40 are very small German refineries.

C.S.T.C. Working Committee (0il) Flat 52: 40 Berkeley Square,W.1. March 13, 1945.

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T H I

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I F I E D ESTIMATING OUTPUT OF ANIS OLD THAN'S INCOME AND A SAME AND A SAME

(All firmes in themselfs of mutric dons for Month).

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STATEDIC PLACES					
	560 132		75 29	49	
Pressinge of Eng-raid Total	1.0%				
NTT TURA ( Correlation )					
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### TABLE II.

UNENDEIN

	GASOLINE	KEROSINE	GAS/DIESEL OILS	FUEL OILS	LUBE OILS XX	TOTAL
Normal Pre-rold North Output	532		284	280	148	1344
Estimated Output in February						
From: Bergius Plants Placher Tropsch Rafining of Mineral Oils Other Sources	21 14 15 25	1 14	18 12 56 22	- 47 82	1 2 15 11	40 29 147 140
Total Resources . Percentage of Pre-raid Total	75 143	15 15%	108 40%	129 46 1	29 2071	356 27,5
Estimated Output in March						
<u>From:</u> Bergius Plants Flacher Tropach Refining of Mineral Oils Other Sources	5 15 37 25	2 16 -	5 11 56 22	- 52 82	- 17 11	10 50 178 140
Total Resources Percentage of Pre-raid Total	82 157	18 18%	914 314	134 48%	30 20/3	358 27%


XX NOTE: The figures shown for lubricating oil output are largely theoretical.

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( <u>TERUS</u> ) NIA			114100 1 2.1	1.20.20	0
<u>1111</u>	L III. CEPTER REPORT	0 STATUS OF FRINCIPAL CT	D FLATTE.		•
<u>1111</u>	L 111, CHPR T TROMOTIO Lole refer to estimated of fuels in theucands of	0 BTATUS OF INIBOLPAL OF current monthly rate of o f metric tens)	D FLATTE.		•
Till (Figures in brac	L 111, CHERT PRODUCTIO hele perer to estimated of rushe in themends of 15 ShifulTIC PLATS	0 STATUS OF IRINGIPAL CT current monthly rate of e f matric tops) 24 GERLAN REFINERIES	D. ELATTA. putput of motor and avi	lation	
TAIL (Figures in brac FRANCISCA STATUS	Lote refer to estimated e fuels in theucands of	current monthly rate of e formetric tens)	D. FLATTS. putput of motor and avi	A BENSOL A	5
Till (Figures in brac	Lote refer to estimated e fuels in theucands of	current monthly rate of e f metric tens) 24 GANNAN REFINERIES	D. FLATTS. putput of motor and avi 37 OTHER ROTTER	A2 BENSCL AF	1.1 {:-1 {:-9 (0.9)
TAIL (Figures in brac FRANCISCA STATUS	Lote refer to estimated e fuels in theucands of	current monthly rate of e f metric tens) 24 GANNAN REFINERIES	D. FLATTS. putput of motor and avi 17 OTHER ROTTERING	A Distant	D {1.1} {0.9}
TAIL (Figures in brac FRANCISCA STATUS	Lote refer to estimated e fuels in theucands of	eurrent monthly rate of o f matric tens) 24 GERBAN REFINERING FEDERALWEEN (C.C)	D. FLATTS. putput of motor and avi 17 OTHER ROTALINE	A2 BLISCL A A2 BLISCL A 302 ALVOS -VCLXLIAAA ALACCHI LAUSCH ELIAUSCH -PHO AUXA -THO AUXA -THO AUXA -THO AUXA -CO GATTIA SACHEEL	D (1.1) (0.9) (0.5) (0.6)
TAIL (Figures in brac FRANCISCA STATUS	Lote refer to estimated e fuels in theucands of	eurrent monthly rate of o f matric tens) 24 GERBAN REFINERING FEDERALWEEN (C.C)	D. FLATTS. putgut of motor and avi 17 OTHER REALIZED	Altion 42 BERSOL J 342 BERSOL J 342 BERSOL J 342 BERSOL J 342 BERSOL 342 BERSOL 342 BERSOL 342 BERSOL 340 ESSI 400 BERSOL 340 ESSI 400 ESSI 400 ESSI 400 ESSI 400 ESSI 400 ESSI	B (100000 (100000 (00000 (00000 (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000) (0000)
Till (Floures in brac FROMMEN STATUS <u>Contempo 3</u> 1. Fill FROMMEN	Lote refer to estimated e fuels in theucands of	eurrent monthly rate of o f matric tens) 24 GERBAN REFINERING FEDERALWEEN (C.C)	D. FLATTS. putput of motor and avi	A2 BUISCL P BA2 BUISCL P BA2 BUISCL P BA2 BUISCL P BA2 BUISCL ACCER BUISCH BUISCH BUISCH BUISCH BUISCH BUISCH BUISCH BUISCH BUISCH BUISCH BUISCH BUISCH	1.1) (0.9) (0.9) (0.6) (0.6) (0.5) (0.7)
CILLON A CILLON A CILLON A IN FULL PROPERTION	Lole Perer to estimated of reals in thewands of 15 SULTATIO PLANTS	eurrent zonthly rate of e f zetrie tens) 24 GENEAN REFINERIES ENDERNAUSEE (0.2)	D_FLATTS. putput of motor and avi 37 OTHER ROTTER ROTTER	A dion 42 Entron and 3.2 all and 42 Entron and 42 Entron and 43 all and 44 all and	D (1.1) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9) (0.9
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
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
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	TYPE	STIP T	ATTACK	DATE OF LATEST COVER	NO. OF TANK WAGONS (LAST COVER)	WATER TRANSPORT ACTIVITY	REMARKS
ACHI		370,000		23.12.44			
BLECKEDE		345,000	-	23.12.44	79 +	2 oil barges	Intact
BREADERNAVEN		65,200		8.2.45	49	-	Oil pier not covered.
GUXHAVEN		80,000		8.2.45	Nil ·	l oil barge	Intact
		43,400	6.9.44	8.2.45	13	Nil	Intact
FLEMHUDE SEE		274,000	in a la state	6.10.44	NH1	Ni 1	Intact
FLENSBURG		13,200		5.1.45	204	2 oil barges	Part completed.
	G,D.	168,600			Nil	Nil	Part completed.
NUEDHOLZ (LUDINGWORTH)	) D	740,000	2	21.2.45	31	Nil	
SCRAFSTEDT		48,000		2.3.45	60 plus	-	Intact, partly incomplete.
LWINE/UNDE		171,600		6.10.44	-	-	Intact.
WILHELMSHAVEN	B	57,700	27.8.44	6.10.44	50	1 tanker	Intact
	-	21,100	≤1 × 0 + 444	8.2.45	38	Nil	
GROIAL DEPOTS:							•
ESSEN SEDAN	A	22,100	-	19.2.45	1		
FRANKFURT (WIFO)	A	30,660	5.11.44	22.2.45	18	Nil	
HAMBURG/ HARBURG	A	120,000	7-8.3.45	8.2.45	74	Nil	
HAMBURG/PETROLEUM HAFE	N. A.	412,000	20.6.44	8.2.45	288	Nal	Awaiting D/A.
KARLSRUHE	A	6,000	-	22.2.45	8	Nil	Active
KIEL/HOLTENAU	Å	25,400	-	29.11.44	7	Nil	
LUDWIGSHAF'EN	A	6,390	15-16.12.44	8.2.45	22	Nil	
MAINZ	A	6,085	-	14.2.45	Nil	Nil	Storage facilities reduced.
MANNHEIM	A	24,445	15-16.12.44	8.2.45	5	Nil	
MANNHEIL/INDUSTRIEHAFE	NA	7,000	15-16.12.44	8.2.45	10	Nil	
MANNHEIM/RHEINAU (WIFO	) A	19,600	15-16.12.44	15.2.45	64	NH1	
MANNHEI MALDHOF	A	8,300	-	8.2.45		l oil barge	
		-,		0.2.4)	Nil	Nil	Tank damaged.

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## COMPRENTIAL

March 13, 1945.

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TABLE V.

### CIL TARGET PRIORITIES.

<u>Prioritz</u>	Target <u>Number</u>	Western <u>Theatro</u>	Mediterraneaa Theotre	Nature Target	of
1. 2.	<u>69 1519</u> <u>38 1512</u>	RUPTAND LUTZKII DORF		Fischer Bergius	Tropsch and Tropsch
3. 49.	<u>(9 151)</u> (9 152) (9 1023)	LOHLES MIGDERO LIPUNG(Dhenania LLREURO (Ebano)	)	Dergius Refinery u	
7. 6. 9.	<u>63 192</u> 69 1611 66 16221	V. # RASURG-FILIDIA	MOOSBIERBAUM IMNIA-SCHWECHAT ISBURG	11	
10. 11. 12.	<u>GQ 1644</u> <u>GQ 1527</u> GQ 1539	(DP.G & Rhenan * HUTDE-DECANINGS OSLEBSH.USIZM	ie) Fudt KOLIN	11 11 11	
13. 14. 15. 16.	GR 5310 GQ 1607 GQ 1655		VILLA-FLORIDSDOF VILLA-KAGRAN KRALUPY	СР II И II	
18. 19.	<u>GQ 1606</u> CQ 1610 CO 1270B CQ 1723	MOLDIS-ESPENN.II & ROBITZ	KORIDUBURG VIIMAA-VOSIDDORF I	u u Tar Refi u u	
20. 21. 22.		* NULLUL.GEN M SLIJZELRGIN N LINEURG-NULLUGF		Refine "	ry
24.	071/P/3	(Schindler) = DOMENUND-ILEPHI SALZGITTIR = CONSOLIDATION I		" Benzol	Plant
26. ( <u>00 1</u> ) 27. ( <u>01 5</u> )	103 or 2224)	×. 1211L		.,	11
29. 29. 30.		DATIDUSCH	-1	11 11 11	11 17 11
31. 32. (	17 2206 17 2206 10 1818.	× ROBERT MUSDR × HOERDER VEREIN × GEBISLEAU	LINZ	11 11 11	11 11 11
- 54 - 55 - 55 - 55 - 55 - 55 - 55 - 55	10 <u>1531</u> 1 <u>15988</u> 60 <u>1536</u> )	# C.STROP R.UXEL * # DRUCHSTRASSE # M.THLAS STINUD:	L.R · 3 III/IV.	11 41 17	17 17 17
50. 39. <u>52</u>	R ² 2234 GH (591) 104/H/1 K 1617A	HEINRICHSHUTTE IMSCHER LIPPE NO DEDEMHAUSEN DORTMUND (Schmi		n H Refir Refir	

# Indicates attack since last cover.

Target numbers in brackets refer to station-list material covering these targets. Co-ordinates relative to station-list illustrations have been notified direct to Commands.

/ IN AREYARCE.

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targots.

ungary: Refineries.

Bernal & Ter Planfs. 1509B NORDSTERN BENZOL 1892 HINSA 1809A CARCLINENGLUCK 2229C BRUCKEAUSEN 1556B PROSPER 1556B MEIDIRICH BENZOL 1557B NEIDIRICH BENZOL 1557C VICTOR 1574C VICTOR 1574C VICTOR 1574C VICTOR 1575B MINISTER STEIN 1576 AINA PLUTO 1588 HINISTER STEIN 1576 AINA PLUTO 1599 VOINIX-WESTENDE 157 SHAROCK IIL/IV 1532) NEUMURIL 1532A MINISTER OSTRAVA TAR

		and the second sec			
	A	and Complementations			
	Georgia Int	ay: Synthetics.		5.	4
00		45-55 - F-152			
63		ERUX POELITZ LEUNA NORDSTERN		i.l	4
tra .	1001	POLLITZ			
G	15154	LEUNA		6.	1
GQ 1	15094	NORDSTERN			-
60 1	525	ZUTUZ		GQ	]
00 1	E16	NORDSTERN ZHITZ MAGDEBURG DOTINGP-WICHELIN LUDWIGSELITEN SIMIKRADI HOUTIN CASTROP RAUKIL KANDI WATRE DITCKIL DORIMURD		0.00	-
00 1	EZES	The Carlos and the second		GQ	3
ung d	-0 -1-	AND LIVE HILLET LEI		GF GF	TT CN
LTD ,	20 H	LUDWILCHIMPIN			2
GC 1	SLIA	STUDICRADE HOUTEN		- 60	
GQ 1	5344	CASTROP RAUNCH		00	
G0 1	67.54				
	57.8	MATTER INTOINT			
C					
		DORLINDED		GH GE GO	
2. 3					1
		and a second s			
	513	OBTINUEDOR NOMELIN E. JOLLEURGIEN REISHCLZ THEIRICH SCHULRU FEIRE I. NEURO-CHARMOOR			
( A ]	600				
	C 301 1	NOT LAFT.			
	020h/	E. OCLUMINGIN		63 60	
CO 1	126B	REISHCLZ		GQ	
GII 8	59C	TRICH	x		
GO 1		SCHUTAN	-		
GD 7	614 622/.				
00 1	CODI	1 Interna an anna an			
rus T	OGEN	The state of the s			
		(Ihenania)	44.11		
00, 10	622C	HAMBURG-GRASDROOK		co.	
		HAMBURG-GRASBROOM Albrecht & Schliemann)			0
GQ 1.		HALBURG-VILIBILISBURG			-
		(Sold & many )			
3. n	ustri	9: Rufineries			
00 16	545	VIIINNA-LOBAU			
0.5 m		A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A			
i. a.		manufactor manufactor			
4. 0.	aconu.	-Slovakia: Refineries.			
	enr				
G-, 1f	225 1	RARDUBICE BRATISLAVA			
		BRATISLAVA			
		DUBOVA			
		IOVY DORUMETR			

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x Recommended for ortillery attack.

/INTELLIGENCE LIST OF P.O.L. DEPOTS.

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#### INTELLIGENCE LIST OF P.O.L. DEPOTS.

(Suitable for stiack as secondary targets)

Crude Storage for HANEURG Refineries

GQ 1630 HAMBURG (Burotank)

Major WIFO Denots (supplying both Army and G.A.F. Depots)

GQ 2014 DERBEN (U) GQ 1720 STASSFURT (U) GQ 2011 HITZACKER (U) GQ 2007 FARGE (U) GQ 2015 FNEIFAM (U) GQ 2021 ROUDHICE (U) GQ 2025 NEUFURG (U) GQ 2012 HILMBURG

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#### Army Depots (supplying the Western Front)

Northern Sector 5105D/4506/H/1 GQ 2029 GQ 2027 HULHULARIAN (S) HULHULA

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#### APPENDIX I.


Attacks on Oil Production & P.O.L. Depote.


Date	Location	Company	Tong	Air Force
5.3		Lienania Ossag & Ebano		8
200	BOHLAN		N	
11	HOLDIG-ESPECTATIC GALZENROEL	Buchsische Werke	667	RAF
17				
		Selzbergen	548	PAF
7.5	DOR'NITITD-MONDA	Dortmana-Norder Hutten		
		Vorein (MORDER VEREIN		
		Benzel Plant)		8
11 -	OLTMUCH- ARPENDED	a a		8
11	DATITA	Gen. Ruscher Lippe		
	THE PERSON			
		( SCHER LIPPE Benzol		
		Flonts)		
	CAOTROP LAUXUL MARDING	Ges.fur Coerversertung		
0.4.0				RAF
	Holden and the state	7		RAF
11		Harrenor Lorribes		
		(POPURT HUGHE Bennol		
		Goluenkirchener Bargwerks		
		(RAUCHSTRASSE Benzol Flont		
11	DORTHUND	Harvence Derrbau	1004	
		(CHEISLIN Benzol Plant)		
18	ALTINISSIN	Locusch		
	**************************************			
11		(IIII Benzol Plant)		
		Stluneachen Zechen		
		14 MIAS STROLES III/IV		
		DINIEL FLAME)	106	
+1		Evirierwerke Scholven		
		Cou.Auguste Viktoria		
		ADAUSTE VIKTORIA Denzel		
		Plans)		
	DA. TITITA	Gew, Bhacher Lippe		
		MSCHIR LIFFE Bonzol Plants)	703	RAF
		Hydrierwerke Scholven		RAF
	Lingad	D.P.A.G. )		alian.
		Dhononto		
		Bchindler	1124	8
		Sobliemonn (		
		ocallienona )		

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	// Present theo		10 E.	17.				
	TOTALS							
<u>93,5632</u>	OSWIRCIN (AUSCHWITZ) 1.G.Forben				25.12	21.1	Captured.	
<u>05 38 M</u>	LUDVIGSMATES I.G.Farben				1.1	2.5	Bergius plant inoperable.	
<u>02 1536</u>	BOTTROP-WILLIMIN Ruhroel A.G.				11.11		Inactive. Repairs to cover station onl .	
00 1551	DLECHLAIMER MORTH (1.3.Parbon)				19.12		Contured.	
	Rheinische Brankohlen A.G.							
GC 15104	(BEAEAG II) WESSELING				30.10	14.2	Consured.	
	Wintershall A.G. 1L.GDEBURG (ROTHENSEE)				3.3	9.3	probably active. Inactive. Heavy comage.	
16. 1512	LUTZKENDORF MUCHELN ×				9.2	2.3	Innetive on lost cover.los	
	BONLES-ROTTL. (DRABAG I)			47	6.3	7.3	Inoctive. Moderate damage.	
02 2569	BLECHRAMMER COUTH # . I.G.Farben		0		25.12	14.1	Captured.	
<u>6K. 1525</u>	ZEITZ-TROCHITZ (BRAEAG III).				17.1		Inactive. Heevy domege.	
	Sydrierworke Scholten a.G.							
	Gelachberg Bonzin A.G. GELSENKIRCHEN (SCHOLVEN)				10.3		Inactive. Heavy damage.	
	Autonick Worke (I.G.Farbda) GMLSESKIRCHER (NONDSCLEN)				23.11	9.3	progress. Inactive. No repairs.	
	LHUNA .				15.3	22.2	Insotive. Repairs in	
	POELITZ Formierwerke Poelitz					2.2	Inoctive. No repairs.	
					1.2	3. 3	Inactive. Some recairs.	

# For Fischer-Trocsch production des Page 2.

PAGE 1 - BERGIUS SYNTHETIC.

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### SYNTHETIC PLANTS - FISCHER TROPSCH FLANTS

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(Figures in thousands of metric tons per month)

Target Number	LOCATION AND COMPANY	Normal Mo Output Capacity	ES	STIMATE Jon.			Last	(1944/45 Lest Cover.	) - <u>894709</u>
<u>62 1519</u>	RUHLAND-SCHWARZHEIDE	29	22	22	22	22	3.3	3.3	Active 75%. No apparent demage.
GQ 1511A	(BRABAG) HOMBERG (MOERS MOERBECK)	16	0	0	0		21.11	22.2	Captured.
SEE PAGE	Rheinpreussen A.G. LUTZKENDORF-MUCHELN	13	7	7	3		9.2	2.3	Probably ective 25%.
1) GQ 1517A	Wintershall A.G. STERKRADE HOLTEN	10.3	0	С	0	0	22.1	22.2	Inactive.
GQ 1534A	Ruhrbenzin A.G. CASTROP-RAUXEL	8.5	0	0	0	2	22.1	21.2	Inactive. Repairs alow.
	Klockner-Wintershall KAMEN (DORTMUND) Chemischewerke Essener	8.5	0	0	2	0	4.3	3.3	Inactive. Moderate damage on last cover. Recults of further
GQ 1518	WANNE EICKEL	11		0			9.2	3.3	attack unknown. Inactive. No repairs.
	Krupp Treibstoffwerke A.G. DESCHOWITZ BEUTHEN (ODERTAL)	7	7	0	0		26.12	19.1	Ceptured.
og 1555	Schaffgotsch BenZin DORTMUND (WAMBELERHOLZ)	7	0	0	2	1	26.2	3.3	Inscrive. Slight
1.447A	Hoesch Benzin G.m.b.H. HARNES (LENS) Courriers - Kuhlmann	2.5	0	0	0	0		additional demage. In Allied bands.	
	TOTALS	113	36	29	29	30			

2 - FISCHER TROPSCH SYNTHETTC PLANTS.

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## GERMANY - REFINERIES

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(Figures in thousands of metric tons per mont)

Farget amber	LOCATION AND COMPANY	Kormal Mo. Crade Intake Capacity		IMATE Jun.	D OUTPUS Feb.	f # March	Date of Last Attack	(1944/45) Last Cover	STATIS
ig 167 <b>6</b> 4	HAMBURG (HARINURG) Rhenania-Ossag A.G.	/ 46	20	1.0	3	15	8.3	9•3	Inactive. Moderate damage. May resume shortly.
<u>iq 16336</u>	HALISTEG (HARBURG) Ebono Asphult-Worke A.G.		0	0	10	10	8.3	9.3	Inactive. Slight damage. Resumption inminent.
10 16 30	HAMPSTO .		C	0	0	0	8.3	9.3	Inactive. Some additional
iq 1625	Europaische Tanklager A.G. MISBURG (Nr.HANNOVER) Deatsche Erdelraff.	25	7	5	10	15	3.3	9.3	damage. Storage in use. Distillation plant inacti
<u>_ 1644.</u>	HEIDE HEMMINGSTEDT (HOLLE) Hermin stedt (Nr. Heide)	16	12	6	7	72	8.3	8.2	Gracking plant in use. Active 50% on last cover. Results anknown.
Q 1613	OSTERMOOR (Nr. BRUNSBUTTELKC Mineralol-a. Asphaltwerke A.	06)12 G.	0	0	С	0	20.6	2.3	Inoperable. Storage in use.
Q 1622D	HAMBURG (WILLELMSBURG)	1.0	9	4	6	97	11.3	3.3	Active prior to attack.
0 162 <b>2</b> 0	D.P.A.G. HAMBURG (WILMELMSBURG) Rhenania	5	4,	2	3	149	11.3	3.3	Results anknown. Active prior to attack. Results anknown.
3 1620	MONHEIM (Nr.Dasseldorf) Rhenania	10 🕬	7	7	5	С	20.2	22.2	Inactive. In battle
<u>g 1627</u>	BREMEN OSLEBBHAUSEN Deatsche Vacuam	2	8	8	8	8	4.8	3.3	Active. Slight damage.
107E/P/3	DORTMUND (HALPENERWEG)	8	0	0	4	77	7.3	19.2	Inactive on last cover. Resalts anknown.
	<u>&amp; B</u> DOLLBERGEN D.P.A.G.	7	4	0	2	С	3•3	93	Inactive, Fresh damage.
	SALZBERGEN (1 r.Rheine) Erdol-Raf.Salzbergen	6	5	5	5	51	6.3	22.2	Probably active prior to attack. Results anknown.
0 1126B	REISHOLZ Rhenania.	6	5	5	3	0	21.2	9.3	Inactive. In battle area.
8590	EMMERICH Deutsche Gasolin A.G.	5	0	0	0	0	7.10	15.2	Inactive. In battle area.

PAGE 3 - GERMANY: REFILERIES

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Tar of Eamber	LOCATION AND CONPANY	Cormal Mo. Grade Intake Capacity			OUTPI Fub.	<u>T</u> <del>x</del> Narch	Date of ( Last Attack	1944/45) Last Cover	and the second s
00 1622E	HAMPURG (NEWHOF)	4	С			27	11.3	9.3	
<u>60 11903</u>	SCHULAU Deatsche Vacam	4	C	Ø	С	1	6.8	9.3	Inactive. May resume shortly.
00.1658	].III.]	2	2	2	2	29	3.3		Active prior to attack Results poor.
<u>52104/1/1</u>	D.P.A.G. DEPENDENT Phoenix Cil Refinery	2	2	2	2	2	3.3	5.3	Active.
<u>60 16174</u>	DORTMUND Schnitz	2	2	2	2	2	-	13.2	Activo.
<u>6. 161/</u>	FillE Schindler	2	2	2	2	0	22.2	2.3	Inactive. Noderate damage.

89 60 75 91

LUBRICATING OIL PROCESSING PLANTS.

Turtet Namer	LOCATION AND COMPANY	Normal Mo. Oatpat Capacity		TMATED Jan.	OUTPU Feb.		Date of (1 Last, Attack	944/45) Lost Cover	<u>ST.TU</u> S
00 16221	HEMBURG (GRASBROOK)	10	5	2	6	1	9.3	9.3	Inactive. Fresh domante.
0, 16223	Rhenania H.MBCRG (MILFERINSFURG)			0	C	29	11.3	9.3	Inactive.
16220	Schliemann's HIMBURG (GRASBROOK)	2.5	1	0	0	1	24.2	9.3	Inactive.
01 1612	Albrecht d. Schliemann's FREITAL (Nr. Dresden) Rhenanis		C	0	0	0	24.0	17.12	Inactive.
	R Estimated ou refining	tpat of fini losses.	ahed I	redact			ince for d		

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PAGE 4 - OBELANY: REFINERIES (Cont'd) - LUERICATING OIL PROCESSING MANTE.

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xx Oilfield topping plant; catpat figures represent gusoline only.

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Par 5 LON 210, ATD CORPANY	lormal na Crude =	•			1172	Date of ( Logt	(1944745) Inst	<u>8144708</u>
Intrado en	Choucity	C.		Pop.	lle peli	Attech	Cover	
no					0	20.2		Indesive. Forvy conce.
						14.2		
- <u>19, 1007</u> VILUA (KAORAN) Vectorum		4						Probably active.
Con Cel u. Lronnetorr A.G.						20.2		Active.
no.1666 HERMONDURG Cashitul Hinier								Aclive.
<u>04 1610</u> VILIUA (VOLUDORF) PELIO <u>08 190</u> ROCEFERDUN								Petelly color,
<u>99 195</u> MCCSELTRAUN Dennu Cherle A.C.						*1.3	·.2	Possibly celly
	95	22	42	48	43			
16.56 permitter	TE Children	091,074			5			
<u>01 1659</u> PACOUNICE Pento <u>02 1640</u> ERATISLAVA		-				14.10		In e ive. Intestve except for hurt-
<u>ballo</u> Apollo	12.5	0		0				cating oll treatment.
	7.5	6		6				Active.
		22		2?	- + °	20.8	14.2	Possibly active.
00 1657 DOLOVA Dutova State Ref.	. 5							
Vacaum <u>GR 1657</u> DUBOVA DUBOVA State Ref. <u>GR 4668</u> LOVY FORMULN Funto	5			0		29.8		Inactive.
Vacaum <u>09 1657</u> DULOVA Dubova State Ref. <u>OH 4668</u> FOVY FOHUMIN	•		0 4 3			26.12	16.2	Inotive Fartly active.

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#### ARY - REFINERIES

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(Finares in thousands of metric tons per month)

Target	100/0100/ 405.00	.Dall	Rornal Ro. Crade # Capacity	EB Dec.	THE.T	D OUTPI PPL . M	T sa Tch	Dute of ( Lust 	19(4/45) Last Cover	<u>377.7715</u>
<u>3H</u> 220						0	0	17.9	21.9	Ciptarud.
BH 71.					6?	61	61	9.0	27.12	Proposly some activity
			7		32	31	32	28.8	22.11	leading send detivity
BH 103			7		O		0	17.9	1,.10	Cuptared.
<u>811 5 .</u> 1311 50				0	0			14.7	13.10	Cupt and .
BH 70			2		0	0		-	16.8	Cuptured.
CH 24	hyirocruny horrowic			0	. 0	0	02.	14.7	22.11	Tomobly none octivity
04, 1656	Gevernment Rolls. MUNIACS		2	C	0			-	22.5	Cepterod.
1 1.04	Del Karpati Leel Skokel			C	0	С			21.8	Captared.
BH 73			l _i ,	0	C	0	0	-		Captured.
		TOT.4.5	67	6	9	91	92			

* Maximum monthly epade cil intake capacity.

HE Estimated output of finished liquid products after allowance for damage and refinery loss.

PAGE 6 - HUNDARY RETTURNED


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			ZOL PLANTS			
(Figures	1.11	thousands	of metric	tons	per	month)

Target Lamber	LOCATION AND COMPANY	Normal Mo. Output Capacity	Number of Batteries	Batteries Working	Date or Last Attack	(1944/45) Last Cover	STATUS
<u>69 15098</u>	NORDSTERN BENZOL Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G.	2.1	4	0	28.2	9.3	Inactive. Heavy damage. Partly active on last cover.
<u>60 1852</u>	HANSA Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G.	2	4	0	4.2	2.3	Resalts anknown. Insctive.
0.0 1809A	CARCLINEN-CLICK (BOCHUM) Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G.	2	4	C	<b>*19.</b> 2	3.3	Inactive.
GF 22504	SALZGITTER Reichswerke Hermann Goering	2	6	26	14.1	3.3	Partly active.
OF 22290	BRUCKHAUSEN Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G.	1.9	5	0 *	2.2	22.2	Inactive. In battle
<u>1536B</u>	PROSPER Rheirische Stahlwerke A.G.	1.7	7	0	4.2	3.3	area. Inactive. No
1 <u>Q 1532B</u>	MEIDARICH BE ZOL Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G.	1.7	6	$\mathtt{l}_{\overline{x}}^{\pm}$	12.12	2.3	repairs. Partly active. In
<u>HI 595B</u>	CSTERFELD Gutehoffnungshütte	1.5	3	0	22.2	25.2	battle area. Inactive.
F 2267D	KAISERSTUHL Heeseh A.G.	1.5	E	0	16.2	3.3	Inactive.
0 1041B	SCHOLVEN BENZOL Bergwerksgesellschaft Hibernia A.	1.4	4	0	22.2	22.2	Inactive.
Q 15340	VICTOR Klockner-Werke A.G.	1.3	4	0	22.11	21.2	Inactive.
Q 1871A	EWALD-FORTSETZUNG Ewald-Konig Ladwig Bergbau A.G.	1.2	3	C	15.1	22.2	Insetive.
H 598D	ROBE T MUSER Harpener Berghau A.G.	1.2	. 4	2?	. 8.3		Partly active on last cover. Resalts
<u>q 18294</u>	CONSCLIDATION I/VI Magnesmannrohreiwerke A.G.	1.1	5	2	5.3	22.2	unknews. Partly active on last cover. Results
AGE 7 - F	SENZC. PLANTS.	z Ma	squito atta	ck.			inknown.

- BENZCL PLANTS.

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Target Namber	LOCATION AND COMPANY	Normal Mo. Output Capacity	Namber of Batteries	Batteries Working	Date of Last Attack	(1944/45 Last Cover	) <u>starus</u>
GF 2205B	VOLKLINGEN	1.1	6	6	-	6.10	Active. In
CF 2203B	Rochling'sche Eisen und Stahlwerke NEUNTIRCHEN Neunkirchner Eisenwerke A.G.	1.1	3	l	30.11	15,2	battle area. Partly active. In battle area.
(F 2206	LINZ Hermann Goeringwerke	1.1	4	42	25.2	8.3	Active.
48181 Ja	GNEISENAU Harpener Bergbaa A.G.	l	2	l	8.3	16.2	Partly active on last cover.
(H 555C	ALMA-PLUTO	1	3	0	27.2	9.3	Results unknown. Inactive.
€F 2267E	Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G. MINSTER STEIN	1	2	0	16.2	19.2	Inactive.
(Q 1513B	Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G. KAMEN BENZOL	1.0	3	0	1.3	3.3	Inactive.
( 1103/ (F 2224	Essener Steinkohlenbergwerke A.G. EMIL Hoesch A.G.	0.9	2	2?	B.3	3.3	Active prior to attack. Results anknown.
<u>eh 691</u>	EMSCHER LIPPE Gewerkschaft Emscher Lippe	0.9	3	l	8.3	9•3	North plant active.South plant damaged and probably inactive.
510	ERIN Gelsenkirchener Bergwerks A.G.	0.9	3	3	-	19.2 -	Active.
M.I.P.	FRIEDRICH HEINRICH I/II Steinkohlenbergwerks Fried	0.9	4	0		20.2	Captared.
CH 555	Heimrich A.G. JACOBI Gatehoffnangshatte A.G. AUGUSTE VICTORIA Gewerkschaft Auguste Viktoria	0.9	3	3	-	22.2	Active. In battle area.
<u>C3 162</u>		0.9	5	5?	8.3	3.2	Active on last cover. Results anknown.
CH 555	DAHLBUSCH	0.8	3	3	-	9.3	Active.
PAGE 8 - I	Bergwerksgesellschaft Dahlbusch MENZOL PLANTS (CONT'D)						•

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Turret Lanter	and the second s	Normal Mo. Output Capacity	lander of Nationas	Buttories Morking	Date of Last Attack	(1944/45 Lust	STA.US
<u>GF 220</u>						Cover	
61 597	Colsering and Berguerks A.t. SHAMAGE INJ/17	•			**		
-		U . 7 Lu			4	22.2	ares. Tructive.
.I.P.		0.7	4		21.11	14.2	Coptured.
F 22681	Tolmer Works A.G.	0.7			8-a		
9 1536		0.06			7.3		Active on last cover.
1 565	Statutes of Lorent Locker (Morse) III/I Statutes of Statutes (Morse) III/I Statutes of Statutes (Morse)	V0.6		31	8.3		Reallts aknown. Active on last cover.
	Construit. Reprint 21 Burghda A.C.	0.6			-		Resalto Abinosa. Activa. In Battle
I.P.	PR Kropp A.G.	0.5					arou. Captaron.
1.5085		0.5			**		active.
1532		0.5			8.3		
22.11		0.5		2			Activo en last cover. Redalts anknorn
- the star	HILINICENTE Banulahi A.C.	0.5			-		netive. In hat le mea. active.

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Terget Namber	LOCATION AND CONTAIN	Normal Mo. Number Output of Capacity Batteries	Batteries Working	Date of Last Attack	r (1924/45 Last Cover.	) <u>status</u>
		TAR OLL AND BENZON	PROCESSING 1	PLANTS		
<u>GQ 1523</u>	ROSITZ Pratsche Ardol A.G.	Normal crude tar capacity 40,000 tons.	approx.	2.3	17.2	Probably active prior to sttack. Results believed good.
<u>GO 1270B</u>	MOLSIS-ESPENHAIN A.G.SEchsische Worke	Normal crude tar capacity 30,000 tons.	approx.	5.3		Inscrive. Moderate damage. May now have resumed at 50%.
<u>60 1532.</u>	DUISBURG-MEIDERICH	Processes Tars and Crude H	Jenzol	3.1	22.2	Active 25%. In battle area.
6 <u>Q 1531</u>	Ges: far Teerverwertan CASTROP-RAUXEL	-ditto-		7.3	7.3	Active 50% on last cover. Resalts anknown.
<u>GF 22310</u>	Ges: far Teerverwertang MORAVSKA OSTRAVA Rütgerswerke	Processes Turs and Crude I	Senzol	-	12.8	In battle area.

PAGE 10 - TAR OIL AND BENZOL PROCESSING PLANTS

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
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
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I STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

To devise a feasible plan for reduction of the operational strength of the German Air Force in preparation for invasion of the European continent, and to increase the effectiveness of the Combined Bomber Offensive by reduction of German Air opposition. EO 11652

DESTRUCTION OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE

AND PLAN FOR INTENSIVE COUNTER AIR FORCE

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II ASSUMPTIONS

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1. That production of German Aircraft will continue to exceed operational losses of the German Air Porce unless some intensive offensive action is taken by the Allies.

2. That the disposition of the German Air Force will remain essentially as at present except for a relative increase in strength in southern Germany and Italy to combat our bombers based in Italy.

III DISCUSSION

1. The final details of organization and execution of any plan for neutralizing the effectiveness of the German Air Force necessarily must be made in the theater of operations. This paper is prepared for the purpose of examining various factors pertinent to the problem, and to present in brief one possible solution for further study.

2. Despite some attacks made on German aircraft production, and the substantial numbers of enemy fighters destroyed in aerial combat, the German air strength has shown increasing numerical strength over the past several months, especially in fighters. Latest available information on numerical strength of Allied and Axis operational aircraft on the Western Mediterranean Fronts, shows a ratio of approximately 2.5 to 1 in favor of the Allies. With German air strength increasing, it would seem obvious that such strength could be most economically neutralized by effort directly against it before it can increase to an inordinate degree.



Such an effort would serve the dual purpose of reducing air opposition to an invasion and to missions of the Combined Bomber Offensive.

3. Targets for merial attack against the enemy sir strength fall logically into three categories:

a. Production, i.e., factories and assembly plants producing finished aircraft and component parts.

b. Reserves, i.e., reserve aircraft in repair, modification, and storage points.

c. Operational sircraft on the ground and in the sir.

4. Production

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a. Tab "A" offers a general analysis of the effectiveness of our bombing of German aircraft factories and assembly plants. Though no assessment is made of more recent attacks, the sharp decline of production indicated, as a result of our bombings in the late summer and fell of 1943, is illustrative of the high degree of effectiveness of the limited number of missions directed against the German aircraft industry.

b. That the number of such missions has been limited is illustrated by the fact that of 67 Combined Bomber Offensive targets directly related to the German air strength, only 14 had been attacked through November, 1943. It should be borne in mind, however, that in the same period attacks were made on 38 other targets, (of which 27 were airdromes) directly related to German air strength but not among those designated for the Combined Bomber Offensive.

c. In view of the above data, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that a concerted bombing of the German sircraft industry would achieve most impressive and gratifying results. All known Axis sircraft production facilities in Europe are within range of Allied heavy bombers based in the United Hingdom and in the Mediterranean area. Considering the known recuperative ability of the enemy, such action would seem urgently necessary as a most potent factor in hastening the conclusion of the war in Europe.

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#### 5. Reserves

Stored reserves of the Jerman air Force, in the usual sense of the term, are inconsiderable. Combat attrition and bombing of production facilities, while they have not nullified the strength of the energy in the air, have forced him to assume a defensive role, and have virtually climinated his effective reserves. Approximately 850 sincraft are estimated to be currently in the normal flowfrom production to operational units. There is no available information indicative that these sincraft are concentrated in pools which, in themselves, would present good targets.

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#### 6. Operational Aircraft

a. Latest available information indicates that: (1) 52.9% of all Axis sireraft in Europe are on the Western Front and the Control and Western Meditteranean; (2) 71.1% of all Axis fighters in Europe are in these areas; (3) 51.3% of all Axis fighters, and 72.3% of all Axis fighters in these areas, are disposed in northern and northwestern Cermany, France and the Low Countries. (See Tab "B"). With the rest of the German Air Force effectively contained in the east, it is reasonable to assume that destruction of Germany's fighter strength in the west would virtually accomplish the destruction of her capability for offering effective aerial opposition to an invasion or to our strategic bombing in Europe.

b. Tab "B" shows 645 fighters, or 22.6% of all dois fighters, to be disposed on the Mediterranean Front. Because these aircraft are scattered over an area from France to Bulgaria and the Agean, and because ranges, terrain and dispositions dictate tectics different from those which would be employed on the Western Front, they are not considered within the scope of this paper. It is estimated that approximately one-third of them are based in Italy within striking distance of our short range aircraft.

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c. Analysis of the disposition of German fighters available for defense against an invasion, and now opposing strategic bombing, disclose definite possibilities for direct attack.

> (1) The main force of single engine fighters on the Western Front is disposed from 40 to 100 miles from the coast between Denmark and the Brest peninsula. Behind these, distribution of the twin-engine day fighters forms a semi-circle. with Leipzig as a center, extending from the Bremen area down to Frankfurt and Stuttgart, and around to Vienne. This distribution is indicative of an intention to use the single engine day fighters to harrass our bomber missions and to have them available as a counter mir force against an invasion, with the twin engine day fighters so distributed that they can join the attack on our day bombers from a minimum distance after the withdrawal of their escort. The twinengine rocket aircraft have proved easy prey for our fighters whenever they could be forced to engage in combat. Night fighters are based throughout northern and northwestern Germany, the Low Countries, and no theastern France. (See Tabs "C" and "D"). (It should be noted that dispositions indicated are illustrative only for the date indicated, and are not intended to evince exact data for execution of a plan of attack).

(2) This distribution puts the great bulk of the German single-engine fighters within striking distance of even the short range Allied aircraft (e.g., Spitfires) based in the United Kingdom.

d. Many German aircraft have been destroyed by our aircraft engaged on missions of the Combined Bomber Offensive. Enemy losses in aerial combat, however, have not been sufficient to effect any substantial reduction in front line German air strength. This may be accounted for

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by three facts: that aerial combat on the pert of our strategic bombers and their escorting fighters is primarily of a defensive nature; that enemy fighters avoid battle unless they have reasonable prospects for success in attacking those of our bomber formations which a pear to be heading toward vital targets; and that our attacks on the German aircraft industry, while effective, have not yet been extensive enough to cause the enemy's production-wastage ratio to remain definitely in our favor.

e. It follows, then, that reduction of the enemy's present operstional air strength can best be achieved by some means other than aerial combat, viz., direct attack upon his airdromes in a menner which will make possible the destruction of the aircraft based on them. For several months we have been making day time attacks on enemy day fighter dirdromes in Europe, using our B-26 medium bombers. The day fighters are rarely found on the ground, except for the few which are not operational. Mircraft on the ground have ample warning of the approach of the B-26's, which attack from an altitude of 11,000 to 12,000 feet with heavy fighter escort, with the result that the German Airplanes get off the ground, and stay in the sir or withdraw to an airdrome which they consider beyond reach of the B-26's. That the Germans consider these attacks incifective is indicated by the fact that interceptions rarely are made, in keeping with their evident present policy of conserving their fighter strength.

7. a. A prerequisite to successful airdrome attacks is striking while the enemy aircraft are immobilized on the ground. Day fighters are on the ground at night, and night fighters during the day. Day fighters are not normally equipped for night flying. Furthermore, at night the day fighter pilots usually are at some distance from their aircraft, unavailable to fly them away in event of a night bombing attack, even if they are qualified to do so. Therefore, night attacks on day fighter airdromes, which will immobilize the aircraft thereon for several hours, would make it unlikely that many aircraft could escape subjection to day bombing attacks made early on the following morning.

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b. Tab "E" is a proposed plan for coordinated airdrome attacks for accomplishing the destruction of the German fighter strength facing England. Its success is predicated upon the employment of the maximum available number of aircraft over a period of several successive days and nights, utilizing both British and American aircraft.

c. The essential elements of the proposed plan for air attack on enemy day fighter airdromes are:

(1) Attacks by heavy night bombers of the Royal air Force to immobilize aircraft on the ground.

(2) Dawn or pre-dawn attacks by Mosquitoes or similar light bombers, dropping "jacks" and delayed action, anti-handling, anti-personnel bombs, to further immobilizing of aircraft on the ground.

(3) Precision pattern bombing attack by heavy and medium day bombers of the AAF to destroy circraft.

(4) Employment of fighters to escort day bombers and to harrass and destroy any enemy aircraft which are able to take to the air for withdrawal or interception of our day bombers.
(5) Bombing and strafing attacks by fighter bombers and fighters against circraft on the ground.

d. The prospects for success of attacks on enemy fighter wirdromes in northwestern Germany, the Low Countries, and northern France, are increased by the fact that about half the single engine fighters in this region usually are concentrated on approximately a dozen airdromes.

8. For attacking sircraft on enemy sirdromes in Italy a plan, similar to that for the Western Front, could be used, utilizing Allied sircraft based in southern Italy.

9. s. The practicality of stacking airdromes in southern Germany, southern France, and the Balkans is questionable because of the long ranges

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involved. Such ranges would not permit the use of short range fighters in support of the bombers, and would make difficult the protection and coordination of effort of numerous groups of aircraft simultaneously attacking different airdromes, even though enemy fighter defense <u>might</u> be split. Furthermore, the enemy might concentrate his fighters on but a small proportion of our aircraft, causing prohibitive losses to the allies. This argument is based on the presumed improbability of immobilizing all or even a majority of the aircraft on distant enemy airdromes. Perhaps the strongest argument against attacking enemy dirdromes at great distance, with a primary purpose of destroying sircraft, arises from the difficulty of selecting the most profitable targets.

b. Destruction of a large proportion of the enemy mircraft within short range striking distance of our bases would force a redistribution of the German sir strength on a reduced scale. This would accomplish in itself the reduction of enemy air opposition at any given point.

10. With the Allies' present numerical superiority in aircraft over the Axis in Europe, and in view of Germany's obvious intention to expand her fighter force to the maximum possible, it would appear that Germany's operational aircraft could be destroyed most economically by concerted offensive action at the earliest possible date. Repetition of such effort immediately prior to the mounting of an invasion, after the enemy has redistributed his already weakened air bastions, coupled with destruction of Germany's aircraft production in the interim, should achieve the degree of allied air superiority prerequisite to the auccess of the invasion, and desired for more economical strategic bombing of Axis targets.

#### IV CONCLUSIONS

1. That an "all out" effort to destroy the German Mir Force should be made at the earliest possible time.

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2. That production of German aircraft must be stopped by increasing the tempo of Combined Bomber Offensive missions against aircraft factories and assembly plants.

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5. That destruction of German fighters in the air has not reduced the German fighter strength to a satisfactory level.

4. That destruction of Germany's operational air strength must be accomplished by some method which will parmit destruction of large numbers of aircraft on the ground.

5. That a combination of night and day air attacks on German airdromes is feasible from the United Hingdom against airdromes within striking distance of our short range as well as long range aircraft, and would offer the most effective method of destroying Germany's operational aircraft.

6. That redistribution of the decreased numerical strength of the German Air Force, resulting from attacks on sircraft on sirdromes at short range, would accomplish the desired reduction in the enemy's effective sir strength.

7. That an "ell out" effort against the enemy's operational air strength should be made as soon as possible and repeated immediately prior to the mounting of an invasion of continental Europe.

#### V RECOMMENDATION

It is recommended that this paper and attached plan of attack be forwarded to General Spaatz for his consideration.

#### 5 Incls: (With original only)"

* Incl 1. Tab "A" - Analysis of Attacks on German Aircraft Production Incl 2. Tab "B" - Analysis of Disposition of Aris Fighters in Europe Incl 3. Tab "C" - Map of German Day-Fighter Disposition in Western Europe Incl 4. Tab "D" - Map of German Night-Fighter Disposition in Western Europe Incl 5. Tab "E" - Plan of Attacking German Airdromes in Western Europe

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# EFFECTS OF ATTACKS ON GERMAN AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION AND 21 Jan. 94 WEY RESERVE STRENGTH OF GERMAN AIR FORCE

#### ATTACKS ON GERMAN AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION AND INSTALLATIONS

1. Attached are lists of aircraft factories, important aircraft component works, and storage and repair depots attacked to date by United States heavy bombers, together with estimated monthly production of aircraft at times of attacks and brief statements of results.

2. Attacks on assembly plants and components works concentrated on single-engine fighter production, although two recent attacks were made on twin-engine production at Augsburg and Brunswickand one attack was made on the aircraft components works at Halberstadt which serves the JU 88 and JU 188 assembly plant at Bernburg.

3. The success of these attacks is shown by a sharp reduction in single-engine fighter production from a high of 810 during July to 600 during November (the latest available estimate). At the beginning of the series of attacks on assembly plants in July, however, production had been expanding rapidly, and it is believed that the enemy planned single-engine production at the rate of about 1000 per month by December. Total production of this type of aircraft would probably have been 1100 planes greater from August through November had the attacks not taken place. No assessments of the effect on production of more recent attacks have been made, but further reductions may be expected. Total production of operational aircraft reflects largely the changes in single-engine fighter production, reaching a high of 1640 in June and July and falling to the November figure of 1455. The recent drop in total production from October to November of 45 aircraft per month, in the absence of continued

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attacks on fighter production, may be an indication of the indirect effects on this industry of allied bombings of enemy industrial targets. The charts attached show production of operational aircraft by types of planes, and production of single-engine planes compared with scheduled production.

4. It must be emphasized that the industry has already shown remarkable powers of recuperation and in spite of its failure to increase production in November, substantial expansion of output may be expected unless attacks on assembly plants are continued.

#### RESERVE STRENGTH OF THE GERMAN AIR FORCE

1. <u>Immediate Reserves</u>. The excess of plane strength over establishment strength has sometimes been referred to as the immediate reserve. These reserves amount to approximately 38 single-engine fighter planes on the Western Front and 45 single and twin-engine fighter planes in Southern Germany. Plane strength and establishment strength are practically the same for other types of units in these areas and for all types of units on other fronts. Actual plane strength of operational aircraft, then, equals establishment strength of 4773 plus immediate reserves of 83, a total of 4856.

2. <u>Non-operational Aircraft</u>. Planes in the non-operational category anounting to 667 cannot properly be considered reserves. These units have been withdrawn for rest, refitting or overhaul. Normally, aircraft remain in the non-operational status for 6 to 8 weeks before being returned to operation. At present, the number of planes in this category is higher than usual, and the excess over the normal level may be considered a reserve (about 70% of non-operational planes are long range bombers, of

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which over one half are believed ready for return to operations). With the present size of the German Air Force, it is expected that from 300 to 400 planes will always be found in the non-operational status.

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3. <u>Stored Reserves</u> refer to operational type aircraft kept at storage depots and factory aerodromes, available to replace aircraft of German Air Force units. Early in 1940, stored reserves amounted to 4000 aircraft, an d constituted a real backlog of strength. Subsequent operations, however, drastically reduced these reserves, until at the present time the category listed as stored reserves constitutes little more than the normal flow of aircraft from production to operational units. The number of aircraft in this reserve has recently varied little from month to month and is currently estimated at 850. Since a certain minimum number of planes must be kept in this pipeline if front line strength is to be maintained, it is doubtful that this reserve except under emergency conditions could be allowed to fall below 500.

 (a) The number of each type of aircraft included in these reserves is estimated as follows:

Long Range Bombers and Long Range Reconnaissance 300 Dive Bombers 50 Single-engine fighters 275 Twin-engine fighters 125 Other Types 100

(b) Estimated allocations of reserves are:

	anean Area	150
Western	ront	250
Eastern	front	250
Central	Pool	200

850

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(c) The greater part of reserves for the Mediterranean Area are held at Munchen/Neubiberg (single-engine fighter types) but some stocks are also held at transit airfields and repair bases in the area (Vicenza and Osoppo and Belgrade/Semlin).

(d) The principal parks now supplying aircraft to the Western Front are Lippstadt and Anklam (single-engine fighter types), Gutersloh (JU 88's and other types), Werl (ME 110's), Romilly - sur - Seine (mainly long range bomber and twin-engine fighter types).

4. <u>Aircraft with Reserve Training Units (RTU's</u>) number not more than 600 planes. Occasionally these units are used for operations, but their operational efficiency is not generally above training school standards. It is estimated, however, that about 150 of these aircraft on the Western Front are likely to be used when necessary for combat purposes.

5. Operational types of training planes amounting to 800-1000 planes are not generally available for operational purposes, although a very small portion of these could probably be used under certain conditions (perhaps on the Eastern European Front) if necessary.

6. Recapitulation: Strength of German Air Force (as of 14 January 1944) Establishment Operational Strength 4773

Immediate Reserves Single-Engine Fighters, Western Front Single-Engine Fighters and Twin-Engine	38		
Single-Engine Fighters and Twin-Engine Fighters, South Germany	45 83		
Actual Operational strength Non-Operational Aircraft Total Available Strength			4856 667 5523
Stored Reserves RTU's Operational Types of Training Planes		850 600 1000	2450
Transports Total			7973 1375 9348

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#### AIRCRAFT ASSEMBLY AND COMPONENTS PLANTS ATTACKED

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	DATE	TARGET	ESTIMATED MONTHLY PRODUCTION-TIME OF ATTACK	RESULTS
	17/4/43	Bremen	80 FW 190's	Severe damage; plant evacuated. No longer in production.
	28/7	Kassel	35 FW 190's Also components plant	Not successful.
	28/7	Oschersleben	55 FW 190's	Number of buildings suffered direct hits.
	29/7	Warnemunde	50 FW 190's Also components	Severe damage.
	30/7	Kassel	35 Fw 190's	Not very successful.
	13/8	Wiener Neustandter	230 ME 109	Successful
	17/8	Regensburg	210 ME 109	Very severe.
	1/10	Wiener Neustadter	200 ME 109	Excellent.
	9/10	Marienburg	110 FW	Destroyed
	9/10	Anklam	Components FW 190	Severe damage.
	2/11	Wiener Neustadter	150 ME 109's	Major degree of destruction
	19/12	Augsburg	40 ME 410's	Unobserved.
	7/1/44 8/1/44	Reggio Emelia	40 fighters	Good results.
	9/1/44	Mirabor	Components for Wiener Neustadter	Several hits.
	11/1/44	Oschersleben	90 FW 190's	Believed destroyed.
	11/1/44	Halberstadt	Components - JU 88 & 188 for Bernburg	40% destroyed.
	11/1/44	Brunswick	55 ME 110	Severe damage.
~	16/1/44	Klagenfurt	Components ME 109's	Successful mission.

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REFAIR AND STORAGE DEPOTS ATTACKED

DATE		TARGET	RESULTS
5/4/43	Antwerp	Erla Machinewerk	Assembly shop razed.
15/5/43	Meaulte	Repair and storage	Heavy damage - especially to small assembly plant.
4/7 16/9	Nantes	Assembly plant and repair depot - bombers and sea- planes.	Main factory totally destroyed. Extensive damage assembly plant and machine shop.
14/7 24/8	Villacout	olay Important fighter repair depot.	Main machine and assembly shop and storage hangar severely damaged. Extensive damage to installations.
14/7 16/8	Le Bourge	t Storage and repair depot.	On second attack, large percentage of hangars and buildings destroyed or severely damaged.
3/9 15/9	Romilly Su Seine		Destruction of 2 large hangars and a flying personnel building. Another large storage hangar severely damaged. Extensive damage.
26/9	Reims	JU Assembly & Repair	Hangar and workshop damaged.
5/1	Bordeaux 1	Repair and Assembly	Believed good.

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GERMAN FIGHTER ASSEMBLY PLANTS LOCATION AND ESTIMATED PRODUCTION NOVEMBER THROUGH JANUARY

- 7 -

#### Single Engine Fighter Assembly Plants

ME 109 Plants	November*	December **	January***
Erla, Leipsig	200	200	200
Regensburg	150	150	175
Wiener Neustadt	50	50	50
Total ME 109	400	400	425
FW 190 Plants			
Arado, Tutow	35	40	45
Fleseler, Kassel	25	35	40
Ago, Oschersleben	90	100	40
Focke-Wulf, Sorau	50	50	50
Total FW 190	200	225	175
Total Single Engine Production	600	625	175 600

#### Twin Engine Fighter Assembly Plants

ME 110	November*	December**	January ***
Brunswick	55	55	25
Gotha	75	75	75
Unidentified ME 410	20	20	20
Augsburg	40	40	30
Budapest JU 88	20	20	20
Bernburg HE 219	65	65	40
Schwechat	5	5	5
	280	280	215


* Estimates by British Air Ministry


** Freliminary estimates


*** Tentative estimates based on preliminary reports of bomb damage to fighter plants during month and assuming no attacks during last 10 days of month.

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
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




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	ET SI	TATISTICAL SUMM	ARY			
Aut	C.G. AAF AXIS	AIR ORDER OF	BATTLE			
	1/7/13 1a: JCN	EUROPE				
SC-/	-22(Air) As	of 13 January	1944			
FRON	SECTION OF FROMT	NATION	BOMBERS	FIGHTERS	OTHERS	T
	France, Low Countries	GERMANY	381	655 4	and the second se	
	N.W. and North Germany	GERMANY	18	836	0	-
TNORY	Denmark, Central & Southern & Southern Norway	GERMANY	42	101	50	
		GERMA NY	441	1,592	86	-
field and	TOTAL WESTERN FRONT	Percent	27.8	56.6	18.6	
	TOTAL MESTERN PROMI	TOTAL Percent	441	1,592 3		
	Change from previous w	neek	+ 60	0	0	
KT2 () 277	Central & Western Mediter- renean (Southern Germany, Austria, Italy, Southern France.)	GERMANY	96	471(2)	22	
	Eastern Mediterranean, (Tugoslavia, Albania Bulgaria, Greece, Crete and Aegean Area)	GERMANY	120	174	75	
		GERMANY	216	645	97	
	TOTAL MEDITERRANEAN FRONT	Percent	13.6	23.0	21.0	_
		TOTAL	216	645	97	
	Change from previous we	Percent	- 39	- 30	20.6	
		1	1-11		+3	
	Northern Norway, Finland	GERMANY	21	49	27	
TRONT	North & Gentral Russia	GER! ANY	270	505	63	
	Southern Russia	GERMANY	639	323	189	3
NETCEUR		GERMANY	930	574	279	1
SOL	TOTAL RUSSIAN FRONT	Percent	58.6	20.4	60.4	
	ANAL ROOTAN FROM	TOTAL Percent	930 53,2	574 19.8	279 59-1	1
	Change from previous w	reek	0	0	0	
	and the second	RUMANIA	160	90	10	
1	Poland, Hungary,	Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	1
CENTRAL,	Gzechoslovakia &	TOTAL	160	90	10	
CER.		Percent	9.2	3.1	2.1	
	Change from previous w	eek	0	0	0	
	TOTAL AXIS AIR	GERMANY	1,587	2.879	1.60	1
	REINTE IN EUROPE	RUMANIA	160	2,811 90	10	4
		TOTAL	1,747	2,901 3	472	5
				-3701 (3)	416 1	2

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STATISTICAL SUMMARY

#### AXIS AIR ORDER OF BATTLE

SC-AS-22(Air)

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#### ASIA AND PACIFIC

#### As of 13 January 1944

CONT	SECTION OF FRONT	NATIONS	BOMBERS	FIGHTERS	OTHERS	TOTAL
	Japan, Kurile, Marcus and Bonin Islands, Hokkaido,	JAPAN	532	784	318	1,631
ASIA	Karafuto, Manchuria, Korea, North China.	PERCENT	35.3	39.6	43.6	38.8
-	Change from previou	s week	0	0	46	4.6
e	Con. & S. Chins, Hainan, Formosa, Indo-China, Thai- land, Burma, Malaya,	Japan	511	533	175	1,219
ASIA	Sumatra, Andamans, & China Sea	PERCENT	33.9	26.9	24.0	28 .9
	Change from previous	week	+ 1	+ 36	+ 38	+ 75
DIAIDVA HJ	Borneo, Java, Philippines, Celebee, Timor, Inner Seas, New Guinea, New Britain,	JAPAN	235	459	122	816
	New Ireland, Solomons, & South Pacific Ocean	PERCENT	15.6	23,2	16.7	19.4
SOUTH	Change from previous	week	- 29	- 63	- 7	- 99
PACIFIC	Wake, Nauru, Palau, Marshall, Mariana, &	JAPAN	228	203	114	545
	Caroline Islands,& Central Pacific Ocean	PERCENT	15.2	10.3	15.7	12.9
	Change from previous	week	+ 3	- 39	1.7	- 29
	COTAL AXIS STRENGTH EN ASIA & PACIFIC	JAPAN	1,506	1,979	729	4,214
	Change from previous	week	- 25	- 66	+ 44	- 47

SOURCE: WDOS, ORDER OF BATTLE MAP AND SC-AS-22 All figures are latest available.

MOTES: 1 While Japanese figures above are estimated total combat airplanes in operational units, figures given for Germany and Rumania represent the estimated initial equipment of operational squadrons, and do not represent an inventory. All second line and obsolete airplanes are omitted throughout.

2. The percentages listed for each nation indicate the proportion of that nation's strength located on each front. The percentages listed for the totals on each front indicate the proportion of total strength located on that front.

3. Airplanes of other Axis satellites are omitted, as, being largely obsolete, they are not an important combat factor.


Statistical Control Division Office of Management Control 21 January 1944 (2E)


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



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




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
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
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A PROPOSED PLAN FOR AIR ATTACK ON GERMAN OCCUPIED AIRDRONES IN NORTHERN FRANCE, NORTHWESTERN GERMANY AND THE LOW COUNTRIES

PAB 'NEN

## I Purpose and Scope of the Plan

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1. This plan is designed for the destruction, by air attack on airdromes, of the German day-fighter strength based in northern France, northwestern Germany, end the Low Countries.

2. The success of the plan is predicated upon the employment of the maximum possible number of all types of operational sircraft of the allied air Forces in the United Kingdom, including short range fighters, e.g., Spitfires, in sustained effort over a period of several successive days and nights.

3. Final details of organization and execution of the plan necessarily must be accomplished in the theater of operations, utilizing current information for selection of targets and determination of available forces to be used against them.

## II Selection of Targets

1. Analysis of enemy fighter disposition on the continent between Denmark and the Brest peninsula indicates that a large proportion of the day fighters are based within 100 miles of the coast within striking distance of all types of Allied operational sircraft.

2. It is especially noteworthy that approximately half the enemy fighters in the area usually are based on approximately a dozen sirdromes (See Tab "0"). A successful attack on these airdromes would afford a substantial reduction in the number of German fighters in the area, end would make for success of attacks on the remainder of the airdromes on days and nights immediately following, and for subsequent attacks on night fighter bases.

3. The most suitable targets for attack would be those airdromes on which the largest numbers of sircraft are concentrated. The use of

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"Y" service and late afternoon aerial photo reconnaissance should furnish reliable information for the selection of targets for the ensuing night and morning.

## III Allied Aircreft to be Employed

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1. To assure that each target attacked would be thoroughly bombed and the maximum number of enemy aircraft destroyed on each airdrome, our attacking forces would be divided among not more than ten targets, according to the area and number of aircraft on each. It is conservatively estimated that the numbers of aircraft listed following would be available in the Unitedkin dom for execution of the plan:

Heavy Bombers - Night	RAF 750	USAAF
Heavy Bombers - Day Medium Bombers- Night )		500
Medium Bombers- Day )	50	180
Light Bombers .	100	
Fighters and Ftr Bombers	1000	500

2. Aircraft allocated to the attack of one dirdrome would operate independently of those attacking other airdromes. Nevertheless, attacks should be coordinated and made simultaneously on all targets to dissipate opposition by the enemy.

## IV Plan of Attack

1. As previously mentioned, targets would be selected from information obtained from "Y" service and late afternoon photo reconnaissance to determine those airdrames on which the largest number of enemy ciraraft might be attacked.

2. RAF Heevy night bombers would attack about an hour before dawn or first light, allowing the minimum practicable period of darkness for withdrawal, proportioning their forces among the airdromes in accordance with the size and importance of each. Pathfinders would be used to drop flares. Their objective would be to light the targets sufficiently to permit visual bombing. Eccause few of these sirdromes are

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defended with heavy caliber flak, bombing altitudes could be 7500 to 8000 feet. Success would be further assured by the fact that the bulk of enemy night fighters would be waiting farther to the rear, expecting deeper penetration. The British bombers would carry the largest number of bombs possible, their purpose being to create the maximum of havoc and confusion.

D

3. At daybreek, Mosquitoes, or other aircraft similarly suited for low altitude attacks would drop jacks and small anti-personnel bombs of the delayed anti-hendling type on runways, taxi-strips, and in front of revetment areas. The purpose of this attack would be to further prevent or, at least, to delay for several hours, any withdrawal of aircraft from the airdromes.

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4. An hour after daybreak, or as soon as light is adequate, all available U. S. Heavy bombers would attack the airdromes with the largest number of bombs that could be carried, combining loads of 120 1b. fragmentation cluster, and 250 or 300 pound demolition bombs. They should attempt to blanket dispersal areas with systematic bomb patters. Our heavy bombers would be followed by all available B-26's end Hritish medium bombers, carrying bomb loads of the same sort. During this period, top cover in the form of offensive sweeps would be provided by F-47's, or other suitable fighters available, in event of air opposition arriving from other areas. Close escort of heavy and medium day bombers would be provided by Spitfires and P-51's at a strength of at least one escort fighter per bomber. A maximum of fighter-bomber attacks would follow the attack by the medium bombers.

5. Throughout the period of daylight attacks, patrols of lowaltitude fighters would be maintained about each airdrome, out of range of automatic weapon fire, to attack and destroy any sircraft which might be able to take off to withdraw from the area or to oppose our

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aircraft. Low altitude fighters, going in at a minimum altitude to avoid radar, and ahead of the day bombers whose higher approach inevitably would be detected, should find good hunting among any enemy aircraft able to take off to intercept the bambers.

6. Photo reconnaissance of each sirdrome target would be made immediately after the attacks, and flash damage assessment made. If damage to enemy sircraft was not complete on a given sirdrome, it should be attacked again on the following day.

## V Attack of Night Fighter Airdromes

1 1. Following the series of attacks on the day fighter dromes, a similar plan might well be applied to energy night fighter bases in the same areas. (See Tab "C")

2. Night fighters, of course, might be expected to be sinterne at any time Allied night bombers are over Europe. Immobilizing them on the ground could herdly be accomplished by night bombing. A program of night bombing missions, designed to lure into the air the largest possible number of enemy night fighters during the late night hours, should result in immobilizing these enemy aircraft at dawn, when they are on the ground for refueling and rearming. They might then be profitably attacked by our day forces.


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
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		Arch
RECORD O	F MEETING HELD ON 20th 1	AT, 3 1814
11 - 10	OM 18/II,AIR MINISTRY,VI	
Subject: PLAN	OR RETALIATORY GAS ATT.	TO:
	TYDE GENERAL	4 4
	PRESENT	
<u>Air Ministry</u>	Air Commodore Bufton Wing Commander Morley Wing Commander Tessell Air Commodore Collier	D.B.Ops.(Chairman) B.Ops.1. B.Ops.2(b) D. ofE,(c)
Bomber Command	Group Captain Inness Squadron Leader Pawcett	DECLASSIFIED EO 11652
U.S.St.A.P.E.	Colonel R.D.Hughes 🖌 Colonel Baum Major Ivensen	
<u>M.E.W.</u>	D	ECLASSIFIED Memo 10 May 61

1. The attached draft record of the discussion is forwarded.

2. It would be appreciated if you would submit your comments in amplification or modification of the draft as soon as possible, in order that they may be included in a final draft which can be discussed at the next meeting which is to be held at 14.45 hours on Wednesday next, 24th May, in Room 18/XI, Air Ministry, Whitehall.

JoB Han

Air Commodore. Director of Bomber Overstions.

21st May, 1944.



## LLAN MILLIALORY LAG ATTION OF BORE

X SECTO

## Introduction

Should the energ initiate chemical variate in "Countries", or otherwise, the Alled Sovernments will decide whether retaliation is to be confined to the sphere of tectical operations assuming the energy uses gas in this sphere only, or whether retaliation shall include the unrestricted use of gas against all types of objectives in German, alone, or in German; and the Satellite Countries. Sectical economy flues

In the tackies sphere, the private and initiate on warfare in the tackies sphere, the private and initiate on warfare aroundly in the tackets addres. In order to determine whether the structure backet torses are in a position to applor gas weapons effectively in a tackets rule, it is reconnected that S.T.A.C.F. should call together the faulth a Doubities consisting of representatives of the Air Staff, U.J.St.A.F.T. Finder Communi, die and 15th Air Forger, A.C.A.F. and if arry though to excelles fully the problems involved and to make recommendations as to the optimum coployment of gas. It is recommended further that this same domaities include recommendations as to the optimum employment of gas by the factical why Forger.

## trateric Engloyment of das.

In considering the means by which chemical weapons can be applyed and officially in strate is attacks on Germany it is assumed that the respective Governments have directed the unrestricted use of galagainst all types of objectives in Germany. It is clear that in such circumstances either of two conditions at ht exist;-

(1) The allied Governments agree simply that chusical contare they be used without restriction against Goreany.

A this deep the struteric books r forces are free to

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contribute towards the dime of the existing bomber policy.

Flux I at Aprondix 'A' has been produced on this assumption.

11) The adjed Governments derive not only to exclude the ical offers without restriction scainst Germany but to could of the the heaviest scale becinst. Control of German constation, and in the conner best colculated to bring short a college of

> In this case a consists change of current borbing solids which the involved and the blostives for strategic attuck would be selected alto the belogt of schirving a possible involve you abe derived people, with sea as the private moment.

eache Minn.

A. The idda contents of the treat the sir is an untried more of "ar. This follow, a salid of its response available to be, not to the subor forces and an lies of the compone available to be, not to the resolution difficulties of exploring a sufficient welches for a to the subord torrow a decision unless it is snown that more to in Gorgany is at such a critically too lovel that the une of som in this manner but if the scales. In the spaces of first ovicenes that such a condition exist, it is continened that it would be next analyse to abandon the exist the bothins polic, the runcess of which has been continuously and accurately evaluated, in favour of one whose actualities that the output be incalcurable.

2. The offectiveness of our well tried high explosive and incendiary versions will, however, be waterially increased by the confidementary use of one weapons. That is at Appendix 'A' has becordingly been eveloped with the object of employing chemical

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weapons in the sammer best calculated to contribute to the success of current boubing polic. As the value of chemical weapons has not yet been proved by experience, provision has also been made in the than for large scale experimental attacks with the object of provising data on which to base subsequent polic.

6. In the light of the above, Flan I should be udepted. Flan II should be to lowented only if there is overshelming evidence that a critically low state of morale exists in Gordan.

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TENDIX. LAT.

PLAN I

## Introductio

In the initiation of the warfare by the energy, the strateric bonner forces rill make uncestricted use of chemical confere weapons in pursuance of their current leading rolley. The alteration will be involved in the collection or the priority of current bombing objectives, but chemical warfare soop as will be employed in the attack of each objectives in the unanner best a louisted to increase the effectiveness of the reaches.

3. No operational operations is as not available to thirder the relative value of chamical so pens in area attack as compared with H.S. and including scapens. Here scale operations in the nature of trials we, therefore, desirable in order that such experience can be coince quickly. Methods of engloying gas serpons must be solified progressively in the light of the experience gained.

## Chr Loymon &

4. On the initiation of chemical warfare, the R.A.P. and U.I. strategic als forces will employ the weapons in the manner indicated coloni-

## .A.F. Bodbar Comund

(a) R....P. Bosber Command will launch heavy series ministers attacks on selected industrial centros. The object will be to achieve within the builtup areas of these centros the concentrations of sus recommands in Forton Paper 1 30/2 (T. 4855) of the 12th ...pril, 1943. These donalties should be reported as an obsolute minimum.

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sifficult problems of decontamination. The T H T S P A Ε Then the S U N L A enters role. I F Ι E D of the attack. 0973

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and mustard will prolong the period over which respirators must be worn and will enforce the wearing of full anti-mas clothing.

(1) Num the effects of the full scale yes attacks have been assessed, our policy for the employtunt of the seconds must be re-examined. If the effect when German war economy is estimated to be less than that achieved through incondingy whach, the further employment of the scopens oust be in a complementary role with incondicties on the rither scopen. On the other hand, if the effect successful results are achieved, a theo for an ell-out we sittled such as outlined in Figh I would merit serious consideration

## Sth and 15th Ale Porces

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(i) then conditions are such that viewel borbing is resulted it is recommended topt restantion to overload in the following corrections which will be subject to modification in the light of experionce -

(a) <u>1.3. Cargels</u> 952 H.C., 50 photogene

- (ii) Then conditions permit all area altick through overcast, these are to be ends in the same namer as the heav scale experimental attacks being undertaken by ...., somber Commun. It is reducted that the loads carried be similar, i.e. 75, educard, 25, i.e. In this case three uncentral missions are to be flown scaling the second dimensions are to be flown scaling the overcord cities with Ferlin succested as the orientic termet.
- 111) Subsequent area attack policy will be subject to revision in the light of the experience of heav; scale mustard attacks which may be gained by the U.S.strategic oir forces P.A.F. Bomber Command.

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APPE DIX 'B'

## FLAN II

## RETALIATORY GAS ATTACK ON GERMANY

## Introduction

In the event of the Allied Governments deciding to retaliste with gas against Germany on the heaviest possible scale against centres of population with the object of bringing about a collapse of G rman morale, the following Plan will be brought into effect.

### Objectives

2. Objectives have been aslected with the object of ensuring that attacks are directed against the maximum concentrations of copulation covering as wide a geographical area as possible, and embracing these centres which have not so far been subjected to heavy air bombariment and these which are thought likely to be psychologically sensitive to gas attack.

3. Bearing in sind the distribution of the bomber forces and the limited penetration of night bomber forces in the summer menths, targets have been provisionally allocated as follows:

-bth Alt Force 30 "

4. The targets selected and their ellocations to commands Shear alteration of the Energy be cause Branch (F.O. and M.E.T.) showing the basis of selection is of equination at innex II.

5. In the case of attacks by the R.A.F. Bomber Command, the following overall bomb loads are recommended:

Mustard 50 Phosgene 25 H.E. 25

/Supplies...

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Supplies will not be sufficient to enable these proportions to b maintained. They should, however, be maintained within the limitations of each monthly allocation of gas weapons, and when these are expended subsequent attacks within the month should employ gas only as a harassing agent. 6. The U.S. strategic bombers will employ the same proportions as far as phosgens stocks permit. 7. The quantities of phosgene weapons advocated above are to be employed subject to adequate provision maving been made for the use of phosgene in textical operations, for which it is especially suitable.

 Any shorteges in phoagene weapons are to be made good by the substitution of musterd weapons.



ROVISIONAL ALLOCATION OF TARGUTS FOR GAS ATTACK UNDER PLAN II

(In Order of Priority)

R.A.P. BOMBER COMMAND (15 targets)

Vestern Germany

Essen Cologne Duisburg Dusseldorf Gelsenkirchen Wuppertal Bochum Oberhausen/Nulhaim Munater Solingen Hagen Krefeld Asehen Nunchen-Gladbach Romscheid

· U.S. 8th .IR IOACE (30 targets)

W. Germany S. J. Germany mburg Frenkfurt/Heir men Mannheim/Ludwigshei Lel Mannheim/Ludwigshei nover Meinz runswick Brerbrucken beck Dermatnat lelefeld mnbruck sstock/Wornemunde lhelmshaven

1.S. 15th AIR FORCE (15 targets)

Southern Germany

Munich Stuttgart Nuremburg Freiburg/1/B Narlsruhe Augsburg Heilbronn-Neckarsul Furth Pforzheim Regensburg Ulm N & Centrol <u>Germany</u> Berlin Dreaden Laipaig Chomnitz Hogdeburg Stettin Dessou Helle Potesson Dessou

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ANNEX II

## TARGOT PRIORITIES FOR CHEMICAL WARFARE ATTACK AGAINST GERMAN TOWNS

## I. INTRODUCTION

TOP SECRET

This paper is concerned with the selection of the German towns against which C.W. attacks should be directed on the assumptions that :-

- a) unrestricted C.W. attack of the civilian population of Germany proper (but not Austria) has been approved;
- b) the primery objective of the attack would be the morale of the civil population;
- c) the whole of the resources of the U.S. 8th and 15th Air Forces and of R.A.F. Bomber Command are available for the purpose.

## II. FACTORS RELEVANT TO THE CHOICE OF TARGETS

If the primary object of this attack would be to break civilian morale it would be wise to aim at the maximum percentage of the enemy's total population which can be covered effectively with the forces evaluable.

If the maximum effect is to be obtained on morale, individual targets should be selected from every geographical area of Germany so that no section of the population remains entirely untouched.

Although the initial effect of the use of an unknown and much fored weapon will be considerable everywhere, it will be greatest in Southern, South-Restorn and Eastern Germany (i. . Reveris, Sexany and Silesis) which have been compositively lightly affected hitherto and have not therefore been conditioned to air stracks of any kind to the same extent as the Rhineland and Contral and N.W. Germany.

## III. ANALYSIS OF GERMAN TOWNS

The population of the usion dorman towns has altered considerably due to evacuation and has in the aggregate been reduced since the refugees from the large towns have been redistributed emong the small towns and in rural districts rather than in other large towns. Accurate computation of the present population of individual towns is impossible. Although fairly accurate estimates can be made by study of evacuation orders etc. of the numbers evacuated from time to time, there is no sure means of assessing the volume of the drift beet which is known in many cases to have been considerable.

Novertheless on ottempt has been made in Appendix I. to estimate the population of the 60 largest towns in Germany as at March 31st 1944 taking into account evacuation and the subsequent return of population. Figures of "normal" population are given for comparison. These towns are estimated to have an aggregate current population of over 22 million persons, which is rather more than one-quarter of the total population of Greater Germany.

Estimates of population alone, however, do not give an adequate guide to comparative importance of German towns an

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-2-targets for C.W. sttack. In the more heavily damaged towns the population is dispersed to a large extent in the suburbs and in the "ahanty cities" which are oppearing to an increasing extent in woods and open spaces on the outskirts. In so far as the more densely built-up portions of these towns have been destroyed and are now largely uninhabited the population by reason of its greater dispersal will be less vulnerable to C.W. attack of a given weight and such towns must consequently be considered less effective targets than these in which damage in previous attacks has not been so severe. so severe.

A column has therefore been included in appendix I. to show the percentage of buildings which have been seriously damaged in each town (as calculated by R.E.S) and in order to provide a rough factor of current comparative importance which takes into account the element of vulnerability, this percentage has been applied to the estimate of current repulation to give a "target factor".

In order to facilitate the ellocation of targets between the verious Companies the towns have been dessified in geo-graphical areas conforming roughly to current operational ennebilitica.

(1) is a result of the enclysic described above, the towns most suitable as targets for C.W. stack are assessed as follows. Comparison target values, based on as incled present population and damage status, are given by means of the "target factor."

(Accessible to night attack by R.A.F. Bomber Commond during the summer months).

	Torget Pocto:
Cologne	
Dulaburg	
Dusseldorf	
Wuppertal	
Wiesbaden	
Oberhousen	
	100
Krefeld	
Dermstadt	
Anchen	
Hulheim	
Munchen-Gladbach	
Remscheid	40 -

B. M.W. OR WY.

(Accessible to R.A.F. Reaber Command after the end of July).

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IV. CONCLUSIONS

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	Henovor Brunswick	
	Luback Biolefeld.	
	Osnabruck Rostock/Warnemunde	
	7.lhelmsheven	60
	C. MORTHERN & OBTITUAL GENERATY	
	Barlin Dresdon Leipzig	2,250 650 488
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S		175 • 136
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A S		115 100
S 1	3. RAGIJEN GERMANY	
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E D	Breslau Konigsberg	
D	Denzig Hindenburg	
	Gleiwitz Beuthen	
	Gurlitz	
	P. <u>SOUTHERU GERMANN</u> (Accessible to U.S. 15th Air Pr	
	Monich	
	Nuremburg Augsburg	289 87
	Valarard .	
		/(ii)
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(ii) Attack of all the 55 towns listed above would offect more than 55 of the population of Greater Germany. The outstanding targets for C.7. attack, having regard to their size and provious history, and agardless of location

Borlin Breslau Dresden Hunich

(111) The list furnished above any not provide sufficient targets within range of the normal genetration of the U.S. 15th , ir Firce. There is, unfortunately, an insufficiency of large towns in South Germany. A supplementary list of smaller towns in South Germany from which solutional targets could be Second is given in Appendix II.

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	541,000	4.20,000		
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PPEADIX II

SULLER TOWNS IN SOUTH GREADING

(Accessible to U.S. 15th L.F.)

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99,000	20,000	

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APPRACIALL N OF STRAILEDIC GAS SEFORT TO BE SUPLOYED IN THE EVENT OF THE OUTBREAK OF CHEMICAL WARFARE

opendix A - Computation of the number of Weapons and sorties required each month.

Appendix B - Statement of production and estimated expenditure including note on Tactical (ir Porce requirements.

### Intraductio

1. Gas is an untried weapon in air warfare. The Paper "Attack on Cities with Gas" (No.1880/P prepared by Chemical Derence Experimental Station, Porton), has been taken as a basis for this appreciation, which attempt to assess the gas effort that can be employed tost effectively in the event of the outbreak of Chemical Warfare.

**

### Beographical conclderations

2. Strategic g is warfare should be directed only against energy territory excluding energy occupied territory. Germany, hungar, Bulgari and Rumania are the only energy countries open to attack at the present time by Anglo-American strategic bomber fords. As our main offensive is directed ag inst Germany, gas attacks against dingary, Bulgaria and Rumania would be diversionary attacks; they are therefore omitted from these considerations; if they were made they would be at the expense of attacks against Germany.

3. The possibility of strategic bombers being called upon to use gas in a tastical role against targets in decupied Verritories must not be overlooked, though the computation of gas effort would not be affect i since such attacks would be at the expense of the strategical copley at of these forces. Such tactical operations could normally fail within the province of the Tactical Air Forces for which provision has been made as in Absendix 'B'.

### Attacks on Japan are not considered in this paper.

4. Attacks against terminy can be delivered from bases in the United singles and in Italy. The majority of suitable targets in Germany are within range of aircraft based in the United Kingdom. Since gas seepons are difficult to transport and they do not store well in hot countries any small advantage them might be gained by conducting chemical warfare from bases in Italy would be outweighed by the difficulties of transportation of gas weapons for air use. It is therefore considered that major as attacks against Germany should be consucted only from the strategic bomber bases in the United Kingdom. Chemical weapons could, however, be used to great advantage from overside bases in heresing attacks. These are i alt with later in a regraph 8(ii).

## So cial characteristics of weapons to be employed.

5. Phoseche is a non-persistent gas. Since complete arotestion egainst it is afforded by an efficient gas mask, surprise is a most important factor inits use. In order to obtain the maximum advantage from Phoseche, it is desirable that the attack should open with a moderate concentration of incendiaries, to bring out fire fighting personnel, and with some high explosive to ventilate the buildings. To obtain maximum effect from initial ettacks by hosgene high explosive and incendiary bombs and chemical weapons

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(Annex I contd.

should therefore be carried in some ratio of the order of 25, 25 and 50% respectively of the total load in a given raid. It is, however, axiomatic that the quantities of phosgene should be sufficient to achieve complete saturation of the target area.

-2-

6. Phosgene can cause heavy essualties, particularly among the unprepared. After the first few attacks when surprise has largely been exploited and the population are armed with wellfitting gas masks, its potential effect becomes less. After the initial attacks it should be used spasmodically with the object of achieving surprise.

7. Since Hustir's gas is persistent, areas attacked with this gas are likely to remain dengerous for a considerable time according to the concentration achieved, temperature, and wather conditions. A sufficiently havy and concentrated attack with Hustard might compel the energy to evacuate the target area. To compel such action in any large toom or city would be to render it particularly vulnerable to subsequent incending attack. The possibilities of this testic shoul be nost evenfully explored, particularly in relation to anylight gro states followed closely by incendingy attack at night.

### ituous of employment of rus.

8. Chemical weapens can be employed in two main ways --

- (1) Heavy so is an a streas, involving high concentrations of gue designed to inflict the maximum number of casualties, to cause widespreed disorganisation and to aff et morel.
- (ii) Herassing attacks designed to chuse frequent gas alorns involving full nti-ges measures, and to increase the electiveness of accompanying incendiary attacks.

### deuvy scale gas attacks.

9. The implication of "all-out" was warfare is that attacks will be sind primarily toroting means disorgonis tion in the target area, inflicting cost ties upon the civilian couldtion, and thus affecting moral. To achieve success in this form of the k it would be necessary to launen repeated fall scale gas attacks on the most dencely populated centres. This course would have its maximum effort at the outset. Attacks must be sustained on a sufficient scale to offset the affects of the increasing efficiency of the encay's intigemeasures which we must expect.

10. The effectiveness of attacks on the above scale is as yet improven: in lounching them, therefore, it is essential that the weight of gas delivered should tend to exceed the amount calculated as new sary to produce saturation at the target selected. Building in mind the size of the forces available and the vagaries of the weather, attacks should be confined to a few centres to obtain the maximum effect.

11. In contrast with the potentialities of heavy scale gas attack we must not overlook to fact that the average city can be virtually destroyed, as opposed to innobilised temporarily, by a few large

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scale incendiary raids. The efficacy of our incendiary and H.E. weapons is established, and it would be unwise drastically to curtail their us when chemical warfare starts. Moreover the supply of mas weapons is limited and this factor too will i termine the frequency with which major gas attacks can be lamehed.

12. Unless encay morele has reached a critically low level at which gas attacks on a heavy scale were decisive in themselves, the available gas effort would best be concentrated into a limited number of neavy severateds per month supported by attacks in which normal weapons constitute the major part of the total bomb loads.

### threas in theers by Grs.

17. As the supply of gas weapons is limited we should consider whether gas can apefully be employed in support of our present forms of attack and pre-ent weapons. The use of gas in conjunction with high explosive and inconducty bombs would force fire-fighting period. All to weap anti-use equipment with consequent loss of invsic 1 efficiency which would increase proportionately the effectiveness of the incentiory/h.d. thacks. Gas would, therefore, be a valuable complement to our existing forms of attack. It should be borne in min , however, that its effectiveness in such a role will be lar bly document upon the degree of success attained in the preceding larg -complements.

14. Our gas supplies are sufficient to permit us to meant a limited number of fall scale gas attacks each month, and, in addition, to meet the requirements of the employment of gas as a complement to him explosive an incending meapens.

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12. Although cherical vergens muy muse considerable risualties and disorganisation and adversely affect morals, they can inflict little perminent diade to property and parmot, of themesives critically reduce the energy's industrial petential.

16. Bearing in mind the size of the bosher forces and the supplies of gas weapons vailable to us, ell-out gas attack is unlikely, in itself, to force a decision whees morals in Germany is at such a critically low level that the use of gas in this manner would the the scales.

17. The effectiveness of our well tried high explosive and incendiary weapons would be materially increased by the complementary use of gas weapons.

18. On the outbroad of chemical must be available supplies of gas weapons should be employed firstly in carrying out a limited number of heavy scale tracks against carefully selected targets, and secondly to exhibit the success of such tracks by employing gas weapons as a marksing agent for the purpose of increasing the freetiveness of our normal methods of stack.

Scale of Gas Measons in heavy scale area attacks.

13. <u>Phosgene</u>. After the first surprise attacks no great advantage can be expected by extensive use of this weapon. Therefore only a very small number of attacks may be required, as and

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
when the supprise element can be reintroduced. Appendix A shows the number of we pons and sorties required to carry out an attack against a target such as Frankfurt.

-4-

20. <u>Mustari.</u> Sustari attacks in sufficient and frequent concentration may completely immobilise a city or insustrial area, and result in its immediate and total evacuation. The effects might persist for considerable periods. The use of mustard on a greater code than hosgene is therefore a vocated. To prevent recovery of activity repeat attacks are necessary. . pendix 's' shows the sumber of compone and sorties required for effective attacks gainst a target such as Frankfurt.

### Scale of Gas Weapons in horassing attacks.

21. Then used is a horizoning agent in conjunction with incendiary and high explosive bombs, the factics employed should ensure that the chemical mappins full as for as practicable in the same area as the N.M. and I.S's. full. Provision for the use of gas weapons in this role has been used on the basis of 1 x 500 lb. as weapon per newly irrest sortie. Appendix ',' shows the number of weapons and sorties needed to not this requirement.



To attack on average size German city ("rankfurt) os the scale as leid down in the scove mentioned paper allowing for 25 of the bomba to remen the target rem would be 1.,800 x 65 lt. bombs or for 8 att ess ......

# Marassing Attacks - Mustard

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A E Ι S U N L A S I F Ι

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Of the 9,442 bombing sorties to be flown in June 1944, provision of 65 15. bombs should be made on the basis of three to one 500 15. container, for two-thirds of the sorties

	equivalent	350
18,000	to	2,347
95,684		29 Wal

76,800 involving 1,410

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From the above calculations it will be noted that of the total estimated effort of 11,254 sorties which will be available in June 1944, provision will be date for 1,822 to carry 100 gas loads for use in a jor gas attacks. In equil number (1,822) of sup orting aircrift carrying M.d./I.m. loads will carteripate in these major attacks, which will thus about a total of 3,044 sorties (i.e., up roximately one-third of the total effort for the month).

