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HISTORICAL SECTION

ARMY HEADQUARTERS

1 Apr 60

Canada's Post-War
Defence Policy 1945-1950

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Canada's Post-War
Defence Policy, 1945-1950

1. This Report covers the hiatus between the conclusion of the Second World War and the outbreak of fighting in Korea. Outwardly the great shrinking in Canada's armed forces suggested a reversion to the ante bellum policy of mobilizing the reserve components before endeavouring to cope with any but sudden and completely unexpected emergencies. That North America could no longer live in "splendid isolation" and that time was now on the side of any potential enemy aggressor were, however, facts only imperfectly realized by even well-informed citizens. Rivalry among the great powers had already put a damper on the high hopes engendered by the original concept of a United Nations organization for world peace. The shadow cast over the free world by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its satellites suggested that an answer lay with regional defence agreements in which members of the British Commonwealth would be joined by the United States of America. Both the continuance of Canadian-American co-operation in defence matters and the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came under this heading. Since these were years of germination in which no single aspect of defence policy reached fruition, however, the present Report can be only a topical treatment which emphasizes beginnings and reaches no conclusions.

2. Problems of security and inaccessibility of documentary material, particularly as regards the files of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, have made it impossible to provide a better account at this time. On the other hand, A History of the Defence Research Board of Canada by Captain D.J. Goodspeed (Ottawa, 1958) provides an adequate treatment of one phase of Canada's post-war defence story.

PART I - THE OLD ORDER CHANGETH

(1) Earlier Policy

3. During its long sojourn in Canada the British Army maintained plans for defence against the only conceivable enemy -- the United States of America. But the withdrawal of British troops in 1871 (except for the garrison at Halifax) virtually coincided with the negotiation of the Treaty of Washington, which settled existing Anglo-American disputes and ushered in an era of better relations. Canadian interest in its Militia soon declined and successive governments of the young Dominion did not even bother to have defence schemes drafted. "You must not take the Militia seriously," Sir Wilfrid Laurier told the last British officer to hold the appointment of General Officer Commanding, "for though it is useful in suppressing internal disturbances, it will not be required for the defence of the country, as the Monroe Doctrine protects us against enemy aggression".¹ Nevertheless, a report prepared by four British officers in 1898, at the instance of the War Office, was unofficially accepted as the country's defence plan until after the First world war.²

4. During the "roaring twenties" and "hungry thirties" the General Staff Branch at National Defence Headquarters in Ottawa devoted considerable attention to the preparation of defence schemes aimed at two eventualities: direct defence of Canadian soil against an aggressor and indirect defence, which might necessitate the despatch of an expeditionary force to act in conjunction with forces of other members of the British Commonwealth and/or Allied Nations. Work on Defence Scheme No. 1 was never reduced to final form and in 1931 the Chief of the General Staff was led to observe that "the direct defence of Canada against invasion by the United States is a problem which in the last ten years has become increasingly susceptible to political solution but quite incapable of being satisfactorily answered by Empire military action".³ Defence Scheme No. 2 envisaged the Japanese as aggressors, but was never developed in detail and during the 1930s became a tri-service outline plan for the preservation of Canadian neutrality in the event of a war between the United States and Japan. Only Defence Scheme No. 3 was a continuing project. It envisaged the outbreak of a major war, with limited immediate threat to Canadian territory but under circumstances probably necessitating intervention overseas. By 1937, however, the direct defence of Canada was looming large in governmental thinking, so increasing attention was directed to local defence and internal security. The expeditionary force element in this Scheme was redesignated the "Mobile Force" and given the following functions:

¹Esquimalt did not receive even rudimentary fortifications, guns and small garrison until 1873. It was a Russian, rather than American, scare that prompted this step.

The primary object governing the mobilizing of the Mobile Force is to employ it, in whole or in part, against enemy landings on Canadian territory, should a situation develop whereby there will be danger that such landings cannot be rapidly dealt with by forces locally and immediately available. The Scheme will also serve as a means of providing a field force for employment, with other Empire forces, overseas, should this be the decision of the Canadian Government in the light of conditions then existing.⁴

5. During 1931 work had been started on a Defence Scheme No. 4, which envisaged the possible despatch of a small Canadian Contingent to meet a minor "Empire crisis", such as a native rising in South Africa or unrest in India. The planners considered that sentimental rather than logical reasons would create a public demand for Canadian participation, as had been the case in 1899, but believed that there would likely be sufficient volunteers to permit the despatch of either a cavalry or an infantry brigade group. This Scheme was, however, never completed.⁵

6. Theoretically Canada had a double naval responsibility during these years: to provide for the defence of both coasts and to co-operate with naval forces of other members of the British Commonwealth. But due to financial stringency only an attempt could be made to cope with the first.⁶ The Royal Canadian Air Force was not properly organized for a military role and, until 1938, its Senior Air Officer reported to the Minister of National Defence through the Chief of the General Staff.⁷

7. During May 1937 the Minister of National Defence told a meeting of the Imperial Conference assembled in London that Canada had established defence priorities:

In general, may I make it very definite... that we attach the first importance to Air development and to attaining our objective of 11 permanent and 12 non-permanent squadrons.

Next in order we place the increasing of our modest Naval force from four to six destroyers - with four out of the six stationed on the Pacific. And lastly, we plan to have two out of our six divisions completely equipped, thoroughly modernized and mechanized, and ready for service immediately in any part of Canada.

In all our plans and preparations we are paying particular attention to the Pacific Coast....⁸

He then stated that the following conclusions had been reached by the Canadian Government:

1. Canadian public opinion supports the present defence policy of the Government of Canada.
2. Canadian public opinion will not, under present conditions, support any larger appropriations than those voted this year by Parliament.
3. Canadian public opinion is definitely opposed to extraneous commitments but is prepared to support a National defence policy for the protection of our coasts and the focal areas of our trade routes....

8. Although it had been customary for Canada's armed forces to model their organization and equipment on those of the United Kingdom, there had never been any specific agreement to this effect: whatever understanding existed was purely tacit and was a voluntary continuation of a practice which the First World War had demonstrated to be both practicable and necessary. The Imperial Conference of 1937 "noted with satisfaction" that co-operation in time of danger would be facilitated by the similarity of the several naval, military and air forces. There also was general agreement that the continued interchange of officers and information of a service nature would further facilitate matters. According to the official Summary of Proceedings, however:

At the same time the Conference recognized that it is the sole responsibility of the several Parliaments of the British Commonwealth to decide the nature and scope of their own defence policy.⁹

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff had been exchanging information with the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the several Dominions since 1909, and had inaugurated an exchange of periodic liaison letters in 1920, but the information informally supplied from Ottawa in return soon became restricted in consequence of the Canadian Government's sensitivity and reiterated policy of "no commitments" in advance of the outbreak of a major war.¹⁰

9. Because of the beliefs that North America was immune from attack by all but hit-and-run raiders from the sea and that there would be adequate time to prepare for war after hostilities had commenced, there was no attempt at mutual defence planning by Canada and the United States. Despite the assurance given by President Roosevelt at Kingston, Ontario on 18 August, 1938 that "the United States will not stand idly by if domination of Canadian soil is threatened by any other Empire", and Prime Minister King's subsequent protestation that Canada too had obligations as a good friendly neighbour,¹¹ neither country had service attachés stationed in the other and liaison was limited to a few purely private conversations by individual officers.

10. Despite the magnitude of her Second World War effort, Canada failed to make her voice heard in its higher direction. During the early months of "phoney war" Canada's policy was a planned and limited co-operation with the United Kingdom. Subsequently, when the British Empire-Commonwealth stood virtually alone, the Canadian Prime Minister declined to participate in an Imperial War Cabinet. This encouraged the British Government to make and carry out decisions for all.¹²

11. Canadian-American relations did become closer during 1940, resulting in the establishment of a Permanent Joint Board on Defence which drafted a Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 1 to cover the situation which would arise should the United Kingdom be defeated. As a consequence of the United States-British Staff Conversations Report (ABC-1), dated 27 March 1941 and setting forth the manner in which the two great powers would collaborate in the event that the United States became a belligerent, the service members of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence drafted a supplementary Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plan No. 2 (Short Title ABC-22). Intended to amplify and, where necessary, modify the United States-British Commonwealth Basic War Plan No. 1, this ABC-22 Plan set forth the following tasks to be undertaken jointly by the United States and Canada:

- (a) the protection of overseas shipping within the northern portions of the Western Atlantic and Pacific Areas;
- (b) the protection of sea communications within the coastal zones;
- (c) the defence of Alaska, Canada, Newfoundland (which includes Labrador), and the northern portion of the United States.¹³

12. Both the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and the Cabinet War Committee were willing to accept strategic direction of joint forces from the United States, "subject to consultation with" Canada, in the event of the United Kingdom being defeated. Throughout the spring and early summer of 1941 they contended, however, that under ABC-22 specific operational tasks could be assigned to the armed forces of both countries and that co-ordination of responsibility could be attained by the "same mutual co-operation which has been so evident between United Kingdom and Canadian Forces now operating in the Atlantic Area".¹⁴ Seeming deadlock was eventually broken by the following compromise:

Coordination of the military effort of the United States and Canada shall be effected by mutual cooperation, and by assigning to the forces of each nation tasks for whose execution such forces shall be primarily responsible. These tasks may be assigned in Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plans, or by agreement between the Chiefs of Staff concerned, the United States Chief of Naval Operations being considered as such.¹⁵

In effecting such co-operation the forces of each nation would support those of the other to "their utmost capacity". Each nation would retain the strategic direction and command of its own forces, except when there was agreement that local circumstances made advisable the establishment of a unified command. Such agreement would, however, be subject to confirmation by the Chiefs of Staff. And such a commander should have no control over the administration and discipline of the unified force. Furthermore, he could not move the naval forces of the other nation from the North Atlantic or North Pacific Oceans, nor the land and air forces from the adjacent land areas, without authorization by the Chief of Staff concerned.¹⁶

13. Following the entry of the United States into the Second World War the provisions of ABC-22 were placed in effect against Japan on 7 December and Germany and Italy on 19 December 1941. When the Canadian and American Chiefs of Staff met in Washington at the end of December, however, the latter conceded that there was no need for unified command in Newfoundland or on the Pacific coast.¹⁷ And the war remained sufficiently distant from North America to make unnecessary any change in viewpoint. The so-called "North American Area" was not included in one of the operational theatres and any necessary action was taken only as a result of direct negotiation between the Canadian and American Chiefs of Staff. Naturally enough, the Canadian component of the Kiska expedition was placed under American command, subject to the qualifications regarding administration and discipline mentioned above.

14. But neither before nor after Pearl Harbor was Canada afforded the opportunity to participate as a full partner with the United Kingdom and the United States in the higher direction of military affairs. Although a Canadian Joint Staff was created in Washington during the spring and summer of 1942, under the chairmanship of Major-General M.A. Pope who had been appointed Canadian representative to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and a Canadian Joint Staff Mission blossomed forth in London in May 1944, these functioned best along channels established by individual members. The fact that Canada preferred to approach London rather than Washington, in the belief that a more sympathetic hearing would be given in the former, must have strengthened Prime Minister Churchill's belief that there was Canadian acquiescence in his presenting the British Commonwealth view to President Roosevelt. Actually, of course, the Canadian Government was vainly trying to insist that Canada should be treated as an independent power with national rights in no way dependent upon her membership in the British Commonwealth; moreover, she was quite unwilling to recognize or utilize Commonwealth procedures or machinery, which might have temporary practical advantages but would compromise the country's status.¹⁸

(ii) Basis for a New Approach

15. What was to become the Canadian approach to military policy after the Second World War seems to have been set forth originally in a report of the Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems dated 16 June 1944 (see paras 17-19). At its meeting on 19 July the Cabinet War Committee gave general approval to this Report, the following paragraphs of which were most relevant:

There are three important lines of approach to the consideration of Canadian military policy after the war, each of which is closely related to the other two. These are:

- (a) Canadian participation in the static defence of the North American continent;
- (b) the Canadian relationship to the defence of the British Commonwealth and especially of Great Britain; and
- (c) the military obligations which may be assumed by Canada as a member of the new world security organization.

2. Canadian defence arrangements with the United States relate especially to the first of these three aspects. If the plans are fulfilled to develop the present alliance against Germany and Japan into a permanent security organization, in which the United States is an active partner, the third aspect will in part merge with the first, because the employment of facilities on Canadian territory, especially air and naval installations, will be essential in order to ensure the rapid deployment of forces from North America against an aggressor in Europe or Northeastern Asia. Hence facilities in Canada will be required both for static defence and to meet aggression or the threat of aggression outside North America.

3. The connection between the defence of the British Commonwealth and Canadian defence arrangements with the United States is perhaps not so close. The common standards of training and equipment maintained by United Kingdom and Canada forces, however, ensure that for a period of years at least Canadian military policy will be greatly influenced by developments in the United Kingdom, quite apart from the political considerations arising from membership in the British Commonwealth.

4. Long range planning must be based on an appreciation of the dangers of attack in the case of static defence and of the probable enemies in the case of a general war. It cannot be projected far into the future and it is suggested that a period of ten years from the defeat of Japan might be accepted as the basis for Canadian planning. Provided that complete victory is won and that it is followed by thorough disarmament of Germany and Japan, it may safely be assumed that there is no danger of attack on North America during the ten years after the war. Even if tension were to become acute between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., the problems of recovery and development in the U.S.S.R. are so great that the possibility of warfare between these two Great Powers during the next decade is extremely remote.¹⁹

(iii) Post-Hostilities Planning Committees

16. As early as 4 December 1942, however, the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs had advised the several Dominion Governments by telegram that a

Military Sub-Committee of the Chiefs of Staff Committee had been established to study post-war problems.²⁰ Subsequently the Dominions were invited to send service representatives to its meetings.²¹ During the spring of 1943 Internal Economic and External Affairs Committees also were established, the three reporting to a Ministerial Committee headed by Sir William Jowitt (Minister without Portfolio).²² During May 1944 the Military Sub-Committee was turned into a Post-Hostilities Planning Staff, subservient to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Planning Directorates of the three Services.²³ Thenceforth planning proceeded on the assumption that the termination of hostilities would be followed by a "ten year safe period" during which the likelihood of a major war (or air attack on the United Kingdom) would be unlikely. This assumption was based on the premise that Germany and Italy would be completely defeated and effectively demoralized. A further assumption was that there would be a "two year period" of warning before any major war broke out.²⁴

17. No action seems to have been taken in Ottawa, however, until the receipt of Prime Minister Churchill's telegram of 19 June 1943 stating that the extent to which the Dominions would be consulted over armistice terms would depend on the extent to which they were prepared to participate in an army of occupation. On 22 July 1943 the Chiefs of Staff, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Secretary of the Cabinet War Committee and other senior civil servants met to discuss what attitude the Canadian Government might adopt. Their conclusions formed the basis for Mr. King's generally favourable reply of 30 July to Mr. Churchill.²⁵

18. On 3 August representatives of the three Services, Privy Council and Department of External Affairs held their first meeting as a "working committee" to give continuous attention to post-hostilities problems. In consequence of its first two reports, dated 3 November 1943, the Cabinet War Committee decided on 24 November to establish a Post-Hostilities Advisory Committee to give direction and guidance to the Working Committee, to refer to it matters requiring detailed study, and to submit to the Cabinet War Committee recommendations on post-hostilities problems as they might arise.²⁶ The Advisory Committee was to include the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Cabinet War Committee and the Deputy Minister of Finance. The Working Committee, headed by Mr. H.H. Wrong of the Department of External Affairs, comprised the Director of Naval Plans, Director of Military Operations and Plans, the Director of Air Plans, a representative from the Privy Council and a secretary from the Department of External Affairs. A partial list of the subjects to be studied follows:

- (i) Advantages and disadvantages to Canada of organizing world security on a regional or on a universal basis.
- (ii) Post-war defence arrangements with the United States.
- (iii) Canadian policy toward defence of Newfoundland.
- (iv) Canadian role in North Pacific defence.²⁷

Although for some months to come the Canadian Government was too busy with current problems to give much direction to this work, it seems likely that the expressed intention of the "Big Four" powers to establish a United Nations Organization had been the spur behind the above action. For the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 had reassuringly stated that the United Kingdom, United States, U.S.S.R. and China were agreed upon the necessity of establishing "at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security".²⁸

19. During 1944 this Working Committee in Ottawa was able to study the draft papers prepared by the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff in London. But early in 1945 their distribution on a government-to-government basis ceased. Dominion representatives were told, at a meeting of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff on 25 January, "that the papers were Staff studies, that they did not represent the views of the British Chiefs of Staff or the British Government, that they were purely exploratory in character, and that it was not intended when finalized²⁹ that they should serve as a basis for executive action. Actually, although still tacitly implied, the series of strategic studies then in preparation no longer made reference to a "ten year safe period"; instead, appreciations were related to "the situation that may be expected to exist in the period 1955-60", when the U.S.S.R. might be expected to have recovered from war exhaustion and consideration would have to be given to the possibility of there being a major war.³⁰ It was indicated at the same meeting on 25 January 1945 that the exchange of papers might be re-established on a military basis after arrangements had been concluded with individual Dominions. But Commander G.F. Todd of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission in London pointed out that the Post-Hostilities Advisory Committee in Ottawa included a representative of the Department of External Affairs: in consequence, certain of its studies might be political as well as military in nature.³¹ Consequently a fully reciprocal arrangement did not become possible.

20. Although the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff's final study entitled "Security of the British Empire in the Period 1955-1960" was drastically revised in consequence of the attitudes adopted by Dominions representatives, these were not able to obtain copies for transmission home. During July 1945 the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff was dissolved and its functions assumed by the Joint Planning Staff. Furthermore, the introduction of nuclear warfare made it imperative to reconsider all existing studies.³²

21. In view of Canadian interest in any studies dealing with imperial defence, the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Ottawa decided on 12 October 1945 to have the Canadian Joint Staff Mission make an informal approach to the British Chiefs of Staff.³³ On 30 October the Canadian Joint Staff Mission replied by telegram that, for the time being, there was no potential enemy against whom the British need prepare strategic plans: the Joint Planning Staff was mainly concerned with current problems and its ad hoc studies would not interest the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, it "would be misleading and possibly dangerous" to pass to Canada all Joint Planning Staff and Joint Intelligence Committee papers prior to their approval by the Chiefs of Staff.³⁴ However, the British Chiefs of Staff Committee proposed to pass copies of its agenda to the Canadian Joint Staff Mission, which might then apply to peruse any papers likely to be of interest. It was hoped that such requests would not often have to be withheld. Papers released for transmission to Ottawa must, however, be for the "strictly personal information of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff and... not be circulated to other authorities". In return, the British Chiefs of Staff had expressed a wish to examine any Canadian planning papers which might be of common interest. But it was not to be inferred that papers would be supplied only on a reciprocal basis, since they were "anxious to meet the wishes of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff in every way possible". In return, at its meeting of 9 November, the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Committee authorized its secretary to forward to the Canadian Joint Staff Mission, for transmission to the British Chiefs of Staff, a copy of the recent inter-service paper on post-war organization of research for defence. In future the secretary was to seek authority from the Committee to forward to London any papers thought suitable.³⁵

(iv) Post-War Defence Organization

22. On 29 March 1945 the Cabinet War Committee agreed that the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems should be directed to initiate a preliminary study of the nature and extent of the permanent forces which Canada should establish and maintain in the period following the conclusion of hostilities. It was not until 25 June, however, that the Chiefs of Staff had the opportunity to outline their respective plans to the Minister of National

Defence (Hon. A.G.L. McNaughton), the Minister of National Defence for Naval Services (Hon. D.C. Abbott) and the Minister of National Defence for Air (Hon. C.W.G. Gibson).

