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Directorate of History
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Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0K2

July 1986

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JUL 4 1947

R E P O R T NO. 11

HISTORICAL SECTION (G.S.)

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: DHD 3-3

by Obe for DHist NDHQ

Date: NOV 7 1986

THE 8TH CANADIAN DIVISION, 1942-1943

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INTRODUCTION

1. This report deals with the 8th Canadian Division. It concludes the brief study of the Home Defence Divisions, two of which have already been discussed in Reports Nos 7 and 8. This report is not in any way intended to be an exhaustive account of the role and activities of the 8th Division; it is intended only as a preliminary outline of a subject which will require more detailed treatment.

EVENTS LEADING TO THE MOBILIZATION OF THE 8TH DIVISION

2. Although the mobilization of the third Home Defence Division appears to have been first considered early in 1942, it would seem that many of the reasons for such action resulted from the events of the two previous years. During 1940-41, discussions concerning the defence of Canada debated the possibility of an attempt at an invasion by Japan, and the size, scope and type of this and other possible threats to the west coast. Differences of opinion were revealed regarding a possible Japanese invasion. According to Maj-Gen W.A. Griesbach, Inspector-General (Western Canada), "an attack by Japan upon our West Coast" was a "distinct possibility", and might be undertaken with these objects in mind:

- (a) A diversion beneficial to Germany and Italy.
- (b) The attainment of prestige.
- (c) The gaining of pawns in future settlement.

(H.Q.S. 3496, vol 2: Memorandum "Western or Pacific Coast Command", by Inspector General (Western Canada), 5 Aug 40)

From the General Staff point of view, however, such an invasion was unlikely for it was considered that the "direct interest of Japan" lay "to the west and south and not to the east" (Ibid: D.C.G.S. to C.G.S., 11 Aug 40).

3. On 2 Mar 41 Mr. King, acting in the capacity of Secretary of State for External Affairs, cabled to Mr. Churchill a "brief appreciation by Chiefs of Staff Committee of defence position as of February 24th". The portions of the telegram relating to the defence of the west coast are as follows:

1. The probable Forms and Scales of Attack, which have been and are now accepted by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, in respect to direct action against Canadian territory and territorial waters, are given in the Defence of Canada plan, dated August 1940, Part I. These are generally as follows:

Atlantic Coast - bombardment by a capital ship; one or two 8" cruisers; or by a merchant raider mounting 6" guns, attack by submarines and small surface craft; attack by small raiding parties; torpedo bomb or gas attack by shipborne or long-range shore-based aircraft on sea-borne, coastal and inland objectives.

Pacific Coast - similar to above but on a smaller

2. It will be particularly noted that the Chiefs of Staff Committee do not anticipate any attempt at invasion by actual or potential hostile Powers. It is the opinion of the Committee that no such attempt would be feasible so long as the defence of the British Isles successfully continues. Even should Germany succeed in overcoming the resistance of our Empire Forces and the conquest of the United Kingdom ensue, there is still no probability that a large scale attack on these shores, with a view to invasion, is a contingency we need anticipate or plan for. A German-dominated Europe, and an Eastern Asia controlled by Japan, could wield such tremendous economic pressure that there would be no need on the part of the enemy Powers to attempt a most difficult military invasion in order to force Canada (and the United States) eventually to accept humiliating terms of peace.

.....

4. Should Japan join with the Axis Powers in war against us - and this eventuality is becoming more probable - it may be that she will actively engage in...raids against our Pacific Coast. Such a contingency, however, should be considered as a possibility rather than a probability, as there are important political (U.S.A.) strategic and tactical reasons for Japan retaining all her forces in the Western Pacific.

5. Our plans for the defence of the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts are still in course of execution. In general, it may be said that our Army formations now manning Coast Defences, or in Mobile Reserve in Coastal Areas, are sufficient rapidly to contend with any limited enemy raiding forces which might attempt to land in the vicinity of suitable objectives and attack them...

.....

7. On the Pacific Coast, the possibility of serious attack by surface-vessels or ship-borne aircraft of the Axis Powers is remote. The volume and importance of shipping in the Eastern Pacific is far less than that in the Atlantic, and there are no military objectives of sufficient importance to justify other than very small-scale tip-and-run raids, the effect of which would have little military significance. An actual attempt at invasion on this coast by Japanese forces is considered highly improbable.

(Ibid, vol 3: Tel 36, Secty of State for External Affairs to Secty of State for Dominion Affairs, 2 Mar 41)

4. Maj-Gen H.D.G. Crerar, then Chief of the General Staff, to some extent expressed similar views in a memorandum to the Minister of National Defence on 18 Nov 41. It was his opinion that the existing dispositions of troops on the Pacific Coast were, in the main, "adequate for the purpose of meeting the anticipated forms and scales of attack" in the event of war with Japan (Report No. 3, Historical Section, Department of National Defence, "The Employment of Infantry in the Pacific Coast Defences" para 45). General Crerar pointed out, however, that it might be expected that, on the outbreak of war with Japan, "strong pressure" would be "brought upon the Government to increase the active forces in British Columbia" (Ibid: para 46). The truth of this statement was partly proven during the next few months.

5. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour on 7 Dec 41 brought declarations of war on Japan by Canada, Great Britain and the United States. The people of British Columbia became alarmed with the approach of war to their own front door; invasion was feared, and demands were made for increased protection of the west coast of Canada against the enemy. Newspapers increased the general panic. The Vancouver Sun, for example, printed a series of three articles entitled "The Derelict Defense", the tenor of which may be judged from the following extract:

Our derelict defense is not ready to fight a 1942 battle. We are preparing, with minute forces, to fight Singapore, Hong Kong and Dunkirk over again.

.....

Our present defense is based on the assumption that we must surrender, and might as well do it first, rather than last.

(H.Q.S. 8704-1, vol 3: The Vancouver Sun, 16 Mar 42, "The Derelict Defense" by Alan Morley)

6. The growing pressure of public opinion in British Columbia was reflected in a meeting held on 16 Mar 42 at which Maj-Gen R.O. Alexander, G.O.C.-in-C., Pacific Command, the Air Officer Commanding, the Commanding Officer Pacific Command, and Premier John Hart of British Columbia were present. General Alexander reported the meeting to the C.G.S. as follows:

I pointed out the broader issues which had to be considered in the war and that the war could only be won by offensive action against the enemy. I stated that I felt that we must guard against a purely defensive complex, i.e. the piling up of troops and weapons for the direct defence of certain areas in excess of the minimum numbers considered essential to deny enemy occupation of those areas. I pointed out that the more assistance we could give to our and allied forces who were attacking the enemy outside Canada's shores, the greater were the prospects of bringing the war to a successful conclusion and that we could not win the war by sitting on the defensive along our own coast. In the light of the bigger issue at stake we must be prepared to accept risks of local "nuisance value" attacks. I also pointed out the problem of available arms and equipment.

.....

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At the conclusion of the conference the Premier stated that he was disappointed in the amount of air support that was available on this Coast and in this connection he felt particularly uneasy about the vulnerability of Prince Rupert. The Premier quite frankly stated that he knew nothing about military affairs and that statements regarding men and their tactical employment did not convey a great deal to him except in a general way. His outlook was definitely largely local and that the defence of British Columbia was paramount. At the same time he quite saw the necessity of realizing the bigger issues at stake and appreciated the fact that we must be prepared to accept "nuisance raids". He stated that while he and certain others might realize this point of view, the people of British Columbia were definitely alarmed and were obsessed with the necessity of the adequate protection of British Columbia from any possible eventuality and until this can be

7. In addition to the fear that invasion was imminent and the existing means of defence inadequate, general concern was also felt with regard to the possible hostile factor represented by the Japanese population of British Columbia. Of a total population of approximately 694,263^x in this province, 22,205^x were of Japanese origin. Reasons for the intense concern, and even hostility, manifest in this period regarding the Nisei may have been that, in addition to the fact that a state of war existed with Japan, Japanese Canadians in British Columbia were to a certain extent set apart by reason of colour, their predominance in the industries in which they engaged, the tendency toward isolationism of a racial minority, and perhaps also indirectly because they had no franchise and no representation in the Canadian Army.^x The fact that Nisei predominated in the fishing industry inevitably gave rise to economic jealousy as well as to doubt of their loyalty and the use they might make of their knowledge of the Pacific coast. Similar sentiments and doubts were evident regarding Japanese in other industries. It has been suggested, therefore, that many people "were taking advantage of the war to urge the removal of the Japanese from personal economic motives rather than for security reasons" (Report No. 3, op cit, Note 61). Whether the possibility of subversive activity or the influence of public sentiment was the more dominant factor, or whether both were equally important, all Japanese were removed from a "Protected Area", a strip of land less than 100 miles wide between the Cascade Mountains and the sea, by authority of P.C. 365 dated 16 Jan 42.

