TOP SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

JCSM-12-63
10 January 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Withdrawal of Italian and Turkish JUPITERs (S)

1. In connection with the decision to withdraw the JUPITERs from Europe, the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested CINCLANT, USCINCEUR. and the Director, Strategic Target Planning (DSTP) to provide their views and recommendations on the implications based on the assumption that the withdrawal would be completed by 1 April 1963. While events have outrun some of these comments, they are forwarded for your Information.

a. CINCLANT. It is feasible to deploy one, two, or three POLARIS submarines to the Mediterranean from Holy Loch commencing April 1963* with certain loss of operating efficiency. However, ships and missiles at sea are secure and the same in number as if all were deployed in the Norwegian Sea. Upon completion of overhaul of Proteus tender in December 1963, POLARIS operations in the Mediterranean could be supported from Rota. With appropriate targeting the 66 2/3 per cent operating efficiency which the submarines had achieved in the Norwegian Sea can be regained.

[* - The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that not more than one POLARIS submarine should be deployed to the Mediterranean by 1 April 1963.]

b. USCINCEUR

(1) In General Lemnitzer’s absence, General Norstad replied, pointing out the low damage expectancy (25 per cent) provided by present forces on Soviet MRBM/IRBMs, even under optimum conditions, and contrasting this target coverage with the high damage expectancy (80 per cent) to Soviet ICBMs. Thus it appears to contradict the statement made by US officials that the threat to NATO Europe is covered continuously and on the same priority as the threat to the United States.

(2) The impact of the loss of THORs combined with the JUPITERs would further degrade the target coverage. Hardening of Soviet missile sites adds to the criticality of this problem. The contemplated POLARIS substitution would have limited flexibility and capability depending on the weapon (A-1 or A-2) and number of submarines. It would be obvious to NATO that this is a subtraction from the over-all capability and merely a redistribution of the remaining force.

(3) In addition, he indicated that in light of the NATO channels and procedures used to make IRBMs available to SACEUR, consideration should be given to the authority or the propriety of the US taking unilateral action. If POLARIS submarines are used in lieu of JUPITERs, they should be placed under the operational control of SACEUR in the same manner as the JUPITERs, directly responsive to the requirements of SACEUR's Nuclear Strike Plan and provided with communications facilities essential to direct and effective SHAPE control.

(4) General Norstad summarized by stating he opposes the withdrawing of JUPITERs from Italy and Turkey until such time as this action can be taken without weakening our nuclear capability and destroying the useful psychological effect this program has had.

c. DSTP. Withdrawal of JUPITER missiles and movement of POLARIS submarines to the Mediterranean would result in reduced target coverage against certain prime targets, ranging from partial to complete loss of ballistic missile application on certain DGZs until major retargeting action is completed. No basic problems in targeting are anticipated as long as Free World missiles are targeted as an integrated package. However, to provide optimum and orderly targeting for all forces, JUPITER phase-out data and schedule of POLARIS submarine deployment to the Mediterranean should be provided DSTP at least 90 days prior to effective dates.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will conduct a detailed analysis of the comments and recommendations of the commanders concerned in order to determine the full impact of the targeting implications.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
/signed/
MAXWELL D. TAYLOR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff