TOP SECRET
WE UNDERSTAND THAT ONE OF YOUR MAJOR INTERESTS IS CENTERED IN THE NORAD VIEW OF PROSPECTIVE REQUIREMENTS FOR BOMBER DEFENSE THROUGH 1975. HENCE, THIS BRIEFING IS INTENDED TO NARROW THE BROAD PERSPECTIVE OF THE OVERALL SOVIET THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA TO A SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE AIR-BREATHING PORTION.
GENTLEMEN. FROM THE MANY PREVIOUS STUDIES YOU HAVE MADE AND BRIEFINGS YOU HAVE RECEIVED, YOU ARE WELL ACQUAINTED WITH THE BASIC NATURE OF THE THREAT POSED BY SOVIET LONG RANGE AVIATION (SLRA) AND THE VARIOUS ESTIMATES OF THE MAGNITUDE OF THIS THREAT, AS WELL AS THE SPECIFIC AREAS IN WHICH THERE ARE SOME DIFFERENCES OF OPINION.
TODAY, I WOULD LIKE TO BRIEFLY REVIEW THIS THREAT, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE NORAD VIEW, AND GIVE YOU SOME OF THE METHODOLOGY EMPLOYED IN THE EXTENSIVE STUDIES CONDUCTED HERE AT NORAD, WHICH ARE THE FOUNDATIONS OF OUR ESTIMATES.
FIRST, I WOULD LIKE TO REVIEW THE CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE OF LRA AND HIGHLIGHT ACTUAL FORCE LEVELS OVER THE PAST TEN YEARS AS COMPARED TO ESTIMATES OF THIS FORCE AS SET FORTH IN AGREED CANADIAN-U.S. INTELLIGENCE (CANUS), NIE, NIPP, AND JIEP.
AS YOU KNOW, THESE ESTIMATES HAVE CONSISTENTLY REFLECTED THE PROJECTED STRENGTH OF THE HEAVY BOMBER FORCE AT SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER LEVELS THAN ACTUALLY CAME TO PASS. [1] THIS CHART DRAMATICALLY DEMONSTRATES THIS FACT; THE FORCE HAS, IN REALITY, REMAINED RELATIVELY STABLE OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS WITH THE ONLY REDUCTION BEING THE RETIREMENT OF A FEW AGING BISON SINCE 1967.
FOR THE MEDIUM BOMBERS, WE SEE AN ALMOST STEADY, BUT GRADUAL, DECLINE IN THE NUMBER OF BADGERS IN LRA, AND A STEADY, BUT GRADUAL, INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF BLINDERS WHICH ARE STILL BEING PRODUCED AT THE RATE OF THREE TO FOUR PER MONTH.
IT SHOULD BE POINTED OUT, HOWEVER, THAT THE DECLINE IN THE BADGER FORCE DOES NOT REPRESENT RETIREMENT OR ATTRITION OF THESE AIRCRAFT IN THE NUMBERS INDICATED, BUT REASSIGNMENT OF MOST OF THESE TO CONTINUED SERVICE IN THE NAVAL FORCES. [3]
AGREED NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES OVER THE YEARS HAVE CONSISTENTLY PREDICTED A MORE RAPID DECLINE IN THE BADGER FORCE OF LRA THAN HAS ACTUALLY TAKEN PLACE. [4]
THESE DIFFERENCES ARE OF VITAL CONCERN BECAUSE THEY HAVE AN IMPORTANT BEARING ON THE SIZE AND DISPOSITION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN DEFENSIVE FORCES, THE CREDIBILITY OF WHICH IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THE DETERRENT. IN OTHER WORDS, IT IS OUR VIEW THAT, IF THE AIR DEFENSE FORCES OF NORTH AMERICA CONTINUE TO BE REDUCED OR PHASED DOWN OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL YEARS AS A RESULT OF A DECREASING BOMBER THREAT POSTULATION BY THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, THE NET EFFECT WOULD BE THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THESE DEGRADED DEFENSES IN EMPLOYING THE TESTED AND DEPENDABLE MANNED BOMBER AS A SIGNIFICANT PART OF ANY PROJECTED STRATEGIC ATTACK AGAINST NORTH AMERICA.