These estimates are based on the total weight of gas to be carried in an attack. the tactical distribution of the loads any well differ in the light of operational conditions obtaining

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APENDIX 'B'

### SHEMICAL VERGARE

## HOFTHLY SCREEDITURS OF VISCONS ON THE SUTTING SOUCHT STATISTICS, 1944 SUGD OF THE SECTION STOLETISS SPECIES

(Including Tactic 1 Air Porce requirements)

NOTE:

The Nortic 1 Air Norde e quirements over a 12 months' period have been estimated, in conjunction with No.21 arey Group as follows :-

onds, 500 lb. 1.d., hospene - 5.900

		walapon, Mu	-14,400
+		11 Be	
		astard	-48,200

.C.I., M.M. (500 1b.) Justard - 1,008

(These Figures include a 50% oper tional margin).

Taking the bove into account, the following is a statement of the position, on the busis of the estimated sorties, on the 1st June, 1944 :-

	op lu.h.C.somb.	500 1b.L.C. Bomi
Estimated monthly production	125,000	15,000
Expenditure. (1) Heavy scale atticks:	76,800	7,300
(ii) Satisated world-wide sorties in harassing attacks	18,884	5,147
(iii) T.A.F. requirements	3,600	
	99,384	10,902
Bolonie for Reserve	25,716	4,078

Pending the production of the SOC Pr. L.C. Sustard weapon the existing stocks of SEO 15. L.C. Mustard bombs will have to be used on the SS in cluster is unsuitable for T.R.F. sircreft stowages. In this statement the SS 15. equivalent has nevertheless been shown to assist in computing Mustard requirements.

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## ANNEX II

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EMPLOYMENT OF THE ANGLO-MERICAN FORCE IN RETALL. FION

owing to the dangerous nature of rhosgene, these weapons are nold in central storage, approximately seven days behind the operational units. Pubsgene cannot therefore be used in the initial stages unless sufficient notice is given.

5. Phosgene is nost villable as a surprise weapon expatie of creating heavy convoltion among the appropriation of the first few atticks when surprise has been exploited and the population are using well-fitting features, it ceases to be so effective. Ifter the initial attacks, therefore, it should only be used consionally, it widely esparated intervals, when an element of surprise might again be achieved.

4. Phosgene would not cause any serious or lasting humage to industrial plant and therefore would not seriously impede the enemy's war industry.

5. Nastard is a persistent gas. Areas stacked with this agent are likely to be angerous to the population for periods consider-ably in excess of 24 nours or more seconding to the concentration achieved, temperature and weather conditions. The danger may persist for a much longer period, until the area has been thoroughly decontaminated. A sufficiently heavy concentration would compel the enemy to evacuate the target area. Thus after neavy mistori attack a city would be remered more vulnerable to be truction by subsequent incendiory attack.

7. The ffect of ras attacks on cities is in direct ratio to the density of the population in the area attacked. The most densely populated areas should therefore be chosen for area attack.

8. Anti-gus measures seriously homper defence organisations. All bombing attacks should therefore include a percentage of gus bombs, to enforce these conditions.

9. As chemical weapons to not cause serious dam ge to industrial plants, attacks arginst precise targets should continue to be undertaken with high explosive and incendiary bombs with a small percentage of gas only.

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#### (Annex II contd.)

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#### Ares Attocks

10. <u>Phosesne</u>. In ediately on receipt of orders for retaliation with gas, heavy attacks should be made by both the British and American forces based in the United Kingdom, on the most suitable densely populated areas. Belection of targets from a mutually agreed list would be governed by the conditions growalling at the tim., e.g., meteorological conditions, nours of uarkness, enemy actions and extent of progressive destruction of German cities.

11. Concentration of gas, as laid down in Paper No.1230/2 "Attack on Oities with Gas", prepared by Chamical Defence Experimental Station, Porton, should be employed as a minimum for these attacks. To exploit the element of surprise, as many targets as practicable should be attacked in the shortest possible time with "hose no during the opening stages.

10. The only co-ordination required between the British and American Forces for non-persistent gas at wexa is the allocation of suitable targets.

13. Mustaid. Mustard attacks should be directed spainst densely populated are s. These attacks should be co-ordinated and the ormore should follow in q isk succession to create conditions which would enforce an evacuation of the target area. Incoming pomos could subsequently be employed with advantage.

14. Close co-contation between the British and emerican Forces is required for attacks with persistent gas. A schedule of suitable targets, agreed by both forces, should be kept up-to-acte to minimize the delay in erranging fully co-ordinate attacks.

#### Marassing Attacks.

15. All nich explosive and incendiary bomb stocks subsequent to the outbrook of shamled worfers should include a propertion of gas woons (principally Justical) related simultaneously to Full in the same trat. Second have been provisioned for this surgess on the sole of one 500 lb, weapon per heavy bomber sortic.

#### Action required.


16. Lists of targets suitable for full-scale Phosgene and mustari attacks should be agreed between the British and American air Forees. These anould :-


- (1) show the priorities of targets coording to valuerability and importance in the energy's war economy:
- (11) be divided into mutable say targets for U.S.A.F. and night targ ts for R.A.F. for chargene attacks;
- (111) show the most suitable targets for both day and night attack by U.S.A.A.P. and R. .P. respectively, employing Mustard;
- (iv) be kept under revision. As targets are reduced by bombing attacks they should be deleted from the schedule or reduced to a lower priority.

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
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
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PLAN FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE STRATEGIC AIR FORCES

#### 1. THE AIM

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The aim can be restated as expressed by the combined Chiefs of Staff at Sextant as "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital lines of communication, and the material reduction of German air combat strength by the successful prosecution of the Combined Bomber Offensive from all convenient bases". It is essential to point out that the destruction of German fighter production and the diminution of the German fighter forces in being was not an aim of itself, but a means of rendering the main aim now readily attainable.

#### 2. APPRECIATION OF THE PRESENT SITUATION

The "Second Front" in the West has been opened. The German Army in Italy is in full retreat beyond Rome; and a major Russian offensive on the Eastern Front is imminent. American and British air strengths in the Western and Mediterranean Theaters have vastly increased, and as the result of this and our attacks, the German Air Force is no longer able to prevent the destruction by our Air Forces of any system of targets which we may now select for the accomplishment of our main aim. The only factors that can prevent success are:

a. A misapplication of our forces by their direction against unprofitable target systems.

b. The continued direction of our forces at previously profitable systems beyond the point where the law of dimishing returns comes into effect.

c. Unpredictably adverse weather.

#### 3. GUIDING FRINCIPLES

In the formulation of any plan for the employment of the Strategic Air Forces at this time, the following principles must govern the action to be adopted:


a. It must, in the shortest possible time, make a maximum contribution to the success of our ground armies by rendering the enemy's armed forces incapable of effective resistance.

b. It must provide for sufficient counter-air force action to ensure that the German Air Force continues to be incapable of interfering with the accomplishment of our main sim.

c. It must provide for the most economic use of our Air Forces. Large though these Air Forces are, they are not large enough to accomplish our aims if effort is expended on profitless objectives. Time is also a critical element, and misdirection at the very least causes delay, which, in turn, directly results in vestly increased camualties to all our armed forces on all fronts.

#### 4. OBJECTIVES SELECTED FOR STRATEGIC ATTACK

All target systems have been re-examined in the light of the present situation, and systems have been selected based upon the conclusions that attacks against them are most likely to accomplish our aims. These systems



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most nearly of all conform to the requirements stipulated in the Guiding Principles, and provide essential tactical latitude.

a. The selected systems listed in order of priority for attack are:

(1) PETROLEUM INDUSTRY WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ligence and the enemy's reaction ON GASOLINE (PETROL) INCLUDING STORAGE

Estimated Effects: Current intelto the recent attacks on oil by the U.S. Strategic Air Force indicate that Germany is facing an cil crisis which can probably be turned into military collapse if the efforts of all available Air Forces are simultaneously directed ruthlessly against this one system of targets.

(2) BALL BEARING INDUSTRY Estimated Effects: This industry has already been heavily attacked and production reduced by around 50%. Intelligence indicates a grave ball bearing shortage, and all further reductions in output will directly effect military production.

(3) TANK INDUSTRY AND ORDNANCE DEPOTS

(4) MOTOR TRANSPORT

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Estimated Effects: Most recent evidence indicates that the enemy is suffering from a shortage of the latest types of heavy tanks; also that the bottleneck is the production of tank engines and gearboxes. The manufacture of these is concentrated in a very few targets and it is expected that destruction of these will seriously interrupt the flow of tanks to his armed forces. This interruption can be accentuated and effected more quickly by additional attacks on selected tank and ordnance depots.

Estimated Effects: Germany is now suffering from a shortage of military transport vehicles and spare parts to maintain her present equipment and services. It is expected to further aggravate this situation by attacks on the major M/T vehicle producers in Axis-Occupied Europe.

4. <u>Counter-Air Force Action:</u> The requisite intensity of Counter-Air Force action, both to ensure the destruction of the foregoing systems of targets and to maintain air supremacy in the battle area, must now be judged by the principal Air Commanders only. The German Air Force can no longer be

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given a rigid place in any priority list and can only be economically policed if attacks on it are fitted in with other operations at the discretion of the Air Commander.

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c. The above is a program for Strategic bombing which should be instituted immediately. It is emphasised that the primary objective is the denial to the enemy's armed forces of oil. The other target systems, of tanks and motor vehicles, have been added because of their vulnerability and great importance to the enemy's ground forces.

d. Ample effort is available in the U.S. Strategic Air Forces and R.A.F. Bomber Command to destroy the German oil industry, provided that the use of that portion of their effort which may be required for the direct support of our ground forces is intelligently and economically planned and executed.

#### 5. DIRECT SUPPORT OF GROUND ARMIES BY STRATEGIC AIR FORCES

It is considered that the most effective use of the Strategic Air Forces in direct support of the ground armies is to implement that portion which is beyond the capabilities of the Tactical Air Forces of the action outlined in the paper by Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force G-2 Intelligence Division No. SHAEF/961 GX/5/Int, dated 3 June 1944, Sub: "Use of Air Power Against Enemy Military Transport and Supplies." In brief, this paper recommends the effecting and maintaining of three rings of railroad interdiction between the battle area and Germany by the destruction of some 80 selected railroad bridges. An appreciable percentage of these bridges have already been destroyed. It also recommends the intensification of the strategic attack on oil by the continuance of tactical attacks against enemy fuel storage and bulk supplies of finished oil products in the possession of the enemy's armed forces. (This paper is attached as Appendix F.) In this connection, the experience of the last 60 days has clearly shown that bridges can be effectively destroyed by our Air Forces with a very modest outlay of effort.

6. Inclosed herewith are the following Appendices:

Appendix A. Priority targets in the Petroleum Industry, with map showing locations.

Appendix B. Priority targets in the Ball Bearing Industry.

Appendix C. Priority targets in the Tank Industry and Depots.

Appendix D. Priority targets in the Motor Transport Industry.

Appendix E. Current priority targets for policing of German Air Force, with map showing locations. (Map includes Ball Bearing Targets)

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<u>Appendix F.</u> Paper Nc. SHAEF/961/CX/5/Int, dated 8 June 1944, subj: "Use of Air Power against Enemy Military Transport and Supplies."

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#### APPENDIX 4

#### OIL INDUSTRY

### 1. SYNTHETIC OIL FLANTS

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	GEISENKIRCH SCHOLVEN WESSELING HOMHERG CASTROP RAU			11 11 11 11	11 11 11 11	n ) n ) n )	R.	TABLE FOR A.F. TACK		

### 2. OIL REFINERIES

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### EIGHTH AIR FORCE

- 1. Rhonania.-Ossag. Harburg.
- 2. Eurotank, Hamburg. 3. Ebano, Harburg.

- Loano, Harburg.
   Misburg. Hannover.
   Mawag. Ostermoor. Kiel Canel.
   Rienania Ossag. Hemburg. (Grasbrook)
   Rhenania Ossag. Monheim. Nr. Cologne.
   Score No. Oslabbrugen. Mr. Brenen.

- Soc-Vac. Oslebshausen. Mr. Bremen.
   Deutche Gasolin. Enmerich. North of Ruhr.
   Erdoelraff. Salzbergen. S. of Enden.

#### FIFTEENTH / IR FORCE

- 1. Prahova. Bucharest.
- Apollo. Bratislevs.
   Shell. Vienns. (Florisdorf).
   Lobau. Vienns.


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- Kegran. Vienna.
   Czepel. Budapest. Hungary.
   Almas Fusito. Hungary.
   Szony. Hungary.


All targets are subject to change as intelligence may indicate from time to time.




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



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
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#### CON AFTEREIX-BIN TOTAL

BALL BEARINGS

- 1. D.K.F. LEIPZIG
- 2. KUGELFISCHER. EBELSBACH.
- 3. WERK II. SCHWEINFURT.
- 4. JAEGER. WUFPERTAC.
- 5. V.K.F. BAD CONSTATT.

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APPENDIX C

TANK INDUSTRY AND DEPOTS

1. TANK ENGINES

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L Α S I F I E D NORDEUISCHE MOTORENBAU. BERLIN MAYBACH. FRIEDRICHSHAFEN (RE-AITACK)

2. DEPOIS

MAGDEBURG/KOENIGSBORN (RE-ATTACK)

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
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
### AIR CRAFT

	or Acce y from		. Place	Make	Target No.
1	U.K.	Erla (Leipzig)	<u>a</u> Heiterblick <u>b</u> Abtnaundorf <u>c</u> Mockau	Me.109	GY.4847 GY.4825.A.
2	Med.	W.N.F.	a Atzgersdorf b Zwolfaxing c Neunkirchen d Ebreichsdorf e Voslau	Me.109	GY.4864 GU.4241 GY.4869 GY.4868 GY.4854.C
	Airfi	elds having conce	entrations of Ope.ational	Aircraft.	
3	U.K.	Junkers	<u>a</u> Bernburg <u>b</u> Aschersleben	Ju.88	GY.4835 GY.4818.A.
4	U.K.	Volkswaggen	Fallersleben	Ju.88	GZ.2822
5	U.K.	Siebel	<u>a</u> Schkeuditz <u>b</u> Halle	Ju.88	GY.4806 GY.4821
6	U.K.	Henschel	Schonefeld	Jü.88	GY.4812.A.
7	U.K. & Med.	Messerschmitt	<u>a</u> Regensburg/ Obertraubling b Regensburg/Frufenin	Me.109	GY.4857 GY.4828.A
8	U.K. & Med.	Dornier	<u>a</u> Neuaubing <u>b</u> Oberpfaffenhofen	Me.410	GY.4827 GY.4759.A.
9	U.K.	Gothaer	Cotha	Me.110	GY.4765.A.
10	U.K.	Opel	Russelsheim	Ju.88	GN. 3786
11	Med.	Heinkel	Schwechat	He.219	GY.4855
12	Med	Heinkel	Maelec	He.219 &	GY.4870
13	Med.	Steyrwerke	Steyr	177 Me.109	GN.3834.A.
14	U.K.	Fieseler	Kassel/Waldau	F.W.190	GY.4809.A.
15	U.K. & Med.	-	Ober Naderach	Jet Fuel	GN.3764
16	U.K.	-	Feenemunde		GU.4387
17	U.K. 1	Henkel	Dusseldorf	п	GK.4452
18	U.K. & Med.	-	Hollriegelskreuth	"	63.1

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Priority	Aceessible from	Firm		Place	Make	. Target No
25	U.K.	Arado	(b	) Brandenburg ) Rathenow ) Babelsburg	He.177	GY.4817.A GY.4802 GH.634.B
26	U.K.	Heinkel		Oranianburg	He.177	GY.4799.A.
27	U.K.& Me	d.Dornier	Friedri	ohshafen (a) Lowen (b) Manze	thal Do. 217	GY • 4758 • A&B • GY • 4755
28	U.K.	Weser		Bremen/Lemwerder	Ju.87	GY.4778.A.
29	U.K.	Heinkel		Rostock/Marienehe	He .111	GY:4834.A.
1	U.K.& Me	d. B.M.W.	(a) (b)	Munich/Allach Munich/Oberwiesen	B.M. W. 801 feld	GY.4662.A. GY.4653
2	U.K.	BoMo-We		Berlin/Spandau Berlin/Basdorf	B.M. W.801	GY.4862.A. GY.4655
3	U. K.	0.B.		Genshagen	D.B.605, 603 and 610	GY.4671
4	Med.	Ostmark		Wiener-Neudorf	D.B.603,605	GY.4690
5	U.K.	Junkers		Köthen	Ju.213 and	GY. 4672
6	U.K.	Niedersach	sischer	Brunswick/Querum.	211 D.B.605	GY.4676
7	U.K.	Junkers		Leipzig/Taucha	Ju.004(jet propulsion)	GY.4673
8	U.K.	B.M.W.	(c) (b)	Eisenach/Stockhaus Eisenach	en B.M.W.6 01( F.M.W.132	?) GY. 4680 GY.4679
9	Med.	Ostmark	(a) (b)	Brno/Loesch Brno/Kurim	D.B. 603 and 605	-
10	U.K.	Junkers		Magdeburg	Ju.211	GY-4675

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SHLEF/561GX/5/INT

7th June, 1944

SUBJECT: Use of mir Tower against Energy Military Transport and Su pplies.

The attached paper sets forth an any Intelligence viewpoint of how air effort may best be used against the energy transport and supply system.

It is apphasized that material from HDST SMART sources has been used in the ampilation of this paper, which may, therefore, only be shown to authorised recipients of such information.

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
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ad of 3, G-2. Air Commolore F.L. HADRED, By ABAF (per Hajer LEDIERT) Group Captain R.H. HEMPLEYS, G-2, SHLEF Colonel J.O. EMART, 21 Arey Group Colonel D. HUCHES, USSTLF (for information) Lieut-Colonel A. BART, 21 Arey Group Limison, 2nd TAF Pajor A.J. TASKER, G-2, SHAFF Enjor F.O.A.C. HEMPETT, 21 Arey Group Limison, MA ARAF Captain D.J. EZEA, G-2, SHLEF



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SUPRENE HEADQUARTERS ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE G-2 (Intelligence) Division

SHAEF/561GX/5/INT

7 Jun 44

### THE USE OF AIR POWER AGLINET TRANSPORT AND MULITARY SUPPLIES

#### 1. Object

The object of this paper is to discuss from an army intelligence viewpoint the use of Air Power

- (a) Against the energy's supply and transport system in the WEST;
- (b) Against industrial targets whose destruction, it is believed, can directly and immediately weaken the enemy's military potential in the VEST.

#### 2. General

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The enemy's military supply and maintenance system in the WEST is dependent, as on other fronts, on direct rail links with GMEMANY. In the WEST this means a rail houl of some 200 - 300 miles over a rail network which is probably the best in EMROPE. The problems confronting us, therefore, are:-

- (a) Can the energy be denied the use of the railways for military supply?
- (b) What is the effect on military capabilities of denial to the enemy of the use of rail transport and the imposition of a read haul of some 200 - 300 miles?
- (c) In order to achieve the maximum reduction of military supplies at the battlefront, and to further aggravate the situation caused by the loss of the railways, how may attacks on dumps and depots in the WEST and industry in GEMANY best be directed?
- 3. Can The Energy Be Denied The Use Of Railways For Military Supply?

This problem can be tackled in one of two ways:

- (a) <u>Attrition</u> against the system as a whole in which attacks are made with the object of so wearing down the system that it is no longer able to function, or is unable to operate to the required capacity.
- (b) <u>Interdiction</u>, that is, interruption of rail routes at a sufficient number of points that it is no longer a profitable or a practical proposition for the energy to use them.

These two approaches are discussed below.

4. Attrition

When considering a policy of attrition it sust be borne in mind that military and indispensable civilian rail requirements

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represent only a small fraction of the total capacity which a usually extensive railway system can bendle, and which such a system is genred up to bandle under normal conditions. For example, it is known that in TLLN the energy daily supply and maintenance requirements SOUTH of KOHI were only some 4,500 tons daily or about 10 - 15 trains a day. Appendix 'A' gives the estimated requirements for the German Forces in the WEST at about 45 trains per day after the build-up. These requirements represent only a small percentage of the rail capacity still available after the resent series of attacks on rail contres (excluding the positive interdiction of lines leading into the lodgement error across the SEINE River). It is not believed a policy of astruction of the system is achieved and maintained.

Attrition has been tried both in ITALY and in VESTERN ENNOPE. The latter presents not only a far more extensive network than that in ITALY, but also a system infinitely superior in volume of explorant and ralkacy operating facilities. Attempts were made by boolding the important rail and marshalling centres in Northern ITALY to discupt the flow of traffic from CENALWY into Central and Southern ITALY. Nevertheless, despite the much less extensive system, it was not until a program of interdiction was tried that the enemy began to feel the pinch. Against this, however, it is certain that the scale of effort available from the UK is considerably greater. Our views on the achievements of the recent attrition offensive against railways in the WEST have already been expressed in a previous paper. However, it is necessary that they should be repeated here.

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Rail contro attacks have failed to so reduce the railway operating facilities as to impair the enemy's ability to move up reinforcements and maintain his forces in the WEST. They have, however, probably succeeded in argoning some slight delay on the throughout speed of rail movement, and they have facilitated to some extent the work of factical attack (e.g. bridge destruction and line cutting) by imposing some reduction on the flexibility of the system as a whole,

Official dounge assessments up to 30 May indicated that:

(a) Slightly less than 3 times the reil line capacity needed for peak movements (including reinforcements against OVERLORD) remains available

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- (b) More than 4 times the number of wagons needed for these movements remains available
- (c) About 8 times the number of locomotives needed for these movements remains available
- (d) More than 10 times the locomotive servicing facilities required for this traffic remains available.

In our view attrition has been triad in IVALY, and failed. We do not see how we can hope, even if all suitable air effort is allotted for a considerable period, to so impose a system of attrition attacks against the rail systems of FRANCE, HELGIUM and Western CEEDANY as to hold any reasonable hope of achieving the desired object within a measurable period.

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#### 5. Interdiction

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The object of such a policy is clear, namely to interrupt all rail lines leading to the battle area at a sufficient number of points so as to force the energy to forsake rail transport. There are two important considerations.

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Firstly, a policy of interdiction invariably means repeat attacks on points which can be repaired quickly, or less frequent attacks at points where repair is slow. Recent attacks on bridges both in MPANUS, BRIGHUM and ITALY have .. clearly demonstrated that railway bridges can be attacked most successfully and that failway bridges can be attacked met successfully and that damage of this nature is durable and meeds little policies. For excepte, the estimated minimum time for military repair of any of the nine rail bridges across the SEANE is 15 days, provided repair work were initiated at once. Actually, the energy's intention or ability to repair more than a few important bridges is doubtful. As a result of these vary successful attacks, the energy has now been forced to set up a ferry service across the SEANE.

Secondly, experience in ITALM has demonstrated that a single line of interdiction is of itself useless, since the energy merely ferrics around the interruptions by means of MT. Experience in ITALM showed that not until a second line of interdiction was imposed did the energy seriously begin to feel the pinch. There has been ample evidence of this, the latest of which is the report them GOC 14 Armay, in which he refers to his MT having to make journeys of up to some 600 miles because of railway failures. In the standard, we also quote an extract from a report from HQ MAF dated 20 May, which states:-

"Shuttling, due to the large number of cuts, appears to have fallen of substantially and a very high percentage of the military transport in the peninsula is now on a through MT basis."

It is clear, therefore, that only by imposing two or more lines of interdiction can trans-chipment around the interdicted points be prevented; and the enemy be forced to revert to long road hauls with all its problems and what are, for him, especially evil consequences. It is obvious that by imposing several lines of interdiction in ITALY, the enemy has been forced to use NT for an extremely long distance behind the front. Rail interdiction in ITALY has materially assisted our current successors by preventing enemy build-up of stocks adequate to sustain heavy battle.

The question will at once be asked, can such a plan be operated in the WEST. ITALY is a narrow peninsula with only three main lines running down the neck southwards from the PISA - RIMINI line; and it offers a terrain especially suitable for such an interdiction plan. Regarding terrain, Western EUROPE has numerous river lines which are equally suitable for rail interdiction attacks. There are more lines to interdict, but recent experience with bridge attacks suggests that a program of interdiction is well within the capabilities of the Air Forces in GREAT ENITAIN. It seems to us that there is no doubt that effort with suitable aircraft as great as that directed against murshalling yards could achieve the interdiction program which we suggest in Appendix 'B'. The offects and consequences of the success of such a plan are discussed in para 6 below.



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However, we do not want it to be thought that we entirely preclude attacks on railway yards and sidings. It is clear that attacks on yards and sidings on routes known to be used by the enemy will be useful and can be organised in the light of current intelligence and observations. The gradual railway strangulation which it is hoped this programme will force on the enemy is likely to offer some suitable targets in the form of concentrations of military trains, etc.

#### 6. Effects of Inability to Use Railways for Military Supply

Assuming the creaty were utable to make use of the rilways within an area reaching back approximately to the line of the Franco-Belgian and German from thers, he would be faced with the problem of difting large tunnages proviously carried by road for some 200 - 300 miles (See Appendix 'A').

The far greater concentrated lifting power of rail over MT is of itself of major importance, even to a force well supplied with MT. It takes about 100 trucks to lift the equivalent of one train load, working on a one day turn round over a distance of about 100 miles. Thus, it is clearly most unccondical to have a great number of vehicles and new field down lifting large quantities of supplies over long distances.

From the enemy's point of view, however, the substitution of road for rail transport would be more than merely uneconomical. The enemy is known to be suffering from an overall shortage of MT a shortage which is affecting all fronts. As a consequence, the enemy has been forced already to raise the priority for MT production. He has also apparently been forced to start requisitioning among previously rejected or otherwise engaged vehicles in the WET. One of the most important results of forcing the enemy into the roads is that the greatly increased amount of NT on the roads will offer the air forces numerous excellent targets. Evidence from all sources leaves no doubt that the energy's losses of NT from air attack in TLMY have been heavy and that this form of attack has been one of the decisive influences on the recent fighting in that theatre.

Besides a shortage of MT the energy is suffering from a shortage of POL. Even before the recent series of attacks on synthetic plants in GUMANY and refinerics in the BAIFANS, production barely balanced consuption, and a small reserve was maintained with difficulty; consequently even military consumption was already severally restricted on all fronts. There have, however, been intediate repercussions from the recent series of attacks on the cil industry. These have taken the form of further orders for even more restricted use of fuel of all types, both for the Army and the Air Force, and a further effort to make greater use of wood fuel generators for MT. It seems clear, from the most recent study of the energy's oil situation, that he is facing an cil crisis which, with **our** assistance, can possibly be made a collapse.

For the last three months in ITALY, the enemy has been forced to resort to a long road haul of 150 - 200 miles a day, lifting some 4,500 tons of supplies, since all the main line railways have been effectively interrupted south of the LONEMEDY plain. A recent report from the GOC 14 Army reveals clearly the unhappy situation of the Germans in ITALY, faced with a supply and maintenance system based on a long road haul. He stated that increasing demands on lorgy space for journeys up to some 600 miles

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(owing to rail transport failure) had lead, during May, to numerous breakdowns. Repair work and supply of spare parts could no longer keep pace with these. The need for means of traction was very considerable; furthermore, a large proportion of gun losses was due to this shortage. He added that, in view of the railway situation, lorry space was of decisive importance.

Not only does this report reveal something of the energy's difficulties, but it "lso reveals a further weak link in the road transport capabilities - spare parts, particularly for non-standard requisitioned vehicles.

Nor is this the end of the enemy's road transport vorries. As recently as early May, the enemy was known to be suffering from a shortage of tyres in ITALY. Tyre shortage is a direct result of shortage of rubber and consequent restricted tyre production. Undoubtedly, the burden of long road hauls has aggravated this shortage.

An obvious point must be noted. Since an army cannot operate without supplies, transport for supply columns must, if necessary in a last resort, be obtained at the expense of further reductions of MT to fighting units.

In conclusion it is clear, therefore, that were the enemy forced to substitute road for rail transport in the WEST, it would place a further strain on already strained resources. It would certainly create a difficult and extremely unhappy situation for the enemy, and one which could have great tactical and strategical consequences, especially if supported simultaneously by attacks on supply depots in the WEST and oil plant (and perhaps, rubber and MT) target systems in GERMANY.

7. In order to achieve the maximum reduction of military supplies at the battlefront, and to further aggravate the situation caused by the loss of the railways, how may attacks from on army viewpoint on dumps and depots in the PEST and industry in GELADAY best be directed?

(a) Attacks on Dumps and Depots in the WEST

Supplies in NORTHINN FRANCE are roughly estimated as sufficient for some two months righting. Stocks of amaunition and POL are generally well dispersed. If, however, a definite planned attempt is made to deny the energy the use of the railways, simultaneous attacks against these supply centres are a necessary concentant. Concurrent loss of stocks will advance the date on which supplies become insufficient to sustain battle.

(b) Attacks on industry in GERMANY which can directly affect the energy's military potential in the AET.

(i) <u>Oil</u> - It is clear from the most recent studies of the enemy oil situation that as a result of recent attacks the enemy is beginning to face an oil crisis, which could even be turned into a collapse. This has been the subject of a separate G-2 report of which a copy of the summary and conclusions is attacked at Appendix 'C'.

It suffices to repeat in this paragraph that it is



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estimated that continued attacks on the energy's cilindustry could vitally affect his military cap-bilities within a matter of months. The gap between his overall needs on all fronts and the supplies available will addan and the energy must either reduce his military activity, or his military commences. The possibilities which such a situation opens need no further elucidating hare. Clearly, however, by denying the energy the use of rail transport, we shall be increasing his vital need for fuel in the WEST, and by attacking oil production we shall be reducing the supply; the two are mutually supporting.

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(11) Early - Most recent evidence indicates that the energy is suffering from a shortage of the latest types of heavy tanks; also that the bottleneck in the production of these tanks is in the production of tank engines and gourboxes. All available evidence indicates that this menufacture, unlike tank assembly, is still encontrated in three main factories. Two are at WRIEDRICHENDEN-MATELOH making engines, and ZANREADFABRIX making geerboxes. Both of these were attacked both by day and night bombers in March and April and were severely damaged. The third factory concerned is NORDENDENDERFR MOVEMENDAU, NERLIN, which has not yet been attacked.

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Another focal point in the supply line of tanks to the field Army is the army AFV Depot at MAGDEBURG. This depot is clearly still the main task depot in GMEMALY and when recently attacked was seen to be full of vehicles. It also seems fairly clear that MAGDEBURG is the main, if not the sole, receiving depot for the repair of ergines of heavy tanks. Although the initial attack on this depot was most successful, a fair portion remains intact.

It is suggested that consideration be given to aggravating the shortage of tanks and tank on junes.

 (iii) Other Industries - Several other industries appear worth investigating as target systems, for their possible effects on military capabilities:

> a. The ball bearing industry: Evidence is at hand that shortage of ball bearings is interfering with aircraft, trak, and MF output. This battered industry should be policed.

b. <u>M7</u> industry: A major portion of German MT assently appears to be concentrated in three plants. The MT assently system should be exceded.

C. Synthetic Bubber Industry: Rubber, the shortings of which one erused the tight tyre position, appears worthy of investigation, particularly in view of stoppage of rubber blockage running by the May. The major portion of total output appears to be encentrated in two or three main plants. The target system should be examined.

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It is clear that attack gainst the industrial target systems suggested above forman integral part of the battle in the UEST. The military effects of the intradiction and dump/dopot program we have suggested will be enormously intensified and accelerated by the suggested interlooking industrial target program.

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I F I E D In conclusion it is emphasized that from an army viewpoint in relation to OVERLORD, the most direct and quick results will be obtained by concurrating air effort on interdiction in FRANCE and the 10% COUNTRIES and cil and task engine production in GERMANY and the rest of MUROPE.

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#### A. EUDIX 'A'

### ESTIMATE OF SUPELY REQUIREMENTS

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The following table presents the estimated supply requirements for enemy divisions in the NETTRE area at various dates:

#### MUNBER OF TRAINS RECEIPED DATES

		Trains per day								
Day	Divisions in NEPICNE area	Sapply, Maintenenco, Roplacement,		Personnel Eracustion & Reclacement	Ccal & Servicing Naterials for Railway Operations	Total Required				
(1)	(2)	<u>2006 (</u> 3)	192113	(4)	(5)	(6)				
D	8	2,400	5	1	1	7				
D + 1	10	3,000	6	. 2	1	9				
D + 3	13	3,900	7	2	1	10				
D + 7	21	6,300	12	3	2	17				
D + 25	35	10,500	19	5	2	26				
D + 60	50	15,000	28	8	14	40				

#### The figures in columns 3 to 5 have been arrived at as follows:

<u>Column 3</u>: An average of 300 tons per division per d y has been allowed. This is the same figure as that used by the JIC in their paper "Energy Hail Requirements at the Time of O'ELORD", which was agreed upon by G-2, SELF, and MI 14, War Office. This figure includes an allowance for Coops and Army Troops and averages between active and inactive divisions. The figure is generous since it is an average for Penzer, Penzer Grenedier, and Infantry divisions, and in particular case under review, the majority of divisions will be Infantry divisions, with a consequently lower degree of motorisation. Furthermore, some 40 of these will be low establishment divisions. The figure is their paper, referred to above. In addition, we have assume that half of the total German tank production and a large propertion of self-propelled artillory production will be allocated to the TEST. This, we estimate as equivalent to about one train part day from D + 7 covards.

Column 4: The figure for personnel evecuation and replacement trains is again based on the figures used in the JIC paper mentioned above,

Column 5: Coal and servicing material trains for railway operating have been estimated on the commonly accepted operating rate of 10% of the total numbe of trains to be operated.

The foregoing table presents trains required to sup Ly forces within the area circumscribed by the LOIRE and SELNE. The daily member of trains required to be despatched to points in FIANCE outside this area at (say) D + 60 are as follows:

other will and four requirements	2	6P 1113	par c	100
GAF and Navy	5	n	"	
Essential economic (coal from LILLE to P.RIS)	6			"
(coar from billing to Finite)				

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trains per day

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## INTERDICTION PROTRAME

1. As stated, the purpose of the interdiction programme is to force the enemy to abandon his rail system of supply. To achieve this result, experience has shown that several lines of interdiction (of all rail routes), spaced a proper distance apart, are necessary. The impolyment to enemy military capabilitles which would be achieved by forcing the enemy onto a road system of supply has been described in the body of the paper.

2. Long bridges have been chosen as the point of interdiction whenever possible because:

- (a) Restoration of through traffic on a damaged or destroyed bridge requires far greater time than for other rail interdiction (except possibly, tannels).
- (b) Bridge attacks during the past several weeks have been remainedly successful, with relatively small effort.

3. The suggested lines of interdiction are shown on the attached map. They are the following:

- (a) SEINE FURE LOIRE river lines (LE HAVRE MANTES BLOIS -ORIMANS - MANIPS): 25 bridges of which 3 are down at the present date.
- (b) ETAPINS PERMONNE FINES NOGENE AUXEMENE ANNECY: 25 bridges.
- (c) ANTWING MAASFRICHT VISA LIFE NAMUR LUADE VERDUN -BENANCON: 35 bridges, of which 6 are down at the present date, 1 is damaged, and 1 has been attacked with unknown results.
- (d) It is probable that interdiction of NORTH SOUTH rail traffic in the sector NEUVY to ORLEWNS, requiring attack on 4 bridges, would achieve useful effects. Interdiction here would prevent the dermans furneling rolling stock and traffic freely from Southern FRANCE to PARIS.

4. The proposed interdiction programme comprises 37 bridges, of which 14 are now down, and an additional 10 (on the MOINE) are scheduled for awtack in any event. The requirements of this programme, then, are about 63 bridges. The total could be out down by 8 if it is thought that 4 PARTS junctions and 4 other junctions (between PARTS and FREEARS) could be kept impassable. However, the repidity with which traffic enrough junctions can be restored and the greater effort required for attack suggests the substitution we have made.

5. Having regard to both time required for repair, and effort required to attack, as well as offers required for counter-airforce and close support; the interdiction progress appears to us well within air force combilities. The effort determination, of course, is an airforce problem. It is, however, within our province to note the temped dropped to achieve recent bridge successes. During the past month, the air forces have demolished or seriously damaged over 40 rail and read bridges. Of these, the 19 rail bridges have been demolished or very seriously damaged with a total of loss then 4000 temp of bombs. We are informed that even this record will in the future be very substantially improved as the result of experience gained in the attacks to date.

6. If the Germans attempt to rail haul the 200 to 300 miles through the lines of interdiction to the battle area, they must detrain, route by truck, and entrain 3 times, in addition to the initial loading and final unloading. Alternatively, they could attempt to pass supplies via South GMEMANY, ITALY

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and Southern FRAMCE. This route is both long and difficult, and it is highly improbable that the enemy would contemplate it. Even if he should, both the BRANCER route into ITALE and the NICE and MODANE routes into FRAMCE have been under attack by MAAF. At the present time, the NICE and possibly the MODANE routes have been interdicted.


7. As the execution of the program progresses and the routes available to the enemy are restricted, it should be possible to pick out military traffic choke points, yards, sidings, etc. which may be profitably attacked.

8. Details of the suggested points of interdiction are in the course of proparation and will be issued shortly. The list of these suggested targets is attached. The investigation now in hand may suggest substitutions for several of the individual targets.

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	Ref.	Location	Tracking	Grid Ref	Target No.	Length in feet	Structural Dotails	Renarks
	1 ROU DIL	en FPE - Milliumity -Roue	dt N	4040a/31111/202131	4901c/B/8	12721	4 spans, 2 x 345', 2 x 286' steel lattice cantilever	Bridge out on 2.6.44
	2 015. (2 1 (2 1) (2 1)	SEL brunches) MS - ROUEN - SERQUI	DT GHY	4040cy/31117/188032	4901B/B/22 4901B/B/23	r, 670 1. 670	3 spans, 130', 2 x 140') steel lat 3 spans, 200, 180, 140 ) girders Severely damaged 9/10 May by bombing.	tice Bridge out on 2.6.44
	3 ORIT	VAL PPE – MULAUNAY – ROU	DT EN	4250a/872 & 826/111009	490 <b>1</b> 3/B/9	950	6 spans 4 x 150', 2 x 120', steel lattice girders	Bridge out on 2.644
1	C4 LE MRCU	ef - NATES - FARIS	DT	4250a/9F1/255996	49013/5/28	700	3 spuns, 250', 200', 200' stool girders.	Bridge out on 2.6.44
SCREET		ESNIL ANDE	ST	4250c/9F1/272883		1200	4 spans x 200', 2 x 150', steel lattice girders.	This line stops int RLST of the Riven Dridge oft on 2.6704
7	GISC	ion DRS - Vernon - Pacx	ST I	4040a/47.114/438745	49012/B/45	650	5 spans, 120', steel lattice girders. 3 Northern spans col- lapsed after basbing.	Bridge sut on 2.6,54
	(2	133 G.ISSICOURT branches) 13 - 1119725 - CHETBOX		4040a/47112/610601	4801E/B/2	r.420' 1.500'	3 spans, 120', elliptical mason- ry arches, 4 spans 125', ellip- tical masonry arches	Bridge out on 2.6.44
	CONEL	DENTIN						
~63		COLORING BUILDING BUILDING			$\sim$			





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Boge 3 Ref		Tracking	Grič Rof	Targot No.	Leigth	St.uotural Reserves
14.		DT			in fect	Doballs
	CLOYIS ERENARY - TOURS	172	4249/914/168516		c. 3:01	Bridge over Liver LOIDI.
15.	BELUGINCY ORL: NG-51018	DT.	4249/9E/471096	4901E/B/4	8,6	Vinduct
16.	BIOIS VENJOLE - VILLERANCH	5 92	Air 5000/10811	4701/B/10	70401	AL.
6-			Air 5000/10811/ 47° 36° 50" N 01° 22° 38" E	44 0 17 DY 10	3010 <b>'</b>	9 stal spons x 1251 27 masonny acobes x 201
14	DUTIOUTS	DT	Ais: 5000/1073E 47°25' 39°11		1150	13 span masoury arch
EF.	E		00%21 05*E			x 80'. Piero 15' thick
18	TOURS - CHATELERAULT	DT	Air 5000/10783	4700/B/1	1420	18 aven masonry circle
HE			47 ⁰ 25135411 00°36*54#B			
19	CINC MARS TODAS - SAMAUR	DT	Air 5000/10707 47 ⁹ 2013091	4700/E/15	BLOW .	10 x 65 mascher and Grid reference for
1			00023145"E		8403	9 x 70 minoury arch larger bridge,
20.	PORT ECULIET PORT BOULLEP - CHINON	ST	Ada: 5000/11981E 47°11,*09'N		1610	10 x 65 mascory and Grid reference for 9 x 70 mascory and Larger bridge. 17 spans deck type Read & transway ? steel trues R. 1 x 45' 15 x 90' L 1 x 65'
			00°09*35"E		-	15 x 90' L 1 x 65'
21.	SAULUR	DT	Air 5000/1197	And I wanted the Party of the P	3850	14 spens x 250', steel

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






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orter allerations 16 Main 2.	BRIDGES ON R.J	l lines - eralles to	LEAS (SWISS BO	DIR)		TOP SECRET
Rof. Location & Routo	Tracking	Gald Rof.	Target Ref.	Longth in foot	Structural Desuils	RE LR S
9. ARTIN DE BLANK U Lasti - Sytesons	171	4040/146/306089		o, 150'		Bridge over CISE Liver Canal.
10. FIS DE RECE - SUISSONS and	27	4040/161/042371		o, 150°		Bridge over VANE Favor, Shallor
						bridge on srme 13115 over some riner at 19051/5/11.
Fir. FENTRUM MANN	DT	MC401/49NI1/695516	4803E/6/6	,300*	3 syna masonry	Builgo over MIRES
						bridge, followed by
						a 4 s.an misonry bridge over TANE (3/5 and 3/4).
212. 155 FOULDIS ASTERNAY - R.J.73	DP	40401,/66121/91,5234		0.1501		Bridge over GLUD
13. NOINT OT CLUE C 172-24 MIS	DT	40401/6682/892986	48032/2/16	215'	3 spin masonry	Bridge over SEILE
14. SIS CO SOU-IROYES	DT	1376/82 15° 32' 27" N 03 [°] 16' 31" E	4803:1/5/18	753'	2 adjacent pamile? 4-span	Bridge over IDICE
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
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






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


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
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P.G Ref		Tracking	Grid Ref.	Target No.	Length	Structural Details	TOP SPORET
	and line			101300 110.	in feet		Remarks
19.	VERDIN THIONVILLE-VERDUN- CHALONS S, MARNE	DT	4336/21/284664		410'	Reinforced concrete 6 spans 1 x 24', 4 x 54', 1 x 57' 28' wide	2.0
20:	THIAUCOURT CUVILLD-LEROUVILLE	DT	4249/14G 610382		475'	6 x 57' masonry arch spans. Height 59'.	Envezin viaduct over Rept de Mad. 4.1 km SW of THIAUCOURT. Station.
22.	FONTENCY PCLIPEY-TOUL	DT ,	A1: 5000/6911E 48° 42' 40" N 05° 58' 00" E		c.500'		KET
Lizo Lizo	TOUL PONT ST VINCENT-TOUL	DT	Air 5000/6911E 48° 40' 25" N 05° 54' 04" E		675'	5 x 122' lattice girder span.	Bridge over River MDSELE and Canal d'EST.
Pt.	CHANDENAY DOMGERMAIN-CHANDENAY	DI	Air 5000/69NE 48° 39' 10" N 05° 54' 00" E		c.400'		Bridge over River MOSESEE rail- line not shown on Air 5000 map; constructed later. Location is approximate.
<b>1</b>	PONT ST VINCENT NEUVES- AISONS- NIRECOURT	DT	Air 5000/69NE 48° 36' 25" N 06° 06' 09" E		c.400*	The bridge over the MOSELLE is masonry construction.	Bridge in series, about 300' apart, over R MOSELLE and Can d'EST. River approximately 400' wide.
	GOLBEY E INAL-HYNONT-MATIAIN	DT	4326/85 48° 11' 30" N 06° 24' 14" E		c.150'	OTTAL	Over Canal de l'EST
enin	COURT		00 24 14 B				

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#### AXIS OIL POSITION

(Invelligence) Division

#### 1. Introduction

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
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We have considered the Axis oil position. The conclusions which follow are our appreciation of the current situation, based on a specially prepared report by MEW, the latest report of the Hartley Oil Committee, and other available origines.