23. The Chief of the Naval Staff then explained that naval plans were in a preliminary stage and had not yet been discussed with Mr. Abbott. It was hoped to organize the Navy as a task force instead of the present escort force. This would comprise two aircraft carriers, four cruisers, two flotillas of modern destroyers and possibly other types of vessels for quick manning in the event of war. Active strength requirements would be 20,000 officers and ratings - half afloat and half ashore. The Reserve would require a further 20,000.³⁶

24. The proposal advanced by the Chief of the General Staff was the seventh or Plan "G" prepared by the Directorate of Staff Duties and would require the following manpower:

Active Force	55,788
Reserve Force	177,396
Training Force	48,500
	<hr/>
	281,684 ³⁷

The Active Force would be organized as a self-contained infantry brigade group for employment as a mobile striking force and would also provide nuclei for defence installations, research and development work, as well as administrative and training staffs. The bulk of any wartime expeditionary force would be found from the Reserve Force organization. But plan "G" depended on the adoption of universal military training on a compulsory basis (as was being mooted in the United States), with youths 18½ to 19½ years of age being inducted at four months' intervals for a year's training which would be followed by an obligatory period of service in the Reserve Force. Should the Navy and Air Force agree, those so electing would be reallocated after the initial phase of military training had been completed. /

25. The Chief of the Air Staff pointed out that R.C.A.F. requirements were merely an active nucleus capable of expansion in time of emergency and the framework for a large training scheme. Even this would require a Regular Force of 30,000 all ranks. There would also have to be an Auxiliary Force of 15,000 undergoing continuous part-time training and a Reserve Force of 50,000 who would be mainly ex-servicemen requiring only a minimum amount of training every year.

26. The annual drain on the nation's manpower for these active elements was estimated as being 10,000 and the estimated annual cost at \$190,500,000 (plus \$37,000,000 non-recurring for the Army). Neither the Chief of the Naval Staff nor the Chief of the Air Staff expressed any interest in the proposal for universal military training and indicated that their manpower requirements could be met by volunteers. Mr. Gibson and Mr. Abbott expressed doubt that such a scheme would be politically acceptable. The latter also suggested that the combined cost of the three plans seemed high. It was finally agreed, however, that the Chiefs of Staff should develop their proposals further and that, after review by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, these should then be presented to the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems.

27. On 10 July the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed that the Joint Planning Sub-Committee's "Appreciation of the Strategic Factors Affecting Canada's Post-War Military Requirements" should serve as the introduction to these studies of post-war defence forces.³⁸ This appreciation outlined the objects of planning and preparation as follows:

- (a) The defence of Canadian territory against attack.
- (b) The protection of Canadian trade and strategic routes.
- (c) The support of the World Security Organization.
- (d) Co-operation with Commonwealth, United States or other forces with which Canada may be associated in the event of another war.
- (e) Internal Security.³⁹

Actual military preparations would require:

- (a) "Regular" forces, immediately available, and sufficient to meet normal peacetime needs including post-war international obligations and training requirements.
- (b) An organization capable of rapid and full mobilization of Canada's war potential, including adequate arrangements for the development and production of military equipment.

28. In consequence of the dropping of atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (6 and 8 August respectively), which hastened the Japanese desire to bring hostilities to an end in the

Far East, the question naturally arose in Ottawa as to how this new means of destruction might affect post-war defence planning. Major-General M.A. Pope, now Military Secretary to the Cabinet, endeavoured to reassure Department of External Affairs officials that, if history could be taken as a guide, all sea, land and air forces would retain their corporate existence for some years at least and that the "see-saw struggle" between the weapons of offence and defence would continue.⁴⁰ He suggested that Canada should adopt a policy of "wait-and-see" and be content to follow the lead of the United Kingdom and the United States, who alone possessed the secret of the atomic bomb. On 21 August General McNaughton was succeeded as Minister of National Defence by Mr. Abbott, who continued to hold the portfolio of Minister of National Defence for Naval Services. But there continued to be separate departments, with a deputy minister for each. Mr. Gibson remained Minister of National Defence for Air.

29. The Cabinet Defence Committee, which had replaced the Cabinet War Committee, was determined to adopt a cautious attitude. On 28 September the Cabinet accepted its recommendation that, until some estimate could be made as to the nature and extent of Canada's international commitments and the effect of new weapons, it was not possible to assess with any degree of accuracy Canada's defence requirements and, consequently, no final decisions could be made as to the exact size and composition of the forces Canada should maintain in the post-war period. But Mr. Abbott and Mr. Gibson might make reference during the current session of Parliament to the fact that the following strengths were being used for planning purposes:

Navy -	10,000
Army -	20,000 to 25,000
Air Force -	15,000 to 20,000

Under the circumstances, no decision was possible either in favour of, or against, a policy of compulsory military training.⁴¹ Personnel for these prospective post-war forces were to be found initially from officers and men of the pre-war permanent forces and such wartime personnel as expressed a willingness to engage in naval, army and air interim or occupation forces rather than be demobilized as soon as their turn came.

30. As early as 1 September 1945 the Chief of the General Staff (Lieutenant-General C. Foulkes) had directed that planning should get underway to determine Canadian Army requirements in the event that the proposal for universal military training be turned down.⁴² It was now decided that the Cabinet's decision of 28 September meant virtual rejection of universal military training and that this new Plan "H" must form the basis for subsequent submission to higher authority.⁴³

31. On 19 December 1945 the Cabinet considered the establishments submitted for consideration by the Navy, Army and Air Force. The Navy proposed a fleet of two light fleet carriers, two cruisers and 12 fleet destroyers, of which one carrier and four destroyers would be in reserve. Personnel requirements, including a proposed naval air arm, would not exceed the tentatively approved total of 10,000 and would not be achieved before 1 January 1947. A Reserve of 18,000 would be organized in 24 naval divisions at principal centres of population across the country to incorporate and supersede the present R.C.N.R., R.C.N.V.R. and R.C.N.F.R. The estimated annual cost was \$45,000,000 and there would be initial non-recurring expenses estimated as being \$30,000,000. The Cabinet approved this plan, subject to the later approval of financial estimates.44

32. The Army proposal called for an Active Force comprising an infantry brigade group and coast defence units, headquarters staffs, administrative and training personnel and special establishments to total 25,000 all ranks; plus a special force of 1200 officers and other ranks to maintain the Alaska Highway and radio and wireless installations in the Yukon and North-West Territories. A Reserve Force of approximately 180,000 all ranks would be organized so as to provide six divisions, four armoured brigades and the necessary corps and army troops for an army of two corps. An indeterminate Supplementary Reserve would comprise individuals who were willing to retain a connection with the Canadian Army: these would provide nuclei for the organization of additional units required to support a field force in time of war. While retaining the existing 11 Military Districts for essential administrative purposes (for the time being), it was proposed that five Commands (western, Prairie, Central, Quebec and Eastern) be organized for operational and training purposes, but with only small staffs. Annual recurring cost for such a programme was estimated at \$70,000,000; initial non-recurring costs would amount to a further \$74,000,000. This also was approved by the Cabinet, subject to the same qualification.

33. The R.C.A.F. proposed a Regular Force of 20,000, an Auxiliary Force of 10,000 and a Reserve Force of 25,000. The Regular Force would provide 10 operational squadrons and eight composite flights, with the necessary headquarters, training and maintenance units. Initially the Auxiliary Force would consist of 19 squadrons, with nine squadrons more to be added at a later date. The Reserve would be former active members of the R.C.A.F. The estimated annual cost would be \$57,000,000. The Cabinet decided, however, that the maximum peace-time strength of the Regular Force should be only 15,000 and that there should be a corresponding reduction in the proposed Auxiliary Force.

34. Planning continued throughout the year 1946 to create permanent forces within the approved ceilings. Recruiting for Canadian Army's Active Force, Reserve Force and Supplementary Reserve commenced in October. On 12 December Hon. Brooke Claxton became sole Minister of National Defence and, as a first step in unifying the three Services, a single National Defence Headquarters was organized in Ottawa. The former Naval Building on Cartier Square was shortly rearranged (as "A" Building) to house the Minister of National Defence, Deputy Minister, Chiefs of Staff and Chairman of the Defence Research Board, and all the personnel directly related to policy making, planning, intelligence, training and operations. Personnel and pay matters for the three Services were relegated to what became known as "B" Building, while the separate staffs handling supply and equipment matters were grouped in an adjacent "C" Building. The Deputy Minister's administrative staff was divided under an associate deputy minister for finance and supply and an associate deputy minister having mainly to do with personnel and pay questions. The objects of this unification were stated to be:

- (1) The adoption of a unified defence program to meet agreed strategic needs;
- (2) A single defence budget under which funds and resources would be allocated in accordance with the program;
- (3) The elimination of duplicatory and even competing services;
- (4) Consistent and equitable personnel policies;
- (5) Greater emphasis on defence research and closer co-ordination with other government departments and with industry.⁴⁵

In order to implement this a number of sub-committees grew up, reporting respectively to one or other of the (inter-service) Chiefs of Staff Committee, Personnel Members Committee or Principal Supply Officers Committee. The Chiefs of Staff Committee, it might be emphasized, served as adviser to both the Cabinet Defence Committee and the Minister of National Defence. In the Defence Council, the Minister of National Defence could discuss with his principal service and civilian advisers any administrative problems concerning his Department as a whole. Heads of branches of each Service met separately as the Naval Board, the C.G.S. Weekly Conference or Air Council to settle problems peculiar to each. Legislation creating a Defence Research Board within the Department of National Defence became law on 28 March 1947. Its Director General (later called Chairman) became a member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

35. Possibly influenced by fear of an economic depression, which fortunately did not occur, the Government soon determined to follow a policy of greater economy. On 10 January 1947 Mr. Claxton told the Defence Council that the Cabinet Defence Committee had ruled that the Department of National Defence's financial estimates for the coming fiscal year 1947-1948 should not exceed \$200,000,000, exclusive of the Northwest Staging Route, Northwest Highway System, Aerial Mapping, Research and Demobilization which should be reduced from \$53,000,000 to approximately \$50,000,000. Mr. Claxton felt that the split should be \$50,000,000 for the Navy, \$85,000,000 for the Army and \$65,000,000 for the Air Force, and that the following principles should serve as a guide for effecting reductions:

- (a) economies in establishments;
- (b) restrictions of recruiting to 75% of authorized strengths;
- (c) reduction in the periods of training for the Reserve Forces;
- (d) review of reserves of materials of war;
- (e) postponement of all non-essential purchase and construction.⁴⁶

36. As regards the Canadian Army, Order in Council P.C. 1/3144 of 6 August 1947 authorized a ceiling of 26,329 all ranks for the Active Force but restricted actual strength to 20,079 all ranks - 2718 officers (including 87 nursing sisters and a reserve of 19) and 17,361 other ranks. Order in Council P.C. 4/3144 of the same day authorized a ceiling of 187,865 all ranks for the Reserve Force but directed that the actual number of personnel should not exceed 90,000 all ranks.

37. Actually considerable difficulty was experienced by the three Services in building up their strengths to even the restricted numbers for ratings, other ranks and airmen. Naval recruiting was not even equalling wastage: the strength of 5767 ratings on 1 July 1947 represented a net decrease of 523 in four months.⁴⁷ Recruiting for the R.C.A.F. had been suspended during the first half of 1947, pending adoption of a firm manpower ceiling, but wastage of existing personnel continued high, with a monthly rate of 85 releases by purchase. A statistical breakdown of the reasons why personnel desired to purchase discharge disclosed:⁴⁸

- (a) Dissatisfied generally with the Service 15%
- (b) Unable to find suitable accommodation for wives and children 11%

- (c) Dissatisfied with pay 22½%
To take up civilian employment 33½%
- (d) To go into business of their own 7%
- (e) To return to school 3½%
- (f) For compassionate grounds,
namely needed at home 7½%

On the other hand, and despite a few specialized exceptions, there proved to be more than sufficient officers to meet the post-war requirements of the three Services and it was considered that the envisaged officer training programmes would supply sufficient junior officers to meet continuing requirements.

38. On 30 September 1947 Mr. Claxton made a radio broadcast initiating a recruiting campaign for the three Services. This campaign was designed to attract both new civilian enlistments and veterans to the active and reserve forces. The following strengths indicate the success that was achieved over the following months:49

Fiscal Year	Navy		Army		Air Force	
	Active	Reserve	Active	Reserve	Active	Reserve
1946-47	7193	3498	15,563	37,657	12,626	408
1947-48	7435	2327	15,967	33,591	12,017	744
1948-49	8154	3272	18,970	36,311	14,552	1427
1949-50	9259	3601	20,652	43,047	17,274	2369

By the end of the period in question, the Cabinet had considerably modified the manpower restrictions introduced early in 1947. Authorized actual establishments were now 9047 for the Navy, 23,034 for the Army and 18,278 for the Air Force.50

39. Order in Council P.C. 1644 of 23 May 1947 authorized the formation of the Canadian Rangers as a corps of the Reserve Militia, not exceeding 5000 officers and soldiers. Organization and expansion were necessarily slow but more and more units gradually came to be located in the remote and sparsely populated northern and coastal areas. It was intended that they should provide guides and observers in the parts of the country with which they were most familiar and form an immediate asset in any emergency.

40. Effective 1 February 1947 (P.C. 314 of 5 February 1947) the Canadian Commercial Corporation assumed responsibility for procuring supplies for the Department of National Defence. Since 1940 this responsibility had rested successively with the

Department of Munitions and Supply and the Department of Reconstruction and Supply. Control over this Canadian Commercial Corporation was vested in the Minister of Trade and Commerce and in practice it was to be both a "shadow" Department of Munitions and Supply and a "shadow" Department of Civilian Supply. The wartime work of the Inspection Board of the United Kingdom and Canada was continued from the end of 1945 until early 1948 by an Inspection Board of Canada. Then the task reverted to the Department of Defence, where an Inspection Services organization was established under a controller general who was vested with the authority of an associate deputy minister. During April 1948 an Industrial Defence Board was created to examine Canada's war potential and keep up-to-date a plan for necessary production. The board was composed of seven representatives from industry and eight representatives of governmental departments and agencies. Mr. H. J. Carmichael, a Canadian industrialist who had been Co-ordinator of Production in the wartime Department of Munitions and Supply became the first chairman. On 28 June 1948 representatives of this Board met with other government officials to assist in drafting the industrial and economic sections of the Government's War Book. Continuous liaison was conducted with the Armed Forces on the matter of major equipment requirements. But Order in Council P.C. 1166 of 15 March 1949 transferred control over this Industrial Defence Board to the Department of Trade and Commerce.

(v) Defence Relationships with
British Commonwealth

41. During the latter half of 1943 and early weeks of 1944 there were a number of suggestions regarding the role that the British Commonwealth might play in the post-war world. Prime Minister Curtin of Australia advocated (14 August, 6 September and 14 December 1943) a return to the idea of Imperial Federation and the creation of a permanent Empire Council which should meet regularly, but not necessarily always in London. Prime Minister Smuts of South Africa proposed (25 November) the institution of regional conferences which should cause particular Dominions to work more closely with the United Kingdom and help with the development of nearby portions of the colonial empire. Although Viscount Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs had emphasized the satisfactory features of the existing machinery of Imperial collaboration, during a speech to the House of Lords on 2 November 1943, he had stated that the British Government was "always ready to consider amendments and improvements for more regular meetings between the representatives of the Governments of the Commonwealth".⁵¹ Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador to the United States, suggested to a Toronto audience on 24 January 1944 that the Statute of Westminster had been, in many ways, a "Declaration of Interdependence"; henceforth there should be a "closer unity of

thought and action" in the common fields of Foreign Policy, Defence, Economic Affairs, Colonial Questions and Communications.⁵²

42. For the most part, public opinion in Canada was highly critical of Lord Halifax's analysis and conclusions: "Canadians of almost all shades of political opinion viewed with dismay the prospect of a post-war world in which power politics would prevail, and in which the British Commonwealth would need to measure its strength against that of the colossi of East and West".⁵³ Moreover, the implication underlying the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff studies being prepared in London (see para 16) was that there should be a single defence policy for the entire Commonwealth, with the United Kingdom and other members acting in effect as one great power.⁵⁴ Therefore, when Parliament convened on 31 January 1944, Prime Minister King set forth his own views to the House of Commons. Although he was "one hundred per cent for close consultation, close co-operation and effective co-ordination of policy on all matters of common concern between the different nations of the British Commonwealth", he preferred the existing "continuing conference of cabinet councils of the commonwealth" to any form of Imperial Council.⁵⁵ His objection to going to Imperial Conferences in London was that he, or any other Prime Minister of Canada, was then at a complete disadvantage:

The Prime Minister attending in London meets an entire cabinet. He may be entirely alone. He has not with him all his colleagues; he has with him very few colleagues, unless the business of his own country is to be neglected while he is away. More than that, however, he is without his expert advisers, who are much needed in dealing with great questions of peace or war. On the other hand every minister of the cabinet in London has his expert advisers, when a certain issue is up for discussion, either seated beside him or in an adjoining room, and he is in a position to command their views on any suggestion that may be made. Further, he is in a position to confer with all his colleagues and make his statement to the conference based upon opinions formed in that way. As I say, unless one is prepared to take with him colleagues and experts, and to allow the government of Canada to be carried on minus these responsible ministers and officials while an imperial conference is being conducted, one is not in a position to discuss matters as they should be discussed, and in the light of the responsibilities of the situation, as one would wish to discuss them.⁵⁶

43. Mr. King refused to accept the thesis advanced by Field Marshal Smuts and Lord Halifax that the "future peace of the world depended on the attainment of an equal partnership in strength and influence between the great powers among the united nations".⁵⁷ Both had taken the view that the resources and manpower of the British Isles were too small to enable the United Kingdom to compete with the United States and the U.S.S.R. after the war. But Mr. King reasoned as follows:

Should we not, indeed must we not, aim at attaining the necessary superiority of power by creating an effective international system inside which the cooperation of all peace-loving countries is freely sought and given?

It seems to me not to be a matter of matching manpower and resources, or, in other words, military and industrial potential, between three or four dominant states. What we must strive for is close cooperation among those great states themselves, and all other like-minded countries. Behind the conception expressed by Lord Halifax and Field Marshal Smuts, there lurks the idea of inevitable rivalry between the great powers. Could Canada, situated as she is geographically between the United States and the Soviet Union, and at the same time a member of the British Commonwealth, for one moment give support to such an idea?⁵⁸

44. It was inevitable, therefore, that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting in London during 1-16 May 1944 should approve no change. In an address delivered to both Houses of Parliament at Westminster on 11 May, Mr. King elaborated on the above argument:

It is of the utmost importance to the Commonwealth that there should continue to be the greatest possible co-operation among its members. In like manner it is, I believe, of the utmost importance to the future of mankind that, after the war, there should be the greatest possible co-operation among the nations of the world....