THE THREAT POSED BY LRA HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN VARYING TERMS OF MAGNITUDE EACH YEAR. THE ESTIMATE OF THE THREAT POSED BY THE HEAVY BOMBER FORCE, IN GENERAL TERMS, HAS REMAINED RELATIVELY CONSTANT – THAT ALL OF THE HEAVY BOMBERS WOULD BE EMPLOYED AGAINST NORTH AMERICA. [5]
UNDER THIS CONCEPT, ONLY THE MAGNITUDE OF THE ATTACKING FORCE WOULD VARY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ESTIMATED FORCE LEVEL FOR ANY GIVEN TIME PERIOD. THESE HEAVY BOMBERS ARE CAPABLE OF ATTACKING TARGETS THROUGHOUT THE U.S. AND CANADA ON ROUND-TRIP MISSIONS [6], AND ALL INDICATIONS SUPPORT THE GENERALLY ACCEPTED CONTENTION THAT THEY WOULD BE EMPLOYED TO THE MAXIMUM. NORAD CONCURS IN THIS CONTENTION AND IT IS OUR ESTIMATE THAT PRESENT FORCE LEVELS WOULD ENABLE ABOUT 135 HEAVY BOMBERS TO REACH NORTH AMERICA.
THE ROLE OF THE MEDIUM BOMBER FORCE, HOWEVER, IS NOT SO READILY ACCEPTED THROUGHOUT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IN 1962, CANUS CONTAINED THE FIRST OF A SERIES OF ESTIMATES INDICATING A DECLINING MEDIUM BOMBER THREAT. THESE ESTIMATES, AMPLIFIED BY THE NIE AND THE NIPP, WERE BASED UPON THE CONTENTION THAT THE MEDIUM BOMBER FORCE WOULD BE PHASED OUT IN FAVOR OF AN INCREASING ICBM INVENTORY AND ON CERTAIN OBSERVED TRENDS IN TRAINING AND EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS, AND CONCLUDED THAT THE USE OF THE MEDIUM BOMBERS ON ONE-WAY MISSIONS WAS MOST UNLIKELY. [7]
NORAD DOES NOT CONCUR IN THIS CONTENTION.
WE HAVE EXAMINED THIS RATIONALE IN GREAT DETAIL OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS, UTILIZING ALL AVAILABLE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, IN AN EFFORT TO DETERMINE WHAT SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES MIGHT BE AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE METHOD OF ACCOMPLISHING THESE OBJECTIVES WITH AVAILABLE WEAPON SYSTEMS. [8]
IN OUR STUDIES, WE FIRST DETERMINED THE OVERALL SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND THEN IDENTIFIED TARGETS, WORLDWIDE, WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE DESTROYED OR DAMAGED TO ATTAIN THESE OBJECTIVES. AFTER THIS HAD BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, WE APPLIED NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS BEST SUITED TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION.
IN OTHER WORDS, OUR STUDIES HAVE DEALT WITH THE PROBLEM OF DETERMINING HOW THE SOVIETS CAN MOST EFFECTIVELY USE THEIR WEAPON SYSTEMS IN AN ALL-OUT, WORLDWIDE, INTEGRATED NUCLEAR ATTACK.
OUR FIRST EFFORT WAS COMPLETED IN LATE 1967, USING CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS, AND TARGET SYSTEMS. HOWEVER, IT WAS READILY RECOGNIZED WITHIN THE STAFF THAT STUDIES SUCH AS THESE, IF EXTRAPOLATED TO THE FUTURE, COULD FORM AN EVEN MORE VALUABLE BASIS FOR THE NORAD AEROSPACE DEFENSE PLANNING FUNCTION.
ACCORDINGLY, DURING THE PAST TWO YEARS, THERE HAS BEEN A PRIORITY EFFORT WITHIN THE STAFF TO CONTINUE DEVELOPMENT OF THESE STUDIES BECAUSE OF THE RECOGNIZED VALUE OF EXAMINING POSSIBLE SOVIET ATTACK OPTIONS IN THE SIMULATED ENVIRONMENT OF A GLOBAL NUCLEAR EXCHANGE.
COMPUTER MODELS HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED TO ENABLE THESE STUDIES TO RESPOND MORE QUICKLY, ACCURATELY, AND COMPREHENSIVELY TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE NORAD STAFF. THESE PROJECTS ACCELERATE THE PRODUCTION AND EXPAND THE APPLICATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE STRIKE STUDIES.
