Air University Review, July-August 1977

A Case for the Manned Penetrating Bomber
Dr. G. K. Burke

Though the outcome is uncertain, the summer of 1977 should witness the final chapter in the saga of the B-1 bomber, "the most expensive weapon system in the nation's history" (approximately $24 billion). This aircraft may also be the most extensively researched system in the nation's history, as well as the most maligned and the most misunderstood. It has been called spurious and unnecessary by some; essential and critical by others. The volumes of testimony concerning it line whole shelves in major libraries; few of us are able to master the technology and nomenclature necessary to a proper understanding of the claims and counterclaims of the protagonists.¹

It is possible, however, that the difficulties surrounding this controversial system are more apparent than real. If the decision to procure the projected force of 244 B-1s is made in the affirmative, it will constitute the backbone of one leg of the strategic Triad for a period of some thirty years, commencing around 1986. Its merits (or demerits) might then most readily be gauged through an evaluation of its ability to contribute to the strategic Triad and through an. evaluation of the Triad itself.

In theory the Triad, composed of the land and sea-based missile forces in addition to the manned bombers, provides the nation with the capability to inflict unacceptable levels of damage on any power or group of powers--the potential capability of the People's Republic of China (PRC) would have to be included in any thirty-year progression-capable of threatening the survival of our nation.² In recent years it has also been considered sagacious to include a redundant capability, a capability beyond assured destruction, for inflicting lower levels of damage (counterforce) aimed at targets other than a potential adversary's urban and industrial centers (countervalue).

In the future, this counterforce capability will continue to be necessary because in its absence the nation would be perilously exposed should a foe choose to strike at weapons rather than populations. In such a circumstance, the national leadership would find itself in the position of having to reply to a limited strike aimed at isolated weapon systems with massive countervalue retaliation or capitulate to the adversary's demands. Since the first alternative would invite the foe to reply in kind, assuming the adversary still possessed active weapons, the situation created could be harrowing. The latter alternative is unthinkable.

In the face of the dual nature of this strategic counterforce/countervalue challenge, the question becomes what level of force is necessary? Sizing the force is not easy because realities differ from nation to nation, and no man is able to predict with high confidence what the exact circumstances of some unnamed future crisis will be. Nevertheless, the best analysis available, that made by then Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara twelve years ago, estimated that 400 one-megaton equivalents (OME) optimally delivered upon the Soviet Union would be sufficient to destroy 30 percent pf the civil population and 76 percent of the industry. It was further estimated that this mega tonnage would effectively terminate civilization in the U.S.S.R.³

In the meantime, however, considerable doubt has arisen over the continued validity of this analysis. The question hinges largely on one's interpretation of four vital caveats. First, the use of OME as a unit of measurement for nuclear destruction has been criticized as being obsolete. OME is calculated by raising the explosive force of the warhead to the two-thirds power. Hence, a 27 megaton (MT) warhead equals 0.09 OME, or has a burst equal to nine one-megaton explosives. ⁴

The equation is 3 * 3 * 3=27, 3 * 3= 9; by the same process a 27 kiloton (KT) warhead would equal 0.09 OME. This reduction in explosive force was necessary because a great deal of the burst, particularly among the large explosives, is released in close and overkills the immediate area of the target. Thus, this unit of measurement once represented a considerable advance in the predicting of the destructive force of a nuclear burst.

However, recent developments have further improved the sophistication of the model. This upgrading was made necessary by the fact that most targets are small, and many are not circular, as is the arc of the blast. By raising the number to the three tenths power for American warheads and to the four tenths power for those of the U.S.S.R., more of the wasted energy released by a typical burst is accounted for. Within the framework of this model, a 27 MT warhead would equal 2.691 adjusted one megaton equivalents (AOME). On the other hand; a 50 KT explosive (the standard Poseidon warhead) has been raised in value from 0.13 OME to 0.409 AOME. This is true for all small warheads, and the strategic implications are considerable.⁵