#### 2. Oil Supplies Available

The Germans are experiencing an oil crisis as the result of recent refinery and synthetic plant attacks. Disregarding, for the moment, the greater shortage of petrol per se, the overall oil position in the next fearmenths is briefly as follows:



The deficiency is thus about .4 million tons per month. Shender military reserve stocks, available for military consumption, are aufficient for 1 or 2 months military operations. There are no free civilian stocks.

#### 3. Effects of Reduced Supplies

It is appreciated:

- (a) That the reduction will fall with particular severity on supplies of gasoline which in June and July will fall short of requirements by 43, and 385 respectively. This reduction will fall minly on the military ground forces which say suffer cuts in their allocations in excess of 506 during these two months.
- (b) That operational requirements in the JERY during June and July will have to be met largely from steeler already in the area. These will, however, suffice to meet the requirements of only about two months active fighting.
- (c) That the German High Command will be concerned at the serious short-ge of supplies and that both strategy and tactics will be conditioned by the need to conserve fuel.
- (d) That if production has not improved by August and if fighting cours with the expected intensity, lock of fuel will by then soriously impedroad supply and thetical mobility.

#### 4. Effects of Further Oil Mant Att cks

If engagements continued on three fronts, the elimination of 2/3 to 4/5 of German oil output would force colleges on one or more fronts once small military reserve stocks were used up. To crient this in time, climination of this output in (say) June and July and disappearance of military reserve stocks by (say) the end of August, would cause the full impact to be field from Sectember enward. The collapse would come, not on "strategic" grounds, but because the military in the field would be tactically without access and the state of the supplies necessary

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to run sup ly, reinforcement, and evacuation vehicles; and without a major portion of the CL required for fighting vehicles, aircraft, and navel craft.

#### 5. .. ir Porce Gauabilities

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
The Strategic Lir Forces should be asked to indicate whether they can achieve and maintain such a major reduction in oil output. It would age at that the advent of the long-range escort fighter, and the reduction in German fighter aircraft production, noke possible for the first time a therough smashing of the loxis oil industry by day and night heavy bushers. Unlike engineering plants, synthetic oil plants and refinieries cannot be moved to unknown locations or disguised. Virtually all Axis oil producing plants have been located and targeted. ...s is known, oil plants are valuerable to bushing ettack.





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
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
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














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### THE EMPLOYMENT OF HEAVY BOMBERS AGAINST GERMANY:

FROM THE PRESENT TO V-DAY

#### General Considerations

- 1. Over the past year the American heavy bomber force created and put into effective practice a new conception of air warfare; namely, the precise and systematic bombardment of carefully selected targets. That conception called for two types of concentration of effort. First, concentration against a given target system. Second, concentration against the installations of a particular plant to the point where sufficient engineering destruction was effected seriously to reduce production. Despite the power of the air defenses which were initially met, despite the discouragement of long periods of bad weather this conception was applied with great determination. The resistance to any avoidable dissipation of effort from the Main Aim has resulted in the defeat of the German Fighter plan, has materially assisted in launching Operation OVERLORD, and has mainly contributed to the present over-all Allied air supremacy.
- 2. Further, it has been the evident lesson of bombing against the German war effort, that the enemy is capable of absorbing a partial attack on any one of his industries, and evading the effects on strength in the field. This holds for RAF experience as a whole, and for those USAAF attacks that were not followed to completion (for example, Huls, V.D.M. Heddernheim, and Continental Gummiwerk, Hannover).
- 3. The following suggested program is based on the belief that rigorous military standards indicated in Para. I should govern heavy bomber operations from the present to V-Day.

4. The target systems indicated in this program are chosen on the view that, while the actual decision in the war will be reached on the ground, the economical and concentrated use of air power in Germany can appreciably hasten that decision. The offensive elements in the program are, therefore, designed to deny to the enemy the flow of new ground force equipment, and his ability to use existing equipment flexibly and efficiently. The defensive elements are designed to maintain our present air supremacy and to maintain the security of the base. The program might be outlined as follows:

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Priority 1 Priority 2

#### Offensive Target Systems 011 Production (a) Bearing Production

Defensive Target

(b) Fighter aircraft production

(c) Flying bomb production

(d) Rocket fuel Dro-

Priority 3 (a) Tank Engine Production (b) Ordnance Depots

Priority 4

(a) Tank Production

(b) Motor Vehicle Production

(c) Synthetic Rubber Production

(d) 011 Storage

In the case of priority 1 and 2 targets thoroughgoing attack on all major elements in the system are required. Priority 3 and 4 targets, however, are designed to impose attrition on ground force equipment to the maximum possible within the limits of other air force committments, of higher priority. These attacks will be useful, even if the target systems are not fully attacked.

The Main Aim 5. For the past two months German synthetic oil production and refinery capacity have been the Main Aim of our heavy bomber operations. Oil production was selected because its destruction would affect every arm of the enemy's effort in the field and the whole of his war production. It was selected, in short, be-cause it represented the most economical and effective contribution the Air Force could make to ending the war.

6. At the present time the sim, in terms of oil production, has been half achieved. All available intelligence indicates that the enemy was more promptly and more drastically affected on all fronts by these attacks, than any pre-attack analysis led us to

The Main Aim of our effort should, therefore, be the completion, in the most prompt and thorough manner within our operational capabilities, of the attacks on synthetic oil production and refinery capacity.

The military effectiveness of our attacks has thus far suffered 8. to some extent from two operational limitations: our inability to drop more than a limited tonnage on a given plant in a single attack; our difficulties in bombing accurately through fully developed smoke screens. It is evident that we do not wish to sacrifice completely the large measure of operational flexibility our superiority in Germany now affords; but the enemy has clearly gained by the limited weight of our individual attacks, especially on synthetic oil plants. To the extent that both limitations can be overcome, the effectiveness of the offensive will be en-hanced; for, at the present time, no other type of target offers a comparable military return.

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#### Secondary Aims

- It is believed that three types of targets constitute legitimate secondary systems at the present time: bearing production, fighter sircraft production; and carefully selected Crossbow objectives.
- 10. <u>Bearing production</u>. In the nature of their role in war pro-duction it is difficult to trace in the intelligence the effects of attack on bearing production strength in the field. It is, nevertheless, evident that our attacks have affected war production of M/T, sero engines, tanks, and quite possibly the production of cerman secret weapons. In view of the limited number of targets which remain, and the vulnerability of the present cormer position, this attack should be pressed of the present German position, this attack should be pressed home.
- 11. Fighter Aircraft Production. It is estimated that, without continuing attack, terman fighter production will rise at the approximate rate of 100 aircraft per month. Although such a rise might well be contained by our tactical strength in the air, the continuance of our offensive, and the maintenance of the present low fighting value of the German fighter force, is a legitimate secondary objective.
- 12. Crossbow. It is apparent that some effort, of a strategically defensive character, from the heavy bomber force against the new Cerman weapons will be called for. In view of the important alternative offensive tasks of our force, it is essential that the Crossbow bembing program as a whole be the most economical and effective possible, within the limits of the intelligence; and that each of the ellied Air Forces be assigned to a limited segment of a coherent total offensive, appropriate to its capabilities. As in the case of tactical bombing it is in our own interest to see that the counter measures as a whole

are well conceived.

#### Tertiary Aims

13. Residual air effort against German targets should be allocated against concentrations of ground force equipment and supplies, in depots or in the assembly stage at factories. It is evident in the intelligence that the Germans are suffering severe shortages of all forms of basic military equipment: tanks, M/T, tires, ordnance, etc. On the whole, greater con-centrations of such equipment are to be found in Germany than on any of the fronts. In the present German position such attacks will have almost immediate effectiveness, both on the active fronts and in the calculations of the High Command. They should constitute an important element in all missions from the present to V-Day.

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14. The most economical target systems for attack on ground force equipment are tank engine plants and ordnance depots. Additional equipment and supply targets are to be found among the following:

> Tank assembly factories /T factories Synthetic rubber plants Large oil storage depots

Other targets may of course be suggested by intelligence from the battle area. Possible shortages in the energy amaunition supply position are currently under examination; evidence thus far available is not conclusive and the investigation is continuing.

15. Profitable targets in these systems, and the targets in the two top priority systems are listed in the appended tables. The listing is by geographical area and target system within each area. Areas are shown for toth the 8th and the 15th Air Forces. The target systems are grouped in the four categories already indicated: oil refineries and synthetic plants, POINTELANK and counter-CROSSBOW targets, tank engines and ordnance depots, and other military supplies and equipment. The information on individual plants is as of 19 July, and the status of plants changes too rapidly for any rigid priority listing to be useful in this document. However, for the systems not hitherto attacked as such by the Air Forces; ordnance depots, tanks, motor vehicles, synthetic rubber plants, and oil storage depots, listing in priority order within each area has been followed.

#### Blind Bombing

- 16. At times when precision bombing is possible in the tactical area, but not in Germany, a greater military contribution can be made by attack on tactical targets.
- 17. When precision bombing is impossible in either Germany or in the tactical area, the blind bombing of large cities containing important military targets is the best use of the bomber force. Such attack in great weight, offers a reasonable chance of direct damage to important war production, and of some useful indirect effects.
- 18. The morale effects of such attack are likely to be negative; since present German propogenda is based on magnifying the extent to which the Allies intend to exact retribution from the German people as a whole

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#### Relation of Targets in Germany to Targets in the Tactical Area

- 19. The distinction between "strategic" and "tactical" targets has become much less meaningful now that the ground battle has been joined on all fronts on the present scale. At this time the purpose of all air force operations must be to make the greatest possible contribution to the whole battle. In this context, therefore, there may be little choice between stack on a tank assembly plant in Germany or an attack upon a large concentration of tanks in a depot near the fighting front in Germany or Italy.
- 20. Accordingly, it is desirable to emphasize the fact that attacks upon targets in Germany should always be weighed against attacks upon suitable targets in the tactical area - transport targets or concentrations of military supplies and equipment - as suggested by joint Army-Air Force intelligence. No preference should be given to strategic targets as such. Operational demands for missions in Germany intended solely to impose wastage on the Luftwaffe may properly become less urgent in view of the current position of the GAF and the opportunity offered to achieve this end in the course of attacks on the large number of targets deep in Germany included in the present program.

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Sth Mir Force Targets by Areas

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			1. Berlin/Spandau/Neustadt	52°33' N 13°12' B	Activ	alizes in issue of e on cover of 8 Ap ous cover. Guns, 1	artillery and range finders. oril 44, although less than on
			Location	Pinpoint		Ourrent A	activity and Re arks
		b.	Ordnance Depots				
			NONE				
	3.	а.	Tank Engine Plants				
		2.	Rocket Fuel Plants				
			NONE				
)		c.	Flying Bomb Flants				
			2. " "	Berlin/Spandau	52°32*20"N 13°13*30"E	15/16 Feb.44	Produces components for Basdorf
			1. Bayerische Sotorenwers	Berlin/Basdorf	52 ⁰ 43' N 13 ⁰ 25' E	not damaged	Assembles about 30% BOW 801 engines
5			Flant	Location	Finpoint	Last Attacked	Current Activity and Memorks
			Fighter Aircraft Plants				
1			NONE				
		2.	Ball Bearing Flants				
			ntblank and Counter-Grossbow	Targets			
			NONE				
	1.	011	Refineries and Synthetic Pl	ants			
		0.1.2			1 : BERLIN	N And a	
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P			AWA 21 BERLIN S and S	
A G	1. Gil Refisories and Synt Mana	betic Flants		
E	2. Tointblank and Counter-	rosabow Targeta		
S	a. Bell Boaring Plants			
U N C	Mant	Location	Empoint Last Attacked Current Activity and Reserve	
L A	1. V.K.F.	"p'mor	52026' N 6 Mar. 44 Producing about 4, of total b	
S	2. N.D.E.	Berlin/ ichtenberg	520311 Il Devlandan about a	
S				and say over the real
S I F	b.Fighter Aircraft Flam		130311 g	earing supply.
S I F I E	b.Fighter Aircraft Flan Flant			***********
S I F I	b.Fighter Aircraft Flan	ta	Mappint Last Attacked Current Activity and Reparks	
S I F I E	b.Fighter Aircraft Flan Flant	ts Location	Mappint Last Attacked Current Activity and Reparks 52019' N No approciable Producing about 40 D0 angine 13046' E damage 52025' N Jan. 44	18
S I F I E	b.Fighter Aircraft Flan Flant 1. Daimlar Bens	ta Location Borlin/Genshagen	Mappint Last Attacked Current Activity and Reparks 52019' N No approciable Producing about 40 DN angine 13046' E damage	18
S I F I E	b.Fighter Aircraft Plan Plant 1. Daimler Bens 2. " " 7. Flying Bank Planta Man	ta Location Borlin/Genshagen	Mappint Last Attacked Current Activity and Reparks 52019' N No approciable Producing about 40 D0 angine 13046' E damage 52025' N Jan. 44	18
S I F I E	b.Fighter Aircraft Flou Flant 1. Desialer Benz 2. * * * Plying Bank Flouts NUTS d. Rocket Fuel Flants	ta Location Borlin/Genshagen	Mappint Last Attacked Current Activity and Reparks 52019' N No approciable Producing about 40 D0 angine 13046' E damage 52025' N Jan. 44	18
S I F I E	b.Fighter Aircraft Plan Plant 1. Daimler Bens 2. " " 7. Flying Bank Planta Man	ta Location Borlin/Genshagen	Mappint Last Attacked Current Activity and Reparks 52019' N No approciable Producing about 40 D0 angine 13046' E damage 52025' N Jan. 44	18

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Т					
H I	4. a. Tank Factories				AREA 1 Page 2
S	Plant	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attacked	
P A G E	1 Ajtmarkisches Kettenwerk	and the second	52°33' N	Jan.144 moderately sev- ere da age.	Current Activity and Remarks Reported repaired. Producing abo 50 of Mark III assault guns
I	b.Motor Vehicle Factories			ore acarge.	
S	Piant	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attacked	Current Activity and Remarks
U N C	1 Adam Opel A.G.	Brandenburg/Havel	52°25'10" ) 12°31'40 B	N	Produces chiefly medium trucks. Produces nearly 10% total truck supply
· L A	c. Synthetic Rubber Plants				and the face of the second process of the second
• S	NONE				
I F	d. Oil Storage in Germany				
I E D	NONE				
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T H		ABEA 2 Fage 2
I	3. a. Tank Engine Plants	Anna z rago z
S	. Flent Location	
P A	1. Norddeutache Berlin/Sieferachorseide	Pinpoint Last Attacked Current Activity and Reserve
G E	No torenbau	52° 28 N 21 Jan.44 Producing 25% or more of all tank 15° 30' 8 minut damage engines.
I	b. Ordnance Depots	
S		
U	Plant foostion	Pinpoint Current Activity and Research
N C	1 Berlin/Schönberg	
L A		52028'50'N Most important issuer of signals equipment. 13021'50'E No equipment is visible in open.
S S	4. a. Tenk Factories	
I F	Plent Location	•
I	1. Dáinier Benz Berlin/Marienfelde	Finpoint Last Attacked Gurrent Activity and Reparks
E D	Solridy Total Course	52°25' N Jan.44. Listed above as aircraft target. 13°21' S active and damage under repair.
	b. Notor Vehicle Factories	Pro-reid, produced 30 of Panthe ro
	H.202	
	c. Synthetic Rubber Plants	
	MURE	
	d. Oil Storage in Germany	
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
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1. Oil Refinerics and Synthetic Plants AREA 3 : Leipsig 510 19 H Lant Locatio 1. Amonia Serke, Attacled Current Activity and Resarks Producing at 2/3 capacity 品品 Louna 7 July 44 Merseburg 120 00" E. of 50,000 tons per month. 2. Braunbohle Bonzin Bohlen Rotha Bergius 51º 11' M 7 July 14 Currently out of capacity Astes 12º 23º R 25,000 top.m. Recovery to 50% by end of August. 3. Wintershall .G. Latzkeniors Bergius 510 18º N Minor damage. ill have regained 23,000 topse. capacity by end of ugest. 7 July 44 Machaln 110 51' 2 4. Brautohles, Bergius. Soits-Troglits 510 04" N Bensin A.G. (BRABAG III) 28 May 44 No prospect of production 120 12' 13 for long period. Matimated current monthly output 0. Bergius. S. D.P.A.G. 510 01' H 120 25' 3 Resits Capacity 10,000 t.p.m. Active Pointblack and Counter-Crossbow Targets Lubricants A. Ball Mille Lant Plant 10 1. I. D June 12. Lelaria Current ctivit . . . total 120 18. dnor damage bearing supply b. Pighter Aircraft Plants Bayerische 1. Laanach Stock-50° 59' N 10° 22' 3 51° 22' N 120 damage Important producer 200 301 Kotorenserk hausen Leipzigeleiter rla components. 2. 7 July 14 ME 109 wings and subassemblies blick 120 27º E




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T H I				Area 3 p. 3
S P	40 E.s	Tank Factorias NONS		
A G E	b.	Notor Vehicle Factories	SEORET	
I S	0.	Synthetic Subber Flants		
U N		Plant Location	Pinpoint Last Attacked	Ourrent Activity & Remarks
C L A		1. Bonaserke G.m.b. H. Schkopau	51° 24° N - 11° 58° Z	Currently producing about 40% new rubber supply.
. S I	a.	Oil Storage in Germany NONE		
F I E D		10.00		
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T H I S P А G E I S U Ν С L А S S I F Ι E

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AREA L: HARMONER - BRUNNER - DEUBAU

1. Oil Refineries an Synthetic Planta

	Flant	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attacked	Chappenet and but here
	Braunkohle Bensin A.C.	Nagdeburg/Nothensee	52° 11' N 11° 40' 8	20 June 14.	Current Activity and Remarks Inactive. Repairs in progress.
•	Doutsche Petroless A.G.	Dollborgen	52° 28' H 10° 11' 8		Fully active. Caracity 5000 ton
•	Julia Schindler Ölserke G.s.b.H.	Poine	520 19' N	20 June 14.	Currently active. Canacity 2000
	Gewerkschafft Deutsche Ardöl-Maffinerie	Hanover/Maburg	-		-Jane CENTICSULES.
			09° 51* ±	and a many ships	About 2/3 capacity. Capacity 25,000 thm. Refinery.

2. Pointblank and Counter-Grossbow Targets

a. Ball Bearing Flants

MORES


b. Fighter Almoraft Plants

		and a second second second second second second second second	The second se		
Plant		Location	Pinpoint	Last Attacked	Comment
1. Niedersächsie	che Mataran	_		The same damp the Bark damp to a second	Current Activity and Remarks
werk		Brunswick/ ue run	520 18' N	No darage	About 20% output of Daimler Benz
2. Henschel Flug	antan .		10° 32' E		engina a
enbau		Eassel/Altenbauna	51° 15* N 9°29* 8	19 Haroh Isla	About 20 output of Daimler Benz
3. 500 00 00			2 ~ 7 B		engines
3. Junkers Fluga ermarke	9601~ I	lagdeburg	52° 10' N 11° 39' N	No damage	About 60% output Jusso 211 ongines.

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S		Plant	-		OLDIN	AREA 4 - Page 2
P A		4. Junicers Flugsotorena rice	Location Nothen	Idapoint	Last Attacked	Current Activity and Remarks.
G E				12,00. 8	No damage	About 30 output Juno 211 engines.
- I S		5. HIAG Lathorwerk	Bransick/SilheLaitor	52°15" N 10°31" E	8 arch 44	le 110 componenta
U		6. HIM Lutherwerk	Bruneerick/Waggues	52019* II 10033* E	8 arch 44	lle 110 components eni final
N C		7. Ago	Oschersleben	52º 2' N		-secondy.
L A		8. Fleseler	Kazeol/Walden	11°16' ±		BE 190 components and final assembly About 10, total.
S S		9. Ago		9"31" S.	19 April 44	NT 190 congonents and final assembly. About 10 total.
I F			na.uorzęnac	51°51*30"1 11°03*30"5		F# 190 final assaubly. About 5. total.
I	C.	Flying Boob Plants				
I E D		Plant			Last	
Е		and the second sec	Location Fallersleben		Attacked	Current Activity and Remarks.
Е		1. Volkswagonserk		529261 11 20	June 1.L.	Probably & flying bomb functione
Е			attorstopen	52°26' N 29 10°47' E		Also Ju 88 wings, light cars.
Е		Rodest Fuel Plants	- attorstopen	1004.71 8		Probably \$ flying banb fuselages. Also Ju 88 wings, light cars.
Е	d. 1		- attorstopen	10047* 8 27		Also Ju 88 wings, light cars.

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T H I S P	b,	. Ordnance Depota				AREA 4 - Page 3
A G E			location	Pinpoint	Gurrent Activ	vity and Reverse
IS		1.		51 ⁰ 18' N 2119:251.3 34' 15" E	SUNILES. CLIV	anti tank guns, vehicles, engineering e on cover 3 July 44, possible tank
UN		2.	Nagdeburg/Friederich- stadt	520 7' N 110 39' B	Specializes in a	rtillery. Active on cover of 10 May 44.
C L		3.	Sectoburg/Altengrabos	52° 12' N 12° 11' 3	Hay be assuming f AFW's and self-pr	functions of Magdeburg Conigsborn. Ropelled guns seen an cover of April 44.
A S S	4. s.	Tank Pactories				
I F		Flant	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attacked	Current Activity and Resarks
I E D		1. Henschel und Sohn	Rassel/Mit belfeld	51° 20° N 09° 29° N	22/23 ctober 43. Ninor decage.	Total supply Tiger tanks.
		2. Henschol und Soin	Kasael/Rothenditaold	51° 20" N 09° 29" E	22/23 October 43. inor damage.	30, of all Panther tanks.
		3. Friedrich Krupp Grussenerk	lingdoburg/Suckau	520 06* N 11° 39* 3	20/21 Jan.44. Minor da.age.	About 30, of Mark IV tanks. This is equivalent to 15, of all SV's.
		4. 101/G	Brunwick/Neupetritor	52° 17' N 10° 30' E	8 April 44 according downgod.	Casege being repaired. Toducing about 39% Hark III assault guns
	ь.	Notor Vehicle Pactori	03			
		Flant	Location	Pinnoint	Last Attacked	Current Activity and Reparks
		1. Büssing N.A.G.		520151 11 100321 11	No décaage	Produces mearly all the heavy (4.5 ton) trucks for the Webrascht



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	Quantum and a second
I S	c. ynthetic Rubber Flants
S U	c. ynthetic Rubber Flatta Flant Location Pinpoint Attached Current sotistic and Security
S U N C	c. ynthetic Rubber Flants Plant Location Pinpoint Attached Current Activity and Separas 1. Continental Guamiserike A.G. Hamovar/Liamer 22° 23' N No damage Producting about 51 of new rabbar simple
S U N C L A S	c. ynthetic Rubber Flatta Flant Location Pinpoint Attached Current Activity and Secarias
S U N C L A S S I	c. ynthetic Rubber Flants <u>Flant</u> <u>Location</u> <u>Pinpoint Attached</u> <u>Current Activity and Sciarks</u> 1. Continental Gumaiserke A.G. Harnover/Thinner 52° 23' H Ho damage Prolucing about 5% of new rubber supply, 09° 41' 3 and a large part of the reclaimed rubber. d. Cil Storage in Germany <u>Location</u> <u>Pinpoint Capacity in Tons</u> <u>Current Activity and Sciarks</u>
S U N C L A S S I F I	c. ynthetic Rubber Flants <u>Plant</u> <u>Location</u> <u>Pinpoint Attached</u> <u>Current Activity and Secarias</u> 1. Continental Guaniseries A.G. Hamowar/Lizzer 52° 23' N No decage Producing about 5' of new rubber supply, og° 41' 3 and a large part of the reclaimed rubber. 4. Cil Storage in Gernany <u>Location</u> <u>Pinpoint Capacity in Tons</u> <u>Current Activity and Secarics</u> 1 <u>Derben-Ferchland</u> 52°25'25'N 145,000 + GAF and Arny sends light oils to
S U N C L A S S I F	c. ynthetic Rubber Flants <u>Hant</u> <u>Location</u> <u>Pinpoint Attached</u> <u>Current Activity and Reserves</u> 1. Continental Gummisseries A.G. Hannover/Linner 52° 23' N No denege Frontschung about 5% of new rubber sumply, og° 41' 3 and a large part of the recialmed rubber. d. Cil Storage in Germany <u>Location</u> <u>Pinpoint Capacity in Tons</u> <u>Current Activity and Genarks</u> 1 <u>Derben-Ferchlani</u> 52°25'25'N 145,000 + GaF and Army sends light oils to Prance
S U N C L A S S I F I E	c. ynthetic Rubber Flants <u>Hant</u> <u>Location</u> <u>Pinpoint Attached</u> <u>Current Activity and Resarks</u> 1. Continental Gumaisseries A.G. Hamover/Linner 52° 23' N No denege Producing about 5 of new rubber supply, og° 41' 3 and a large part of the reclained rubber. d. Cil Storage in Gernany <u>Location</u> <u>Pinpoint Capacity in Tons</u> <u>Current Activity and Genarics</u> 1 <u>Derben-Ferchland</u> 52°25'25'N 145,000 + <u>Gaf and Army sents light oils to</u> <u>Prance</u>
S U N C L A S S I F I E	c. ynthetic Aubber Flants           Mant         Location         Manoint         Ast           Mant         Location         Mapoint         Attached         Current Activity and Scarks           1. Continental Gummisserice A.G. Hannover/Linner 52° 23' H No damage         Producing about 5% of new rubber supply, and a large part of the recialmed rubber.           d. Cill Storage in Genseny
S U N C L A S S I F I E	c. ynthetic Rubber Flants <u>Hant</u> <u>Location</u> <u>Pinpoint Attached</u> <u>Current Activity and Reserves</u> 1. Continental Gummisseries A.G. Hannover/Linner 52° 23' N No denege Frontschung about 5% of new rubber sumply, og° 41' 3 and a large part of the recialmed rubber. d. Cil Storage in Germany <u>Location</u> <u>Pinpoint Capacity in Tons</u> <u>Current Activity and Genarks</u> 1 <u>Derben-Ferchlani</u> 52°25'25'N 145,000 + GaF and Army sends light oils to Prance
S U N C L A S S I F I E	c. ynthetic Aubber Flants           Mant         Location         Manoint         Ast           Mant         Location         Mapoint         Attached         Current Activity and Scarks           1. Continental Gummisserice A.G. Hannover/Linner 52° 23' H No damage         Producing about 5% of new rubber supply, and a large part of the recialmed rubber.           d. Cill Storage in Genseny
S U N C L A S S I F I E	c. ynthetic Aubber Flants           Mant         Location         Manoint         Ast           Mant         Location         Mapoint         Attached         Current Activity and Scarks           1. Continental Gummisserice A.G. Hannover/Linner 52° 23' H No damage         Producing about 5% of new rubber supply, and a large part of the recialmed rubber.           d. Cill Storage in Genseny
S U N C L A S S I F I E	c. ynthetic Aubber Flants           Mant         Location         Manoint         Ast           Mant         Location         Mapoint         Attached         Current Activity and Scarks           1. Continental Gummisserice A.G. Hannover/Linner 52° 23' H No damage         Producing about 5% of new rubber supply, and a large part of the recialmed rubber.           d. Cill Storage in Genseny

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T H I S P A G E I S U N C L

A S S I F I E D

			sa 5: Munich - Friedrichahaf	en OFORT
Oi	1 Refineries and Synthetic Plant			SEURE
1.	Rhenania Ossag Mineral- Blwerke A. G.	Location Regensburg	Pinpoint Last Attacked 49° 01' N. not damaged 12° 08' E	Current ctivity & Remarks Capacity 1000 tons per month. Lubricants.
2.	Danubia A. G. fur Mineralölindustrie	Regensburg	49° 01' N Not dama ed	Capacity 2000 tons per month.
Poi	intblank and Counter-Crossb	ow Targets		
a.	Ball Bearing Plants MONE.			
b.	Pighter Aircraft Plants			
1.	Bayerische Motorenwerke	Location Munich/Allach	Pinpoint Inst Attacked 480 13' N 15-6-44 Very 110 28' 30"E minor damage	Current Activity & Remarks About 40 total 30 801 production
2.	Bayerische Motoremwerke	Munich/Ober- wiesenfeld	480 11' N 13-7-44 110 13' E	BMF development. Possibly compor and assembly.
3.	Messerschmitt G.	Regensburg/ Prufening	49° 01' N 25 Feb 44 12° 11' E	Me 109 components.
4.	Messerschaitt A. G.	Regensburg/ Obertraubling	48° 59' N 25 Feb 44 12° 11' E	Me 109 components and final assem
5.	Messerschmitt A. G.	Dingolfing	48° 38' N no damage 12° 29' E	Me 109 subassemblies
6.	Messerschnitt A. G.	Augsburg	48° 20' N 13 pr 44 10° 54' E	He 410, 163, 262 components and assembly.
7.	Wiener Heustädter	Kottern	47° 42' N no damage 10° 19' E	We 109 fuseLages and subassemblies
8.	Wiener Neustädter	Kempten	47° 44. N no damage	Me 109 fuselages and subassemblies

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T H I S		с.	Flying Bomb Plants				Area 5, p. 2
P A G			NONE Rocket Fuel Flants			•	
Е			Plant	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attacked	Current Activity & Remarks
I S			1	Ober Raderach	47° 42' N 09° 26' E		Important producers of concentrated H202
U N			2. Degussa	Rheinfelden	470 34° W 070 48° E		Important producers of concentrated $H_2O_2$
C L A S			3. Electrochemische Werk Munchen linde Eis masch- inen Fabrik	) ) <b>follråegels</b> kreuth ) )	48° 03' N 11° 30' E		Important producers of concentrated $\rm H_2O_2$
S. I F	3.	a. 1	Tank Engine Flants				
I E		-	Plant . Motorenwerk	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attacked	Current Activity & Remarks
D			Maybach	Friedrichshafen	47° 39' N 09° 28' E	27/28 April 44	Repair being vigorously pressed. Production more than $\frac{1}{2}$ of pre-raid rate of 60% or more of all German tank engines.
		ъ. с	Prdnance Depots				
		-	Loc	ation	Pinpoint	Current A	ctivity and Remarks
		1	. Ingolatadt		48° 47' N 11° 25' E	Also cente	bers of guns on all covers. er for small arms supply. ve on cover of 11 April 44.

T H						
I S P		3. Wist/Neu	i Ulua	180 22' N 10 ⁹ 01' Ξ	Area 5, p. 3 Specializes on guns for AFVs and engineer equipment. Active on cover of 25 June 14.	
A G E	ljæ	a. Sank Fa	ctories			
I S		BONS b. Hotor V.	elicle Factories			
U N		NORR				
C L		NONE NONE	ic Subber Flents			
A S S		d. Oil Sto	rage in Germany			
I F			Location	Pinpoint	Current Activity and Reparks	-
I E D		1. Freihen (Unt	terpfallenhofen)	48° 6' N 11° 22' S	GAP and Army. Ships light oils to Italy.	

		THIS PAGE IS	S UNCLASSI	FIFD	and the second
		ARRA 6	: Frankfurt	-Schweinfurt-St	uttgart
1.	011 Refineries and syn	thetic plants			
	NCHIS				
2.	Pointblank and Counter	-Grossbow Targets			
	a. Ball Bearing Flants				
	Flant	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attacked	Ourrent Activity & Remarks
	1. Kugelfischer	Schweinfurt	50° 02' N 10° 31' S	26/27 April 44	Producing about 11 total bearing supply.
	2. V.S.P. Sork I & II	Schwinfurt	50° 02' N 10° 31' E	26/27 April 44	Producing about 11 total bearing supply.
	3. Rugelfischer	Sbelsbach	49° 59' N 10° 40' 8	No damage	Producing about 7/ total bearing supply.
	4. S.E.F. (Morma)	Stuttgart	48° 48' H 289 39' 27. 9° 11' E	16 March 44.	Froducing about 3 total bearing supply.
	5. Georg Muller	Nurnberg	49° 26' N 11° 05' E	No demage	Producing about 5% total bearing supply.
	6. Gebauer and Goller	Fulda	50° 33' N 09° 43' N	No damage	Producing about 2% total bearing supply.
	7. 1258	Wetzlar	50 ⁰ 33' N 08 ⁰ 30' E	No damage.	Producing about 25 total bearing supply.
	7. REW b. Fighter Aircraft Fl	e and make a particular products of the best of the second states of the second states of the second states of		No demege.	
		e and make a particular products of the best of the second states of the second states of the second states of	08 ⁰ 30' 8	26/27 Nov 43	

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T H									
I S							Area 6, p. 2		
Р		c. Flying Bosh Flants							
A G		L. Adam Opel A.G.	Locati			t Last Attacks	i Current Activi	ty & Remarks	
Е		and the second of the second second	Russelshoir	1	49° 59' H 08° 21' E	8/9 Sept 42	Plying boab fu Motor vehicle	selages. compenents.	
I S		d. Rocket Fuel Flants					and an Endewand of a dam water and a dam of the second sec	A. Breezekking A	
U		HOR2							
N C	3.	Control Control							
L A		NONE b. Ordnance Depots							
• S		Locati	OR	2 months					
I F		1. Mains/Mastel		Finpoint 50° 01' N		Currant Activi			
I E D				X 17. 17. 1	rx I	signal equipme 30 June 14.	engineer oquipme at spares. Active	at and on cover of	
	J _{j+}	a. Tank Factories							
		Flant	Locati	on	Pinpoist	Last Attackel	Ourrent Activity		
		2. H.A.H.	Numberg			8 Surch 43	Produces about J Panther tanks. tracked assored	10 of	
					Service and the service service				

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Т			
H I		Area 6, p. 3	
S		b. Motor Vehicle Factories Plant Location Fingeint Last Attacked Current Activity &	Renarks
P A G E		Flant         Location         Finpoint Last Actacked Current addivity a           1. Daimler Benn         Gaggemen         45° 45' N Hot demaged froduces chiefly mot trucks. Accounts f           9° 12' E         10° of total truck	dium for nearly
I S U		2. Daimler Benz Stuttgart/Enterturk- 4,8° 47' N 26/27 Nov 43 Hadius and light to heim 9° 15' E Hoderate damage.of total vehicle s Listed as aircraft above.	rucks. 50 supply. t target
N C		c. Synthetic Rubber	
L A		Flant Location Pinpoint Last Attacked Current Activity	Remerks
· S I F		1. I.G. Farberindustrie Ludwigahafen/Oppau 49° 30' N 11 Feb 44. Currently produci. 08° 26' E Einor damage. 10 new rubber su	ng about pply.
I		d. Oil Storage in Germany	
E D		INTEL	
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			ARIA 7 1. 1944		
1. 051 30	finerics and gathe				
	ant	location			
	rwerke Scelitz 3.6.	Poelitz	93933* 8. 16833* 8.	20-6-44	Disctive. May result at 50% of 50,000 tens mentily out- put in sugart
2. Joint	blank and Counter-Gr				
se B					
·		unta			
	sat	iostion	Finpoint	Lost attacked	Aur ent activity and Remarks
1. ~0	mier	is or	53055* N. 11027* S		FF.190 components to support
2. 329			53°51' 3. 13942' 4.	9-10-63	190 mings. 30-30/10.
5. Doi		Schwerin	55°364,0" II. 11°22'00"		P.190 final associaty. 30/mo.
4. 728		oubrandenburg	3°36'10" N. 13°18'40" S.		

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Т				
H I S				
P		d. Somet Puel Florida		
A G E				leat Attacked Our out lativity & Remarks
I		1.	54° 09' N 13° 48' B	A PRINCIPAL CONTRACTOR OF THE REAL OF THE
S U	3.	a. Tent Sugine (lante		And any long second contraction of the second s
N C		NGEN b. Ordnance Depote		
L A S				
S I		Location	Pinpoint	Our out antivity and Memoria
F I E		Prieméburg	53°48* 5. 12°13140° 2.	total guas and vehiclos. Very solive on cover of 19 Meb. 44
D		a. Tani Sectories		
		b. Totor Vehicle Factories		
		o. Synthetic Rubber Flants		
		d. Gil Starage		
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AREA 8 : Northeastern Genaany

- 1. Oil Refineries and Synthetic Plants
  - NONE
- 2. Fointblank and Counter-Crossbow Targets
  - s. Ball Bearing Plants
  - NONE
  - b. Fighter Aircraft Flants

	Plant	Location	Pinpoint Last Attacked	Current Activity and Remarks
1.	Focks Wulf	Grauienz	53° 28'30"N No damage. 18° 46' 3	PM 190 final assembly and possibly components. 20-30/mo. 10% of total
2.	Focke Sulf	Marienburg	54° 02' N 9.4.44. 19° 05' E	Fa 190 final assembly 20/mo. 8% of total.
3.	Kurt Kanenb <b>u</b> rg	Gäynia/Rahmel	54° 34° N 9.4.44. 18° 24' E	Ps 190 final assembly 30-40/mo. 12- of total.

- c. Flying Bamb Plants
- NCMA
- d. Nocket Fuel Flants
- NONS
- 3. m. Tank Magine Flants
  - MORE
  - b. Ordnance Depots
  - NONE
- 4. a. Tank Factories
- NONE

	TO INCLASSIFIED	
T H	b. Notor Vehicle Pactories	AREA 8, p. 2
I S P A	NONE e. Synthetic Rubber Flants	
G E I S	NONE d. 011 Storage in Germany NONE	
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L A S S I		
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Т						
H I				REA 9: Bast	Central Ger	any c
S	1.	. Gil Refineries and Synthetic	Flants			NO SECONT
Р						
A G		Plant	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attacked	Estimated Current Activity
E					and the second second second second second second	
E		1. Sudetenlandische Treibstof. werke s.G. (Hessag v)	f= Brux	50° 34° N	12 May 14.	Partial penales. Little or no production
I		<ol> <li>Sudetenlendische Treibstof werke A.G. (BRABAG V)</li> </ol>	f– Brux	50° 34° n 13° 37° z	12 Nay 14.	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last
I S		<ol> <li>Sudetenlendische Treibstof werke A.G. (BRABAG V)</li> </ol>	f – Brux		12 ≝ay <i>b</i> h.	Partial penales. Little or no production
I S U N		WERKE A.G. (BRADAG V)	f – Brux		12 ≚ay 14	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last
I S U		<ul> <li>Werke A.G. (BRADAG V)</li> <li>2. Braunkohle Bengin A.G.</li> </ul>	Ruhland-	13° 37' в 51°29' и	·	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last cover. Capacity 25,000 tpm. Bergius.
I S U N C L A		<ul> <li>Werke A.G. (BRABAG V)</li> <li>2. Braunkohle Benzin A.G. (Brabag)</li> </ul>	Ruhland- Sohwarzheide	13° 57° в 51°29° и 13°53° в	·	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last cover. Capacity 25,000 tpm. Bergius. May resume at 50% of 29,000 tons monthly capacity in August. Fischer Tropsch.
I S U N C L A S S		<ul> <li>Werke A.G. (BRADAG V)</li> <li>2. Braunkohle Bengin A.G.</li> </ul>	Ruhland- Schwarzheide	13° 37' в 51°29' и	·	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last cover. Capacity 25,000 tpm. Bergius. May resume at 50% of 29,000 tons monthly capacity in August. Fischer Tropsch.
I S U N C L A S	2.	<ul> <li>Werke A.G. (BRABAG V)</li> <li>2. Braunkohle Benzin A.G. (Brabag)</li> <li>3. Rhemania-Gasag Voltol Plant</li> </ul>	Ruhland- Schwarzheide Freital	13° 57' E 51°29' R 13°53' E 50°59' N	·	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last cover. Capacity 25,000 tpm. Bergius. May resume at 50 of 29,000 tons monthly capacity in August. Fischer Tropsch. Satimated current monthly output 500 tons
I S U N C L A S S I		<ul> <li>Werke A.G. (BRABAG V)</li> <li>2. Braunkohle Benzin A.G. (Brabag)</li> </ul>	Ruhland- Schwarzheide Freital	13° 57' E 51°29' R 13°53' E 50°59' N	·	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last cover. Capacity 25,000 tpm. Bergius. May resume at 50 of 29,000 tons monthly capacity in August. Fischer Tropsch. Satimated current monthly output 500 tons
I S U N C L A S S I F I		<ul> <li>Werke A.G. (BRABAG V)</li> <li>2. Braunkohle Bengin A.G. (Brabag)</li> <li>3. Rhenania-Casag Voltol Plant</li> <li>Peintblank and Counter-Crossbo e. Ball Bearing Plants</li> </ul>	Ruhland- Schwarzheide Freital	13° 57' E 51°29' R 13°53' E 50°59' N	21 June 44	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last cover. Capacity 25,000 tpm. Bergius. May resume at 50 of 29,000 tons monthly capacity in August. Fischer Tropsch. Satimated current monthly output 500 tons
I S U N C L A S S I F I E		<ul> <li>Werze A.G. (BRABAG V)</li> <li>2. Braunkohle Benzin A.G. (Brabag)</li> <li>3. Rhemania-Casag Voltol Plant</li> <li>Pointblank and Counter-Crossbo</li> <li>a. Ball Bearing Plants</li> </ul>	Ruhland- Schwarzheide Freital	13° 57' E 51°29' R 13°53' E 50°59' N	·	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last cover. Capacity 25,000 tpm. Bergius. May resume at 50% of 29,000 tons monthly capacity in August. Pischar Tropsch. Satisstal current monthly output 500 tons Lubricant.
I S U N C L A S S I F I E		<ul> <li>Werke A.G. (BRABAG V)</li> <li>2. Braunkohle Bengin A.G. (Brabag)</li> <li>3. Rhenania-Casag Voltol Plant</li> <li>Peintblank and Counter-Crossbo e. Ball Bearing Plants</li> </ul>	Ruhland- Schwarzheide Freital	13° 57' E 51°29' N 13°53' E 50°59' N 13°39' E Pinpoint 50°25'55'N	A June 44	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last cover. Capacity 25,000 tpm. Bergius. May resume at 50, of 29,000 tons monthly capacity in August. Fischer Tropsch. Satissted current monthly output 500 tons Lubricant.
I S U N C L A S S I F I E		<ul> <li>Werke A.G. (BRABAG V)</li> <li>2. Braunkohle Benzin A.G. (Brabag)</li> <li>3. Ehenania-Gasag Voltol Plant</li> <li>Pointblank and Counter-Grossbor</li> <li>a. Ball Bearing Plants</li> <li><u>Flant</u></li> <li>1. SEP</li> </ul>	Ruhland- Schwarzheide Freital W Targets Location	13° 57' E 51°29' N 13°53' E 50°59' N 13°39' E Pinpoint	A June 44	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last cover. Capacity 25,000 tpm. Bergius. May resume at 50% of 29,000 tons monthly capacity in August. Pischar Tropsch. Satisstal current monthly output 500 tons Lubricant.
I S U N C L A S S I F I E		<ul> <li>Werze A.G. (BRABAG V)</li> <li>2. Braunkohle Benzin A.G. (Brabag)</li> <li>3. Rhemania-Gasag Voltol Plant</li> <li>Pointblank and Counter-Crossber</li> <li>a. Ball Bearing Plants</li> <li>Plant</li> <li>1. SEP</li> <li>b. Fighter Aircreft Plants</li> </ul>	Ruhland- Schwarzheide Freital W Targets Location	13° 57' E 51°29' N 13°53' E 50°59' N 13°39' E Pinpoint 50°25'55'N	A June 44	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on last cover. Capacity 25,000 tpm. Bergius. May resume at 50, of 29,000 tons monthly capacity in August. Fischer Tropsch. Satissted current monthly output 500 tons Lubricant.
I S U N C L A S S I F I E		<ul> <li>Werke A.G. (BRABAG V)</li> <li>2. Braunkohle Benzin A.G. (Brabag)</li> <li>3. Ehenania-Gasag Voltol Plant</li> <li>Pointblank and Counter-Grossbor</li> <li>a. Ball Bearing Plants</li> <li><u>Flant</u></li> <li>1. SEP</li> </ul>	Ruhland- Schwarzheide Freital W Targets Location	13° 57' E 51°29' N 13°53' E 50°59' N 13°39' E Pinpoint 50°25'55'N	Lest Atlackod	Partial repairs. Little or no production of tars or finished products on lest cover. Capacity 25,000 tpm. Bergius. May resume at 50, of 29,000 tons monthly capacity in August. Fischer Tropsch. Satissted current monthly output 500 tons Lubricant.