THE PREPARATION OF THESE STUDIES IS BEING PRESENTED TO YOU IN SOME DETAIL BECAUSE THEY HAVE ENABLED THE INTELLIGENCE STAFF TO EXPRESS THE ENEMY THREAT IN SPECIFIC, RATHER THAN GENERAL, TERMS, AND BECAUSE THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH STRIKE PLANS IS SOMEWHAT UNIQUE IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THIS APPROACH ENABLES THE STAFF TO DEVELOP OBJECTIVE AND COMPREHENSIVE ATTACK PATTERNS BASED UPON A DETAILED STUDY OF EXPECTED SOVIET WARTIME TARGETING OBJECTIVES AND THE CONSEQUENT WEAPON SYSTEMS REQUIREMENTS.
I WOULD NOW LIKE TO PRESENT A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE SITUATIONS CONSIDERED AND RESULTS OBTAINED FROM TWO OF THESE STUDIES.
BOTH WAR PLANS CALL FOR SOVIET PREEMPTION OF HOSTILITIES – NOT BY DESIGN, BUT UPON THEIR CONVICTION THAT U.S./ALLIED INITIATION WAS IMMINENT.
IN THE FIRST CASE, SLBMS WERE TARGETED AGAINST SAC BASES AND AGAINST CERTAIN OTHER TIME-SENSITIVE MILITARY TARGETS. IN CONSONANCE WITH COMMON INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. THE MAJORITY OF THE SUBMARINE-LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES WERE EMPLOYED FOR FLEET INTERDICTION PURPOSES, WITH NOT MORE THAN 20 PERCENT OF THIS FORCE TARGETED AGAINST URBAN/INDUSTRIAL COMPLEXES.
SOVIET ICBMS – EXCEPT THE LOW-YIELD, HIGH-CEP SS-11 – WERE EMPLOYED AGAINST MINUTEMAN LAUNCH CONTROL CENTERS (LCC'S). ALTHOUGH THIS TARGETING PROCEDURE IS NOT PARTICULARLY REWARDING IN TERMS OF DAMAGE EXPECTANCY, IT IS FELT THAT THE SOVIETS COULD NOT AFFORT TO INITIATE HOSTILITIES WITHOUT ATTEMPTING TO REDUCE THE MINUTEMAN THREAT TO RUSSIAN TARGETS.
IN DEVELOPING THIS ATTACK PLAN, WE EMPLOYED THOSE WEAPONS WHICH THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES BELIEVE WOULD BE USED AGAINST NORTH AMERICA.
HEAVY BOMBERS WERE SCHEDULED FOR EMPLOYMENT AGAINST URBAN/INDUSTRIAL TARGETS AND OTHER NON-TIME-SENSITIVE INSTALLATIONS. THIS SLIDE SUMMARIZES THE TARGET LIST COMPOSITION, THE NUMBER OF TARGETS IN EACH CATEGORY, THE DESIRED DAMAGE, AND THE PERCENTAGE OF DAMAGE EXPECTED.
NOTE THAT AVERAGE DAMAGE LEVELS ACHIEVED WITHOUT THE MEDIUMS WERE SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THOSE DESIRED IN MOST TARGET CATEGORIES. THAT IS, DURING THE PERIOD COVERED BY THIS INITIAL STUDY, THE SOVIETS COULD NOT HAVE HOPED TO INFLICT THE DESIRED DAMAGE ON EVEN A MINIMIZED SET OF NORTH AMERICAN TARGETS BY USING ONLY THOSE WEAPONS PUT FORTH BY THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES. AS SHOWN IN THE LAST COLUMN ON THE SLIDE, THE DESIRED DAMAGE LEVELS COULD BE ACHIEVED THROUGH THE EMPLOYMENT OF MEDIUM BOMBER-DELIVERED WEAPONS.
ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET ICBM INVENTORY HAS EXPERIENCED SOME GROWTH SINCE THIS STUDY WAS COMPLETED, IT IS STILL APPARENT THAT THE MEDIUM BOMBER IS A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF A COORDINATED SOVIET ATTACK AGAINST THE NORAD-DEFENDED AREA.