Second, and most disturbing, for some ten years the Soviet Union has been systematically engaged in hardening its society. This process has included: civil defense training and evacuation planning for the populace, massive shelter construction programs for vital command and control elements, dispersing from 60 to 80 percent of the new industry to small or medium-sized towns, employing simple measures. to harden vital machinery to withstand up to 300 pounds per square inch (psi), and the placing of key factories in positions that render. destruction of' more than one of them by a single re-entry vehicle (RV) impossible. The end product of this massive program (estimated to cost between $50 and $100 billion) is a society that might secure 98 percent population survivability in the event of all-out countervalue strikes. Such programs would appear to have invalidated analyses based on 400 OME or even 400 AOME.⁶

Third, the 400 OME or AOME must be optimally delivered. Prior to the enemy's initiation of hostilities, the most vital targets would be covered by at least one weapon apiece. But afterwards, in the confusion and destruction that will inevitably accompany any thermonuclear counterforce strike aimed at weapon systems, this may not be true. Some target may still be covered by more than one weapon, others by none. The following rule then prevails: If prompt response is desired, more than 400 OME / AOME must survive in order to deliver 400 OME / AOME optimally.⁷

Fourth the 400 OME figure fails entirely to account for the redundant force necessary to reply to lower-level strikes. When all is considered, a conservative estimate of the force necessary to deter the Soviet Union across the entire counterforce/countervalue spectrum must be increased by an order of magnitude, with particular emphasis on weapons programmed to offset Soviet "societal hardening" measures. This force should include large numbers of (1) medium-size, accurately delivered explosives programmed to eliminate the numerous, hard, widely dispersed targets the new matrix consists of and (2) extremely large explosives, programmed to create the large quantities of fallout necessary to attack an evacuated populace protected by, " . . . hasty shelters constructed from materials at hand."⁸

When the PRC is factored in, the estimate increases substantially. The PRC is only 20 percent urbanized contrasted to the Soviet Union, 56 percent, and the United States, 73.5 percent. This is relevant since assured destruction is related to urban population density and concentration. That explains why the Soviet Union was once considered vulnerable to 400 optimally delivered OME, compared to the 200 OME requirement for the United States. Precisely what the figure for the PRC would be has never been declassified, but it may safely be assumed to be at least twice that of the U.S.S.R. In toto, then, a conservative, responsible estimate would indicate that the original McNamara estimate is now inaccurate by several orders of magnitude. ⁹

THE ROLE of each arm of the Triad in producing this force level might next attract the attention and consideration of the analyst. The most heralded of the arms is the ballistic missile submarine because of its invulnerability to detection and destruction in terms of one swift strike. But it should be noted that a conventional warfighting phase of undetermined duration in Western Europe looms among the most sophisticated projections of nuclear confrontation. Given weeks or months, portions of the ballistic missile fleet could be detected and destroyed. And this condition would be greatly exacerbated if the real-time antisubmarine warfare (ASW) breakthrough, projected by Dr. Malcolm R. Currie, former Director of Defense Research and Engineering, were to occur.

A second difficulty results from the relatively small and inaccurate RVs that current and projected sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) are armed with: they are ill-equipped to attack hardened or dispersed industrial and population targets. For example, the projected Trident 1 and Trident 2 submarine-launched missiles, outfitted with optimally designed inertial guidance systems, have notional accuracies of no more than 0.25 nautical miles (NM). The Trident 1 missile is expected to be armed with eight 100 KT warheads and the Trident 2 with as many as seven 350 KT Mark 12A RVs. The former would have approximately a 0.32 single shot kill probability (SSKP) against a structure hardened to withstand 300 psi, while the latter would possess approximately 0.59 SSKP. Neither value is impressive. This lack of performance could be overcome by equipping the ballistic missile submarine fleet with terminal guidance systems, but many critics feel that accuracies of at least 0.05 NM (1.00 SSKP against a target hardened to withstand 300 psi) will destabilize the strategic balance because missiles so equipped would be equally lethal against hardened missile silos. In any event, terminal guidance will not achieve initial operating capability before 1987.¹⁰

Of more significance, small warheads produce small quantities of fallout, which is one aspect of a nuclear burst that is directly proportional to the size of the explosion (approximately 100 pounds to a one-megaton detonation). Since large quantities of fallout may be necessary to secure the assured destruction of an evacuated populace dispersed in hastily constructed shelters, small submarine-launched RV's may be expected to have limited value in attacking it. These re-entry vehicles might be more cost-effectively employed against general, soft area targets.¹¹