If, at the close of hostilities, the strength and unity of the Commonwealth are to be maintained, those ends will be achieved not by policies which are exclusive but by policies which can be shared with other nations. I am firmly convinced that the way to maintain our unity is to base that unity upon principles which can be extended to all nations. I am equally sure that the only way to maintain world unity is to base it upon principles that can be universally applied.⁵⁹

45. On 15 May the question of defence was discussed. Viscount Cranborne argued that, whether or not a single world security system should be established, it was essential that there should be close collaboration within the British Commonwealth. He then put forward the following suggestions:

- (a) Assuming that the Imperial Conference remained the main organ of consultation between the nations of the Commonwealth, would it be possible to give some degree of continuity to its proceedings, by establishing a standing committee to deal with strategy and other aspects of defence.
- (b) Alternatively, or perhaps in addition, there might be periodic meetings at regular intervals between Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Staff in London or elsewhere. These might possibly be preliminary to meetings of the World Council.
- (c) There might be an extended system for the interchange of military staffs. This would be particularly valuable if, as the result of definite obligations under a world security system, the preparation of joint plans became a practical possibility.
- (d) There might be a considerable expansion of the training of U.K. and Dominion officers in the principles of Imperial Defence. This would involve an expanded conception of the Imperial Defence College.
- (e) Study might be given to the co-ordination of industrial potential throughout the Commonwealth and Empire. This was a matter which had not been given as much attention heretofore as it deserved but which had emerged as a new factor of vital importance during the present war, when the various parts of the Empire had supplied others with great quantities of war materials. Much experience had been gained which was extremely valuable, and it would be a pity if in another emergency we had to start all over again at the beginning. It was for consideration whether an expert body might not be set up in the near future to consider this aspect.
- (f) It would no doubt be agreed that the organization, equipment and training of forces on a common model throughout the Commonwealth should continue as before.60

46. Viscount Cranborne felt that after the Prime Ministers had had an opportunity to discuss his proposals with their own Cabinets it might be possible to set up a committee to examine their practicability. The Prime Minister of Australia expressed great interest in the proposals. The Prime Minister of New Zealand suggested that the scope and functions of the Committee of Imperial Defence should be broadened, in order to co-ordinate defence planning for the whole Commonwealth and Empire. Regional defence planning bodies might also be established. Such a body was needed, for example, to plan the security of the South Pacific Area and ensure close co-operation between Australia, New Zealand, Fiji and the territories in the High Commission of the Western Pacific. The Canadian Prime Minister made it clear, however, that he did not wish to make any comment until the whole matter had been thoroughly discussed with his colleagues in Ottawa. Mr. King also considered that answers to these questions could not be reached while the war was still in progress. There was, however, general agreement that the British Prime Minister should hold monthly meetings with the several High Commissioners in London (with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs also in attendance).

47. Subsequently the Advisory Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems in Ottawa was directed to have a study made by its Working Committee. Although numerous discussions were held and a good deal of re-drafting done, the civilian and service members of the Working Committee could never agree on a version for submission to higher authority. The Department of External Affairs representative was opposed to there being a definite "defence association" with the United Kingdom or the Commonwealth, whereas the Service viewpoint was that a strong Commonwealth and tangible defence arrangements were still desirable.⁶¹ Officials of the Department of External Affairs wished to keep an open mind towards the possibility of Canada entering the United Nations organization independently rather than as a member of a British Commonwealth bloc. Moreover, they felt that any British tie-up might prejudice defence discussions vis-à-vis the United States. In any event the study seems to have died a natural death early in 1945. A similar fate befell the monthly meetings of the several High Commissioners in London with the British Prime Minister: only a few meetings were held because of the great pressure of work on Mr. Churchill, who was also Minister of Defence.⁶²

48. All too soon, at the San Francisco Conference of 1945, the Dominions were forced to accept lesser status in the United Nations organization which was established than was accorded to the five great powers -- which received permanent membership on the Security Council and the power to veto the wishes of a majority. Thus their service representatives in London proved very critical

of the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff's draft study on the "Security of the British Empire during the Period 1955-1960" (see para 20). As a result the section entitled "Dominion Collaboration" was drastically rewritten before the final report was issued on 29 June 1945. Despite the expressed beliefs of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, this document assumed that a single imperial defence policy was desirable in peace-time and that the United Kingdom should speak on behalf of all to the United Nations organization. Since Commander Todd of the Canadian Joint Staff Mission had followed his instructions and expressed no official opinions at the meeting of 5 June, however, the Post-Hostilities Planning Staff might be excused for hoping that its revised formula might be found acceptable:

- (b) It is considered not unnatural that Canada, and to a lesser extent Australia and New Zealand, should feel their defence problems to be very closely linked to U.S.A., but the security of all members of the Empire is interdependent and the security of the U.K., India and South Africa, like that of Canada, Australia and New Zealand, depends on close collaboration with U.S.A.
- (c) The difficulties of the Dominions in undertaking the firm commitments necessary for a co-ordinated imperial defence policy are appreciated and it is only if these difficulties are resolved that such a policy can be achieved.⁶³

In order to achieve the end desired it would be necessary to improve methods of imperial consultation at all levels and "educate" the constituent peoples to a realization that security could not be considered in the light of local interests alone, since a threat to any member was a threat to the Empire as a whole. The initiative would, of course, have to be taken by the United Kingdom.

49. On 3 August 1945 Commander Todd met with the Drafting Section of the Joint Planning Staff, whose members held much more realistic views than had the disbanded Post-Hostilities Planning Staff (see para 20). They considered that a single imperial defence policy, with twice yearly meetings of the Commonwealth Chiefs of Staff, was merely "wishful thinking". War with the United States being "unthinkable", and the ex-enemy states remaining under

some form of supervision, the U.S.S.R. was the only nation which possessed the capacity to challenge the security of the British Commonwealth. But not enough attention had been given to probable action by the United Nations organization in the event of major Russian aggression against members of the British Commonwealth. 64

50. Two British papers on defence were prepared for discussion with the Commonwealth Prime Ministers at the meetings held in London during April and May 1946. The Chiefs of Staff paper designated four "main support areas" - United Kingdom, American continent, southern Africa, Australia and New Zealand - and recommended the following principles for Commonwealth defence:

- (a) Each member of the Commonwealth should accept responsibility for the development and defence of their main support area and the strategic zone round it. In defining areas of strategic importance it was pointed out that the security of western Europe had been proved of direct interest to Canada.
- (b) There should be acceptance of the principle of joint responsibility between parts of the Commonwealth concerned for protection of the lines of communication between the main support areas.
- (c) Members should agree that it is in their strategic interest to assist, both politically and militarily, in maintaining the British position in those protective areas which directly affect the security of their territory and communications. 65

Emphasis was placed on the vulnerability of the United Kingdom and the desirability of having population, resources, military stores and training facilities dispersed throughout the Commonwealth.

51. These views were incorporated by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in his paper, which was primarily concerned with machinery for consultation and co-operation. This conceded that a centralized system for Commonwealth defence would be generally unacceptable: in any future major war the Commonwealth would require the active assistance of the United States and individual members would have to rely on regional co-operation with other countries. Since meetings of Prime Ministers could not be held frequently, it was suggested that some

looser system for co-ordination should be based on the national defence organizations. Individual Dominions might maintain Joint Staff Missions, attached to their High Commissioner's office in the United Kingdom and in any other Dominion in which they were considered to have sufficient interest. It was emphasized that consultation might take place not only in London, but in any Commonwealth capital where a British Joint Staff would similarly be positioned. For example, it was suggested that the existing Staff Missions in Melbourne should be developed as the principal co-ordinating body in the South-West Pacific.

52. At discussions of these papers with Mr. Chifley and Dr. Evatt of Australia and Mr. Nash of New Zealand, Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke emphasized that the scheme was based on that of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the British members of which made recommendations on matters of major policy to the Defence Committee of the Cabinet which could, if necessary, refer them to the full Cabinet. Stressing the parallel of collaboration between two foreign countries, Lord Alanbrooke argued that no encroachment on the sovereignty of the Dominions was intended. Mr. Nash indicated general acceptance, provided there was assurance of adequate political consultation at all levels and that it was agreed that the centre of the scheme need not be in London. He did, however, express some doubt that the co-ordination of the policies of five governments would be as easy as that of the United Kingdom and United States. While not rejecting the scheme, the Australians were not disposed to accept out of hand: Prime Minister Chifley was afraid that any move towards centralized control of defence policy would be politically impracticable; his Minister of External Affairs was more worried lest consultation on a military level would result in the reaching of agreements which would be difficult to change by the time they reached the political ministers concerned.66

53. Prime Minister Smuts, who reached London from South Africa only during the second week of the talks, expressed interest in the substance but not in the form of the proposals. He felt that the creation of "Military Missions" might appear to be "ganging up" on Russia and displaying lack of confidence in the United Nations organization: Commonwealth defence contacts should be of an informal liaison nature. Mr. Chifley then reiterated that such proposals would have to be considered by the Australian Government. 67

54. With this information at his disposal, and in answer to questions raised by the leaders of each of the three other political parties, Mr. King consented to give the House of Commons in Ottawa a brief statement on 9 May about his forthcoming trip. The Prime Minister suggested that he was not anxious to visit London, at this time, but that he had given his word earlier and that consultation was necessary as regards certain matters. However:

I wish to make it perfectly clear that I am not going to attempt at any consultation to say what this government's opinion is with regard to questions of defence, questions of trade, preference and the like, because I am not one of those who pretend to speak for the entire cabinet without the opportunity of conferring with its members. I shall be happy at any conference to give my views in a general way as to opinions that I think this country would wish to have fully considered. But as for presenting at a conference the official view of Canada in great matters of defence, trade and numerous other important questions, without the presence of the ministers who are responsible immediately concerned for the different departments of government and without the presence of their experts as well, I can assure the house that I shall be careful to refrain from committing anyone in a manner that is likely to occasion embarrassment.⁶⁸

Mr. King never gave any public statement as to what did transpire during his talks in London, by which time Mr. Chiefley was on his way back to Australia. The final communiqué, issued by the Dominions Office on 23 May, included a reassertion of faith in the existing methods of Commonwealth consultation:

They are flexible and can be used to meet a variety of situations and needs, both those where the responsibility is on one member alone, and where the responsibility may have to be shared. They are peculiarly appropriate to the character of the British Commonwealth, with its independent members who have shown by their sacrifices in the common cause their devotion to kindred ideals and their community of outlook. While all are willing to consider and adopt practical proposals for developing the existing system, it is agreed that the methods now practised are preferable to any rigid centralized machinery. In their view such centralized machinery would not facilitate, and might even hamper, the combination of autonomy and unity which is characteristic of the British Commonwealth and is one of their great achievements.

They reaffirm their belief in the efficacy of free and constant consultation and co-operation not only within the British Commonwealth but also in the wider international sphere. They are determined to do everything in their power to maintain in time of peace the historic co-operation achieved by the Allies in time of war. They look forward to the steady development throughout the whole world of closer international co-operation based on increasing mutual confidence and devoted to the raising of standards of living and the promotion of democratic liberty. Their Governments and peoples are determined to give the fullest support to the United Nations Organization, not only as a foundation of peace and security, but also as a means for promoting economic progress and social welfare.69

55. The next step was the publication of a British White Paper on Defence. This contemplated the establishment of a Defence Committee under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister to take over the functions of the Committee of Imperial Defence in respect of the United Kingdom. In respect of Commonwealth Defence the White Paper noted:

Methods of collaboration between the various members of the Commonwealth are governed by the principle enunciated in the Statute of Westminster. Even before 1923, the conception that there should be a central authority in London, representative of all the self-governing members of the Commonwealth, to review defence questions and prepare central plans which would be binding on the whole Commonwealth and Empire, was never recognized as practicable even if it were desirable. Admittedly the Dominions have a close interest in problems that affect the Commonwealth and Empire as a whole, but each of them has a special and distinct outlook on world affairs, dependent on its geographical position and its political and economic environment, and Dominion Governments must retain full liberty of action. Co-operation in Commonwealth Defence has therefore always taken the practical form of promoting uniformity of organization, training, and equipment of military forces, maintaining the closest possible touch between Staffs, and interchanging officers in order to promote a common doctrine and outlook in military affairs. Collaboration in war-time between the naval, land and air forces from different parts of the Commonwealth has thus been easy and effective.70

Therefore emphasis should continue to be placed on the methods of collaboration which were "peculiarly appropriate to the character of the British Commonwealth". Since geography largely determined the problems of most interest to individual members of the Commonwealth, it was felt that British liaison officers should be stationed in each capital to study regional problems with the local Chiefs of Staff. Similarly, Dominions' liaison officers stationed in London could work closely with the British Chiefs of Staff.

56. The proposals to exchange liaison officers received a favourable response from the Dominions. Canada merely converted its wartime Joint Staff Mission into a Joint Liaison Staff, with different terms of reference. Its components perpetuated the rapidly dwindling Canadian Naval Mission Overseas, Canadian Military Headquarters and R.C.A.F. Overseas Headquarters. However, the Conservative opposition in the United Kingdom attacked the Labour Government for abandoning the Committee of Imperial Defence, omitting the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs from membership in the new Defence Committee and failing to make provision for continuous high-level dominion representation. But, as Professor Nicholas Mansergh has wisely observed:

...it was of more importance that the Empire which the Committee of Imperial Defence was designed to serve had passed away. There had been a transformation in intra-Commonwealth political relations, but also, and this was more fundamental, there had been a change in the balance of world power. The concept of imperial defence in any absolute form was outdated. In its place there was the concept of regional defence agreements under the Charter of the United Nations. That was why, when the United Nations grievously disappointed the hopes of its sponsors and failed to achieve its primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security, it was not in imperial defence but in regional associations that the members of the Commonwealth, and not least the United Kingdom, sought refuge.⁷¹

The principal responsibility of the British Government's new Defence Committee was, in practice, not to plan the defence of the Commonwealth in isolation but rather to link together regional plans for defence in which both members of the Commonwealth and foreign nations were involved. The Defence Committee was well fitted to serve this more modest purpose and the October 1948 meeting in London of Commonwealth Prime Ministers expressed satisfaction with its discharge of these important but limited responsibilities.

57. Reporting on the C.I.G.S. Conference* recently attended in the United Kingdom, General Foulkes told the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Ottawa on 31 May 1950 that Field Marshal Sir William Slim had stressed the following:

- (a) in spite of the close co-operation with the United States, co-operation with the Commonwealth was a first priority. The United Kingdom military authorities had given up any idea of a purely British strategy and had accepted the fact that they must take part in a common world-wide strategic policy with the United States;
- (b) the present U.K. policy was that the cold war requirements would take precedence over the preparations for the hot one;
- (c) the main pillars of U.K. strategy were defined as follows:-
 - (i) defence of the United Kingdom, which now includes the defence of western Europe,
 - (ii) defence of sea lines of communication, and
 - (iii) defence of the Middle East;
- (d) in the matter of balanced forces, Field Marshal Slim had emphasized that he was in full accord with the policy of balanced overall forces as opposed to balanced national forces. In this regard the United Kingdom had given up any idea of a strategic bomber force and also any idea of a battle fleet. The main naval activities would now be limited to anti-submarine warfare and anti-mining activities; and
- (e) the defence of the United Kingdom was being given first priority.⁷²

*Inaugurated in 1946 by Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, after becoming Chief of the Imperial General Staff, to ensure that all general officers of the British Army, in the United Kingdom and overseas, understood the broad tactical doctrine being evolved. The Chiefs of the General Staffs of the several Dominions received invitations to attend.

PART II - CANADA-UNITED STATES COLLABORATION

(i) Defence Planning, 1944-1946

58. Approval by the Cabinet War Committee on 19 July 1944 of a Preliminary Paper on "Post-War Defence Arrangements with the United States" (see para 15) carried with it approval for the Working Committee on Post-Hostilities Problems to undertake more detailed studies. Although the Department of External Affairs was to stress the implications of a possible world security organization on future Canadian-American relationships, the Service view was that Canada-United States relationships were bound to develop whether or not such a world body were created. Only on 28 February 1945, however, did the Cabinet War Committee approve a much amended study entitled "Post War Canadian Defence Relationships with the United States: General Considerations". According to this document:

7. In the past, Canadian "defence" planning has been based on a strong British Navy, and on the premise that the United States would be a benevolent neutral if not an ally in the event of Canada being at war. Developments of this war have not changed these two fundamentals, but other factors have come into being necessitating a review of certain aspects of Canada's defence planning particularly vis-à-vis the United States.⁷³

But the attitude of the United States following acceptance by the two governments of the two Joint Canadian-United States Basic Defence Plans (see para 11) was described as follows:

12. Nearly all the tasks set out in this plan involved measures to be implemented in Canada, Newfoundland and Alaska. It is possible that if Canada had not been able to carry out the defence measures required on Canadian territory the United States would have done so, even though the United States was not then at war.

13. This attitude of the United States became more apparent after the entry of that country into the war. If Canada had refused or failed to undertake projects which formed part of United States plans (such as the Crimson Air Staging Route), or measures in Canadian territory for the special protection of the United States (e.g., the Radar Chain across Northern Ontario to protect industrial installations in the mid-continent), the United States was willing and even anxious to proceed alone. As time

went on, it became increasingly apparent that the existence of major military installations in Canada built, paid for and operated by the United States might impair Canada's freedom of action. This difficulty has been mitigated, if not eliminated, by the Canadian Government's decision, agreed to by the United States, to reimburse the United States for construction costs of all airfields and certain other facilities of continuing value erected in Canada by the United States.

14. Thus, developments in the present war have brought about a new sense of defence relationships between Canada and the United States of which the following are the most significant:

- (a) Opinion in both countries has gone far towards recognizing that the two oceans do not provide full protection for North America from attack, and further that the ultimate security of the continent depends on the maintenance of peace in Europe and Asia.
- (b) Both the United States and Canada have accepted the fact that in addition to protection against seaborne attack they must have adequate protection against airborne attack, especially from the North, Northeast and Northwest.
- (c) Canada along with Newfoundland, Alaska, Greenland, Iceland, Bermuda and the West Indies will continue to be vital to the defence of the United States. As aviation develops the northern routes will increasingly become world commercial highways. By the same token they will become potential routes for hostile powers with designs against the United States, and could conceivably be used by the United States for offensive purposes.
- (d) Although no immediate threat of attack may be discerned, neither country is likely again to reduce its defences to the pre-war level.

59. Thus the United States could be expected to take an active interest in future Canadian defence preparations, but "with an absence of the tact and restraint customarily employed by the United Kingdom in putting forward defence proposals". The result would be pressure on Canada to maintain defences at a higher level than might seem necessary from the point of view of purely Canadian interests. Since Canada lay astride the direct route between the United States and the U.S.S.R., any serious deterioration in their relations must be a worry

to Canada. Therefore, Canada's best hope for peaceful existence lay in the establishment of an effective world security organization. But, in any case, Canadian and American defence planning should be co-ordinated to produce what would really be a regional defence system. Appropriate machinery already existed in the Permanent Joint Board on Defence:

Through the Board, representatives of two countries (the one great and the other relatively weak) meet together on an equal footing. It is quite conceivable that in the post-war period there may not be a great deal for the Board to do. Nevertheless, its mere existence is a useful public symbol of the mutual confidence which exists between Canada and the United States. Moreover, there is a great advantage in having available a body that can consider potentially controversial questions of defence before government policy in either country has become fixed. The Board will continue to be available to recommend joint defence plans, and as an agency to facilitate discussion and exchange of information.

60. Exactly what defence measures would be required in the post-war world could not yet be determined. But it was inevitable that Canada would have to assume greater peace-time commitments than heretofore. Canada had already recognized a responsibility for the local defence of Newfoundland and Labrador. However:

22. This closer liaison with the United States is in no sense an isolationist policy. If any single lesson has emerged from the present conflict, it is that no nation can ensure immunity from attack merely by erecting a defensive barrier around its frontiers. Canada's first lines of defence at the present time extend far out into the Pacific in the West and to Europe in the East. With the growth of air power, frontier defences have become less significant. It is not intended that Canada should base its defensive policy exclusively on collaboration with the United States. On the contrary it is considered that Canada should accept a fair share of responsibility in an international security organization along with the other Nations both inside and outside the Commonwealth.

The following conclusions were drawn:

- (a) that the defences of Canada should be closely co-ordinated with those of United States in the post-war period.