THIS STUDY WAS PRESENTED TO CONAD AND COMPONENT COMMANDERS AND TO SENIOR MILITARY AND DOD PLANNERS FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION. AS A RESULT OF THE WIDESPREAD ACCEPTANCE OF THE METHODOLOGY AND ANALYTICAL PROCEDURES INVOLVED, WE HAVE SINCE CONSIDERED OTHER ATTACK OPTIONS WHICH THE SOVIETS MIGHT ELECT TO EMPLOY.
IN OUR ASSUMED ROLE AS SOVIET PLANNERS, WE HAVE ANALYZED THE WORLDWIDE BLUE TARGET SYSTEM TO EXPLOIT ANY WEAKNESSES OR VULNERABILITIES WHICH WERE FOUND TO EXIST AND WHICH THE SOVIETS COULD BE EXPECTED TO KNOW ABOUT.
AS A RESULT OF THIS INVESTIGATION, A STUDY WAS INITIATED TO EXAMINE THE FEASIBILITY OF SOVIET EMPLOYMENT OF A PINDOWN TACTIC.
IN SPITE OF THE UNCERTAINTIES INVOLVED IN THE USE OF SUCH A TACTIC BY THE SOVIETS, IT WAS CONSIDERED ATTRACTIVE IN THE SENSE OF INCREASING THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS OF SOVIET COUNTERFORCE STRIKES. THE NIE ACKNOWLEDGES PINDOW AS A TACTIC WHICH THE SOVIETS MIGHT EMPLOY.
THEREFORE, ANOTHER STUDY WAS DEVELOPED WHICH ENVISIONED A SOVIET PREEMPTIVE ATTACK UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES SIMILAR TO THE CASE JUST DISCUSSED, BUT THIS TIME INCLUDING THE USE OF SOVIET PINDOWN DETONATIONS OVER U.S. MISSILE FIELDS.
THE PINDOWN ENVIRONMENT IS MAINTAINED BY SOVIET ICBMS, AND SUCCESSFUL EXECUTION OF COUNTERFORCE STRIKES REQUIRES THAT U.S. MISSILES BE DESTROYED IN THEIR SILOS. THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH EMPLOYMENT OF ACCURATE, HIGH-YIELD ICBMS AS WELL AS GRAVITY WEAPONS DELIVERED BY PORTIONS OF THE SOVIET BOMBER FORCE.
AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP IN OUR ANALYSIS WAS TO DETERMINE THE THREAT TO THE SOVIET UNION.
ANY SOVIET ATTACK ON NORTH AMERICA WILL HAVE TO BE COMPLEMENTED, WE FEEL, BY A WORLDWIDE ATTACK ON THE FREE WORLD AND PROVISIONS FOR AN ATTACK AGAINST CHINA. THUS THE THREAT BECOMES THE WORLD OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC.
SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN THIS SITUATION WOULD BE AS SHOWN:
DESTROY ALLIED NUCLEAR STRIKE CAPABILITY
LIMIT DAMAGE TO THE USSR
DISRUPT THE ALLIED WAR EFFORT
ELIMINATE THE WESTERN WILL TO FIGHT
RETAIN THE INDUSTRIAL BASE OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE
ELIMINATE CHINA AS A POST-WAR RIVAL
WITH THE THREAT ESTABLISHED AND OBJECTIVES DEFINED, LET US NOW EXAMINE SOVIET REQUIREMENTS IN TERMS OF TARGETS NECESSARY TO COUNTER THE THREAT TO THE USSR AND ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES.
FOR EASE OF REFERENCE, WE HAVE DIVIDED THIS ATTACK INTO FOUR MAJOR THEATERS: EUROPE, COMMUNIST CHINA, SOUTHEAST ASIA/PACIFIC, AND NORTH AMERICA, INCLUDING THE CARIBBEAN AND PANAMA CANAL ZONE.
IN ASSIGNING TARGET PRIORITIES, THE TIME-SENSITIVE TARGETS ARE THOSE WHICH MUST BE HIT WITHIN THE FIRST HOUR. U.S. AIR DEFENSES ARE CONSIDERED TIME-SENSITIVE TO ENHANCE THE CAPABILITY OF SOVIET BOMBERS TO HIT THEIR ASSIGNED TARGETS.