8. After their attack on Pearl Harbour, Japanese forces met with success at Hong Kong, Singapore, Java, Burma and Bataan. An enemy submarine shelled an oil refinery in California, and in June 1942, three months after the first proposals were made to organize the Brigade Groups of the 8th Division, a Japanese submarine fired upon a radio station on Vancouver Island. During this same month, Japanese forces occupied Attu and Kiska. Although the actual extent of the influence exerted by Japanese successes and public opinion is not clear, it would appear that they served as indirect causes for the strengthening of the infantry dispositions in Pacific Command, in spite of the fact that a Japanese attack in force on the west coast of Canada was still not considered probable.

MOBILIZATION OF THREE BRIGADE GROUPS OF 8TH DIVISION

9. Lt-Gen K. Stuart, C.G.S., made, on 20 Mar 42, what appears to have been the first proposal for the mobilization of three Brigade Groups of the 8th Division, and gave the immediate reason for the placing of a second division in Pacific Command. In a memorandum to the Minister of National Defence he stated:

1. I have recently received an actual copy of the Forms and Scales of Attack which, in the opinion of the British and the United States Chiefs of Staff, are applicable to the West Coast of North America. One of the forms of attack listed was that of a "destructive raid" by a force of not more than two brigade groups. The purpose of such a raid being to destroy an industrial or military objective of major importance.

2. In my opinion the only points on the West Coast of Canada that might be classed as possible objectives for a "destructive raid" of the nature indicated

would be:-

- (a) Prince Rupert, when used as a supply base for U.S. troops in Alaska.
- (b) Victoria-Esquimalt.

Of these two possible objectives, I consider that Prince Rupert is the more probable of the two. Both are, in my opinion, remote contingencies because the risks involved would be out of all proportion to the results that might be expected. It is necessary, however, to provide adequate defences against this possibility.

3. The War Committee of the Cabinet has already approved the raising of ten unbrigaded infantry battalions, a large number of anti-aircraft batteries, three brigade groups of the 7th Division and the completion of the 6th Division.

4. This addition of strength will enable me to complete the garrisons at air and naval stations and other strategic points and to maintain a mobile reserve, of one division at each coast.

5. On the East Coast the mobile reserve will be located at Debert and Sussex. The 6th Division will take over these stations when the 4th Armoured Division moves overseas.

6. On the West Coast one brigade group will be in the Prince Rupert-Hazelton area, the other two brigade groups will be in the southern part of Vancouver Island.

7. You will note that no other active formation will be available to back up the mobile reserves I have referred to. I propose, therefore, to ask for authority to complete the 7th Division and to raise three brigade groups of the 8th Division. One brigade group of the 8th Division would be stationed in the Kamloops-Vernon area, one at Wainwright, Alta, and one at Valcartier.

(H.Q.S. 20-1-25: C.G.S. to Minister, 20 Mar 42)

10. On the afternoon of the same day, 20 Mar 42, General Stuart called a meeting of the Military Members of the Defence Council to explain his plans with respect to the Army Programme (Home Defence) for 1942. He pointed out that on 1 Jun 42 "remaining units of 6th Division and units of three Brigade Groups of 7th Division would be concentrated under canvas". Then, on 1 Aug, "these units would proceed to their operational stations and would be replaced by the balance of units of the 7th Division and units of the Brigade Groups of the 8th Division." (Ibid: C.G.S. to D.S.D., 20 Mar 42)

11. On 21 Mar 42 an estimate of the costs which would be incurred in the organization of three Brigade Groups of the 8th Division was prepared by the Directorate of Staff Duties. The total cost was estimated at \$23,611,400, of which \$9,372,076 would be non-recurring. This estimate was based on the assumption that the total strength of three Brigade Groups would be 12,537 all ranks, or 11,973 other ranks and 564 officers; and that organization of the cadres would take place by 1 Jun, and concentration of the units by 1 Aug 42 (Ibid: S.D. 3(a) to D.S.D., 21 Mar 42).

12. The C.G.S. prepared a submission to the Minister of National Defence on 24 Mar "to secure authority for the mobilization

completion of the Order of Battle of the 7th Division." With regard to the 8th Division, General Stuart proposed:

To mobilize the 19th, 20th and 21st Brigade Groups of the 8th Division...

.....

The concentration of three Brigade Groups of the 8th Division at Valcartier, Vernon, and Williams Lake or Wainwright Park, by 1st November, 1942.

(Ibid: C.G.S. to Minister, 24 Mar 42)

The units which were to be mobilized to make up these three Brigade Groups were:

Three Headquarters, Infantry Brigades
Three Headquarters, Field Regiments
Nine Field Batteries
Portion Divisional Signals
Nine Infantry Battalions
Three Brigade Group Companies, R.C.A.S.C.
Three Field Ambulances
Three Light Aid Detachments (Type "A")
Three Light Aid Detachments (Type "B")

(Ibid)

13. Ministerial approval of the above proposals was granted on 26 Mar 42. District Officers Commanding were requested to submit their selections for any additional units which would require to be mobilized, and "to proceed with the formation of cadres on the 1st of June, pending formal Privy Council approval" (Ibid). The C.G.S. visualized the concentration of the units taking place "on approximately 1st August",^{*} at which time the establishments would be completed "by posting appropriate 'R' recruits with due regard to territorial affiliation" (Ibid: C.G.S. to A.G., Q.M.G., M.G.O., 8 Apr 42).

14. In a third submission on 9 May 42, General Stuart asked the Minister's approval of the formation of the units required "to form three Brigade Groups of the 8th Division" (Ibid: C.G.S. to Minister, 9 May 42). He proposed to mobilize a number of units; and from these and "from units previously authorized to mobilize for coast defence and garrison duties" the actual Orders of Battle were later to be determined. He stated that he intended to advance the date of concentration prior to 1 Aug 42 "as accommodation and sufficient trained cadre personnel can be made available". The personnel to form the cadres of these units were to be obtained from the following sources:

- 888 27
- (a) From the Reserve Units being mobilized.
 - (b) From Reserve Army resources within each District.

* There is no correspondence on file to show when the date for the concentration of the units was advanced from 1 Nov 42 (para 12) to 1 Aug 42 (para 13) or the reason for such a change. It is noted in para 13 that this change had been made, and it is assumed that the suggestion of S.D. 3(a) mentioned in para 11 that the concentration of the units would take place by 1 Aug 42 was adopted by the C.G.S. between 21 Mar 42 and 8 Apr 42.

- (c) By withdrawing suitable personnel from Active Units already mobilized in Canada. This personnel, where possible, to be withdrawn from Active Units of the same territorial Infantry Regiment or from the same Corps of other Arms and Services.
- (d) From the Canadian Army Overseas.

(Ibid)

15. No infantry battalions were selected from Military Districts Nos 6 and 7 "in view of the heavy mobilizations which have previously taken place" in these Districts, which were also being called up to form a considerable number of new Anti-Aircraft units. It was noted, however, that "one Light A.A. and one Field Battery, R.C.A., will be mobilized respectively from these Districts" (Ibid).

16. After the D.Os.C. had considered the matter, eleven "major" units were selected to meet the requirements of the 7th and 8th Divisions. The units, three of which were French-speaking, were:

30th Reconnaissance Battalion (The Essex Regiment)
2nd Battalion The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada
2nd/10th Dragoons
The Princess of Wales' Own Regiment (M.G.)
2nd Battalion Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal
2nd Battalion Le Regiment de Maisonneuve
Le Regiment de Levis
2nd Battalion The Royal Winnipeg Rifles
2nd Battalion Irish Fusiliers (Vancouver Regiment)
2nd Battalion The Regina Rifle Regiment
2nd Battalion The Edmonton Fusiliers

(Ibid)

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17. The C.G.S. informed the A.G. on 13 May 42 that the Minister had approved the above recommendations, and suggested advancing the date of concentration from 1 Aug to 1 Jul 42. Pertinent paragraphs of this memorandum read as follows:

In view of the urgent necessity of providing operational units in Canada, prior to, or as soon as possible after, the departure of the 4th (Armoured) Division, it has been decided that the date on which concentration is to commence will be advanced to about 1 JUL 42, at least in the case of Infantry and Recce Battalions, and if possible for the other Arms and Services as well.

The units that will be concentrated on 1 JUL will depend upon the availability of accommodation, which is now being surveyed...

In the meantime, however, it will be apparent that the early procurement of trained cadres for these units is of urgent importance, and to ensure that the units have every advantage in the initial stages of their organization it is suggested that the appointment of Commanding Officers (or alternatively Seconds in Command in cases where the Commanding Officer comes from abroad) ought to be the first consideration.

(Ibid: C.G.S. to A.G., 13 May 42)

All units had been allotted to Districts, a step which was considered "desirable and necessary" even in the case of units with no official reserve counterpart. Nevertheless, it was not considered that the respective D.Os.C. should bear all responsibility for the formation of cadres:

Bearing in mind the heavy commitments which Districts have had to meet, and the slimness of the resources of Reserve Units, it will be appreciated that assistance will have to be given both from units overseas and from operational and H.W.E. Units already formed in Canada.

(Ibid)

It was the opinion of the C.G.S. that the units already formed in Canada would be the "most prolific source" of trained personnel (Ibid).

18. A memorandum from the A.G. to the Director of Mobilization and Requirements and the Director of Personal Services of 15 May 42 read in part as follows:

In order to expedite these mobilizations, I feel that the Infantry Units and Recce Battalions could be mobilized in the same way as are the battalions which are being formed this month, that is by providing cadres and by filling the units with N.R.M.A. Recruits who have not been passed through Training Centres.