- (b) that the Permanent Joint Board on Defence will continue to be a valuable means of facilitating this co-ordination and also as a medium for the informal discussion of mutual defence problems.
- (c) that the source of major friction between Canada and the United States is more likely to grow out of differing views towards events outside this Continent. Particularly in view of Canada's geographic position astride the overland route between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., Canadian defence arrangements with the United States will be greatly influenced by the general character of the relations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
- (d) that in joint defence planning with the United States, Canada should accept full responsibility for all such defence measures within Canadian territory as the moderate risk to which we are exposed may indicate to be necessary.
- (e) that Canada should continue to accept responsibility for the local defence of Newfoundland and Labrador, and that the part of the United States in the defence of these territories should be limited to the operation of their leased bases in Newfoundland.
- (f) that because of the new vulnerability of the North American continent, quite apart from any obligations under a world security organization, Canada must accept increased defence responsibilities and maintain larger armed forces than before the war.
- (g) that the exchange of technical information on military research and development between Canada and the United States should continue and that Canada should maintain the means of making an effective contribution to such exchange.

61. At the 50th Meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, held at New York on 14-15 June 1945, Major-General Guy V. Henry* presented his own personal views on "Continental Defense Value of the Canadian

*Senior representative of the United States Army.

Northwest" and "Postwar Collaboration". He then suggested that the Canadian members might put forward their personal views as to the post-war value of the Alaska Highway, air route, telegraph line, gasoline distributing systems and the Haines cut-off route, and whether Canada was likely to maintain those portions in its own territory. General Henry did not see how there could be any true homogeneity of defence of the Western Hemisphere unless Canada became a member of the Pan American Union and adopted American military organization and equipment, as the Latin-American Republics were being encouraged to do. "From a purely military standpoint", he argued, "there appears little doubt that our tactical and supply problems for the defense of North America would be greatly simplified if Canadian and United States forces had interchangeable munitions and were trained and organized in general along similar lines".⁷⁴ He cited as examples the revamping of the Canadian force sent to Kiska in 1943 and the current organization of the Canadian Army Pacific Force on American lines. On the other hand he conceded that there were possible obstacles: attitude of the general public, existence of traditional ties with the United Kingdom and the need to promote Canadian manufacturing. At the next meeting, held in Montreal on 4-5 September, General Pope made a number of observations on behalf of the Canadian Members. He pointed out that the value of more than one of the defence installations constructed in Canada at American expense had been questioned by the Canadian members from the outset, and suggested that the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff should make the Canadian Services more fully aware of the reasons upon which their appreciation of the defence requirements of the North American continent were based. Canada must reserve the right to model her forces as she chose and he suggested that standardization of British Commonwealth and United States military equipment would be preferable to Canada abandoning British-type equipment completely in favour of that produced to American specifications. General Pope added, however, and the American members agreed, that post-war military collaboration did not appear to present any particular difficulty.⁷⁵

62. During the course of the 52nd meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, at New York on 7-8 November, the United States Army and Navy members submitted identical communications signed respectively by the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy:

Although the 'Ogdensburg Agreement' provides a continuing basis for continuing military action by the United States and Canada, it appears that the Joint Canadian-U.S. Defence Plan (ABC-22), which provided for specific action in the event that the United States and British Commonwealth were associated in the war against Germany and her allies, requires revision. While the

Plan did not fix a period for which it was to be effective, its general tenor was such as to provide for the war just concluded.

I desire that you initiate... conversations leading to revision of ABC-22 to provide, in the light of changed world conditions, a continuing basis for joint action of the military forces of Canada and the United States in order to ensure the security of Alaska, Canada, Labrador, Newfoundland and the northern portion of the United States.⁷⁶

63. On 19 December the Canadian Government approved this undertaking. Arrangements for joint planning were to be concerted through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. Responsibility was to be delegated by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to its Joint Planning Sub-Committee, working in consultation with the Secretary of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the Secretary of the Cabinet Defence Committee. Any resulting plans must, however, safeguard Canada's strategic position in respect of Newfoundland and Labrador, take into account the maximum strength approved for the post-war armed forces and be subject to approval by the Government.⁷⁷

64. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London had already sought (14 December) the Canadian Government's opinion on American requests for support in securing rights to retain or establish military bases in territories under both British and other sovereignty. The Canadian reply, despatched by telegram on 16 January, 1946, follows:

1. We have given preliminary consideration to the general issues involved in these proposals and are continuing our examination. On broad grounds we would welcome the assumption by the United States of responsibility for the maintenance of a far-flung chain of bases in the Atlantic and Pacific, provided that they were to be made available on acceptable terms to the Security Council and that equitable arrangements could be reached for civil aviation facilities at certain points. At the same time, we appreciated your anxiety lest the position of the United Nations Organization should be prejudiced through pressure by the United States to secure rights at this stage. Where military facilities have been established in foreign territories during the war (e.g. the Azores), however, it seems important that there should be no gap between the lapsing of wartime rights and the adoption of long-term arrangements.

2. It is, of course, of special interest to Canada from the point of view of North American defence that the United States should have effective use of suitable outlying bases in the North Atlantic and North Pacific. In this connection we are about to institute, under the auspices of the Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board on Defence, joint discussions with a view to revision of the existing defence plan which was adopted by the two governments, at the Board's instance. It is clear that the maintenance of establishment of such U.S. bases, particularly in Labrador, Greenland, and Iceland, would directly affect any revised plan which may be worked out.

3. In short, we regard it as in the interest of Canada and in the general interest of the Commonwealth and the United Nations Organization that the United States should have extensive rights and responsibilities outside her own territories. However, we also are dubious about the timing of some of the requests which they have put forward especially as they may encourage the Soviet Government to make undesirable demands.⁷⁸

65. The Canadian Government subsequently declined an informal suggestion from the U.S. State Department that Canada be associated with the several American Republics in an inter-American defence treaty which, it had been agreed at Chapultepec (Mexico) a year earlier, should establish a regional security zone. According to a letter which the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs wrote to the Canadian Ambassador in Washington on 7 January 1946, there was general agreement in Ottawa that Canada's best course was "to remain on the sidelines".⁷⁹ "So far as our own defence is concerned", this letter continued, "the advantages and liabilities accruing to Canada would probably be about the same, whether we were a signatory to an inter-American defence treaty or were content to concert our arrangements with the United States alone as is already planned". Moreover, neither Canadian nor American public opinion seemed particularly interested in Canada being represented in such a group. And it would be rather hard to explain adherence to such an inter-American treaty when there had been no effort to secure a similar pact within the British Commonwealth. Therefore, the Ambassador was instructed to suggest to the State Department that the Canadian Government considered that it would be "preferable to work out military staff agreements under the United Nations Charter first and then consider what regional supplements are required".

66. At its meeting in Quebec City on 16-17 January 1946 the Permanent Joint Board on Defence drew up a memorandum pointing out that "more than a development of a basic defense or security plan is needed, and that the two Governments should now take action to assure that their respective Armed Forces are prepared in time of peace to act promptly in carrying out any war plan in case of emergency". The following principles were stated:

- (a) Canada and the United States will jointly prepare an all embracing plan to preserve the security of the two countries.
- (b) There will be free and comprehensive exchange of military information and intelligence insofar as it affects the security of the two countries. Each country will respect the security classification of the other and will undertake to preserve all limitations on transmission to third parties specified by the originating country.
- (c) Personnel of the armed forces of one country will be assigned with the armed forces of the other country in such numbers and upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the respective military, naval and air authorities.
- (d) The principle of standardization in arms, equipment, organization, methods of training and new developments will be applied as far as practicable. Appropriate joint groups will be organized to study and make recommendations on these matters.
- (e) Joint manoeuvres and joint tests of material of common interest will be encouraged.
- (f) The agreement for the reciprocal transit of military aircraft and public vessels now in effect will be continued, and the military, naval, and air facilities of each country will continue to be made reciprocally available to the armed forces of the other country.
- (g) Each country will be responsible for mapping and surveying its own territory and will provide maps on the scales to be mutually agreed by both partners.
- (h) In order to develop a Joint Security Plan, joint groups will be established to study and recommend to the PJB for reference

to the two Governments the military, naval, and air installations, bases, meteorological services, communication services, and industrial facilities needed, together with the forces required and tasks or missions of the same, to insure the security of both countries. This study will be revised from time to time.⁸⁰

67. The Canadian Government subsequently decided to go along with the State Department's view that this memorandum should be regarded as a guide for the planners. During March it was learned that the American committee would comprise the service members and civilian secretary of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and the United States Joint Staff Planners or their representatives. Consequently the Canadian planning team was enlarged to include the service members of its section of the Board.⁸¹

68. When the Canada-United States Military Co-operation Committee held its first meeting on 20-23 May 1946, in Washington, an American intelligence document formed the basis for the resulting "Appreciation of the Requirements for Canadian-United States Security, No. 1, 23 May 1946". This included the following security concept:

In the past North America has been comparatively immune from heavy attack by a hostile power, due to the geographical barriers created by the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans and the frozen wastes of the Arctic. Technical developments in the art of warfare occasioned by scientific progress have lessened this immunity and portend that it will diminish progressively. Hence, we are now confronted with the necessity of modifying our concept of defence for the United States and Canada. The principal advancements in the science of war responsible for this change are:

- A. The increased range of application of destructive power and armed force resulting from the development of modern aircraft, amphibious technique, guided missiles, and advancement in the technique of submarine warfare.
- B. The increased destructive capacity of weapons such as the atomic bomb, rockets and instruments of biological warfare.⁸²

Any aggressor capable of overrunning Europe would possess a great superiority in manpower, organized ground and tactical air forces, and submarines. But the United Kingdom was the only European nation possessing an

effective balanced navy and strategic air force. Although war was unlikely until the devastation of Europe had been remedied, the "continued reduction" of Canadian and American forces would help to improve the relative ability of a potential aggressor to build up his forces in the manner necessary to wage a successful conflict. Moreover, within three to five years this potential enemy would probably develop his own atomic bombs.* Continuing, this Appreciation stated:

A major invasion of Canada and the United States will be beyond enemy capabilities for at least several years and would not be attempted prior to securing local air and naval superiority. However, an enemy could attempt a limited invasion of Alaska, northern Canada or other positions in the northern part of the Western Hemisphere for the purpose of projecting further operations against vital or more densely populated areas of the United States and Canada. An enemy would undoubtedly initiate a vigorous submarine campaign, including the use of mines, against U.S. and Canadian shipping. Sabotage of U.S. and Canadian industry on the largest possible scale would likewise be a practicable certainty. The introduction of specially trained sabotage teams by air or submarine must be expected. Capabilities of potentially hostile powers to conduct sustained long-range air operations would be slight initially, but limited long-range air attacks are possible. A strategic air offensive against the United States and Canada would probably be initiated as soon as suitable means were available. Pending availability of the atomic bomb this air offensive would include conventional type bombing and mine-laying in coastal or inland waters.

As regards probable avenues of approach, the Appreciation stated:

From examination of the polar projection map on the northern portion of the Western Hemisphere, it is obvious that no all-land routes exist for attack on Canada and the United States. Possible routes of approach are therefore by sea or air from either the east, west or north, or combination of these approaches. The shortest approach to the northern part of the Western Hemisphere from the centre of gravity of the world island (Eurasia-Africa) is via the polar cap. Feasibility of direct assault and entry by enemy forces from the north is complicated by logistical problems which render these operations by any but small forces difficult. However, it is from this direction that the

*On 23 September 1949 public announcement was made of the fact that an atomic explosion had occurred within the U.S.S.R. a short time previously.

major air effort, including a missiles attack, would probably come. It is considered that no world power, with the exception of Great Britain, has the capacity of a major assault by sea. It is concluded, therefore, that the most probable hostile effort would be via air from the northwest, the north or the northeast with the last named being the most likely approach of an attack in view of its forming the shortest route from the industrial heart of Eurasia. The stepping stones provided by such localities as Spitzbergen, Iceland, Greenland and the northern Canadian islands would facilitate such an approach.

It was estimated that "by 1950 the offensive capabilities of a potential enemy against the Western Hemisphere can assume menacing proportions".

69. The Canadian-United States Military Co-operation Committee then began drafting a Basic Security Plan. An agreed draft was completed by the Canadian and American Joint Planning Staffs, meeting in Ottawa on 5 June.⁸³ The expressed intention was to provide for co-ordinated action in the defence of the territory of Canada, Newfoundland and the United States, including Alaska, and the protection of the vital sea and air communications associated therewith, in order to ensure the ultimate security of Canada and the United States. The armed forces of Canada and the United States would have to be prepared to undertake jointly the following tasks:

TASK ONE: PROTECT VITAL AREAS OF CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES FROM AIR ATTACK.

TASK TWO: DEFEND THE NORTHERN AREA OF CANADA AND LABRADOR AND PROTECT THE LAND, SEA AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATED THEREWITH.

TASK THREE: DEFEND ALASKA AND PROTECT THE LAND, SEA AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATED THEREWITH.

TASK FOUR: DEFEND NEWFOUNDLAND (EXCLUDING LABRADOR) AND PROTECT THE LAND, SEA AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATED THEREWITH.

TASK FIVE: DEFEND EASTERN CANADA AND THE NORTHEASTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND PROTECT THE LAND, SEA AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATED THEREWITH.

TASK SIX: DEFEND WESTERN CANADA AND THE NORTHWESTERN PORTION OF THE UNITED STATES AND PROTECT THE LAND, SEA AND AIR COMMUNICATIONS ASSOCIATED THEREWITH.

TASK SEVEN: PROTECT OVERSEAS SHIPPING IN THE NORTHWESTERN ATLANTIC.

TASK EIGHT: PROTECT OVERSEAS SHIPPING IN THE NORTHERN PACIFIC.⁸⁴

70. This Plan was to be placed in effect by the Chiefs of Staff of Canada and the United States, "when so directed by" the two Governments. Co-ordination of the military efforts of Canada and the United States would be effected by "mutual co-operation except where unified command is determined to be appropriate". The forces of each were to be assigned tasks for whose execution such forces were to be deemed primarily responsible. These tasks might be assigned in the Plan or by agreement between the Chiefs of Staff concerned. Furthermore:

17. When operating on a basis of mutual co-operation, the forces of each nation shall support to their utmost capacity the appropriate forces of the other nation. During such operations, the Chiefs of Staff of each nation will retain the strategic direction and command of their own forces.
18. Unified command may be established over any United States and Canadian forces operating in any area or areas, or for a particular operation:
 - (a) When agreed upon by the Chiefs of Staff concerned; or
 - (b) When the commanders of the Canadian and United States forces concerned agree that the situation requires the exercise of unified command, and further agree as to the service that shall exercise such command. All such mutual agreements shall be subject to confirmation by the Chiefs of Staff concerned, but this provision shall not prevent the immediate establishment of unified command by local commanders in cases of emergency.
19. Unified command, when established, shall vest in one commander the responsibility and authority to co-ordinate the operations of the participating forces of both nations by the setting up of task forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the exercise of such co-ordinating control as the commander deems necessary to ensure the success of the operations. Unified command shall authorize the commander concerned complete freedom of movement of all forces of either nation or any service under his command to any area within his jurisdiction. Unified command, however, shall not

authorize a commander exercising it to control the administration and discipline of the forces of the nation of which he is not an officer, nor to issue any instructions to such forces beyond those necessary for effective co-ordination.

20. The assignment of an area of responsibility to one nation shall not be construed as restricting the forces of the other nation from temporarily extending appropriate operations into that area, as may be mutually agreed between commanders concerned.

The above, it should be emphasized, was virtually identical to what had been written into ABC-22 during the summer of 1941 (see para 12).

71. Each nation would endeavour to provide the forces and, within its own territory, the military installations necessary to implement the Plan. So far as practicable, the bases, harbours and repair facilities of each would be made available for use by the forces of the other. Commanders would be required to establish liaison and co-operate with appropriate commanders of the other. Special arrangements would be made to permit mutual use of areas and facilities for peace time training, tests or manoeuvres. Special agreements might also be concluded to permit the stationing of combat forces in the territory of the other during peace-time. When necessary to facilitate common decision and action, both governments would establish, in the capital of the other, officers of all services to represent their interests; furthermore, liaison officers would be assigned to forces in the field. Finally, this Plan was to be subject to review annually, or at lesser intervals, by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence.

72. Early in July 1946 the Canadian and United States Chiefs of Staff gave their approval. On 24 July the Cabinet Defence Committee approved of continued defence planning with the Americans. Similarly the necessity of establishing sub-committees to undertake detailed planning was approved by the appropriate authorities of both nations during August.⁸⁵ Such Canadian-American sub-committees soon got to work as follows:

1. Sub-Committee on Air Interceptor and Air Warning System.
2. Sub-Committee on Navy Air Striking Force.
3. Communications for Defence.
4. Sub-Committee on Air Navigation Aids for Defence

5. Sub-Committee on Air Photography, Mapping and Charting for Defence.
6. Sub-Committee on Strategic Information.
7. Arctic Tests and Experience for Defence.
8. Sub-Committee on Meteorological Service for Defence.
9. Sub-Committee on Anti-Submarine Measures.
10. Sub-Committee on Anti-Aircraft Ground Defence.
11. Sub-Committee on Army Air Mobile Striking Force.
12. Sub-Committee on Strategic Air Reconnaissance.
13. Sub-Committee on Naval Convoy and Routing. ⁸⁶

73. On 20 November 1946 the question of how much information concerning this defence planning should be made available to United Kingdom authorities was discussed by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence. The United States members felt that there would be no objection to passing along the general gist of the planning then in progress. "Moreover, in fields where cooperation with the United Kingdom is essential, such as anti-submarine convoy and routing, and the defence of Newfoundland and Labrador, there was no objection to passing on considerable detailed information. It was thought, however, that it would not be in the general interest and might even cause some confusion to arise if details of projected plans for North American defence, with which the United Kingdom had no functional concern, were passed on".⁸⁷ Since the Permanent Joint Board on Defence was merely a consultative body, however, the senior United States Army and Navy members undertook to obtain a ruling in Washington.

(ii) Recommendation of 20 November 1946

74. During the course of its 55th meeting, held at Ottawa on 29 April 1946, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence decided to substitute the following for its First Recommendation of 26 August 1940:

Subject to the national policies of the two governments, there shall be a free and comprehensive exchange of military information in so far as it affects the

security of the two countries, the circulation of which shall be subject to such restrictions as may be specified by the originating country.⁸⁸

The Board then proceeded to make a 35th Recommendation, to provide for continued close co-operation in peace-time between the armed forces of Canada and the United States. At the instance of the United States section, which considered it desirable that certain principles should be incorporated governing the carrying out of joint defence projects in the future, an amendment was offered to the next meeting on 19-20 September.⁸⁹ After receiving an official blessing in both Ottawa and Washington, this was accepted at the 57th meeting held in Montreal on 19-20 November, 1946. Commonly known as the "Recommendation of 20 November 1946", it read as follows:

In order to make more effective provision for the security of the northern part of the western hemisphere, Canada and the United States should provide for close cooperation between their armed forces in all matters relating thereto, and in particular, through the following measures:

- (a) Interchange of personnel between the armed forces of both countries in such numbers and upon such terms as may be agreed upon from time to time by the respective military, naval and air authorities.
- (b) Adoption, as far as practicable, of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, methods of training and new developments to be encouraged, due recognition being given by each country to the special circumstances prevailing therein.
- (c) Cooperation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises and with the development and tests of material of common interest to the armed services to be encouraged.
- (d) Reciprocal provision by mutual arrangement between the Governments of its military, naval and air facilities by each country to the armed forces of the other country. Each country shall continue to provide reciprocally for transit through its territory and territorial waters of military aircraft and public vessels of the other country.