The following should also be observed:

(1) Attacks on submarines at sea produce little or only limited collateral damage. This system invites attacks upon itself to a far greater degree than either of the other two arms of the Triad. (2) Ten Trident boats will cost an estimated $15 billion. To procure a force approaching the level required for assured destruction would impose an unendurable fiscal burden on the nation. (3) A sudden breakthrough could wipe out the entire deterrent if it were committed to a single medium. (4) Severe communication problems may exist in relation to the ballistic missile submarine. The boat may possess more survivability than the means to communicate with it, even assuming that the Seafarer communication system is constructed. (5) Limited strikes from a ballistic missile submarine present serious difficulties. Once a missile is launched the boat has disclosed its position and would in some instances be in danger of destruction.

Conclusion: Though a key portion of the strategic Triad, the ballistic missile submarine lacks the cost-effective survivability to cover the entire counterforce/countervalue spectrum alone.¹²

The second arm of the deterrent is the land-based missile force. This arm of the Triad is currently passing through a stage of uncertainty. Careful analysis indicates that if current trends continue, by the late 1980s a Soviet land-based missile force of 313 55-18 and approximately 65 55-19 ICBMs will be sufficient to destroy about 95 percent of the current American land-based missile force.^l3 Since the Vladivostok aide-mémoire permits each superpower to procure 1320 missiles with multiple warheads, the situation could assume critical dimensions.

The logical response to such a threat would appear to be to move at once in the direction of one of the mobile basing alternatives available. Eventually this may become necessary, but at present powerful forces argue against the adoption of such a course. Three factors are paramount: (1) The inability to detect the number of missiles present in either the covered trenches or the multiple aim points of the two most-often-proposed land mobile systems could mean the end of SALT negotiations and serve as a powerful catalyst to nuclear proliferation. (2) The existing silo force is relatively inexpensive to maintain. This would not be true of a land mobile force, which will be 1.5-2.0 times as costly. Equally disturbing is that in a period of high labor costs the approximately eight men it requires to operate and maintain each Minuteman 3 leap to an average of 40 to 50 men for most mobile systems studied so far.^l4 (3) The greatest problem may lie in creating cost-effective firepower. Even the 10,000 point system recommended by Paul H. Nitze would secure inadequate survivable firepower within the confines of currently proposed Minuteman force levels.^l5 Juxtaposed, if a crash program were mounted and the entire Minuteman force of 1000 missiles was replaced by the 150-170,000 pound version of the MX, it should be possible to secure a formidable poststrike force. But it should be further noted that to procure such a force could entail expenditure in the area of $20-$30 billion. This figure does not include the $10-$20 billion estimate for the mobile system itself. Lastly, the proposed MX, with its fourteen 350 KT Mark 12A RVs, will encounter many of the same difficulties the Trident missiles are apt to be exposed to in terms of attacking a widely dispersed populace.^l6

Conclusion: With regard to the land-based missile force, follow current force planning goals. Introduce modifications to the current silo-based Minuteman force, withhold land mobile basing and large-scale MX alternatives pending the outcome of U.S.-Soviet negotiations.

Manned bombers constitute the third and final arm of the strategic Triad. They are the least understood of the three systems comprising the Triad, but paradoxically they are also the most lethal. The maximum payload per unit is enormous. Today a single B-52G / H optimally equipped with four gravity bombs (10 MT X 2 + 5 MT X 2) and six 200 KT short-range attack missiles (SRAM) disposes a payload that due to its enormous weight is optimal for attacking widely dispersed targets. In terms of megatonnage, an optimally armed B-52 would notionally dispose 30 MT as compared to a Trident submarine's 19.¹⁷

From another standpoint, the extreme accuracy of air-delivered gravity bombs renders the manned bomber the ideal candidate to attack such portions of Soviet society that have been hardened to withstand nuclear assault. In fact, witnesses before the Senate Armed Services Committee have testified that some targets in the single integrated operations plan (SIOP) cannot be attacked cost effectively by any other means. (For example, the Hoover Dam may require up to 10,000 psi)¹⁸

Considering that the prime mission of our strategic forces is deterrence, the manned bomber force is the only leg of the Triad that can be flexed in time of crisis. Neither ICBMs nor SLBMs can be recalled once fired. It is unthinkable that either of them would ever be launched under any conditions other than on general hostilities. But the bomber force can be launched on warning and recalled at any time short of reaching the target. In short, the bomber force gives our national command authorities a strategic option between all or nothing when hostilities appear imminent.