(Ibid: Macklin to D.M. & R. and D. Pers, 15 May 42)

The memorandum stated further that it was "urgently necessary" to proceed with the formation of the cadres of these units, and suggested that recent experience had shown that the first step to be taken in mobilizing units was to appoint a Commanding Officer. D. Pers was instructed to take "immediate steps to have the Selection Board make recommendations in this regard", and to consult the General Staff concerning the advisability of asking the Canadian Army Overseas, "in accordance with approved policy", to provide a portion of the cadres. It was also considered that places of concentration should be selected at this stage (Ibid).

19. Accordingly, all D.Os.C. were requested by telegram on 15 May to forward recommendations for the appointments of Commanding Officer of Second-in-Command of the units listed in para 16 (Ibid: D. Pers to D.M. & R., 19 May 42). D.M. & R. pointed out, however, that in order to speed up the formation of the 7th and 8th Divisions it was considered desirable to appoint Officers Commanding for "even such small units as L.A.Ds." at an early date, so that the mobilization of these units might be carried out with the utmost despatch (Ibid: D.M. & R. to D. Pers, 17 Mar 42).

20. The G.Os.C.-in-C., Atlantic and Pacific Commands, and the D.Os.C. were informed on 21 May 42 that authority for the formation of the units of the 8th Division had been granted. The plan of mobilization was outlined as follows:

- (a) Appointment of Commanding Officers or Seconds-in-Command.
- (b) Selection of cadres.
- (c) Preliminary training period prior to concentration.

- (d) Selection of place of concentration.
- (e) Concentration of cadres and enlisted Active personnel.
- (f) Completion of Unit by posting of personnel called up under N.R.M.A.

(Ibid: A.G. circular letter, 21 May 42)

It was anticipated that some N.C.Os. would be available from overseas for the cadre of each unit. Others were to be found from Active units already mobilized in Canada. The list of these units, together with the number of men each was to furnish, is as follows:

<i>Rifles</i>	
The Royal Regiment of Canada	34
Victoria Rifles of Canada	22 32
2nd Battalion, The Canadian Scottish Regiment	30
The Prince Albert and Battleford Volunteers	10
The King's Own Rifles of Canada	20
The Canadian Fusiliers	24
The Kent Regiment	8
Irish Fusiliers	28
The Rocky Mountain Rangers	5
The Pictou Highlanders	13
The Edmonton Fusiliers	25
The Winnipeg Grenadiers	21
The Saint John Fusiliers	31
The Algonquin Regiment	26
The Midland Regiment	42
The Lincoln and Welland Regiment	25
The Sault Ste. Marie and Sudbury Regiment	10
The Dufferin and Haldimand Rifles of Canada	22
Fusiliers du St. Laurent	32
Le Regiment de Joliette	34
Le Regiment de St. Hyacinthe	35
Le Regiment de Hull	34
The Prince of Wales' Rangers	10
The Prince Edward Island Highlanders	37

(Ibid)

In the case of Infantry and Engineer units, only 75% of the cadres was to be supplied from the two sources just mentioned. The remainder would be obtained from the Reserve counterpart of the units being mobilized, from Reserve Army resources within each District, and by general enlistment.

21. It was appreciated that some difficulty might be experienced in securing these cadres by 1 Jul 42, the final date set for the concentration of the units; but it was requested that every effort be made in order that the units might concentrate as early as possible (Ibid). The rank and file were to be obtained by enlistment from the Reserve unit, by general enlistment, and by the posting of H.D. recruits.

22. As in the case of the 7th Division (Report No 8, Historical Section Department of National Defence, "The 7th Canadian Division", para 16), there was a shortage of cadre personnel for the units of the 8th Division. On 16 May 42 a cable requesting officers and N.C.Os. for the 8th Division was despatched to Canadian Military Headquarters. It read, in part, as follows:

We...appreciate that we have made very heavy demands on you during past few months...Nevertheless in view of great scarcity of trained and experienced officers and NCOs in Canada we would much appreciate it if you could see way clear to supply personnel.

23. A reply was received from General McNaughton on 24 May 42, in which he stated:

During the past 4 months nearly 700 officers and over 3,000 other ranks have been returned to Canada for instructional and organizational purposes. In addition 195 candidates for OCTU have been despatched. The resulting situation is that units formations and staffs have been seriously depleted and time is now required for the development of replacements. Moreover organization First Army HQ and 2 Corps involves further drain on units and Corps and will undoubtedly limit the rate of completion of those formations. Also we have assumed heavy additional responsibility in reinforcement units by acceptance of partially trained personnel as reinforcements which will create a further demand on units for instructors.

In consequence of the foregoing I do not feel that your request can properly be met at this time and I suggest that it be deferred until about 1 Aug 1942, by which time I hope to be in a position to help situation in Canada without undue compromise of efficiency here.*

(Ibid: Tel G.S. 1756, Canmilitary to Defensor (for A.G. from McNaughton), 24 May 42)

24. Maj-Gen W.H.P. Elkins, G.O.C.-in-C., Atlantic Command, pointed out another difficulty on 25 May 42. As already noted, Le Regiment de Joliette was to furnish 34 N.C.Os.; Le Regiment de St. Hyacinthe, 35 N.C.Os.; and Les Fusiliers du St. Laurent, 32 N.C.Os. for the cadres of the 8th Division. General Elkins stated:

It appears that in making out the table of requirements the fact has been overlooked that the above 3 units have only recently been mobilized and have concentrated for training only 5 weeks ago. The units are themselves without sufficient N.C.O's. to properly conduct their training and until further N.C.O's. are provided will not be in a suitable condition to assume coast defence duties. If required to provide N.C.O's. for 8th Division Units all would be quite incapable of carrying out operational duty or even of continuing their own training.

(Ibid: Elkins to the Secretary, Department of National Defence, 25 May 42)

As a result, all D.Os.C. were requested to investigate thoroughly all sources other than Active units already mobilized, and to advise the A.G. what cadre personnel could be obtained in each District (Ibid: Tel Mob 584, A.G. to D.Os.C., 27 May 42; and Ibid: A.G. circular letter, 30 May 42).

25. Maj-Gen H.F.G. Letson, then the A.G., informed General Elkins on 28 May 42 that the problem he had raised was receiving consideration and that, in the meantime, personnel

* Both the request for cadre personnel and General McNaughton's reply were made less than a month after the "Conscription Plebiscite" had taken place, and there can be little doubt that the manpower problem was not yet solved.

were to be selected according to previous instructions (para 20). He added:

It will be noted that personnel selected are to remain with their present respective units until further instructions are issued.

(Ibid: Letson to Elkins, 28 May 42)

It was pointed out by D.M. & R. that when the number of cadre personnel available in each District, from sources other than Active units, had been ascertained, the number to be provided by these Active units would then be determined.

In other words, we have asked for a greater number of N.C.O's than we will require providing cadres can be obtained from other sources.

(Ibid: M.R. 1 to D.M. & R., 28 May 42)

26. In a memorandum addressed to the C.G.S. on 8 Jun 42, General Letson proposed to ask the Army Commander to furnish "early in August" further information concerning the provision of overseas personnel for the cadres of the 8th Division (Ibid: A.G. to C.G.S., 8 Jun 42). The situation with regard to Artillery officers was considered particularly acute. It was also evident, General Letson said, that units were "finding it extremely difficult to obtain a working cadre of qualified officers", and that they had invariably to resort to the instructional staffs of Training Centres. He pointed out that such action aggravated the difficult situation in completing Training Centre establishments. In reply it was suggested that some Artillery officers might be obtained from the 6th Division, and that the other rank cadres might be obtained from sources in Canada (Ibid: Minutes 2 and 4).

27. A memorandum from Col L.M. Chesley to D.M. & R. points out the reason for the policy of selecting cadre personnel from Active units in Canada:

When the undersigned (i.e. Col Chesley) visited the Pacific Command with the C.G.S. last week, the Pacific Command registered strong protest in regard to the supplying of cadres for 8th Div. units from Active units of the Command. After discussion and pointing out that by facilitating the formation of 8th Div. Brigade Groups they were, in effect, facilitating the formation of units which were necessary for the defence of the Pacific Command and which would later move to that Command, and pointing out the lack of other available sources from which to draw cadres other than Active Army Units, the A.A. & Q.M.G. and the G.O.C.-in-C. agreed to supply the cadres.

(Ibid: D.S.D. to D.M. & R., 8 Jun 42)

28. Brig G.G. Anglin, D.O.C. M.D. 7, pointed out that if The Saint John Fusiliers (M.G.) were to furnish the N.C.Os. required (para 20) for the 8th Division, it would be depleted of "practically all its N.C.O. material", and requested that such action be avoided "unless found absolutely necessary" (Ibid: Anglin to Secretary, Department of National Defence, 18 Jun 42). After "serious consideration", the A.G. replied that:

...while it is fully realized that the depleting of the N.C.O's strength in that unit will result in reducing temporarily the efficiency of the unit, the instructions are issued in the interest of the

Further, it is considered that N.C.O's drawn from the Saint John Fusiliers should be replaced by promotion within the unit, and thus present an opportunity for deserved promotions.