- (e) Subject to any special arrangement which may be entered into, each country will be primarily responsible for the mapping of its own territory and for the provision of maps in accordance with agreed needs.
- (f) In time of peace certain principles shall govern the joint construction or maintenance of military projects, the carrying out of joint tests or exercises and the use by one country of military facilities in the other country, when such activities have been approved by the appropriate authorities of both governments, and these principles should be applied on a reciprocal basis as follows:
 - (i) Military projects or joint tests or exercises undertaken within the territory of one country, or the territory leased by one country, should be under the supervision of that country.
 - (ii) Military projects, tests or exercises, agreed to by both countries, whether jointly conducted or not, are without prejudice to the sovereignty of either country, confer no permanent rights for status upon either country, and give only such temporary rights or status as are agreed upon by the appropriate authorities of the two countries in authorizing the projects, tests or exercises.
 - (iii) Public information in regard to military projects, tests or exercises, jointly conducted or conducted by one country in the other country, or in the territory leased by it, should be the primary responsibility of the country whose territory is utilized. All public statements on these subjects shall be made only after mutual agreement between the appropriate authorities of the two countries.

In discussing the interpretation of the words "by mutual arrangement between the Governments" in sub-paragraph (d) above, it was the view of the Board that this represents a continuation of present policy under which such arrangements may be delegated to appropriate service authorities.⁹⁰

75. When the Cabinet Defence Committee had met on 13 November to discuss defence matters and estimates for the coming year, Prime Minister King stated that he had discussed certain matters of interest to Canada and the United States with President Truman in Washington on 28 October. In consequence of a subsequent "oral message", inter-governmental conversations would be held shortly in Ottawa. Therefore Mr. King wished to be briefed by the Chiefs of Staff as to the present state of Canadian-American defence planning and the general strategical situation. The Chief of the Air Staff (Air Marshal R. Leckie) stated that he did not altogether share the American view that an aggressor would attempt to neutralize the war potential of the North American Continent before embarking on a programme of expansion elsewhere. He felt that any attacks would be of a diversionary nature, which would not warrant the establishment of an elaborate defence scheme employing Canadian resources in a static role. Thus, although the Basic Security Plan's most important detailed appendix on air defence had not yet been completed, he was concerned about the extent of the proposed undertakings and their financial implications, feeling that it would be preferable to adopt measures of more modest proportions. The Chief of the General Staff (Lieutenant-General C. Foulkes) agreed that any attempts to provide complete protection against sporadic raids would not be justified. But General Foulkes felt that it was important to keep in mind that the continent was no longer free from the possibility of attack. Furthermore, realistic planning should provide the means for offensive action as well as for static defence. Finally the British assessment of the risk to North America did not materially differ from the American intelligence upon which the Joint Appreciation had been primarily based. The Chief of the Naval Staff (Vice-Admiral H. Reid) conceded that the naval role was of lesser importance - defence of coastal waters and escort duties in both the Atlantic and Pacific approaches. (The Royal Canadian Navy would also be capable of providing a force to co-operate, as the occasion required, with the British and American navies.) Undoubtedly anti-submarine measures would constitute the most important and difficult naval task, but it was not yet clear what means would prove most effective.⁹¹ On 15 November the Cabinet discussed these matters. It was agreed that while general endorsement could be given to the principle of joint defence planning with the United States, there could be no concurrence in the Joint Appreciation pending the outcome of discussions between the two governments.⁹²

76. These informal talks were held in Ottawa on 16-17 December. While non-committal and exploratory in nature, they served to dispel any impression that Canada was reluctant to undertake practical defence measures in co-operation with the United States. Furthermore, they indicated that the scale and urgency of the military undertakings visualized by the United States were rather less than the Canadians had been led to anticipate. In discussing the extent to which preliminary joint defence measures in the north could be carried out

under civilian auspices, the American representatives mentioned certain immediate undertakings which already had been or would shortly be proposed. These included:

- (a) projects related specifically to the air defence scheme (research on air warning equipment, survey of airfield sites, maintenance of airfields which might otherwise be abandoned and training for air defence duties); and
- (b) projects related to general planning (mapping programme, weather coverage, Loran programme* and joint tests at Churchill.⁹³)

No agreement was sought as to the proportion of cost to be borne by each country, but it was suggested that the annual implementation programmes might be examined jointly by the appropriate financial authorities. There was general agreement that some publicity would have to be given to the Permanent Joint Board on Defence's "Recommendation of 20 November 1946", and notification sent to the Secretary General of the United Nations. As regards keeping the United Kingdom advised of Canadian-American defence plans, the United States representatives took the view that no formal agreement was necessary and that the policy suggested at the 19-20 November meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence would be satisfactory (see para 73).

77. On 9 January 1947 the Cabinet Defence Committee agreed that the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs should draft a public statement.⁹⁴ On 16 January the Cabinet officially approved the "Recommendation of 20 November 1946". On 12 February the Prime Minister read the agreed statement to the House of Commons. President Truman issued an identical statement in Washington. Although merely a watered down version of what was being contemplated, the principles enumerated are worth quoting:

- (1) Interchange of selected individuals so as to increase the familiarity of each country's defence establishment with that of the other country.
- (2) General cooperation and exchange of observers in connection with exercises and with the development and tests of material of common interest.
- (3) Encouragement of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, methods of training and new developments. As certain United Kingdom standards have long been in use in Canada, no radical change is contemplated or practicable

*Long range aid to navigation (see para 104).

and the application of this principle will be gradual.

- (4) Mutual aid and reciprocal availability of military, naval and air facilities in each country; this principle to be applied as may be agreed in specific instances. Reciprocally each country will continue to provide, with a minimum of formality, for the transit through its territory and its territorial waters of military aircraft and public vessels of the other country.
- (5) As an underlying principle all cooperative arrangements will be without impairment of the control of either country over all activities in its territory.⁹⁵

Mr. King stated further that:

No treaty, executive agreement or contractual obligation has been entered into. Each country will determine the extent of its practical collaboration in respect of each and all of the forgoing principles. Either party may at any time discontinue collaboration on any or all of them. Neither country will take any action inconsistent with the charter of the united nations. The charter remains the cornerstone of the foreign policy of each.

An important element in the decision of each government to authorize continued collaboration was the conviction on the part of each that in this way their obligations under the charter of the united nations for the maintenance of international peace and security could be fulfilled more effectively. Both governments agree that this decision is a contribution to the stability of the world and to the establishment through the united nations of an effective system of world wide security. With this in mind each government has sent a copy of this statement to the secretary general of the united nations for circulation to all its members.

78. In his further comments Mr. King emphasized that his Government considered the United Nations Charter to be the "cornerstone of the foreign policy" of both countries; but much progress had still to be made before a system of international security should become effective.⁹⁶ Mr. King suggested that there was a parallel of long standing in the relationships between members of the British Commonwealth:

Without formal agreements between governments, we have had working arrangements with the

United Kingdom and other commonwealth countries for the interchange of personnel, the exchange of observers, and so forth. The similar arrangements envisaged between Canada and the United States in no way interfere with or replace our commonwealth connections in matters of defence training and organization. Given the geographical position of Canada, it is important that measures of cooperation should be undertaken both with the United States and the United Kingdom.

Mr. King denied that the United States had asked for bases in the Canadian North. Although an enemy might now come from the north, and Canada's defence forces must be experienced in Arctic conditions, "our primary objective should be to expand our knowledge of the north and of the conditions necessary for life and work there with the object of developing its resources". Canada's northern programme, according to the Prime Minister, was "primarily a civilian one to which contributions are made by the armed forces".⁹⁷

79. In a feature article of 5 March 1947, however, E. Zhukov informed Pravda's readers that no formal Canadian-American treaty had been signed because it was wished to avoid publicity as do all "agreements directed to the detriment of peace... the more so when they contain secret clauses and supplements".⁹⁸ Ridicule was heaped on the argument that "Canada's northern programme is inspired merely by an attraction for learning of topography and meteorology, merely by a sudden love which had flamed up for geography of the north". The future of Canadian-American and Anglo-Canadian relations merited special attention, this article continued, because Canada was now within the military (as well as the political and economic) orbit of the United States. If Canada was still a connecting link between the United Kingdom and the United States, as claimed editorially by The Times (London, England), then Britain must be a participant in the Agreement, which must really be an Anglo-American Military Agreement.

(iii) The Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act, 1947.

80. Since the Order in Council promulgated under the authority of the War Measures Act to legalize the status of United States Forces serving in Canada was due to expire on 1 April 1947, new legislation was drafted and submitted informally to American authorities for comment before being introduced into the House of Commons on 23 May.⁹⁹ In answer to questions raised during the debate on the second reading of the bill on 4 June, Hon. Louis S. St. Laurent, Secretary of State for External Affairs, gave the following explanation:

The provision to be made is that when United States forces are present in Canada the service courts and service authorities of those forces may exercise within Canada, in relation to members of those forces, all such powers as are conferred upon them by the laws of their own country; but not to the exclusion of the exercise by the ordinary authorities in this country of our own laws, and not to the exclusion of the rights of any person over whom they attempt to exercise that authority to apply to our own courts to determine whether or not he is a member of their forces.

This bill is to be concerned only with United States forces present in Canada with the consent of the Canadian government. United States forces present in Canada without the consent of the government would be committing an unfriendly act. This bill will have no application to civilians, or to any others than members of an organized unit of the United States present in our country with the consent of the Canadian authorities.

That is the same situation which had to be dealt with, o.. which it was felt should be dealt with by the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act of 1933. Prior to that act, any group of persons from another part of the commonwealth could come here; there was nothing to prevent their coming here. But there was no right of anyone conducting such a party to exercise any authority in this country over the members of the party he was conducting. It was for that reason that the Visiting Forces (British Commonwealth) Act of 1933 was enacted... so that those officers could exercise here the powers which they would have over the same men in their own country, but not to the extent of preventing Canadian authorities from dealing with them while they are here in accordance with the laws and procedure of our own Canadian administration. And it is the same thing, in substance, that is contained in this bill....100

81. The Prime Minister's statement of 12 February on future Canadian-American defence policy and collaboration had been couched in such generalities that members of the opposition in the House of Commons could not offer any constructive criticism of this bill. Even Major-General G.R. Pearkes (Nanaimo), was able to contribute nothing to the debate. His remarks indicate that he laboured under the delusion that there

was "a joint plan of Canada, the United States and Great Britain".¹⁰¹ As a result criticisms had to be limited to the fact that foreign troops, in uniform, would be stationed on Canadian soil in peace-time. The bill received its third reading on 9 June, and royal assent on 27 June as 11 George VI, Chap. 47.

(iv) Implementation of Security Plans

82. During the early winter of 1947 the Chiefs of Staff Committee began to devote serious attention to the following recommendation advanced by the Canada-United States Military Co-operation Committee:

- (a) that the appreciation and basic security plan (with appendices) should not be treated as documents which require acceptance (or rejection) by the governments; the basic security plan to be regarded as a joint defence plan designed to ensure the security of the North American continent agreed between the Canadian and United States Chiefs of Staff; and
- (b) that the Chiefs of Staff Committee (with appropriate civilian officials) be responsible for recommending the degree, sequence and rate of implementation of the agreed plan, such "implementation programmes" to be submitted from time to time for decision by the government.¹⁰²

In explanation, it must be understood that the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan (complete with appendices) was a "war plan" which might be placed in effect by the two governments upon the outbreak of hostilities, or in anticipation thereof. It listed the manpower and facilities which should be available and the organization necessary to meet an emergency. The resources shown as necessary were, in some cases, considerably in excess of those then available but, as was pointed out, "acceptance of the plan by the Canadian and U.S. authorities involves no commitment to provide such resources nor, indeed, to take any specific action towards their provision". Because of the time factor, however, certain measures would have to be undertaken beforehand. The particulars of such measures were embodied in "Implementation Programmes". These were to be submitted annually and if accepted, would be included in the "Defence estimates" of both countries. Actually, the extent of implementation of the overall Plan would depend on the world situation and would be a matter for decision by both governments in the light of both military and political considerations. At its meeting of 11 February 1947 the Cabinet Defence Committee agreed that this procedure was acceptable to the Canadian Government. The Chiefs of Staff were

instructed to have such Implementation Plans consolidated annually for consideration by the Government prior to the preparation of financial estimates for the ensuing fiscal year.¹⁰³

83. On 24 July 1947 the Canada-United States Military Co-operation Committee reported that it had reviewed the "Appreciation of the Requirements for Canada-United States Security", No. 1, 23 May 1946, and the "Canada-United States Basic Security Plan", 5 June 1946 "in the light of world developments subsequent to their preparation" and "considered that no changes should be made at this time".¹⁰⁴ Efforts would be made to complete those Appendices still in preparation and thereafter to review and integrate them to the Basic Security Plan:

Implementation measures through 1949 should be concerned primarily with the fundamentals of each defense complex - surveys, research, tests, acquisition of experience, training of key personnel, - continuation of mapping and meteorological programs, development of detailed planning to provide for rapid mobilization of forces, furtherance of standardization in arms, equipment, doctrine and operating procedures. In succeeding years it may be necessary to provide for certain installations or to initiate construction projects which, for logistical reason, will require early action and protracted construction periods.¹⁰⁵

As regards implementation of the Plan, the Committee had recommended on the previous day that the objective should be completion of the several preparatory measures within "twelve months after 1951". The whole Plan should be capable of execution with one month's notice by 1 July 1957.

84. During the course of the 60th meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, held at New York on 11-12 September 1947, General Henry expressed concern over the brief time remaining for implementation to be completed and over the political, legislative, financial and inter-service problems which remained to be solved. General Henry's memorandum posed the following fundamental questions:

- (a) From our best estimates, does it appear that the North American continent is in danger of serious air attack within the next ten years?
- (b) If so, what date should be accepted as the beginning of the danger period?

- (c) What measures should be taken between now and the beginning of the danger period to provide reasonable security to our peoples and our great industrial areas?
- (d) Will each country seek to implement these measures as they may be revised from year to year?
- (e) What will be the formula for division of cost of implementations?¹⁰⁶

The Board "decided to invite the attention of the appropriate agencies of the two governments" to General Henry's memorandum.¹⁰⁷

85. At the Board's next meeting, at Toronto on 20-21 November, General McNaughton reported the opinion of the Canadian Chiefs of Staff: "their views with respect to the questions (a) and (b) were that a large scale air attack was possible within the next ten years; that the capabilities of a potential enemy are not the only factors to be considered but that probabilities must also be examined; that it is not possible to make an accurate estimate at present of when the danger period will begin; that it is preferable to assess periodically the likelihood of war when presenting implementation programmes for approval; and that in this way such programmes may be accelerated or decelerated".¹⁰⁸ The Cabinet Defence Committee had agreed that any question of implementation would be considered by the Canadian Government whenever submitted. The members of the American Section had taken no similar action, since they considered that partial answers to General Henry's memorandum were contained in the Military Co-operation Committee's paper of 23 July, which had been approved by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was then reported that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had reconsidered this paper and had approved it for planning purposes. Finally, the Board took note of the fact that the implementation of the Basic Security Plan could proceed only on the basis of decisions made for each fiscal year in succession and not in terms of a period of years.

86. Before the year 1947 drew to a close the Chiefs of Staff of both countries had approved four appendices to the Basic Security Plan:

Air Photography
Hydrographic Survey
Mapping and Charting
Meteorological Services¹⁰⁹

The Canada-United States Military Co-operation Committee and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff had approved the appendix on Air Interceptor and Early Warning System, but only as a basis for long-range planning. The reorganization of the United States Forces then in progress had delayed its approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. Seven further appendices had been approved at the Military Co-operation Committee level:

The Protection of Sea Lines of Communication
Signals Communication
Air Navigation Aids
Strategic Information
Anti-Aircraft Ground Defence
Mobile Striking Forces
Strategic Air Reconnaissance

Appendices dealing with Military Intelligence and Command Relations had not yet been drafted.

87. During the course of the Cabinet Defence Committee's meeting on 27 Jan 1948, to review progress made in Canadian-American defence collaboration, the suspicion was voiced that Mr. James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense in Washington, might not be "fully informed" on the subject and aware of the differences in procedure required in the two countries to implement the Basic Security Plan.¹¹⁰ Therefore, on 13 Feb the Chiefs of Staff Committee submitted a memorandum making the following points:

- (a) that the existing machinery for defence collaboration was satisfactory but that it should be kept under constant scrutiny to ensure that the agencies concerned carried out their designated functions and that Canadian representatives were at all times kept in touch with government policy;
- (b) that the Minister of National Defence address a communication to the United States Secretary for Defence with a view to reaching a common interpretation of procedures and a full understanding of the Canadian position;
- (c) that planning has now reached a stage where discussion between the United States and the Canadian Chiefs of Staff on the overall strategic concept would be desirable;
- (d) that the policy governing Canadian participation should be re-considered when the basic security plan had been completed and reviewed in relation to the overall strategic concept.¹¹¹

But Hon. Brooke Claxton, Minister of National Defence, told the other members of the Cabinet Defence Committee that a formal approach to Mr. Forrestal would not be necessary, since the Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (General McNaughton) had had satisfactory talks with the Chairman of the United States Section. The Secretary of State for External Affairs agreed that it would be preferable to handle the matter informally. Two Annexes prepared by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to set forth the Canadian position might be communicated informally to American representatives on the Permanent Joint Board on Defence

and appropriate planning committees. The first, dealing with procedures followed in Canada, is worth quoting:

- (a) The only real difference in procedures between Canada and the United States appears to arise from constitutional differences.
- (b) In Canada, the Chiefs of Staff approve plans but Canadian constitutional practice makes it necessary for Cabinet approval to be obtained, not only for policy decisions, but also for relatively minor expenditures on implementation programmes.
- (c) The final authorization, under Canadian practice, for budgetary requirements rests with Parliament.
- (d) The Canadian Chiefs of Staff approve plans with the provision that any expenditure involved in implementation will be subject to authorization by the Cabinet.
- (e) Other factors which contribute to differences in the approach to joint defence problems are:
 - (i) that a large number of Canada-US defence operations and installations are required to be on Canadian soil; and
 - (ii) defence expenditures which are perhaps small in the United States are relatively large in Canada.¹¹²

88. At the 4-6 August 1948 meeting of the planning element of the Canada-United States Military Co-operation Committee it was agreed that the Basic Security Plan should be completely revised. These planners met in Washington on 7-13 December to draft an emergency plan for the period extending to 1 July 1950 and to prepare the directives necessary for the work of revising the Basic Security Plan and Programme.¹¹³ Meeting in Washington during March 1949 the Military Co-operation Committee completed a Canada-United States Emergency Defence Plan (MCC 300/1): based on forces currently available, it was subject to revision but to remain in effect until superseded. On 21 April the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff approved this Plan. Five days later the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Ottawa gave general approval; minor amendments of a service nature would affect only Canadian forces.¹¹⁴

89. Three reasons seem to have been responsible for the considerable delays that were to continue well

into 1950 as regards the development of the Canada-United States Basic Security Programme: inability of the United States Army and Air Force to agree on the problem of air defence of North America; continued divergence of Canadian-American intelligence appreciations; and disagreement as to the constitution of forces required for the protection of sea lines of communication. Knowledge that the Russian experiments with atomic bombs had met with success during the autumn of 1949 did, however, spur the Canada-United States Military Co-operation Committee to greater efforts. At its meeting of 13-17 December 1949 agreement was reached that the planning date being used in connection with "Canada-United States SECURITY REQUIREMENTS-1957" should be advanced to 1954. But fresh intelligence appreciations and exhaustive studies would have to be completed before the Military Co-operation Committee could complete a "Canada-United States SECURITY REQUIREMENTS - 1954".115

90. A Canadian-United States Intelligence working team was created and shortly produced two appreciations: one for 1 July 1951, designated ACAI 9 and intended for use in short term planning; the other for 1 July 1954, designated ACAI 10 and intended for use in medium term planning. ACAI 9 was used to provide the basis for estimating enemy capabilities and most probable courses of action. It was considered that the enemy's most probable course of action would be a combination of the following:

- (a) An Atomic offensive aimed at reducing and disrupting our war-making capacity, thus diminishing our ability and desire to render timely aid to the European Allies.
- (b) Sabotage and Subversive activities on a large scale aimed at diminishing our ability and destroying our desire to render aid to our European Allies.
- (c) Orthodox employment of all arms aimed at diminishing our ability and desire to render aid by diminishing the amount of that aid or by causing maldeployment of our forces for North American defense against a minor threat while the Soviets pursue their aims against our European Allies.116

91. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff were dubious, when considering the Short Term Plan, whether the Russians could employ the major portion of their 25-45 atomic bombs most profitably in the initial offensive against North America. But right or wrong, the Plan need not be appreciably different: "The maximum material damage and morale shock, and the greatest chance of operational success, would be achieved by surprise on D-day".