THERE ARE ABOUT 625 EUROPEAN TARGETS AND 2275 WEAPONS AVAILABLE TO HIT THESE TARGETS, OR ABOUT FOUR WEAPONS PER TARGET. FURTHER ANALYSIS REVEALED THAT ONE OR, AT MOST, TWO WEAPONS WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ENSURE A SATISFACTORY PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE AGAINST THE LARGE MAJORITY OF THESE 625 TARGETS BECAUSE OF THEIR RELATIVE SOFTNESS.
MOST OF THE FORCES LISTED AT THE BOTTOM OF THIS SLIDE WOULD BE USED IN THEIR PRIMARY ROLES. FOR EXAMPLE, ONLY 23 PERCENT OF 2900 TACTICAL COMBAT AIRCRAFT STRENGTH WERE ASSIGNED STRATEGIC TARGETS. [9] THE REMAINDER WOULD BE USED FOR GROUND SUPPORT. IT IS APPARENT THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE CONSIDERABLY MORE WEAPONS IN EUROPE THAN ARE REQUIRED.
IN COMMUNIST CHINA, WE ALLOCATED ABOUT 640 WEAPONS TO SOME 300 TARGETS TO ENSURE THAT THE CHICOMS WOULD NOT BECOME A DOMINANT WORLD POWER AS THE RESULT OF A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR.
THIS RATIO OF ABOUT TWO WEAPONS PER TARGET IS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT AGAINST MOST OF THE RELATIVELY SOFT CHICOM TARGETS. WHETHER OR NOT THE SOVIETS INTEND TO STRIKE COMMUNIST CHINA IN AN INITIAL ATTACK, WEAPONS MUST BE RESERVED FOR THIS PURPOSE IN PLANNING.
IN THE SOUTHEAST ASIA/PACIFIC AREA, THERE ARE ABOUT 145 WEAPONS TO HIT 130 TARGETS. THESE WEAPONS CAN BE AUGMENTED EASILY, IF REQUIRED, FROM THOSE ALLOCATED TO CHINA, WHICH ARE MORE THAN SUFFICIENT. FOR PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY, AN ARBITRARY DIVISION WAS MADE BY A LINE THROUGH THE BERING STRAITS WEST OF ALASKA AND HAWAII. ALL TARGETS EAST OF THIS LINE WERE INCLUDED IN THE NORTH AMERICA LIST. THEREFORE, HAWAII WAS TARGETED WITH OTHER NORTH AMERICAN TARGETS.
IN NORTH AMERICA, THE FAVORABLE WEAPONS-TO-TARGET RATIO THAT EXISTS IN THE OTHER THREE THEATERS HAS BEEN REVERSED. THERE ARE 1910 TARGETS, INCLUDING APPROXIMATELY 1300 OF SUCH HARDNESS THAT THEY DEMAND STRIKES BY MULTIPLE HEAVY ICBMS OR AIRCRAFT FREE FALL BOMBS TO ACHIEVE A SATISFACTORY PROBABILITY OF DAMAGE. IN OTHER WORDS, WE HAVE ONLY 1550 WEAPONS TO DEAL WITH 1910 TARGETS, 1300 OF WHICH ARE HARD. [10]
YOU WILL NOTE THAT WE HAVE EMPLOYED ALL THE WEAPON SYSTEMS WHICH NATIONAL ESTIMATES POSE AS A THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA AND WE FIND A MARKED DEFICIENCY EXISTS IN THE SOVIET CAPABILITY TO ACHIEVE THEIR ESSENTIAL TARGETING OBJECTIVES. THERE REMAINS IN THE SOVIET INVENTORY A WEAPON SYSTEM CAPABLE OF FILLING THIS GAP. NORAD BELIEVES THIS REMAINING SYSTEM, THE MEDIUM BOMBER FORCE, WILL BE UTILIZED ON RANGE MISSIONS AGAINST NORTH AMERICA.
HERE, THEN, IS WHAT WE CONSIDER TO BE ONE OF THE MOST ATTRACTIVE AND FEASIBLE OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO SOVIET PLANNERS.