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c. Flying Boob Plants	ARSA 9 - Page 2
Flant	Location Pinpoint Attacked Current Activity and Resarks
1. Spinning Plant	Newlok, Czechoslovakia 50°13'30" H No damage Filatic a sizeroff fundament
	12°W, 00° 5 Je 88 wings.
d. Rochet Fuel Flants	
Tank Engine Plants	
Tank Angine Flants Mont	
Tank Engine Flants Nons b.Ordnance Depats	
Tank Engine Flants Monte	Planoint Current Activity and Resarks A9942*15" N Tanks, gans, and stores visible on last cover. area also contains personant any bernocks
. Tank Engine Flants MONS b.Ordnance Depats Location 1. Grafonsohr	49942115 H Salka, state and showed states
. Tank Engine Flants MONE b.Ordnance Depots Location 1. Grafonsohr	19942115" N Tanka, gams, and stores visible on last cover. area also 11954'10" E contains personant any barracks
<ul> <li>Jank Engine Flants MONS</li> <li>D.Ordnance Depate</li> <li><u>Location</u></li> <li><u>Craftmechr</u></li> <li>Graftmechr</li> <li>Tank Factories NONS</li> <li>Lotar Vehicle Factories</li> </ul>	49042*15° N Tanka, guns, and stores visible on last cover. area also 14°54*10° E contains percentant any barracks
<ul> <li>.Tank Engine Flants NONS</li> <li>b.Ordnance Depots</li> <li><u>Location</u></li> <li><u>Location</u></li> <li>Crafonsohr</li> <li>a. Tank Factories NONS</li> <li>b. Lotar Vehicle Factoris NONS</li> <li>c. Synthetic Rubber Flant</li> </ul>	49042115° N Tanka, guns, and stores visible on last cover. Fee also 11°54'10° E contains percanent any barracks
<ul> <li>Jank Engine Flants MONG</li> <li>D.Ordnance Depate</li> <li>D.Ordn</li></ul>	49042115° N Tanka, guns, and stores visible on last cover. Fee also 11°54'10° E contains percanent any barracks

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#### ARSA 10 : Ruhr (Rhein-sestphalia)

1. Oil Refineries and Synthetic Oil Flants

T H I S P A G E I

U N C L A S S I F I E D

	Plant	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attack	Estimated Current Activity
1. 0	Lelsenberg Benzin/	A.G. Gelsenkirchen Nordstern)	51° 32' N 07° 03' E	12/13-6-44.	Small scale production possible at end of August. Capacity estimated at 8000 tons. Bergius.
c k		elsenkirchen Scholven Buer)	51° 36' N 07° 02' E	7.7.44.	Shut down temporarily. Capacity 29,000 tons. Mustuating activity. Estimated curpent monthly output 17,000 tons. Bergius.
	Union Rheinische Braunkohlen Fraftstoff A.G.	Wesseling	50° 40' N 07° 00' E	25.6.44.	Flucthting activity. Estimated current monthly output 17,000 tons. Bergius.
4.	Ruhroel A.G.	Bottrop-Welheim	51° 32' N 06° 59' E	10.4.44.	In full operation 20.6.14. Estimated Gurrent monthly output 8,500 tons. Bergius.
	Rheinpreussen	Homberg (Moers- Moerbach)	51° 28' N 06° 38' E	19.8.42.	Working normally. Estimated current monthly output 16,000 ton Fischer Tropsch.
	A.G. Ruhrbenzin A.G.	Sterkrade Holten	51° 31' N 06° 48' E	16/17-6-44.	Repairs may be completed in Augus Estimated current monthly output 9,500 tons. Fischer Tropsch.
7.	Geverkschaft Viktor (Kloeck-	Castrop-Rauxel	51° 35' N 07° 20' E		Believed fully active. Estimate current monthly output 8,500 ton Fischer Tropsch.
8.	ner-Wintershall) Chemischewerke Essener Stein-	Kamen (Dortaind)	51° 38' N 07° 38' E		Believed fully active. Estimate current monthly output 8,500 ton Fischer Tropsch.
9.	kohle A.G. Krupp Treib- stoffwerke A.G.	Wanne Eickel	51° 31' N 07° 11' H	29/30-9.43.	tons. Fischer Tropsch.
10.	Hoesch Benzin G.m.b.H.	Dortmund (Wambelerholz)	51° 32' 1 07° 30' 1	<b>N</b> -	Believed fully active. Estimate current monthly output 7,000 tor Fischer Tropsch.

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11.	Rhenania Mineralöl- werke A.G.	Monheim (nr.	Dusseldorf)510 060	06' 53'	N E	Believed fully active. Estima- ted monthly output 10,000 tons. Lubricant.
12.	Rhenania-Ossag Mineralölwerke A.G.	Reisholz		10' 51'		Believed fully active. Estima- ted current monthly output, 5,000 tons. Lubricant.
13.	Deutsche Gasolin A.G.	Enmerich		50' 16'		Very heavily damaged. Estimate d current monthly output 0. Lubricant.
14.	Schmitz	Dortmund	51° 07°	32' 26'	N E	Believed fully active. Estima- ted current monthly output 2,000 tons Lubricant.

AREA 10, p. 2

2. Pointblank and Counter-Crossbow Targets

a. Ball Bearing Flants

	Plant Locati	on Pir	npoin	it I	ast Att	acked Curr	ent Ac	stivity	& Remarks
1. Jaeger	r Wuppertal,		15' 06'		-	About supply		total	bearing

b. Fighter Aircraft Plants

NONE

c. Flying Bomb Plants

NONE

d. Rocket Fuel Plants

Plant	Location	Pinpoint Last attacked Current Activity and Rem	arks
1. Heinkel A.G.	Dusseldorf	51° 11' N	
		06° 50' E	

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x		Tank Engine Flants				AREA 10, p. 3
	ci.					
		NONE				
	Ъ.	Ordnance Depots				
		Location		Pint	oint	Current Activity and Remarks
		and a state of the		a contract of the second second	and clouds in our with the star	
	1	Deutoma 1 /mars		0		
	1.	Dortaund/Unna		51° 33 07 41	45" N	Specializes in bridge equipment and engineer stores.
ha	_			51° 33 07 41	45" N	
4.	_	Tank Factories		51° 33 07 41	45" N	
4.	_			51 ⁰ 33 07 41	.45"N .* ■	
4.	a.	Tank Factories	es	51° 33 07 41	• 45" N • ■	
4.	a.	Tank Factories NONE	es	07 41	.* 18	engineer stores.
4.	a.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori Plant	Locatio	07 41 on Piny	oint	engineer stores. Current Activity and Remarks
4.	a.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori		07 41	.* 18	Current Activity and Remarks Chiefly medium trucks. About 30% of
4	a.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori Plant	Locatio	07 41	oint	Current Activity and Remarks Chiefly medium trucks. About 30% of mediums and over 10% of total trucks. Also manufacture of half tracks for
4.	a.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori Plant	Locatio	07 41	oint	Current Activity and Remarks Chiefly medium trucks. About 30% of mediums and over 10% of total trucks.
4.	a.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori Plant	Locatio Cologne	07 41	oint	Current Activity and Remarks Chiefly medium trucks. About 30% of mediums and over 10% of total trucks. Also manufacture of half tracks for
4.	a.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori Flant Ford	Locatio Cologne	07 41 on Pinp 51° 00 06° 58	oint ' 30" N ' 00" E	Current Activity and Remarks Chiefly medium trucks. About 30% of mediums and over 10% of total trucks. Also manufacture of half tracks for artillery.
4.	a.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori Flant Ford Synthetic Rubber Flan Plant	Locatio Cologne ts Locatio	07 41 m Pinp 51° 00 06° 58 m Pinp	oint ' 30" N ' 00" E	Current Activity and Remarks Chiefly medium trucks. About 30% of mediums and over 10% of total trucks. Also manufacture of half tracks for artillery. Current Activity and Remarks
4	a.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori <u>Plant</u> Ford Synthetic Rubber Flan	Locatio Cologne ts Locatio	07 41 m Pinp 51° 00 06° 58 m Pinp	oint ' 30" N ' 00" E	Current Activity and Remarks Chiefly medium trucks. About 30% of mediums and over 10% of total trucks. Also manufacture of half tracks for artillery.
4.	a. b. 1.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori Plant Ford Synthetic Rubber Flan Plant Chemische Werke Huls G.m.b.H.	Locatio Cologne ts Locatio Hills	07 41 on Pinp 51° 00 06° 58	oint ' 30" N ' 00" E	Current Activity and Remarks Chiefly medium trucks. About 30% of mediums and over 10% of total trucks. Also manufacture of half tracks for artillery. Current Activity and Remarks
4.	a. b. 1.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori Plant Ford Synthetic Rubber Plan Plant Chemische Werke Huls	Locatio Cologne ts Locatio Hills	07 41 m Pinp 51° 00 06° 58 m Pinp	oint ' 30" N ' 00" E	Current Activity and Remarks Chiefly medium trucks. About 30% of mediums and over 10% of total trucks. Also manufacture of half tracks for artillery. Current Activity and Remarks
4.	a. b. 1.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori Plant Ford Synthetic Rubber Flan Plant Chemische Werke Huls G.m.b.H.	Locatio Cologne ts Locatio Hills	07 41	oint ' 30" N ' 00" E	Current Activity and Remarks Chiefly medium trucks. About 30% of mediums and over 10% of total trucks. Also manufacture of half tracks for artillery. Current Activity and Remarks About 20% of total new rubber supply.
4.	a. b. l. l. d.	Tank Factories NONE Motor Vehicle Factori <u>Plant</u> Ford Synthetic Rubber Flan <u>Plant</u> Chemische Werke Huls G.m.b.H. Oil Storege in German	Locatio Cologne ts Locatio Hills	07 41 <u>on Pinp</u> 51° 00 06° 58 <u>on Pinp</u> 51° 4 07° 0	oint ' 30" N ' 00" E oint 1' N 6' E	Current Activity and Remarks Chiefly medium trucks. About 30% of mediums and over 10% of total trucks. Also manufacture of half tracks for artillery. Current Activity and Remarks About 20% of total new rubber supply.

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#### ANGA 11 : Hardburg - Bresson

#### 1. Oil Rofinsries and Synthetic Flants

	Plant	Location	Pinpoint	last Att	sok	Estimated Current Activity
1.	Rienania-Casag Minoral- Siserico A.G.	Heburg (Greebro	ok)53°30' N 09° 59' 3	20 Jun	e dada	Active on 26.6.44. Normal monthly output is 10,000 tons -
2.	Dautsche Vacuus-Olag	Branen (Oslobshausan)	53° 08' N 08° 43' E	24 Az	44	lubricants. No damage. Monthly output 8,000 tons. Lubricant.
	Deutsche Patroleum A.G.	ianburg (Eilhelanburg)	53° 30° 11 09° 59° 3	20 Jun	44.	Moderate damage. Estimated current monthly output 5000 tons. Labricant.
he	Arnat Schliessons 61- worke G.m.b.H.	Hodburg (Graebrook)	53° 30' 11 09° 59' E	20 Jun	44	Heavy damage. Estimated current manthly output 1,500 tens. Lubricant.
5.	Julius Schiniler 81- works G.m.b.H.	liedneg (Neuhof)	53° 30° 1 09° 59° 1	26 Jun	44	Heavy danage. Estimated current monthly output 1,000 tons. Lubricant.
	Macrulölessis G.m.b.H.	Halang	530-301 k 090-591 k	20 Jun	44	Astimated current monthly output 500 tens. Severe damage. Labricant.
		Salsborgen (ar Sheine)	52° 19' 1 07° 21' 5			Believel fully active. Normal monthly output 2,500 tons.
	Rhenenia-Gaosg Mineral- Shorter J.C.		09° 58' E	26 Jun	2,24	Distillation Flant not badly damaged. Labe oil plant severely damaged. Estimated current monthal y output 37000 tons. Lubricant.
	Shano Aspinit-Astro A. (.		53 ⁶ 29* N 09 ⁵ 58* E	26 Jan	lete !	Bolievel to have been inactive. Crule Refinery.
	Suropalache Tanklager-u- Trana.A.G.	lisaburg	53° 32° 1 09° 53° 8	26 Jun .	hile	Nolicved to have been inactive and now very severally damaged. Ho our rest output. Gruie Refinary.
1.	Mineral61-u.Asphalt- Sente A.G.	Ostensoor (ar. Drunabuttelkoog)	53 °55' n 07° 11' n	6 Jul 1	44.	Very heavily damaged. No ourrant output. Grule Sefinery.

#### Ι S Ρ А G E Ι S U Ν С L А S S I F I

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T H							Laro	a 11, p. 2	
I S P			12. Nærdingstælt (n	r Soida) Salle (Meine/ Nesdingatedt)	54° 09' H 09° 05' Z	29 Jun July in	uly active.	Setimated current m thly output 14,000 tons. Crule Sefina	
A G		2.	Pointblank and Court	for Constant Provents				an a	-8044
E			e. Ball inering the						
S									
U N			b. Fighter direrert						•
U N C			b. Pighter Alrenaft Plant	Location				vity and semura	
U N C			b. Fighter direrert			lant Attacked No dumage		vity and semarica s per no. 10s of	-
U N C L A S S I			<ul> <li>b. Pighter aircraft</li> <li>Plant</li> <li>1. Flockner Flog-</li> </ul>	Location		No dunage	80 Bas 8014 total.		
U N C L A S S I F I E			<ul> <li>b. Pighter alreraft</li> <li>Plant</li> <li>1. Thomas Theorem and the second second</li></ul>	Toontion Toontion Toolung/Scorfleth	55° 51*00% 10° 05*15*8 53° 03* 8 8° 53* 2 53° 03* 8	No dumage	80 Bar 801's botal. Fa 190 compo	s per mo. 10% of	-
U N C L A S S I F I			<ul> <li>b. Fighter Alreraft</li> <li>Plast</li> <li>1. The same Tag- notorenhau</li> <li>2. Focke sulf</li> </ul>	Toontion Heburg Scorfleth Brussn/Keselingen Brasen/Kastelt	53° 31*00°31 10° 05*15*8 53° 03* 8 8° 53* 8 53° 03* 8 8° 53* 8	No damage No appreci- able damage. No approci- able damage.	60 Bas 6014 botal. Fe 196 compo Ff 196 compo	monts and repair.	
U N C L A S S I F I E			<ul> <li>b. Fighter Alreraft</li> <li>Plast</li> <li>1. Flockner Fisc- notorenbau</li> <li>2. Pocke sulf</li> <li>3. Pooke sulf</li> </ul>	Toontion Heburg Scorfleth Brusson Monelingen Brusson Mastelt Brusson Mouenlander	53° 31*00°N 10° 05*15*8 53° 03* H 8° 53* 2 53° 03* H 8° 53* 3 53° 02*15*8	No damage No appreci- able damage. No approci- able damage.	60 Bas 6014 botal. Fe 196 compo Ff 196 compo	a per mo. 10% of monte and repair.	
U N C L A S S I F I E	•		<ul> <li>b. Fighter Alreraft</li> <li><u>Plant</u></li> <li>1. Floringer Flag- notorenbau</li> <li>2. Pocke sulf</li> <li>3. Pocke sulf</li> <li>4. Pocke sulf</li> </ul>	Toontion Heburg Scorfleth Brusson Monelingen Brusson Mastelt Brusson Mouenlander	53° 31*00°N 10° 05*15*8 53° 03* H 8° 53* 2 53° 03* H 8° 53* 3 53° 02*15*8	No damage No appreci- able damage. No approci- able damage.	60 Bas 6014 botal. Fe 196 compo Ff 196 compo	a per mo. 10% of monte and repair.	
U N C L A S S I F I E			<ul> <li>b. Fighter alreraft</li> <li><u>Plant</u></li> <li>1. Flockney Flag- motorombau</li> <li>2. Pocke sulf</li> <li>3. Pocke sulf</li> <li>4. Pocke sulf</li> <li>c. Flying Borb Flant</li> </ul>	Loontion Huburg, Scorfleth Brasen/Neselingen Brasen/Neselingen Brasen/Neselingen	53° 31*00°N 10° 05*15*8 53° 03* H 8° 53* 2 53° 03* H 8° 53* 3 53° 02*15*8	No damage No appreci- able damage. No approci- able damage.	60 Bas 6014 botal. Fe 196 compo Ff 196 compo	a per mo. 10% of monte and repair.	
U N C L A S S I F I E	•		<ul> <li>b. Fighter Alcoratt</li> <li>Flast</li> <li>1. Electric Flag- notorenbau</li> <li>2. Pocke sulf</li> <li>3. Pocke sulf</li> <li>4. Pocke sulf</li> <li>c. Flying Borb Flant EONE</li> </ul>	Loontion Huburg, Scorfleth Brasen/Neselingen Brasen/Neselingen Brasen/Neselingen	53° 31*00°N 10° 05*15*8 53° 03* H 8° 53* 2 53° 03* H 8° 53* 3 53° 02*15*8	No damage No appreci- able damage. No approci- able damage.	60 Bas 6014 botal. Fe 196 compo Ff 196 compo	a per mo. 10% of monte and repair.	
U N C L A S S I F I E			<ul> <li>b. Fighter Alreraft Plant </li> <li>1. Floring Fig- notorenbau</li> <li>2. Pocke sulf</li> <li>3. Pocke sulf</li> <li>4. Pocke sulf</li> <li>6. Flying Borb Flant NONE</li> <li>d. Rocket Puol Flant</li> </ul>	Loontion Helburg/Scorfleth Branan/Nemelingen Branan/Nemelingen Branan/Nemelingen Branan/Nemelingen	53° 31*00°N 10° 05*15*8 53° 03* H 8° 53* 2 53° 03* H 8° 53* 3 53° 02*15*8	No damage No appreci- able damage. No approci- able damage.	60 Bas 6014 botal. Fe 196 compo Ff 196 compo	a per mo. 10% of monte and repair.	
U N C L A S S I F I E	•	3.	<ul> <li>b. Fighter Alcoratt <u>Plant</u></li> <li>1. Electric Fac- notorenbau</li> <li>2. Focke sulf</li> <li>3. Pocke sulf</li> <li>4. Pocke sulf</li> <li>c. Flying Borb Flant NONE</li> <li>d. Rocket Fuel Flant MONE</li> </ul>	Loontion Helburg/Scorfleth Branan/Nemelingen Branan/Nemelingen Branan/Nemelingen Branan/Nemelingen	53° 31*00°N 10° 05*15*8 53° 03* H 8° 53* 2 53° 03* H 8° 53* 3 53° 02*15*8	No damage No appreci- able damage. No approci- able damage.	60 Bas 6014 botal. Fe 196 compo Ff 196 compo	a per mo. 10% of monte and repair.	

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S	b. Ordnance Depots			Area 11, p. 3	
P A	Location	Pinpol	Int	Current Activity and Remarks	
G E	1. Hesting/Glinic	53°32*2 10°13*1	80"N Usual gu	and vehicles, plus and saint	hin-
I		1.61.01	10"% ery. Ver	y active on cover of 12 May 44.	
S	 e. Tank Factories				
U N	b. Motor Vehicle Factori	0.0			
C L	Plant	Location	Pinpoint	(Annaly Cold of the second	
A S	1. Carl F. Borgward	Branen/lienolingen	53° 04' N Hedi	Current Activity and Amaarks	6799-16-18-18-18-
S I			08° 54* S tota	1 trucks supply.	
F	c. Synthetic Rubber Plan NOBS	ts			
E D	d. 011 Storage in German				
	Location	Pinpoint	Consol by to too		
	1. Parge	53°12*45"%	Capacity in ton: 490,000	the second s	Mer Banders
	2. Locours	03933*00"E	400,000	Supplying Givet (GAF and Army).	
	and represented	52°27*00"N 09°06*00"E	12,000	Air Defense Germany.	
	5. Nienburg	52°36*157N 09°10*30"3	247,000	Light oil supply to France (GAF and Array)	
	4.	Oldendorf	52018•20"N 8°27*15"E	21,000 WAF and Army tons	



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T H			AREA 12 POSNAN.			
I S P	2.b. Fighter Airc	aft Plants	AUX 12 LUNIN.			
A G E	PLANT	LOCATION	PINPOINT	LAST ATTACK	CUREENT ACTIVITY AND REMARKS	
I S	1. Focke Wulf	Kreising	<b>52⁰18'№.</b> 16 ⁰ 59'≌ <b>.</b>	29.5.44.	About 100/mo. FW 190 wings and fuselages. FW 154 components.	
U N C L A	3.b. Ordnance Dapo	ts				
S S I	LOCATION		PERPOENT		CURRENT ACTIVITY AND REMARKS	
F I E D	1. Posnan/Glowno		52 <b>°</b> 26° N. 16 [°] 59' E.		General stores and repair of heavy guns. Only cover of poor quality, shows activity as of 22 Feb. 1944.	
	No other targets.					

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-	1. OIL REFIN	BRIES AND SYNTHETIC PLAN			NTRAL POLAND
-	PLANT	LOCATION	PINPOINT	LAST ATTACKED	CURRENT ACTIVITY AND REMARKS
1.	POLMIN POLISH STATE REFINERY	Drohobycz	49 ⁰ 21'N. 23 ⁰ 32'E.	26.6.44.	Severely damaged. No current output.
2.	Dros Polski	•	49°21°N. 23°32°E.	-	Monthly crude intake capacity 4,000 tons
3.	Galicja S.A.		49°21'N. 23°32'E.	-	Monthly " " 13,000 "
4.	Gazy-Ziemne S.A.	Lwow-Zniesienie	49°50"N. 24°05"E.	-	n n n n 3,000 n
5.	Fanto	Ustrzyki Dolne	49°25°N. 22°34'E.	-	Possibly not active. Monthly crude intake capacity 3,000 tons.
6.	Gartenberg & Schrier	Jaslo Nieglowice	49°44"N. 21°27"E.	-	Monthly crude intake capacity 6,000 tons
7.	Rafinerja Jedlicze	Jedlicze	49°43°N. 21°40°E.	-	" " " G,000 "
8.	Limanowa	Sowling (nr.Limanova)	49°44•N. 20°24.'E.	-	" " " 8,000 " Perhaps only storage.
9.	Fabryka Nafty Iska	Krosno	49 ⁹ 42"N. 21 ⁹ 45"E.	-	Monthly crude intake 3,000 tons. Perhaps only storage.
	2. b. Fighter A	ircraft Plants			
	Flugsotorenwerk Rzeszow	Rzeszow	50°01"N. 29°60"E.	No damage	Daimler Benz engine components. Also tank and motor vehicle components.

No other targets.

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	15th Air Force Targets by Areas
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AREA I - VISCA-GRAZ-LINZ 1. Oil Refineries & Synthetic Plants

-	Flant	Location	Pin	nio	t	Last Attack	Estimated Current Activity.
	Osternarkische Mineralswarke A.G.	Vienna/Lobau	48° 16°			26 June 44.	Heavy damage. Estimated current monthly out- put 5,000 tons.
	Shell Floridsdorfer Mineralol Pabrik	Vienna/Floridadorf	48° 16°			8 July 14.	Results of last attack not yet known. Bsti- mated maximum present monthly output 8,000 tons.
5.	Vacuum Oil Co.	Vienna/Kagran	48° 16°			16 June 44	Seriously damaged. Estimated current monthly output 1,000 tons.
	Nova Cal und Brenn- storf A.C.	Vienna/Schwechat	48° 16°			26 June 44.	Seriously damaged. Estimated current monthly output 6,000 tons.
	Oesterreichische Fant A.G.	to Vienns/Vosendorf	48° 169			8 July 44	Results of latest attack not yet known. Ratimated maximum present monthly output 3000 tons.
	Creditul Minier. Oesterreichische Romainische Pet.	Kornenberg	48º 16º			8 July 44	Results of latest attack not yet known. Satimated axisum present sonthly output 4,000 tons.
7.	Apollo Mineral Oil Re	finery Bratielava/Pressbur	45°			16 June 14	Temporary damage. Estimated current monthly output 2,000 tons.

2. Pointblank and Counter-Crossbow Targets

a. Ball Bearing Flants

And the second state of th				
Plant	Location	Finpoint	Last Attacked	Current Activity & Remarks
1. Steyr Daimler Puch	Steyr	48° 03' N 14° 27' E	4 April 44	About 4 of total supply Also aircraft see below.

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b. Fighter Aircraft Plants

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Н Ι S Ρ A G E Ι S U Ν L А S Ι F I E D AREA I - Page 2

	Plant	Location	Pin	poin	t	Last Attacked	Current Activity & Reparks
1.	Steyr-Daimler-Puch	Steyr	48° 14°	03' 27'		4 April 44	Daimler Benz and BLW engines.
2.	Flugmotorenwerke Ostmark	Graz/Thorndorf			15° N 35" B	No damage	Daimler Benz engines, tank, and motor vehicle components.
3.	Flugaotorenwerke Ostaark	Maribor			40" N 40" E	No damage	Daimler Benz engines, tank, and motor wehicle components.
l _b .	Flugsotorenwerke Ostaark	Wiener Neudorf	4,80 160	04,* 13*	30" N 30" E	No apprec- iable da ag	150 Daimlar Benz engines/20.8 of e total.
5.	Wiener Neustadter Flugseugwerke	Bad Voslau			45" N 45" E		Me 109 final assembly, 30/mo. 16 of total.
6.	Wiener Neustadter Flugzeugwerke	Zwolfaxing			00" N 10" B	8 July 44	Me 109 final assembly. 30/mo. 16 of total.
7.	Wiener Neustadter Flugseugwerke	St. Folten/Ober- grafendorf	48° 15°	10* 32*		No damage	Me 109 fuselage and sub-assembly.
8.	Wiener Neustadter Flugzeugwerke	Rohrbach/Neuonkirchen	47º 16º	43' 03'	30" N 35" E	29 May 44	He 109 fuselage and sub-assembly.
9.	Wiener Nuustadter Flugzeugwerke	Spreichsdorf			40" N 35" E		Ne 109 fusclage and sub-assembly.
10	.Wiener Neustadter Flugzeugwerke	Atzgersdorf			30" N E	29 May 44.	Me 109 fusciage repair. Nore than 40/mo.

c. Flying Bomb Plants

NONE

	•						
Т							AREA I - Page 3
H I			locket Fuel Plants				
S		d. h	NONS				EGRET
P A	5.	8. 1	ank angines				
G			HON S				
E		b. (	rdnance Depots				
I S							
U			Location	Pinpoint			tivity and Reparks
N C L			i. Vienna/South	48° 11' N 16° 55' S	Important depo cover).	center for repair t functions. A	ir and modification of APV's. Also ctive on 4.7.54 (80 tanks seen on air
A S		-					
· S I F	he	a.	Tank Factorics				
F I E							
D			Plant	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attacked	
			i. Nibelungenwerk	St. Valentin	43° 09' N 14° 30' E	-	Produces about 30 of Mark IV tanks; more than 15 of all ABV's (excluding around cars).
		Ъ.	Notor Vehicle Factorie	18			
			R-R-3				
		с.	Synthetic Rubber Plant	ia			
			NCN S				
		d.	011 Storage in Genuary	7			
			NONE				

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				AREA II: SOUTH (	HERDANY EAST	
1.		Refinerics and Synt	thetic Plants			
		NONE				
2.		nt Blank and Counter				
		Ball Bearing Plants	-			
		HONS Fight r droraft d	1 orta			
			Location	Pinpoint	Last Attacked	Current Activity & Remarks
		Bayerische Motor- enwerk		48°13'00" N 11°28'30" B	13-6-14	350 INST 8015/mo. 40% of total production.
	2.	Bayerische Motor- enverk	Munich/Oberwiesen- feld	48° 11' N 11° 13' B	13-7-44	Biff development; some components or assembly.
	3.	Messerachmitt	Augsburg	48° 20' N 10° 54' E	13-4-44	Me.410, 163, 262 components and final essembly.
	2	Messerschmitt	Regensburg/ Prufening	49° 01'25" N 12° 03' E	25 <b>-</b> 2-14	Me.109 components.
	5.	Messerschmitt	Regensburg/ Obertraubling	48° 59' N 12° 11' E	25 <b>-</b> 2-l ₄ l ₄	Me.109 final assembly. 25 of total.
			Dingolfing	48°38'30" N	no damage	Me.109 sub-assemblies.

NONE

		1. St.			
	d. Hocket Fuel Flants				Will II : Inge 2
	lent	Location	rinpoint	Lost attacked	Current ctivity & emerica
		Olex achieves		32 Aug-14-14	- Commence of Street Stre
	2. lectrochemische erke unchen inde sis sschinen Fabrik	Soll riegelsk reuth	48°03 N 11°30 N	19 July 14.	1-portant producer of $H_2O_2$
3.	a. Tank Engine Lints				
	b. Ordnance Depots				
	Location	inpoint		Cur ent Activity	and Remarks
	1. agolatedt	48 ⁰ 4 <b>7</b> · R 11 ⁰ 25 · S		Lenter for s all	guns seen on all covers. are supply. Very f 11 april 44. New
	2. Hunich/Hilbertshofen	40 ⁰ 11' N 11036* d		Large depot for A	FV's and muna. Stacool
4.	a. Tank Factories			on 1. June $l_{\mu-1}$ no	cover since.
	b. Notor Vehicle Instaries None				

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			AREA II : Page 3
c. synthetic subber lanta		SECKET	ALLA LI I POLO J
 d. Gil Storage in Germany			
Location	inpoint	Capacity in tons	Current schivity s sesaria
1. Fr <b>eiham</b> (interprarienhofen)	40° 6' 8 11°22' 8	60,000	GAF and Arg. Sends light oils to Italy.
	d. Gil Storage in ter any Location 1. Freiham Unterprarrenhofen;	d. Gil Storage in Ger any       Location       inpoint       1. Freiham       (Interpressionhofen)	d. Gil Storage in Ger any       Location     inpoint       Location     inpoint       1. Freiham     40° 6' R       (Interpretrienhofen)     11°22' S

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		AREA III	: SOUTH GERMAN	TIEN 1	
1.	Oil Refineries and Synthet	ic Plants			ET
	RCRE				
2.	Foint Blank and Counter-Cr	rosabow Targets			
	s. Ball Bearing Flants				
	NONZ				
	b. Fighter Aircraft Plant	ta			
	lant	Location	Finpoint	Last Attack	Current Activity & Remarks
	1. siener Neustählter	Aattern	47 ⁰ 421 N 10 ⁰ 191 E	Not da sged	Se.109 fuselage subassembl
	2.	Respten	47041 * N 10 ⁰ 19* 3	Not damaged	be.109 fuselage subasse bl
	c. Flying Bo b lants				
	Plant Plant	Location Ober Raderach	Pinpolnt 47° 42' N. 09° 26' E.	19 July 44 1	arrent Activity & Resarks aportant producer of 12°2.
3.	a. Tank Engine   lants				
	man and the second seco		Finpoint	Last Attack	Current Activity & Remarks
	Flant	Location	: animaris	the state of the s	

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•						
T H I		b. Ordnance Depots		SECRET	ARTA III Tage 2.	
S						
P A G		Location	Pinpoint	Curres	it Activity and Hemaics	
E		1. Ulm/Neu-Ulm	78°22* N 10°01* E	Specializes in	At guns and engineer	
I S	4.	a Tank Factories				-
U		NONE				
N C		b. Jotor Vehicle Pactories				
L A		NORE				
. S		c. Synthetic Rubber Flants				
I		NGAS				
F		d. Oil Storage in Germany				
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#### AREA IV - SILESIA

#### 1. 011 Refineries and Synthetic 011 Plants

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P A G E I S U N C L A S S I F I E D

PLANT		LOCATION	PINPOINT	LAST ATTACK	CURRENT ACTIVITY AND REMARKS
	I.G.Farben	Blechhamer South	50°18'N.	7.7.44.	Minor damage. Current monthly output est. 23,000. Bergius.
	Oberschlesische Hydrierwerke (I.G.Farben)	Blechhammer North	50921 • N. 18018 · E.	7.7.44.	Results of last attack not yet known. Max current monthly output 9,000 tons. Bergius.
3.	Schaffgotschisch Benzin G.m.b.H.	e Deschowitz, Beuthen/Odertal	50°25°N. 18°08°E.	7.7.44.	Main units not hit. Est. current monthly output 6,500 tons. Fischer-Tropsch
4.	I.G. Farben	Oswiecim/Auschwitz	50 ⁰ 02°N. 19°18°E.	-	Probably incomplete and inactive
5.	Panto Werke	Novy Bohasin	49°54•N. 18°21•E.	31.5.64.	Estimated current monthly output 4,500 ton
	Privozer Mineral- Blwerke A.G.	Privog/Moravska Ostrava	49°51*N. 18°16*E.	-	Estimated " " 4,000 "
	Rafinerja Frzebinia	Trzebinia	50°10'N. 19°27'E.	-	Important producer of lubricants. 8,000 tons monthly crude x capacity (intake).
. 1	Zacum Oil Co. S.A.	Czechowics/Oziedits	49°54*N. 19°01*E.	-	Lubricants. 8,000 tons monthly crude intake capacity.

No other targets

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#### AREA 13 & V - SOUTH CENTRAL FOLAND

#### 1. Oil Refineries and Synthetic Plants

Т Н Ι S Р А G E Ι S U N С L А S S I F I E D

	PLANT	LOCATION	PINE	ODA		LAST ATTACKED	CURRENT A	GTIV	ITY & RS	SHARAS		
1.	Polain Polish State Refinery		49° 23°			26-6-44	Severely output.	dana,	gel. No	o current	•	
2.	Dros Polski		49° 23°			-	Monthly o	rule	intake	capacity	7 4,000	ton
3.	Galicja 3. 4.	19	49° 23°			-	bonthly				13,000	**
li.	Gazy-Ziezne S.A.	Igow-Inicaicnic	49° 24°			-		n	a	u	3,000	Ħ
5.	Panto	Ustrzyki Dolne	49° 22°			-	Possibly capacity			Monthl	y cruie	int
6.	Gartenberg & Schrier	Jaslo Nieglowice	49° 21°	44 <b>'</b> 27'	N. E.	-	Sonthly (	orude	intako	capacit	y 6,000	ton
7.	Rafinerja Jedlicze	Jedlicze	49° 21°	43° 40'	N. E.	-	et	*	a		6,000	
8.	Lámanova	Sowling (Mr. Idmanova)	49° 20°	44 <b>*</b> 24 <b>*</b>	H. S.	-	Berhaps	only	storage	•		
9.	Fabryka Nafty Iska	Krosno		42'		-	Nontly conly sto			3,000 to	ns. Iv	rhay

	Contraction of the local distance	50° 01' N.	No demage	Daialar 1	Benz engine components. ALSO
Flugmotorenwork		220 1.51 Ccc		tank and	otor vahicle components.
ZESNOW		and the Star		tran and the second straining	- set and the set of t

No other targets.

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I S	3.	b. Ordnance Depots	AREA VI : BR	<u>UAIU</u>	
P A G		Location	Pinpoint	Current Activity and Remarks	
E I S		1. Breslau	51° 08° n 17° 01° 5	Specializes in repairs to heavy artillery and bridging equipment. Also small anti-tank weapons. Active on cover of 24 February 1944.	
U N C L		No other targets			
A . S . S					
I F I					
I E D					

T H I					
S P	1.	11 Reflorries & Synthetic (1		RAN VII - FRAGUL	
A G E					
I S		Flant 1. Zavody Fantory Acc. Spol	Location Parlubice	50° Q2' N 15° 45' N	Estimated southly current sutput
U N		(Panto) 2. Vacuan Oil Co.	Kolin	50° 03' II 15° 13' 2	13,000 tons. Estimated monthly current output 6,000 tons.
C L A S		3. Eralupy Min. Hef. adorer and Co.	Kralupy	50° 03° 11 16° 18° 2	Possibly not active. Monthly crustintake capacity 1,000 tons.
S I F					
I E D		No other targets			

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T H							
I S	2.	b. Fighter Aircraft Fl		VIII: HIUHN			
P A						Current Letiv ty é Hemarks	
G E		lant	Location	Finpoint	No da age	Daimler Benz engine	
I S		1. Flug otorenwerk Ostwark	Brunn/Liser	49 ⁰ 12 II 16 ⁰ 41 II		components	
U N		No other targets					
C L A							
• S I							
F I E D							
D							
						C	
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-	Plants	
P	LANT	LOCATION
1	. Shell,Koolag R.T.	Budapest/Csepel
2	. FantoEgyesult Magyar Asvany Olaj.	Budapest
3	. Vacuum Oil Co.	Almasfuzito
4	. Magyar Olaj Muvek	Szony
5	. Magyar Petrol- eum Ipar	Budapest
(	6. Nyirbogdaniji Petroleum	Nyirbogdaniji
-	7. Government Refinery	Petfurdo

Τ

Н Ι S P A G E

I S

U N C L

A S S I F I E D

-	Plants				The original
PLA	NT	LOCATION	PINPOINT	LAST ATTACK	CURRENT ACTIVITY AND REMARKS
1.	Shell,Koolag R.T.	Budapest/Csepel	47 [°] 26'N. 19°06'E.	2.7.44.	Temporary damage. Est. ourrent monthly output 4,000 tons.
2.	FantoEgyesult Magyar Asvany	Budapest	47°28°N. 19°06°E.	14.6.44.	Temporary damage. Est. current monthly output 1,000 tons.
3.	Olaj. Vacuum Oil Co.	Almasfuzito	47 ⁰ 44 <b>*N.</b> 18 <b>°</b> 15 <b>*</b> E.	2.7.44.	Temporary damage. Est. current monthly output 4,500 tons.
4.	Magyar Olaj Muvek	Szony	47°44 . N. 18°10 E.	14.6.44.	Severely damaged. Est. current monthly output 2,000tons.
5.	Magyar Petrol- eum Ipar	Budapest	47°28'N. 19°06'E.	3.4.44.	Est. current monthly output 7,000 tone.
6.	Nyirbogdaniji Petroleum	Nyirbogdaniji	48°05'N. 21°51'E.	-	Apparently inactive
7.	Government Refinery	Petfurdo	47010'N. 18008'E.	14.7.44.	Results of latest attack not known. Max. current monthly output 4,000 tons.
8.	Del Karpati Koo Finomito es Ker		48°27"N. 22°43"E.	-	Est. current monthly output 2,000 tons.
9.	Szeregi Petrole		-	-	Est. current monthly output 1,000 tons.
2.	b. Fighter Airc	eraft Plants			
	Manfred Weiss	Budapest	47°30'N.	3/4.4.44	Producing 8% of Daimler Benz engines.
	Duna Repul- ogepgyer	Cspel Island, Budapest	19°06' 1. 19°06' 1.	13.4.44.	Me 410 components and final assembly,

AREA IX - HUNGARY

NO OTHER TARGETS.

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#### AREA X - Roumania

#### 1. Oil Refineries and Synthetic Oil Plants

	Plant	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attack	Current Activity and Remarks
1.	Astra Romana	Ploesti	44° 55' N 26° 02' E	6.6.44.	Estimated current monthly output 40,000 tons.
2.	Steaua Romana S.A.	Campina	45° 08' N 25° 45' E	6.5.44.	Unlikely to operate before September.
3.	Concordia S.A.R.	Ploesti	44° 58' N 26° 02' E	9.7.44.	Results of last attack not known. Estimated maximum current monthly output 85,000 tons.
4.	Romana Americana	Ploesti	44° 57' N 26° 05' E	15.7.44	Estimated current monthly output 80,000 tons.
5.	Dacia Romana	Ploesti	44° 57° N 26° 04° E	15.7.44.	Estimated current monthly output 15,000 tons.
6.	Phoenix Oil and Transport Coy (Orion)	Ploesti	44° 55' N 26° 02' E	-	No evidence of activity on 28.6.44.
7.	Petrol Block S.A. Romana	Ploesti	44° 55' N 26° 02' E	15.7.44.	Estimated current monthly output 32,000 tons.
8.	Unirea Sparentza	Ploesti	44° 55' N 26° 02' E	15.7.44.	Estimated current monthly output 11,000 tons.
9.	Xenia Raff. of Redeventa S.A.	Ploesti	44° 58' N 26° 40' E	9.7.44.	Estimated current monthly output 20,000 tons.
LO.	Redeventa S.A.R.	Ploesti	44° 58' N 26° 40' E	6.6.44.	No sign of activity or clearance on 28.6.44.
11.	Lumina	Ploesti Sud	44° 55' N 26° 02' B	1.8.43.	No sign of activity or repairs on 28.6.44.
12.	Soc. Gen. Mine and Petrol	Doicesti-Dambovita	44° 58' N 25° 25' E	-	Estimated current monthly output 5,000 tons.
13.	Steaua Romana	Moinesti	46° 27' <b>X</b> 26° 30' E	-	Estimated current monthly output 4,500 tons.
14.	Prahova S.A.R.	Bucharest	44° 27' N 26° 08' E	3.7.44.	Heavily damaged. Estimated cur- rent monthly output 1,000 tons.

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					AREA X - Roumania, p. 2
15.	Titan	Bucharest	44° 26' N 26° 12' E	3.7.44.	Results of last attack not yet known. Estimated maximum current output 1,500 tons monthly.
16.	Vacuum Photogen	Brasov	45° 40' N 25° 39' E	4.7.44.	Heavily damaged and out of action.
17.	Petrol Block	Buzau	45 [•] 09' N 26 [•] 51' E	-	Probably not active.
18.	J. Friedman	Dej	47° 06' N 23° 51' E	-	Probably not active.
19.	Venus	Rimnic Sarat	45° 22' N 27° 03' E	-	Estimated current monthly output 3,000 tons.

No other targets.

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1. 11 Mariarles & Synthetic 11 Plants

Flore	Jocation	Pinpoint	Last Attack	Current Activity & Ceparics
1. A puila	Trieste	45° 36* H 13° 49* H		No evidence of potivity or repair on 12 June 1/1.
a latalaña	Trieste	45° 36* 11 13° 49* 1	6 June 44	Dausged. Procebly inscrive.
5. R.O.H	Plune	45° 201 16 14° 25° 8	25 Feb. 44	Estimated current monthly output 3,000 tons.
h. A.G.X.P.	Venice/Porto Marghera	650 201 11 12 ⁰ 167 1	13 June 14	Damagol. Probably inschive.
5. Noc. Petrolifer Italian		44,0 42* N 400 07* 1	22 June 14	Probably institut.
Italiam		100 07" 1		

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no other targets.

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
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
T H I								
ŝ		AREA XII - ZEGOMAVIA						
P A G	1.	1. Al Sefineries & Synthetic Oil Plants						
E		Plant	Location	Pinpoint	Last Attack	Current Activity & Remarks		
I S		1. Yugoslavensko Shell	Caprag	450 27" N 16 ⁰ 23" z	$th$ June $h\mu_{r}$ .	Seriously damaged. Probably inactive.		
U N		2. Standard Vacuus 011 (	Co.Nosanski, Brod.	45° 081 N 17° 591 S	14/15 Jul.44	Heavy datage. Fre hebly inactive.		
С		3. Obljek	Osijek	45° 35' 11 18° 42' 3	$1l_p$ Jurner $l_q l_p$	Severely damaged. Trobably inactive.		
L		4. Sumadiara Freditava	Shedere vo	44° 41* N 20° 57' E	11 June 44.	Estimated monthly current output 1,500 tons.		
A S S								
A S I F I								
A S S I F		No other Eurgets						
A S I F I E		No other Dargets						


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
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






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








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S Cenr Sortals

In accordance with your request the following accordances with your request the following accordances whould be under to the circuits of the meeting old caturday, 20 arch, 104 of corthe strategic bombard cut policy in the period be fore "overlaged" was inclused.