(Ibid: A.G. to D.O.C. M.D. 7, 23 Jun 42)

29. By 20 Jun 42 Officers Commanding had been selected and approved for all Infantry units of the 8th Division except the 2nd Battalion, Le Regiment de Maisonneuve; and a selection had been made, but not approved, for each of the 25th, 26th and 27th Field Regiments (H.Q.S. 20-1-25, vol 1: Notes for Director's Meeting, 20 Jun 42).

PLANS TO MOBILIZE 8TH DIVISION HEADQUARTERS

30. In a memorandum to the Minister of National Defence of 12 Jun 42, General Stuart sought authority for the "immediate organization of Headquarters of the 8th Division and certain associated headquarter units" (Ibid: C.G.S. to Minister, 12 Jun 42). The new units were to include:

- One Headquarters of a Division
- One Div H.Q. Defence and Employment Platoon
- One Headquarters, Div Artillery
- One Headquarters, Div Engineers
- One Headquarters of a Commander Div R.C.A.S.C.
- One Divisional Intelligence Section
- One Field Security Section

(Ibid)

General Stuart pointing out the reasons for creating these new units, stated:

The expanded programme for the provision of forces for the defence of the West Coast includes five Brigade Groups, three belonging to the 6th Division and two to the 8th Division. It is the intention that the G.O.C., 6th Division shall be responsible for the three Brigade Groups in southern British Columbia, i.e. at Tofino-Alberni, Nanaimo, and Vernon.

Under this arrangement, the G.O.C.-in-C. will be obliged to deal directly with the G.O.C., 6th Division, the Commanders of the two Brigade Groups of the 8th Division, and the Commanders of the Defences at Prince Rupert, Vancouver, and Esquimalt-Victoria. He will, therefore, be dealing with six formation commanders, as well as with the various isolated battery and detachment commanders guarding aerodromes and vulnerable points.

Bearing in mind that the G.O.C.-in-C. is charged with the responsibility of co-ordinating strategically the work of all three Services in addition to his duties as Military Commander, I consider it essential that a Headquarters be provided to relieve him of the direct control of the Brigade Groups at Prince Rupert and Prince George, as well as the Prince Rupert Defences.

As mentioned in para 9, one Brigade Group of the 8th Division was to be stationed at Valcartier.

I consider that the need for such a Headquarters can best be met by organizing the Headquarters of the 8th Division to be located at Prince George. A Divisional Headquarters Defence and Employment Platoon, and Intelligence Section, and a Field Security Section will also be required.

In order that the G.O.C., 8th Division may receive specialist and technical advice in carrying out his duties, I further consider that Headquarters Divisional Artillery, Divisional Engineers, and Divisional Army Service Corps should also be organized.

(Ibid)

The total establishment strength was to be 360 all ranks; and it was estimated that the cost incurred in providing this strength, as well as ancillary transport, armament and ammunition, would be \$894,976 for nine and a half months.

31. The formation of the 8th Divisional Headquarters and the units mentioned above was approved by the War Committee of the Cabinet on 14 Jun 42, and the D.S.D. was instructed to proceed with the necessary action. The concurrence of the Treasury Board in the proposal to mobilize these units was forthcoming on 14 Jul 42 (Ibid: Minute of a Meeting of the Treasury Board, 14 Jul 42); and the units were placed on Active Service with effect from 15 Jun 42 (Ibid: G.O. 301, 22 Jul 42).

32. The A.G., Q.M.G. and M.G.O. were informed on 23 Jun 42 that approval had been granted "for the mobilization forthwith" of these units, and that:

These headquarters and units will concentrate at Connaught Ranges and will subsequently be moved to operational locations at Prince George. In the case of all but the intelligence and field security sections and the defense and employment platoons, it is intended to make this latter move when the necessary officers have been selected. Other rank personnel may then be drawn from units within the division.

The selection of the commanders and staff officers concerned will be undertaken forthwith.

(Ibid: Chesley to A.G., Q.M.G., M.G.O., 23 Jun 42)

pg 16. 2.1
33. It was suggested by D.M. & R. that, since only limited accommodation was available at Connaught Ranges where the Headquarters of the 6th and 7th Division were already organizing, the officers of the 8th Division might be called to Ottawa, after which they would be sent to Prince George to begin organization of the Divisional Headquarters (Ibid: Chesley to D.M. & R., 23 Jun 42, Minute 2). This suggestion was adopted, and on 25 Jun 42 a circular letter stated that the officers of the Divisional Headquarters, the Intelligence Section and the Field Security Section would proceed to Ottawa to "attend to the preliminary organization" of those units. The officers of the Headquarters, Divisional Engineers, Artillery and R.C.A.S.C. were to be sent to their operational location at Prince George as soon as they were appointed to organize their respective headquarters (Ibid: A.G. circular letter, 25 Jun 42). No. 8 Defence and

Employment Platoon was to concentrate at Connaught Ranges on 23 Jul 42. Its cadre, and as many of the non-cadre personnel as possible, were to be supplied by The Lorne Scots; if a sufficient number was not available from this source, the unit was to be brought up to establishment strength by the posting of N.R.M.A. personnel (Ibid. See also, Ibid: A.G. to D.O.C., M.D. 2, 27 Jun 42).

34. The units which were to comprise the three Brigade Groups of the 8th Division were placed on Active Service by G.O. 309 of 1942, with effect from 12 May 42, G.O. 301, dated 22 Jul 42, called out on Active Service the 8th Division Headquarters and the Headquarters units mentioned in para 30, with effect from 15 Jun. Other units were placed on Active Service as the need arose. The 8th Divisional Postal Unit was authorized to form on 4 Sep 42, with effect from 31 Aug 42, and was to serve the 8th Division and coast defence concentrations at Prince Rupert, Prince George and Terrace (H.Q.S. 20-5-25-1: A.G. circular letter, 4 Sep 42). Nos 19, 20 and 21 Defence Platoons were named as Active units of the Canadian Army by G.O. 360 dated 15 Sep 42, with effect from 1 Aug 42, and were to serve the 19th, 20th and 21st Infantry Brigade Groups respectively (H.Q.S. 20-4-25-J). Instructions were issued on 9 Nov 42 for the formation of a Pack Transport in Pacific Command. One troop of 12 horses was to be provided for each Brigade Group of the 6th and 8th Divisions located in Pacific Command, and each troop was to be further allotted to one Infantry battalion within the Brigade for "experimental and training purposes" (H.Q.S. 20-1-12-11-S: A.G. circular letter, 9 Nov 42). A further addition was made to the units of the 8th Division when, on 30 Nov 42, authority was granted for the formation of a Field Cash Office. (H.Q.S. 20-4-W: A.G. circular letter, 30 Nov 42). No. 1 Armoured Train, authorized to organize by G.O. 45 of 26 Jan 43 (effective 1 Dec 42), came under the command of the 14th Brigade, Headquarters, 8th Divisional Signals, was formed by authority of G.O. 469 dated 3 Dec 42, with effect from 15 Oct 42. Also under the command of the 8th Division in Pacific Command were the 8th Aerodrome Defence Company at Annette Island, the 11th Aerodrome Defence Company at Terrace, and the 14th Aerodrome Defence Company at Smithers.

APPOINTMENTS

35. Brig H.N. Ganong, V.D., who had commanded the 3rd Infantry Brigade and had been recommended by General McNaughton, was selected to command the 8th Division with the rank of Maj-Gen. The senior appointments of the Divisional Headquarters were as follows:

<u>Appointment</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Effective Date</u>
G.O.C.	Maj-Gen H.N. Ganong, V.D.	11 Jul 42
G.S.O. 1	Lt-Col S.T.E. Fetterley	3 Aug 42
A.A. & Q.M.G.	Lt-Col A.E. Duncanson, D.S.O., V.D.	3 Aug 42
A.D.M.S.	A/Col J.L. Sutherland	18 Jul 42
A.D.O.S.	Lt-Col C.F. Curtis	12 Aug 42
C.R.C.A.S.C.	Lt-Col H. Westmorland	10 Aug 42
C.R.C.A.	Brig W.C. Thackray	1 Sep 42
C.R.C.E.	Lt-Col P.L. Debney, M.M., E.D.	14 Sep 42

36. Some difficulty appears to have arisen in obtaining officers to command the units of the 8th Division and to fill certain junior appointments. The situation was considered "so serious as to justify any reasonable expedient" in filling

existing vacancies. It was suggested that, as a temporary measure, junior officers for Artillery and Infantry units might be obtained by selecting suitable persons from the following sources:

- (a) N.C.Os. with not less than six months' service in the C.A.S.F.
- (b) C.O.T.C. cadets who had completed not less than one annual training in the C.O.T.C.
- (c) N.C.Os., Reserve Force, who had completed one annual training.
- (d) Selected civilians whose business experience indicated that they were officer material.