As with the other arms of the Triad, several caveats need to be observed. First, a single B-52 with ten weapons embarked could strike at no more than ten targets, while the Trident class submarine could theoretically (if implausibly) strike at up to 192. Second, in terms of a large target structure, one comprised of many small noncircular sites, the manned bomber fares poorly when contrasted to the submarine. A B-1 with an optimal payload of 24 SRAMs possesses 15 AOME, the Trident submarine with 24 missiles, 98. Third, in many instances the bomber would deploy a payload far less than the maximum one quoted above (a typical B-52 bomb load might consist of 1 MT X 4 or 400 KT X 4). The target structure to be attacked would be the determinant. Therefore, across some profiles the submarine would be superior.

But it must be remembered that the bomber is a reusable platform, and no other system has this capability in cost-efficient terms. When this capability is factored into the equation, it invalidates most other measurements. Invariably, the manned bomber is undervalued because its real-time capability for multiple strikes is ignored. This becomes more apparent when it is remembered that the Minuteman 3 and Poseidon missiles have a current price of approximately $9 million per unit. The cost of reloading missile silos or submarines would be prohibitive. Of equal significance, many bombers may be purchased for the price of one submarine. The proposed force of 244 B-1 bombers has an estimated cost of $24 billion. A mere ten Trident-class submarines have been cost estimated at $15 billion. Conclusion: No high-volume force capable of coping with current Soviet civil defense measures is able to be developed in a cost-effective manner without a high volume, high accuracy manned bomber.¹⁹

IF IT is assumed that a manned bomber is a viable portion of the Triad, the next consideration should involve the configuration of the aircraft. Under this heading few serious analysts question the need to procure a replacement for the aging B-52 fleet. Built to perform over a 5000 hour flight profile, the average B-52 has logged over 8000 hours with many exceeding 11,000; built to perform for ten years, the last B-52/H was delivered in October 1962. By 1990 these veterans will no longer be able to perform a first-line mission. If they are not supplemented by some alternative system, it is doubtful that they will be able to perform at all.²⁰

In terms of the future, two candidates have been proposed to augment/replace the aging B-52 fleet: the Air Force B-1 manned, penetrating bomber and the Brookings Institution cruise missile armed, wide-body, stand-off bomber.²¹ Which of the two will eventually be adopted and procured as the B-52 follow-on is not clear at this writing. Nevertheless, the final decision should be based on considerations involving basic survivability, which must be seen both in terms of escaping from a base under attack and in terms of successfully penetrating to the target.

Regarding the former consideration, two factors become relevant: (1) In a "worst possible case" scenario, eight minutes of vacillation by the national command authorities in the face of a dedicated attack by depressed trajectory SS-N-8 missiles could lead to the complete loss of any bomber force. Conclusion: Any bomber force is vulnerable even to small human error. No bomber force possesses a sufficiently high level of survivability to be entrusted with the whole of the nation's strategic defense.²² (2) In "worst plausible case" scenarios, crisis preparations combined with the anticipated timely decision-making at the national level will be able to invalidate any foreseeable enemy attack aimed at preempting the bombers on their runways. Conclusion: In most plausible crises, the manned bomber is a valid system and remains a vital portion of the strategic Triad.