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There was, however, agreement as to the need to guard against the possibility of disproportionate forces being employed to defend against a minor threat:

The Soviet potential for subversion within North America and the Soviet capacity to launch small scale sporadic attacks of all arms against widely dispersed areas of North America give the enemy the capability of causing serious maldeployment of great portions of our armed forces which should be used for rendering aid to Europe.

It was decided, therefore, to increase the state of readiness of available forces, deploy them to afford protection for as many as possible of the essential locations for continuing a war, and accept the risks involved in leaving some critical areas relatively unprotected. In particular, the concept of defence against air attack provided for limited defence by a pre-D-Day increase of the state of readiness and deployment of available air defence forces best calculated to afford protection for the following critical areas (not listed in order of priority) of Canada and the United States:

- (a) The Montreal-Boston-Norfolk-Chicago Area.
- (b) The Vancouver-Spokane-Portland Area.
- (c) The Fairbanks-Anchorage-Kodiak Area.
- (d) The San Francisco-San Diego Area.
- (e) The Central New Mexico Area.

92. In so far as short term planning was concerned, the difference between the Emergency Plan then in effect (MCC 300/1) and its successor (MCC 300/2), was as follows:

... it restricts our defensive action to afford protection for only that limited number of critical areas which is within the defense capabilities of the limited forces made available for the purpose of defending Canada, the continental United States and Alaska, and in that it provides for pre D-Day deployment of forces. Implicit in the Plan is the acceptance of risk involved in leaving some critical areas largely undefended. After exhaustive study it was concluded that only by concentrating our limited defences in five critical areas and accepting risks elsewhere, could we most effectively use the forces made available. In selecting the five areas indicated in the Plan, the MCC considered the following factors, separately and in their various combinations:

- (a) Soviet most probable courses of action.
- (b) Vulnerability of the various areas, particularly to Soviet air attack.
- (c) Density of essential elements of our war-making capacity within certain areas.
- (d) Extent of our own defensive capabilities.
- (e) Extent to which defense of selected areas would indirectly contribute to the protection of other areas by creating defense in depth.

3. Despite the improvements in our current capabilities which will result from implementation of "Enabling Measures", this Plan provides inadequate protection for our war-making capacity. In order to increase our capabilities for over-all defense, additional means must be made available. In view of the urgency inherent in the growing Soviet atomic threat, particular emphasis should be placed on priority provision of the following:

- (a) Improved intelligence to provide a period of warning.
- (b) Extension and integration of the Canada-United States early warning and control system.
- (c) Improvement of telecommunications facilities, particularly in Canada and Alaska.
- (d) Increased numbers of all-weather fighter squadrons and bases.
- (e) Increased numbers of modern anti-aircraft weapons.
- (f) An effective civil defense system.

93. Although several draft versions of a medium term Plan had been prepared, disagreement as to what should be an air defence concept for 1954 had been the main stumbling block to prevent approval of any of these as late as 12 September 1950.

(v) Fort Churchill

94. Expediency had been the governing factor during the middle years of the Second World War, with American activities in the northland assuming such proportions that Canadian control often became, in practice,

almost completely ineffective. These activities included the Alaska Highway, airfields of the Northwest Staging Route and the Northeast Ferrying Route, approximately 60 weather stations and the abortive "Canol" project.¹¹⁷

95. In accordance with the terms of the diplomatic notes exchanged on 17 and 18 March 1942, ownership of the Alaska Highway, constructed at American expense, passed to Canada free of charge on the understanding that responsibility would be assumed for maintenance, which became a task of the Canadian Army on 1 April 1946.¹¹⁸ As a result of agreement based on diplomatic notes exchanged on 23 and 27 June 1944, Canada paid \$76,811,511.00 compensation for the permanent construction undertaken for United States authorities at the northern airfields (including Goose Bay, Labrador to which Canada possessed a 99-year lease), the weather stations and other facilities (excluding "Canol"). When tabling these notes in the House of Commons on 1 August 1944, Prime Minister King reasoned as follows:

In the first place, it is believed that, as part of the Canadian contribution to the war, this country should take general responsibility for the provision of facilities in Canada and in Labrador required for the use of Canadian, United Kingdom and United States forces. In the second place, it was thought that it was undesirable that any other country should have a financial investment in improvements of permanent value, such as civil aviation facilities, for peace-time use in this country. I am happy to say that our views on this subject were understood by the government of the United States and the agreement which I have tabled is the result of this understanding.¹¹⁹

The temporary construction at these locations, such as barracks and other housing facilities, which had cost the United States \$13,872,020.00, also was relinquished to the Canadian Government. Since "Canol" had not proved to be a sound project, having been abandoned by the United States and partially dismantled prior to the cessation of hostilities, there was no requirement for Canada to assume its continuing assets and liabilities.

96. Consequent upon the recommendation by the Permanent Joint Board on Defence in its memorandum of 17 January 1946 that "Joint manoeuvres and joint tests of material of common interest" should be encouraged (see para 66), General Henry outlined to the members during the course of the New York meeting on 21-22 March the interest of the United States Army in the following:

- (a) Setting up a joint arctic experimental and testing station at Churchill or other suitable locality;

- (b) Holding joint exercises next winter in the Canadian subarctic (with possibly five hundred United States troops participating); and
- (c) Carrying out training and testing with operational air squadrons under conditions of extreme cold in Canada.¹²⁰

The Canadian members immediately suggested that both the United States Army Air Forces and United States Navy might participate in the further tests of R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. equipment being conducted by the R.C.A.F. at Edmonton.

97. Meeting on 9 April the Chiefs of Staff Committee agreed in principle that General Henry's wishes should be met, so long as tests were carried out under Canadian control, but referred the problem to the Joint Planning Committee for study. It was subsequently agreed that further consideration should be postponed until the Canadian Government had received the Canada-United States Intelligence Appreciation and the Basic Security Plan. The United States authorities subsequently withdrew the request for the holding of joint troop exercises in the sub-Artic, but continued to press for the establishment of a joint Arctic experimental station for testing equipment.¹²¹ Having received authority from the Cabinet Defence Committee on 24 July to continue defence planning with the United States (see para 72), the Chiefs of Staff Committee decided that Churchill was a suitable locality. The Inter-Service Committee on Winter Warfare was instructed to produce:

- (i) a short-term plan and recommended establishment for the operation of Churchill on a joint basis (i.e. the three Canadian Services);
- (ii) a long-term plan and proposed establishment for the operation of Churchill on a joint basis (i.e. the three Canadian Services).¹²²

Meanwhile the Army was to continue its present activities at Churchill, instead of terminating them on 1 September 1946 as planned.

98. On 18 September 1946 the Minister of National Defence told the Cabinet Defence Committee that service equipment would be tested at Churchill during the coming winter; but the scale of the undertaking would be small, involving the employment of only 560 Canadians and 100 Americans. The Canadian Army would assume responsibility for the camp administration, the R.C.A.F. would be responsible for the operation of the airfield and associated facilities, while the Department of Transport would be asked to continue the operation of the radio range and meteorological services.¹²³

99. AS regards "powers of command", the Chief of the General Staff instructed the Commandant of Fort Churchill in a letter dated 13 January 1947 to issue the following Order:

Members of the Canadian Army serving with Fort Churchill are hereby notified that they will obey the orders and instructions of officers, WO's, Petty Officers and NCO's of the RCN, RCAF, and US Army, superior to them in relative rank. All such orders and instructions as are not contrary to Canadian Military Law shall have the same force and effect as if they had been issued by a superior officer, WO or NCO of the Canadian Army and will be obeyed accordingly. It will therefore be clearly understood that when Canadian Army personnel are serving with Fort Churchill in conjunction with the RCN, RCAF, or US Army, the members of such Services and force will be treated and will have over such Canadian Army personnel, as individuals only, powers of command, (but not discipline and/or punishment), as if they were members of the Canadian Army of relative rank. Similarly, pursuant to orders issued by the officers commanding the detachments of such Services and force serving at Fort Churchill, Canadian Army personnel will be treated and will have over individual members of the RCN, RCAF or US Army the same powers of command as if they were members of those forces of relative rank. Failure to observe the terms of this Order will render the individual offender liable to disciplinary action under Canadian Military Law.¹²⁴

Upon arrival at Fort Churchill the United States Army Commanding Officer was instructed by the War Department in Washington to issue the following Order:

In order that the United States Army Forces serving at Fort Churchill may work harmoniously and efficiently with the Canadian Armed Forces, the following is ordered:

Members of the United States Army Forces serving at Fort Churchill are hereby directed to obey the standing orders of the Canadian Commanding Officer of that station and, in addition thereto, to obey the orders or instructions of officers and non-commissioned officers of Canadian Forces superior to them in relative rank.

Failure to obey the terms of this order will render the individual offender liable to disciplinary action by proper United States military commanders.

Members of the Canadian Armed Forces have been issued with like instructions regarding their relationship with the United States Army Forces.¹²⁵

100. The principal task at Fort Churchill during 1947 was the construction of buildings by detachments of the Royal Canadian Engineers and the United States Army's Corps of Engineers. As of 31 January 1948 there were 103 officers, 469 other ranks and 110 civilians at Fort Churchill, making a total of 682 of whom 501 were Canadians and 181 Americans.¹²⁶ Although it had been considered originally that accommodation would have to be provided for 1810 Canadians and 500 Americans, experience soon proved that tests could be conducted by relatively small numbers, which made possible a reduction in the ultimate Canadian requirement to 1175.¹²⁷ As of 15 August 1950 there was actual accommodation for 952 officers and men. Messes, workshops, garages, administrative buildings, laboratories, hospital and recreational facilities also had been completed. Two chapels, a 10-room school for children and further living accommodation for dependents were scheduled. Actual strength on 1 September 1950 was:

Canadian Army	417
Royal Canadian Navy	52
Royal Canadian Air Force	95
United States Army	132
Defence Research Board, visitors, etc.	505
Construction Personnel (in own temporary accommodation)	982
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	2183 128

(vi) Weather Stations

101. On 1 May 1946 the United States Embassy in Ottawa presented the Department of External Affairs with a memorandum requesting permission for the U.S. Weather Bureau to establish weather stations in the Western Archipelago in order to increase meteorological knowledge of the polar region.¹²⁹ The proposal called for stations in north-western Greenland and on Melville Island, which would throw out small advanced stations, accessible only by air. It was proposed to establish three of these last during 1947, as satellites of the station on Melville Island.¹³⁰ The Cabinet Defence Committee would have preferred to postpone any action for a year but, since the two governments tacitly agreed during July 1946 that joint defence planning should continue (see para 72), approval was given subject to the following conditions:

- (a) that the project be recognized as a joint undertaking carried out under civilian rather than military auspices, and that the United States furnish equipment and accommodation;
- (b) that the majority of personnel employed in the operation be Canadian and, if these are not available in the numbers required, that U.S. personnel be used with the

understanding that they may be replaced by Canadian as soon as such become available;

- (c) that Canada should have the right to take over the installations at any time upon payment of the cost involved;
- (d) that U.S. personnel on the stations be subject to the ordinances of the Northwest Territories, and that the requirements of the Department of National Health and Welfare for the protection of the health of the Eskimos be met; and
- (e) that this authority be regarded as a temporary one, and that the whole matter be subject to review in connection with the joint Canadian-U.S. defence plan.¹³¹

102. On 14 August a letter was addressed to the Secretary of the Canadian Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence seeking permission for the Weather Service of the United States Army Air Forces to re-open the weather stations at Padloping Island, Baffin Island and Indian House Lake, P.Q. and to operate them for a year or until such time as Canada was prepared to take over. If necessary, additional facilities would be provided for the stations at River Clyde and Arctic Bay on Baffin Island. This letter stated that the U.S.A.A.F. would continue to provide weather service for Mingan, Cape Chimo, Frobisher Bay, Mecatina and Cape Harrison (Labrador). The request was granted on a temporary basis for Padloping Island, Indian House Lake, River Clyde, Mingan, Fort Chimo, Frobisher Bay and Mecatina -- on the understanding that Canadian personnel should be included on the staffs in order to facilitate eventual operation of these stations by Canada. In addition, the U.S.A.A.F. was requested to employ civilian rather than military personnel "as far as possible, if not completely".¹³² As regards Arctic Bay, however, it was pointed out that the Department of Transport was already carrying out observations similar to those requested. But it proved impossible for the interested American authorities to hire either Canadian or American civilians for employment in that isolated region. Although the Department of Transport was loath to spare any of its own limited number of trained meteorological personnel, which were urgently needed elsewhere, it did make available radio operating staffs.¹³³

103. Conditions had changed considerably by 1949 and the situation was discussed in Washington on 25 August by representatives of the United States Air Force and Royal Canadian Air Force. These agreed that existing facilities were overly expensive¹³⁴ but the agreement

reached after further correspondence proved to be a compromise. Although the airfields at Mingan and Chimo were to be taken over by the R.C.A.F. and placed on a "caretaker" basis, the U.S.A.F. would leave a small detachment at each to permit continuity in upper-air meteorological observations for about a year, pending availability of trained personnel belonging to the Department of Transport; responsibility for operating the airfield at Frobisher Bay would pass to the R.C.A.F. by 1 September 1950; the combined meteorological and radio range stations at Cape Harrison and Padloping Island would be taken over by the Department of Transport in the summers of 1950 and 1951 respectively.¹³⁵ This timetable was followed, to leave Padloping Bay as the only weather station under American control by the end of 1950. The United States Weather Bureau was, however, still operating five stations jointly with the Department of Transport and also supplying expendable equipment for upper-air meteorological observations at another 14 weather stations operated by the Department of Transport.¹³⁶

(vii) Loran Stations

104. Following discussion by the Joint Sub-Committee on Air Navigation Aids for Defence (see para 72), General Henry presented the Permanent Joint Board on Defence with a memorandum, dated 14 November 1946, proposing that six low frequency Loran stations should be established in the Arctic to furnish long range navigational fixes: one station in Alaska, three in Canada and two in Greenland.¹³⁷ Canadian approval was forthcoming in March 1947 and the project was given the minimum security grading "restricted".¹³⁸ Before the end of that year a north-western chain was in operation, with two stations in Alaska (Skull Cliffs and Barter Island) and three in Canada (Kittigazuit, Sawmill Bay and Cambridge Bay). Establishment of a north-eastern chain with a station on Baffin Island and two in Greenland had, however, been held up because the International Communications Conference meeting at Atlantic City during the summer of 1947 had suggested that Canada and the United States should not use a frequency which might interfere with European broadcasting.¹³⁹ Sites for a north-eastern chain were surveyed during the summer of 1948, but no action was taken pending further tests of the value of the north-western chain as a navigational aid.¹⁴⁰ Meeting in Ottawa on 22 February 1949 the Canada-United States Combined Low Frequency Committee agreed that even the north-western chain should be curtailed. Therefore, Cambridge Bay and Sawmill Bay ceased Loran but not other operations on 10 March 1949.¹⁴¹ The continuing stations did provide "otherwise unobtainable scientific data of inestimable value in the ultimate development of a satisfactory long-distance navigation aid".¹⁴² But the results proved not to be proportionate to the costs involved. Therefore the U.S.A.F. and R.C.A.F. agreed that this project should be discontinued on 1 April 1950. The U.S.A.F. would continue with experimental work, but only within the continental United States.

(viii) Newfoundland and Labrador

105. Following the conclusion of the Second World War, American service personnel had remained at Argentia, Fort Pepperell and Stephenville in Newfoundland, in accordance with the Leased Bases Agreement made between the United Kingdom and United States on 27 March 1941. The United States Army continued its forces at the Canadian-leased base at Goose Bay, Labrador with the consent of Canada and Newfoundland (as provided by the Canada-Newfoundland Agreement of 10 October 1944). Actually no serious consideration of Canadian-American post-war relationships towards either proved possible until the status of Newfoundland should be resolved. By November 1947 Canadian proposals for confederation were being seriously discussed by the Newfoundlanders and a small majority in favour of confederation with Canada was secured in the second referendum held on 22 July 1948. Following satisfactory direct Canada-Newfoundland discussions, the British Parliament passed the British North America Act, 1949 necessary to make this union possible. On 1 April 1949 Newfoundland became a province of Canada.

106. At its meeting of 2-8 January 1950 the Permanent Joint Board on Defence discussed the future status of the American servicemen and dependents stationed at the leased bases, in view of the Canadian Government's request for modification of the Bases Agreement.¹⁴³ There was further discussion at the next meeting, held at Montreal on 28-30 March, when proposals were advanced as regards taxation, customs and excise exemptions, military postal facilities and the question of legal jurisdiction. With regard to this last thorny topic, the Canadian Section proposed application of the Visiting Forces (United States of America) Act "on the understanding that an arrangement be made with the Provincial authorities under which members of the U.S. Forces shall normally be left to be dealt with by U.S. Service courts, particularly in cases in which residents of Canada and Canadian property are not affected".¹⁴⁴ Cases involving Canadian residents and Canadian property would, however, have to be the subject of painstaking legislation.