(H.Q.S. 20-5-25-1: D.C.G.S.(B) to
C.G.S., 8 Jun 42)

In addition, it was pointed out that there might be obtained from "well established Infantry Units (A.F.)" officers who had held "present rank (A.F.) for a year or more" and were recommended as suitable to command units (Ibid: A.G. circular letter, 18 Jul 42). A number of officers to command units or to serve as Seconds-in-Command were supplied by Canadian Military Headquarters (Ibid: Tel A. 2835, Camilitary to Defensor, 17 Sep 42).

ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS 8th DIVISION

37. Headquarters of the 8th Division began organization on 3 Aug 42 in Ottawa under the command of Maj-Gen Ganong, with offices in the Bolton Street Public School (H.Q.S. 20-4-25, vol 2: D.M. & R. to Chief Ordnance Officer, 4 Aug 42). The Headquarters was scheduled to move from Ottawa on 18 Aug to Prince George where concentration was to take place (Ibid: Ganong to Secty, D.N.D., 12 Aug 42). It appears, however, that there was a lack of canvas accommodation at Prince George, and, partly because of a shortage of materials, permanent accommodation could not be completed until mid-October. It was suggested that representatives from the 8th Division might be sent to Vancouver to "look over the situation in conjunction with Pacific Command and submit definite proposals for the move". Accordingly, Lt-Col S.T.E. Fetterley, G.S.O. 1, and Maj W.G. Hale, R.C.O.C., were authorized to proceed to Pacific Command (Ibid: Macklin to D.C.G.S.(A), 12 Aug 42; also Gibson to D. Pers, 13 Aug 42). They reported that they had "inspected camp and approved general site" but were not in favour of the Division moving there for some time (W.D., H.Q. 8 Cdn Div (A. & Q.), September 1942, Appx VII, 20 Aug 42). Jasper, Alberta, was suggested as a possible temporary site for the Divisional Headquarters until the spring of 1943, when it was anticipated that accommodation would be completed at Prince George.

38. The G.O.C.-in-C., Pacific Command, issued the following instructions with respect to the organization and role of the Division:

1. It is not the intention to hand over Command of any of the units or formations of 8th Division to the G.O.C. 8th Division until such time as the G.O.C.-in-C. is satisfied that 8th Division Headquarters is fully organized and ready to take over Command. In the meantime they are to concentrate on the organization of their Headquarters at Jasper.

2. The G.O.C. 8th Division is expected to travel around his area as much as he desires taking a hand in and supervising the training of the Brigade Groups at Terrace and Prince George.
3. The G.O.C.-in-C., Pacific Command will retain Prince Rupert Defences and Annette Island directly under his own Command for some time to come.
4. The defence plan for 8th Division should be based on the defence of and recapture of, if necessary the aerodromes at Terrace, Woodcock, Smithers, Vanderhoof, and Prince George.
5. The Armoured Train has been ordered to Vancouver where it will be overhauled by Ordnance and all necessary adjustments and alterations made so that the equipment will stand up to movement on rails. Eventually the train will be stationed at Terrace and will constitute a mobile reserve, making a run once a week or so. Before this happens, however, training on the train will proceed until the O.C., 14th Infantry Brigade is satisfied with its operational state.

(P.C.S. 504-8-B-1 (H.S.): Memorandum of Instructions from G.O.C.-in-C., Pacific Command, 27 Aug 42)

39. On 31 Aug 42 General Ganong submitted to the C.G.S. a report on the three main camps which were to come under his command. At Prince George he found the morale of the troops "exceptionally high". Training was well advanced and large parties were engaged in fire fighting which he considered good training. The state of morale at Prince Rupert was also very good, and close cooperation with the American troops there was an "outstanding feature". At Terrace, however, the situation was not as satisfactory: the troops appeared "bored", morale was "not at all high", and training was "seriously behind". The G.O.C. noted that Lee-Enfield rifles were being issued to all camps, but added that 2" mortar bombs and hand grenades were needed for training purposes. He recommended the establishment of land lines to improve the system of communication, and the organization of a Field Bakery at Terrace. With regard to the construction of hutments, General Ganong stated that building was "progressing fairly well" at Prince Rupert and Prince George, but that it was "badly behind at Terrace" (H.Q.C. 8522-8: Preliminary Survey, Northern Portion, Pacific Command, 31 Aug 42).

40. Concentration began at Jasper on 1 Sep 42. Two hotels, the Athabasca and the Astoria, were rented as quarters for the Division², and office space was located in the Masonic Hall. Further accommodation was required, and the possibility of using Jasper Lodge, owned by the Canadian National Railways, was considered. As an alternative, National Defence Headquarters suggested that accommodation might be available at Terrace, but an investigation failed to reveal suitable buildings. The problem was settled by moving personnel of the 8th Divisional Headquarters from Jasper to Prince George as accommodation became available there.

41. The strength of the Divisional Headquarters on 30 Sep 42 was 20 officers and 88 other ranks (including five H.D. personnel), with 23 all ranks attached. The Defence and

* A long and involved lawsuit resulted from the use of these two hotels. Final settlement was made in October

Employment Platoon, which had arrived at Jasper on 11 Sep 42, had a strength of 10 all ranks (W.D., H.Q. 8 Cdn Div (A. & Q.) October 1942, Appx VII). On 1 Oct 14th Infantry Brigade at Terrace, and the 16th Infantry Brigade at Prince George, came under the command of the 8th Division. The Division took over the command of the Prince Rupert Defences on 9 Oct 42. By 14 Nov all Headquarters personnel had been moved to Prince George.

THE BRIGADE GROUPS OF THE 8TH DIVISION

42. As already mentioned, the Brigade Groups mobilized as part of the 8th Division were the 19th, 20th and 21st (para 12). Subsequent events saw the 8th Division in command of the 14th Brigade Group at Terrace, the 16th Brigade Group at Prince George, and the Prince Rupert Defences. The story of the Home Defence Divisions is somewhat complicated; and although the 8th Division never administered the Brigade Groups originally assigned to it, a very brief outline of the 19th, 20th and 21st Brigade Groups may be of value.

43. The 19th Brigade Group began organization at Vernon, B.C., on 22 Jun 42 under the command of Brig W.G. Colquhoun, M.C., and derived its nucleus from the 17th Brigade Group Headquarters (W.D., 19 Inf Bde, 22 Jun 42; see also Report No. 8, op cit, para 27). The Infantry component of this Brigade Group consisted of The Winnipeg Light Infantry, The Prince Albert and Battleford Volunteers, and the 3rd Battalion, Irish Fusiliers. The 19th Infantry Brigade formed a "Command Reserve", one of the four commands directly under Pacific Command Headquarters. The location of this Brigade at Vernon was selected with a view to making possible rapid movement in any emergency to Prince George to Vancouver, up the Cariboo Highway to the Williams Lake District, or down the Okanagan Valley to the International Boundary (Report No. 3, op cit, para 107). With the reduction of the operational troops in Pacific Command, the 19th Brigade Group was disbanded with effect from 15 Oct 43.

44. The 20th Brigade Group began organizing its Headquarters at Niagara-on-the-Lake on 31 Aug 42 with Brig P. Earnshaw, D.S.O., M.C., as commander. The 2nd/10th Dragoons, the 3rd Battalion, The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada, and the 3rd Battalion, The Royal Winnipeg Rifles, made up the Infantry component. The 20th Brigade Group came under the command of the 7th Division, and moved to Debert on 30 Sep 42. The Brigade Headquarters moved to Vernon on 3 Jul 43, and to Port Alberni (Vancouver Island) on 30 Jul, to take over the role of the 13th Brigade which had been sent to Kiska. The disbandment of the 20th Brigade took place on 15 Oct 43.

45. The C.G.S. had stated to the Minister on 24 Mar 42 that it was proposed to provide a Brigade Group at Valcartier "as a reserve for the Atlantic Command" (H.Q.S. 20-1-25, vol 1: C.G.S. to Minister, 24 Mar 42), and later it was decided to organize the 21st Brigade Group there. No action was taken for several months. On 16 Dec 42 Col L.M. Chesley, D.S.D., noted that "no action has as yet been taken to mobilize the Headquarters, 21st Brigade Group" and suggested that steps be taken so that this Headquarters might "function at as early a date as possible" (H.Q.S. 20-1-25-E: D.S.D. to D. Mob, 16 Dec 42). Brig G.V. Francoeur, O.B.E., V.D., was selected to command the Brigade, and the D.O.C., M.D. 5, was requested to select suitable personnel for the Headquarters staff (Ibid: D. Pers to D. Mob, 2 Jan 43; also Minute 2). The 21st Brigade Group Headquarters began to function on 5 Jan 43 (W.D., H.Q. 21 Inf Bde, 5 Jan 43). The Infantry units in the Brigade were Le Regiment de Levis,

the 3rd Battalion, Le Regiment de Maisonneuve, and the 3rd Battalion, Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal. The strength of the 21st Brigade Group as at 9 Jan 43 was 1,456 all ranks, of whom 158 were officers, 605 Active personnel, and 851 H.D. or N.R.M.A. soldiers (H.Q.S. 8899, vol 3: "Canadian Army in Canada by Formations - Strength", 9 Jan 43). The Brigade carried out training until its disbandment on 15 Oct 43.