This conclusion is most readily grasped by examining a typical crisis. Whatever the origin (possibly involving Europe), the administration would have adequate warning of the impending collision, would be eager to control the level of tension, but at the same time would find it advantageous to optimize its force level should negotiations collapse. From the standpoint of the manned bomber, this state could be most readily achieved by deploying the available number of bombers at sparsely inhabited points where a preemptive strike could not reach them prior to their successful escape. Though it should be observed that at present the Soviets have not developed depressed trajectory capability for their modern naval missiles (SS-N-6 and SS-N-8), they have tested it on the enormous land-based SS-9 system. Inasmuch as the next generation of bombers is expected to have a life-cycle span of thirty years, the possibility that this "within the state-of-the-art" concept may be deployed is difficult to ignore.²³ Were it to be deployed, its impact may be illustrated by observing that the total escape time for B-1 is approximately 240 seconds. The Brookings wide-body cannot perform the same mission profile in less than 330 seconds and is only able to perform it that well if rocket-assisted takeoff is provided. In addition, B-1 is smaller and hence is able to take off more swiftly than the wide-body, one every 7.5 seconds as opposed to one every 15 seconds. Finally, B-1 is able to operate from short (7500 foot) runways, as contrasted to the approximately 10,500 foot runways needed for the wide-body. The result of this phenomenon is that only Rapid City, South Dakota, has the right combination of runway length and distance from the sea to enable the wide-body to escape attack from dedicated SLBMs. In contraposition, the four largest municipal airports in the state of Wyoming themselves possess a notional capability to launch 49 percent of the proposed B-1 crisis force of 210 in the face of the same assault. Conclusion: Of a total force procurement of 244, generating a crisis alert force of 210, B-1 produces 210 survivors operating either from existing airstrips or easily modified airstrips, the wide-body fewer than ten.²⁴

In light of this harsh reality, a force of wide-bodies would have one of two choices: either to risk preemptive destruction or proceed to airborne alert. The latter move would preserve that portion of the force so deployed, but the gambit has its drawbacks. Primary among these is that it requires a very large force on the ground to sustain a very small force in the air. It is estimated that in the early 1960s the United States possessed a capability to sustain 12.5 percent of the then existing bomber force in the air for a period of one year. For crises of shorter duration improved percentages should be possible, but the implications are obvious. ²⁵

A second problem encountered in scenarios involving airborne alert touches on the delicate question of crisis management. While in some situations it might be deemed desirable to place bombers on airborne alert to signal resolve, in others it might not. It should be understood in advance that placing bombers on airborne alert has ominous escalatory overtones. Even a quick deployment to deep interior bases, away from vulnerable coasts, would not have the same impact. Conclusion: Airborne alert is not necessarily a desirable state.

Provided the bombers survive attempts aimed at preemptive destruction, they must then possess the capability to penetrate to their targets. Twenty years ago Albert Wohlstetter estimated that on a typical mission an individual bomber possessed between 0.5 – 0.9 chance of survivability, depending on the state of the defense and the skill and execution of the offense. Under present conditions, analysis would indicate that the wide-body is near the lower end of that profile, while the B-1 is at the upper end.²⁶

The wide-body, presumed to be in the 747 class, is vulnerable to a wide range of criticisms. Among them is the fact that the 1500 nautical-mile-range cruise missile that the Brookings experts proposed as the irreducible minimum does not exist. Proposed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) have notional ranges of between 1000-1200 nautical miles. And while a longer-range ALCM could be developed from the Navy's sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) program, to achieve 1500 nautical miles in the airborne mode would entail additional expenditure.²⁷

Of more significance, the aircraft and its missile (whatever the range) are vulnerable to enemy air defense. The Soviet Union has the world's largest and most modern air defense system. It currently lists in its inventory 5000 air surveillance radars, over 2500 interceptors, and some 12,000 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers. It is constantly being upgraded. This air defense would have a wide range of options to deploy against the handful of surviving lumbering wide-bodies that could be maintained on airborne alert. ²⁸

First, the Soviets could attack them at extreme range with a combination of airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and transports (possibly of the Il-76 class) armed with air-to-air missiles. The proportion that this problem is apt to assume may be best illustrated by observing that analysis indicates that even the current primitive Soviet AWACS (NATO code-named Moss) works acceptably over water, the very medium above which the wide-body would be expected to launch its ALCMs. Future AWACS should be far more effective, especially when they are combined with the high-altitude profile the lumbering wide-body would be flying and its vast radar cross section.²⁹

Second, in regions where the wide-body would have to approach nearer to the coast to attack its targets, less costly and sophisticated measures should suffice. Current or projected interceptors supported by AWACS and, in some instances, by in-flight refueling should be able to exact a considerable toll among the lumbering wide-bodies. It is possible that the mortality rate would approach the 50 percent mark. ³⁰