In ois over these dimites I note that two very is ortant points were left out in the argument presented by the 100742 representatives in allogert of the size of the strate is effort against bill or str rather in a size francortation.

1. I presented a brief to the principal performs at the section, discussion the relative cerits of the TAT plan with the Trans orthtion plan. I request that the brief be included in the minutes in coordance with my statement calling attention to that brief.

2. To stated that we could not marantee an addreciable effect on the initial miceas of "overhead" by stracks against ill barrets. In the stated that our studies indicated that attacks a sainst micease o "overhead". It was also pointed out that stracks a minut state attacks against framportation of id not have a decisive effect that stracks against framportation of id not have a decisive effect within my consura is length of time.

It is believed that the points listed above must be included in the sinutes, and it is recommended that they be so included.

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#### Sincerely,

CARL SPAATZ Lieutenant Deneral, Dia Commendia

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> Air Ministry, Ming Charles Street, Whitehall, S. ....

31 March 1944.

C.INF/LOLD

#### Dear Spaatz:


I am replying to your letter of yesterday to C.A.S. about the minutes of the meeting. I feel that to attach the text of your paper to the minutes would only lead to our having to attach other papers, such as Tedder's, which were under consideration at the meeting. I discussed this point with Anderson and reach greement with him that a reference to the paper should be made and the conclusions and recommendations quoted in the minutes. This will ensure that your views are clearly recorded. I also agreed that the second point mentioned in your letter should also be included.

Be are having a revised version of the minutes printed now, incorporating the above and certain other amendments which have been received and will send you copies as soon as they are ready.

Yours, sincerely.

s/ Norman Bottomley

Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz, A.F.C. 633. U.S.Army



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Air Ministry, King Charles Street Whitehall, S.W.1

31st March, 1944

Dear General Spaatz,

I enclose two copies of the final version of the minutes of the meeting with C.A.S. held last Saturday on the "OVERLORD" Bombing Flan. Would you please be good enough to substitute these for the copies of the draft with I sent to you earlier.

/s/ R.S. Crawford

Licutement Ceneral Carl Spettz, Headquarters, U.S.S.T.A.F., APO 633.

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Air Ministry. King Charles Street, Thitehall, J.W.1.

31 March, 1944.

by dear Spaatz.

Thank you very much for your memorandum of today about the use of strategic bombers in support of OVERLOAD. In view of the impending change in the channel of direction over all the strategic bombers. I thinkit would be better if I left it to General Eisenhower, to whom I see that you have sont a similar paper. to deal with your proposal. I am sending a copy of this letter to Air Chief Marshal Tedder.

Yours sincerely,

/s/ Fortal

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Lieutenant-General Carl Spaatz, A.F.C. 633, U.S. Army.

GAP-SECRE C.A.S./ 1sc./61. INUTES OF A MEETING ISLD ON SATURDAY WARCH 25TH DISCUSS THE COMBINE POLICY IN THE PERIOD DEFORE "OVERLORD" The following were present :-R 1.0 Varshal of the R.A.F. Sir Charles Portal Seneral Lisenhower Air Chief Marshal Tedder Air Chief Marshal Leish-Mallory Mir Chief Marshal Harris - C.A.S. - S.A.C.A.E.F. - Deputy S.A.C.A.E.F. Air C.-in-C. A.E.F. - A.O.C.-in-C. Somber Command Lt. General Spaatz lajor General Anderson ) - U.S.ST.A.F. Major General Kennedy Major General McMullen Major General Crawford - War Office Air Marshal Bottomley Air Vice-Marshal Inglis ) - Air Ministry Cir Andrew Noble - J.I.S. Mr. Lawrence - M.E.W. Mr. Crawford

(Secretary) had been called and then asked A.G.M. Tedder to explain the nature of his bombing plan.

A.C.M. Tedder said that his plan was based on two principles:

- P.S. to C.A.S.

(a) That J.A.F. Targets should remain on the highest priority and that everything necessary should be done to keep J.A.F. production and strength on as low a figure as possible.

There was agreement by all present that this priority should be maintained and that the purpose of the meeting was to consider what target system ought to be attacked with the effort remaining after what was necessary had been allotted to the attack of J.A.F. targets. It was confirmed that G.A.F. targets included enemy ball-bearing factories.

(b) That the remaining effort should be used to delay and disorganize energy ground movements both during and after the "MEPTUME" assault so as to help the Army to get ashore and stay ashore. Be proposed that the target system of second priority should be the enemy's railway system. According to his plan the target of first priority within this railway system should be the enemy's railway servicing centres; he was convinced that a concerted attack on these would reduce the efficiency of the enemy railway system which was already severely strained to a very low level. By doing this it was hoped that we should force the enemy to pass all traffic in the OVENLORD area through a comparatively small number of lines and the task of the tactical air forces of cutting these implified; we should also be able to reduce very considerably the efficiency and flexibility of his repair services and so make it much harder for him /to repair ......



to repair quickly the damage inflicted in the tactical battle. The result would be that in the first few weeks of CVERLORD the enemy's railway movement would suffer considerable delays and he would be forced to move formations by road which would be very much slower than by rail.

.C.M. Tedder said that he did not wish to claim too much for the plan. In particular, he did not claim that the attacks on the servicing centres and marshalling yards would precent all traffic getting through. He was however convinced that without the all-out attack that he proposed the tactical plan for the disorganisation of enemy movement immediately before and after D day would have no chance of success.

<u>C.A.S.</u> said that he felt sure that all were agreed that the execution of this plan would have almost serious effect on the efficiency of the enemy railway system. It was essential however to be certain that what was left would not be adequate for the amount of movement which the enemy would find necessary in the first few weeks of the battle, bearing in mind that he must possess large stocks in N. France and that much of the present traffic was civil and not military and would undoubtedly be severely curtailed once the battle started.

#### Considerable discussion ensured on this question.

<u>Senerel</u> chullen said that the railways in North France were in some ways very vulnerable depending as they did to a considerable extent on a steady flow of coal obtained in the Aille/Lens area which had to be collected in wagons in railway storage yards and then distributed. These storage yards presented good targets. At the same time it must be remembered that the Germans were already sing 45,000 military railwaymen on the French railways and that even though we destroyed the permanent servicing facilities they could quickly put up in a few days a number of small temporary servicing units with the essential facilities required to keep railway equipment going. The thought that the strategical plan might reduce the overall efficiency. Superimposed on this there would then come the tactical bombing after D day. In spite of this he was convinced the Germans would still continue to get a small amount of traffic through. The question was whether this would be enough. The pointed out that there were two sorts of movement:-

- (a) The movement of formations. He thought that if the lines on which formations were moving mere attacked, these might be delayed for a day or two.
- (b) The flow of maintenance stores. Experience in Africs and Italy had shown that the effect on this of stacks on railway targets was not decisive. A line might be cut for a short time and the flow of stores interrupted, but it would then be repaired and the flow of stores would be resumed. Meanwhile, the fighting formations would have lived on their stocks which were built up during the good periods. He doubted whether the effect which would be achieved by the plan would sufficiently reduce the movement to have a military effect.

/ A.C.M. Todder .....

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A.C.H. Tedder said that assuming that the J.I.C. estimate of the amount of military traffic was generally accurate he was fully convinced that the plan would have military effect. In this connection he thought it important to remember that some economic traffic was bound to continue.

Mr. Lawrence said that some food distribution to the French population would undoubtedly have to continue for military reasons, but taking account of the season in which the operation was taking place and the fact that the part of the country under consideration was almost entirely self-supporting, the food traffic would be very small. The great bulk of the economic traffic was coal and industrial raw materials. The French contribution to the German industrial requirements amounted at the most to 10% of the total and the Germans would willingly give this up for the short period necessary if it would help them to defeat us.

General Eisenhower said that in his opinion the question for decision was as follows. The first five or six weeks of OVEMLORD would be a most critical period for the Allied Armies and it was essential that we should take every possible step to ensure that they got ashore and stayed ashors. The greatest contribution that he could imageine the air forces making to this aim was that they should hinder enamy movement. Granted that the tactical plan would aim at achieving this after D. day, then how much easier would the task be made by a preparatory period in which all the air forces available after attacks on G.A.F. targets has been allowed for, would attack railway targets? This would reduce the over-all efficiency of the enamy railway system, smalise the traffic, destroy repair facilities and make it harder for the erray to recover from the blows delivered in the tactical battle. If the preparatory bombing would help this task sufficiently to justify hopes that enamy movement would be hampered and delayed, then he thought that it was worth while, and, in default of any other alternative plan which would produce greater results, he thought the present one should be adopted.

General Kennedy agreed with General Eisenhower's statement of the problem. If the bombing of railway targets could delay movement of even one division in the critical period of the battle then it was worth while. What he was not sure about was whether we could so reduce the efficiency of the eneny railways that this could be expected. The feeling of the General Staff was that the attempt to reduce the efficiency of the whole Northern European railway system was too ambitious and that if it did not come off completely then the whole effort might have been wasted. In spite of the frequent and heavy attacks on railway targets in Italy there had been no significant interference with strategical movement there and he was doubtful whether we should be any more successful in France. The only thing that mattered was the delay of enemy movement after OVERLORD had begun when the energy, having discovered the point of assault, would nove formations towards it. The General Staff felt that a less ambitious plan over a smaller area carried out shortly before D day might be more effective in preventing the movement of these formations. He felt that the present plan was largely based on the experience and knowledge

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/of civilian ....

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of civilian railway experts, who are accustomed to look at energy transportation problems with the entirely different problems of this country in their minds, qualified no doubt by experience of conditions in the last war when the problems were also quite different. He suggested that the plan ought to be re-examined in consultation with those who were experts in working military railways, namely the staff of the Directorate of Transportation in the Mar Office.

<u>Caneral Hisenhower</u> said that everything he had read had convinced him that apart from the attack on the G.A.F. the transportation plan was the only one which offered a reasonable chance of the air forces making an important contribution to the land battle during the first vital weeks of OVER GED: In fact he did not believe that there was any other real alternative. He had not realized however that the Ear Office Staff had not been consulted on whether if the plan were successful it would have the desired effects on the enary's military movement and he certainly agreed that they should examine the plan from this point of view. He realized that it would not be possible to provide an estimate in figures of the redaction in military traffic which might be achieved, but in his opinion, it was only necessary to show that there would be <u>some</u> reduction, however small, to justify adopting the plan, provided that there was no alternative available.

Later in the setting, <u>General McMullen</u> said he had no doubt that the examination could produce no other conclusion than that there would be <u>some</u> reduction in the energy's military movements if the plan were put into effect. It would not be possible to estimate the size of the reduction. His main concern had been to emphasize that the energy would undoubtedly be able to improvise railway facilities if the permanent ones were knocked out and that his essential movements would probably not be seriously embarrassed by executing the railway plan.

A/C/M. Tedder added that he would welcome advice from the Military Transportation Authorities during the execution of the plan.

Discussion then turned on whether there was any alternative plan worth consideration. <u>General Spaats</u> stated that he thought the attack on oil installations should be considered. This had great tactical advantages from his point of view. <u>C.A.S.</u> said that it should certainly be considered if it could be shown that results would make themselves felt early enough.

<u>Mr. Lawrence</u> said that it had been calculated that if U.S.ST.A.F. completed their plan of attacking 27 oil installations within a period of three months then by the time a further three months was up the Germans would have to institute a cut of 25% in their present consumption.' (This was assuring that they stillheld the Roumanian oilfields). What we could not estimate was how they would distribute this cut. It was thought that they had large stocks in the mest so that the effect there would in any ease not be immediate. He thought that there would probably be some effect noticeable in the mest four or five months after the plan began to be put into effect.

/ C.A.S. ....

<u>C.A.S.</u> said that this showed conclusively that the oil plan would not help WHEADED in the first few critical weeks. It was, rather, a longer term plan which might have greater overall effects on the course of the war as a whole than the transportation plan but it would be six months before these were felt appreciably. We agreed however that the oil plan had great attractions and he thought we should seriously consider adopting it after the first crisis of OWNEDOND was passed and we were firmly established on the Continent. After all, the number of essential oil targets was not very great and it might be possible to hit all of them in a month or two of good summer weather. <u>General Elecunhower</u> entirely agreed that the oil plan should be considered as soonas the first critical situation in OVER.CRD was passed.

<u>General Kennedy</u> said that the attack of certain army targets required consideration such as tank depots, <u>A.C.M. Leigh-Mallory</u> said that these would be looked after by the 9th Air Force and 2nd Tactical Air Force. He was collecting all possible information about such targets in France and would certainly work into his tactical plan any important targets of which the General Staff had information. <u>General Elsenhower</u> repeated that it looked as though there was no alternative to the transportation plan.

Some discussion then took place on whether the J.I.C. should be asked to examine possible alternative plans and make recommendations but it was eventually decided not to do this. <u>General Eisenhower</u> said he would welcome any comments that the J.I.C. cared to make on the transportation plan or on any other subject related to OVERLORD.

Consideration than turned to the tactical questions involved in using the strategic bomber force in the transportation plan.

A.C.M. Harris said that Bomber Command would contribute in two ways: -

(n) By carrying out precise attacks on railway centres within 'OBOE' range during the moon periods. He pointed out that the plan required him to stack 26 such targets and he had so far only disposed of three or four. He felt extremely doubtful whether he would be able to complete his part of the plan during the time remaining, having regard to the

/limitations imposed .....

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#### BIGOT LOOP SECRET

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limitations imposed by the requirement s of adequate target marking and good weather in the particular areas in which the railway centres were located. This fact, together with the doubts about the effectiveness of the transportation plan as a whole made him ask that it should be most carefully examined before being adopted. In any case he urged strongly against the adoption of the alternative type of plan suggested by General Kennedy which would presumably require a larger number of attacks on precise targets and present him with a task which was juite beyond the capacity of his Gommand.

(b) By continuing his attacks on German cities which sould of course have some incidental effect on the energy's transportation system. He warned General Misenhower that the effect of this could not be expected to be very great although he would as required by the plan, use railway centres as aiming points in the cities attacked. He was of course anxious to continue attacking cities in eastern Germany for as long as the hours of darkness made this possible. <u>A.C.M. Tedder</u> said there were good railway targets in eastern Germany.

General Misenhower said that the Transportation Plan clearly meant very little change in the present Bomber Command programme. The more important question was whether the 8th and 15th Air Porces could achieve their part in it.

General Spaatz said that he would need to continue devoting one half of his effort in visual bombing to stacking G.A.F. targets. It was, however, essential that the other half should attack a target system which would produce at least some enemy fighter reaction, and so attrition. He was very doubtful whether the Transportation Flam would fulfil this condition. That was the primery reason why he had preferred the Oil Flan, which he was convinced would provoke constant air battles, and so constant attrition of enemy fighters.

C.A.C. said that this was to some extent begging the question; the enemy would not doubt not oppose attacks on railway centres unless he thought an allout attack upon the whole wailway system was being made. He might well start to send up his fighters as soon as he realized our intentions.

<u>General Sparts</u> emphasized the importance of the location of the targets chosen. It was essential that his kir Forces should attack well into Germany to produce air fighting, and for tactical reasons some at least of the targets would have to be in the same areas as the G.A.F. targets.

A.C.M. Tedder entirely agreed. Me said that amont the crucial railway targets were the four marshalling yards on the eastern side of the Ruhr and he was confident that there was an adequate number of targets which would fit in with Ceneral Sphatz's tactical requirements.

 $\underline{C.A.S.}$  asked if General Spaats could get through his share of the Transportation Han in the time available.

<u>Ceneral Spartz</u> suid this had not been worked out and <u>A.C.M. Leigh-Mallory</u> said that on the latest list of targets,

/there.....

# esere sould be about 2 th get allotted to U.S.ST.A.P.

<u>C.A.S.</u> said that it was essential that we should know we other U.S.ST.A.F. could do their share of the plan, and asked ..... Tedder to tell leneral Spartz what his requirements have under the plan. He thought t at General Spartz and A.C.M. ender should also assess whether the combination of the transportation Plan with the attacks of the G.A.F. would produce sufficient air fighting to cause the necessary attrition. He was convinced that the attacks on G.A.F. targets would in themselves achieve this.

C.A.S. asked whether the bombing effects of the Transportation lan would prejudice our subsequent operations on the ground in the OVERLORD area. <u>General Eisenhower</u> said that we ought not to allow this consideration to influence us at all since the Germans would certainly destroy all railway facilities as they retreated.

<u>G.A.3.</u> then mentioned the fact that the full execution of the Mailway Plan would mean attacking a number of targets in built-up areas, and that there could not fail to be a very large number of French civilian casualties. This was naturally a matter of some concern to M.M.G. and the Cabinet ought to be iven an opportunity to consider the implications. We felt that the best solution would probably be to make a public announcement that everyone living within may one mile from any railway centre in North France was in danger and should immediately move out.

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Deneral isenhower said that be fully appreciated the ortance of this point and would himself bring the matter up for consideration.

General Eisenhower and G.A.S. summed up the discussion, and it was decided that the following action should be taken:

- (1) A.C.W. Tedder should supply General Spastz with the latest information about the contribution that U.S.ST.A.F. could make to the Transportation Flan. General Spastz would then consider whether this could be achieved with half the effort of visual bombing which could be expected from the 3th and 15th Air Forces in the period available, and in conjunction with A.C.W. Tedder and the Air Staff would assess the effect that this plan, considered in conjunction with the attacks on the T.A.F., was likely to have on T.A.F. tactics and on the attrition that would be caused. The result should be reported to General Eisenhower.
- (11) A.C.V. Tedder would produce a draft directive to the Commanders concerned with the execution of the Transportation Plan, after taking into account any points that emerged in the investigation referred to in (1) above. This would be discussed with the authorities concerned and then referred to General Eisenhower. Finally, General Eisenhower and C.A.S. would discuss the matter again in a few days time in order to reach a final decision and agree upon the directive.

(111) A.C.M. Tedder would keep in touch with the General Staff and in particular with the Willtary transportation experts during the execution of the plan and would immediately consider any advice that they wished to offer.

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C.A.S./Misc./61 (Final). FINAL MINUTES OF A MEETING HELD ON DISCUSS THE BOMBING FOLICY IN "OVERLOP	THE PERIOD BEFORE		TYP SRCRET
The following were present:	- Tala H	-1	2
Marshal of the R.A.F. Sir ( Portal General Sisenhower	charles		C.A.S. S.A.C.A.E.F.
Air Chief Marshal Tedder		-	Deputy S.A.C.A.E.F.
Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Ma.	llory	-	Air Cin-C. A.E.F.
Air Chief Marshal Herris		-	A.C.Cin-C. Bomber Command
Lt. General Speatz ) Major General Anderson )		•	0.5.ST.A.F.
Major General Kennedy ) Major General McMullen ) Major General Grawford )		-	Tar Office
Air Marshal Bottomley ) Air Vice-Marshal Inglis )		-	Air Ministry
Sir Andrew Noble		-	J.1.S.
hr. Lawrence		-	M.E.W.
Mr. Crawford		-	P.S. to C.A.S. (Secretary)

<u>C.A.S.</u> explained the circumstances in which the meeting had been called and then asked A.C.M. Tedder to explain the nature of his bombing plan.

A.C. W. Tedder said that his plan was based on two principles:

(a) That G.A.F. targets should remain on the highest priority and that everything necessary should be done to keep G.A.F. production and strength on as low a figure as possible.

There was agreement by all present that this priority should be maintained and that the purpose of the meeting was to consider what target system ought to be attacked with the effort remaining after what was necessary had been allotted to the attack of  $G_{\bullet,\bullet}$ . F. targets. It was confirmed that  $G_{\bullet,\bullet}$ .F. targets included enough ball-bearing factories.

(b) That the remaining effort should be used to delay and disorganise enemy ground movements both during and after the "NELTING" assault so as to help the Army to get ashore and stay ashore. He proposed that the target system of second priority should be the enemy's railway system. According to his plan the target of first priority within this railway system should be the enemy's railway servicing centres; he was convinced that a concerted attack on these would reduc e the efficiency of the enemy reilway system which was already severely strained to a very low level. By doing this it was hoped that we should force the enemy to pass all traffic in the OWARLOND area through a comparatively small number of lines and the task of the tactical air forces of cutting these critical lines after D day would be very much simplified; we should also be able to reduce very considerably the efficiency and flexibility of his repair services and so make it much harder for him to repair quickly the demage inflicted in the tactical battle. The result would be that in the first few weeks of OVERLORD the enemy's reilway movement would suffer considerable delays and he would be forced to move formations by road which would be very much slower than by rail.

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A.C.M.Tedder said that he did not wish to claim too much for the plan. In particul r, he did not claim that the attacks on the servicing centres and marshalling yards would present all traffic getting through. He was however convinced that without the all-out attack that he proposed the tactical plan for the disorganization of enemy movement immediately before and after D day would have no chance of success.

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<u>C.A.S.</u> said that he felt sure that all were agreed that the execution of this plan would have a most serious effect on the efficiency of the enemy railway system. It was essential howover to be certain that what was left would not be adequate for the amount of movement which the enemy would find necessary in the first few weeks of the battle, bearing in mind that he must possess large stocks in N.France and that much of the present traffic was civil and not military and would undoubtedly be severily curtailed once the battle started.

#### Considerable discussion ensued on this question.

General McLaullen said that the railways in North France were in some ways very vulnerable depending as they did to a considerable extent on a steady flow of coal obtained in the Litle/ ons area which had to be collected in wagons in railway storage yards and then distributed. These storage yards presented good targets. At the same time it must be remembered that the Cermans were clready using 45.000 military railwaymen on the French railways and that even though we destroyed the permanent servicing facilities they could quickly put up in a few days a number of small temporary servicing units with the essential facilities required to keep railway equipment going. He was doubtful as to how much the plan of strategical bombing could reduce the overall efficiency of the system, but even if this produced a reduction to between 20 and 30% of its present efficiency, there would still be sufficient capacity for the necessary German military traffic. Superimposed on this there would then come the tactical bombing after D.day. In spite of this he was convinced the Germans would still continue to get a small amount of traffic through. The question was whether this would be enough. He pointed out that there were two sorts of movement:-

- (a) The movement of formations. He thought that if the lines on which formations were moving were attacked, these might be delayed for a day or two.
- (b) The flow of maintenance stores. Experience in Africa and Italy had shown that the effect on this of attacks on railway targets was not decisive. A line might be cut for a short time and the flow of stores interrupted, but it would then be repaired and the flow of stores would be resumed. Meanwhile, the fighting formations would have lived on their stocks which were built up during the good periods. He doubted mhether the effect which would be achieved by the plan would sufficiently reduce the movement to have a military effect.

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/h.C.M. Tedder .....

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A.C.M. Tedder said that assuming that the J.I.C. estimate of the amount of military traffic was generally accurate he was fully convinced that the plan would have military affect. In this connection he thought it important to remember that some economic traffic was bound to continue.

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Sir 4. Moble said that over the longer period the Germans would ceratinly have to make some provisions for the distribution of food to the French population, if only becaus a starving vivilian population would be an embarrassment to Germany's military effort. During the first five weeks of "OVERLOAD", however, the Germans would have to move very little food for the French population, because last year's harvest had already been distributed and this year's would not yet require to be moved.

As regards France's contribution to the German war effort, it was estimated that this only amounted to about 10 per cent and, apart from beaxite, which would not require much rail traffic, the movement of other goods could be suspended for some five weeks. The great bulk of the economic traffic is coal and industrial raw material. The Germans would certainly not heattate to cut off this traffic if it was necessary in order to ensure the defeat of "OVERIGED". Over the longar period, the Germans would have to make some provisions for the movement of coal inside France and for the export of Lorraine iron ore to Germany.

General disenhower said that in his opinion the question for decision was as follows. The first five or six weeks of "OVERIGAD" would be a most critical period for the Allied armies and it was essential that we should take every possible step to ensure that they got ashore and stayed ashore. The greatest contribution that he could imagine the air forces making to this aim was that they should hinder enemy movement. Granted that the tactical plan would aim at achieving this after D Day, then how much easier would the task be made by a preparatory period in which all the air forces available after attacks on G.A.F. targets has been allowed for, would attack railway targets? This would reduce the over-all efficiency of the enemy railway system, canalise the traffic, destroy repair facilities and make it harder for the enemy to recover from the blows deliverd in the tactical battle. If the preparatory bombing would help this task sufficiently to justify hopes that enemy movement would be hampered and delayed, then he thought that it was worth while, and, in default of any other alternative plan which would produce greater results, he thought the present on e should be adopted.

<u>Eneral Kennedy</u> agreed with General Lisenhower's statement of the problem. If the bombins of railway targets could delay movement of even one division in the critical period of the battle then it was worth while. What he was not sure about was whether the present plan of long drawn out bombing over such a wide area would result in delaying military movement. The feeling of the General staff was that the attempt to reduce the efficiency of the whole Northern uropean railway system was too amitious and that if it did not come off completely then the whole effort might have been wasted. In spite of the frequent and heavy attacks on railway targets in Italy there had been no significant interference with theretedical movement there and he was doubtful whether we should be any more successful in France. That we should concentrat upon was the delay of enemy movement after "O MIGND" had bogon when the enemy, having discovered the paint of asseult, would move formations towards it. The General staff felt that a less amiticas plan over area carried out shortly before D May might be more effective amiler area carried out shortly before D May might be more effective in delaying the movement of these formations. We felt that the present plan was largely based on the experience and knowledge of civilianrailway experts, who are accustomed to look at enemy transportation problems with the entirely different problems of



of civilian railway experts, who are accustomed to look at enemy transportation problems with the entirely different problems of this country in their minds, qualified no doubt by experience of conditions in the last war when the problems were also quite different. He suggested that the plan ought to be re-examined in consultation with those who were experts in working military railways, namely the staff of the Directorate of Transportation in the War Office.

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<u>General Sisenhower</u> said that everything he had read had convinced him that apart from the attack on the G.A.F. the transportation plan was the only one which offered a resonable chance of the air forces making an important contribution to the land battle during the first vital weeks of OVERLORD; in fact he did not believe that there was any other real alternative. He had not real ized however that the War office Staff had not been consulted on whether if the plan were successful it would have the desired effects on the enemy's military movement and he certainly greed that they should examine the plan from this point of view. He realized that it would not be possible to provide an estimate in figures of the reduction in military traffic which might be achieved, but in his opinion, it was only necessary to show that there would be some reduction, however amall, to justify adapting the plan, provided that there was no alternative available.

Later in the meeting. <u>General McMullen</u> said he had no doubt that the examination could produce no other conclusion than that there would be some reduction in the enemy's military movements if the plan were put into effect. It would not be possible to estimate the size of the reduction. His main concern had been to emphasize that the enemy would undoubtedly be able to improvice railway facilities if the permanent ones were knocked out and that his essential movements would probably not be sericusly embarrassed by executing the railway plan.

A/C/M Tedder added that he would welcome advice from the Military Transportation Authorities during the execution of the plan.

Discussion then turned on whether there was any alternative plan worth consideration.

General Speatz said that he had given his views on this in a paper which he had circulated before the meeting. This paper had proposed the attack of oil installations as an alternative to the Transportation Plan and had discussed the strategic and tactical merits of the two plans. It had reached the following conclusions:-

> (a) Strategic attacks on the enemy railway system with the forces and within the time available would not affect the course of the initial battle and would not prevent the movement of German reserves from other fronts. On the other hand, the execution of the oil plan would force the enemy to decide to reduce oil consumption in anticipation of an impending shortage and consequent reduction in fighting power.

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(b) Attacks on the vast European railway system could not within an acceptable length of time weaten the resistance of the energy's armics on all fronts simultaneously. The oil plan would do this and would have the success of CYNTLOND in the period after D Day.

(c) Attacks on railway targets would not force the Bornan fighters into action whereas the endry would defend oil installations to the last fighter aircraft.

The paper had therefore recommended that our policy should be to continue the destruction of the German Air Force and the industry summaring it, particularly the ball bearing industry, secondly to attace this oil production and finally to work out a plan for the tirect tactical support of 0.740,000 by the stack of committeetons and military installations of all kinds which would assist the initial phases of the battle.

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
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C.A.C. said that the oil plan should certainly be considered and asked the K.C. representative what the effect of adorting the oil plan was expected to be on the German oil position.

<u>Ir. Lawrence</u> sell that it had been calculated that if ... T. F. completed their plan of attac in 27 oil instaliations within a period of three months then by the time a further three months was up the formane would have had to institute a cut of 25% in their present military consumption. (This was assuming that they still held the communan oilfields. That we could not estimate was how they would distribute this cut as between the various fronts. It was thought that they had large stocks in the set so that the effect need not be impediate. We thought that there would certainly be some effect noticeable in the set four or five onthe after the plan begin to be ut into effect.

<u>C.1.</u> and that this shows enclosively that the oil has world not bell difficult in the first fer critical works. It was, rather, a longer term has which wight have rester everall effects on the course of the war as a while that the transportation plan but it would be six months before these ware falt approximally. He agreed however that the sil plan had great attractions and he thought we should seriously consider adopting it after the first crisic of Winted was moused and we were firstly established on the Continent. After all, the number of essential all targets



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was not very great and it might be possible to hit all of them in a month or two of gool summer weather. <u>General</u> isonhower entirely agreed that the cil plan should be considered as soon as the first critical situation in VURLORD was passed.

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<u>Ceneral Kennedy</u> said that the attack of certain army targets required consideration such as tank production and depots, M/T parks etc. <u>A.C.N. Leich-Hallory</u> said that these would be looked after by the 9th Air Force and 2nd Tactical Air Force. He was collecting all possible information about such targets in France and would cartainly work into his tectical alan any important targets of which the General taff had information. <u>Concel Lechower</u> remented that it looked as though there was no alternative to the tr momentation alan.

one discussion then took place on whether the J.I.C. should be asked to examine possible alternative plans and make recommendations but it was eventually decided not to do this. <u>Deneral Risenhower</u> said he would welcome any comments that the J.L.C. eared to have on the transportation plan or on any other subject related to makehome.

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Consideration than turned to the tactical questions involved in using the strategic bomber force in the trans ortation plan.

contribute in two ways:-

(a) By carrying out precise attacks on railway contres within 'OBOG' range during the moon periods. He pointed out that the plan required him to attack 6 such targets and he had so far only disposed of three or four. He felt extremely doubtful whether he would be able to complete his part of the lan during the tile remaining, having re and to the limitations is used by the requirements of adequate target marking and good weather in the orticular areas in which the railway centres were located. This fact, together with the doubts about the effectiveness of the transportation plan as a whole mde his ask that it should be nost . carefully exclined before being adopted. 'n any can be urged strongly against the adoption of the literantic stype of than suggested by General Kennedy which would presumbly require a larger number of stiates on precise targets and present him with a task which was quite beyond the capacity of his Command.

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General isenhower

<u>demonal Simonamor</u> sold that the Transportation The clearly ment very little charge in the recent Denter Command regrame. The more invertant question was eather the standard title in Forese could believe their part in it.

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<u>Jonaral masts</u> said that he would need to continue devoting one half of his effort in visual beshing to attaching LA.F. targets. It was, however, oscential that the other half should attack a target system which would reduce at least some energy fighter reaction, and so attrition. He was very doubtful whether the Transportation has would fulfil this condition. That was the riskry reason shy he had preferred the filling, which he was convinced would provoke constant air battles, and so constant attribute of energy fighters.

<u>C.i.</u> said that this was to some attant begging the question; the energy world no toubt not o rose attacks on railway control miles he thought an all-out attack u on the whole railway system was being main. He might well start to send up his fighters as soon as he realised our intentions.

<u>Constal masts</u> explasized the importance of the location of the targets chosen. It was eccential that his hir Forces should attach well into ferming to produce air fighting, and for tactical restance some at least of the targets would mave to be in the same areas to the "..." targets.

C.1.2. asked if General pasts could get through his share of the Transportation las in the time available.

le oral mate said this had not been warked out and ..... Leid-Hallery said that on the latest list of targets,

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there would be about 2 targets alletted to .....

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<u>A...</u>, said that it was essential that we should know whether A.S. T.C.F. could do their share of the plan, and asked A.S. Teider to tell General Gen

<u>(.4.3</u>) noted chether the backing effects of the requestation has would rejudice our subsequent operations on the grant to the OSHIND area. <u>General Figures</u> said that we are the structure consideration to influence as at all since the Generate would containly desired all railing facilities as they retreated.


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
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
<u>control isothered</u> and  $C_{-1}$ , stand up the discussion, and it can decided that the followin action should be taken:-

(11 ... Tobler would projuge a draft directive to the Concenters concerns, with the angult on of the Concenters concerns, with the angult of the Concernstical lan, after taking into account any points that a arget in the Loweringtion referrance in (1) move. This would be discussed with the attorities concerned and then referred to thereal. The Accern finally, Centeral isenions and C... would the cust to enter spain in a few days the in order to reach a final decision and agree soon the directive.

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SUBJECT: Flaming DirectivecoDef Memo 16 May 61

TO : Col. Williamson, Col. Highes, Col. Cabell, Col. Measure, It. Col. Sender, and It. Col. Wrigglesworth

1. It is directed that a Special Flanning Committee, consisting of the following memed officers, take immediate action to prepare plans and supporting studies for operations to follow after accompliminant of the p immry objective of the Combined Ecoler Offensive (destruction of German Air Force production facilities) and for operations of the strategic air forces in the direct support of OFFERCHD:

> Colonal Charles G. Williamson, 0-17723 (Steering Nomber Colonal Michard D. Maches, 0-415901 Colonal Charles J. Cabell, 0-16121 Colonal Joseph J. Hozarro, 0-20364 Lt. Col. Frank P. Bender, 0-392735 Lt. Col. Milliam J. Wrigglesworth, -22630

2. Discussion of Feleted Feets and Conditions:

E. Plans anddirectives for conduct of the Combined Reader Offensive are considered to be entirely adequate and thoroughly sound for guiding the operations of the strategic air forces until the primery objective has been accomplished. There is not, however, any specific definition of subsequent operations to complete the breakdown of Center power and will to resist, nor is there any guide as to the methods that will be exployed to force the strition of energy aircreft existing after their principal sources have been des royed.

b. It now appears that completion of the primary task is sufficiently near to necessitate the invadiate preparation of a plan covering the employment of the strategic dir forces until the end of all energy resistance in this Theater.

3. The final report of the Committee will include the following listed separate items:

c. Summery of the Status of the CBO

b. Study of Tossible Target Tystams and Operational Policies.

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#### D.C.T

#### Plenning Directive, 12 Feb 44.

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2. Study of the Possibilities of Newy Posker Participation in Direct Support of CVERLORD.

g. Flans Supplementing the Combined Hoster Offensive Flanz

- (1) For continuin the Strategic sir Offensive after destruction of GSF production:
- (2) and for simultaneous support of CVD-2000 in so for as conditions warrant at the moment.

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 $\ell_*$  . The final report of this Special Flamming Consisted will be submitted to this Headquarters not later than Earch 1. 12/4.

By command of Lieutenent Command Source:

F. L. ARUDOUN Dejor General, C.J.A. Deputy Commander, Operational

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MINISTRY OF BOONCELC WANTARE Lansdowne House Herkeley Square, W. 1.

th Barch, 1964.

#### Deer General Curtis,

I have received your letter of the 5th March and have read with care the enclosed statement of the enemy oil position.

In view of the urgency which you attach to the reply it has been impossible to convene the Technical Sub-Committee on Axis Cil to consider this statistical presentation of the oil position and the conclusions drawn as a result of the action planned.

I have no hesitetion in stating, however, that both from its own reports and those of the Energy Cil Committee, the Sub-Committee on Axis Cil agree fully with the velidity of the picture of the German all position which has been presented. I would further consider that the operational conclusions resulting from the destruction of the synthetic plants and refineries referred to, represent a most conservative expression of the results.

#### Yours sincerely.

/a/ Hark Turner MART TISHER

Frigadier Concrel E. P. Curtis, U.S.A. Chief of Staff. U. S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe . A.F.O. 633. U. S. Anny

THE IS A TRUE COPY:

/s/ Charles C. illismon Charles G. Willismson, Colonel, C. .C.

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LINSION FOR SCONDAIC AFFAIRS 1 Crosvenor Square. London, W. 1.

March 6, 1914.

Erigedier General S. P. Curtis. Chief of Staff. US Strategic Air Forces in Europe. APO 533. US AIRS.

Dear General Curtis:

I have read the statements on the energy oil position prepared by USUTAF attached to your latter of March 5. and an glad to give to you my opinions therean.

You will appreciate, however, that I a m speaking only in my appacity as metroleum Attache of the UB Hebrary and have no authority to speak directly for either the Enemy Gil Committee in Machington or the Technical Subcommittee on Axis Gil here in London. I am familiar with, and have studied, the latest reports and opinions from these two bodies however, and do note that the figures used in the USETAF report are based on and in substantial agreement with these.

I am not competent to make any estimate of the percentage destruction of productive capacity that might be expected from the proposed attack on the fourteen synthetic plants and thirteen refineries. However, it is evident that if the destruction of these were 100% complete, a loss in production considerably larger than that estimated by UNSTAF would result. Their estimate that the attack on these targets would result in a loss of fuel production from refineries and synthetic plants of about 50% would mean to correspond to an assumption that roughly three-quarters of the productive epacity of plants attacked would be lost for the six months' period.

I am quite in agreement with the conclusions drawn as to the effect of a production loss of this magnitude on German military and industrial effort. Intelligence has indicated that Cerman

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#### CAR ALBARAN.

Brigedier General E. P. Curtis.

Harch 6, 1944.

military effort has often been limited by oil supplies, and the reduction in supplies evaluable would therefore directly limit military activity after a short time. Moreover, the mecossery restrangement of industrial activit iss, perticularly the increase in transportation meeded to utilize spare refining capacity at inconvenient points, would be serious. Inability to use such capacity would result in an even greater loss of oil production than the 50% indicated above.

In Survey, it is felt that the Cermon oil situation is extremely vulnerable to the scale of attack contemplated, and that the results of any appreciable demage to production would be disestrous.

Mineeraly yours.

/a/ mith D. Turner. // mith D. Turner. Petroleum attache.

THIS IS A THUE COPY:

/s/ Cherles G. Williemson /t/ Charles G. Williemson Colonel, G.S.C., Asst. Deputy Commander for Operations

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CORTENDO THE

COPY

5 March 1964

SURJ.CT: Flan for the Completion of the Combined Dember Offensive.

TO : General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Consender, Heddcuprters, ESOLA.

1. The "intermediate objectives" in the Combined Romber Offensive are repidly approaching accompliaiment. The target systems of "Cointblens" have been re-examined in the light of that fact and of the necessity for providing maximum support for "Overlord." The results of that reexamination are given in the attached Then.

2. I consider that the Diam provides for the optimum use of the Strategic Air Forces between now and the time for close support in the immediate tectical area. Our calculations of the possible results are considered to be concervative. As you will note, they are pitched in terms of so lowering the German fighting efficiency on existing fronts that the German ability safely to move strategic reserves will be impaired; and in the months following D-Day, the capacity of the German ground ermise effectively to continue resistance must inevitably be exhausted.

3. Request your concurrence in the Flam.

L. A copy of the Flan has been furnished harshal Fortal by covering letter, copy of which is attached.

/s/ Corl Spects /t/ CARL SPACE Lieuteman General. 5. .A. Commending

5 Incls: Commending Plan. Lit to Marshal Portal. Planning Directive, dtd 12 Teb bh. Lit fr Ministry of Conemic Marfore, dtd 6 Mar bh. Lit fr Ministry of Conemic Marfore, dtd 6 Mar bh.

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CON

5 Harch 1984

SUPPORt Flan for the Completion of the Combined Bomber Offensive.

: Air Chief Harchal Sir Charles F. A. Portel, C.C.F., D.H.G., M.C., Chief of the sir teff. sir Ministry. London.

1. The etteched Plan for the completion of the Combined Pomber offensive is submitted.

2. Becommend that you issue the necessory implementing directives.

3. Recommend further that in second with the orig inel Combined Rember Offensive Flam the H./.F. Bomber Commend effort be integrated to the maximum precticable extent with this plan.

4. A copy of this glan has been furnished Ceneral Sisenhower (copy of letter attached).

> /s/ Cerl Spects /t/ CAN SPARTS Lieutenent & morth. U.S. .. Constand 1 mg

5 inclas Incl 1 - Flen.

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Incl 2 - ty of lir to General Misenhower.

Incl 3 - Flenning Eirective, dtd 12 Feb 44 Incl 4 - Itr fr Ministry of Beomenic Marfere, dtd ( Mar 44.

Incl 5 - Lar fr Mission for Monomic Affeirs, dtd 6 mer ak.

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5 10 reh 1944

PLAN FOR THE COMPLETION OF THE COMPANED

BOMER OF TELESIVE

#### 1. THE AIM

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It is essential at this time to re-clarify the sim of the Strategic Air Forces. The sim can be restated, as expressed by the Combined Chiefa of "toff at Sextent, cas "the progressive destruction and dislocation of the Cerman military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital lines of communication and the material reduction of Cerman air contant strength, by the successful prosecution of the Combined Eacher offensive from all convenient bases." Implied in this sim is the direct support of Overlord. It is essential to point out that the destruction of Cerman Fighter production, and the disinution of the Cerman Fighter Force in being, is an essential means of remiering the sim more readily attainable. It is also a prerequisite for overlord. Pointblank does not termine to with the disposed of the high priority targets in the German Fighter industry and the Fall Basring industry.

#### 2. IN APPRICE TER OF THE PLANE AT THE

A setisfactory degree of destruction to German Highter Force production and Nell Bearing production is well on the way to achievement. It is within the especity of our "trotegic Air Forces to continue attacks against these two industries encillary to other opers ions. A prime essential is any plan must now include the repid attrition of the German Highter Force in being. It is felt that this can best be achieved by stateles on objectives which are so vital to the German War Machine that they must defend them with everything they have, or face the repid reduction of their military forces to impotence. In view of the isminance of Overlord, it is appropriate here to state some of the conclusions reached as the result of the last two weeks' operations. These are kriefly as follows:

a. Irrespective of the exact percentages of attrition and destruction to new production inflicted on the Cerman Fighter Force in the last two weeks, the Cerman Fighter Force will never be as strong again in the foreseeable future on it was two weeks ago.

b. The striking power of the heavy boshers and long-range essort fighters of the Strikegic Air Porces will steedily increase.

c. At the pask of its strength two weeks ago, the Cerman defence was powerless to prevent the destruction by our Air Forces of selected precision targets, widely distributed over all of Cermany and Austric. In attempting to prevent the destruction of these objectives, the German defenses were unable to inflict oufficiently heavy casualties on our Forces to deter them from continuing such operations.

d. As a result of an evaluation of sub-paragraphs a., b., and c. above, it is concluded that Gaumany is powerless to prevent the destruction by our sir forces of any system of targets which we may now select for the accomplishment of our real aim. The only factors that can prevent success are:

(1) A missepplication of our Forces by their direction a gainst unprofitable target systems.

(2) The continued direction of our forces at previously profitable systems beyond the point where the law of diminishing returns comes into effect.

A LANG

(3) Impredictably adverse weather.

e. In view of the urrest time factor, the stresk on these new target systems must company forthwith.

S. C. ADAM. PILICA AND :

In the formulation of any alan for the employment of the Stretegic Air Forces at this time, the following principles must govern the action to be adopted:

 It must provide for the existence of air supremery at the time of the examult.

b. It must favor a Tenkin.

c. In the event that a Mankin has not moterialized it must have made maximum contribution to the success of Overlord.

4. CITICIAY AND AND TOP ATTACK:

All target systems have been re-examined in the light of the present situation, and systems have been selected based upon the conclusion that attacks against them are most likely to accomplish our size. These systems most meerly of all conform to the requirements stipulated in the Guiding Frinciples, and provide essential testical latitude.

 The selected systems listed in order of priority for attack ere;

> (1) PRIMERIAL INDUSTRY. SITU SPECIAL MOMERIES ON CLEOLINE (PETROL) AS OFFORED TO OIL IN CONTENT.