46. The 14th Brigade Group had been authorized to mobilize on 29 Jul 41 (H.Q.S. 20-1-5, vol 1: Crerar to Minister, 15 Jul 41, Minute 2). Its Headquarters began organizing at Chippewa Barracks, Niagara Falls, 24 Sep 41, under the command of Brigadier O.M. Martin, where the Brigade assumed the task of protecting industrial installations in that area. Brig V. Hodson took over the command on 21 May 42. The 14th Brigade Group moved to Terrace, B.C. on 29 May 42. Brig J.P. Girvan, D.S.O., M.C., V.D., became Brigade Commander on 27 Aug. On 1 Oct 42, the date of which the Brigade became part of the 8th Division, the King's Own Rifles of Canada and the Kent Regiment, two of the Infantry battalions of the 14th Brigade Group^x, had strengths of 683 and 482 respectively. Also in camp at Terrace were the 19th Field Regiment, R.C.A., the 5th Field Company, R.C.E., No. 1 Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C., and a Signal Section (W.D., H.Q. 14 Inf Bde, October 1942, Appx "C"). The 14th Infantry Brigade left Terrace for Nanaimo on 13 Oct 43.

47. The 16th Brigade Group, which had been intended to form part of the 7th Division, began its organization at Prince George, B.C., under the command of Brig O.M. Martin, V.D., on 26 Jun 42. The Infantry units were already in camp, and their strengths were as follows:

	Officers	Other Ranks (Active)	H.D.
The Oxford Rifles	34	158	615
The Brockville Rifles	38	284	453
The Prince of Wales' Rangers	47	254	473

(W.D., H.Q. 16 Inf Bde, 26 Jun 42)

By the end of July 1942 the Brigade Headquarters staff numbered 15 all ranks. The 8th Division took over the command of the 16th Brigade on 1 Oct 42. Brig D.R. Sargent, E.D., replaced Brig Martin as Commander on 28 Jul 43. The 16th Brigade Group moved to Nanaimo on 28 Jul 43 where it came under the command of the 6th Division.

PRINCE RUPERT DEFENCES

48. The Prince Rupert Defences had been in existence prior to the beginning of the war. With the despatch of the "Warning Telegram" on 25 Aug 39, the 102nd (North British Columbia) Heavy Battery, R.C.A., was called out for duty at Prince Rupert (Preliminary Narrative, History of the Canadian Military Policy and of Canadian Military Forces in Canada and Adjacent Regions 1939-45, Chapter 7, "Further Measures of Preparedness 1939-40", para 17). Lt-Col S.D. Johnston, M.C., V.D., was placed in command, temporary gun mountings were made, and a guard was mounted at the drydock (W.D., H.Q. Prince Rupert Defences, 26 Aug 39). By the first week in October, the troops under Fortress command included the 102nd (North British Columbia) Heavy Battery, R.C.A., the 2nd Searchlight Battery, R.C.A., a Signal company, a company from the 2nd Battalion, The Canadian

x The third Infantry battalion of the 14th Brigade Group

1921 6.5
Scottish Regiment, two companies from the Irish Fusiliers, an R.C.A.S.C. detachment, and a detachment from the 12th Field Ambulance, R.C.A.M.C. Col D.B. Martyn, D.S.O., M.C., V.D., took over the command of the Prince Rupert Defences on 13 Sep 42 (Ibid: 13 Sep 42).

49. General Ganong stressed the strategic importance of Prince Rupert in a memorandum of 5 Nov 42, part of which read as follows:

Prince Rupert is the most tempting bait for the Japanese on the Canadian Pacific Coast. With the tremendous amount of American supplies flowing through this port; the fact that it is the junction point of the Canadian and northern American defenses and the capture or destruction of this port would be a big factor in isolating the American effort in Alaska; the appalling vulnerability of the railway line forming the only means of East and West communications in the area; the numerous excellent, and difficult-to-protect approaches, most of which are well known to the Japs; all of these things would tend to make Prince Rupert assume a very large place in enemy plans regarding any projected invasion or raid on North America.

(P.C.S. 504-8-8-1 (H.S.) Ganong to H.Q. Pacific Command, 5 Nov 42)

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1-3
50. The troops at Prince Rupert in April, 1943, included portions of the 17th (North British Columbia) Coast Regiment, the 22nd Field Regiment, R.C.A., the 22nd Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A., the 32nd Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A., The Winnipeg Grenadiers, The Midland Regiment, No 9 Area Signal Company, No 4 Fort Company, R.C.E., No 11 Company, R.C.E. and Headquarters personnel. In addition, No 1 Armoured Train and a Reserve Machine Gun Battalion, which began organization in February 1943, provided means of defence in that area.

NO 1 ARMoured TRAIN

51. In order to further strengthen the defences of northern British Columbia, No 1 Armoured Train was put into operation on the railway line between Prince Rupert and Terrace. More, specifically, it was intended to defend this vital portion of railway from an attack by landing parties which might be transported in small craft up the Skeena River, which was navigable for a hundred miles from its mouth and along the banks of which the railway had been built. The train was protected by heavy steel plate armour, and armed with two 75 mm guns, four 40 mm Bofors guns and two searchlights. It was manned by approximately 55 all ranks, including 44 from the 48th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, R.C.A. and, in addition, was capable of carrying one full company of Infantry with platoon weapons (W.D., No 1 Arm'd Train, February 1943, Appx 3; see also Report No. 3, op cit, para 88). Training was carried out under the direction of the 14th Brigade, and No 1 Armoured Train was assigned a role in the 8th Division's defence scheme. Although it was never necessary to use the train in an active role, it appears to have maintained a high degree of preparedness for such an eventuality, and in addition proved useful in moving troops in that area. No 1 Armoured Train was disbanded by G.O. 378/44, with effect from 31 Jul 44.

NO 1 PACK TRANSPORT TROOP, R.C.A.S.C.

52. On 5 Nov 42 the C.R.C.A.S.C., 8th Canadian Division, was instructed to plan the formation of a pack transport unit (W.D., No 1 Pack Tpt Tp, R.C.A.S.C., 5 Nov 42). According to further instructions received on 17 Nov, one troop of 12 pack horses was to be provided for each Brigade of the 6th and 8th Divisions located in Pacific Command, and each such troop was to be allotted to one Infantry battalion in the Brigade for experimental and training purposes. Personnel were to be found within existing establishments, but might be enlisted within the establishment of the units concerned for service with the Pack Transport Troops (Ibid: 17 Nov 42). Although it was planned to provide a Pack Transport Troop for each Brigade of the 6th and 8th Divisions, only one such troop appears to have been organized. No 1 Pack Transport Troop, called out by G.O. 175 of 23 Apr 43, with effect from 15 Mar 43, functioned directly under 8th Divisional R.C.A.S.C. Headquarters.

88.22 88 53. Two farms, comprising 40 acres, which were being purchased by the Department of National Defence at Prince George for a rifle range, were to be used to accommodate the Troop horses. Buildings, fences and corrals had to be constructed, and it was not until 25 Feb 43 that the first 12 horses were purchased. These, with 12 more, arrived at Prince George on 13 Apr 43. The unit establishment authorized a strength of two officers, 68 other ranks, and 80 horses. A detachment consisting of 18 all ranks and 34 horses, after assembling at Jasper, Alberta, proceeded to Little Yoho Valley in the latter part of June 1943, covering 175 miles in seven days (Ibid: July 1943, Appx 4). The detachment performed the necessary "packing" for the Mountaineering Course which was conducted there, and returned to Prince George on 12 Sep 43 (Ibid: September 1943, Appx 4). A number of men and horses were also provided to transport supplies for the courses of the Jungle Warfare School (Ibid: 19 Aug 43 and 24 Aug 43) No 1 Pack Transport Troop was disbanded 14 Feb 46, by G.O. 92.

OPERATIONAL ROLE

54. The operational role of the units of the 8th Division consisted of the protection of important points in the northern part of British Columbia. Briefly, the 8th Canadian Division was responsible for the defence of that portion of British Columbia lying north and west of the main line of the Canadian National Railways from Ashcroft to the Alberta border, including the United States aerodrome at Annette Island but not including the R.C.A.F. base at Bella Bella. Within this area were a number of military and civil installations of strategic importance: the northern branch of the Canadian National Railways provided the only means of communication inland from Prince Rupert; there were aerodromes located at Prince George, Vanderhoof, Smithers, Woodcock, Terrace, Dog Creek and Quesnel, and an American aerodrome at Annette Island from which aircraft might move to Alaska or carry out offensive action against any enemy approach. In addition, there were advanced air bases at Seal Cove and Alliford Bay. At Prince Rupert, centre of fishing and lumbering for northern British Columbia and Canadian National Railways terminus, there were shipping, dockage, drydock, shipbuilding and ship repair facilities, as well as advanced naval and air bases and an American base which handled supplies and shipping for Alaska. For all of these installations the 8th Division had to provide means of defence.