Third, in addition to the bomber, the ALCM itself may be attacked. It is not often noted, but all projected cruise missiles fly a portion of their profile at very high altitudes (as much as 45,000 feet). At such heights, even primitive interceptors with standard air-to-air weapons should be lethal. Of perhaps more importance, during the next 30 years interceptors equipped with look-down-shoot-down systems should be developed and deployed. Brookings experts estimate that 600 such interceptors, each equipped with six missiles capable of a 50 percent intercept/reliability, could inflict up to 1000 kills on a notional cruise missile force.³¹

Fourth, sophisticated terminal air defenses should be able to engage and kill several hundred more slow-moving, subsonic cruise missiles. The effectiveness of these defenses hinges largely on the number of sites to be defended, the number of rounds each launcher is able to fire at an approaching ALCM concentration, and, most significant, how many sites are able to be avoided by skillfully preplanning ALCM flight patterns. Taking these factors into consideration, one conservative estimate yields approximately 300 additional kills. ³²

Finally, it would appear that the wide-body / cruise missile system is a vulnerable weapon. It would also appear that the Brookings experts were cognizant of this. To overcome the weaknesses inherent in the wide-body system, they proposed that a path for the ALCMs be cleared through the terminal defenses with air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBMs). This system does not exist in any form today, and the expense of developing it might be exorbitant.³³ Conclusion: Without ALBM support the wide-body system is highly vulnerable and, in addition, is subject to the earlier elaborated caveats concerning the difficulty of attacking dispersed populations with low fallout producing explosives (ALCM warhead = 250 KT). ³⁴

The strategic picture involving B-1 is different. B-1 combines a relatively small radar cross section with an electronic countermeasures suite that will prove difficult for many enemy sensors to penetrate. The aircraft is capable of near sonic speed at heights as low as 200 feet above the ground. This renders tail chase by any foreseeable interceptor highly implausible. Should the enemy improve his sensors or electronic counter-countermeasures, B-1 has room to grow and will be fully capable of accepting advanced systems such as the short-range ballistic defense missile (SRBDM) and the advanced strategic air-launched missile (ASALM). The former would be used to protect the bomber from air-to-air missiles; the latter will be capable of nuclear engagement against air or land-based targets and will combine SRAM speed (Mach 2.5 – 3.0) with ALCM range (650 NM). If their deployment becomes necessary, they should provide an acceptable answer to an advanced Soviet AWACS and look-down-shoot-down interceptors.³⁵

Above all B-1 will penetrate to the target with its weapon mix of SRAMs (as many as 24), or gravity bombs, or ALCMs, or SRBDMs, or ASALMs, providing unrivaled flexibility of payload, extraordinary accuracy of delivery, and even some immediate reconnaissance of the target area. The fact that this system is manned optimizes system survivability by providing the maximum number of options for defense suppression, ranging from jamming, to avoidance, to destruction. Unlike the ALCM it will not be bound to a set, slow-moving flight profile devoid of alternatives.

The lethality of the system is best gauged by observing the performance of the aircraft under conditions depicting "the worst plausible case." This scenario envisions the national command authorities' failing to disperse exposed aircraft to secure inland sites. Thus, only those bombers deep based at Minot and Grand Forks, North Dakota, and at Rapid City would survive preemption. If Rapid City were outfitted with a double squadron wing, some 34 B-1s could escape a dedicated attack by depressed trajectory SLBMs with a notional capability to travel 1100 NM in 445 seconds and have operational access to Hudson Bay.³⁶

The amount of firepower deliverable by such a force in a single strike would vary with the payload carried. But if 0.9 of those able to escape preemption proved to be mechanically reliable and 0.85 survived enemy defenses (as the USAF has hypothesized), then 26 B-1s should reach their goals armed with as many as 24 SRAMs per bomber (if each proved to have a 0.9 reliability that would equal almost 600 weapons delivered on target) or a far smaller number of heavy gravity bombs.³⁷

Under similar conditions, a mere six wide-bodies would escape from their only safe haven, Rapid City. And it is questionable that any weapons would be delivered on target by this handful of survivors if the rest of the equation included: 0.9 mechanical reliability, 0.5 survivability, and serious degradation to the 50 ALCMs (0.9 reliability) embarked aboard each aircraft from both interceptors and terminal defenses.