Fatina tod Effects: (a). Current sup lies of all petroleum products will be reduced by about 50 percent over the six months beginning with the assault on this system, and the loss will be greater in motor fuel then in lubricents. The result of policy decisions based on the enticipetions of these effects will be i modic to. (b). A likely form in which the Carmins will choose to recept this loss will be the denie. to their military forces of at least one third of their requirements, and a reduction in essential investrich consumption by about one half. (c). In order to limit the loss to this extent the Correcte

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will be forced to put into action now-idle refining machinery in lestern mrope, where it would be easily accessible to subsequent attack. (d) This reduction of German military and industrial capabilities will have the following effects: (1). The efficiency and mobility of troops on existing fronts will be seriously inpaired; and the ability of the Cereans safely to withdraw troops from these fronts to the est will be consequently limited. (2). This general embarresement, affecting the capabilities of all ground forces, will be an important factor in the decision of the derman High Command to continue resistance after D-Day. (c). This target system affors the seximus opportunity for reducing the defensive capabilities of the German Army by heavy bomber attack outside the taction! 6198.

stinted ffects: (a). It will limit monthly production of Fighters to less than 200 single-angine types, and less than 100 twin-engine types. (b). With that con-tinuing level of production, air supremacy is assured: The G.A.F. will be incapable of offering serious op osltion to other strategic operations against Cerman targets, or of sustaining large-scole close support operations from D- my forward. (c). R will light German ball bearing production to not more than 35 percent of the November 1943 level. (d). With that con-tinging level of production, a spreading crisis will be izposed on German industry producing aircraft of all types, and on other major forms of finished armanents, as well as upon the U.A.P. and Jerman aray Maintenande Commanda.

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INDERING INDUSTRY.

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atimated ffects: (a. 75 will limit German Subber proexcelon to about 35,000 tons, or roughly 25 percent of the rate obtaining at 1 March 1944. (b). Ith that nontiming level of production a spreading crisis will be ispessed on the German ray which will progressively limit its mobility. (c). Die effects of this crisis will be felt from about three months after the beginning of attack, and will reach its climax six to al dat months after the stack. The result of policy decisions based on the anticipations of these effects will be inmediate.

Tomber production will be held to a level of less than 150 per month. (b). At this continuing level of any

150 per sonth. (b). At this continuing level of production the German borber force will be inceptible of sustained operations in close support. (c) porndic a tacks of limited objective will still be within the capabilities of the German borber force.

stimuted ffoota: (a).

Fransportation denters in Germany will be stracted as targets of last resort when weather conditions do not permit the procise science of primary targets.

b. The above is the program for trategic boshing from the present tile until the time required to initiate the tactical support of Overlord. It is estimated that the four systems will require 15 days' effort of visual bombing for their accomplicament by the lighth is more and 10 days by the Fifteenth dir force.

c. Legiming at the time when a major part of the effort of the trategic in areas will be required directly to social in the round operation, intensive operations will be carried out in the faction area in great strength. The system selected for attack during this period is:

Curing this period sufficient operations should be carried out deep into Germany to insure the retention, away from the theolesi area, of large portions of the remaining German Fighter Parce.

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 A tacks against the selected systems will give the maximum support to Overlard by:

(1) Assuring air supremey at the time of the assault.

(2) Confronting the German army with a progressively tightening fuel supply situation on all fronts, so that redistribution of strategic ground reserves and other military operations will be adversely affected by the time of mesault, and thereafter.

(3) Further restricting the essential military industrial production upon which the German aread forces depend.

(4.) Providing required direct surgert.

5. In the implementation of this plan, ancest for the period of direct tastical support, so estima is required by the Combined Chiefs of taff insamuch as it is within the scope of endisting directives implementing fointblank. The sachiery for individual target selection enists through the Target Committee of Mr Ministry, and Mr. oncerted action is required, however, by the supreme diffiel domand, if whistry, and built is order to determine the unture of the institution of the rendered by the trategic for forces during the testical support to be rendered by the trategic for forces during the testical support period. It is, therefore, recommanded that a Committee for that purpose be established by agreement of Mr Ministry, spreme whiled command, and shows.

6. Inclosed herewith are the following a encioes and supplements

and ball Bearing targets, and conclusions as to how these can best be policed.

<u>Intendix</u> R. 4 list and map giving the proposed fetroisus targets, and a study as to how these can best be attacked, together with an estimate of the results to be expected from successful organizes a sinct them.

inpartix C. A list showing the Mubber targets, and a study as to how these can best be stincked, together with an estimate of the results to be expected from successful operations against them.

now these can best be attached, torother with an estimate of the results to be expected from etcoseful overations analyst then.


promite . a sperediation of the Transportation water.

in endix (. An estimate of the present condition of all Teinthlack target systems.

Appaulia . Deputation of ffort equired.

Airpacient, opredictions of target systems which it was considered necessary to re-exemine at this tile. These consist of the following: locals, aliroad, fransport, advarines, sireraft in ines, Williamy fotor irresport, orbitis, weeks, lives, Tank in ines and earlosts, onder irresft, and til.

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#### Tell Desrine Production. Fichter and

1. Targets which remain in the field of Fighter and Ball Dearing production are of three types:

> Frise targets, as yet unintended; 11.

APT SIDIA A.

- Secondary targets, as yet unionaged; 6.
- Prime targets, partially or wholly out of action. C .

Group a. above is selected for early attack. Group b. targets are selected as secondary objectives in the course of missions which have other targets as their primary objective. Group c. targets will be carefully matched, through photographic and other intelligence, and be promptly restacted on evidence of effective repair or resoval to other alter.

2. The three lists of targets follows

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Ï. F Ι Ε D s. riss tarnets, as yet unispansi.

Fighter Aircreft	Lall Baszlard
Focke Hulf:	V.E.F., Berlin/Erkner
Breising Foson Tutes Farlenburg	0.K.F., Loipzig
Focke alf, Sorau	
Mienor Haustadtars	·
Had Voslau Fisterand	
larm Mapulgepyar, Musispest/Szige	ntniklos
b. Becondary Tarnets. as	ret uniozacit
Pichian AlamaCi	Rall Rearian
Siebels	Jacgar, Supportal
Schkendits Halle	Buller, Suronbarg
Mungarian Car & Magon Norks, Gyo	or (Hungary)
I.A.H., Brasov (Russois)	
c. *Friss Termets partial	lly or shally out of action:
Fighter Airoraft:	Ball Bearlasse
Focks Bulf, Gachersleben	Schweinfurt
rlat	Stayr
Leipzig/Nockau Leipzig/Abtanundorf	V.K.P., Stuttgart
Junicorns	
Baushamer	

Halberstadt

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Fighter Alveraft (Cont'd)

Fingelers

Ensel/Settenhausen

"This list will very with current intelligence.

3. The successful execution of this program will have the following effects:

SECRAT

a. It will limit monthly production of Pighters to lass than 200 single-carine types, and less than 160 twin-engine types.

b. sith that continuing level of production air supremary is secured; the G.S.F. will be incepable of offering serious opposition to other strategic operations against German targets, or of sustaining largescale close support operations from 1-bay forward.

c. It will Mait German ball bearing production to not more than 35 percent of the Hovember, 1943 level.

d. With that continuing lavel of production, a spreading crisis will be imposed on German industry producing sirerait of all types, and on other major forms of finished arraneuts, as well as upon the C.A.F. and German array Maintenance Commends.

#### 4. Effort Required:

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a. On listed targets:

Sth. Air Forces: 63 Dombat Box attacks. 15th. Air Forces: 22 Combat Box attacks.


b. Instincts on listed or other targets:

Sth. Air Force: 55 Gombet Box attacks. 15th. ir Force: 16 Gombet Box attacks.

Note: For greater datall with respect to the present position of fighter aircraft and ball bearing targets see Appendix F.

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1. Wenty seven major targets in the field of retrolous production, comprising 14 synthetic plants and 13 refinerles, are selected for immediate attack. If surplus effort eventuates, additional targets will be assigned for attack.

2. These targets are listed below by the areas into which they fall:

1 General

#### CONTRAL AND SANT GORGAN SUMPRETIC PLANTS:

frux leuns Lechhanner outh Hechhanner North Nagdsburg chwartsheide Trogiltz eits Hohien Diha

which is a second of a second as

elserkirchen cholven hesseling baberg castrop auxel

#### Detits/ tettin ( ynthetic (lant)

REACH GROWAN A FIRST L ...

Harburg Hanover/Haburg Hurotank/Hasburg

- All Anna Anna Anna

Istra Iomana, lioesti Iomordia, " Mericana " Unirea " Petrol Mock " Dacia " Frahova, Eucharest

lobau, austria (Tefinary) Tratislava, Sechoslovakia (Tefinery) Hell, Mudajest (Tefinery)

3. These targets account for more than (0 percent of total synthetic production and 60 percent of usable refinery capacity, suitably located.

 Accessful attack will have the following effect on the German retroleum position:

3. Current supplies of all petroleum products will be reduced by about 50 percent over the six months beginning with the assault on this system, and the loss will be greater in motor fuel than in lubricants. The result of policy decisions based on the anticipations of these effects will be immediate.

b. A likely form in which the dermans will choose to accept this loss will be the denial to their military forces of about one third of their requirements, and a reduction in essential industrial consumption by about one half.

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g. In order to limit the loss to this estent the demans will be forced to put into action non-idle refining muchinery in Mestern derope, where it would be easily accessible to subsequent attack.

g. This reduction of German military and industrial expediities will have the following effects:

(1) The efficiency and mobility of troops on existing fronts will be impaired; and the ability of the Germans safely to mithdraw troops from these fronts to the fest will be consequently limited.

(2) This general moharrasament, effecting the capabilities of all ground forces, will be an important factor in the decision of the German High Germand to continue resistance after Delay.

g. This target system offers the maximum opportunity for reducing the defensive capabilities of the German Army by heavy bomber stank outside the innediate tactical area.

5. ffort soulred:

ighth dr force: 101 Ochat lox stacks.

Wifteenth Mir Moreat 75 Combat Nex Attacks.


for analysis in greater detail see Arrianed. Part 10.


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
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




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1. Five targets exist in the field of Fubber production; nine major targets exist in the field of fire production.

2. Subber production is selected for immedate attack.

3. Tire factories represent an accumulation of Fulber stocks in store and in process of the order of two weeks' production. Their destruction will hesten the effect on Corven strength of the attacks on Rubber production, but they are not regarded as a lajor objective of attack. They are, therefore, selected as secondary objectives, in the course ofmissions which have other targets as their primery objective.

4. The lists of targets follow:

Rubber Factories:	212001
Schkopeu	Continental:
1010	Manover/Vahrenselderstresse
Ludwigshefen/Cppeu	Nonover/Northefen
Henever/Linner (reclein)	Hanover/Erienwerder
Leverkusen	ate, glin (Ogechoslovekie)
	Pirelli, Eilen (Italy)
	Dunlop, Hensu
	Theenix, Musburg/Marturg

Fulde, Fulde.

Detaler, Dunich.

DECRET

5. The successful execution of this program will have the following effects,

e. It will limit German Butber production to about 35,000 tons, or roughly 25 percent of the rote obtaining at lat murch 1944.

b. With that continuing level of production a spreading crisis will be imposed on the German Army which will progressively limit its mobility.

c. The effects of this crisis will be felt from clout three months after the beginning of attack, and will reach its climer aix to eight months after the attack. The result of policy decisions based on enticipations of these effects will be immediate.

6. Effort Nequired:

Oth Air Force: 38 Combet Box attecks 1 th Air Force: 0 Combet Box attecks

Sth Air Force: 15 Combot Hox attacks 15th Air Force: 17 Combet Box ettecks

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B .

For a more detailed statement of the position of rubber targets see Appendix 7; for enelysis in greater detail of the potentialities of the tire system, see uppl mont, Fort 7.

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#### APPENDIX D

1. Deven sufer bomber essenbly plants remain underseed in Carmeny. Shey are the following:

Henschel, Schonefeld	<b>Ju.</b> 80
Siebel, Schloeditz	Ju. 88
Dornier, Oberpfaffenhofen	Do. 217 - Ne. 410
Junkers, Bremen	Ju. 87
Beinkal, Grenienburg	Me.177
Aredo, Frandburg	Ne.177
Junkers, Desseu	Ju. 290

2. These factories and aircreft on the associated sirfields, are selected as accountary targets in the course of missions which have other prisary objectives.

3. Because of the relatively slow turnover of bombers in first line strength, bomber component factories are not selected for stack, because of the long delay between attack and effects on first line strength.

 $h_{\rm e}$ . The successful consumption of the attacks will have the following effects:

6. Hoster production will be held to a level of less than 150 per month.

b. At this continuing level of production the Cerman bamber force will be incompable of sustained operations in close support.

c. Sporadic attacks of limited objective will still be within the compatilities of the German bosher force.


#### 5. Effort Tequired:

Sth Air Force: 72 Combat Box attacks 15th Air Force: 5 Combat Box attacks

Note: For analysis on greater detail see Supplement, Fart 9

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APPENDIX N

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#### TR MPO T


1. To effect a 30 percent reduction in German roll traffic over a period of a year, 500 targets must be successfully attacked, of which 250 are major workshops of heavy construction. Since military traffic is not more than one fifth of total German traffic, this series of attacks would have little direct military effect.

2. Consequently, German transport targets have not been selected for systematic stack as prisery objectives, prior to the beginning of the direct support period.

3. In order to impose a useful continuing attrition transport conters have been selected as targets of last report.

4. The present report does not treat the marits of interdiction of transport lines, which constitutes mainly a textical problem.

More nolysis in greater detail see monlement, Tert 2.



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AT WRITTING OF FORM BL NG STITTING

#### Mille Last.

Thile it is too early to make definitive statements about much of the damage inflicted during the final weak of February, it appears that German single-make finiter production has fallen, by 1 March 1964 to about 250 planes per month, or 25 per cent of pre-raid peaks of production: twinengine fighters to about 50 per month or 22 per cent of pre-raid rates: ball and rolier bearing output to 40-50 per cent of November levels; while robber supplies were still at the same figure.

-

Attacks have been made on the oil refineries at Flocati (agust 1943) and the synthetic oil plant at Gelsankirches, of this date these attacks have probably not weakened the German petroleum position, although the elimination of excess refinery capacity at Flocati had increased the vulnerability of that complex to subsequent attack.

The tables below summarize present incodedge of the degree of destruction imposed upon fighters, ball bearings and rubber. This information, as noted, is tentative.

#### 1. 1. - 0.1

issambly ire beganants ion	-Attack thly Cut- put	lates of Attack	iresunt Pro (25-2-14	faction Semerks
ag <b>e,</b> Gecheraleban	90	28=7=43 11=1=44 20=2=44 20=2=44		tate of lana e under examina- tion. Terhape some ireduction
Ago, Wleiche	-	-	-	Control surface plant. Never sttacked. mall
arado, Tutow		-	75(7)	Twice attacked thru 10/10. No demage expected.
/rado, /nklam /rado, Warnesande	-	9-10-43 29-7-43	-	How repair. Sepaired part- ially.
P arienburg	110	9-10-43	20(*)	Under recon- struction. For- heps some aspen- bly.
T.W. Topan	-	-	-	Tet's to both Tutow and Unrienbury; some to oray.
T Feising	-	-	-	st
F urfield		-	50(7)	Components from Coran, Tosen and Areising.
F ora	-	-	-	suall factories.
Fieseler, Kassel/ Saldau	40	30-7-63	25(1)	istizate may be low.
fleseler, Kassel/		30-7-63 3/4-2-/63		Sepair under May.
	300 at peak		170 (1.	

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
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Me.109 Assembly Components	Pre-Attack Monthly Out- put	Letes of Atteck	duction (25-2-44)	Remarks
W.N.F.Fla		16-1-44		Minor demage.
W. N.F. Bad Vo	sleu		See above Work I	
Pottendor Textile H Voslau Te Mills	<b>1</b> 11s			Reported in component production. Reported in component production.
Regensburg/ Oberstraubli	ng (225 25 of 22-2-44	22-2-1.4 25-2-44	0	Denniged 22-2-44 Destroyed 25-2-44
Regensburg Prufening	250	17-8-43 25-2-44	•	Fully repaired as com- ponent plant by 25-2- hh Then destroyed.
Steyrwerk Steyr	e	23-2-44 24-2-44 24/25-2-44		Heavy damage.
Erla, Leipzi Mockau	<b>e</b> 225	20 <b>-2-</b> hh	25 (?)	Heavily demeged.
Leipzig/ Heiterbli Leipzig/ Abteundor erk 5		3/4-12-43		Heavily damaged. Undamaged One helf destroyed.
Me. 109	650 Totels at peel		75 (?)	
Single-engin		tely	245 (?)	
2. THIN ER	INE FIGHTERS			
	Pre-Attack ionthly Out- put	Dates of Attack	Present Pro- duction (26-2-44)	Ferm rks
MIAG, Brunss	ick/	11-1-44	0	
HIAC. Neupetrit		20-2-44 21-2-44	-	Heavy Danage
MIAG Wilbelmit	tor	20 <b>-2-</b> 44	-	Minor Damage
Sothaer, So B.B.F., J	othe 65 Furth -	24-2-44 25-2-44	0	Hesvy Demoge. Hesvy Demoge.
Me.110 Approximate	Total 115		0	
Me. 210-410				
Me.Augsburg	30	25-2-44 25/26-2-44	10	Some dernage
Duna Repulse Szigentmikle Tokol A/F Me.210-410 Approximate	30	•	30	-
appa o nation of		-2-		
		-2-		

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Ju.85 & 158 is eably Concorrents	Pre-Stack Sonthly OUL-	lates of st tack	Arasent From deduction (25-R-14)	and an	
Ju. Hernburg J. Halbers J. Cachara	stadt =	20-2-14 11-1-44 22-2-44	C	Heavy Smalls home humans fleavily duraged	
iebel, chke		-	10	-	
			ARCONCE WE		
Au.68 & 108	lotal 60		10		
(fighters on)	Ly)				
Sein-engine	otal 225				
3	CILCH MARTING				
	Percentage Contribution gs of 11-63	lace of that	pat of lov.	Filming#Film	
0.00057					
	oher, 22.Z	(17-3-4)		Present estimate	
chroin		(21,m);Omle) (24,m2m2k	15.0 17)	based on possible dispersal.	
chwein	Sure	(23) / 25 m 2m 2m 2	1		
iniewip.			1		
1.1.1 · (	Norma) 5.8 rt-Canstatt	23.2-14	2.5 (7)		
Talial's	rimer 4.8		5.0	group! sources	
1			3.0		
erim.	Neukoln3.7			los they damaged in	
leipzig Joager	3.9		3.0	attack 3/4-12-63	
uppert	al 2.9		2.9	Ingressal engloment	
huller Naroch			2.5	reported.	
	-lichtenberg		1.0		
Pulda	a Noller 1.0		1.0		
lobert			2.0		
	roducers2.0		2.0		
Total	72.5		22.9		
AT 1. 10		COTTA -			
teyr,	20.6		5.0 (1)		
teyr		24-2-44 24/25-2-44			
i Fuerst	ain 1.0		1.0		
	roducera U.9		-		
lotal	Ľ		7.9		
ITUY B.L.V.		8-11-43			
Turin	3.9	1-10-13			
R.1.V. Villo	r Ferena 1.0	the last			
		-3			




Shote: The "100.0%" figure for November actually represents 91.6% of bearings available to Bermany with Sweden and Witzerland supplying the differential.

lace	Output June 1943	Date of Sttack	Output 1 March	Romarks
	(tons per year)		(tons per	year)
STATISTIC RUSS	<u>R</u>			
e hkopau	30,000	-	40 <b>,</b> 000	Output at this plant may have been expenden as a result of the Huls raid
liuls	30,000	22-6-1.3	15,000	
Ludwigshaf	en Oppau			
	15,000	-	15,000	
Cywledin	C	-	5,000	This is a plant now under construction whose planned output is nelieved to be much larger than 5,000 tons This 5,000 ton figure represents an allow- ance for small partial operation of the un- complete plant.
Leverkusen	5,000	-	5,000	
Ot hers	10,000	-	10,000	
Total	90,000		90.000	
ANGLA DE				
Hanno ver-1	1mmer 20,000		20,0.0	
Other	20,000		20,.00	
Total	40,000		40,000	
	130.000		130.000	

I S Ρ А G E I S U Ν С L А S S I F I E D

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#### COMPUTATION OF EFFORT

1. As the basis for all calculations finally resulting in the "Table of Force sequired" at the end of this Appendix, the experience figures of the sighth air Force were used. Since bomb dispersion from various causes is definitely decreasing, this average gives of itself a margin in the calculation; an extra 121% has been allowed for gross errors. (Also an experience average.) Some requirements were interpreted in terms of combat boxes of <u>eighteen (18)</u> planes over the target, thereby allowing for individual sircraft failures to go with their units.

2. The resulting total effort required over the target 1s 500 combat box attacks in which no allowance has been made for the fact that, on the average, about 44% of the units dispatched do not attack assigned targets. Therefore, the actual effort required must be increased by 400 combat boxes, making a total dispatched effort of 900 combat boxes.

3. Although the figures given in the preceding paragraph give a basis for estimating the capabilities of the two Air Forces involved, they must be interpreted more practically in terms of operational days for different areas as expressed in the following tables:

eng are boben aboad	NURBER OF RE-UIRSD GORDAT DOARD DIS- PATCERD	
STH AIR POACE AREAS	and the second	
duhr - Kessel	127	3
Hamburg - Hanover	124	3
Berlin - Leipsig	277	6
stattin - Danzig	45	1
Frankfurt - Muremberg		
TOTALS (8th AF)	665	15
15th AIR FORCE AREAS		
Munich	27	2
Prague - Breslau	38	2
Vienna - Sudapest		3
Floesti - Bucharest	85	
TOTALS (15th AF)	_234	10
FOTALS (8th & 15th)	900	(No real total)

(all figures include allowance for 44 % unit failures to attack assigned targets.)

*Mased upon having at least fifty (50) combat boxes available in the sth Air Force and at least twenty (20) in the 15th Mir Force.

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LARKE OF FOURT AND	0100			
<u>Finan</u>		CT-2 Collins		
	et	ih 17 151	th Af	
FRIMENT TANGATS				
LIGUES ALCONT				
°Cs chers leben	12,000	3		
≈leipzig/bockau	19,000	5		
zig/Abtneundorf	19,000			
spernbarg	13,000	6		
Wha lberstadt	12,000	3		
"Lassel/iettennisse	26,000			
"fassel/ sldau	25,000	7		
Sreising	12,000	3		
Polsan	18,000	4		
Tutor	12,000	7		
lariestarg	12,000			
sorma	15,000 (Est	,6		
lener Weustadter				
Fad Voslau	22,000		6	
Fischweend	21,000			
Duna 7./Padapest/ zig.	19,000			
isil marings				
V.T., berlin/ ramer	26,000			
.t., wipsig	26,000	7		
and the second s				
CHUTTER STORAT				
schkoudita/or. is ipsig	12,000			
Rello	26,000	7		
Ger & lagen forms, Gor	12,000			
I.s. H., Brasev (No Target Solder)				
LOLAS SING				
Seger/uppertal	26,000	7		
Milier/Ruresberg	26,000	7		
and the set of the state of the		-		

Pall -	ARIMOS (Cont td)	ALTITUDE	FORCE IN COMBAT BO OVER TARG Sth AF		
	infurt a. V.K.F.I.	22,000	7		
	b. V.R.P.11	22,000	6		
	c. Kugelfischer		6		
*steyrw		12,000		3	
	-Da imler-Puch	12,000		5	
*V.K.F.	. Stuttgart	22,000			
#Allow:	ince made for re-attack				
RUNAL	N REFINISIES				
Astra	omana	22,000		6	
Concor	rdia	22,000			
meric	cana	22,000		6	
Unires	5	22,000		6	
Petrol	1 Eloch	22,000		6	
Dacia		22,000		6	
Praho	ra, Bucharest	22,000		6	
Lobau	, Austria	22,000		6	
Brati	slave/Czech	22,000			
Shell	, Budapest	22,000		6	
<u>nuka .</u>	ATETRICIC PLANTS				
Gelse	akirchen	26,000	7		
schol		26,000	9		
0530.		22,000			
Hombel		26,000	7		
	op dauxel	26,000	7		
	tz/tettin	22,000	6		
	AL AND RANT GLAMAN SYN				
Brux		19,000	5		
Leuna		19,000	13	9	
	hammer North	19,000		5	
Brech	hammer south	19,000			

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
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		Sth Ar 1	11 12
CATRAL AND SANT GERRAR ATRA	ATIC MARTE (Cont	(b*d)	
Magdeburg	26,000	7	
chwartshelde	19,000	5	
Troglits Weits	12,000	3	
Bohlan Rotha	19,000	5	
BORTH GRANTE REFINERING			
Harburg	26,000	7	
Banover/Blaburg	26,000	7	
Surotank/Senburg	26,000	7	
SOVAR PRODUCTION			
Schonefeld	26,000	7	
chkeudits	19,0.0		
Coerpfailenhofen	19,000		
Oranienburg/mashof North Are	a26,000	14	
outh rea	19,000	10	
randenburg ost rea	26,000	14	
ast rea	19,000	1.	
Сезвац	19,000	5	
Brean/lesserder	26,000	7	
<u>11      </u>			
Hanover/Hordbafen	26,000	7	
Manover/Wahreawald.	26,00	10	
Hanover/Marlenwarder	26,000	7	
Bats, lin	12,000		
Firelli	19,000		
Dunlop/Hanau	26,000	7	
Phoenix, Hamburg/Harburg	26,000	10	
Guaniwarke, Fulda	12,000	L,	
Metaler/Dunich	26,000		
<u>RM 18</u>			
schkopsun	26,000	7	
Huls	26,000	7	
ludwigshafen/Oppsu	26,000	7	

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T H I S P A G E 1 S U Ν L А S S I F I ED

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				1,1
	LTITUDE	FO-CS IN COMP-I BOLCI CVLR THOOT Sth at 15th at		
Allendia (cont 'd)				
Hanover/Linner	26,000	10		
Leverkusen	26,000	7		



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### ALALATIN & PATE ALL FRANKLE THEFT AVAIL

Farts 1 to 10 excesses in abbreviated function the current target potentialities of seven industries, other than fighter sireraft, sath. Friction bearings and rubber, which the C.A.S. and Camblance directions have specifically mentioned, together with grinding wheels (for which special consideration has been asked), tasks and task engines, and the target system offered by German morals. The relevant considerations of that exclusion may be summarized as follows:

1) Normale - This is not a useful target system. Funic, mar meaniness and fear of impovarishment of Germans in general or particular, achieved through daylight beakardsont of texas in general is not likely to speed disintegration of Sami controls. (Part 1).

11) <u>Sailmond temperant</u> - Acts railroad motive poser in not a useful target system. The interdiction of railroad consumication, judged as a tastical objective, is not considered. Strategic attacks on railroads, however, is judged to present too many targets, have too great a cushion of civilian and kany-term industrial use, and stand too deep in time to offer a chance of actieving algoliticant uilitary effects. (Part 2).

111) <u>Hummings</u> - This is no longer a usoful system. The strategic importance of submarines has declined with the full use of affective means of defeating them at sea. German G-hest construction is clacking off. No offects on ensay capabilities could be achieved in time to affect OWNLORD (Part 3).

iv) <u>Aircraft envires</u> - This is not a useful system. Meany Cornan losses in Fighter assaubly especity have created an angles curplus. Destruction of angles capacity would rebalance the German industry but achieve long-run attritional rather than short-term military effects (Part 4).

v) <u>Military motor timesport</u> - This is not a usaful system. Los rates of turnover in civilies and military trucks protect silitary holdings from rapid reflection of the current level of entput. Complete cessation of production would probably reduce military holdings only by 20 per cent in a year's time (Part 5).

vi) <u>Grinking wheels</u> - This is probably not a currently useful system. In depth, it lies accesses bolins ball bearings with which it overlaps, and like rubber, it consists of another out through the entire German economy. Saven plants produce 96 per cent of Ruropean controlled-structure wheels, or 60 per cent of grinking wheels of all types. (Burt 6).

vii) Three - Six targets in the field of three constitute not a three system, but a useful opportunity of destroying half-a-conshi's supply of rubber and comparish advancing the time at which the intier system will catch hold. (Fart 7).

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vili) <u>Tank enclose and continues</u> - Three targets, two of thes closely adjoining, offer a means of depriving suis arcies of 1000 tanks and assault guess within a sizementh period beginning two to three souths after successful attack (Part S).

ix) <u>Bomber Sirgnaft</u> - Five homber assessbly factories marit early attack to reduce the weight of unsupported bother night assault which the infusifie can amount scainst OFSELORD. Since bosher turnover is alow, 5 souths instead of 2) months for fighters, strength cannot be such reduced by B-day. Components, moreover, are not deserving of attack. (Part 9).

a) (12 - 23 sputhetic plants and 31 refineries currently account for over 10 per cast of total Axis refinary and synthetic oil output. 14 synthetic plants and 13 refineries account for over 20% of synthetic production and over 60% of readily usable refining capacity. The effect of attack on these plants would fall more heavily on actor fuel than upon habricant production. A special problem exists with respect to the statistic scale, major refineries in use are successfully statisted on a substatistic scale, major refineries and attached when active. Petroleum stocks are believed to be of the order of three menths consumption, including stocks in transit and at refineries and synthetic plants. These would be heavily drawn down to could on the first effects of attack. These would be heavily drawn down to could on the first effects of attack, of attack, after fighter aircreft and ball-bearings, to bring the Carsen armiss to the point where their defeat in the field will be meaned. (Part 10).

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### PART Z.

### WAR DE ATTACE

#### SCLOSION:

Day raids by American heavy bombers egainst Dersen towns as such are considered to have little merit as a means of exploiting air supremacy over Germany. Meither fear, war wearingss, nor the prospect of impoverial-ment is likely to be sufficient to enable impotent political and model groups to over three the efficient, terroristic Mani social controls and bringabout Asialid. It is balieved the German aredes will have to be defeated in the field. At best, the prospect of such defeat as inevitable might induce the Army to purge itself of Wasis and assume power. The likelihood of this, prior to GWERLARD, is believed slim.

German towns, therefore, constitute targets for daylight bombardment only during prolonged periods of bad weather when precision objectives of direct allitary isportance cannot be attacked. In these conditions, indus-trial toxus are preferable to toxus in general; and the industrial areas of towns, if selection is possible, are more advantageous targets than residential somes. It is not believed that administrative or conservial portions of the major cities like Berlin, Bunich, or Vienna constitute exceptions to these targeting principles.

#### HORALS BOOMING: I.

Attacks on German morale may be considered in terms of (a) terrory (b) war weariness and dispust; (c) concern for German post-war prosperity in general or particular. The methods usually considered as possible means of producing one or more of these effects consist in the daylight beskerdment

- German towns in general
- large German citles
- industrial targets chosen for their symbolic value industrial targets chosen for possible political effects on specific key business or Masi interest (aside from direct silitary target systems).

### Q. REAT MILL TO DESIRT:

The morals of the General people is already sidely believed to be To the extent that this means that the Garman civil population has had. little hope of victory and is auxious for defast, this is probably correct. It is gravely doubted, however, whether the German people can take overt stops to hasten the acceptance of defeat by the German mation; or that further detorioration of morals will lead significantly closer to a position from which such steps can be taken by these.

Sorale in a totalitarian society is irrelevant so long as the patterns function effectively. The Masi party controls have functioned well. Air raids have produced temporary local outbraaks, but opposition has had little opportunity to take overt sivantage of the breakdown of communications, transport, and services in these periods. Social control is required to reestablish the conditions where life is possible. This the Real party has been sufficiently edeptable to provide.

#### THE MODALS, OF THE MARK PARTY. 3.

The will of the Mani party to resist Allied military processors oprings from strong simple urges. It is generally egreed, and is doubtless clear to the party's loading members, that their chances for curvival after NAMEN are slight. Their motivation in resistance is clear.

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The Masi party's shility to organize recuperation is a possible point of attack. If the addiniatrative problems thrust upon them by destruction of anjor dities were too large to be coped with, addiniatrative breakdown might have the party powerlass. This is fact occurred for a short period with the failure of the evacuation scheme. But the impotence of other social and political groups is such that the war continues will radually the party reasonas an adequate measure of control. Short of willtery defeat and occupation by United Mations' forces, no group in Germany has shown itself sufficiently strong to contest the party's position even in moments of administrative breakdown.

### 4. PORTAL OPPOSITION GROUPS

It is not believed that industry is likely to become a center of opposition to the Masi party. Exerting its power through other model groups, it has been infused an open political role. Soreover, in the last ten years, it has been infused with Masi leaders in key political of management, and thed closely to governmental administrative institutions.

Sanking and finance have no extional landers. The judiciary and the civil service are Sail in complexion. The Church has to independent role or means of expression. The middle class has long been eliminated as a political factor.

The working class, from which effective opposition to the Mazi party might be expected to cores, is profoundly war weary, but in no real sense organized to impose its will upon the mation. Its impotence in the frace of Masi controls, moreover, is a reflection not only of the ineffectual role it played in the '20s and '30s, but also of the negative character of its assumption of power in 1918. The monarchy was not overthrown by the working class. Fower fall from its grasp, and the working class was sucked into the vacuum created by the abmance of political control.

Finally, the Army. This has for some months been infuned with reliable desis, both in the High Command and in the younger officers taken in directly from the High Command and in the younger officers providing opposition to the Hasis. Its interest in so doing would be based upon desire to dimensionlate itself in defeat from guilty Heat political landership, and preserve some semblance of dignity for Jerman military tradition. Its capacity for so doing lies in the possibility of foreibly removing entereding lasts from power in the Army, then selsing political control by force or threats of comming resistance.


### 5. BELEVAND OF DAYLADOUT ROUBARDHORT OF TOTAL TO POSTICAL POSES

If the sray is the only model or political group in Germany estable of wresting control from the Mani party, it follows that neither would be control of towns calculated to terrorize, nor destruction of decing German defeat on grounds of morels. A breakdown of Basi party than the arry can restore control, however, is similar. And the arry is likely to oppose the party on such an occasion only when it has judged inevitable its defeat in the field.

Aray calculations of advantage are not in the least likely to be affected by the fears of the people or their maariness. Their refusal to work or of soldiers to fight would be another matter. Have refusal is unitively since the first several thousand, at lass, would be shot. Of far nore importance to the army are factories in which Cerman people may work, and weapons with which the Tehrasolt may fight. Attacks on industries of direct military importance, therefore, are far nore capable of producing algorificant effects on army political moves then attacks on non-industrial

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### PAST 2.

#### TANKST POTOTIALITIES OF ARIS SUBSTRAN TRANSPORT - DARC 194

### CONCLUCION:

exis inropean transportation denued be recommanded as a target system for strategic attack. Military traffic forms a small proportion of total traffic; at its exists it will not be more than about one-fifth of total traffic. A reduction of at least 30% could be made in European rule traffic (the most important part of the traffic system, and the part which is relatively volgerable to air stack) without affecting energy military potential for a year. To affect a reduction of this order would demand sttack on more than 500 targets. At least 250 of these targets are major workshop arong of heavy construction, requiring a large weight of basis. Attritional strategic attack on Axis transport is therefore considered undesirable. The present report does not treat the marits of interdiction of lines, which constitutes meinly a textical problem.

### 1. ______:

Fotel freight traffic in exis Surope is currently estimated at short 2 billion tens, or 400 billion ton kilometers. Of this, about threequarters (both in terms of tens and ten kilometers) is carried on the reilways, and mearly a quarters on the inland meterways. The contribution of constal shipping, while important for certain specific hauls, is small in overall terms, and higheny traffic is capligible.

Attritional attack on transport in general (which is the only type considered in this note; as contrasted with attacks on specific motements at specific times) must be directed olderly at the railways. The unterways satury a quarter of the total fraight traffic, which consists of coal, building materials, timber, and grain, while precidenly more of it consists of whiter supplies. Further, must inter-borne traffic is on natural river materways relatively invulnerable to attack. At present, direct silitary traffic - munitions and other supplies whiped to field white - constitutes abcome con-sixth or here of total rail traffic. Not of this is on the Bastern France, the series of board fielding and maximum trops novements in France, the every properties of military traffic over any period of time will not rive over short one-fifth of the total, and any not rise at all if the retrast in the Bast continues.

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Nore than two-thirds of the total relies? Freight traffic consists of coal and coke, construction meterials, iron ore and other ainerals, usprocessed bulk foodstuffs. Fortilizers, and iron and steel sill products. A relation in the supply of these items would not make iteelf fail on the fighting fronts for a considerable time. Mone of the classes is, on the average, less than six months every free finished ensemble in the production cycle, and the existence of stocks and pipelines means that they are seven or eight months from the front line. Some items, like fertilizers, and comstruction materials, may be as much as twenty months deep. The average doubt of the whole rell transport system is containly as great as the average doubt of the whole production cycle; this is at least nine months, and may be an more as a part.

### 3. Contract and a second and and and

The fact that direct allienty traffic is not expected to constitute core than cos-fifth of total rail traffic even during the period of intecnive fighting and high reinforcement rate which will follow the invanion of centern surope scans that a 305 out in traffic will have no effect on CF LIND.

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addition .

The great depth of the transport system means large reductions could be unde in rail transport without affecting military capabilities for some time. It is estimated that a 30% reduction in railway traffic, falling largely on coal, iron ore, fertilizers, construction materials, and agricultural products could be sustained for at least a year mithout affecting the strength of the Webreacht in the field. Thus the military position of the ensay would not be affected within a relevant period by any stack on transport in general which could be mounted. (See below, paragraph 4.)

### 4. TUNCETTAL

A sustained reduction in the carrying capacity of the railway system is general can best be soldered by an attack on serviceskle locomotives. Attack on other possible sub systems such as rolling stock or permanent way facilities would each require a much larger effort to achieve the same effect. Locomotives are in relatively shorter supply then freight cars on the continent today. Horeover, the destruction of a similar proportion of the total stock would desend attack on a greater number of targets. The railway acknowly for littles so quickly affected, that no considerable sustained reduction in traffic can be achieved by feasible effort against the rail network.

In order to schieve a reduction of 30% in railway freight traffic, enough locceptives would have to be put out of action to eliminate all passenger traific above the absolute minimum possible (estimate all present passenger train mileage) as well as to out down freight pervice. There are a total of about 34,000 serviceable mainline steam locenotives in Acts Europe today, and about 10,000 more being overhauled in major repair shops. The reduction of freight traffic by 30% would require a reduction of this number by nearly 20,000 locenotives, in addition to normal wastage and ambotage.

At any one time servicesble locomotives would be found more or less equally distributed between open railway lines and locomotive sheds. There are about 3,000 locomotive sheds in Axis Surope. The 20 largest would at any one time contain at most 1,400 locomotives; the next 40 sight contain another 1,400. Heavy attack on these 60 targets might thus result in the destruction of about 2,500 locomotives. It is doubtful that heavy attack on the mext 100 sheds would contribute more than another 2,500 locomotives.

During a six-month period, the 36 producers of main line atoms locomotives will produce about 1,500 locomotives. Destruction of these 36 plants / would mean the reduction of the total by 1,500 locomotives. In the mane period about 13,000 locomotives will go to major repair shops for overhauls. There are about 200 major repair whops in Axis Hureper the 50 largest do about onethird of the total repair work. Isstruction of these 50 would result at most in an increase in unserviceable locomotives and a destruction of locomotives of 2,000 in this six south period.

An additional burden on the railroads equivalent to the loss of about 3,00 locomotives could be achieved by stopping traffic on the Sittelland Caual in Germany. Successful stack on 16 targets - 2 ship elevators, 5 equeducts, 7 looks, and 2 enhantments, would render the whole caual unuable.

Thus successful attacks on 262 targets would result in a reduction of the locatotive supply by about 14,500 units. The reduction of afficiency in handling the locatotives in the neighborhood of the larger shads which have been destroyed might be equivalent to another 500 locatotives, whiging the total up to 15,000. This the destruction of 5,000 locatotives by other means is required to relifil the program. This could be dense in part by strafing and bombing individual locatotives - which has up to now achieved a menium rate of destruction of compiderably less than 1,000 in six months, and is part by further attack on locatotive sheds containing fewer than 20 locatotives each.

### H S P A G E T U N C L A S I F T E

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#### rant 2. (CONTINED).

### 5. YOL MADILITY:

Except for the 16 waterway targets, all the targets discussed require heavy attack to produce major damage. The buildings of locomotive sheds, repair sheps, and producers are all large and strongly built, with gantry cranes and generally with steel framing. Minor damage to those buildings will have little effect on activity, since equipment and contents are very heavy.


The average locomotive shed and surrounding track area on which locomotives are parked consists of about 10 acres, of which the shed comprises 5. A major repair shop or factory may have a plant area of 100 acres or more, of which 500 is covered by buildings.

### 6. TOULIDIA DAMAGE AND STTECTO:

It is doubled that any mosle of attack can be mounted which will achieve destruction of the listed targets in six months or even a year. If this were achieved, no military effect would be felt for more than a 9 months following the completion of the program. Therefore no significant military effect can be expected from attack on this system in any relevant time period.

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### PART 3.

Station 194

TABOAT POTE TIALITIES (F SUPERADINES - MARCE 1944.

### CONCLUSION:

The self-isposed German decrease in submarine production supports the conclusion that anti-submarine techniques have diminished the effectiveness of this weapon to the point where increasing the already large fleet is deemed unisportant. This fact plus the known alight vulnarability of building installations and the long period between construction and operational use justifies the conclusion that attack upon submarine yards is no longer warranted.

### 1. PROMOTION. TERBERS AVAILABLE. DEPTHS

Germany had 271 submarines under construction in June 1942, 270 in June, 1943, but only 200 as of February 1942. Completions have fallen from over 22 to less than 15 per month.

Since a minisum of 1 to 12 years elapses between the laying of a submarine keel and the day it joins the fleet, only a small addition (perhaps 50 submarines) to the present number is likely before ONERLORD.

450 units make up the Corman submarine fleet. Completions and destruction keep the number of U-boats in the operational fleet roughly constant.

### 2. ETHATEDIC RELATION OF SUPPLANIES TO FUTURE OF RATIONS:

U-boats are used chiefly against trans-oceanic supply routes. They may be used, but to an owen less effective extent, spainst actual invasion shipping. Ships already in existence represent almost the entire potential for operations of either type. A slight increase in numbers will hardly affect the effectiveness of this weepon.

Furthermore, present anti-subwarine tochniques are believed to have diminished the affectiveness of submarines in either use to an extent justifying the conclusion that they will have only the most indirect affect on future military operations in the European theater.

### 3. TANGATOS

Submarines are produced in 10 yards in 12 German cities. Essentially these yards are assembly shope producing submarines from components manufactured all over Occupied Europe.

1 1 9 5

City	inaï	Submariaes on Slips or Fitting Sat (all Dona)	Percent of Total
Bressa	Deschines	26	13 \$
Bremeriavan	Desching	2	1
Danaig	Manaiger Werft	15	7.5
Danalg	Schicheu	23	11.5
-mian	lordsee	7	3.5
Longhurg	Schiffsheu	9	4.5
lanburg	Blohn & Vons	24	12
Heathurg	Doutsche Herit	4	2
liemburg	Howaldt Werke	6	3
lemburg.	Stulcken Sohn	9	4.5
iel	Doutache Marico	8	4
lel	Germania	7	3.5
101	Homeluit	10	5.
Luback	Flandarwarica	12	é
iostoci.	Neptun	8	1
stattin	Gollaow	3	1.5

Stattin Odorsonice 4 2 % Vegeseek Braner Vilean 15 7.5 Wilhelmshaven Marine Nerft 8 4

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### 4. YULABRANILITY:

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
I F I E D Basage assessment deconstrates that subsarines under construction are virtually invulnerable to saything but a direct hit. With forer subsarines being produced the relatively higher percentage which may be built on covered slips makes this possibility of even lessor interest. Complete destruction of yard facilities such as power plants, metal working shops, slips, and the like has proved difficult, and the cusparative resilience of the industry through ready replacement or repair has resulted in only minor delay from even the nost successful raids.