55. The anticipated forms and scales of enemy attacks may be summarized as follows:

- (a) Bombardment by a capital ship, by two 8-inch gun cruisers, or by one merchant ship mounting 6-inch

- (b) Attack by minelaying craft, submarine and small surface craft.
- (c) Attack by sea-borne or air-borne raiding parties whose strength would not exceed the equivalent of two brigade groups. Such a raid might be prolonged from 24 to 48 hours.
- (d) Light to medium scale bombing, torpedo or gas attack by ship-borne aircraft on coastal or inland objectives.

56. The troops assigned to the 8th Canadian Division to meet an enemy attack included, in addition to the units of the 14th and 16th Brigade Groups and the Prince Rupert Defences, a Reserve Machine Gun Battalion at Prince Rupert, detachments of the Services which had been allotted to the area, and companies of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. The Prince Rupert Defences were responsible for the Prince Rupert area, the 14th Brigade Group for the Terrace area, and the 16th Brigade Group for the Prince George area. The Reserve Machine Gun Battalion was in the process of being organized in February 1943, and it was not anticipated that it would be of operational value for some time.

57. The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, organized in February 1942, consisted of hunters, fishermen, farmers, loggers, and men of many other occupations who formed companies varying in strengths from 50 to 300. It was considered that these men, armed with 30/06 and 30/30 rifles and 9-mm Sten sub-Machine Carbines, were capable of being used in the following roles:

- (a) Intelligence duties and local defence against minor raids.
- (b) To operate either by themselves or in conjunction with units of the Active Army to repel a major attack.
- (c) Observation.
- (d) Anti-sabotage measures.
- (e) Scout and guide parties.
- (f) Guerilla tactics.
- (g) Demolition work.

For operational purposes, the companies of Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were under the command of the formation in whose area they were located. (A list of Pacific Coast Militia Ranger companies under the command of the 8th Division for operational purposes, and their location, is included as Appx "B"). (Additional information concerning the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, may be found in H.Q.C. 5393-5-3: Lt-Col T.A.H. Taylor to D.H.S., 4 Apr 45, and attached letters "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", "F"; Ibid; Brig W.G. Colquhoun to D.H.S., 30 Apr 45; and Report No 3, op cit, paras 94-99.)

58. In March 1943 the coast defence and anti-aircraft armament allotted to the 8th Division was reported as follows:

Prince Rupert Defences

Main Defence	Artillery	3 - 6" guns
		2 - 8" R.R. guns
Harbour and Boom	"	2 - 12 pdr. guns

Close Defence	M.M.G's	7 - M.M.G's - ultimately 8 - M.M.G's
	L.M.G's	6 - L.M.G's
A.A. Defence	Artillery	12 - 40 mm Bofors 4 - 3.7" A.A. guns
C.A.S.L's		2 - 60" Concentrated 2 - 60" Dispersed 1 - 38" Dispersed 2 - 18" Concentrated
<u>Annette Island</u>		8 - 40 mm Bofors 4 - 3.7" A.A. guns
<u>Tyee</u>	Artillery	2 - 25 pdr guns - Hows
	C.A.S.L's	Ultimately 2 - 90 Cm
	Armoured Train	2 - 75 mm guns 4 - 40 mm Bofors 2 - 120 Cm Searchlights
<u>Alliford Bay</u>		2 - 75 mm guns 2 - 2" Mortars 2 - 40 mm Bofors 3 - M.M.G's 2 - .5 A.A.M.G's

(The "Operational Plan" for the 8th Canadian Division may be found in the War Diary, H.Q. 8 Cdn Div (G.S.), March 1943, Appx 2, from which the information in the preceding paragraphs was taken.)

STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION

59. The total strength of the 8th Division and all units under its command on 9 Jan 43 was 7,197. Of this number, 431 were officers, 3,263 Active soldiers, and 3,703 H.D. or N.R.M.A. personnel (H.Q.S. 8899, vol 3: "Canadian Army in Canada by Formations - Strength", 9 Jan 43). An Operational Location Statement showing the composition of the 8th Division, the location and approximate strengths of its units on 7 Apr 43 is attached as Appx "A".

TRAINING

60. During the first months in Pacific Command, it appears that of necessity much time was spent on the problems of organization, leaving little time for more than individual training. On 14-20 Oct 42 a message battle scheme, Exercise "Lilac", originating at Pacific Command Headquarters, was carried out to test communications and staff work of formations and units in Pacific Command. The Prince Rupert Defences and the 14th Brigade took part, and it was considered that all concerned "derived great benefit because by actually going through the motions and assisting in the preparation of the planned defence scheme...they learned their duties thoroughly and became better acquainted with the defences of the area" (P.C.S. 501-1-26, vol 1 (H.S.): Col D.B. Martyn to Headquarters, Pacific Command, 22 Oct 42).

61. Under instructions from Pacific Command Headquarters, a winter training course was to be held at Prince George by the 8th Division. Instructors who attended were later to conduct similar training for the units at Prince George, Terrace and

Prince Rupert (W.D., H.Q. Pacific Command (G.S., Trng), October 1942, Appx 10).

62. Combined Operations training began on 9 Dec 42 at Courtenay Camp under the auspices of Pacific Command Headquarters. One officer and 40 other ranks from both The Midland Regiment and The Winnipeg Grenadiers were to represent the 8th Division on the first course (Ibid: November 1942, Appx 20), and in addition the 8th Division was allotted a number of vacancies on the courses to be held during 1943. Normal Combined Operations training was suspended during June, July and August 1943, in order to give preference to the units undergoing "Green Light" training.[#]

63. In March 1943 Pacific Command Headquarters informed the 6th and 8th Divisions that it would be advisable to train men as observers and snipers in the use of "tree climbing irons", and drew attention to the fact that the Japanese Army in the South Pacific had used such personnel in woods and jungles with considerable success. Each battalion and Brigade Headquarters was to send one N.C.O. to a short course on this subject, to be held in the Vancouver area from 5 Apr to 17 Apr 43 (Ibid: March 1943, Appx 9). The 8th Division was also instructed to send four teams, each consisting of one officer and five other ranks, to the Canadian Battle Drill School at Vernon for a course beginning 9 May 43, and similar vacancies were allotted on succeeding courses.

64. A security scheme, Exercise "Muskeg", was held at Prince Rupert 22-25 Jun 43, with members of the Reserve Machine Gun Battalion acting as Nazi agents. The United States Army, The Royal Canadian Navy, and Headquarters, 8th Division, also supplied personnel. A similar exercise, "Nechako", was held at Prince George beginning 24 Jul, with members of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers taking the role of enemy agents.

65. A School of Mountaineering had been held during the summer of 1942 in Little Yoho Valley, Yoho National Park, B.C., for which instructional personnel had been supplied by the Alpine Club of Canada. This course was repeated in 1943 from 17 Jul to 7 Aug. No 1 Pack Transport Troop was used to transport supplies for the camp, and a composite company from the 8th Division, consisting of approximately 147 all ranks, attended for purposes of instruction. During the summer 8th Division troops also carried out training at Wainwright, Alberta.

66. Courses in "Forest, Bush and Jungle Warfare" were conducted at Prince George under the supervision of the G.O.C., 8th Division. The first course was held in August 1943. Liaison concerning this subject was maintained with British and American Army authorities in order to take advantage of lessons already learned in actual fighting. The courses endeavoured to "instruct as many Officers and N.C.Os. as possible...in the art of living and fighting in small groups in close country, without camp facilities, under all weather conditions, and for long periods of time" (P.C.S. 502-1-28, vol 1 (H.S.): Report on Forest, Bush and Jungle Warfare School, Prince George, 19 Jan 44).

DISBANDMENT - 15 OCT 43

67. By the summer of 1943 there was evident some improvement in the strategic situation in Europe and in the Pacific theatre, and the possibility of an attack on either coast of Canada appeared lessened. As a result, the C.G.S.

proposed to the Minister of National Defence on 30 Aug 43 that the 7th and 8th Divisions should be disbanded, and the strength of the 6th Division should be reduced. These recommendations were approved by the War Committee of the Cabinet on the following day, 31 Aug 43 (H.Q.S. 20-1-5, vol 3: Murchie to the Minister, 13 Jan 44). Mr. Ralston made a public announcement of this decision on 13 Sep 43. His statement read, in part as follows:

Events of recent months have greatly improved the general strategic situation in respect to the defence of both coastal regions of Canada.

In the Pacific there has been the eviction of the Japanese from the Aleutians and the increasing scale of operations in the South West Pacific.

The European area has seen the continuance of Russian successes with increasing menace to Hitler, the destruction of the Axis forces in North Africa, and the capitulation of Italy. These successes intensify the threat of further operations against the Axis both in Northwestern Europe and in the Mediterranean area.

While these developments do not remove the threat of enemy action in certain forms against this continent they reduce materially the scale of any possible operation of that kind.

The degree of probability and the possible type and weight of any such operations have been appraised in consultation with the United States authorities.

In the light of this appraisal it is possible to revise the composition of the portion of the Army in Canada which is allotted to operational tasks and to effect a reorganization and a substantial reduction in the number of troops to be employed for that purpose.

Obviously, operational troops in Canada are employed principally in connection with the defence of the Atlantic and Pacific coastal areas. Consequently the main features of the reorganization will include:

(a) Downward adjustments in local defences at strategic points, having regard to their relative importance and vulnerability.