IN THE period of the late 1980s the concept of the strategic Triad may be discarded, and revolutionary strategies may develop, However, until such plans are reasonably formulated, the classical model will necessarily have to be followed. If it is, and if it is decided that a high-volume, high-accuracy payload is a desirable feature for the strategic forces of the United States, then there would appear to be little cost-effective alternative to the B-1 bomber system.

New Rochelle, New York

Notes

1. Francis P. Hoeber, "The B-1: A National Imperative," Strategic Review (Summer 1976), pp. 111-17, John W. Finney, "Who Needs the B-1?" New York Times Magazine (July 25, 1976), p. 7.

2. U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services, Part 1 Authorizations, 94th Cong.," 1st sess., February 5, 1975, p. 50.

3. Geoffrey Kemp, "Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers: Part 1; Targets and Weapons Systems," Adelphi Papers, No. 106 (Autumn 1974), p. 26.

4. Ian Bellany, "The Essential Arithmetic of Deterrence," The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (March 1973), pp. 28-34.

5. Thomas J. Downey, "How to Avoid Monad--and Disaster," Foreign Policy (Fall 1976), pp. 172-201.

6. Editorial, "The Erosion of the U.S. Deterrent: The Real Intelligence Crisis," Strategic Review (Summer 1976), pp. 4-5; John W. Finney, "Stronger U.S. Civil Defense Effort Urged by an Industrial Study Group," New York Times (November 18, 1976), p. 16; "Intensified Soviet Civil Defense Seen Tilting Strategic Balance," Aviation Week & Space Technology (November 22, 1976), p. 17, "Strategic Defensive Systems Emphasized," Aviation Week & Space Technology (September 20, 1976), p. 49.

7. Robert J. Carlin, "A 400 Megaton Misunderstanding," Military Review (November 1974), pp. 3-12.

8. Arthur A. Broyles and Eugene P. Wigner, "The Case For Civil Defence," Survival (September/October 1976), pp. 217-20.

9. Kemp, p. 5, P. J. McGeelan and D. C. Twitchett, editors, The Times Atlas of China (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1974), p. xvi; Alan Golenpaul, editor, Information Please Almanac Atlas and Yearbook (New York: Dan Golenpaul Associates, 1975), p. 708.

10. For Currie statement see U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services, Part 6 Research and Development, 94th Cong., 1st sess., March 7, 11, 17, 19, 21, and April 25, 1975, p. 2828. Clarence A, Robinson, Jr." "New Propellant for Trident Second Stage," Aviation Week & Space Technology (October 13, 1975), pp. 15-19, Bellany, loc. cit.; "Study Finds Joint MX/Trident Impractical," Aviation Week &-Space Technology (October 13, 1975), p. 17. Downey, loc. cit.; All SSKP calculations were done with a General Electric Missile Effectiveness Calculator.

11. Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper Brothers, 1957), p. 74.

12. U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services, Part 1 Authorizations, 94th Cong., 1st sess., February 5, 1975, p. 74.

13. Lynn Etheridge Davis and Warner R. Schilling, "All You Ever Wanted To Know about MIRV and ICBM Calculations But Were Not Cleared To Ask," The Journal of Conflict Resolution (June 1973), pp. 207-42; John W. Finney, "Soviet Deploying 2 New Missiles," New York Times (January 15, 1975), p. 1; Paul H. Nitze, "Assuring Strategic Stability In an Era of Détente," Foreign Affairs (January 1976), pp. 207-32; Thomas A. Brown, "Missile Accuracy and Strategic Lethality," Survival (March/April 1976), pp. 52-59.

14. General William J. Evans, "The Impact of Technology on U.S. Deterrent Forces," Strategic Review (Summer 1976), pp, 40-47, "B-1 Bomber Crux of SAC Plans," Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 10, 1976), pp. 39-45.