AS YOU KNOW, THE USE OF THE MEDIUM BOMBERS REQUIRES STAGING FROM THE ARCTIC AND WE FEEL THAT OUR PROJECTED LEVEL OF STAGING WOULD NOT BE OF SUCH MAGNITUDE AS TO AROUSE UNDUE SUSPICION OF AN IMPENDING ATTACK, BUT ONE THAT COULD BE REASONABLY EXPLAINED AS A SEASONAL TRAINING EFFORT WHILE STILL INVOLVING THE EMPLOYMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE MEDIUM BOMBER FORCE. [11] [12]
SUCH A MEDIUM BOMBER FORCE IS LIKELY TO INVOLVE APPROXIMATELY 125 MEDIUM BOMBERS IN THE CHUKOTSKI PENINSULA AREA AND 40 MEDIUMS, PLUS ALL AVAILABLE MEDIUM BOMBER TANKERS, IN THE KOLA PENINSULA AREA. [13] [14]
THE EMPLOYMENT OF THIS MEDIUM BOMBER FORCE WOULD INVOLVE THE PROGRAMMED DESTRUCTION OF ALASKAN DEFENSES BY BLINDER AIRCRAFT OUT OF MAGADAN AND THE SUBSEQUENT OVERFLIGHT OF ALASKA WITH THE REMAINING MEDIUM BOMBERS. [15] THE MEDIUMS FROM TIKSI WOULD BE EMPLOYED AGAINST TARGETS IN CANADA AND THE EXTREME NORTHWEST PORTION OF THE U.S. THE MEDIUMS FROM CHUTKOTSKI PENINSULA WOULD ATTACK THE ICEM FIELDS SHOWN ON THIS MAP AND U.S. TARGETS AS FAR SOUTH AS THE MIDWESTERN U.S. MEDIUMS FROM THE KOLA PENINSULA AREA, ONCE REFUELED IN FLIGHT, COULD ATTACK TARGETS AS FAR SOUTH AS THE NORTH ATLANTIC STATES IN THE EASTERN SECTION OF THE U.S. [16]
THESE MEDIUM BOMBERS STILL RETAIN SUFFICIENT FUEL TO ALLOW RECOVERY IN ISOLATED AREAS IN CANADA. THIS FORCE WOULD PROVIDE, AFTER NONCOMBAT DEGRADATION, 135 HEAVIES AND 140 MEDIUMS FOR A TOTAL OF 275 AIRCRAFT OVER NORTH AMERICA.
HOWEVER, IF THE SOVIETS FEEL A REQUIREMENT FOR MORE BOMBERS TO ATTACK ADDITIONAL TARGETS IN NORTH AMERICA, THEY COULD STAGE OVER 200 IN THE CHUNOTSKI PENINSULA AREA AND ATTACK THESE EXTRA TARGETS (POINT TO MAP) ON RANGE MISSIONS – THAT IS, TO FUEL EXHAUSTION. (17)
THIS FORCE, AFTER NONCOMBAT DEGRADATION, WOULD PLACE ABOUT 375 AIRCRAFT OVER NORTH AMERICA.
WE FEEL THIS OPTION IS LESS ATTRACTIVE, SINCE THE SOVIETS MUST ASSUME THAT MASSIVE STAGING WOULD BE DETECTED AND PROBABLY ELICIT DEFENSIVE REACTION BY U.S. AIR DEFENSE FORCES, AND IN VIEW OF THE OBVIOUS THREAT, MIGHT EVEN CAUSE THE U.S. TO INITIATE A PREEMPTIVE ATTACK.
IN GENERAL, THE NUMBERS OF MEDIUM BOMBERS WHICH POSE A THREAT TO NORTH AMERICA ARE GREATLY DEPENDENT UPON THE TIME AND SITUATION UNDER WHICH HOSTILITIES MIGHT COMMENCE – AND WILL VARY ACCORDINGLY.
AS A PARTIAL SUMMATION, WE AT NORAD HAVE EXAMINED A BROAD SPECTRUM OF OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO THE SOVIETS IN AN INITIAL ATTACK AGAINST NORTH AMERICA, AND HAVE PRESENTED TO YOU ONE OF THE MOST LIKELY OPTIONS, USING TWO FORCE LEVELS, UNDER WHICH A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE MIGHT COMMENCE AND THE MANNER IN WHICH THE SOVIETS MIGHT WELL EMPLOY THEIR FORCES.