(b) The 7th and 8th Divisions now on duty in Canada will be disbanded and the 6th Division will be partially disbanded. In substitution for these Divisions it is proposed to retain a composite formation of three brigade groups each capable of operating independently. These troops will be administered and trained under a modified Divisional Headquarters.

(The Ottawa Journal, 13 Sep 43)

68. The final entry of the War Diary of the Headquarters, 8th Canadian Division (G.S.), dated 15 Oct 43, is as follows:

The 8 Cdn Div has completed disbandment and ceases to exist w.e.f. 2359 hrs this date.

Thus, after an existence of approximately 14 months, the 8th Division, which had been first discussed in March 1942, and which had commenced organization of its Headquarters on 3 Aug 42, ceased to function. The 8th Divisional Headquarters had fulfilled, for the period of one year, its purpose of relieving the G.O.C.-in-C., Pacific Command, of the direct control of the 14th and 16th Brigade Groups and of the Prince Rupert Defences (para 30), and in doing so had helped provide stronger defences for the west coast of Canada during the period when it had seemed most likely that stronger defences would be necessary.

69. This report was drafted by Miss J.N. Buchanan, Historical Section, Army Headquarters.

T. Stacey, Capt
for (C.P. Stacey) Colonel,
Director Historical Section (G.S.)

21 Apr 47.

APPENDIX "A"

Parent Unit	Sub Unit or Det	Approx Offrs	Strength O.Rs.	Location	Armament
H.Q. 8 Cdn Div	H.Q.	32	130	Prince George	
8 Def & Emp Pl	Pl	1	59	Prince George	
H.Q. R.C.A. 8 Div	H.Q.	3	24	Prince George	
H.Q. R.C.E. 8 Div	H.Q.	6	24	Prince George	
H.Q. R.C.A.S.C. 8 Div	H.Q.	14	111	Prince George	
8 Div Fd Security Sec	Sec	1	7	Prince George	
8 Div Postal Unit	Unit	1	24	Prince George	
8 Div Fd Cash Office	Office	2	3	Prince George	
"D" Sec 8 Div Sigs	Sec	2	38	Prince George	
DIV TPS					
24 Fd Coy R.C.E.	Coy	4	140	Prince George	
Gen Tpt Coy R.C.A.S.C. 8 Div	Coy (less one tpt pl, det 8 composite pl, det relief dr increment, det wkshop pl)		256	Prince George	
14 CDN INF BDE					
H.Q.	Bde H.Q.	11	49	Terrace	
14 Def & Emp Pl	Pl	1	26	Terrace	
"K" Sec 8 Div Sigs	Sec (less Det)	2	40	Terrace	
	Det		2	Tyee	
112 L.A.D.	L.A.D.	1	15	Terrace	
Kent R.	Bn	29	554	Terrace	
K.O.R. of C.	Bn less two coys and one pl	27	451	Terrace	
	One pl	1	33	Tyee	
22 Fd Regt	R.H.Q.	8	61	Terrace	
	6 Fd Bty (less one sec)	9	183	Terrace	6-25 pdr guns
	Sec	1	28	Tyee	2-25 pdr guns
	80 Fd Bty	10	179	Terrace	8-25 pdr guns
9 Lt A.A. Regt	48 Lt A.A. Bty	8	238	Terrace	8-40 mm Bofors
17 (NBC) Coast Regt	Det 102 Coast Bty		8	Tyee	2-18" S.L's
21 Fd Coy	Coy	4	175	Terrace	
1 Fd Amb	Coy (less det)	11	221	Terrace	
11 Aero Def Coy	Coy (less det)	1	49	Terrace	
Armd Train	Det	1	5	Pacific	2-75 mm guns 4-40 mm Bofors 6-T.S.M.G's 2-90 cm S.L's
42 Pro Coy	H.Q. & det	1	22	Terrace	
Gen Tpt Coy 8 Div	One Tpt Pl	2	93	Terrace	
	det Composite pl, det relief dr increment det wkshop pl				
16 CDN INF BDE					
H.Q.	Bde H.Q.	12	47	Prince George	
16 Def & Emp Pl	Pl	1	37	Prince George	
Oxf Rif	Bn	29	551	Prince George	

P of W Rang	Bn	33	653	Prince George	
3 Edmn Fus	Bn	34	690	Prince George	
43 Pro Coy	det		17	Prince George	
14 Aero Def Coy	Coy	2	87	Smithers	
PRINCE RUPERT DEFENCES					
H.Q.	H.Q.	7	37	Prince Rupert	
17 (NBC) Coast Regt	H.Q.	3	17	Prince Rupert	
	F.C. Post		9	Kaien	
	F.C. Post	5	56	Barrett	
	F.C. Post		10	Frederick	
9 Coast Bty	Bty less E tp	5	181	Kaien (Fairview)	2-8" U.S. Ry guns 2-40 mm Bofor
	E tp (less dets)	3	79	Frederick	2-12 pdr guns 2-60" (DB) C.A.S.L's
	det	1	5	Casey	1-6 pdr gun 1-38" (DB) Comm Lights
102 Coast Bty	det B tp & 2 A.A. Sec	7	257	F.O.P. Digby Barrett Fort	3-6" (Mk III) guns 1-6 pdr gun 2-40 mm Bofor 2-60" (CB) C.A.S.L's
	D tp	1	34	Dundas	1-75 mm gun 2-18" (DB) Comm Lights
22 Fd Regt	3 Fd Bty less one tp	5	98	Prince Rupert	4-25 pdr guns
	One tp less one sec	2	31	Verney	2-25 pdr guns
	One sec 3 Fd Bty	2	36	Casey	2-25 pdr guns
22 A.A. Bty	H.Q. and Bty less one tp	5	179	Prince Rupert	4-3.7" A.A. g
	One tp (less one det at Digby Island 1 offr 56 O.Rs. building sites)	3	86	Annette Island	4-3.7" A.A. g
32 A.A. Bty	Bty H.Q. B tp	7	170	Prince Rupert	4-40 mm Bofor
	A tp			Prince Rupert	4-40 mm Bofor
34 A.A. Bty	Bty	6	165	Annette Island	8-40 mm Bofor
58 Spec A.A. Bty	One Sec	2	44	Alliford Bay	2-40 mm Bofor 2-75 mm guns
Wpg Gren	Bn less two pls	28	577	Prince Rupert	
	One pl		24	Frederick	
	One pl		34	Dundas	
Mid R	Bn less one coy	28	397	Highway Camp Prince Rupert	
	One coy	2	40	Port Edward	
K.O.R. of C.	One coy	2	93	Alliford Bay	
	One coy	2	95	Highway Camp Prince Rupert	

9 Area Sigs	Coy	4	79	Prince Rupert
4 Fort Coy R.C.E.	Sec less			
	three dets	2	35	Prince Rupert
	Det		9	Barrett Fort
	Det		14	Frederick
	Det		7	Dundas
8 Aero Def Coy	Coy	1	42	Annette Island
42 Pro Coy	Det	1	22	Prince Rupert
37 Coy V.G.C.	Pl	1	41	Drydock

H.W.E. and MISCELLANEOUS

#1 Camp Ord Depot	Depot	2	64	Terrace
#2 Camp Ord Depot	Depot	3	98	Prince Rupert
#5 Adv Ord Depot	Depot	10	144	Prince George
11 Coy R.C.E.	Det	1	22	Prince Rupert
C.D.C.	dets	4	6	Prince George
		3	5	Terrace
		3	5	Prince Rupert
Prince George				
Mil Hosp	(offrs incl	(17	65	Prince George
Prince Rupert	N/S)	(
Hosp		(10	37	Prince Rupert
4 Sup Depot		3	53	Prince Rupert
5 Sup Depot		1	15	Terrace
6 Sup Depot		1	16	Prince George

(W.D., H.Q. 8 Cdn Div (G.S.), April 1943, Appx 2)

APPENDIX "B"

PACIFIC COAST MILITIA RANGERS
UNDER COMMAND 8 CDN DIV

<u>Unit</u>	<u>Localization</u>
<u>14 Cdn Inf Bde</u>	
No 69 Coy	Butedale
No 70 Coy	Terrace
No 83 Coy	Surf Inlet
<u>16 Cdn Inf Bde</u>	
No 74 Coy	Bella Coola
No 33 Coy	Ocean Falls
No 37 Coy	Lillooet
No 39 Coy	Williams Lake
No 52 Coy	Smithers
No 64 Coy	Clinton
No 97 Coy	Quesnel
No 98 Coy	Wells
No 104 Coy	McBride
No 106 Coy	Hudson Hope
No 131 Coy	Prince George
<u>Prince Rupert Def</u>	
No 95 Coy	Port Simpson
No 96 Coy	Queen Charlotte City
No 105 Coy	Masset
No 108 Coy	Cunshewa Inlet Moresby Island
No 109 Coy	Cunshewa Inlet Moresby Island
No 113 Coy	Huxley Island
No 114 Coy	Cunshewa Inlet
No 130 Coy	Kincolith

(W.D., H.Q. 8 Cdn Div (G.S.), March 1943, Appx 2,
"Operational Plan 8 Cdn Div", Appx "H")