15. Nitze, loc. cit.; "B-1 Bomber Crux of SAC Plans," loc. cit.; "Study Finds Joint MX/Trident Impractical," loc. cit.

16. U.S., Congress, Senate, Subcommittee On Arms Control, International Law And Organization Of The Committee On Foreign Relations, U.S.-USSR Strategic Policies, 93rd Cong.; 2d sess; March 4, 1974, p. 19; U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services United States Senate, Part 6 Research and Development, 94th Cong., 1st sess., March 7, 11, 17, 19, 21, & 25, 1975, pp. 2804-5.

17. "Weapon Advances Raise B-52 Capability," Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 10, 1976), pp. 132-35, The Military Balance 1972-1973 (London: International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1972), pp. 66-67, 85-86; Jane's All the World's Aircraft 1975-76 (London: St. Giles House, 1975), Kemp, p. 6; Bellany, loc. cit.

18. U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services, Part 7 Research and Development, 93rd Cong., 2d sess.," April 4, 5, 12, 16, 23, 25, 26, and May 2, 1974, pp. 35-39; U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services, Part 4 Research and Development 94th Cong., 1st sess., March 4 and April 5, 1975, p. 2122.

19. Geoffrey Kemp, "Nuclear Forces for Medium Powers: Parts 2 and 3: Strategic Requirements and Options," Adelphi Papers, No. 107 (Autumn 1974), p. 19; Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Minuteman Production Defended," Aviation Week & Space Technology (January 19, 1976), pp. 12-15.

20. "B-52 Lifetime Extension Effort Pushed," Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 10, 1976), pp. 140-42; "Policies Altered to Stretch Funds," Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 10,1976), p. 151; "SAC Tests Consolidation of Maintenance," Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 10, 1976), pp. 152-53.

21. Some critics have suggested that the B-52 might be replaced by a stretched FB-111 or an improved version of the B-52 itself. At this writing neither suggestion has attracted much bipartisan support.

22. Alton H. Quanbeck and Archie L. Wood, Modernizing the Strategic Bomber Force (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1976), p. 44.

23. Janes Weapons Systems 1973-1974 (London: St. Giles House, 1973).

24. Low Altitude Instrumental Approach Procedures, Volumes 1-9 (St. Louis: The Defense Mapping Agency Aerospace Center, 1976); Quanbeck and Wood, pp. 47, 52, 109; U.S., Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services, Part 7 Research and Development 93rd Cong., 2d sess., April 4, 5, 16, 23, 25, 26, and May 2,1974, pp. 3873-78; Jane’s All the Worlds Aircraft 1975-76, loc. cit, Craig Covault, "FB-111's Effectiveness Increased," Aviation Week & Space Technology (May 10, 1976), pp. 103-13.

25. Quanbeck and Wood, p. 23.

26. A. J. Wohlstetter, F. S. Hoffman, R.J. Lutz, and H. S. Rowen, Selection and Use of Strategic Air Bases (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1954), p. 20.

27. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Strategic Programs Scrutinized," Aviation Week & Space Technology (March 31, 1975), pp. 12-13; Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Tentative SALT Decision Made," Aviation Week & Space Technology (February 16, 1976), pp. 12-14.

28. The Military Balance 1975-1976 (London: International Institute For Strategic Studies, 1975), p. 8.

29. Senate, Armed Services Committee, February 5, 1975, p. 224.

30. Hoeber, loc. cit.

31. Quanbeck and Wood, p. 73; Robinson, Aviation Week & Space Technology (March 31, 1975), loc. cit.

32. The equation is: Total surface-to-air missile launchers: 800, Shots per launcher at ALCM concentration: 1, Percentage of launchers successfully effecting engagement with ALCM concentration: 0.46, Overall reliability of surface-to-air missiles: 0.81, Kills: 300.

33. Donald E. Fink, "Minuteman Experiences Aiding MX," Aviation Week & Space Technology (July 19, 1976), pp. 113-20.

34. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Tomahawk Clears Crucial Test," Aviation Week &: Space Technology (November 22, 1976), pp. 14-16.

35. U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before The Committee On Armed Services, Part 4 Research and Development, 94th Cong., 1st sess., February 25, 27, March 4 and 5, 1975, p. 1995.

36. Low Altitude Instrumental Approach Procedures, loc. cit.; Quanbeck and Wood, pp. 44-48.

37. Woblstetter, pp. 94-95; Quanbeck and Wood, p. 65.