01352
1959/02/18

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
Office of the Chief of Staff
United States Air Force
WASHINGTON, D.C.

18 FEB 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF, USAF

SUBJECT: (U) Vulnerability of SAC Bombers in Early 1960's

1. On 12 February 1959, the Air Force Council considered a presentation by the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations on the above subject in response to questions submitted by Dr. Killian, Scientific Advisor to the President (TAB A).

2. The Council noted that:

a. Measures presently being taken to enhance our bomber force survival include ground alert, dispersal, and hardening of SAGE centers, selected SAC HQs, and HQ NORAD. Further, an airborne alert concept is presently being tested.

b. Study and development programs are being continued in an effort to increase the survivability of the bomber force. In addition, an overall study, expected to be completed within six months, will provide more definitive answers to questions concerning the manned bomber survival problem.

c. The bomber survival problem has been complicated by the advent of operational ICBM's.

d. Preliminary costs to provide emergency take-off strips and aircraft protective shelters capable of withstanding 200 PSI overpressures are estimated as follows:

(1) $103.8 million per B-52 Wing (30 bombers).

(2) $1.45 billion for the B-52 force of 14 wings (420 bombers).

e. Hardening was compared to alternate means of survival in terms of systems, their availability, effectiveness, limitations and estimated costs (TAB B).

Reproduction of this document in whole or in part is prohibited

3. The Council agreed that the proposed briefing, with minor modifications (TAB C), should be presented to Dr. Killian.

CURTIS E. LeMAY
General, U.S. Air Force
Chairman, Air Force Council

3 Incls

TAB A – Questions Submitted by Dr. Killian
TAB B – Comparison of Alternatives
TAB C – Recommended Mods, to Proposed Briefing

NOTED: FEB 18 1959

SIGNED

THOMAS D. WHITE
Chief of Staff
United States Air Force

AFC 8/2

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. KILLIAN

1. Does the Air Force believe in hardening SAC bombers?

a. If yes, what are the plans?

b. If no, why not? What are the alternatives?

2. What are the costs of hardening?

3. How do the costs of hardening compare with the costs of other methods of survival?

4. What are SAC's views of the operational problems which may be encountered in operating from a hardened configuration?

TAB A

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COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES

TAB B

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RECOMMENDED MODIFICATIONS TO PRESENTATION ON “VULNERABILITY OF SAC BOMBERS IN EARLY 1960”

1. Delete the phrase "microscopic dispersal" or explain it in concise and understandable language.

2. In referring to cost figures, emphasis should be placed on the tentative and preliminary nature of these estimates, rather than imply firm cost estimates.

3. It was suggested that Project CENTERLINE be substituted for Project LOW CARD when referring to study and Development Programs.

4. Emphasize the Alternatives to hardening that are available to increase bomber force survivability.

5. Make it clear that the Air Force has long studied the bomber survivability problem and has taken action consistent with established priorities.

6. Delete the term "low accuracies" or further explain it.

TAB C