EXERCISING ANY FIRST-STRIKE OPTION, THE SOVIETS WOULD, OF NECESSITY, HAVE AS A PRIMARY OBJECTIVE THE DESTRUCTION OR NEGATION OF THE U.S. RETALIATORY FORCES. BASED ON THIS OBJECTIVE, SOVIET STRATEGIC STRIKE CAPABILITIES, AND THE FACT THAT THERE IS NO APPARENT REQUIREMENT FOR THE RATHER LARGE MEDIUM BOMBER FORCE IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, [18] WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD EMPLOY A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF MEDIUM FORCES AGAINST NORTH AMERICA ON RANGE MISSIONS.
WE ARE CURRENTLY PROJECTING OUR ANALYSES THROUGH THE 1972-1975 TIME PERIOD WHEN MOST INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES VISUALIZE A SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION IN SOVIET MANNED BOMBER FORCE LEVELS. ALTHOUGH WE CANNOT, OF COURSE, STATE WITH CERTAINTY WHAT THESE NUMBERS WILL BE, WE DO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL RETAIN A SIZEABLE PORTION OF THEIR PRESENT FORCE THROUGH THIS TIME PERIOD, AT LEAST UNTIL SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENTS ARE MADE IN ACCURACY AND RELIABILITY OF THE PRESENT MISSILE FORCE. WHILE THE NATIONAL ESTIMATES ENVISION A POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON MEDIUM BOMBER, THEY CONSIDER THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HEAVY FOLLOW-ON BOMBER UNLIKELY.
NORAD BELIEVES – EVEN MORE STRONGLY – NOW THAT THE TU-144 SUPERSONIC TRANSPORT HAS FLOWN, THERE IS A GOOD POSSIBILITY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL EXPLOIT THE TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES OF THIS AIRCRAFT TO DEVELOP AN INTERCONTINENTAL SUPERSONIC BOMBER DURING THE PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION.
WE BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIETS ALSO HAVE THE OPTION OF INTRODUCING AN IMPROVED BEAR WITH AN ADVANCED ASM. THIS WOULD LEND FURTHER CREDENCE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF SOVIET HEAVY BOMBER FORCES AT CURRENT LEVELS IN CONTRAST TO THE REDUCTIONS FORECAST BY THE NIE AND CANUS. THE MANNED BOMBER UNDOUBTEDLY REPRESENTS AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO SOVIET PLANNERS, WHO WOULD OTHERWISE BE FORCED TO RELY UPON SLBMS AND ICBMS – SYSTEMS WHOSE PERFORMANCE IS UNCERTAIN.
IN CONCLUSION:
WITHOUT THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE MEDIUM BOMBER, THE SOVIETS NOW HAVE, AND WILL HAVE FOR SOME TIME TO COME, A DEFICIT IN WEAPON SYSTEMS REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THEIR TARGETING OBJECTIVES IN AN ATTACK AGAINST NORTH AMERICA. [19]
A SUFFICIENCY OR OVERABUNDANCE OF WEAPONS EXISTS FOR USE IN ALL OTHER AREAS.
THE PROJECTED INCREASES IN ICEMS AND SLBMs WILL PARTIALLY ALLEVIATE THIS SHORTAGE PROVIDED THE SOVIETS INCORPORATE IMPROVED ACCURACIES IN PRESENT AND FUTURE SYSTEMS. HOWEVER, THE RELIABILITY OF THESE SYSTEMS, UNTESTED IN A WARTIME ENVIRONMENT, MUST BE OF CONCERN TO SOVIET PLANNERS. [20]
THE BOMBER FORCE IS A VIABLE AND CONTINUING SYSTEM. THERE IS NO APPARENT APPLICATION FOR THE LARGE NUMBER OF MEDIUMS STILL IN THE SOVIET INVENTORY OTHER THAN AGAINST NORTH AMERICA.
IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, NORAD BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD, OF NECESSITY, EMPLOY SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF THE MEDIUM BOMBER FORCE ON RANGE MISSIONS IN ANY FIRST STRIKE AGAINST NORTH AMERICA. [21]
IT IS CONSEQUENTLY A VITAL FUNCTION OF THIS COMMAND TO RETAIN SUFFICIENT AIR DEFENSE LEVELS THROUGH THIS PERIOD TO MAKE DEPENDENCE ON MANNED BOMBERS AN EXTREMELY COSTLY AND, THEREFORE, LESS DESIRABLE OPTION TO SOVIET STRATEGIC PLANNERS.