### 5. STRATIGIO EFFRONS OF PRODUPDOTIVE DAMAGE

Ferhaps the bast evaluation of the expected future importance of submarine warfare is found in Germany's apparently self-imposed decrease in production after Allied anti-submarine techniques had proved affective, as opposed to increased production during the period of heaviest attacks upon yards. This fact plus the small contribution to total strength possible during the mest six months and the proven invaluenability of installations to attack readers the possibility of further yard damage of little probable strategic affect.

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### PARE 4.

DECEST

TANGET POTESTIALITIES OF AIRCRAFT ENGLIES - MARCH 1944

### CONCLUSION

Allied attack against airframe factories and essenbly plants has already created a sizeable engine surplus. The shortage of ball bearings impedes engine production. Under these circumstances, attack on engine manufacture and acceebly is not considered warranted. This conclusion is not subject to modification for special types. Attack should rather be pressed further egainst aircraft themselves.

#### 1. IRODUCTION. STRENGTH AND DEPTH

Freduction of angines for operational aircraft before the February raids on airfreese factories was believed to be roughly 1100 Juno 21ks per month, 1000 BB 603s and 605s, and 700 BHS 801s. Repair output of the three major types was around 1000, 1000, and 600 respectively. The rate at which manufacturers will operate, following the recent destruction of aircraft plants, is difficult to estimate; first, because of the lowered requirements; and second, because of the unknown effects of ball bearing abortages. Undoubtedly all engine plants will be out back substantially. The following table shows the probable excess of previous production rates over the present requirements for angines to go into new aircrafts

	Airplane Production January, 1944	Approximate Post Raid Airplane Pro duction(Harr		
Me 109 Me 110 Me 410 FN 190	475 120 60 225	75 0 40 170	(188 605) 400 (188 603) <u>40</u> (188 603) <u>40</u> (1883 602) 55	40
Ju 86 (with Min 801) and Ju 198	75	10	130	185
Ju 88 (with Juno 211) Ne 111	175 100	110 90	(Juno 211)130	2.70

In addition, the decreased scale of operations forced on the GAF by the reduction in supply of new aircraft will reduce the demands on edgine plants for production of spare engines and spare parts.

### 2. TANDATA AND PERCENTAGE CONTRINUTION:

Following is a table of the producers of the three major operational engines, showing their rates of production before February. In some cases, such as Miener Heudorf, this does not present full expectly but illustrates only the reduced level of operations following earlier states on airTrans makers.

Juno 211	Hunber	Fergestera
Junkers Lothen	300	27
Junkors Magdeburg	600	55
Leipsig/Taucha	100	9
Prague/Cakovice	200	
	1100	200

198

(last 4 Cont'd)			SECR
Daialer Senz	605	603	rercentare
Berlin/Genshegen Hiedersachsische/ Branswick-Quorma	600 200	100	54 16
Henschel, Kassel Berlin/Marienfelds Flugsstoren Ostaark, Wioner/Neudorf	200	35	16 3
	-	150_	
	1000	385	100
<u>n 7 501</u>		Buiber	ercentage
BMW Samich/ )) Oberwisconfeld ) Samich/Allach)) Sam Berlin/Besdorf)		360	51
Berlin/Spendau) %lockner, Bassburg/		260	37
Soorfleth		- 80	_12_
		700	100


### 3. YU MERABLLITY

Ingine manufacturing is fairly sell concentrated. A large proportion of the casting and forging processes are subcontracted but remaining work is largely done at the main plants. These are largely typical of light engineering plants. The machines themselves are largely of conventional types, except a few special installations for gear cutting and cylinder grinding, and are moderately vulnerable to fire.

### 4. FICE OTIVE PARSOR COSTRER AND STRATECIC EFFECTS

Because of the large excess of engine depacity over requirements, a disproportionate amount of damage would have to be inflicted on the entire engine industry before any strategic effect would be gained against final aircraft output. Even the production of the DB 603, which seems to be well concentrated, could be shifted to any of the other Deinler Benz plants. Attack against it would have to be directed against the whole Dainler Benz system. Direct results on the strength of the GAF in operational aircraft at D-Day and thereafter may much more offectively be gained by continuing to confine attacks to aircraft plants.

T H



### TANORT FORETIALITIES OF BUTCH THAN FORT VEHICLES - HARCH 1944

#### CONCLUSION

Attack on motor vehicle factories cannot significantly affect German military mobility within a short period of time. As a long run target system the impeirment which such attacks sould impose on the Tehrmacht and industry in a year would be useful but of disappointing magnitude: perhaps of the order of a 20 percent reduction in greatent holdings. Wastage is a small proportion of holdings.

#### 1. PRODUCTION, WILLTARY USE, AND RATE OF TURNOVSA

Production of trucks in exis surope is estimated at 100,000 pe year. At least 90 percent of this output is for military use. The remainder is for essential industrial use. Truck holdings are roughly estimated to total slightly over 1 million, of which about 500,000 are military holdings. Fernaps 200,000 civilian vehicles are suitable for military use. Mastage is estimated at 200,000 per year, of which 165,000 is military truck wastage. The rate of military truck wastage is this about 35 percent per year, while civilian truck wastage is 10 percent or less year year.

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In the average, completed trucks at assembly factories are one to two months behind military use in theaters of operation, or alternatively several weeks behind use in Germany and estern urops.

#### 3. STRATICIC RELATION TO GV RLOID TO AFTER

Adequate numbers of trucks are, of course, essential to German resistance to OVERIOND. Since the number of trucks which will be produced in the next six months is but 10 percent of the military holdings available to the Germans (and a somewhat smaller percentage of military holdings plus useful civilian motor transport), the significance of truck production to OVERIOND is negligible. Supplemental attacks on motor vehicle parks could likewise not be expected substantially to affect OVERIOND opposition unless undertaken ismediately prior to D-day.

If truck westage over the next year were not replaced, probable requisitioning of 50,000 to 100,000 vehicles from the civilian economy would hold shrinkage in net military holdings to about 20 percent. The result would be a useful impairment of military mobility and a greater impact upon economic productivity.

#### 40 4 50 122

the major truck producers and their estimated output are prosented in the following table. Plants without output figures contribute in unknown amounts to the other plants of the same company.

rirm	Location	Output		
Ford Notor Co	1. Koln-Michl 2. Intworp 3. Insterdam	22,000 ?	22	
Adam Opel 4.6. Deimler Dens 4.6.	<ul> <li>4. Berlin-Johanni</li> <li>1. Brandenburg</li> <li>1. Bagrenau</li> <li>2. Unterturkheis</li> </ul>	latbal 7 17,000 10,000 1,500	? 17 10 2	
	3. Sindelfingen 4. Mannheim 5. Marienfeldo	1,500 ? ?	1 ? :	

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PART 5. (Cont 'd)

Firm		location	Output	% of Total Output
Citroon	1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.	Clichy Rt Quen Ppinettes Grenalle Gutenberg Javel	) ) ) ) ) ) ) )	13
Carl F. W. Forgward	1.	Brenen	6,000	6
Bassing-Nag	1.	Erunswick	6,000	6
Auto-Union	1.	Siegaar	5,000	5
Others		-	<u>18,000</u> 100,000	<u>18</u> 100

### 5. VUINERABILITY

Truck factories have the same moderate order of vulnerability as other light and medium engineering plants. Most German plants have only the conventional machine tools which could be replaced after bombing.

### 6. PROSPECTIVE DAMAGE POSSIBLE AND STRATEGIC EFFECTS

Successful attack of this target system would not have significant military effect for at least a year. This is due to the low ratio of truck production to military holdings and to the possibility of requisitioning civilian trucks. The magnitude of effect which would then take place would be less than that which can be expected from successful attack against the rubber target system, to which it is an alternative.

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### TARAT POTALITIES OF GRIMPIAD AN -L-MARCH 1944

#### C HULLING

A concerted series of situates upon seven grinding wheel plants will have a useful effect in decreasing the productivity of a wide, if unpredictable, range of amament and engineering industries. Such effect will begin to make itself felt upon Gerzan industry within 3 - 4 months and upon military capabilities within 5 - 7 months of completion of the state's.

### 1. PRODUCTION, CONSERVITION AND STOCKS

German Suropean production and consumption of grinding wheels were both recently estimated to be of the order of 36,000 tens per annum. Stocks were believed equal to two months requirements. Ance grinding wheel requirements have presumably decreased as a result of recent stacks on ball bearing, aircraft and other machining plants without any significant parallel decline in production, present stocks may be roughly estimated equal to 3 - 4 months requirements.

2. STRATEDIC BELATION TO OVALLOND AND OTHE

Available stocks render unlikely effects from even ismediate attacks on grinding wheel plants before 00000000. However, within 3 - 4 months of simultaneous or nearly simulaneous destruction of key grinding wheel plants, production of all types of engines and components, crank-shafts, piston rings, ordnance components, gears, mochine tools and all other products requiring close toleraneous would be seriously, if perhaps up redictably inpaired.

#### Jo income

Rearly 60- of all German surpress granding wheels are produced in soven plants. These plants account for 90% of all controlled structure wheels (reputedly of higher precision):

lity	Mant	Fergent of Total Ul Types	Percent of Controlled Structure Theels
iresden 1 t-Jenatak	Prosdan Deick .G. United Costrit and	120	
near Frague	Carbo randuza	12	18
rankfurt	Naxos Union		2
la Bourget/ Paris	Neules Norton	6.5	9.5
Offenbach	Hayer & whmildt	7	101
essel ng	Seutsche Norton		
Rieseldorf	Seutsche Gerborundum	6-	9.5

### 4. YULMDARILITY

The kilns in which grinding wheels are fired are highly vulnerable to H.E. and are probably quite vulnerable to blast. Septectent times vary from six weeks to six months derending on the size and type of kiln. It must be particularly noted, however, that the limited number of experienced repair and construction personnel would impose serious dalays if several plants were attacked at the same time.

#### 5. STRATEGIC AF OT OF TOSSER AND DE


Observed attacks against the seven leading producers will have an important overall effect upon production of a great but unpredictable variety of military equipment and machine tools. Secause many consumers amploy sumiskilled help, Variations in the specifications of grinding sheals produced by smaller firms and presumbly to be made available to high priority consumers who are deprived of their mormal source of aug by, will offer a significant bonus in the form of decreased productivity.

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### RT 7

### TARGET FORENTIALITIES OF TIRES - MARCH 1944

#### CONCLUSION

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Tires do not constitute en important primary target system. The six major factories, however, have some value as secondary targets for filling out missions planned about more significant targets. The destruction of their contents by successful incendiary attack would liquidate stocks of rubber in bulk and in process, and thus reduce by half a month the time required for the main impact of the attack on rubber output.

It is not likely that the destruction of tire factories of tire stocks in military depots in estern mrope could effect energy capabilities of resisting CV-LORD.

### 1. PRODUCTION, DIPTH, AND TURSOVER

(1) Mis tire production is estimated to be about 200,000 per year of which perhaps 150,000 covers are required for motor vahicles. The remainder are chiefly airplane tires. To a considerable extent, capacity is interchangeable among various types of tire output. A large volume of excess plant capacity exists. mortage of rubber is the limiting factor on production.

(II) stocks of tires on military wehicles, in depots, and on civilian vehicles are probably sufficient so that no immediate effect could be gained by the loss of tire making capacity. Between five and ten percent of the tires in service must be replaced each month. Loss of synthetic and reclaim rubber capacity will produce effects on the serviceability of German military equipment in perhaps 6 months. The loss of rubber at tire plants is a moderately useful reinforcement of successful attack against rubber production.

#### 2. STR TRGIC SIGNIFICANCE

(1) Nost newly produced tires are used as replacements on motor vehicles in service. New motor vehicles absorb 10 to 15 percent of monthly output. Since tire replacement and retreading are to some degree postponable, the immediate effect of loss of both symthetic rubber and of tire output would only be to require still further economies in German usage. After three months, however, tire stringencies would begin to implage gradually and cumulatively on military mobility and industrial activity.

(11) It may be seriously doubted that the loss of tire output now would affect German ability to resist OVERIGED. Even if the tire depots in Gestern urope could be located, their destruction by fire, superimposed on the loss of new output, would have attritional effects rather than impair factical mobility.

### 3. TACONTS

The following list presents output figures for the six major targets, as well as for some of the smaller operating plants:

ki <b>r</b> a	Lo cation			A of Total
Continental	Hanover-WahrenWald- erstrasse Hannover-Kordhafen Hannover-Kordhafen	250) 125) 7)	85	43
Bata Pirelli Dunlop Phoenix Fulda Hatzler 15-20 Others		25 70 100 50 60 50 670	25 25(?) 19 13(?) 12 10 11	12 12 10 6 5 6
			11 .	100



(FART 7 Cont Md)


### 4. VOLERALLISY.

fire plants have the Characteristic of high valuerability to fire. They are also relatively small and compact in layout.

5. FOR POULAR DE DE LE LE AD TRAIDELE MA GLO

bout one-half month's loss of rubber supplies would result from successful stack upon the six largest targets listed above. This would hasten the impairment of military mobility and industrial activity which would result from destruction of the rubber target system.

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#### PART 8.

APOLS POTRIMINALITATE OF SAME, THEY PROTATE, THE CHARMONES -MAICH 1914

#### C NCLUSICH

Three significant targets exist in the field of tank engines and georboms. Their destruction would produce a saterial loss of tank output in the third to sixth months following attack. This result would not affect early encay resistance to OVERADE, except perhaps by inducing him to employ his tanks more conservatively (a qualitative benefit to our landing), and through alowing down tank allocations to the Sastern Front. Once our landing had been assured, however, the lack of tank replacements would gradually be felt quantitatively.

STORY.

### 1. PHOLICTION. STRENOTH AND DESTIN

Ground evidence of German efforts to increase tenk production appears to justify increasing estimates from 400 (based on enelysis of serial numbers) to 500-600 units per month. First line strength is believed to be of the order of 4000 tenks. The normal intervals from completion of engines and completion of tenk assembly to delivery to first line units are four and two months respectively.

### 2. STRATHERE FELATION TO OVERLOED AND AFTER

Destruction of tenk assembly or tank engine plants will not affect first line strength before D-day. Thereafter, within the relatively limited defensive importance of tanks, insbility to replace tanks should detrest from German defensive capabilities by imposing limitations upon the mobility of overll evailable weapons. The prospective loss of replacements may, moreover, result in the conservative emp loyment of tanks in first line units. except in the energy's exploitation of major opportunities.

### 3. 7400178

There are eleven or more tank assembly plants; in the absence of evidence of relative size, these are assumed to be of appreximately equal importance. Recause of the possibility of using other heavy industry plant, the relative invulnerability of such factories and lack of evidence of a higher degree of importance of any of the plants, attack on assembly plants is not recommended. Heveral of thes have suffered verying degrees of damage.

Seriel number enalysis indicates that two plants, Maybach is torenbeu at Friedrichshefen and Morddeutsche Matorenbeu et Berlin produce all or nearly all tank engines. Maybach designs ell and produces approximately twice as many engines as Mordbau. Maybach also may be importent as an angine repeir center and gear box producer.

The Schuredfebrik in Friedrichshefen supplies a majority of all tank geers.

### 4. VILLERATINY

Tenk engine and gear plants contain some specialized but, for the most part, general purpose machinery. The three plants named under paragraph 3 are fairly typical light angineering plants of a type believed vulnerable to HE attack.

### 5. STRATICLE STREETS OF POSSIBLE RANGE

Assambly plant stocks of engines and goer boxes are sufficient to prevent any decline in final accombly for approximately two months following severe damage to Maybech, Mordbau and Tahnredfebrik. The

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	HACTON .
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	eix months following such dansge, however, would result in an overell less of approximately 1000 tasks, with consequent im- pairment of energy military capabilities.
•	1. Fully trecked self propelled game are treated as tanks in this report.
•	
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### BECRET

#### PART 9

### TARGET POSTOFIALITING OF BONDED ALBORART - MANCH 1944.

#### CONCLUSION

The destruction of the Gensen fighter sirersft industry deprives bombers of their most significant possible relevance to E-day, i.e. devlight attack on Allied beaches, shipping and pots of amberkation. Potentialities of might attack, however, are such as to marit some consideration to the target system.

Bomber sirereft production and repair now constitute 25 percent of tobl strength. Attack on final assembly factories for Ju. 88s and Do. 217s would have some effect on the forces available to the gar on D-day. Desper attack, fait later, would not be servented. On qualitative grounds, attack on other types than those mentioned would be masted.

### 1. PRODUCTION. STREMOTH. AND DIGTH

Comman output of bankers declined in December and January and suffered a further small reduction by the banking of Bostock. Hernburg and A.T.G. in February. A summer of production and repair and their relationship to toki strength follows:

	Present Monthly Production	Fepeir	Total Input	Strength	Fercentage: input to Strength
long-renge Scabers ad Fonter-Secon- neissence	210	60	320	1325	24
Dive-Bombers and ground stack	85	30	115	900	16

These figures are fairly typical of the past months during which monthly bomber production and repair together have represented about 20% of total strength. In other words, the turnover of the basher force has occurred about once every four or five months. In contrast, before the February reids fighters turned over every two and one half to three months.

The part played by repair in the maintenance of the bomber force is more important than for fighters. Henthly input from repairs is about 20% of total new homber accessions against only 8% in the case of fighters.

### 2. MIRATEGIC RELATION TO OVELOUD AND APTE

An eiteck on bosher factories will have some effect on the first-line bosher force before D-Day, but not as great propertionally as the impact of attack on fighters. For one thing, the interval is longer between scooptance of boshers by the CAF and their arrival at first-line units; for enother, as outlined above, the rate of tursover is slower and the contribution of repair plants larger.

The strategic importance of reducing the bomber force, has been lessened. The numbers and effectiveness of the bomber force has declined during the past year as the GaF has gone on the defensive; and its effectiveness has declined even more as a result of the attacks against fighter factories. If fighter Bupport can be cut down by at least 70% with the completion of the compaign against fighter factories, the tectical operations of the GAF bomber force in anticipation of p-Day and thereafter will be limited in the main to might attacks of relatively low efficiency.

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### 3. 30.0.22

The full range of basher eircraft factories is set forth on the following page, with a rough estimate of current monthly output. Final essembly fectories of value as targets consists primarily of:

SECRET

<u>Ju. 55 6 165</u> Siebel, Holle Siebel, Schkeuditz Henschel, Schonefeld

Dornier 217 Dornier, Cherpfeffenhofen Dornier, Missor

### 4. VILLEWEILLIN

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Subsectivity and component erection plants containing machine tools, presses, heat treating apparatus, specialized jigs, etc., are highly valuerable, but as shown in paragraph 3, they are well seattered. Final costably plants are more concentrated but their recuperation period is little more than one month in contrast to three to six months for subsessmbly and component creation. Notither represents a perioderly attractive target. Final assembly plants would probably be preferable because of the consequent more inmediate effects on strength at D-Jay.

### 5. PROMPROTIVE DAMAGE AND REPRETED OF TRATECIC APPROT

In view of the dispersel of the German bomber industry, the possibilities of recuperation between raids, and the large role played by repairs, it is doubtful whether banker production and repair could be besten down to much below 150 from the present 420 per month. This schievement does not seen of sufficient importance, essuing that fighters have been properly dealt with, to warrent divorsion from other target systems. With the possible exception of the Do 217, the Ju 68 is the only character that would justify any effort. Ju 83 producers might be included in a mystem of policing the POINTELAM list. Occasional attacks might be sade on them by benkers detached from divisions pursuing other systems. Noth Dornier and Junkers, however, should be watched for any signs that they are starting to produce fighters, and attacked as soon as such production is under way.

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### BOMBER ALICRAFT FACTORIES

ADDA FORT

### ADERCAINANT MORTEN PRODUCTION AS OF 1 MARCH, 1964

### Long-ronce Ecaber and Repher Reconneissonce

### Ju. 83

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SIFIED

Finel Assembly	larsber	Percentere
A.T.C., Leipnig Henschel, Schonefeld	10 (Dessecod 60	) 4 23
Siebel, Malle ) Siebel, Schkeuditz)	15 105	13

### Componente

Opel, Fasselsheim A.S.G., Sikkau (Also Junkers plents below)

### The 200

### Finel Josembly

Junkers,	Bernburg	10	(severely	li
			Landged)	

### Componenta

		Schoneback Skiberstadt	( lightly Leraged)		
		Ascheraleben	(Hanty Dasser)		

### 10. 227

### Finel Assembly

Cornier, Oberpfeffenhofen	)
Norddeutsche Dornier.	) 20
Si mar	)

### Comonenta

Dernier,	Neucubing
Dornier.	lubeck
Dornier.	Perlin/Feinickendorf
Dornier.	Neustadt Clove

### 16.111

Heinkel, Tosteck ) 90 (Temeged) 32 * . Orenienburg) 90 (Temeged) 32 (nome components from Arado plants below)

### 10. 177

Heinkel, Cremienburg ) Aredo, Brendenburg ) (SCHE components from ) Aredo, Fabelsburg ) Cheb-Obsrachon ))	30	12
Care - Centra Cherry I		

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### PH. 200


Poche Wulf, Esttbus 10, 290 - Junkers, Desseu

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				<u>2346</u> 2		
		Dive-Easters and Ground Atteck Planes				
		Ju. 87	Manber		Percentage	
		"eser. Eremen. Leswerder) " . Berlin/Templehof	70		62	
		Camponenta				
		Delmenhorst			· · ·	
		<u>34. 129</u>				
		Henschel, Berlin/Johannisthel	25	(Decenced)	18	
			85		100	
					Segmentation of the second sec	
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### PART 10

### TARGET POTESTIALITIES OF OIL - MARCH 1944

### CONCLUSION

The major question regarding oil refineries and synthetic plants as a target system has been whether the number of targets and their depth in Germany permitted attack on the requisite scale. Until the present, it appeared that it was a target system beyond Air Force capabilities. In view of the substantial destruction of German fighter production and the consequent lessor fighter opposition, this job may now be within German Ref Capabilities. If this be the case, no other target system holds such great procise for hastening German defest.

Twenty-three synthetic plants and 31 refineries currently account for over 90 per cent of total stis refinery and synthetic oil output. M synthetic plants and 13 refineries account for over 80% of synthetic production and over 60% of readily usable refining capacity. The effect of stack on these plants would fall more heavily on motor fuel than upon lubricant production, and it would reduce the total current supply of fuel by an estimated 90%.

The loss of approximately 50% of axis output would directly and materially reduce German military capabilities through reducing tastical and strategic mobility and fromt-line delivery of supplies, and industrial shifty to produce weapons and supplies. The impact in time of these attacks would be hastened by derman policy decisions, based on anticipations of their effects.

The extension of stacks to storage facilities in Sectorn Burope might directly impair German mobility in deploying to meet 6 YERLORD. Indirect benefit to OVERLORD would in any case result from the Lessened mobility of German divisions in Finland and Norway, Bussia, the Balkans, and Italy.

1. PRODECTION AND STOCES

If refineries and synthetic plants are not attacked, it is estimated that sxis production of liquid fuels and lubricants during the six wonths following 1 March 1964 will be 8.6 million tons, comprised as follows:

#### Grude and hale oil products synthetic oil products substitutes, vegetable oils, etc.

4.1 million tons 3.3 " " 1.2 " "

stimated stocks of finished products at 1 Morch 1944 agregate about four sillion tons, equivalent to about three months output and consumption. These stocks include reserves and the entire distributional pipeline, approximately as follows:

	and civil re stocks at i	
points		

1.0 stiller tons 1.6 .6

4.0

Not all of these stocks could be consumed by the ailitary if output cossed. Due of the stocks at refineries and synthetic plants would be destroyed in booking. And some of the reserves, operating stocks, and in transit stocks would not be the particular types of products needed (e.g., industrial fuel oil would not satisfy a need for patral or lubricants.)

Hote: Figures on output, consumption, and stocks are taken or interpolated from papers by U.S. Energy Cil Committee and British Nartley committee.

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#### I TRATILITY AND THE TY WE IS USA ENANGED.

The consumption pattern for the six much period following 1 March 1944, assuming an output of 8.6 million tons, is estimated as follows:

Military	Millions of Tons	Percent
iray Ar Porce Havy	2.7 1.3 .9	31 15 11
Total	Military 409	57
Non-Military		
Industrial & Civil Miscellaneous Increase in itooks	2.9 .1 .7	34, 1 0
Total N	on-Military 3.7	13
Total	8.6	100

A Ling Strate

The revalance of oil production for ray, hir force and favy operations is clear; as indicated, stocks suitable for military consumption are sufficient for only several months military operations.

Senial of oil supplies to the scie industry and excitulture would impose very severe exchanic restriction of an attritional character on the economy. This is not immediately or directly relevant.

The political and morals effects of destroying Germany's ability to produce oil would be substantial. The will to resist of the German High German and Wehrmacht, the German political leaders, and the German industrial leaders would be weakened. The will to resist of the German inpeople would be less seriously effected, although they would no chabt regret the disappearance of oil for transportation, food production, power, heat, and industrial regularements.

### 3. VULKERABILITY

Gil refineries and synthetic oil plants are moderately vulnerable to boob damage in terms of structure, industrial process, and plant layout. They are large in size, relative to other targets, and would probably require a larger scale of attack than is necessary for, say, aircraft plants, isouperation time for a severely damaged plant is relatively slow, six months and more.

#### 4.

To reduce output in synthetic plants and refineries to virtually zero in the six months following 1 March requires the destruction of 23 synthetic plants (about 3.3 million tone) and 31 refineries (about 3.7 million tone). The capacity of the 31 designated refineries is about 1 times as large as their output; it is necessary to destroy this excess capacity as well as the capacity in operation. Additional excess capacity in France, Wolland and Italy, inconveniently located, might be resorted to by the Germans as an extreme measure. Many are constal refineries which formaly handled crude oil from ocean tankage. They are located within easy bombing range. A list of the 54 targets involved is stacened.

#### 20 Marchay

The impairment to German military and industrial capabilities and German morale which would be achieved from actually putting the 23 synthetic plants and the 31 refineries out of action, is very great. If military cil supplies could be totally denied, their resistance to Aussian offensives would collapse when stocks were used up; resistance to OVERLOAD

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could be maintained only as long as stocks endured; and GAP air opposition to USAF and GAP activity would cease with the disappearance of stocks. Destruction of over half as much output, that is, about more than 3.5 million tons in the six months following 1 March would (m) deny to the axis military forces one-quarter to one-third of their military requirements of about 5 million tons; and (b) reduce industrial and civilian supplies by one half. These effects would be militarily significant, directly through impairing military mobility and front line delivery of supplies, and through effecting industrial ability to produce meapons. The impact in time of these stacks would be hastened by erman policy decision based upon anticipations of their effects. Achievement of much less than half the program, however, would permit the decrease in output to be absorbed by changes in stocks, some decrease in non-military consumption, and insubstantial reductions in military consumption. It would not necessarily have significant direct or indirect military effects.

of Low mind

The destruction of oil production might not effect materially the opening stages of OVERLORD if the Germans choose to allocate stocks to the Bestern Front. Although if production facilities were destroyed these stocks could probably be profitably attacked as tactical targets, the small volume of oil required for initial OVERLORD operations could not confidently be expected to be denied the Germans.

6. T GIT LLT

The following tables require a word of explanation.

Table 1 presents synthetic oil plants and their output.

Table 2 includes all Axis refineries capable of hendling crude oil which are balieved to be operating at more than 60,000 tons per annum. It also includes five large refineries of unknown activity which represent convenient alternative capacity. Table 2, in short, is the list of primary oil objectives in the refining field.

Table 3 lists major refineries not now believed to be engaged in crude oil refineing. Some are definitely known to be inoperative and some are believed destroyed or dismantled. The great majority are inconveniently located: German efforts to use then would be an extreme measure. Merial reconnaissance of these, particularly those for which inactivity is not certain, is essential to prevent major loopholes from arising in the target systems.

Table 4 lists all other suropean refineries capable of operating on crude oil. Current information on their activity, which could be improved by aerial reconnelisance, is indicated. Operating plants represent useful secondary objectives or targets of opportunity, The aggregate capacity of these plants is sufficient to refine 14, percent of crude oil output and could represent 8 percent of total oil output. Their attack, therefore, is not an essential ingredient of the oil target system.

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SPORT.

#### TANK 1

Synthetic Cil Plants - March 1. 1944

Loes	tion (:	annuel Cutput In thousensis of tons)	Fercent of Total	Percent of Totel Synthetic & Pe- fining Output
*1.	Bruce	680	10	5
*2.	Louns	620	2	5
*3.	Poelitz	620	9 9	4
sh.	Dischhermen			
	South	520	8	4
-5.	Gelsenkirol	103		
	Nordst	tern 430	7	3
·6.	Scholven-Bu		76	300
\$7.	Schwarzheid	le 350	5	ž
-8-	Troglity Le		ta tatata	2
109.	Bohlen Both		Ę	2
-10.	Magdeburg	300	5	2
·11.	Elechhammer		-	-
	North	270	4	2
e12.	Sesseling	220	4	1
·13.	Homberg	190	352	1
·14.	Castrop Reu	unel 150	2	1
e15.			2	1
·16.	Lutzkendorf			
	Muchel	n 150	2	1
+17.	Holton	130	2	1
-18.	Erupp (Saun	0		
	Eich	el) 130	2	1
*19.	Solbeim Bot	trop 120	2	1
-20.	Deschowitz	110	2	1
*21.	Mesener Ver	ein 100	2	1
×22.	Hoesch	90	1	1
*23.	Ruhlman (Ba	rnes) 30	1	
*21,.	Unknown Fla			1
		6.600	100	4.5

· Selected for imprinte attack: 81

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		Primery Cru	ale Cil Refi	nery Objectives.	
be	own to large 1 oducers	<u>lefinory</u>	<u>Capacity</u> in thousand tons per an	s of ed num) abb	rcentege of tel usetle socity suit- ly located in percent)
*2.	Astra Receime.	Ploesti, Rezonie	1.750	Capacity operation	a 1 <i>1</i> ,
*2.	Concordia,	Ploesti, Resenio	1,300	Major portion in u	ше 10
*3.	Americana.	Ploesti, Ramnie	1,100	Capacity operation	9
е <u>г</u> ,	Unirea	Ploesti, Rumania	800	Mojor portion in u	use 6
*5.	Brburg. Germa	ng	550	Capacity operation	4
ъ.	Petrol Plock	Ploesti, Ruminia	550	mjor portion in u	200 L
*7.	lobau, Austria		350	Capacity operation	3
-8.	Hennover, Misb	urg	300	Copecity operation	2
*9.	Shell, Budapes	t. Bungary	220	Capacity operation	2
*10.	Decis, Russia		220	mjor portion in a	se 2
-11.	Prehove Petroli	ul, lucharest, Ar	minie 200	lajor portion in u	06 2
12.	Perdubice. Case	choslovakie	180	Capacity operation	1
13.	Almos Fuzito, 1	hunge ry	170	Copecity operation	1
*31i •	Fratisleve		150	Cepacity operation	1
15.	Columbia, Floes	ti. Rumania	135	Capecity operation	1
16.	Floridsdorf. At	atrie	200	Capacity operation	1
17.	Brasen Celebola	usen. Certany	100	Copecity operation	1
18.	Capreg. Mugoalo	vie	120	Major portion in us	ie 1
19.	Norkwiller, Pec	helbrown, Frence	130	Dejor portion in us	e 1
20.	Drohobyez, (Pol	min). Solend	120	Mojor portion in us	e 1
21.	Magyor, Budepes	t. Hungary	90	Copueity operation	1
22.	Prohobyez, Gali	cia. Poland	90	Major portion in us	e 1
23.	Trbsebinje. Pol	and	90	Bjor portion in us	e 1
24.	Czechozice (Dai	edzice), Poland	90	mjor portion in us	<b>o</b> 1
25.	Nolin			Capacity operation for lube cil, not c	rule 1
26.	RACRAN, ADOTRIA		75	Capacity operation	1
27.	Sperente, Ploest	Li. Rusania	400	Unknown	3
*28.	Surotank, Banbuz	E. Cerminy	400	Unicnown	3
29.	Xenis, Ploesti,	Resente	260	Unisson	2
30.	Redeventoe, Rune	inia	230	Unknown	2
31.	Lumina Petroina	• Famenia TOT L	10.490	Calcnown	1
*Gele	eted for immedia			cepacity suitebly lo	SU,

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	Pofinery	(in thousend of tons per smum)	<u>. ervitka</u>
1.	Confreville, Frence	1,600	helieved destroyed
2.	Port Jerane, France	1,100 .	Believed destroyed
3.	Martigues, Frence	900	Unused, inconveniently located.
h.	Petit-Couronne, France	800	Deligred destroyed
5.	Steng de Berre, France	500	inused; inserveniently located.
6.	Notterdem-Pernis	500	Yory slight activity; inconveniently located
7.	Poillec	500	Bolieved destroyed
8.	Venice, Italy	1,50	ctivity unknown; in-
20	Dunkirk, France	410	Delieved destroyed
0.	L'ivera, France	600	Unused; inconveniently located.
12.	equile. Trieste, Itely	350	Activity unknown; in- conveniently located.
2.	Sec d'Unites, France	250	Unused; inconveniently located.
3.	peak. Italy	310	Unwod; inconveniently located.
i.	Ebenn, Benhurg, Commy	300	Daused
5.	Courchelettes, France.	250	Activity unknown
64	Grevenchon, Frence	250	Belloved destroyed
7.	Frontignen (Sete)	200	Caused; inconveniently located.
.8.	Lethorn, Italy	105	Believed destroyed
9.	Donges, France (2 plants)	320	Unused; incommentantly located
.0.	Cote moor, Resturg. Cermony	150	Unused
1.	Formen, Flume, Italy	120	Delieved destroyed
2.	SIAP, Trieste, Italy	120	Activity unknown; in- conveniently located.
8.	Antwerp (ledeventas) Helgium	120	Selieved Costroyed
2.	Luranome, Polend	90	Used for storogs
5.	Chent, Langerbrugee (Shell), Telgi	un 85	Activity unknown
1.	Newy Hohumin (Oderberg). Czechoslow		Activity unknown

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Total Copacity exceeding refineries destroyed, or inconveniently located. 940

Percentage of total usable cepucity suitably located 7 per cent

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
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		Capacity	jens rks	
	(1)	a thousends of		
•	\$r	ons per ennum)		
	Jamonie	50	Activity unknown	
	Noris Fresso-Vecum	35	Pertial operation	
	75 62 000 11 6 000			
	Austria	50	Capacity operation	
	Schwecha t	45	Capacity operation	
	Kornenberg Vosendorf	10	Cepecity operation	
	Drossing .	35	Activity unknown	
	Rungery Sudencet	50	Copacity operation	
	Fanto Bulapest Hazeii	50	Capacity operation	
	Munkecs	25 20	Major portion in use Major portion in use	
	Petfurdo	20	Major portion in use	
	Nir ogdany	15	Mejor portion in use	
	spreg	10		
	Complexity			
	Czechoslovski Dubova	60	Mejor portion in use	
	Prez (Horeveake Catreve)	55	Activity unknown Activity unknown	
	Frelupy	40	ACTIVIC) discussion	
	Yugoslevia	50	Activity unknown	
	Osijek (Ipcil)	25	Activity unknown	
	polend	60		
	Meglowice (Juslo)	60	Mejor portion in use	
	Clinik-Meriempelski		Major portion in use	
	Drohobyez (Mafta)	35 30	Used for storage	
	Krosbo Livon	30	Bejor portion in use	
	Itely	50	Activity unknown; income	
	Fornovo Tere	-	veniently located	
	Germany		setivity unknown	
	Dusseldorf	25	Activity unknown	
	Regensburg (1 tergets)	80 18	Activity unknown	
	Schonberg	15	Activity unknown	
	Templehof	~		
	Frence		Shale oil operation	
	Autun	15	She we our offere race	
	Vello-Toneberg	50	Activity unknown; in-	
	10110- 100000 C		conveniently loceted	
	Tel min	50	Selieved dest oyed	
	Antwerp-Miel	20	Activity unknown	
	Chent Langerbruge Hoboken (Soconj)	20	Believed destroyed	
	Antwerp-lerse	20	setivity unknown	
4	a at the period and	•		
	Hol land	10 (2)	Activity unknown	
	Flushing Asphalt	40 (?)		
	Total, excluding the few be-			
	lieved destroyed or incon-			
	veniently located	1,253		
	Percentage of total useble			
	capacity suitably	9 per cent		

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DIRECTIVE NO. 3 FOR THE STRATEGIC AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

12 January 1945

#### General Mission

In accordance with instructions received from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the overall mission of the Strategic Air Forces remains the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic systems and the direct support of land and neval forces.

#### Priorities of Objectives

2. Under this general mission you are to direct your strategic attacks, subject to the exigencies of weather and tactical feasibility, against the following systems of objectives:

#### First Priority

(i) <u>Fetroleum industry</u>, with special emphasis on petrol (gasoline) including storage.

#### Second Priority

(ii) <u>The German lines of communications</u>: The operations of the Strategic Air Forces are to be directed against enemy lines of communication: Those based in United Kingdom will place particular emphasis upon the Ruhr.

### Important Industrial Areas.

3. When weather or tactical conditions are unsuitable for operations against the systmes of objectives mentioned above, attacks are to be delivered on important industrial areas with blind bombing technique as necessary. As far as operational and other conditions allow, these are to be directed so as to contribute to the maximum destruction of the petroleum industry and the dislocation of the target systems indicated above.

#### Counter Air Force Action.

4. Largely as a result of the concentration of our strategic bomber effort on the enemy's petroleum industry and his communication system, and due to our preoccupations on the battle-front, we have sllowed the GAF to 'recover a great deal of its.fighting strength. Moreover, the enemy has concentrated his efforts particularly on developing his fighter force at the

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expense of other branches of the GAF. In this effort to increase the efficiency of his fighter force, he has turned to the rapid development of jet fighters and there is every evidence of his intention to produce them on a large scale as early as possible.

Already he has a considerable number of these aircraft in operation. They are superior in speed and armament to our conventional fighters. As soon as they are available in sufficient numbers, and as soon as the enemy has developed suitable tactics for their efficient employment, they will doubtless be employed systematically against our strategic day bombers. The conditions which are likely to confront the conduct of our strategic offensive in the near future are therefore serious, unless the enemy's production and employment of jet aircraft is checked in some way.

In addition, the employment of these aircraft over the battle-front will place our tactical air forces and the armies themselves at considerable disadvantage. This particularly applies to reconnaissance and to the employment of these aircraft in a ground attack role. It has therefore been decided that we shall employ the necessary amount of strategic effort to neutralize this grave threat. The GAF and primarily its jet production, training and operational establishments now become primary objectives for attack.

#### Direct Support.

5. The direct support of land and nevel operations remains a continuing commitment.

#### Attack of Enemy U-Boat Organization

6. In view of the growing menace of the German U-Boat developments, it has been decided that certain objectives in the enemy's U-Boat organization will be attacked whenever possible by marginal effort or incidental to operations covered by the preceding paragraphs in this directive.

#### S. O. E. Operations

7. All S.O.E./S.I.S. operations will be in accordance with existing instructions and procedure.

#### Targets and Target priorities.

8. The list of targets best calculated to achieve the aims set out above and the relative priorities accorded them will be issued separately. These priorities will be adjusted from time to time in accordance with the situation.

#### Co-ordination.

9. The procedure as at present established for the co-ordination of operations between the various Air Forces will continue.

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MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL KUTER:

Subject: Comments on Strategic Directive No. 3 by AC/AS, Plans

1. General Spaatz' has forwarded Directive No. 3 for the Strategic Air Forcesin Europe with a covering letter of 16 January and states that this directive has been forwarded to the operating Strategic Air Forces including British Bomber Command. In the covering letter, General Spaatz states that this directive is a reflection of his thinking outlined in his letter of 7 January 1945. Upon the receipt of this letter by AC/AS, Plans, a special paper was prepared and in preliminary form was handed to General Loutzenheiser for informal discussion with General Fred Anderson in London. Through this channel the views of AC/AS, Plans on Directive No. 3 will be conveyed promptly to USSTAF.

2. This directive can hardly be said to be a liberal interpretation of either General Spaatz' letter of 7 January or the covering letter of the 16th of January. The directive appears to be highly conservative and is not a radical change from the former directive. Briefly, the priorities are stated as follows: First priority: petroleum industry; Second: German lines of communication (not further defined); Third: important industrial areas with particular reference to oil and communications; Fourth: counter Air Force, directed specifically against jet; Fifth: direct "support" of land and naval operations; Sixth: enemy U-boat organization by "marginal effort or incidental to operations covered above".

3. It is apparent that this directive is the result of agreed decisions between Air Marshal Bottomley and General Spaatz. The latter's personal views stated in his letter of 16 January and 7 January indicate a willingness to place submarine construction, jet aircraft production, and GAF training installations well ahead of the priority indicated in the directive. Specific comments on the priorities by AC/AS, Plans follow: 4. <u>Petroleum Industry</u>: This industry is placed in first priority. The question should be raised of diminishing returns after the heavy tonnage already dropped by visual effort on this system.

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5. <u>German Lines of Communication</u>: There is no further definition of what particular targets will be attacked under this high priority. This can be a very large overall target. If this means that we are to place most of our visual effort, after the petroleum industry, on marshalling yards, it is considered that this is an unattractive proposition... It is felt that German lines of communication are placed too high on the list of priorities.

6. <u>Important Industrial Areas</u>: This priority is also undefined, but is limited by the statement that it is to be attacked "when weather or tactical conditions are unsuitable for the higher priorities". It is stated that this target shall be so attacked "as to contribute to the maximum destruction of the petroleum industry and the dislocation of the target systems indicated above", i.e. communications. This is considered to be a very vague priority and is probably included in this directive to satisfy area bombardment concepts of the RAF. It is difficult to believe that General Speatz will operate by day against such a target except in the Ruhr.

7. <u>Counter Air Force Action</u>: This priority clearly states the threat of the jet aircraft and is considered an excellent appraisal of the problem. Inasmuch as the German Air Force has in the past been considered a special priority, it is felt that this portion of the directive is satisfactory as it will probably be treated on the historically "special" basis. This paragraph is considered very acceptable.

8. <u>Direct Support</u>: AC/AS, Plans feels that if an all-out air effort can be delivered at the time that the ground forces are prepared to assault that such an operation should be of the highest priority. Such a special effort will be of short duration and hence a limited diversion from the strategic effort. The initiative of the air in spearheading a large scale ground offensive could easily provide the impetus for a decisive victory.

9. <u>Attack of Enemy U-boat Organization</u>: This appears very low on the list, but General Spartz' accompanying letter indicates that he is prepared

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to take a much more aggressive attitude then is indicated by the directive itself. In addition to this a cable was dispatched last night asking General Fred Anderson's comments on the question of a 25% allocation of effort to this priority. This cable takes the necessary action to challenge the directive.

10. <u>Conclusions</u>: The directive which appears, as stated above, to be a very much too conservative approach to the problem should be considered as a compromise between RAF and AAF views.

11. The draft memorandum taken by General Loutzenheiser to London clearly expresses the views of AC/AS, Plans. It is therefore felt that necessary action has been taken to bring the Air Staff point of view to the attention of General Spaatz.



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48	519.311-2	Mar/45			Briefs for Lt.Eaker.	U	
69	519,311-3	Sep/41- Sep/44			Projects & Separate Plans.	U	
11	519.311-4	Jan-Ju1/44			Misc/Memorandums.	U	
5	519.311-5	Mar/45			Special Projects Bugle.	U	
11	519.314-1	1944			Office Memorandums.	U	
8	519.3171-1	Jan/44			Raids on Berlin Planning.	U	
9	519.3171-2	Mar/44			Use of Air Power.	U	
0	519.3171-3	Mar/45			Plan Use of Strategic AF.	U	
9	519.3171-4	Jan/44			Destruction of the GAF.	U	
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