107. On 30 March the Permanent Joint Board on Defence agreed on a detailed Recommendation. This was noted with approval by the Cabinet Defence Committee on 25 April, but two days later the Cabinet indicated that formal approval would not be given until the necessary legislation was drafted. On 1 August the President of the United States approved the recommendations. Canadian drafts of the legislation necessary to effect the desired changes were shown informally to the United States Section of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence during February 1951.¹⁴⁵

(ix) Combined Exercises and Training

108. Actually only one exercise was conducted for the armies and air forces of both countries during the period 1945-1950. This was Exercise "SWEETBRIAR", held along the North-West Highway System between Whitehorse (Yukon) and Northway (Alaska) during 13-23 February 1950 to develop procedures, doctrine and technique for combined Canadian and United States forces operating in the Arctic. Combat Team "A" was provided by units of the Fifth U.S. Army, while Combat Team "B" was built around Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry. But, beginning with the winter of 1947-1948, Canadian observers attended the United States Army's cold weather programme in Alaska.¹⁴⁶

109. During its meeting at Churchill on 19 February 1947 the Permanent Joint Board on Defence recommended that, as a reciprocal application of the Recommendation of November 20, 1946, arrangements should be made for the use of United States facilities, climate and topography to train Canadian personnel in amphibious operations.¹⁴⁷ During the autumn of 1947 a Canadian Army cadre of nearly 40 officers and N.C.Os. (in two groups) received amphibious training at the Little Creek, Virginia, school of the Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet, U.S.N.¹⁴⁸ During November 1948 two platoons of The Royal Canadian Regiment and one platoon of the Royal 22e Régiment commenced five months training in amphibious warfare at Little Creek; the final phase was participation in an amphibious landing on Vieques in the Caribbean during a March 1949 Atlantic Fleet Command Exercise.¹⁴⁹

110. Plans for joint Canadian-American naval amphibious training exercises in the far north resulted in what were really American operations, since the Royal Canadian Navy was busy with its destroyer modernization programme.¹⁵⁰ Exercise "NORAMEX" held on the Labrador coast during October-November 1949 required one heavy cruiser, one escort aircraft carrier and six destroyers of the United States Navy to support the landing of a reinforced battalion of U.S. Marines; but only H.M.C.S. Haida could be made available in a gunfire support role.¹⁵¹

111. From time to time and after clearance had been arranged with the Canadian Chiefs of Staff, ships of the United States Navy cruised in northern waters: to train personnel and test equipment and material in Arctic conditions; to observe geographical, navigation and aviation conditions; to take supplies to isolated weather stations; and to conduct such other scientific investigations and services as were desired by other government agencies.¹⁵² American submarines assisted in the anti-submarine training of the Royal Canadian Navy, whose ships also participated in United States Navy training exercises. Similar naval training was carried out with units of the Royal Navy.¹⁵³

112. During June 1949 regular and reserve squadrons of the R.C.A.F.'s new Air Defence Group participated in United States Air Force Exercise "BLACK JACK" to test the air defence system of the north-eastern United States.¹⁵⁴ Subsequently an agreement was made whereby exercises should be conducted from time to time to test the ability of the R.C.A.F. reserves and United States Air National Guardsmen to integrate forces in the event of an emergency. The first of these, Exercise "METROPOLIS", took place in the New York City area on 22-23 October.¹⁵⁵ Four Vampires of No. 442 (Reserve) Squadron, R.C.A.F. and one radar (AMES 11) based at Sea Island participated in Exercise "DRUMMER BOY", conducted in the Vancouver-Seattle area during 4-14 October by Air Defense Command of the U.S.A.F. to test the air defences of the north-western United States of America.¹⁵⁶

(x) Exchange of Officers

113. The November 1945 meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence was informed that the Canadian Chiefs of Staff would like to see developed the practice of interchanging Canadian and American officers within selected positions. Such a practice would promote within the respective Services a better knowledge and understanding of the two countries and would be particularly valuable in such matters as the development and use of weapons, logistics, communications and organization. Some exchanges had been made during wartime but it was felt that these should now go forward on a carefully planned basis.¹⁵⁷ This idea was accepted and incorporated in the discussions which led to the Board's Recommendation of 20 November 1946. The Board's subsequent views were embodied in the instructions issued to exchange officers during the spring of 1947: "officers attached to the Armed Forces of either country should under no circumstances forward official reports to the service departments of their own country without keeping the commanding officers of the units to which they are attached fully informed of the subject matter of such reports."¹⁵⁸

114. Due to a shortage of personnel the Royal Canadian Navy was unable immediately to exchange officers with the United States Navy. But eight officers were selected to act as observers during the spring exercises of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet and U.S. Pacific Fleet. One American naval officer was, however, immediately loaned to the R.C.N. Signal School as an instructor.¹⁵⁹ The aim of the Canadian and United States armies was to exchange approximately 20 officers, while the two air forces approved 19 exchange postings.¹⁶⁰

115. By March 1949 the exchange situation was as follows. A United States Navy commander was holding the appointment of Deputy Director of Naval Aviation at

Naval Service Headquarters in Ottawa, while two communications officers were exchanged for two Canadians serving with COMSUBLANT and CINCLANTFLT [i.e. Commander, Submarine Force, United States Atlantic Fleet and Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet respectively].¹⁶¹ There were 15 United States Army officers on exchange duty in Canada and 21 Canadians on similar assignments in the United States.¹⁶² Twelve R.C.A.F. officers were integrated into the American services, ten in staff appointments and two on flying duty. An equal number of U.S.A.F. officers were covering off R.C.A.F. positions.¹⁶³ On the other hand, the U.S.A.F. personnel stationed in Canada (including Newfoundland) totalled 440 officers, 2299 enlisted men and 2306 civilians, with the greatest number of these belonging to the Air Transport Service or Airways Communication Service.¹⁶⁴

116. During the period 4 March-14 June 1949 there were 52 officers and 94 other ranks of the Canadian Army attending courses in the United States. Five U.S. Army officers were attending courses held in Canada.¹⁶⁵ One officer of the Royal Canadian Navy was attending the Submarine School at New London, Connecticut, while 12 R.C.A.F. officers had recently completed training at the U.S. Navy's Anti-Submarine Warfare School, San Diego, California.¹⁶⁶ Other Canadian Naval and Air personnel were attending courses designed to fit in with the standardization procedures being worked out by the United States, United Kingdom and Canada (see paras 136-142).

(xi) Procurement in the United States

117. During the course of its meeting in New York City on 11-12 September 1947 the Permanent Joint Board on Defence "noted with concern" the difficulties hindering Canadian procurement of arms, munitions and materiel in the United States. Although obviously a necessary corollary to existing defence arrangements, the United States was legally able to make available to Canada only those items which had been declared technically surplus to the needs of its own armed forces. For example, negotiations had been going on since February 1947 for the procurement of certain spare parts for the American tanks actually acquired by Canada only a short time earlier.¹⁶⁷

118. The Board reverted to this subject, during the course of its meeting on 3-4 June 1948, when the "unanimous and strong conviction" was expressed that the "difficulties preventing Canada from procuring weapons, munitions and materiel from the United States constitute the greatest single obstacle obstructing satisfactory progress in the implementation of U.S.-Canadian defence arrangements".¹⁶⁸ There were a great many specific items urgently required and Canada was ready to pay for them.

As on the previous occasion, however, the Chairman of the United States Section could only repeat that efforts were being made "at the highest level" to obtain ameliorating legislation by Congress. At the next meeting, held on 19-20 August, he reported that the Board's recommendation had been submitted formally to the Secretary of State and to the Secretary of Defense. Unfortunately, however, the necessary remedial legislation had failed to pass during the last session of Congress. Furthermore, the one channel of partial procurement -- surplus property disposal -- had been closed on 30 June 1948. Thus there was no means whereby Canada could procure from the United States Government even the necessary maintenance supplies for its existing stock of weapons and equipment.¹⁶⁹

119. The brief presented by the Canadian Section at the next meeting, held at Montreal on 16-17 December 1948, argued that a large portion of the standard U.S. armament and equipment already held by Canadian forces was no longer usable due to lack of spare parts. Further steps towards standardization were being hampered. Where the United States was the only available source of supply, purchase through government sources was necessary because:

- (a) Where the equipment is manufactured in arsenals or workshops of the U.S. Services, the U.S. Government is the only possible channel of supply.
- (b) It would frequently be impossible for Canadian requirements to be met by direct purchase from the U.S. manufacturer until the full requirements of the U.S. Services had been met. This would seriously affect any standardization of training or operations considered necessary by PJBD.
- (c) In the case of direct purchase from the manufacturer, the latest modifications required by the U.S. Armed Forces would not necessarily be known to the Canadian authorities or applied to Canadian orders. As a result, Canada might frequently obtain equipment that is already obsolescent or below the standards used by the U.S. Services. This, again, would seriously affect the program of standardization.
- (d) There is the added possibility that, in view of later developments, a manufacturer might cease production of equipment or parts on short notice. Under direct purchase, there might be a considerable time-lag before the new production would be available for the Canadian Forces.¹⁷⁰

Purchase through United States Government sources would have the following additional advantages:

- (a) Integration of Canadian requirements with those of the U.S. under one contract would result in somewhat larger orders being placed. The unit cost might be accordingly reduced in some cases to mutual advantage.
- (b) Inspection would be carried out by U.S. Government inspectors, ensuring an equal standard.
- (c) Modifications would be automatically applied to all equipment, again ensuring a standard and interchangeable product.

Thereupon the Permanent Joint Board on Defence made the following recommendation:

That long-term arrangements be effected which will:

- (1) Permit the military services of Canada to purchase military supplies, arms, equipment and weapons of war direct from or through the U.S. Armed Services at cost price if the item is new and at an agreed depreciated value if used.
- (2) Provide that funds in payment of such supplies, arms, equipment or weapons of war so purchased revert to the appropriations of the U.S. Services concerned.¹⁷¹

120. Although this recommendation was subsequently concurred in by the Secretary of Defense, there was doubt in Washington as to whether it would be advisable to put before Congress during 1949 a measure relating exclusively to Canada, in view of the fact that considerable effort would have to be devoted to securing passage of the proposed Military Assistance Bill to give effect to the Foreign Military Aid Programme designed particularly to meet the needs of N.A.T.O. countries (see para 145). The Permanent Joint Board on Defence was told, during the course of its 17-18 March 1949 meeting, that the proposed Military Assistance Bill was broad and flexible enough to meet the Canadian procurement problem. General McNaughton then raised the point of dollar exchange: since Canada had always paid for its military equipment, it would be necessary to sell equipment to the United States in return. A jet engine then in an advanced stage of development was an example of what Canada would be prepared to sell. Something similar to the wartime Hyde Park Agreement of 1941 seemed desirable. This suggestion found general agreement. The U.S. Army member then pointed out that a workable procedure had recently been discovered whereby equipment could, in a limited way, be made available to the Canadian Services by transfer on an exchange basis.¹⁷²

121. Following discussions between "high-level" authorities of the two countries the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs gave the United States Ambassador in Ottawa, on 31 March 1949, a comprehensive secret memorandum which:

- (i) pointed out the desirability of U.S. defence purchases in Canada with a view to ensuring the most advantageous use of the resources of the continent and in order to offset Canadian defence purchases in the United States; and
- (ii) included a preliminary list of the military equipment that could be purchased in Canada.¹⁷³

On 3 June the Canadian Embassy in Washington presented to the State Department an unclassified Aide Memoire which:

- (i) explained the advantage to both countries which would result from Canada being permitted to purchase military equipment from and through the United States Defence authorities, and recalled the Board's recommendation to this effect of December, 1948, as well as the views recorded by the Board on earlier occasions;
- (ii) indicated that it remains the policy of the Canadian Government to pay for the military equipment and supplies that it obtains from United States sources;
- (iii) pointed out that, in present circumstances, increased Canadian defence purchases in the United States would create difficulties in the balance of international payments between the two countries unless such purchases were counterbalanced by similar United States purchases in Canada;
- (iv) noted the advantages that would result from United States defence purchases in Canada - e.g., more rapid progress in the implementation of defence arrangements and the development of industrial capacity available for an emergency; and
- (v) expressed a hope that any measures considered by the United States authorities with a view to carrying out the foreign military aid programme will provide provisions to meet points (i) and (iv) above.

At the same time the Canadian Embassy handed over a tentative outline of Service requirements from American sources for the year beginning 1 July 1949. Because of other financial commitments this list totalled only

\$20,000,000. But, should the present negotiations be brought to fruition, Canadian purchases would likely be larger in subsequent years and/or under changed world conditions.

122. Passed by Congress on 28 September, the Mutual Defence Assistance Act, 1949 was signed by President Truman on 6 October. This Act made provision for cash purchases by Canada of military equipment from and through the United States Services. It also made possible American procurement in Canada for transfer to third countries (i.e. "offshore" purchases). But nothing was said about procurement in Canada for the use of United States Services, indicating that the restrictions imposed by the "Buy American" legislation were still effective. Meeting at Annapolis on 11-12 October, the Permanent Joint Board on Defence devoted considerable attention to the whole question of procurement. The placing of American orders in Canada would help to decentralize the defence industrial pattern of the continent. It was pointed out, however, that Canada's insistence on paying for equipment would place her at a disadvantage, since other countries would soon be able to obtain American equipment merely for the asking. The discussion was concluded by the following Recommendation of 12 October 1949:

- (a) Policy decisions and any necessary legislative measures required to resolve the problem be undertaken as being in the national interests of United States and Canada because speedy resolution is patently in the interests of continental and Atlantic community defence; and
- (b) That the necessities as well as the logic of the Canadian position be accorded the fullest consideration in the administration of the U.S. Military Assistance Program and the mutual aid features of the Atlantic Pact.¹⁷⁴

123. On 2 December the United States Munitions Board was directed to study this recommendation. On 21 April 1950 its Chairman made a favourable recommendation to Secretary of Defence Louis Johnson.¹⁷⁵ On 5 May Mr. Johnson directed that the "Secretaries of Army, Navy and Air Force, acting through the Munitions Board, develop a coordinated Department of Defense program for reciprocal purchasing of military equipment with Canada for FY 1951 within the range of 15 to 25 million dollars".¹⁷⁶ The Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff and the Special Representative in Washington of the Canadian Commercial Corporation subsequently were designated to discuss necessary procedures with the United States Munitions Board.

124. General McNaughton told the next meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (27 May) that the Canadian authorities were very heartened by this arrangement for the initiation of reciprocal purchases in Canada and that it was felt the principle far transcended in importance the amount involved.¹⁷⁷ It is, however, worth quoting the following exchange between the Deputy Minister of National Defence, who had attended the meeting, and General Henry of the United States Section:

While the projected programme for reciprocal purchasing for 1951 was very gratifying, Mr. Drury noted that it did not offer a complete solution and hoped that it would be possible in due course to make arrangements under which the U.S. Services would be free to buy what they wanted in Canada, providing their purchases were in the interests of joint defence. His interest in this matter was due to a desire for a rational approach to industrial planning. Production of certain items in Canada solely with a view to conserving U.S. dollar exchange sometimes led to uneconomical production.

The U.S. Chairman stated that he was in accord with the ideas expressed by Mr. Drury but, while these might be achieved promptly in time of war, under present conditions they could probably only be realized gradually.¹⁷⁸

(xii) Industrial Mobilization Planning

125. During the course of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence meeting at Toronto on 20-21 November 1947 General McNaughton suggested that "in any programme for the stockpiling of strategic or critical metals the possibility of obtaining supplies from Canada should be seriously considered. Also, the possibility of using existing facilities in Canada for the production of materiel required in any joint defence programme should be kept in mind".¹⁷⁹ During April 1948 the Canadian Government was informed that the United States Munitions Board would be interested in exploring the possibilities of collaboration on industrial mobilization.¹⁸⁰ On 7 June exploratory talks were held in Washington between representatives of the United States Munitions Board, United States National Security Resources Board and the Canadian Industrial Defence Board.¹⁸¹ Subsequently, however, the Cabinet Defence Committee decided that, while it was desirable to have the maximum exchange of information and co-operation with the United States, it would be premature to develop formal liaison until the appropriate Canadian authorities had had an opportunity to consider plans for economic defence generally and until a decision should have been made upon the allocation of such responsibilities between government departments and agencies.¹⁸²

126. On 1 December 1948 the American Government proposed the establishment of a Joint United States-Canadian Industrial Committee.¹⁸³ On 12 April 1949 this Committee was formally established by the exchange of notes between the Department of External Affairs and the State Department. During the first meeting, held in Washington on 1 June, it was decided to add the word "Planning" to the title. The Joint U.S.-Canada Industrial Mobilization Planning Committee then established sub-committees to deal with the following:

- (a) Mechanical transport;
- (b) Chemicals and explosives;
- (c) Non-ferrous metals;*
- (d) Administrative controls;
- (e) Pulpwood, wood pulp, newsprint and woods labour.¹⁸⁴

Active investigation was to be carried on by these five sub-committees and the Joint Committee need not hold formal meetings more often than twice a year.

127. Mr. Sydney Pierce, Associate Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, explained to the 22-23 June 1949 meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence that Canadian industrial mobilization planning could not be self-contained. Although Canada's productive capacity greatly exceeded her own military requirements, Canadian factories relied to some extent upon American supplies of component parts and materials. Thus, in order to plan intelligently, Canada would require a sound and continuing estimate of the production demands likely to be made by its principal allies - the United States and the United Kingdom.

128. Committee work was slow to get underway but by the late autumn of 1949 informal discussions were well advanced. There also had been an exchange of information and some informal discussion on civil defence, health resources, abrasives, machine tools, industrial and governmental dispersion, petroleum, natural gas and solid fuels.¹⁸⁵

129. A second meeting of the Committee proper was, held on 8 August 1950, in Ottawa and under the joint chairmanship of Mr. C.D. Howe, Minister of Trade and Commerce, and Mr. W. Stuart Symington, Chairman of the United States National Security Resources Board. The recent outbreak of war in Korea gave impetus to consideration of the problems of industrial mobilization. The Committee recommended that studies should be made of the basic

*Actually nine sub-committees were to be established in the field of non-ferrous metals.

industrial programmes of the two countries and of the steps necessary to meet their production and supply problems. Closely associated with these studies was the question of regulations pertaining to priorities, allocations and export controls.¹⁸⁶ In order to facilitate this work the Committee prepared the following statement:

The United States and Canada have achieved a high degree of co-operation in the field of industrial mobilization during and since the Second World War through the operation of the principles embodied in the Hyde Park Agreement of 1941, through the extension of its concepts in the post-war period and more recently through the work of the Joint Industrial Mobilization Planning Committee. In the interests of mutual security and to assist both governments to discharge their obligations under the United Nations Charter and the North Atlantic Treaty, it is believed that this field of common action should be further extended. It is agreed, therefore, that our two governments shall co-operate in all respects practicable, and to the extent of their respective executive powers, to the end that the economic efforts of the two countries be co-ordinated for the common defence and that the production and resources of both countries be used for the best combined results.

The following principles are established for the purpose of facilitating these objectives:

1. In order to achieve an optimum production of goods essential for the common defence, the two countries shall develop a co-ordinated programme of requirements, production and procurement.
2. To this end, the two countries shall, as it becomes necessary, institute co-ordinated controls over the distribution of scarce raw materials and supplies.
3. Such United States and Canadian emergency controls shall be mutually consistent in their objectives, and shall be so designed and administered as to achieve comparable effects in each country. To the extent possible, there shall be consultation to this end prior to the institution of any system of controls in either country which affects the other.
4. In order to facilitate essential production, the technical knowledge and productive skills involved in such production within both countries shall, where feasible, be freely exchanged.

5. Barriers which impede the flow between Canada and the United States of goods essential for the common defence effort should be removed as far as possible.
6. The two governments, through their appropriate agencies, will consult concerning any financial or foreign exchange problems which may arise as a result of the implementation of this agreement.¹⁸⁷

On 26 October 1950 an exchange of notes was effected in Washington by the Canadian Ambassador and the Secretary of State to give formal effect to this statement.

PART III - - AMERICAN-BRITISH-CANADIAN
POST-WAR CO-OPERATION

(i) Beginnings

130. Despite uneasiness on both sides of the Atlantic regarding possible action by the Russians, top level Anglo-American discussions on military matters had ceased following the conclusion of the Second World War. But certain aspects, including a number of direct interest to Canada, continued to be investigated by committees of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, represented in Washington by the British Joint Staff Mission. 188

131. One of these was standardization. During January 1946 General Foulkes urged an exchange of views with the War Office as to the feasibility of standardizing small arms on a tripartite basis as a starting point. On 29 April the Permanent Joint Board on Defence gave its blessing to the proposal for Canadian-American standardization. On 30 May the Chiefs of Staff in Ottawa received a government-approved recommendation from their British counterparts that the United Kingdom and Canada should make a joint approach to the United States. But the Chiefs of Staff subsequently decided that an approach to Washington might better be made at the service level and separately. 189

132. Here the matter stood when Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein assumed the appointment of Chief of the Imperial General Staff on 26 June 1946. During his visit to Canada in August-September 1946, he sought and obtained permission from Whitehall to proceed further than the mere discussion with Canadians and Americans of standardization of weapons, equipment and operational procedures. 190

133. On 9 September Field-Marshal Montgomery outlined his views on the need for tripartite collaboration in the fields of strategic planning and intelligence to Prime Minister King, the Minister of National Defence and the Chiefs of Staff in Ottawa. Mr. King is reported to have replied that Canada would go to any length to bring about standardization and that Montgomery might informally say as much when in Washington. Two days later President Truman similarly gave his approval to the proposals. When appraised of this Prime Minister Attlee telegraphed his approval, but did caution

Montgomery to avoid any specific commitments. During the Field Marshal's meeting with the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff on 16 September agreement was reached that talks should be held on all defence matters. The first meeting might well be held in Washington and a planning staff from Canada should be included. 191

134. On 20 October Lieutenant-General C. Foulkes, Air Vice-Marshal G.E. Waite and Rear-Admiral C.R.H. Taylor proceeded to London to discuss the agenda proposed for the forthcoming tripartite conference in Washington:

- (a) To explore the possibility of standardization between the Armed Forces of UK, USA and CDA.
- (b) To report on the immediate field of procedures for standardization.
- (c) To consider the exchange of views on strategic and technical intelligence between the three countries. 192

The result was agreement that there should not be a common policy for the Commonwealth and that Canada should speak for herself at any future tripartite conferences. Canada was represented in Washington during November by Commodore A.H.G. Storrs, Brigadier W.J. McGill and Air Commodore C.R. Dunlap. Complete agreement was reached on the exchange of information in the fields of political and technical intelligence, but problems of standardization were too difficult to resolve quickly (see paras 136-142).

135. Subsequently, the members of Canada's Joint Intelligence Staff participated with the Combined Intelligence Committee of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in the preparation of an intelligence appreciation ABCI-15, which was dated 27 September 1949. It would appear, however, that Canadian opinions had carried little weight:

- (a) In the Summary, Part I, the Canadian view was that it was inadequate in that it stopped at 'strategic intentions' and omitted any reference to the campaigns and to modification of Soviet capabilities therefrom. They had felt that the strategic intentions should be re-examined in the light of the campaign studies.

- (b) The Canadian representatives had suggested, and obtained agreement, that the use of the expressions "Soviet Union and its allies" and "the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and their allies" be accepted in the statement of the problem. Later, however, the United States and the United Kingdom exerted strong pressure to revert to the earlier term "Anglo-American" and the Canadians were unable to get agreement as to an explanatory note defining the latter term. 193

The resulting operational plan ABC-109 would seem to have been a purely Anglo-American effort, like the original ABC-1 of 27 March 1941. But there was no need to produce a supplementary equivalent to ABC-22, because of the existence of the Canada-United States Basic Security Plan, 1946 and Emergency Defence Plan MCC 300/1.

(ii) Standardization

136. During the later stages of the Second World War a start had been made in standardization, particularly between the United States and Canada. In the realm of materiel, the items included tire sizes and treads, automotive parts, components of tanks, ammunition, wireless components, fuels and lubricants. Under the heading of operations there had developed common radio procedure (R/T), common security classifications, standard visual signals and standard forms of time. During September-October 1945 a third Conference of Unification of Engineering Standards met in Ottawa, under the auspices of the Combined Production and Resources Board, and decided that the standards organizations of the three countries should make up samples and conduct tests of an agreed composite screw thread. For until there was standardization of screw threads, no real progress could be made towards tripartite standardization of equipment. 194 The Permanent Joint Board on Defence's Recommendation of 20 November, 1946 made pointed reference to the desirability of the "adoption, as far as practicable, of common designs and standards in arms, equipment, organization, methods of training and new developments", and brief mention has already been made of the tripartite conference held in Washington that same month (see para 134).

137. On 21 January 1947 General Foulkes told his fellow Chiefs of Staff in Ottawa that no attempt should be made to achieve immediate standardization; but new weapons and techniques should be developed on a tripartite basis and taken into use

when jointly agreed. It was then suggested that standardization steering committees should be established, in Ottawa from members of the Canadian section of the Canada-United States Military Co-operation Committee and in Washington from members of the Canadian Joint Staff, to facilitate a free exchange of information with the British Joint Staff Mission and the United States War and Navy Departments. Neither the British nor Americans were willing to accept such a joint approach to standardization, however, and even in Canada there was found to be insufficient interest between the Services to facilitate a common approach. 195

138. On 27 June 1947 a tripartite meeting of army representatives in Washington established a working committee. On 23 July this committee issued "Preliminary Notes on Standardization Concept" as a basis of agreement to standardize materiel between the United States, British and Canadian armies. This was approved in Ottawa in its entirety and subsequently published as the "Canadian Plan for Standardization dealing with Equipment, Materiel and Supplies - Army Aspects". Canadian approval was also quickly forthcoming for the working committee's document of 6 October 1947 entitled "Standardization of Certain Aspects of Operations and Logistics". 196 Canadian and American representatives agreed that, prior to and concurrent with the standardization of end-items, emphasis must be placed on standardization of common technical procedures, tooling, design and engineering practices such as drawing practices, material equivalents, screw threads, dimensioning and tolerancing. In the field of materiel a test of Canadian and American prototypes of a "portable, demountable hut" was being conducted at Fort Churchill by representatives of both armies. The field of "Operations and Logistics" was divided into five main categories:

- (a) Operation Procedures.
- (b) Staff Work.
- (c) Logistic Procedures.
- (d) Maps and Charts Affecting Land Operations.
- (e) Military Aspects of Civil Affairs and Military Government Procedures. 197

The United States Army accepted responsibility for detailed examination of categories (a) and (c), while the Canadian Army accepted category (d). Each army designated certain of its exchange officers to serve as standardization officers (see para 113).

139. Representatives of the R.C.A.F. and U.S.A.F. met in Washington from 29 January through 5 February 1948 to discuss how the two air forces might best be able to operate side by side in certain possible theatres of operations. Certain aspects presented no difficulties but others could not be easily resolved. In an effort to solve these last, a temporary steering group was formed in Washington to supervise the work being attempted in each capital. 198 Shortly thereafter an Air Standardization Coordinating Committee was formed and by the end of 1948 there were 49 working groups functioning under its direction. 199

140. During roughly the same period a number of exploratory meetings were held in Washington to discuss methods whereby the Royal Canadian Navy could standardize and collaborate with the United States Navy. 200 Early in 1949 the Naval Board in Ottawa approved in principle a change from the existing system of storekeeping to that used by the United States Navy. By that time the Royal Canadian Navy had switched almost entirely to American communications procedures and was shifting over to American tactical doctrines. 201 Tripartite naval action proved to be considerably slower than that taken by the three armies but the Combined British-United States-Canadian Anti-Submarine Working Group ("CANUKUS") established in Washington during November 1948 gradually worked out a standard tactical doctrine (the R.A.F. and R.C.A.F. were represented as well as the three navies). 202 Only during the spring of 1950, however, was action taken to establish a tripartite naval standardization organization similar to those existing for the armies and air forces. 203

141. On 18 November 1948 delegates from government and industry of the United States, United Kingdom and Canada had met in Washington to sign an accord on the unification of the British and American standard systems of screw threads. As soon as revised publications of the Interdepartmental Screw Thread Committee of the United States of America, the British Standards Association, the Canadian Standards Association and the American Standards Association should be implemented by industry, a general interchangeability of threaded products manufactured in the three nations would become possible. 204

142. According to the minutes of the 71st meeting of the Permanent Joint Board on Defence, held at Halifax during the final days of May 1950:

The Board noted with particular satisfaction that the reports contained many evidences of significant progress, both in the material and non-material fields of standardization. It seemed clear to the Board that the U.S.-Canadian (and in fact U.S.-U.K.-Canadian) standardization programme was now firmly established and was moving forward at an accelerated pace.²⁰⁵

(iii) Emergence of N.A.T.O.

143. Quite aside from the negotiations which were to result in "Marshall Aid" to assist European economic recovery, the year 1947 produced the Dunkirk Treaty to strengthen Anglo-French relations, the BENELUX customs union of Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg, and an idea in the mind of the British Foreign Secretary, Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, that a Western European Union was possible. Negotiations for a Western Union were hastened by the Communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia and on 17 March, 1948 representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Luxembourg signed a 50-year treaty of alliance in Brussels. Concluded in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and predicating aid from the United States of America, the treaty could be invoked by any member state which should be the victim of armed aggression. Despite the subsequent Russian blockade of West Berlin, implementation of what is known as the Brussels Treaty Organization continued throughout the spring and summer. During September a Western Union Defence Organization was created and Field Marshal Montgomery appointed permanent Chairman of its Land, Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief Committee.

144. Meanwhile, and disregarding Russian protests, the American, British and French occupation zones of Germany had been combined for economic purposes, on the assurance that the United States would maintain armed forces there until the peace of Europe was secured. The idea of associating the United States with a European defence system had been enunciated first by Mr. Winston Churchill at Fulton, Missouri, during March 1946, when he advocated a military alliance between the United States and the British Commonwealth. On 29 April 1948 Hon. Louis S. St. Laurent, Secretary of State for External Affairs, suggested to the House of Commons in Ottawa that the Brussels Treaty Organization should be replaced by an Atlantic defence system which should include Canada and the United States. Mr. Bevin welcomed this Canadian suggestion and Senator Alfred H. Vandenberg's Resolution, passed by the U.S. Senate

on 11 June 1948, opened the way for concrete negotiations. On 21 July it was announced in London that representatives of Canada and the United States were participating in the activities of the Brussels Treaty Organization and would soon be represented at meetings of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee.

145. Diplomatic exchanges continued during the summer and autumn. Norway and Denmark decided to forego a proposed Scandinavian Union in favour of membership in an Atlantic Group. On 4 April 1949 a North Atlantic Treaty was signed by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. 206

146. The immediate task was to create a North Atlantic Treaty Organization capable of discouraging Russian aggression. The long term hope, held particularly by the Canadian Government, was that N.A.T.O. could contribute materially to the establishment of a North Atlantic Community of free peoples. 207 Agreement was quickly reached that the North Atlantic Council should normally comprise the foreign ministers of each member nation and that its subsidiary Defence Committee, charged with the task of drawing up unified defence plans, should consist of the defence ministers of each.

147. Although the purely service organization was to include a Military Committee, composed of one representative of each and preferably a chief of staff, the executive body functioning permanently in Washington was to be a Standing Group representing only the Chiefs of Staff of the United States, United Kingdom and France. There seems little doubt that the British and American Chiefs of Staff would have preferred to run matters themselves, as they had through the Combined Chiefs of Staff organization during the Second World War, but France was by far the most important European member and could not be excluded. Perusal of the minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee meetings in Ottawa during these months suggests that, although the Canadian Government and its service advisers were not happy about developments, their attitude was largely one of resignation to events over which they had no control. History seemed to be repeating itself when General Omar M. Bradley, Chairman of the Standing Group, was informed in October that Air Vice-Marshal Hugh Campbell was being sent to Washington to represent the Canadian Chiefs of Staff. 208 Air Vice-Marshal Campbell was also to serve as Chairman of the Canadian Joint Staff, Washington and principal military adviser to the Canadian Ambassador.

148. The next step was the establishment of five Regional Planning Groups:

- (a) North Atlantic Ocean - all except Italy and Luxembourg.
- (b) Canada-United States.
- (c) Western Europe - Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States.
- (d) Northern Europe - Denmark, Norway, United Kingdom, United States.
- (e) Southern European-Western Mediterranean - France, Italy, United Kingdom, United States. 209

The United States was the only member belonging to every group. The Canada-United States Group comprised the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. The members of the Canada-United States Military Cooperation Committee began to function also as the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group. Subsequently, and on the understanding that information concerning purely Canadian-American defence information need not be provided to the Standing Group, the two bodies physically merged as the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group. 210 This last-named body had, in addition to the task of planning the defence of Canadian-American territory, two special tasks of reinforcing overseas regions which might be attacked and supporting and preparing for the execution of the strategic air offensive. 211 There was no problem about providing Canadian representation at meetings in the United States of the North Atlantic Ocean Group. Major-General S.F. Clark was made Chairman of a re-organized Canadian Joint Staff in London and Canadian representative to both the Western Europe Regional Planning Group and the continuing Western Union Defence Committee.

149. On 1 December 1949 the N.A.T.O. Defence Committee, meeting in Paris, agreed on a strategic concept for the "integrated defence of the North Atlantic area". 212 Meeting at The Hague on 1 April 1950, the Defence Committee approved the first draft of a detailed four years' defence plan (subsequently known as the Medium Term Defence Plan) which had been prepared by the five Regional Planning Groups, the Standing Group and the Military Committee. Work on this last had, however, uncovered a lack of co-ordination with other N.A.T.O. agencies -- the Defence Financial and Economic Committee and the Military Production and Supply Board, each of which

possessed its own permanent working staff. Therefore, the North Atlantic Council decided on 15 May 1950 that a permanent civilian body should be created to carry out agreed policies during the intervals between Council meetings. Accordingly, a body of North Atlantic Council Deputies was established to meet in continuous session in London. 213 But the "cold war" had changed considerably by 25 July, when the Council Deputies met for the first time. One month earlier North Korean Communist divisions had crossed the 38th parallel. United States forces now were in action in South Korea and other members of the United Nations were organizing forces to assist in resisting this aggression.

(iv) Canadian Army Emergency Defence Plans

150. The Joint Intelligence Committee's Appreciation of possible military threats to the Security of Canada and the United States, dated 3 May 1948, was used by the Joint Planning Committee in Ottawa to prepare a short-range plan "BULL MOOSE" covering the period 1 July 1948 to 1 July 1949. This Plan was discussed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee on 24 June 1948 and approved in principle. Mr. A.D.P. Heeney, Secretary to the Cabinet, suggested, however, that:

The conclusions in regard to the strategy to be employed and the degree of Western European resistance which could be counted on had important external political implications. They should be made known to the responsible Ministers, in particular to the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in order that those responsible for related foreign policies should be fully aware of the military factors involved. 214

151. On 26 July 1948 Brigadier J.D.B. Smith, acting Chief of the General Staff, submitted to the Minister of National Defence a memorandum outlining the Army aspect of this Emergency Plan. This was based on the assumption that Selective Service and National Registration would be put into effect as of M-Day: "without Selective Service and National Registration, the proposed Plan could not become operative because of the time factor involved in overall Allied Strategy". 215 In the event that Russian preparations for war should be so well disguised that D-Day might coincide with M-Day, it was essential that all the requirements for mobilization

should be available beforehand. The forces for home defence were the minimum and the Overseas Forces the maximum which the Canadian Army might organize, train and equip for operations during the period M-Day plus 12 months. Although extra forces would be required later, it was considered that the vital issues, and manner in which the war should be fought, would be determined within that period. It was emphasized that this time the troops would have to be ready to fight as soon as they reached their destination and that there would be no opportunity for undergoing additional training. The manpower required for this first 12 months was detailed as follows:

(a) Overseas Force - Corps of two Infantry Divisions, two Armoured Brigades and necessary GH ₄ , L of C and base troops, plus 3 months reinforcements.	127,744
(b) Home Defence - incl Mobile Brigade Group, AA, Coast Defence and Internal Security Units.	57,036
(c) Reinforcements under training in Canada.	60,000
(d) Training, Instructional and School Adm Staffs.	40,000
(e) H ₄ Commands, and administrative units.	42,000
Manpower total	<hr/> 326,780

152. An adequate training organization would be an immediate need. Existing resources of the Active Force schools totalled only 2350, leaving a deficiency of 37,500 all ranks, which could be found only by a greatly accelerated recruitment by the Active Force. The memorandum then warned:

...unless immediate action is taken to increase the size of the Active Force by Selective Service or by some other means, Canada will not be able to produce her minimum commitment in accordance with the agreed Allied Strategy. Should Canada (or any other of the countries concerned) not be prepared to accept the commitments arrived at on military levels, the agreed Allied Strategy would be founded on false premises. It is important to take into account the fact that with the present

military resources of the Allies and with the knowledge of the present Russian strengths, there is in the allied military opinion no other strategy which could be developed should war take place in the period 1 Jul 48 - 1 Jul 49. Any departure from the agreed military planning could not be done as unilateral action which might result in the gravest consequences.

153. Certain important changes were made, however, before the Canadian Army's Emergency Operational Plan was issued in September 1948. For example:

Initially, mobilization will proceed on a basis of voluntary enlistments until such time as a system of selective service and control of manpower can be placed in effect. It is assumed that the Government will initiate some form of manpower control in the event of an emergency. However, any such plan produced at the present time could not be effective before approximately six months. It can be assumed that for the purpose of placing the Mobilization Plan into execution that manpower will be available initially through voluntary enlistment and subsequently through some form of manpower control. 216

Due to deficiencies of major items of equipment and trained personnel, the Plan could not be completely effective on M-Day; however, it was the intention to remove such limitations progressively.

154. The roles of the Army (not in order of priority) were summarized as follows:

- (a) To defend those areas vital to the national economy of the country in order to enable the mobilization of industry and manpower;
- (b) To counterattack any airborne landings;
- (c) To assist in civil defence and internal security;
- (d) To bolster the morale of the people;
- (e) To take part in major land operations;
- (f) To occupy and defend base areas;
- (g) To occupy vital portions of the enemy territory.

The Mobile Striking Force, consisting of an infantry brigade group capable of being air lifted with existing R.C.A.F. resources, was the counter-attacking force assigned to the direct defence of Canada. In view of the large area over which it might be required to operate, command was retained initially by Army Headquarters. Five coast artillery regiments and six independent batteries were to provide for the defence of ports and bases, in conjunction with the Navy and Air Force. Three and a half infantry battalions were to provide garrisons for these. Anti-aircraft defence of vital areas would be provided by the R.C.A.F. and 10 H.A.A. and 12 L.A.A. regiments. The defence of vital points was assigned to 27 infantry companies and two provost companies. In the more remote areas Canadian Rangers were to deal with local saboteurs, provide guides for organized troops and assistance to the R.C.M.P. and/or provincial police. Aside from its own protection, the Army's role in civil defence was closely linked to that of aid to the civil power.

155. Regardless of the size of the Field Force, the Chief of the General Staff would be the senior officer in the Canadian Army. In any event, this Field Force was envisaged as serving under British, American or Allied combined command. There would be no need for an intermediate headquarters such as the C.M.H.Q. of the Second World War, since the Canadian Liaison Section at Theatre Command Headquarters would be an advanced element of Army Headquarters in Ottawa. The Headquarters, Canadian Communication Zone would communicate directly to Ottawa on all administrative and service details. It would also have direct command of the Canadian Base, Reinforcement and Training Installations and the Canadian 2nd Echelon.

156. This Plan was subject to annual review and amendments were made when necessary to meet current requirements. Revision and augmentation finally resulted in a new Emergency Defence Plan being issued on 16 February 1950. This bore the short title AH₄-EDP 50/1. Once again, however, it was conceded that all facilities would not be available on M-Day and that the balance would have to be developed as soon as possible. Should no serious threat have developed against North America by D plus three months, consideration would be given to the despatch of the Active Force brigade group in the first flight of the Field Force to the theatre of overseas operations and its replacement as a Mobile Striking Force by one of the mobilized brigade groups. Likewise, certain anti-aircraft artillery units might be despatched overseas for active employment. 217

157. As a consequence of the events of the summer of 1950, however, the Emergency Defence Plan was drastically revised as of 2 October (short title AH₄-EDP 50/2) into what was primarily a defence of Canada project. 218

CONCLUSION

158. The reader will have discerned from the foregoing paragraphs that, although the North Atlantic Triangle still functioned there had been a shift in emphasis as far as Canadian defence policy was concerned. Prior to the Second World War Canada had been a useful and indispensable hostage to good relations between the United Kingdom and the United States: American security had then depended greatly on the British position in the world, which in turn had rested on the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe. The conclusion of the Second World War left Europe in decline, however, and in danger of being dominated by the armed might of the U.S.S.R. -- unless the United States should assume the role which the United Kingdom no longer had the wealth or resources to continue. The gradual American assumption of leadership of the western nations naturally led Canada to seek closer ties with its great neighbour to the south. Although no treaty was negotiated and as yet actual commitments were little more than a continuation of wartime arrangements, considerable leeway was left for the Chiefs of Staff to advise their respective governments as to what action should be taken if an emergency arose. The British Commonwealth had flourished and survived two major wars in the 20th Century, without its members having to commit themselves ahead of time, but it was apparent by 1950 that this would not be good enough for North American defence or N.A.T.O. How Canadian defence policy crystallized and what commitments were made during the ensuing decade of so-called "cold war" must, however, be left for later study.

159. This Report was written by J. Mackay Hitsman.

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